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---
title: War Termination
subtitle: POSC 3610 -- International Conflict
author: Steven V. Miller
institute: Department of Political Science
titlegraphic: /Dropbox/teaching/clemson-academic.png
date:
fontsize: 10pt
output:
beamer_presentation:
template: ~/Dropbox/miscelanea/svm-r-markdown-templates/svm-latex-beamer.tex
latex_engine: xelatex
dev: cairo_pdf
fig_caption: false
slide_level: 3
make149: true
mainfont: "Open Sans"
titlefont: "Titillium Web"
---
```{r setup, include=FALSE}
knitr::opts_chunk$set(cache=FALSE)
library(tidyverse)
library(stevemisc)
library(countrycode)
library(knitr)
# library(maddison)
```
# Introduction
### Puzzle for Today
*Some wars end with the occupation of the capital. Others end because both sides agree to stop fighting. Why?*
### Why Wars End
Let's contrast two wars involving Russia.
- WWII: ended with the USSR advancing on Berlin and occupying the Reichstag.
- Russo-Japanese War: ended with Russia suing for peace.
Both are major power wars but ended quite differently (beyond the outcome difference). Why?
# War Termination
### Types of War Termination
Scholars generally assume one-sided termination to wars.
- i.e. war continues until one side no longer sees the benefit of war.
- The side that gives up loses; the other side is the victor.
###
```{r, eval = T, echo = F, fig.width=14, fig.height = 8.5}
x <- seq(1, 100)
y <- sqrt(x)
y2 <- sqrt(x) + 4
tibble(
x = seq(0,100),
y = sqrt(x),
y2 = sqrt(x) + 4
) %>%
ggplot(., aes(x, y)) + theme_steve_web() +
geom_path(aes(, y), color = "#000000", size = 1.5) +
geom_hline(yintercept = 6.25, color="#00BCF4", size=1.5, linetype = "dotted") +
geom_hline(yintercept = 10.25, color = "#F8766D", size=1.5, linetype="dotted" ) +
# ylim(0, 12) +
scale_y_continuous(breaks = NULL, limits = c(0, 12)) +
scale_x_continuous(breaks = NULL) +
geom_hline(yintercept = 0, linetype = "dashed") +
geom_vline(xintercept = 0, linetype = "dashed") +
annotate("text", x = 2.5, y = 10.5, hjust =0,
label = "State A's Threshold", color = "#F8766D") +
annotate("text", x = 2.5, y = 6.5, hjust =0,
label = "State B's Threshold", color = "#00BCF4") +
ylab("Expected Benefits of War") + xlab("Time") +
labs(title = "War as Coercion Between State A and B, Over Time",
subtitle = "The rising costs of war (black line) rise and surpass the threshold of benefits for B, but not A in this illustration.")
# geom_path(aes(, y2), color = "#00BCF4", size=1.5, linetype="dashed")
```
### The Limitations of One-Sided Termination
Importantly: it assumes the stakes in the war are fixed.
- States have a priori cost thresholds and fixed aims they pursue.
- The first past the threshold loses.
But this doesn't make a lot of sense from a bargaining perspective.
- The "losing" side should drop some of its war aims under these conditions.
- The "winning" side should demand more as well.
### The Stylized Case of World War I
Consider the exogenous shock of the Bolshevik revolution in WWI.
- Russia desperately wanted out of WWI.
- Germany (not exactly in the best shape) should've been eager to accept.
What happened instead: Germany launched a new offensive on 16 February 1918.
- End result: Germany acquires the Baltic states, separates Ukraine from Russia, and gets Kars for the Ottoman Empire.
### Two-Sided Termination?
This leads to an interest in two-sided termination, but this is incomplete.
- What makes states at war prefer peace?
- If they preferred peace, why are they at war?
Ultimately, we need to return to the familiar problem of bargaining.
## A Reminder About Bargaining
### A Reminder About Bargaining
![](crisis-bargaining.png)
### Expected Utility for A of the War
\begin{eqnarray}
EU(\textrm{A} | \textrm{B Rejects Demand)} &=& (1 - p)(1 - k) + p(-k) \nonumber \\
&=& 1 - k - p + pk - pk \nonumber \\
&=& 1 - p - k \nonumber
\end{eqnarray}
### Expected Utility for B of the War
\begin{eqnarray}
EU(\textrm{B} | \textrm{B Rejects Demand)} &=& (1 - p)(-k) + p(1 - k) \nonumber \\
&=& -k + pk + p - pk \nonumber \\
&=& p - k \nonumber
\end{eqnarray}
### What's the Next Step in our Backward Induction?
![](crisis-bargaining-no-nature.png)
### Now How Do We Proceed from Here?
- When does B accept A's offer?
- What does A offer to B?
- Would A ultimately make that offer to B?
### The Bargaining Space
![The Bargaining Space](bargaining-space.png)
### Bargaining Failure
When bargaining fails, war follows and generally for three reasons.
1. Issue indivisibility
2. Asymmetric (incomplete) information
3. Commitment problems
## War Termination from Information Convergence
### Incomplete Information
War as result of incomplete information is a convenient explanation.
- i.e. states disagree about terms of the model (e.g. *p* and *k*)
War necessarily results from when $p + k < p - k$.
- War can end when battles result in $p + k \ge p - k$.
### Russo-Japanese War (1904-05)
![Map of the Korean Peninsula, 1904-05](rjwar190405.jpg)
### Russo-Japanese War (1904-05)
The Russo-Japanese War (1904-05) is a nice illustration of the **principle of convergence**.
- Issue: Port Arthur (Korea).
No one thought Japan stood a real chance at war's onset.
- Not even Japan did, actually.
The onset of war happened when negotiations were still on the table.
### Russo-Japanese War (1904-05)
No one thought Japan could win, but Japan fared better in each battle.
- Battle of Port Arthur: stalemate, both sides claiming victory.
- Battle of Yalu River: Japanese victory
- Siege of Port Arthur: Japanese victory
- Battle of the Yellow Sea: indecisive
- Battle of Sandepu: indecisive
- Battle of Mukden: major Japanese victory
- Battle of Tsushima: decisive Japanese victory
After this, Russia had lost Manchuria, Korea, Port Arthur and the Sakhalins. Russia sued for peace.
### Russo-Japanese War as Real War
It's not that Russia could not have sent more troops.
- A variety of problems made this impractical.
A march on Moscow (or Tokyo) was never at stake in this war.
- However, Japan's victories updated Russia's prior beliefs about what would happen if it came to that.
Japan waged a real war against Russia to influence Russia's expectations about a potential fight to the finish.
- War results in a relatively quick disclosure of information.
## Other Explanations
### Problems With Information Convergence
Ramsay (2008) finds only a little support for the information convergence argument.
- intuitively: "quick disclosures" will struggle to explain longer wars.
Instead, we'll look at two other factors for how wars end.
1. Regime type
2. Commitment problems
### Regime Type and War Termination
Goemans (2000) has a general argument about regime type and war. Factors:
- Level of repression
- Level of exclusion
Findings:
- Mixed regimes (semi-repressive, moderately exclusionary): worst of both worlds, mostly likely to "gamble for resurrection."
- Democracies, strong non-democracies are more likely to lower their demands to end a war.
### Commitment Problems and War Termination
Concerns for commitment might prove more important.
- i.e. states don't adjust demands because they doubt the commitment on the other side is durable.
Reiter (2009) uses case studies to make this case:
- States with commitment concerns and hope for victory actually increase their demands in war despite discouraging information.
- States with same concerns and *no* hope for victory will adjust demands.
- Importantly, domestic politics don't seem to be as important.
# Conclusion
### Conclusion
Most wars end because both sides agree to stop fighting. General explanations:
- Incomplete information, and information convergence
- Regime variation
- Commitment problems