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Outline

- 1 Introduction
- 2 Cipher Implementation
- 3 Observations
- 4 Brownie Point Nominations
- 5 Conclusion

Origin

KHAZAD is a block cipher designed by Paulo S. L. M. Barreto and Vincent Rijmen, one of the designers of the Advanced Encryption Standard (Rijndael). KHAZAD is named after Khazad-dûm, the fictional dwarven realm in the writings of J.R.R. Tolkien.

It was presented at the first NESSIE workshop in 2000, and, after some small changes, was selected as a finalist in the project.

Introduction

KHAZAD has an eight-round substitution–permutation network structure similar to that of SHARK. The design is classed as a "legacy-level" algorithm, with a 64-bit block size and a 128-bit key.

KHAZAD makes heavy use of involution as sub-components which minimises the difference between the algorithms for encryption and decryption.

NAME	KHAZAD
Number of rounds	8
Schedule (extension) of the key	The Feistel scheme
Unreduced polynomial of the field $GF(2^8)$	$x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x^2 + 1$
Implementation of the S-box	Recursive P - and Q-mini-blocks
Implementation of the mixing matrix	Involution MDS code

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Brief Overview

Khazad has an SPN structure. During encryption, it iterates 8 times a SP round function. Each of this 8 rounds consists of 3 stages (except the last round):

- 1 *Nonlinear Transformation γ*
- 2 *Linear Transformation θ*
- 3 *Adding a round key σ*

NOTE:-

The last round does not have a linear transformation layer.

Key Expansion

A 128-bit (16-byte) key K is divided into 2 equal parts:

k_{-1} - older 8 bytes (from the 15th to the 8th)

k_{-2} - lower 8 bytes (from the 7th to the 0th)

Keys $k_0 \dots k_8$ calculated according to the Feistel scheme :


$$k_i = f(C_i, k_{i-1}) \oplus k_{i-2}$$

Here:

$f(x, y)$ - round function of the algorithm with the input block x and the key y .

C_i - 64-bit constant, j which byte is $C_i^j = S(8i + j)$

Key Expansion



Round Function

Now lets see the Round function

General Round Structure

A single round consists of 3 stages:

- 1 *Nonlinear Transformation (γ)* : An sbox is applied in this layer to each byte of the current state.
- 2 *Linear Transformation (θ)* : The state matrix is multiplied with a square matrix in $GF(2^8)$ of size 8
- 3 *Adding a round key (σ)* : The xor of the round key and the state matrix is taken in this stage.

Nonlinear transformation (γ)

Denoted as γ .

In each round, the input block is divided into smaller blocks of 8 bytes, which are independently subjected to nonlinear transformation (change), i.e. passed in parallel through the same S-blocks (each S-block - 8x8 bits, i.e. 8 bits at the input and 8 bits at the output).

Replacement blocks in the source and modified (tweaked) ciphers are different. The substitution unit is selected so that the nonlinear transformation is involutory, i.e. $\gamma = \gamma^{-1}$ or $\gamma(\gamma(x)) = x$.

Linear transformation θ

Denoted by θ . An 8-byte row of data is multiplied byte by byte to a fixed matrix H size 8×8 , and byte multiplication is performed in the Galois field $GF(2^8)$ with a polynomial that is not given $x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x^2 + 1$ (0x11D).

$$\theta(x) = x \times H \text{ where}$$


$$H = \begin{bmatrix} 01_x & 03_x & 04_x & 05_x & 06_x & 08_x & 0B_x & 07_x \\ 03_x & 01_x & 05_x & 04_x & 08_x & 06_x & 07_x & 0B_x \\ 04_x & 05_x & 01_x & 03_x & 0B_x & 07_x & 06_x & 08_x \\ 05_x & 04_x & 03_x & 01_x & 07_x & 0B_x & 08_x & 06_x \\ 06_x & 08_x & 0B_x & 07_x & 01_x & 03_x & 04_x & 05_x \\ 08_x & 06_x & 07_x & 0B_x & 03_x & 01_x & 05_x & 04_x \\ 0B_x & 07_x & 06_x & 08_x & 04_x & 05_x & 01_x & 03_x \\ 07_x & 0B_x & 08_x & 06_x & 05_x & 04_x & 03_x & 01_x \end{bmatrix},$$

Adding a round key σ

A 64-bit XOR operation is performed on the 64-bit data block & the 64-bit round key . A 64-bit data block is being xored with a round key of 64 bits calculated using key expansion algorithm based on Fiestal scheme.


$$\text{For } i^{\text{th}} \text{ round} : \sigma(x_i) = x_{i-1} \oplus k_{i-1}$$

Encryption Algorithm



The Encryption Algorithm

Decryption Algorithm



The Decryption Algorithm

Outline


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The Substitution box

- In the original version of the cipher (KHAZAD-0) tabular replacement was represented by a classic S-block.
- In the modified version of the cipher, the S-block 8x8 is modified and represented by a recursive structure consisting of mini-blocks P and Q
- Each of which is a small replacement block with 4 bits at the input and output (4x4).

The Substitution box

- Recursive structure of the replacement unit in the modified KHAZAD cipher:



- This structure of P and Q-mini blocks is equivalent to the S-block with the following substitution table:

u	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	A	B	C	D	E	F
P(u)	3	F	E	0	5	4	B	C	D	A	9	6	7	8	2	1

u	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	A	B	C	D	E	F
Q(u)	9	E	5	6	A	2	3	C	F	0	4	D	7	B	1	8

S-box

The final KHAZAD S-box

	00 _x	01 _x	02 _x	03 _x	04 _x	05 _x	06 _x	07 _x	08 _x	09 _x	0A _x	0B _x	0C _x	0D _x	0E _x	0F _x
00 _x	BA _x	54 _x	2F _x	74 _x	53 _x	D3 _x	D2 _x	4D _x	50 _x	AC _x	8D _x	BF _x	70 _x	52 _x	9A _x	4C _x
10 _x	EA _x	D5 _x	97 _x	D1 _x	33 _x	51 _x	5B _x	A6 _x	DE _x	48 _x	A8 _x	99 _x	DB _x	32 _x	B7 _x	FC _x
20 _x	E3 _x	9E _x	91 _x	9B _x	E2 _x	BB _x	41 _x	6E _x	A5 _x	CB _x	6B _x	95 _x	A1 _x	F3 _x	B1 _x	02 _x
30 _x	CC _x	C4 _x	1D _x	14 _x	C3 _x	63 _x	DA _x	5D _x	5F _x	DC _x	7D _x	CD _x	7F _x	5A _x	6C _x	5C _x
40 _x	F7 _x	26 _x	FF _x	ED _x	E8 _x	9D _x	6F _x	8E _x	19 _x	A0 _x	F0 _x	89 _x	0F _x	07 _x	AF _x	FB _x
50 _x	08 _x	15 _x	0D _x	04 _x	01 _x	64 _x	DF _x	76 _x	79 _x	DD _x	3D _x	16 _x	3F _x	37 _x	6D _x	38 _x
60 _x	B9 _x	73 _x	E9 _x	35 _x	55 _x	71 _x	7B _x	8C _x	72 _x	88 _x	F6 _x	2A _x	3E _x	5E _x	27 _x	46 _x
70 _x	0C _x	65 _x	68 _x	61 _x	03 _x	C1 _x	57 _x	D6 _x	D9 _x	58 _x	D8 _x	66 _x	D7 _x	3A _x	C8 _x	3C _x
80 _x	FA _x	96 _x	A7 _x	98 _x	EC _x	B8 _x	C7 _x	AE _x	69 _x	4B _x	AB _x	A9 _x	67 _x	0A _x	47 _x	F2 _x
90 _x	B5 _x	22 _x	E5 _x	EE _x	BE _x	2B _x	81 _x	12 _x	83 _x	1B _x	0E _x	23 _x	F5 _x	45 _x	21 _x	CE _x
A0 _x	49 _x	2C _x	F9 _x	E6 _x	B6 _x	28 _x	17 _x	82 _x	1A _x	8B _x	FE _x	8A _x	09 _x	C9 _x	87 _x	4E _x
B0 _x	E1 _x	2E _x	E4 _x	E0 _x	EB _x	90 _x	A4 _x	1E _x	85 _x	60 _x	00 _x	25 _x	F4 _x	F1 _x	94 _x	0B _x
C0 _x	E7 _x	75 _x	EF _x	34 _x	31 _x	D4 _x	D0 _x	86 _x	7E _x	AD _x	FD _x	29 _x	30 _x	3B _x	9F _x	F8 _x
D0 _x	C6 _x	13 _x	06 _x	05 _x	C5 _x	11 _x	77 _x	7C _x	7A _x	78 _x	36 _x	1C _x	39 _x	59 _x	18 _x	56 _x
E0 _x	B3 _x	B0 _x	24 _x	20 _x	B2 _x	92 _x	A3 _x	C0 _x	44 _x	62 _x	10 _x	B4 _x	84 _x	43 _x	93 _x	C2 _x
F0 _x	4A _x	BD _x	8F _x	2D _x	BC _x	9C _x	6A _x	40 _x	CF _x	A2 _x	80 _x	4F _x	1F _x	CA _x	AA _x	42 _x


Attacks on Khazad

- 1 Khazad belong to group of ciphers which consists of Shark, Square, Rijndael, Anubis.
- 2 These were made in such a way that differential attack and linear attacks are not successful attacks for them.
- 3 It is very unusual to be successful for these ciphers on their full versions.


Differential attack

- 1 A differential attack exists for a 3 rounds Khazad cipher but its time complexity is very large as compared to 3 round integral attack.
- 2 Lets see the effect of each round on the message block due to different layers.

The 3 round differential attack



The 3 round differential attack




So after guessing 8 bytes of key or guessing subkey there would be at max 2^{64} possible guesses for 8 bytes of subkey, therefore the time complexity achieved would be 2^{64}

Attack Type	Rounds	Time
differential attack	3	2^{64}

DDT

The DDT for s-box of KHAZAD can be created similar to how it was created for other block ciphers.



There were around 100 s-box transitions like 5 - 5 , 4 - 2E, 7 - 86 having the best probability equal to $\frac{8}{16} = 0.5$. Any of the byte can be taken accordingly for differential attack.


Integral attack

Also known as the **The Square Attack**. The integral attack consists of the following properties. The attack is set on a 256 plaintexts, such that the first byte takes all 256 possible values while other bytes have constant values.

- **The All property:** The All property is the byte in which all values come once among the texts in the set. It is denoted by **A**.
- **The Constant property:** The constant property refers to the byte in which all texts in the set have the same value. It is denoted by **C**.
- **The Balanced property :** Also called the 0-sum property, the balanced property refers to the byte in which sum of all the texts in the set is 0. It is denoted by **B**.


The 3 round integral attack

The initial round consists of one byte to have A while the rest bytes have C




K_0 addition

After key addition no changes to any property, one byte to have A while the rest bytes have C




Round 1 nonlinear transformation

After nonlinear transformation of round 1 no changes to any property, one byte to have A while the rest bytes have C




Round 1 linear transformation

After linear transformation of round 1 changes will occur in all constant property, now all bytes will have all property A




The 3 round integral attack

After key addition no changes to any property, all bytes have A




Round 2 nonlinear transformation

After nonlinear transformation of round 2 no changes to any property, all bytes to have A




Round 2 linear transformation

After linear transformation of round 2 changes will occur in all bytes containing all property, now all bytes will have balanced property B



Round 2 Key XOR

After key addition no changes to any property, all bytes have B



The 3 round integral attack

- 1 All bytes in our plaintexts will have balanced property after 2 rounds.
- 2 No H-box or linear transformation in the last round.
- 3 sub-key guessed separately to do a complete 3-rounds attack here.
- 4 The complexity of this attack will be nearly 2^{16} sbox looks and 2^9 plaintexts selections. Also we can increase this attack to 4 rounds by guessing the other subkey and this will increase time complexity by 2^{64} .
- 5 The 3 round integral attack's complexity is:

Attack Type	Rounds	Time	Space
integral attack-1	3	2^{16}	2^9

The 4 round integral attack and beyond

The another variant is 4 round integral attack where we guess the other subkey.

Attack Type	Rounds	Time	Space
integral attack-2	4	2^{80}	2^9

- Improved Integral attack for 5 rounds.
- Weak Keys Attack
- Interpolation attack
- The boomerang attack

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Brownie Point

- We implemented the key expansion algorithm and the code implementation of the cipher in python language which was not available anywhere and was solely done by us.
- We created several figures using draw.io which will be very helpful for people who want to understand KHAZAD implementation algorithm and basic attacks on it. These figures were not available online and were solely made by us.

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Security

In terms of security:

- The most effective attack to find the KHAZAD cipher key is a full search.
- Retrieving any information about some Plain-Cipher text pairs using any given Plain-Cipher text pair is as efficient as using complete key search to determine the key.
- The approximate complexity of the key search by the full search method is directly dependent on the bit length of the key and is equal to 2^{127} applications of KHAZAD.

Key Features

- KHAZAD is much better than most of the available modern ciphers as far as compatibility is concerned.
- It's a very fast cipher and it avoids using excessive storage space for all of its code and tables.
- Since it does not have uncommon and expensive instructions built for a processor, it is good for most platforms.
- The maths included in the creation algorithm is easy to understand.
- Since the key schedule is similar to the round function, we don't require any extra storage.

Thanks

Team Members

- Swapnil Narad
- Devansh Chaudhary
- Aditya Kumar Susawat

Implementation Info

- Github Link: <https://github.com/swapnilnarad2000/Khazad-Block-Cipher.git>