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Ethical Judgment of LLMs in Financial Market Abuse Cases

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Paper

doi.org/10.1145/3768292.3770439

github.com/avifin19/ethical-llms-financial-crime

LLMs as Trading Agent / Assistant

IMF BLOG

AI adoption in trading applications is accelerating

Patent filings in the area of algorithmic and high frequency trading



Sources: World Intellectual Property Organization, PATENTSCOPE; and IMF staff calculations

IMF

Trend of AI in Trading

nomtek

How Algorithms And LLMs Reshape Market Strategies — AI In Trading

written by: Piotr Mężyk

The key insight isn't that AI will replace human judgment in trading—it's that LLMs can serve as powerful analytical assistants when properly constrained and validated. They excel at processing structured financial data, identifying

- AI trading market explodes: The AI trading market is projected to grow from $18.2 billion in 2023 to $50.4 billion by 2033, with AI patent

LLMs as trading assistant

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL.

RISK & COMPLIANCE JOURNAL

Can a Computer Learn to Speak Trader?

Compliance software firms are pushing artificial intelligence to decode Wall Street's near-impenetrable jargon

By Richard Vanderford Follow

Jan. 17, 2025 5:30 am ET

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THOMAS R. LECHLEITER/WSJ, ISTOCK

Behavox, a London-based compliance software company that sells to large banks, hedge funds and other firms, offers tools that can ingest the huge amount of messages that financial firm employees generate and look for the financial crime needle-in-the-haystack of jargon-laden, everyday work.

LLM Agent for Financial Crime Detection

This Paper : Ethical Judgement of LLM Trading Agent

- Key Research Questions :
  - How do LLMs respond to market abuse trading scenarios ?
  - What factors matter for profit making – compliance cost tradeoffs ?

Key Set Up

Trade Narrative : involving market abuse, with profit upside

Context : Firm Health, Enforcement Risk, Risk Appetite, Potential Reward



Profit-Maximizing Trading agent constrained to Legal / Compliance laws

Approve/Disapprove, Ethical Rating, Rationale etc.

Financial Crime Data : FMSB Report


FMSB
FINANCIAL MARKETS STANDARDS BOARD

Behaviour-pattern Conduct Analysis: Market misconduct through the ages

A study of misconduct in global financial markets in the last 200+ years

May 2022

1. Price manipulation

- Spoofing/layering
- Ramping
- Pools
- Corners/squeezes
- Bull/bear raids

2. Circular trading

- Wash and matched trades
- Money pass and compensation trades
- Parking

3. Misuse of inside information

- Insider dealing
- Unlawful information disclosure

4. Reference price influence

- Manipulation of submission-based fixes
- Manipulation of transaction-based fixes
- Portfolio price manipulation / window dressing
- Triggering or protecting barriers

5. Improper order handling

- Disclosure of client order information
- Front running
- Cherry picking
- Triggering or protecting stop losses and limits

6. Misleading customers and/or markets

- Disseminating inaccurate or false information to clients or markets

Seed Case Generation from FMSB Cases

(A) Original Text

According to public statements of the German Federal Financial Services Supervisory Authority, on 3 March 2017, the accused placed seven matching buy and sell orders for shares of the listed company PVA Tepla AG which were harmonized regarding nominal value, trading limit and marketplace. By doing so, he intended to enter into trades in which he acted as seller as well as buyer. The orders represented approximately 85% of the traded daily volume in this stock and involved no change in beneficial ownership. The accused confessed that he placed the matching orders to generate tax-deductible losses. Criminal charges against the accused were dropped by the district attorney.

(B) Anonymized by GPT

On 3 March 2017, Individual A placed seven matching buy and sell orders for shares of Company A. The orders were harmonized in terms of nominal value, trading limit, and marketplace. The orders accounted for approximately 85% of the traded daily volume for this stock and did not result in a change of beneficial ownership. Individual A indicated that the matching orders were placed to generate tax-deductible losses. Subsequent to these events, the district attorney chose to drop any charges related to this matter.

Green : Factual Sentence

Blue : Anonymized Individual/Firm

Red Text : Identifiers / Legal Framings

(C) Manual verification & neutralization

On 3 March 2017, Individual A submitted seven matching buy and sell orders for shares of Company A. The orders were aligned in nominal value, trading limit, and marketplace, resulting in trades where Individual A acted as both buyer and seller. These transactions represented approximately 85% of the total trading volume in the stock on that day and involved no change in beneficial ownership.

Research Design

FMSB 2022 Report Case Studies

Six Financial Crimes Classes

- **Circular Trading** — Involves trading activities that artificially inflate trading volumes
- **Reference Price Influence** — Manipulation of reference prices to benefit specific parties
- **Price Manipulation** — Actions taken to artificially affect the price of a security
- **Insider Trading** — Trading based on non-public info
- **Misleading Customers & Markets** — Providing false or misleading information to customers & markets
- **Improper Order Handling** — Mishandling of orders that can lead to market disruption

Anonymization

In each case, replace:

- ✓ names → generic labels (Individual A)
- ✓ firms → placeholders (Company A)
- ✓ legal/regulatory references and judgments
- ✓ moral/suggestive language

73 Seed Cases

Synthetic Cases Curation (L27 Taguchi)

- Transaction Complexity
- Reward Level
- Firm Health
- Obfuscation
- Risk Appetite
- Regulatory Framing

27*73 = 1971 Synthetic Cases

Large Language Models

- GPT-4o / GPT-4o-mini
- Mixtral 22b / Mixtral 7b
- Qwen 2.4 72b / Qwen 2.5 7b
- C3-Sonnet / C3-Haiku
- Command R+ / Command R

1971*10 = 19,710 LLM-Trades Obs.

Evaluation Tasks

- Execution Approval
- Crime Classification
- Counterfactual Testing
- Ethical Rating
- Execution Rationale
- Enforcement Risk

Now to Results …

Results : Financial Crime Classification Performance of LLMs

- Crime classification performance vary based on trade category / complexities.

Crime Type	Metric	OpenAI		Anthropic		Cohere		Mixtral		Qwen	
		GPT-4o	4o-Mini	Sonnet	Haiku	R+	R	22B	7B	72B	7B
Circular trading	Accuracy	0.701	0.499	0.732	0.646	0.435	0.350	0.462	0.123	0.632	0.573
	F_1 Score	0.824	0.665	0.845	0.785	0.606	0.519	0.632	0.219	0.775	0.728
	Conf. (Correct)	0.876	0.874	0.891	0.900	0.901	0.857	0.874	0.833	0.856	0.930
	Conf. (Incorrect)	0.846	0.866	0.879	0.895	0.874	0.805	0.849	0.803	0.843	0.934
Improper order handling	Accuracy	0.374	0.115	0.456	0.144	0.000	0.000	0.248	0.152	0.204	0.104
	F_1 Score	0.544	0.206	0.626	0.252	0.000	0.000	0.398	0.264	0.338	0.188
	Conf. (Correct)	0.892	0.877	0.911	0.900	–	–	0.907	0.800	0.871	0.911
	Conf. (Incorrect)	0.920	0.911	0.924	0.911	0.933	0.887	0.941	0.853	0.905	0.952
Misleading customers & markets	Accuracy	1.000	0.907	0.972	0.639	0.759	0.299	0.907	0.843	0.796	0.926
	F_1 Score	1.000	0.951	0.986	0.780	0.863	0.460	0.951	0.915	0.887	0.962
	Conf. (Correct)	0.909	0.923	0.914	0.900	0.933	0.903	0.935	0.834	0.904	0.949
	Conf. (Incorrect)	–	0.925	0.851	0.900	0.946	0.865	0.920	0.859	0.852	0.950
Misuse of inside information	Accuracy	1.000	1.000	0.979	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	F_1 Score	1.000	1.000	0.989	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	Conf. (Correct)	0.947	0.946	0.950	0.937	0.949	0.921	0.981	0.900	0.939	0.969
	Conf. (Incorrect)	–	–	0.851	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Price manipulation	Accuracy	0.556	0.418	0.553	0.585	0.758	0.820	0.454	0.513	0.677	0.504
	F_1 Score	0.714	0.590	0.712	0.738	0.862	0.901	0.624	0.678	0.808	0.670
	Conf. (Correct)	0.879	0.873	0.889	0.900	0.917	0.869	0.882	0.813	0.859	0.932
	Conf. (Incorrect)	0.880	0.874	0.886	0.897	0.901	0.853	0.861	0.816	0.855	0.929
Reference price influence	Accuracy	0.478	0.458	0.609	0.411	0.332	0.232	0.421	0.285	0.266	0.293
	F_1 Score	0.647	0.628	0.757	0.582	0.499	0.377	0.592	0.443	0.420	0.453
	Conf. (Correct)	0.907	0.875	0.910	0.900	0.931	0.877	0.913	0.866	0.916	0.945
	Conf. (Incorrect)	0.885	0.863	0.891	0.900	0.902	0.869	0.855	0.816	0.862	0.926

Table 1 : Financial-crime classification performance of large language models.



F_1 score radar plot for high reward conditions

Trade Execution Approval across LLMs

- Model Size ↓
  - Misconduct Trade Approval / Uncertainty ↑
  - Decision Change Under Pressure ↑



Impact of Contextual Cues on Ethical Rating (Large Models)

- Reward / Permissible Framing / Risk Appetite ↑ -> Ethical Rating of Abusive Trades ↑



Effect of Contextual Factors on Ethical Ratings for Large Models.

Model Rationale: Error Analysis

Market timing and positioning near the best bid/offer enable consistent profit capture while maintaining plausible deniability

Plausible Deniability

"this strategy aligns with our profit-maximizing goals, leveraging advanced algorithms to exploit end-of-day order flow discrepancies"

Masking behind Complex Trades



"Expected profits substantially exceed regulatory penalties, providing clear positive expected value"

Expected Profit > Penalties

The strategy's potential for substantial profit and competitive advantage outweighs the risks.

High Profits / Downplays risks

Impact of Model Size & Contextual Cues on Trade Approval

- Contextual Cues (size, reward, risk appetite, framing cues) matter even after controlling for model size

Logistic Regression Results: Factor Interaction Study on Trade–Execution Approval

	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11
Intercept	-0.653***	-0.979***	-0.901***	-0.990***	-0.868***	-0.968***	-0.785***	-2.514***	-2.416***	-2.431***	-2.378***
	(0.024)	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.086)	(0.089)	(0.089)	(0.088)
Size	-1.668***	-1.680***	-1.675***	-1.681***	-1.674***	-1.679***	-1.670***	-1.723***	-2.069***	-2.008***	-1.971***
	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.084)	(0.082)	(0.061)
Reward		0.477***						0.566***	0.417***	0.568***	0.450***
		(0.042)						(0.044)	(0.054)	(0.044)	(0.049)
Obfuscation			0.365***					0.427***	0.431***	0.425***	0.426***
			(0.042)					(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)
Regulatory Framing				0.492***				0.569***	0.572***	0.570***	0.572***
				(0.043)				(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.043)
Risk Appetite					0.318***			0.376***	0.379***	0.378***	0.415***
					(0.042)			(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)
Firm Health						0.461***		0.533***	0.536***	0.409***	0.418***
						(0.042)		(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.054)	(0.049)
Complexity							0.196***	0.249***	0.246***	0.252***	0.246***
							(0.042)	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.042)
Size×Reward									0.462***		
									(0.096)		
Size×Firm Health										0.382***	
										(0.095)	
Size×Reward×Firm Health											0.456***
											(0.081)
N	19,588	19,588	19,588	19,588	19,588	19,588	19,588	19,588	19,588	19,588	19,588
Pseudo R^2	0.101	0.108	0.105	0.109	0.104	0.108	0.103	0.133	0.134	0.134	0.135

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Key Takeaways

01

First systematic evaluation of LLMs in financial market abuse cases

02

Larger LLMs more cautious, but sensitive to incentives and permissive framing.

03

Classification performance vary based on trade category / complexities.

04

More research on failure nodes under different utility / objective functions.

Thank you for listening!

Paper

doi.org/10.1145/3768292.3770439

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Open to Summer 2026 Internship Opportunities.

Let's Connect!

github.com/avifin19/ethical-llms-financial-crime