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title: "Understanding Interests, Interactions, and Institutions"
subtitle: POSC 1020 -- Introduction to International Relations
author: Steven V. Miller
institute: Department of Political Science
titlegraphic: /Dropbox/teaching/clemson-academic.png
fontsize: 10pt
template: ~/Dropbox/miscelanea/svm-r-markdown-templates/svm-latex-beamer.tex
latex_engine: xelatex
dev: cairo_pdf
fig_caption: true
slide_level: 3
make149: true
mainfont: "Open Sans"
titlefont: "Titillium Web"
```{r setup, include=FALSE, cache=F, message=F, warning=F, results="hide"}
knitr::opts_chunk$set(cache=TRUE, warning=F)
fig.process = function(x) {
x2 = sub('-\\d+([.][a-z]+)$', '\\1', x)
if (file.rename(x, x2)) x2 else x
```{r loadstuff, include=FALSE}
# library(maddison)
# Introduction
### Puzzle(s) for Today
*What explains these patterns of world politics (i.e. war and peace, cooperation and conflict) we discussed?*
# Interests, Interactions, and Institutions
### Interests, Interactions, and Institutions
The authors believe the answer lay in understanding this alliteration.
1. Interests: the actors involved, and their preferences
2. Interactions: i.e. cooperation, bargaining, public goods, and collective action
3. Institutions: can facilitate or constrain behavior
## Interests (Actors and Preferences)
![It's as much the head of state as it is the support base](kim-jong-un.jpg)
### Actors
Traditional IR paradigms "black boxed" the state.
- definition, per Weber: "the monopoly of the legitimate use of violence within a given territory."
- States had few ("national") interests. Typically: power (c.f. classical realism), security (c.f. neorealism), or policy (c.f. power transition theory).
However, this "black boxing" of the state is unsatisfactory and leaves more questions than answers.
### Actors
A better typology of actors:
- Generally, we care first about state leaders (i.e. presidents, kings, prime ministers).
- These state leaders are ultimately responsible for policymaking to meet their own interests.
- These interests: typically tenure (i.e. holding office/the regime).
### Actors
Heads of state rely on making a group of people happy to meet their own interests (i.e. tenure).
- We call this group the **winning coalition**.
The size of the **winning coalition** typically varies across state types. Examples:
- Democracies: generally 50%+1 of eligible voters. Exclusion rules apply (see: U.S.).
- Autocracies: much, much smaller % of the population.
For example: Kim Jong-Un needs to bribe a handful of generals with fine cigars and courvoisier to keep his spot.
### Actors and Preferences
| Actor | Preferences | Comments |
| States | power, security, prosperity | discussed in "systemic" analyses |
| State leaders | tenure, various policy goals | see: selectorate theory |
| Businesses/firms | profit | typically big players in the winning coalition |
| Classes | material well-being | see: Marxism |
| Bureaucrats | budget maximization, influence | also key players in winning coalition |
| IGOs | reflect interests of their members | |
| NGOs | policy goals | may also be part of winning coalition |
## Interactions
### Interactions
The problem of international politics:
- Actors compete for scarce resources.
- They compete under conditions of anarchy.
- This makes all interactions fundamentally *strategic.*
### Clarifying What We Mean
We're making two assumptions here worth clarifying:
1. Actors are *rational* the extent to which they have interests, rank possible outcomes, and work toward maximizing utility.
2. Actors are *strategic* because they must condition their choice based on the expected response of other actors.
### An Illustration of Cooperation
Stag Hunt is a useful illustration of how cooperation can improve quality of life. Consider:
- Hunter 1 and Hunter 2 are trying to take down a deer.
- Both need to shoot the deer (i.e. "cooperate") in order to get yummy deer meat.
- However, if one is unsure the other will shoot the deer, s/he can shoot a bunny (i.e. "defect") for a smaller dinner.
### The Stag Hunt Payoff Matrix
| | H2 Cooperates | H2 Defects |
| H1 Cooperates | 4, 4 | 0, 2 |
| H1 Defects | 2, 0 | 2, 2 |
Note that the payoffs for the first player (here: Hunter 1) are listed first.
### Solving This Game
Solving this (or most any) game requires finding a **Nash equilibrium**.
- Definition: the outcome of a game when no player has an incentive to *unilaterally* change behavior.
How can you find this?
- Find best responses for each potential decision and highlight it for a specific player.
- The quadrant(s) where each payoff is highlighted is a Nash equilibrium.
### The Stag Hunt Payoff Matrix
| | H2 Cooperates | H2 Defects |
| H1 Cooperates | **4, 4** | 0, 2 |
| H1 Defects | 2, 0 | **2, 2** |
### So Why Do Actors Cooperate?
Implications from the stag hunt:
- Actors cooperate because they *trust* the other side will cooperate.
- Cooperation creates abundance for both sides in this scenario.
- If you don't trust the other side, cooperation is hard to start.
- If you've been cooperating, breaking that trust seems impractical and makes no side better off.
### Not All Cooperation is Simple
The **prisoner's dilemma** is one of the most ubiquitous pedagogical games in game theory.
- It’s a useful description for most of international politics.
- In short: it’s a situation when the mutually optimal outcome is individually irrational.
- Much like the heart of international politics.
- Demonstrates individual-level pursuit of self-interest can have perverse group consequences.
### The Situation
The players (Criminal 1, Criminal 2) have just robbed a bank.
- The police has insufficient evidence for a serious conviction.
- The po-po has only enough evidence for a minor, unrelated conviction.
In custody, detectives isolate the criminals and try to coerce a confession.
- Assume there's a prior commitment from both criminals to clam up.
- However, this can't be enforced (noncooperative game theory).
### The Situation and the Payoffs
The criminals have only two choices: cooperate (with each other, by clamming up) or defect to the police.
- If they both keep quiet: police can only pursue the minor conviction.
- If one defects while the other keeps quiet: the rat turns state's evidence, the other gets the books thrown at him.
- If they both rat on each other, they get a partial sentence for making things easy for prosecutors.
### The Prisoner's Dilemma Payoff Matrix
| | C2 Cooperates | C2 Defects |
| C1 Cooperates | -1, -1 | -10, 0 |
| C1 Defects | 0, -10 | -6, -6 |
Again, find best responses to locate the Nash equilibrium.
### The Prisoner's Dilemma Payoff Matrix
| | C2 Cooperates | C2 Defects |
| C1 Cooperates | -1, -1 | -10, **0** |
| C1 Defects | **0**, -10 | **-6, -6** |
### The Implications of the Prisoner's Dilemma
In situations with payoffs structured like the prisoner's dilemma, the prospects for cooperation versus conflict look dim.
- Defect is a **dominant strategy**. Each player is better off defecting no matter what the other player does.
- Ideal payoffs per player: *DC > CC > DD > CD*.
- *Ordinal* payoffs are all that matter in a single-shot game.
- The Nash equilibrium is **Pareto inferior**.
- The "best" outcome is when no player can maximize her payoff without making some other player worse off is the **Pareto efficient** outcome.
- Clearly, the Pareto efficient outcome is *CC*, though rational players won't choose *C*.
## Institutions
### Institutions
Institutions may help actors overcome the temptation to defect, uncertainty, and lack of information.
### Institutions
Institutions may have enforcement mechanisms and can authorize punishment. Examples:
- WTO agreements are binding and enforceable.
- The IMF imposes conditionality on borrowers (loans conditional on certain behavior).
- Coordination and self-enforcing: air traffic controllers agree to use English.
The more specific the standards for behavior, the more effectively they can promote compliance.
### Some Quirks About Institutions
Who benefits from institutions in international politics?
- Post-WWII concert (i.e. the Power Five in the UN)
- The West
- e.g. IMF rules give enough votes to the U.S. and Europe that allow effective vetos.
- Powerful/rich countries (see above)
```{r imf-voting-power, echo=F, eval=T, fig.width = 14, fig.height = 8.5, warning = F, message = F}
IMF <- readxl::read_xlsx("~/Dropbox/teaching/posc1020/development-1/Quota_SDRs.xlsx", sheet=2) %>%
slice(1:5) %>% rename(Category = 1)
WDI(country=c("1W", "XM", "XN", "XD"),
indicator = "SP.POP.TOTL",
start=1960, end=2017) %>% tbl_df() %>%
group_by(year) %>%
mutate(worldpop = max(SP.POP.TOTL)) %>%
filter(iso2c != "1W") %>%
mutate(Category = ifelse(iso2c == "XD", "High Income", "Low and Lower Middle Income")) %>%
group_by(Category, year, worldpop) %>%
summarize(pop = sum(SP.POP.TOTL)) %>%
mutate(perc = pop/worldpop,
Year = year) %>%
mutate(data = "Population Percentages/World Total") -> popprops
IMF %>%
gather(Year, Value, `1950`:`2016`) %>%
group_by(Year) %>%
mutate(perc = Value/max(Value)) %>%
ungroup() %>%
mutate( Year = as.numeric(Year)) %>%
filter(Category != "World") %>%
filter(Category == "Advanced Economies" | Category == "Emerging and Developing Countries") %>%
mutate(data = "IMF Vote Share") -> imfshares
imfshares %>%
ggplot(.,aes(Year, perc, color=Category, group=Category,linetype=Category)) + theme_steve_web() +
geom_line(size=1.1) +
scale_x_continuous(breaks=seq(1950, 2015, by =5)) +
breaks = seq(.2, .8, .1)) +
geom_hline(yintercept = .5, linetype="dashed", color="grey66") +
scale_color_brewer(palette="Set1") +
xlab("Year") + ylab("Percentage of Voting Power") +
labs(title = "IMF Voting Rules Privilege the Wealthy States Over the Developing States",
subtitle = "Voting power is weighted by economic size/openness/reserves in the IMF, which favor countries like the U.S. despite the majority of the world's population residing in poorer countries.",
caption = "Data: International Monetary Fund")
### Some Quirks About Institutions
When do institutions fail to promote cooperation:
- Generally: when cost of compliance is too high or payoff to defect is too large.
# Conclusion
### Conclusion
- Interests (actors and preferences) are the key stuff to understanding all politics.
- All politics is strategic interaction.
- We'll discuss the problem of bargaining more when we get to war.
- Institutions are rules that constrain and enable interaction
- Institutions are not neutral; actors struggle to tilt them in their favor.
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