# SECURE FORM PROCESSING AND PROTECTION

Joe Ferguson

@JoePFerguson


"WHAT KEEPS YOU UP AT NIGHT?"

#### FOR ME, IT WAS FORM PROCESSING


- for a while, at least


#### "HOW DO I SAFELY, SECURELY, AND RELIABLY GET INPUT FROM MY USERS?"

#### LITTLE BOBBY TABLES









#### VULNERABILITIES

# CROSS SITE SCRIPTING (XSS)

"XSS enables attackers to inject client-side script into Web pages viewed by other users. A cross-site scripting vulnerability may be used by attackers to bypass access controls such as the same origin policy"

# THERE IS NO STANDARD CLASSIFICATION OF XSS

#### TYPES OF XSS EXPLOITS

- Reflected (Non-persistent)
- Persistent

Can also be distinguished by:

Server-side versus DOM-based vulnerabilities

## REFLECTED (NON-PERSISTENT)

Data passed to the app immediately without sanitizing the data

#### **Basic HTML Form** Name: Submit HTML Form Processing with PHP Hello i aM l3eT HaX0R aLL uR baSe R bElOnG 2 mE OK

#### WHAT HAPPENED?

```
Example1.php - Secure-Form-Processing-ar
      <div class="container">
          <?php
          if(isset($_POST['name'])){
                                                                Basic HTML Form
              //form has been submitted
              ?>
              Hello <?php echo $_POST['name']; ?>
                                                                        <script>alert('i aM I3eT HaX0R a
          <?php
          } else {
                                                                 Submit
              ?>
              <h1>Basic HTML Form</h1>
10
              <form name="basic_form" method="POST" action="#">
11
12
                  <label>Name:
                      <input type="text" name="name" id="name" value="">
13
                 </label>
14
                 <label>
15
                     <input type="submit" id="submit" value="Submit">
16
                  </label>
17
              </form>
18
19
          <?php
20
21
      </div> <!-- /container -->
22
```

#### PERSISTENT

Data passed to the app is saved by the server


When the code to display the dynamic data is run again, the code that was inject runs again.

# DATA PASSED TO THE APP IS SAVED BY THE SERVER

```
<div class="container">
          <?php
          if(isset($_POST['name'])){
              //form has been submitted
              $user = new User;
              $user->name = $_POST['name'];
              $user->save();
              ?>
              Hello <?php echo $_POST['name']; ?>
          <?php
10
          } else {
11
12
              ?>
              <h1>Basic HTML Form</h1>
13
              <form name="basic_form" method="POST" action="#">
14
                  <label>Name:
15
                      <input type="text" name="name" id="name" value="">
16
                  </label>
17
                  <label>
18
                      <input type="submit" id="submit" value="Submit">
19
20
                  </label>
21
              </form>
22
          <?php
24
      </div> <!-- /container -->
```

#### INJECTED CODE RUNS AGAIN

Wherever the dynamic content is called, the injected code runs



http://www.phparch.com/magazine/2014-2/august/

## SERVER-SIDE VERSUS DOM-BASED VULNERABILITIES

- Examples:
  - Single page applications (JavaScript)
  - Still need to protect these applications
  - Malicious code doesn't touch server, only DOM

#### WIDESPREAD XSS EXPLOITS

- Twitter September 21, 2010 "MouseOver"
  - tweeting a JavaScript function for "onMouseOver"
  - Victims would mouseover areas of a tweet that looked like highlighted areas and code would execute to tweet out the same exploit from their account.

#### WIDESPREAD XSS EXPLOITS

- Facebook Early 2013 Chat & Checkin vulnerable
  - Chat: GUI for presenting a link to chat window was unfiltered / not sanitized.
  - Checkin: Attacker could post malicious scripts in pages and code would run when victims checked in to location

http://thehackernews.com/2013/04/hacking-facebook-users-just-from-chat.html

#### WIDESPREAD XSS EXPLOITS

- MySpace October 2005 Samy (computer worm)
  - Added an XSS on a profile that would posted to the victims own profile.
  - The exploit spread like a worm virus infecting new users whenever an infected profile was viewed

# CROSS SITE REQUEST FORGERY (CSRF)

Sending unauthorized commands from a user that an **application trusts** 

Relies on tricking a user into viewing a malicious image or clicking on a malicious link.

#### CSRF CHARACTERISTICS

- Targets a site that knows about the victim
- Exploit the trust (often logged in state) of victim
- Trick victim into sending HTTP requests to target
- HTTP requests have side effects (malicious intent)

#### LOGIN CSRF

Used to log a user into an application

## GOOGLE YOUTUBE CROSSDOMAIN SECURITY FLAW

- \*.google.com was trusted
- Send a malicious SWF file to the attacker's gmail and locate the download URL
- Logged in YouTube user visits attacker's malicious page

## GOOGLEYOUTUBE CROSSDOMAIN SECURITY FLAW

- Force user to authenticate and exploit a login-CSRF / session initialization vulnerability to authenticate the victim as the attacker.
- Attacker embeds the malicious SWF file to the page the victim viewing.
- Attacker now has read/write access to victim's YouTube account

http://jeremiahgrossman.blogspot.com/2008/09/i-used-to-know-what-you-watched-on.html

#### DYNAMIC CSRF

- Attacks can be changed based on the origin of the request.
- · Dynamically created as part of an XSS exploit
- Customized payloads to specific targets
- Usually involves relying on session data getting leaked cross domain

#### CSRF LIMITATIONS

- Target site that doesn't check referrer header or the victim's browser supports referrer spoofing
- The attacker must target some submission point on the victim's computer (changes / reads of victim's personal information, modify bank account records, etc)

#### CSRF LIMITATIONS

- The attacker must determine the correct values to submit to the application
- The victim must be logged into the target application

#### CSRF ATTACKS ARE BLIND

#### REPLAY ATTACKS

## SCARED YET?

#### OF COURSE NOT!

# THIS SHOULDN'T BE THE FIRST TIME YOU HAVE HEARD THESE TERMS

"An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure"

- Benjamin Franklin

#### CRYPTOGRAPHIC NONCE

Preventing Replay Attacks and CSRF

#### CRYPTOGRAPHIC NONCE

- Arbitrary number used ONCE in a cryptographic communication
- Used in HTTP digest access authentication to has the password. Nonce changes every time the 401 response is presented.
- · Use to prevent replay attacks.

#### EXAMPLE NONCE IN PHP

```
<?php
      ini_set('default_mimetype', 'text/plain');
     i@i_set('default_charset', 'ISO-8859-1');
      define('NONCE_SECRET', 'MemphisPHP!');
     require_once('NonceUtil.php');
      print "generating a nonce with a 1 second lifetime.\n";
      $nonce = NonceUtil::generate(NONCE_SECRET, 1);
10
      print "check nonce (nonce should be valid): ";
11
      $r = NonceUtil::check(NONCE_SECRET, $nonce);
      var_dump($r);
14
      print "\n";
16
      print "generating a nonce with a 1 second lifetime.\n";
17
      $nonce = NonceUtil::generate(NONCE_SECRET, 1);
19
     print "wait 2 seconds.\n";
      sleep(2);
22
     print "check nonce (nonce should be invalid): ";
     $r = NonceUtil::check(NONCE_SECRET, $nonce);
25
     var_dump($r);
26
```

# USING WORDPRESS & NONCE CURIOUS?

- WordPress has it's own internal NONCE System
- It isn't a true NONCE since you can use it more than once.
- More info:
  - https://www.getpantheon.com/blog/nonce-upon-timewordpress
  - Written by Cal Evans

#### PREVENTING XSS

## HTMLENTITIES()

- Convert all applicable characters to HTML entities
- This function is identical to htmlspecialchars() in all ways, except with htmlentities(), all characters which have HTML character entity equivalents are translated into these entities.

```
<div class="container">
 2
          <?php
          if(isset($_POST['name'])){
              //form has been submitted
 5
              ?>
              Hello <?php echo htmlentities($_POST['name']); ?>
 6
          <?php
          } else {
 8
 9
              ?>
              <h1>Basic HTML Form</h1>
10
              <form name="basic_form" method="POST" action="#">
11
12
                  <label>Name:
13
                      <input type="text" name="name" id="name" value="">
14
                  </label>
15
                  <label>
16
                      <input type="submit" id="submit" value="Submit">
17
                  </label>
              </form>
18
19
          <?php
20
21
          ?>
      </div> <!-- /container -->
22
```

## FILTER\_VAR()

- · Filters a variable with a specified filter
- · Returns the filtered data, or FALSE if the filter fails.
- Example Filters:
  - FILTER\_VALIDATE\_EMAIL
  - FILTER\_VALIDATE\_INT

http://php.net/manual/en/function.filter-var.php

## SANITIZE WITH FILTER\_VAR()

- Sanitize incoming or outgoing data
- Example Filters:
  - FILTER\_SANITIZE\_EMAIL
  - FILTER\_SANITIZE\_STRING
  - FILTER\_SANITIZE\_NUMBER\_INT
  - FILTER\_SANITIZE\_URL

http://php.net/manual/en/filter.filters.sanitize.php

```
<div class="container">
 2
          <?php
          if(isset($_POST['name'])){
 3
              //form has been submitted
              $salutation = filter_var($_POST['salutation'], FILTER_SANITIZE_STRING);
 5
              $name = filter_var($_POST['name'], FILTER_SANITIZE_STRING);
 6
              $greeting = 'Hello ' . $salutation . ' ' . $name;
              echo $greeting;
 8
 9
          } else {
10
              ?>
11
              <h1>Sanitizing Data</h1>
              <form name="basic_form" method="POST" action="#">
12
13
                  <label>Salutation:
                      <select name="salutation" id="salutation">
14
15
                          <option value="Hello">Hello</option>
16
                          <option value="Mrs.">Mrs.</option>
17
                          <option value="Mr.">Mr.</option>
18
                      </select>
                  </label>
19
20
                  <label>Name:
                      <input type="text" name="name" id="name" value="">
21
22
                  </label>
23
                  <label>
24
                      <input type="submit" id="submit" value="Submit">
25
                  </label>
26
              </form>
27
          <?php
28
29
          ?>
30
      </div> <!-- /container -->
```

# MANY FRAMEWORKS HAVE THIS BUILT IN

## ANGULARIS

- Angular calls it XSRF
- Server needs to set a JavaScript readable cookie
   "X-XSRF-TOKEN"
- · Unique per user and be verifiable by the server

#### ZEND

- Zend\Escaper contains methods for escaping output
- Zend\Filter contains common data filters
- Zend\Form\Element\Csrf Protection is achieved by adding a hash element to a form and verifying it when the form is submitted.

http://framework.zend.com/manual/current/en/modules/zend.form.element.csrf.html

#### ZEND CSRF PROTECTION

```
1     <?php
2
3     use Zend\Form\Element;
4     use Zend\Form\Form;
5
6     $csrf = new Element\Csrf('csrf');
7
8     $form = new Form('project-create');
9     $form->add($csrf);
```

#### ZEND ESCAPING OUTPUT

```
<?php
      $escaper = new Zend\Escaper\Escaper('utf-8');
      <h4>Project</h4>
 6
      <div class="well clearfix">
          <div class="col-md-8">
             <strong>Title</strong>:
                 <?php echo $escaper->escapeHtml($project->title); ?>
10
             <strong>Description</strong>:
11
                 <?php echo $escaper->escapeHtml($project->description); ?>
12
13
             <strong>Status</strong>:
                 <?php echo $escaper->escapeHtml($project->status.title); ?>
14
15
             <strong>Priority</strong>:
                 <?php echo $escaper->escapeHtml($project->priority.title); ?>
16
17
             <strong>0wner</strong>:
                 <?php echo $escaper->escapeHtml($project->owner.username); ?>
18
          </div>
```

#### SYMFONY

- Generate CSRF Token (Symfony\Component\Form\Extension \Csrf\Csrf\Provider)
  - {{ csrf\_token('authenticate') }}
- Twig Template can default to automatic escaping
  - If disabled: {{ user.username|e }}

#### SYMFONY CSRF PROTECTION

## SYMFONY ESCAPING OUTPUT

If the escaper extension is enabled, escaping is automatic.

Otherwise you can use:

#### SLIMPHP

 Slim-Extras - Slim Authentication and XSS Middlewares

• Slim\Extras\Middleware\CsrfGuard

#### LARAVEL

- Query Builder uses PDO parameter binding to protect against SQL injection
- Automatically handles CSRF when using Form::open
- Escape output by using {{{ \$input }}} in Blade

#### LARAVEL CSRF PROTECTION

```
@extends('layouts.default')
 2
 3
      @section('content')
           <div class="well">
               {{ Form::open(array('action' => 'ProjectsController@store')) }}
 6
               <h4>Create New Project</h4>
 8
               <div class="form-group {{ ($errors->has('title')) ? 'has-error' : '' }}">
 9
                   {{ Form::text('title', null, array('class' => 'form-control', 'placeholder' => 'Title')) }}
10
                   {{ (\serrors->\text{has('title') ? \serrors->\text{first('title') : '') }}}
11
               </div>
```

#### LARAVEL CSRF PROTECTION

#### LARAVEL CSRF PROTECTION

```
70
71
       CSRF Protection Filter
72
73
74
       The CSRF filter is responsible for protecting your application against
75
       cross-site request forgery attacks. If this special token in a user
76
       session does not match the one given in this request, we'll bail.
77
78
79
80
      Route::filter('csrf', function()
81
      {
82
          if (Session::token() !== Input::get('_token'))
83
84
              throw new Illuminate\Session\TokenMismatchException;
85
86
87
      });
```

#### LARAVEL ESCAPING OUTPUT

```
@extends('layouts.default')
      @section('content')
          <h4>Project</h4>
 4
          <div class="well clearfix">
 6
             <div class="col-md-8">
                 <strong>Title</strong>: {{{ sproject->title }}}
                 <strong>Description</strong>: {{{ sproject->description }}}
                 <strong>Status</strong>: {{{ sproject->status->title }}}
10
                 <strong>Priority</strong>: {{{ sproject->priority->title }}}
11
                 <strong>0wner</strong>: {{{ sproject->owner->username }}}
12
             </div>
```

### LARAVEL ESCAPING OUTPUT

#### **Project**

Title: Sample Project

**Description**: Test project

Status: Open

**Priority**: Low

Owner: admin

#### OTHER FRAMEWORKS

Check the documentation for best practices!

#### XSSTESTINGTOOLS

- Acunetix Web Vulnerability Scanner
  - http://www.acunetix.com
- IBM Security AppScan
  - http://www-03.ibm.com/software/products/en/appscan
- Burp Suite
  - http://portswigger.net/burp
- OWASP Zed Attack Proxy Project
  - https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP\_Zed\_Attack\_Proxy\_Project

#### LINKS

- Examples & Links:
  - https://github.com/svpernova09/Secure-Form-Processing-and-Protection-Talk
- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-site\_scripting
- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-site\_request\_forgery
- http://securingphp.com
- "HTML Form Processing with PHP" Article:
  - http://www.phparch.com/magazine/2014-2/august/
- Leave me feedback: <a href="https://joind.in/13441">https://joind.in/13441</a>