NAME: _____

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Midterm 2

Answer the questions below on the scantron sheet provided to you. Make sure to circle in your answers well.

Chapter 4

1. According to Fearon, why are wars ex post inefficient?

   A) Because the outcome is worse than what could have been achieved through negotiations

   B) Because the winner does not necessarily deserve the spoils

   C) Because they involve transaction costs that could have been avoided by agreeing beforehand on whatever outcome war subsequently reveals

   D) Because the outcome does not necessarily reflect the most optimal division of resources

2. According to Fearon (1995), why do states fight wars even though wars are ex post inefficient?

   A) Asymmetric information.

   B) Commitment problems.

   C) Disputes over indivisible goods.

   D) One of the above has to be present for war to break out.

3. According to neorealism, what states are considered to be essential actors?

   A) States whose support is necessary for the dominant leader to remain in power.

   B) States whose assistance is necessary to counteract a threat from a rival coalition of states.

   C) States whose survival is essential for a system to remain multipolar.

   D) Strong states around which weaker states cluster.

4. According to neorealism, states seek to maximize their power _____.

   A) at every opportunity

   B) very rarely

   C) only if they are very weak

   D) only if this does not diminish their security

5. A bipolar system is a system that:

   A) Consists of two powerful states, with weaker states aligned to one of the powerful states.

   B) Consists only of two powerful empires.

   C) Consists of many powerful states, two of which are much more powerful than the others.

   D) None of the above is correct.

6. According to neorealism, a bipolar world is more stable than a multipolar world because:

   A) There are fewer disputes.

   B) There is less uncertainty.

   C) There are fewer commitment problems.

   D) b and c are correct.

7. The argument that bipolar systems are less uncertain than multipolar systems and are, therefore, more stable:

   A) Follows logically from the neorealist theory

   B) Does not follow from the neorealist assumptions

   C) Is supported by empirical evidence

   D) Is common to all structural theories of international relations

8. If we add to neorealism the assumption that certainty makes states more cautious, whereas uncertainty makes states more reckless, we:

   A) Contradict other assumptions and predictions of neorealism

   B) Fix the problem of the logical leap between the neorealist assumptions and predictions

   C) Make neorealism indistinguishable from the power transition theory

   D) Contradict empirical evidence that shows the opposite

9. A bipolar balance-of-power system will be stable only if power is distributed exactly equal between the two blocs.

   A) True

   B) False

10. Suppose there are five states: A, B, C, D, and E. The power is distributed in the following manner: A = 75, B = 74, C = 75, D = 74, and E = 2. This implies that:

    A) Multipolar systems are never stable, just as the bipolarity argument claims.

    B) Bipolar systems are more stable than multipolar only if power is distributed exactly equally.

    C) Bipolar systems are less stable than multipolar.

    D) A multipolar system can be stable, contrary to the neorealist claim.

11. The neorealist hypothesis that essential states always survive implies that:

   A) We should not have observed the collapse of the Soviet Union.

   B) We should not have observed Austro-Hungarys elimination.

   C) We should not have observed the U.S. becoming a superpower.

   D) a and b are correct.

12. Suppose state A has to decide whether to go to war against state B or to remain in the status quo. As utility from the status quo is 0.81. A has 100 units of power, and B has 20 units of power. As probability of winning is 0.8. As utility from winning is 1, and As utility from losing is 0. Suppose A chooses not to go to war and remains in the status quo. This implies that:

   A) A state that is relatively happy with the status quo might not attack even if it is much more powerful than the other state.

   B) A is irrational.

   C) A is risk-averse.

   D) States never put their security at risk.

Chapter 5

13. According to neorealism, uncertainty _____ the risk of instability.

   A) does not affect

   B) is caused by

   C) increases

   D) decreases

14. The seven assumptions included in the IIG serve the following purpose:

   A) They make the game more strategic

   B) They substantially reduce the possible pairs of preference orderings while still keep the game rich enough.

   C) They make the game more compatible with the neorealist assumptions.

   D) They allow us to test falsifiable hypotheses.

15. According to the IIG assumptions, the outcomes of acquiescence and capitulation are:

   A) Better than the outcome of war

   B) Worse than the outcome of the status quo

   C) Known only probabilistically

   D) Known with certainty

16. According to the IIG assumptions, each state prefers:

    A) to capitulate rather than negotiate

    B) to keep the status quo rather than go to war

    C) to negotiate rather than go to war

    D) to capitulate rather than acquiesce

17. According to the IIG assumptions, what is the difference between war and negotiations?

    A) Wars involve costs not involved in negotiations.

    B) Some states have a better chance of succeeding in negotiations than in war.

    C) In negotiations states always have to agree to a 50-50 split, while in war they can get all they want.

    D) Negotiations are always better than the status quo, and wars are always worse than the status quo.

18. According to the IIG assumptions, which of the following is true from the perspective of player A?

    A) Acqueiscence$_A$ > Status quo

    B) Acqueiscence$_B$ > Status quo

    C) War$_B$ > Capitulation$_B$

    D) War$_A$ > Negotations

19. In the domestic version of the IIG, if the conditions of the basic war theorem are met, but at least one of the leaders has a wrong perception of his rivals preferences, then the risk of war is reduced.

    A) True

    B) False

20. What is the fundamental difference between the domestic and the realpolitik versions of the IIG?

    A) For A: War$_A$ > Acq$_A$ is impossible in the realpolitik version, but is possible in the domestic version.

    B) For A: Capitulation$_A$ > War$_B$ is impossible in the realpolitik version, but is possible in the domestic version.

    C) For B: Capitulation$_A$ > Negotiation is impossible in the realpolitik version, but is possible in the domestic version.

    D) For B: War$_A$ > Acquiesence$_B$ is impossible in the realpolitik version, but is possible in the domestic version.

21. In both versions of the IIG (domestic and realpolitik), every states prefers to negotiate rather than be compelled to capitulate.

    A) True

    B) False

22. The domestic and the realpolitik versions of the IIG have different predictions when:

    A) The IIG conditions are not met.
    B) The IIG conditions are not met and there is uncertainty.
    C) The IIG conditions are met and there is no uncertainty.
    D) There is uncertainty.

23. According to the resurrection hypothesis, when leaders anticipate that they might be ousted in case of a military defeat:

    A) They fight harder.
    B) They capitulate.
    C) They propose negotiating a peaceful solution.
    D) They resign from office.

24. What is a "dove" in the context we discussed in class?

    A) A leader who prefers to acquiesce to demands of others
    B) A leader who prefers to capitulate if attacked
    C) A leader who prefers to negotiate with a rival rather than force him to capitulate
    D) A leader who does not believe in first-strike advantage

25. What is a "*pacific* dove" in the context we discussed in class?

    A) A leader who prefers to negotiate with a rival rather than force him to capitulate.
    B) A leader who prefers to capitulate if attacked rather than retaliate.
    C) A leader who always negotiates and acquiesces to the demands of others.
    D) a and b are correct.

26. A weak pacific dove is more likely to attack if:

    A) (S)he believes that the opponent is a hawk.
    B) (S)he believes that the opponent is a dove.
    C) (S)he believes that the opponent will fight back.
    D) (S)he believes that the opponent is fighting for resurrection.

27. Richardsons model of arms race is an example of the strategic approach.

    A) True
    B) False

28. If we observe that each side in a pair of rival states is arming in response to the arms decision of the other side, then the explanation is:

    A) They might be engaged in an arms race.

    B) The national defense establishments in both countries are trying to get more allocated to their budget.

    C) They might be producing more weapons to sell to other countries.

    D) All of the above.

29. Arms reduction agreements can make wars _____ and _____.

    A) more costly and more likely

    B) more costly and less likely

    C) less costly and more likely

    D) less costly and less likely

Chapter 6

30. The core of the democratic peace is that:

    A) Democracies do not tend to be engaged in wars.

    B) Democracies do not fight with one another but fight nondemocracies.

    C) Democracies are rarely attacked by nondemocracies.

    D) b and c are correct.

31. The democratic peace runs contrary to neorealist perspectives because:

    A) It shows that domestic institutions play an important role in shaping international affairs.

    B) It shows that security is not the most important objective.

    C) It shows that the international system is not anarchic.

    D) It shows that leaders seek power more than everything else.

32. Which of the following is not one of the empirical regularities of the democratic peace?

    A) Democracies that are major powers are more constrained than democracies that are minor powers.

    B) Transitional democracies are less constrained than full-fledged democracies.

    C) Democracies make a greater effort to win a war than nondemocracies.

    D) Wealthy democracies are more constrained and less likely to initiate a war that less affluent democracies.

33. Which of the following is not true?

    A) Large-W leaders are more likely to win a war they start than are small-W leaders.

    B) Large-W leaders are less likely to initiate a war against a strong opponent than are small-W leaders.

    C) Large-W leaders are more reluctant than small-W leaders to attack the very weak.

    D) Large-W systems are likely to suffer less casualties than small-W systems in wars they initiate.

34. The claim that democracies do not fight one another because they share norms of compromise and negotiation is flawed because:

    A) It assumes that domestic politics in democracies are characterized by negotiations.

    B) It assumes that democracies do not fight one another.

    C) It restates the same fact it is supposed to explain.

    D) It does not explain why democracies are attacked by nondemocracies.

35. The argument that democracies do not fight one another because of slow decision-making processes is a flawed explanation of the democratic peace phenomenon because it does not explain:

    A) Why autocracies do not prefer to negotiate

    B) Why democracies initiate wars against nondemocracies

    C) Why democracies win the majority of wars they initiate

    D) Why democracies make an extra effort to win

36. According to the selectorate theory, the outcome of war depends on:

    A) The military balance between the two sides.

    B) The amount of resources each side devotes to war.

    C) a and b are correct.

    D) The experience of the leader.

37. According to the selectorate theory, small-W leaders initiate wars in which they do not have an overwhelming chance of winning because:

    A) They fight weak opponents.

    B) They have strong allies.

    C) Losing a war does not have a great effect on their leader.

    D) They are ready to make an extra effort to win.

38. According to the selectorate theory, large-W systems do not fight one another because:

   A) They share common rules of behavior that make them prefer to negotiate rather than fight.
   B) Domestic institutions prevent leaders from going to war without the necessary approvals.
   C) They are selective about which wars they fight, and they fight only if they have overwhelming chances of winning.
   D) They do not have the resources to spend on wars.

39. According to the selectorate theory, large-W coalitions fight for _____, while small-W coalitions fight for _____.

   A) policies/resources
   B) private goods/public goods
   C) territory/regime change
   D) natural resources/trade

40. When the selectorate theory argues that large-W leaders are more selective about wars they fight than are small-W leaders, it means that:

   A) Large-W leaders select themselves into wars against weaker opponents.
   B) Large-W leaders select themselves into wars against stronger opponents.
   C) Large-W leaders select themselves into wars against large-W leaders.
   D) Large-W leaders select themselves into wars against small-W leaders.