## PHOS and cons of VCG mechanism


- 1) DSIC hence very low cognitive load on The bidders
- 2) No deficit (and subsidy) if items are goods
- (3) Never charges a losing agent
- (4) Individually national to participate nobody loses money.

## Criticismo of VCG:

- 1) Privacy and transporency:
  - (a) it neveals true valuations/types. Two competing companies would not like to make the private information public.
- would not like to make the private information public.

  (b) a malicious auctioneer may introduce take bidders to extract more payment from the bidders.
- 3) Not frigal: payment could be very large

VCG is guaranteed to be no deficit, but can charge payment much larger than the cost.



Example: item delivery network (2 g., Amazon)
This is a cost setup, hence The values can be considered
to be negative. Each edge is a player.

## 4) Revenue monotonicity violated

trevenue monotonicity: revenue weakly in creases with number

of players.

		F	M	payment	
_		0	90	$O \rightarrow D$	nobody's
	2	100	Ð	90 ->0	pivotal
-	3	100	0	<del>)</del> 0	

## (5) Not budget balanced

This is a no deficit me chanism, but it almost always keeps Surphus - Which can be large.

Problem: this money cannot be redistributed among the same players, since that will change their payoffs and the resulting mechanism can be not DSIC.

If the players are partitioned into two groups and the surplus of one group is redistributed over the other group - then it is budget balanced, but the overall efficiency is compromised.

This surplus has to be taken away or destroyed - money burning

To understand this treade off better, see

Nath and Sandholm (2019): Efficiency and budget balance in general quasi-linear domains, Games and From Behavior.

Remark: these are certain limitations, VCG still is quite elegant and widely used in various settings. Good to know the limitations for effective use.