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---
title: "Wrapping Up: What Do We Know About International Conflict?"
subtitle: POSC 3610 -- International Conflict
author: Steven V. Miller
institute: Department of Political Science
titlegraphic: /Dropbox/teaching/clemson-academic.png
date:
fontsize: 10pt
output:
beamer_presentation:
template: ~/Dropbox/miscelanea/svm-r-markdown-templates/svm-latex-beamer.tex
latex_engine: xelatex
dev: cairo_pdf
fig_caption: false
slide_level: 3
make149: true
mainfont: "Open Sans"
titlefont: "Titillium Web"
---
```{r setup, include=FALSE}
knitr::opts_chunk$set(cache=FALSE)
library(tidyverse)
library(stevemisc)
library(countrycode)
library(knitr)
# library(maddison)
Disputes <- read_csv("~/Dropbox/projects/mid-project/gml-mid-data/2.03/gml-ndy-disputes-2.03.csv")
```
# Introduction
### Puzzle for Today
*What do we know about war? And what's still left as a matter of disagreement?*
# What Do We Know About War?
## Received Wisdom and General Consensus
### Dangerous Dyads
Bremer's (1992) "dangerous dyads" still holds up well.
1. Contiguity
2. Joint democracy
3. Power preponderance
4. Major powers
5. Joint alliance
6. Advanced economies
7. Militarization
###
![](../dangerous-dyads/figs/dangerous-dyads-dwplot.pdf)
###
```{r, eval=T, echo=F, fig.height=8.5, fig.width=14, message = F, warning=F}
tribble(
~period, ~Type, ~perc, ~count,
#-----, -------, -----, -----
"1648-1714", "Territory", 77, 17,
"1648-1714", "Territory + Territory-related", 86, 19,
"1648-1714", "Other Issue", 14, 3,
"1715-1814", "Territory", 72, 26,
"1715-1814", "Territory + Territory-related", 83, 4+26,
"1715-1814", "Other Issue", 17, 6,
"1815-1914", "Territory", 58, 18,
"1815-1914", "Territory + Territory-related", 84, 18+8,
"1815-1914", "Other Issue", 16, 5,
"1918-1941", "Territory", 73, 22,
"1918-1941", "Territory + Territory-related", 93, 28,
"1918-1941", "Other Issue", 7, 2,
"1945-[1990]", "Territory", 47, 27,
"1945-[1990]", "Territory + Territory-related", 79, 27+19,
"1945-[1990]", "Other Issue", 21, 12
) %>%
mutate(Type = forcats::fct_relevel(Type, "Territory", "Territory + Territory-related", "Other Issue"),
perc = perc/100) %>%
ggplot(.,aes(x=period, y=perc, fill=Type)) + theme_steve_web() +
geom_bar(stat="identity", position = "dodge",
alpha = I(0.8), color="black") +
scale_fill_brewer(palette="Set1") +
xlab("Historical Period") + ylab("Percentage of All Wars") +
scale_y_continuous(labels = scales::percent) +
labs(title = "Percentage and Frequency of Wars By Issue Type, 1648-1990",
subtitle = "Most wars over time have been fought over territory or territory-related issues than other issue types.",
caption = "Data: Vasquez (1993) via Holsti (1991). Note: counts appear on top of the bars by issue-type.") +
geom_text(aes(label = count, group = Type), color="black",
position = position_dodge(width=.9), size=4,
vjust = -.5, family ="Open Sans")
```
### Democracies Are a Peculiar Class of Countries
We'll note disagreement later, but generally democracies are a unique class of countries.
- Democracies find ways to avoid war with each other.
- Democracies tend to perform well in war.
- However, democracies are no more or less war-prone than other state types.
That we even observe this defies received wisdom from our structural theories.
### War is Bargaining
We generally see war as bargaining failure (or, alternatively, bargaining via other means).
- Issue indivisibility
- Commitment problems
- Asymmetric information
### When Does Deterrence Work?
Deterrence is a long-standing debate, but we tend to believe it works the more credible threats are.
- Unilateral deterrence offers more paths to peace.
Worth noting: credible threats make deterrence more likely to succeed, but does not guarantee it.
- It won't guarantee it if challengers are highly motivated.
### Not All Wars Look Like the "Big Ones"
...and thank god, but it does mean we're mindful of what we're studying. Generally:
- Expansion follows opportunity and willingness.
- Easier to rethink it as an expected utility calculation.
### Not All Wars Look Like the "Big Ones" (Continued)
Further correlates of war's cost and outcomes:
- "Rougher" terrain
- Balance among disputants
- More troops in the combat zone.
- *Fewer* states involved
One caveat: modeling "costs" of war is tricky, and we tend to do it ex post.
### Conflict and War are Concentrated in a Handful of Countries
Wars are definitely not "independent and identically distributed." There are usual suspects.
- Rivalry explains a big part of this.
- Commitment problems following bargaining
###
```{r, eval=T, echo=F, fig.height=8.5, fig.width=14, message = F, warning=F}
Disputes %>%
group_by(dispnum) %>%
distinct(dispnum, .keep_all=T) %>%
mutate(war = ifelse(hostlev == 5, 1, 0),
fatal = ifelse(fatality1 == 1 | fatality2 == 1, 1, 0)) %>%
group_by(ccode1, ccode2) %>%
summarize(`No. of MIDs` = n(),
`No. of Wars` = sum(war),
`No. of Fatal MIDs` = sum(fatal)) %>%
arrange(-`No. of MIDs`) %>%
mutate(`Country A` = countrycode::countrycode(ccode1, "cown", "country.name"),
`Country B` = countrycode::countrycode(ccode2, "cown", "country.name")) %>%
ungroup() %>% select(-ccode1, -ccode2) %>%
select(`Country A`, `Country B`, `No. of MIDs`:`No. of Fatal MIDs`) %>% head(10) %>%
kable(.,
caption = "Dyads With the Most MIDs (and Type of MIDs), 1816-2010 (GML MID Data, v. 2.03)")
```
## Areas of Contention
### Are Alliances War-Prone or Paths to Peace?
There is still a fair bit of debate about what role alliances play in conflict onset.
- Recent exchanges between Leeds and Johnson (2017) and Vasquez et al. (2017) highlight this disagreement.
You generally saw this in our lectures.
- No relationship between alliance proliferation and war at system-level.
- Allies are unlikely to fight each other.
- Some allies *are* likely to fight each other.
### Are Conflict Processes the Same for Onset and Escalation?
Recall Diehl (2006) encouraged us to think of different phases.
- Different phases may have different contextual influences.
We generally don't want to stray too far from a "dangerous dyads" framework, but we've found:
- Power parity leads to MIDs, but MIDs between equals are less likely to lead to war.
- Joint democracy leads to fewer MIDs, not necessarily fewer wars.
- Satisfied states have fewer MIDs, not necessarily fewer wars.
- Allies still have disputes; just unlikely to escalate to war.
### Power Matters, but How?
"Power" is a central topic in IR, but how it matters is unclear.
- Is it the contested benefit or the source of bargaining breakdown?
- Simple explanations of power via CINC do poorly.
Whatever role "power" has in conflict onset, we tend to eschew "neorealist" explanations.
### Does the Democratic Peace Have Anything to Do With Democracy?
Democratic peace might be the most important finding in IR, but doubts persist:
- "Capitalist peace" (ed. there are a laundry list of problems with this argument)
- Common systems or common interests? (ed. we don't adequately model temporal variation)
- Territorial peace (i.e. have we put the cart before the horse?)
In other words, democracies don't fight each other, but does that have anything to do with democracy?
### What Are the Consequences of War?
War sucks and it creates costs, but there's still some major disagreement:
- Effects can be permanent and temporary, short-term and long-term, direct and indirect, positive and negative.
Discussions of "Phoenix" factors compound what we can say about war's lasting consequences.
# Conclusion
### Conclusion
We've done a lot of work on the causes of war.
- We have lots of answers.
- We generally don't have a single answer.
I enjoyed this class; I hope you did too.
- We'll discuss your final exam next.