1 current sec model to transcribe ADEM + AMAC to a more symmetric style

1.1 used primitives

- ADEM: input tag, key en message lead to a cythertext. It should be improbable distinguish the cythertexts of two messages. (adversary may choose two cyhtertexts and has to guess which one of the two is encrypted)
- AMAC: input tag, key en message lead to a cythertext. It should be improbable to make a forgery (a pair (key, tag, message, cythertext) that verifies without begin generated by calling Omac(key, tag, message) first)

1.2 goal

with

message m is encrypted using a tag that cannot repeat and two keys to generate a cythertext concisting of two parts. First part is Cdem which is the message encrypted with the nonce and the first key while the second part is Cmac that is the mac computed over Cdem, the tag and the second key.

1.3 Sec model

the security is purely based on the games for the AMAC and ADEM that are visible below.

```
Game N-MIOT-UF<sub>A,N</sub>
                                         Oracle Omac(j, t, m)
                                                                                       Oracle Ovrf(j, m, c)
oo forged \leftarrow 0
                                         or if C_j \neq \emptyset: return \perp
                                                                                      13 if C_i = \emptyset: return \bot
01 T \leftarrow \emptyset
                                         os if t \in T: return \perp
                                                                                      14 if (m,c) \in C_i: return \bot
02 for all j \in [1..N]:
                                         of T \leftarrow T \cup \{t\}; t_j \leftarrow t
                                                                                      15 if \mathsf{M.vrf}(K_j,t_j,m,c):
03 K_j \stackrel{\hspace{0.1em}\mathsf{\scriptscriptstyle\$}}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{K}
                                         10 c \leftarrow \mathsf{M.mac}(K_j, t_j, m)
                                                                                      forged \leftarrow 1
04 C_j \leftarrow \emptyset
                                                                                      17 return true
                                         11 C_j \leftarrow C_j \cup \{(m,c)\}
05 run A
                                         12 return c
                                                                                      18 return false
06 return forged
```

```
Game N-MIOT-IND_{A,N}^b
                                           Oracle Oenc(j, t, m_0, m_1)
                                                                                         Oracle Odec(i, c)
00 T \leftarrow \emptyset
                                          of if C_i \neq \emptyset: return \perp
                                                                                         12 if C_i = \emptyset: return \perp
of for all j \in [1 .. N]:
                                          07 if t \in T: return \perp
                                                                                         13 if c \in C_j: return \perp
02 K_j \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{K}
                                          08 T \leftarrow T \cup \{t\}; t_j \leftarrow t
                                                                                         14 m \leftarrow \mathsf{A.dec}(K_j, t_j, c)
     C_i \leftarrow \emptyset
                                          09 c \leftarrow \mathsf{A.enc}(K_j, t_j, m_b)
                                                                                         15 return m
                                          10 C_j \leftarrow C_j \cup \{c\}
04 b′ ← A
os return b'
                                           11 return c
```

```
\begin{array}{lll} \textbf{Proc A.enc}'(K,t,m) & \textbf{Proc A.dec}'(K,t,c) \\ \textbf{00} & (K_{\mathsf{dem}},K_{\mathsf{mac}}) \leftarrow K \\ \textbf{01} & c_{\mathsf{dem}} \leftarrow \texttt{A.enc}(K_{\mathsf{dem}},t,m) \\ \textbf{02} & c_{\mathsf{mac}} \leftarrow \texttt{M.mac}(K_{\mathsf{mac}},t,c_{\mathsf{dem}}) \\ \textbf{03} & c \leftarrow (c_{\mathsf{dem}},c_{\mathsf{mac}}) \\ \textbf{04} & \mathsf{return} & c \\ \end{array} \quad \begin{array}{ll} \textbf{Proc A.dec}'(K,t,c) \\ \textbf{05} & (K_{\mathsf{dem}},K_{\mathsf{mac}}) \leftarrow K \\ \textbf{06} & (c_{\mathsf{dem}},c_{\mathsf{mac}}) \leftarrow c \\ \textbf{07} & \mathsf{if M.vrf}(K_{\mathsf{mac}},t,c_{\mathsf{dem}},c_{\mathsf{mac}}) \\ \textbf{08} & m \leftarrow \texttt{A.dec}(K_{\mathsf{dem}},t,c_{\mathsf{dem}}) \\ \textbf{09} & \mathsf{return} & m \\ \textbf{10} & \mathsf{return} & L \\ \end{array}
```

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2 needed sec model to transcribe ADEM + AMAC to a more symmetric style

for now we only look at the nonce based options as the pkc paper does that too.

2.1 used primitives

- ADEM: input nonce, key en message lead to a cythertext which should be improbable to distinguishen from RO (adversary has to guess if he is talking to RO or ADEM)
- AMAC: input nonce, key en message lead to a tag that should be improbable to distinguishable from random oracle (adversary has to guess if he is talking to RO or AMAC)

2.2 goal

message m is encrypted and protected against active attacks because it is authenticated with tag T.

2.3 Sec model

We define the following sec games for the AMAC, the ADEM and the ADEM+AMAC (names will prob be improved later):

$$t \leftarrow g$$

Game $AMAC_{A,N}^b$	Oracle $Omac(j,n,m)$
$used_n \leftarrow \emptyset$	if $T_j \neq \emptyset$: return \perp
for $j \in [1N]$:	if $n \in used_n$: return \perp
$K_j \leftarrow^{\$} K$	$used_n \leftarrow used_n \cup \{n\}$
$T_j \leftarrow \emptyset$	$\mathbf{n}_j \leftarrow n$
$b' \leftarrow ^{\$} A$	if b=0: $t \leftarrow M.mac(K_j, n_j, m)$
return b'	if b=1: $t \leftarrow RO.mac(K_j, n_j, m)$
	$T_j \leftarrow T_j \cup \{t\}$
	return t

Table 1: AMAC game

Game $ADEM_{A,N}^b$	Oracle $Oenc(j,n,m)$
$used_n \leftarrow \emptyset$	if $C_i \neq \emptyset$: return \perp
for $j \in [1N]$:	if $n \in used_n$: return \perp
$K_j \leftarrow^{\$} K$	$used_n \leftarrow used_n \cup \{n\}$
$T_j \leftarrow \emptyset$	if b=0: $c \leftarrow E.enc(K_j,n,m)$
$b' \leftarrow ^{\$} A$	if b=1: $c \leftarrow RO.enc(K_j,n,m)$
return b'	$C_j \leftarrow C_j \cup \{c\}$
	return c

Table 2: ADEM game

```
Game ADEM_{A,N}^b
                                            Oracle Oenc(j,n,m)
                                                                                                 Oracle Odec(j,n,c)
used_n \leftarrow \emptyset
                                           if C_j \neq \emptyset: return \perp
                                                                                                 if (c,n) \in C_j: return \perp
for j \in [1..N]:
                                           if n \in used_n: return \perp
                                                                                                 if b = 0:
K_{j} \leftarrow^{\$} K
T_{j} \leftarrow \emptyset
b' \leftarrow^{\$} A
                                            used_n \leftarrow used_n \cup \{n\}
                                                                                                       m \leftarrow A.dec'(K_j, n, c)
                                           \mathbf{n}_j \leftarrow n
                                                                                                       return m
                                           if b=0:
                                                                                                 if b = 1:
return b'
                                                c \leftarrow E.enc'(K_j, n_j, m)
                                                                                                       m \leftarrow RO.dec'(K_j,n,c)
                                           if b=1:
                                                                                                       return m
                                                 c \leftarrow RO.enc'(K_j, n_j, m)
                                           C_j \leftarrow C_j \cup \{(c,n)\}
                                            return c
```

Table 3: ADEM + AMAC game

where E.enc, E.dec, M.mac , RO.enc, RO.dec and RO.mac are inherited from the underlying primitives and E.enc', E.dec', RO.enc' and RO.dec' will be defined later here defined.

3 burning questions

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4 current todo's

- $\bullet\,$ de games opnieuw formazilen naar de nieuwe vondsten
- dit naar git verplaatsen
- crypto.bib kijken

5 main idea

The PKC paper ends with a ADEM + AMAC construction as "solution". The original paper from ENC -; MAC has been revised, so this should prob be revised as well. In general its nice to write down thing in a more "sym crypto" style as we use symmetric primitives. It would probably also be nice to revise it more in general and see what other ways there are to reach the endgoal expected in the PKC paper.