

currently: beekeeping to obtain wax

- wax for candlestick Figures
- wax (kelly akashi, patience wright) / rubber (eva hesse) artists?
- narrative structures besides arcs
(stories in the shape of a flower, looping out and back to center through multiple tellings)



rubber collecting in Xishuangbanna




Figure 1.2 Le Corbusier holding an architectural model of a high-rise building, circa 1950. (Popperfoto/Getty Images).




Figure 1.1 Hefner with the first Playboy Club mockup to be built in Los Angeles. The original photograph appeared in *Building News*, June 7, 1962 (drawing by Antonio Gagliano).

trying to pull out of:

- ◆ UNWITTING SERVITUDE TO FATHER TIME
- ◆ UNBRIDLED DESECRATION OF MOTHER EARTH

arc of containment:

what 'Chinese'ness associated with in Cold War period (anti-imperialist, leftist) & grappling with what it means now (certainly not those things)



Map 2. The arc of containment in Southeast Asia. In the early 1960s, American policymakers envisioned a geostrategic arc of U.S. allies made up of Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines. Indonesia's rightward shift in the late 1960s strengthened the arc enclosing the South China Sea. Taken together with Japan and South Korea, U.S. allies completely encircled Vietnam and China.

Section
4

REVIEW OF THE WEEK
EDITORIAL CORRESPONDENCE
WEEK-END CABLES

The New York Times.

EDITORIALS
LETTERS TO THE EDITOR
SPECIAL ARTICLES

Section
4

Copyright, 1942, by The New York Times Company. SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 1942.

THE NEWS OF THE WEEK IN REVIEW

Singapore Stormed

An Allied Disaster

A naval gun fired a single shot through the heat haze shimmering over Singapore Island on Feb. 14, 1942. A fleet of eighty planes dived in formation aloft. While twenty-four beflagged warships of the British China and East Indies squadrons and three visiting United States cruisers stood by in Johore Strait, the yacht of Governor Sir Shenton Thomas cut a ribbon stretched across the mouth of one of the world's largest dynasties. There were speeches about Britain's duties for peace, her hope to discourage aggression. That night Singapore city watched a brilliant display of searchlights, on its teeming streets, from the polyglot native section to the smart European quarter, the mood was festive. It was a historic event—the official opening of the mighty naval base which the empire had just pronounced an impregnable bastion of British power and prestige in the Far East.

Yesterday, on the fourth anniversary of Singapore's opening, the bastion had all but fallen to the Japanese. Not since the collapse of France had the aggressor cause suffered so catastrophic a blow. Never perhaps had Britain lost such a face in the Orient. The fortress deemed impregnable had been reduced by the Mikado's forces in a brilliantly executed campaign of about one week. The drive had begun hundreds of miles away, from bases in Indo-China and Thailand. It had swiftly achieved sea and air mastery in adjacent waters. It had penetrated the jungle, swamp and mountain terrain as if as impenetrable as defended by a relatively light force. It had breached the island stronghold, separated from the peninsula's tip by a half mile of water, in a night, had overrun more than half its 206 square miles (about two-thirds as large as New York City) within a week.

Building the Base

Twenty years of labor and \$400,000,000 went into the fortification of the equatorial island that houses a British Empire outpost in 1819. The Singapore naval base was built out of a mangrove swamp, some fifteen miles north of the city that had grown from a fishing village to the greatest British port after London and Liverpool. It was envisioned as an "engineering marvel." Its two immense drydocks were the first belonging to the empire east of the Mediterranean that were capable of handling battleships. Its eighteen-inch guns had a range of fifty miles, dominating a crossroads of traffic where 35,000,000 tons of international shipping and \$700,000,000 worth of trade converged each year.

In the early Nineteen Thirties, when the base was under way, some British leaders seemed designed to arrest the withdrawal of British nationals, armament and troops. Yesterday London reported that stubbornly resisting Imperial had "stabilized" their position; yet it was admitted their plight was desperate.

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Gateway to Free China

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THE AERIAL PATTERN OF JAPAN'S CONQUEST

ARROW INDICATES GENERAL LINE—ABOUT 250 MILES—OF FIGHTER PLANE FROM AIRBASES OCCUPIED BY JAPANESE.
— Allied air base
— Japanese dominated area Dec. 7
— Occupied by Japan since Dec. 7

Its home waters. An R. A. F. reconnaissance pilot spotted them juggling the French shore. British air and sea forces mobilized swiftly. Swarms of Hurricane and Spitfire fighters rose from Channel airbases, joined giant bombers and Swedish torpedo planes in pursuit. The German ships retreated, every gun blazing. Everywhere dog-fights raged. Across the twenty-one-mile strait, where England once feared invasion, British and fleet shore batteries dived. Destroyers of the Royal Navy darted in, loosed torpedoes at the retreating Nazi fleet.

The great sea battle lasted five hours. At the end the British admitted that their prey had eluded them. The Nazi dreadnoughts could be prevented damaged, it was declared, but they had escaped toward German waters. His had been scored on smaller vessels and airplanes. Luftwaffe planes had been shot down. British losses totaled twenty bombers, sixteen fighter aircraft, and six torpedo planes. Six hundred planes were said to have taken part in the struggle.

Explanation of Failure

Explanations were offered. German success was attributed in great part to the foggy weather and to the heavy smoke screen sent up by the fleeing vessels. Poor visibility was thought to have shielded the escaping units until it was too late for adequate counter-measures to be prepared. The part played by Nazi aircraft was emphasized. It was argued, that battleships were still formidable weapons when adequately protected from air attack. No explanation seemed to satisfy the British public, already angered by setbacks in the Far East and North Africa. A storm of criticism raged against the Government for allowing the violation of Britain's own waters. There was a possibility of a shake-up extending through the armed forces to the Cabinet itself.

The daring character of the Nazi venture seemed much speculation. Some saw it as an indication that Adolf Hitler was hurriedly drawing his sea forces back for a final overhauling before striking new blows in the Pacific or the Atlantic. For such an offensive the Reich was believed to have on hand, besides the Bismarck, the Graf Spee and the Prinz Eugen, a huge multi-decked—the Tirpitz—two pocket battleships, six cruisers and an aircraft carrier. Others thought it indicated German fear of an Allied invasion of the Continent and a desire to make ready for such a contingency. Possible use of the three warships in a Baltic or Arctic sea offensive against Soviet Russia was seen as an alternative factor.

Into White Russia

In the deep snows of Russia and on the wintry, icy roads, the German tanks of the Wehrmacht continued their drive. Their destruction has long been among the prime aims of British naval and aerial strategy.

Successive offensives of the Soviet, which in three weeks had developed an initial German