A Random Item Response Model of External Territorial Threat, 1816-2010 *

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Multiple scholars have shown that external territorial threat, conceptually the level of concern for a state that its territorial integrity is subject to violent conflict and imposed contraction by other states, has major implications for the state's domestic political environment. However, the strand of scholarship that agrees on the domestic political effects of external territorial threat disagrees on how to code this important concept. These works either rely on binary indicators that do a poor job communicating ''increasing" or ''decreasing" territorial threat, or use dyad-year indicators of conflict propensities as a stand-in for a state-year-level observation. I use this research note to offer an empirical measurement of state-year external territorial threat from a Bayesian random item response model for all states from 1816 to 2010. I assess the face validity and construct validity of the data these models generate, all of which suggest the measure does well to capture the concept in question. I close with a statement of the availability of the data and its potential applications.

Keywords: territorial threat, item response, mixed effects

Introduction

Disputed territory is central to international relations scholarship on conflict processes between states. Scholars inspired by the robust connection between threatened territory and interstate conflict extended this work into the realm of domestic politics. Conceptually understanding "territorial threat" as a state-level phenomenon representing the level of concern that the state's territorial integrity is subject to violent conflict and imposed contraction by other states, scholars have developed a battery of analyses showing how territorial threat influences all matters of society and governance. However, these analyses that agree on the effect of territorial threat on domestic politics disagree on how to measure the motivating concept. Each work takes one of several approaches toward operationalizing the concept, all with important limitations.

In this research note, I offer a new data set of state-year-level territorial threat for all states in the international system from 1816 to 2010. The estimates come from a Bayesian random item response model that leverages long-standing and familiar data sets on interstate conflict, territorial claims, territorial changes, and spatial rivalries over the allocation of territory. The estimates are weighted by both distance and island status, creating not only an estimate of territorial threat at the high end but territorial peace at the low end for

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states that are islands far removed from potential sources of threat. I assess the validity of my state-year estimates of territorial threat in two ways. First, I do an exploratory data analysis of the data, finding that states that should score high (or low) in territorial threat across space and time approporiately do. Next, I do an assessment of the construct validity of the measure in the form of two replications of two analyses of territorial threat. The results suggest my measure of territorial threat is valid and offer an important caveat on a recent analysis linking territorial threat and mass killing onsets. I close with a discussion of extensions of the data and their potential uses.

The Difficulty of Measuring Territorial Threat

Territorial threat scholarship has produced multiple findings on a host of different topics. Generally, territorial threat leads to centralization of power in the executive (Gibler, 2010) and a unique set of autocratic regimes (Kim, 2019*a*). Individual-level preferences emerge under territorial threat that are sympathetic to autocratic power consolidation (e.g. Hutchison, 2011*a*; Miller, 2017, 2018). Territorial threat leads to increased militarization of a country (Gibler, 2012) and a stronger focus on land-based armies that incentivize repression (Wright, 2014), mass-killing of regime dissidents (Hong and Kim, 2019), and disincentivize armed challenges to the central government's authority (Gibler and Miller, 2014). The effect of external territorial threat on domestic political attitudes is wide-reaching. Territorial threat increases individual willingness to fight for the country (Kim, 2019*b*), the ability of governments to mobilize citizens (Hutchison, 2011*b*), and even re-orients an individual's identity to the state (Gibler, Hutchison and Miller, 2012). There are greater downstream societal effects as well. Territorial threat increases political intolerance toward outgroups (Hutchison and Gibler, 2007), creates miserable conditions at home (Miller, 2013), and leads individuals to prioritize more "masculine" values over "feminine" values (Tir and Bailey, 2018). The Tir and Bailey (2018) finding would explain why countries under territorial threat have fewer women in national legislatures (Kang and Kim, 2020). Overall, this scholarship tends to agree that external, territorial threat creates conditions conducive to autocracy and a domestic political environment that is a far cry from an open, egalitarian, and liberal society.

This agreement on the importance of external territorial threat for domestic politics belies the considerable disagreement on how all these individual works code the motivating concept at the core of their hypotheses. One approach codes territorial threat as the presence of a spatial rivalry for a state in a given year (e.g. Hong and Kim, 2019). Another approach codes territorial threat as either a latent (e.g. Miller, 2017) or observed (e.g. Hutchison and Gibler, 2007) phenomenon based on recent conflicts coded from the CoW-MID dataset. Yet another approach looks to the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) dataset to code territorial threat by whether the state is a target of a territorial claim (e.g. Wright, 2014). Adding to the confusion, some works will even include two or more of these indicators in a given estimation as multiple proxies of territorial threat (e.g. Kang and Kim, 2020).

However, these approaches have important limitations. For one, binary indicators of

spatial rivalries or territorial claims may not capture "increasing" or "decreasing" external territorial threat because binary indicators assume only values of 0 or 1. This bogs the measure in a debate whether the binary indicator is merely a special case of nominal measurement akin to "yes"/"no" or "success"/"failure" with no natural ordering. No matter, an information-poor binary indicator could separate a spatial rivalry like Eritrea-Ethiopia from a more peaceful dyadic pairing like France-Australia. However, binary indicators for spatial rivalries would not separate particularly severe spatial rivalries like India-Pakistan from a case like the Argentina-UK spatial rivalry and binary indicators for territorial claims do a poor job distinguishing important territorial claims (e.g. Syria's claim for the return of Golan Heights from Israel) from long-dormant and almost anachronistic territorial claims that appear in the data (e.g. the U.S. claim for Machias Seal Island from Canada).

The use of the CoW-MID data may better coincide with the concept in question, but there are important problems with this approach as well. First, early work on the domestic politics of territorial threat used the `revtype` variables to search for territorial conflicts that would then be aggregated or modeled into a measure of territorial threat (e.g. Hutchison and Gibler, 2007), but more recent research emphasizes that the `revtype` variables in the CoW-MID data are so poorly coded that they are almost unusable for this task (Gibler, 2017). Efforts to manually code whether a dispute is territorial (and how many dispute are territorial) encounter related difficulties. These include a conflation of state-to-state confrontations with those that are protest-dependent and the heterogeneity of militarized actions within and across hostility level categories (Gibler and Little, 2017). They also result in overdispersed counts that necessitate sensitivity analyses. Collapsing these counts into a binary indicator will address the issue of influential observations (e.g. Kang and Kim, 2020), but doing this invites the same interpretation issues as using a binary indicator for spatial rivalries or territorial claims.

These issues are not as pronounced in works using a "latent" measure of territorial threat derived from models of conflict onset (e.g. Miller, 2017; Tir and Bailey, 2018), but issues arise in this approach as well. First, all these works understand "external territorial threat" as a state-level phenomenon, but they use dyad-level predicted probabilities as a stand-in for this concept. The inputs into a standard conflict onset model lean on unreliable information from CoW-MID about revision type or include information unrelated to the concept. For example, Miller's (2017) latent territorial threat measure includes information about militarization, the level of democracy and economic development in the dyad and Tir and Bailey's (2018) measure includes information about the state's level of militarization, defense pacts, and whether there is a civil war in the state. The latent measures of territorial threat that emerged from this estimation approach were fine for their respective uses, but it would mean using their measures of territorial threat to explain changes in a country's militarization (for example) would be tautological in an important way.

Yet, these approaches to measuring external territorial threat have some merit. Conflict indicators, targeted territorial claims, and the presence of a spatial rivalry are in or-

bit of the concept. The next section proposes a method of including these indicators and more to develop a more sophisticated state-year measure of external territorial threat. The following section outlines how I will generate an interval estimate of external territorial threat for all countries from 1816 to 2010.

A Random Item Response Model of External Territorial Threat

My primary sampling frame for an approach to measuring state-year territorial threat starts with a directed politically relevant dyad sampling frame, which are all dyads that are land-contiguous, separated by 400 miles or fewer of water, or include at least one major power. The sources of data I use within this sampling frame are familiar to researchers who work in this strand of scholarship and work more generally on territorial conflict. Yet, my primary perspective to measuring state-year territorial threat leans on the territorial claim data from Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) (Frederick, Hensel and Macaulay, 2017) and the strategic rivalry data described by Thompson and Dreyer (2012).

For each directed politically relevant dyad in a given year, I code whether the first state (i.e. `ccode1` in a typical directed dyad-year data set) is targeted in a territorial claim, how many targeted territorial claims that state has in the year in the directed dyad, and the total salience of the claim for the target at the directed dyad-year level.[1] The target-challenger distinction in ICOW's territorial claims data here is useful for these purposes because not all disputed territory is disputed in both directions. For each politically relevant directed dyad in a given year targeted in at least one active territorial claim, I incorporate the GML conflict data (e.g. Gibler, Miller and Little, 2016) and estimate whether there is an ongoing conflict in a given year, whether there was an ongoing war in a given year, an estimate of how many of the state's troops died in a given conflict that year (logged), and include peace spells for both wars and conflicts at lower levels of severity.

I do the same for the strategic rivalry data from Thompson and Dreyer (2012). I code whether the directed politically relevant dyad is part of a spatial (i.e. territorial) rivalry if the strategic rivalry that Thompson and Dreyer (2012) code is spatial in either the "type 1" or "type 2" field. Each politically relevant directed dyad includes indicators for whether there is an ongoing conflict in the context of the spatial rivalry, whether there is an ongoing war, an estimate of (logged) troop fatalities in a given year in these conflicts, and peace spells for both wars and disputes at lower levels of severity.

Finally, I add two indicators from the territorial change data (Tir et al., 1998). The first is whether Side A in the politically relevant directed dyad was subject to a violent transfer of territory to Side B in the year. The second is the number of violent transfers for Side A as a state-level input.

[1] For claims ongoing by the end of 2001, I look carefully at each case and code whether the claim could be extended to the end of 2010 or whether there is an end date for the territorial claim between 2001 and 2010 (e.g. the Lete Island dispute between Benin and Niger, which ended in July 2005 via International Court of Justice ruling).

Weighting the Raw Data

My approach to estimating territorial threat breaks ground from other approaches by considering the role that distance between states should have in altering perceived threat. Gibler (2012) conceptualizes territorial threat (and, conversely, territorial peace) as a relationship between land-contiguous states and Gibler and Tir's (2014) approach to measuring territorial threat looks at just contiguous states (assumingly imputing 0—or no threat—for states without contiguous neighbors). However, territorial threat can span waters. Taiwan, for example, has a real territorial threat from China even though Taiwan is an island. Likewise, Cyprus could perceive a territorial threat from Turkey prior to Turkey's 1974 invasion and subsequent territorial occupation. Distance from a source of threat may dampen a territorial threat but it need not eliminate it.

Toward that end, I weight all indicators by the distance between two states in an ordinal ten-category measure. The first half of the scale leans on the CoW contiguity data (c.f. Stinnett et al., 2002), which codes dyadic members as being land-contiguous, separated by 12 miles of water or fewer, separated by 24 miles of water or fewer, separated by 150 miles of water or fewer, or separated by 400 miles of water or fewer. However useful this contiguity value is, more can be done to expand it. For example, France and Morocco are formally not contiguous by this classification scheme, but the minimum distance between them is just 524 miles. Thus, I expand this scale after distance by 400 miles or fewer of water by calculating capital-to-capital distance while also considering cases where the capital moved. For states that CoW's contiguity data codes as not contiguous, I code whether the states' respective capitals are separated by 401 to 750 miles, 751 miles to 999 miles, 1,000 miles to 1,999 miles, 2,000 mile to 2,999 miles, or 3,000 miles or more. This rounds out the ordinal ten-category distance measure.

Thereafter, I use this ordinal ten-category distance measure to weight the raw data. For example, the United States had a territorial claim on then-Russian Alaska from 1822 to 1867, but the distance between the Russian and American capitals at the time was 4,476 miles. This divides the binary indicator of the claim by 10 because the remote nature of the claim should represent a negligible addition to Russia's overall level of territorial threat. A direct territorial claim like India and Pakistan over Kashmir receives the full value of 1 because India and Pakistan share a land border. This works in the same way for peace year variables, which otherwise go in the opposite direction of the other indicators (i.e. higher values of peace years indicate less territorial threat). In the case of the peace years, a peace spell like that between India and Pakistan is divided by 10 whereas a peace spell observed between Denmark and the USA (re: Virgin Islands, until 1917) receives the full value of the peace spell because Washington and Copenhagen are separated by over 4,000 miles. Cases where State A is an island are re-weighted again by the same method, weighting up territorial threat and inflating peace spells by distance, in order to approximate the concept that islands buffered by oceans or seas of water do not have the same kind of territorial threat as states with land-contiguous borders (Gibler, 2012). While they can still experience territorial threat (e.g. Cyprus, Taiwan), a sea or ocean buffer diminishes the scope of threat.

Scaling the Data and the Statistical Model

The weighting procedure has the effect of taking all raw inputs and expanding the number of potential responses for each input, effectively creating an interval-level estimate even for the variables that were originally on a binary scale. From there, I scale each indicator to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1 so that all indicators share a common scale. The peace year variables were multiplied by -1 prior to this scaling because, unlike the other model inputs, higher values indicate less territorial threat. The statistical modeling procedure is a Bayesian mixed effects random item response model (see: De Boeck, 2008) implemented in the Stan programming language. Random item response models treat the model's items as random effects alongside the "person" effects (here: state-year effects) because modeling the item as a random effect improves the accuracy and stability of the model's parameter estimation (Choo et al., 2014). The state-year estimate of territorial threat is communicated as the mean of the random intercept for the state-year across all simulations (including a standard deviation around the estimate).

Assessing the Validity of the Measure

I offer two validity assessments of this measure of territorial threat. The first is a face validity assessment that explores the model's output for particular actors and particular moments of time. The second validity assessment is through replication (and, in one case, clarification) of two findings about territorial threat's effect on domestic politics.

Assessing the Face Validity of the Territorial Threat Measures

An exploration of the model's output will suggest the measures of territorial threat are intuitive and capture the concept of state-level territorial threat. First, Figure 1 plots the mean level of territorial threat for all states in the international system from 1816 to 2010. A few patterns emerge that are intuitive. First, there is a climb in the average level of territorial threat around the 1860s. This would coincide with several wars across the international system over the distribution of territory, including the Paraguayan War, the various wars of Italian and German unification, and the Seven Weeks' War. The average level of territorial threat in the international system spikes during World War I and is in fact higher than the average level of territorial threat during World War II. This suggests that while World War II was the deadlier war, the territorial implications of World War I in a then-smaller international system may have been larger. Finally, the graph suggests that the average level of territorial threat has been declining in the international system since World War II. There are still prominent territorial problems in places like South Asia and the Middle East, but this post-World War II trend would be consistent with the Goertz, Diehl and Balas (2016) argument that the grisly nature of World War II resulted in norms discouraging territorial conquest afterward. Certainly, zones of territorial peace emerged after that fighting, prominently in Western Europe, that can account for this trend as well.

Figure 1 Here

Figure 2 is the estimated territorial threat over time for some select state pairings. The top-left plot in Figure 2 is the estimated territorial threat for India and Pakistan. The top-right plot is the estimated territorial threat for the triad of Egypt, Israel, and Syria. The bottom half of Figure 2 is the estimated territorial threat for 19th century European great powers of Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom from 1816 to 1920 and, below them, Russia and Turkey (Ottoman Empire) during the same time frame. The estimated territorial threat for all these observations has considerable face validity. Observe that India and Pakistan have similar (and high) levels of territorial threat over time, though India had higher levels of threat than Pakistan as a result of the Sino-Indian War in the early 1960s. The trend line for Israel in the top-right of Figure 2 is worth highlighting. Informally, no state after World War II should score higher in territorial threat than Israel shortly after its creation. Israel was born from war, immediately surrounded by three hostile neighbors, and was even the target of four territorial claims by its neighbors before 1950. That Israel would score this high in a state-year measure of territorial threat is intuitive. It is also something that using a dyad-year measure as a stand-in for a state-level phenomenon might miss. Israel's territorial threat after its formation comes from the full scope of its rivalry relationships with its land-contiguous neighbors.

Figure 2 Here

The bottom half of Figure 2 includes the historical territorial threat estimates for six important European/Eurasian countries. The first part includes a comparison of the scores for Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. Observe that the United Kingdom has similar levels of territorial threat as Austria-Hungary, France, and Prussia/Germany through the first half of the 19th century. No state was targeted in more territorial claims in the data than the United Kingdom. Indeed, the United Kingdom was targeted in at least ten—and as many as 25—territorial claims every year from 1841 to 1967. By comparison, no other state in a given year was targeted in more than seven territorial claims.[2] However, the UK's distance from these states reduces the effect of these claims and the disputes that emerge from them. Changes in territorial threat for the three other countries shown alongside the UK are intuitive, coinciding with major confrontations in the context of spatial rivalries and claimed territory. These include the unification conflicts in the 1860s and 1870s and World War I.

The bottom of Figure 2 is a comparison of Russia and the Ottoman Empire/Turkey during the same time frame as the 19th century European great powers. Notably, the trend line for the Ottoman Empire visualizes how scholars understand the Ottoman Empire as the "sick man of Europe" during this period. The Ottoman Empire's territorial threat substantially increases as a result of Greek independence and increases further because of successive territorial contractions in the Balkans and the Caucuses. Russia is largely if not exclusively responsible for the Ottoman Empire's territorial contractions during the 19th century. The losses Russia imposed on the Ottoman Empire do not manifest in the same kind of increases of territorial threat for Russia as we observe for the

[2]China was targeted in seven unique territorial claims from 1943 to 1945.

Ottoman Empire. However modest Russia's territorial threat vis-a-vis Turkey during the 19th century, the violent end of the Russian Empire resulted in a massive territorial contraction. Thus, Russia in 1918 has the highest recorded level of territorial threat in the whole data, which adequately reflects the one million square kilometers of its territory that it lost that year following the already destructive battles of World War I.

Assessing the Construct Validity Through Replication

The previous section suggests the estimates of territorial threat gathered from the random item response model have high face validity. Next, I assess the validity of the measure through a replication of two analyses that explore the effect of territorial threat on various domestic political processes.

Territorial Threat and Militarization

Gibler (2012) links territorial threat and militarization as an important component of his territorial peace argument and Table 5.1 in Gibler (2012) offers illustrative evidence to support this part of the argument. The onset of a contiguous territorial MID has a positive and statistically significant effect on changes in the number of military personnnel from the previous year, and this effect is discernibly greater than the effect of a contiguous, non-territorial MID. However, this analysis appears to lean on the `revtype1` and `revtype2` variables to code whether a dispute is over territory, and follow-up analyses from Gibler demonstrate these variables are so poorly coded that they cannot be used for this kind of analysis (Gibler, 2017).

I offer a simple replication of Table 5.1 in Gibler (2012) that drops the other conflict indicators for my estimate of territorial threat. The dependent variable is the change in the size of military personnel for the state from the previous year. The control variables include whether the state is a major power, whether there is a dispute onset in the observation year, the total population of the state, the difference in military expenditures from the previous year, and the size of the military personnel from the previous year. The only other change is to eschew Gibler's state fixed effects for state random effects.

Table 1 Here

I offer the results of this replication in Table 1, where Model 1 measures territorial threat as the threat level from the year prior to the observation year and Model 2 measures territorial threat as the difference from the year before the observation year and the year before that. The results are substantively the same as what Gibler provides in Table 5.1, as is the substantive takeaway from Gibler's argument. States with higher levels of territorial threat (Model 1) and states with increases in territorial threat (Model 2) are more likely to see increases in the size of military personnel. Gibler's analysis leaned on the information available in the CoW-MID data, which his follow-up analyses suggested were unusable for this kind of analysis. My measure of territorial threat offers more confidence in Gibler's (2012) original findings.

Territorial Threat and Violent Repression

Next, I offer a replication of Hong and Kim's (2019) analysis on territorial threat and mass killing. Hong and Kim's analysis is challenging in both substance and measurement. Substantively, the territorial threat scholarship has yet to reach a consensus on the exact relationship between territorial threat and repression, more generally (Gibler and Miller, Forthcoming). Amid this, Hong and Kim (2019) argue external territorial threats increase mass killing episodes, a particularly severe form of repression, during episodes of state failureand when government elites hold exclusionary ideologies that justify efforts to exclude whole categories of people and belief systems. The main evidence in favor of the hypothesis comes in a statistically significant interaction between territorial (i.e. spatial) rivalries and whether government elites hold an exclusionary ideology. However, the rivalry data serve as an information-poor metric of territorial threat since binary indicators do not necessarily capture "increasing" or "decreasing" the same way they capture "success"/"failure."

I offer a replication of the main finding, best seen in their Model 3 of Table 1, as Table 2. The first model offers a near identical reproduction of Model 3 in Table 1 of Hong and Kim (2019). Model 2 substitutes the latent territorial threat measure for the territorial (spatial) rivalry measure in Hong and Kim (2019) and re-estimates the statistical model. Here, there is no support for the authors' hypothesis of a statistically significant interaction between exclusionary ideology and territorial threat on mass killing onsets. It suggests the modeling choice, absent a better measure that I provide here, drives the results the authors report. Spatial rivalries are information-poor measures of territorial threat because they lump quiet spatial rivalries like Bolivia-Chile and Argentina-United Kingdom with more active spatial rivalries like Armenia-Azerbaijan and India-Pakistan.

Table 2 Here

Model 2 suggests that the results Hong and Kim (2019) report could be better clarified by considering a hypothesis that increasing territorial threat leads to mass killing onsets in cases where there is already at least some territorial threat. I next subset Hong and Kim's (2019) data to just cases where the state is in at least one spatial rivalry (Model 3) or for states that are targeted in at least one territorial claim (Model 4). I then re-estimate Model 2 on these subsetted data and find partial support for this intuition. There is a statistically significant effect of exclusionary ideology on mass killing onsets in states in spatial rivalries or targeted in at least one territorial claim. Further, there is the positive and statistically significant of increasing territorial threat in the subset of states that are in at least one spatial rivalry or are targeted in at least one territorial claim. However, there is no significant interaction between them. This sugests two things about the relationship between territorial threat and mass killing onsets in cases of state failure. First, the effect of territorial threat on mass killing onsets is only observed in states with at least some level of territorial threat. Second, the effect of territorial threat on mass killing onsets does not depend on elite ideology (and vice-versa).

Conclusion

Researchers in the territorial conflict literature have long-agreed on the basic importance of territorial threat and almost unanimously agree on the scope of its effect on domestic politics. However, researchers encounter an uncomfortable situation where they almost unanimously agree on territorial threat's effects disagree on how to best operationalize this important concept. I change this by providing a continuous measure of territorial threat for all states in the international system from 1816 to 2010. I also offer an expansive analysis of the data and two empirical replications that show the validity of the measure and its utility for our hypotheses on territorial threat.

The data are ideally best used for analyses looking at the effect of territorial threat on state-level outcomes, like militarization, democratic backsliding, or individual-level outcomes in which state-level territorial threat is an important contextual influence (e.g. political intolerance, support for autocratic governments). They can, however, be used more broadly as a stand-in for "external threat." After all, researchers who look at the effect of territorial threat on various domestic political outcomes are using territorial threat as just the most obvious and important form of external threat (see Hutchison and Gibler, 2007, and Miller (2017), for two examples). The processes they outline are applicable to other non-territorial forms of serious, external threat, even though identifying serious, non-territorial external threats are often ad hoc. This should broaden the scope of analyses for which these data would be useful.

The data will be available on my Github and can be downloaded as R serialized data frames or .csv files for researchers using any statistical software or programming language. I will also provide the script that generates these data for maximum transparency. Github is a particularly attractive repository for hosting free-to-use data sets because version tracking in Git (through Github) will provide additional transparency about changes to the data as it gets updated.



Figure 1: The Average Level of Territorial Threat, 1816-2010

Table 1: A Mixed Effects Model of Change in Military Personnel, 1816-2010

	(1)	(2)
Territorial Threat (Lag)	33.114***	
	(7.712)	
Territorial Threat (Diff. from Prev. Year)		144.719***
		(20.680)
State is a Major Power	120.244***	115.274***
	(8.395)	(8.364)
Dispute Onset in Obs. Year	10.194**	12.555***
	(4.302)	(4.290)
Total Population (Lag)	0.0002***	0.0002***
	(0.00002)	(0.00002)
Military Expenditure (Diff. from Prev. Year)	0.00001***	0.00001***
	(0.00000)	(0.00000)
Military Personnel (Lag)	−0.112***	−0.110***
	(0.004)	(0.004)
Constant	1.933	3.081
	(2.312)	(2.341)
Number of States	216	215
sd(State)	13.695	13.722
N	15975	15750

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This is a basic replication of Table 5.1 in Gibler (2012)



Estimates of uncertainty are available for all observations but are not included to make each individual plot more legible.

Figure 2: Estimated Territorial Threat Over Time for Select State Pairings

Table 2: Territorial Threat, Exclusionary Ideology, and Mass Killing Onsets (1956-2010)

	Replication of Hong and Kim (2019) Table 1, Model 3	Latent Territorial Threat Measure	Subset: Spatial Rivalries	Subset: Target in Territorial Claim
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Exclusionary Ideology	−0.075	0.765	2.569***	2.575*
	(0.638)	(0.474)	(0.961)	(1.324)
Territorial Threat Variable	−0.824	−1.063	4.054*	5.162*
	(0.549)	(1.511)	(2.106)	(2.760)
Post-Cold War	−1.607***	−1.465***	−2.688**	
	(0.508)	(0.509)	(1.129)	
Civil War	−0.404	−0.373	0.333	0.749
	(0.536)	(0.521)	(0.816)	(1.061)
Interstate War	0.924	1.046	1.865	1.343
	(1.138)	(1.166)	(1.522)	(1.508)
GDP per Capita	−0.202	−0.276	0.334	0.039
	(0.277)	(0.296)	(0.403)	(0.508)
Liberal Democracy Index	−2.461	−2.055	−5.734**	−3.943
	(1.836)	(1.857)	(2.651)	(3.087)
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.142	−0.087	0.506	−0.220
	(0.718)	(0.705)	(1.375)	(1.426)
Territorial Threat*Exclusionary Ideology	1.976**	2.220	−4.983	−3.002
	(0.834)	(2.190)	(3.321)	(4.069)
Constant	−1.315	−1.000	−6.568**	−6.234
	(1.983)	(2.122)	(3.274)	(4.039)
N	991	991	433	455

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This is a basic replication of Table 1, Model 3 in Hong and Kim (2019)

Cubic polynomial of years since laste state failure omitted to save space.

The post-Cold War dummy is a near perfect predictor in Model 4 and is omitted for presentation.

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