Consider an arbitrary profile

 $P = (P_1, P_2, \dots, P_n)$   $P_i(1) = P_i$ , peaks.

Goal: Show f(P) = med (p1,..., pn, y1,..., yn-1)

We can assume WLOG PI & P2 & --- & Pn due to ANON.  $x_{ay} = med(p_1, ..., p_n, y_1, ..., y_{n-1})$ 

Case 1: a is a phantom peak

say  $a=y_j$ , for some  $j \in \{1, ..., n-1\}$ is a median of (2n-1) points, and (j-1) phantom peaks are to the left of the median and (m-1-j) are on the right (because of y; {y;+1). Hence

(n-1-j) phantom peaks  $\{(j-1) \text{ plantom } \mathcal{Y}_j \}$ (n-j) agentj agent

Hence

þ, ≤ --- ≤ þn-j ≤ Ŋ; = a ≤ ðþn-j+, ≤ ---- ≤ þn ) (1)

Consider two profiles  $(P_1, P_2, \dots, P_n)$  $\left(P_1^{\circ}, P_2^{\circ}, \dots, P_{n-j}^{\circ}, P_{n-j+1}, \dots, P_n^{1}\right)$ I apply f b (say) y; (definition)

fin SP => Mj Pib => Mj & b

v also => b P, y, but P, (y, => b < y; )

repeating the argument for the 
$$(n-j)$$
 agents, we get  $f(P_1, \ldots, P_{n-j}, P_{n-j+1}, \ldots, P_n) = \gamma_j$ 

now consider  $f(P_1, \ldots, P_{n-j}, P_{n-j+1}, \ldots, P_n) = b$  (say)

 $\gamma_j P_n' b \Rightarrow b \leq \gamma_j$ 
 $\gamma_j P_n' b \Rightarrow b \leq \gamma_j$ 

$$b P_n y_j$$
 and  $y_j \leq b_n \Rightarrow y_j \leq b$ 

$$b = y_j.$$

## Case 2: a is an Agent peak

We prove this for 2 agents - The general case repeats this argument.

Claim:  $N = \{1, 2\}$ , let P and P' be 1.t.  $P_i(1) = P_i'(1)$   $\forall i \in N \Rightarrow f(P) = f(P')$ 

Proof: Let  $a = P_1(1) = P_1'(1)$  and  $b = P_2(1) = P_2'(1)$  $f(P) = \pi$  and  $f(P_1', P_2) = \gamma$ 

I is SP, hence xP, y and yP, x

Since The peaks are same, 'f x, y fall on The same

side of The peak, they must be same. The only

other possibility is that x and y fall on different

sides of the peak. We show that this is not

possible.

WLOG  $2 < a < \gamma$  and a < bsince f is  $SP + ONTO \Leftrightarrow f$  is SP + PEand PE requires that  $f(P) \in [a, b]$  but Repeat The argument for  $(P_1', P_2) \rightarrow (P_1', P_2')$  Profile:  $(P_1, P_2) = P_1, P_1(1) = a_1, P_2(1) = b$ y, is the phantom peak by assumption mel(a, b, y,) is an agent peak WLOG let the median be a. Assume for contradiction  $f(P) = c \neq a$ By PE, c must be within a and b. Two cases to consider: b < a < y, and y, < a < 6 Case 1: b<a<y, By efficiency c < a

Consider  $P'_{i}$  /s.t.  $P'_{i}(1) = a = P_{i}(1)$ and y, P, c [possible since they are on other sides of the peak P,(1) ] Since f(P) = C

 $f(P_1',P_2) = C$ 

by The claim

Now consider the profile (P1,P2) I peak at the right most.  $P_2(1) = b < \gamma_1 < P'(1)$ 

The median of (b, P, (1), y,) is y, and hence by The previous result,

 $f(P_1',P_2)=\gamma_1$ 

& But since y, P, C and f(P, /P2) = C agent 1 will manipulate in  $(P_1', P_2)$  to  $(P_1', P_2)$  which is a contradiction to f being SP. (23-4)

Case 2:  $y_1 < a < b$ PE  $\Rightarrow$  a < cConstruct  $P_1' \land A \cdot b$ .  $P_1'(1) = a = P_1(1)$ and  $p \quad y_1 p_1' c$ . [possible]  $f(P_1', P_2) = c \quad [claim]$ Consider profile  $(P_1^\circ, P_2)$   $P_1^\circ(1) < y_1 < b \Rightarrow f(P_1^\circ, P_2) = y_1$ but  $y_1 p_1' c$ , hence manipulable by agent 1. Confradiction

The phantom voters/peaks are introduced so that the extreme preference conditions can be handled with a "fair" decision.

E.g. if help the agents are at the extreme left and help are at the extreme pright, then a fair distribution of phantom peaks may pick the median at somewhere in the center trather than at some extremal print.

Median voting rule is actually a class of voting rules.