

Terrorism and the Resource Curse: A Weapon of the Resource Rich

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Abstract

How does rebel funding influence their use of terrorism as a strategy of violence? Rebels face a variety of challenges in their struggle against states. One problem is controlling the population, or winning them over to your side. I argue that rebels that exploit natural resources have the freedom to commit terrorism against the population because they do not need to rely on locals for recruitment, goods, etc. This is also an attempt at refuting a portion of the ‘weapon of the weak’ argument, which states that groups that use terrorism are weaker actors, since they cannot directly attack the state. In this study, I examine all rebel groups between 1990 and 2012 and use a negative binomial regression with fixed effects on rebel group and year. I also perform factor analysis to determine if there are overall ‘types’ of civil wars. My results(although early) are not supportive of my theory, and are also supportive of the weapon of the weak argument. The factor analysis shows that there are civil wars that are dominated by the state, and those in which rebels have more power which are more intense. Groups that control territory are no more likely to commit attacks, and are less likely to kill individuals in attacks. These results may be subject to future robustness checks.

Introduction

There is a large school of thought in the terrorism literature that suggests terrorism is a 'weapon of the weak.' (Crenshaw 1981, Pape 2003) This definition suggests that terrorist actors are inherently weak, and resort to terrorism as they cannot change the state by directly attacking it. Rebel groups, on the other hand, are strong enough to attack the state and attempt to overthrow or separate from the current regime. However, rebel groups use terrorism throughout many civil conflicts.

An example of a group that has used terrorism increasingly throughout its conflict with the state is the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The FARC is a Marxist rebel group that has been fighting the Colombian government since 1964. After different ceasefires and various agreements, the conflict has nonetheless persisted in Colombia. During the conflict the FARC has consistently resorted to violence and kidnappings as both acts of power against the population as well as a smaller portion of their funding. (Bannon and Collier, 2003; Hanson, 2003; Offstein, 2003). The FARC also assassinated a former culture minister in 2001 and Hijacked a plane which resulted in a kidnapping of a senator in 2003. (Hanson, 2003) The FARC is also known as one of the strongest and most durable rebel groups in history. It has fought the Colombian government for more than fifty years and at one point was one of the world's largest suppliers of cocaine.

Throughout the FARC's reign in Colombia it has exploited natural resources in the country for sources of funding. The FARC engaged in the extortion of Coca (Offstein 2003), Tungsten and Gold mines (Smith 2013, Pettersson 2013), coffee (Dube and Vargas, 2013), and oil (Offstein, 2003). These natural resources that were exploited by the FARC gave them access

to funding that was not reliant on the local population. The rebels can divert the funding towards arms, explosives, man power etc. to give them more power to fight. These funds also could be used for the planning and carrying out of terrorist attacks. After the 70's the FARC became increasingly involved in the drug production industry in Colombia. In the 90's the FARC was at its peak in terms of economic power during the drug trade. During the 90's the FARC also began to commit more acts of terror. In 1997 the FARC committed the most terror attacks in its history, 152 the most in the groups history. The following year the FARC killed 444 people in attacks, the deadliest year in the groups history.(Global Terrorism Database) Is this relationship coincidental, or is there something more?

When the FARC started, it was explicitly a Marxist rebel group that aimed at replacing the government of Colombia with a communist state. The FARC has since supported its soldiers with health care and payment, trying to uphold its communist principles. However, since the 70's there was a growing rift between the group's ideological status and its political nature. During President Bentancur's Presidency in the mid 1980's the rebel's groups were given a chance to negotiate with the government and participate legally in politics. However, the FARC broke the portion of the agreement that specifically stated they need to cease kidnaping and extortion activities. In other words, the FARC was unwilling to give up their stream of income to participate in the political process. The streams of revenue from illicit drugs and other natural resources gave them the military power to continue to resist the government, as well as carry out their terrorist activities.

While the FARC is certainly a unique rebel group in its duration and circumstance, many other rebel groups are also funded by natural resources. These resources give groups the firepower to continue fighting the government and carry out acts of terrorism when and where

they previously could not.(Fearon 2004) The structure of this paper is as follows. First I will define what terrorism is in this paper. Second I review the relevant literature for both the resource curse and the group dynamics of terrorism. Third I will lay out my theory. Fourth I will present my research design followed by relevant tables and results. Lastly, I will offer concluding thoughts.

Definition of Terrorism

To examine the relationship between rebel group finance and their use of terrorism, I need to define what terrorism is. The major debate on the definition of terrorism stems from whether terrorism is actor specific or action specific. By that I mean, do the ‘terrorists’ determine what we call terrorism, or do ‘terror attacks’? This debate has raged on for as long as terrorism has been studied, however for this study the decision is simple and straight forward. I am using an action based definition of terrorism. More specifically, I am using the Global Terrorism Database(GTD) definition of what a terrorist action is. “A terrorist attack is the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion or intimidation.”(In future versions of this paper I plan on addressing the possible reverse causality problem associated with this definitions.)

The choice to use GTD’s more broad set of criteria for an action based definition of terrorism is logical given the circumstances. An actor based definition of terrorism would not make sense, given that the actors in my case are all rebel groups that take up arms directly against the state. These actors are by definition not weak. However, this definition does allow me to test hypotheses concerning the strategy of violence rebel groups use. Notably, this definition does include attacks against possible military or quasi-military(such as police or

national guard type agencies) targets. Again, this is because the definition of terrorism I am employing has more to do with the nature of the attack rather than the actors or victims. This definition is broad enough to pick up on different strategies of violence rebels use, while not being too exclusive and missing out on possible incidents.

The other break in the terrorism literature is using transnational or domestic terrorism as a variable of choice. While some theories make specific assumptions about which terrorism is likely to be related to the covariates, this theory does not make an explicit assumption.

Arguably, domestic terrorism should be more closely related with civil wars, however a rebels ability to carry out a terrorist attack is not exclusive to one type of terrorism. Additionally, the term 'transnational terrorism' is a loaded term. If 40 natives and one foreigner from a neighboring country is killed that act is coded as transnational, regardless of the groups goals in carrying out the attack. This makes that data incredibly noisy when attempting to disaggregate between domestic and transnational acts. For the purposes of this paper I do not differentiate between transnational and domestic terrorism.

Literature Review

This paper examines the intersection of the resource curse and group level studies of terrorism. The relevant literature in both camps has implications about the capabilities and strategy selection of rebel groups.

Much of the cross-national resource curse literature to date has been strongly influenced by a series of articles by Collier and Hoeffler(1998, 2002, 2004). The papers findings suggest a non-linear relationship between resources and civil conflict, determining that the risk of civil war is greatest when resource dependence(exports divided by income) is equal to roughly 30%. The authors also present the 'greed' argument. Namely: Rebels are incentivized to rebel against the

state and capture the natural resources. This is also called the state-as-prize argument. When a state has natural resources, it has the ability to draw more rents than normal, increasing the incentives for a group to try and seize it. There is strong evidence that natural resource abundance drive conflict(Fearon 2005; Ross 2006). Collier and Hoeffler(2005) adapt their theory to deal with possible endogeneity issues by using resource rents as an independent variable rather than resource dependence. The authors find a same but weaker relationship, increased resource rents are associated with an increase in the likelihood of civil war.

More recent literature focuses on more micro-level studies of the resource curse. Lujala(2009) uses spatial data that includes information on conflict zones as well as diamond deposits, hydrocarbon extraction, and drug cultivation. Lujala finds that there is a positive relationship between diamond mining and conflict intensity. He also finds a positive relationship between hydrocarbon extraction. However the author does not find a relationship between drug cultivation and conflict intensity. Furthermore, Weinstein(2005) finds that rebel leaders that manage to gain control of natural resources can start groups faster than other ideological groups. Humphreys and Weinstein (2008) also use data from the conflict in Sierra Leone to show that material incentives are good predictors for individuals to join rebel groups. These results show how natural resources can create new and more violent conflict between states.

There has been limited work on rebel groups using terrorism in the context of civil war. Stanton(2013) argues that weaker rebels are more likely to use terrorism. More specifically, Stanton finds that groups that do not control territory are more likely to use terrorism.(The control of territory is crucial in determining a group's strength is common in civil war literature) A recent working paper by Fortna has a series of results measuring various aspects of the 'weapon of the weak argument.' The author finds little to no support for the argument and many

of its possible variations. While there has been other work detailing the civilian targeting of rebel groups in civil war, those arguments pertain to general human rights violations, so they provide limited context for the argument to follow.(In a future version I may return back to this literature as an influence)

Theory

The logic of this theory follows closely with Cunningham et al.'s definition of rebel group power and what Stanton(2009) refers to as control. Cunningham et al. (2009) divides a rebel groups strength into two categories: The power to target and the power to resist. Rebel groups that have offensive strength, "or the ability to inflict costs on a government in the center," have the power to target.(Cunningham et al. 2009, 575) While defensive strength, or the power to resist, is the equivalent of group survival. The authors suggest that small rebel groups do not have the ability to target the government, but can hide and persist. On the other hand, large rebel groups have greater military power and can target the government directly without needing to hide. Rebels can have both types of strength. Drawing on the previous example, the FARC has the power to fight the government directly, but also has control of territory which makes a complete defeat of the FARC by the Colombian government unlikely.

The same logic can follow with rebel groups and their choice of adopting terrorism. Stanton(2009) defines 'control' as the use of violence to ensure that civilians cooperate with one's own side and deter citizens from cooperating with the enemy. Terrorism literature focuses heavily on the symbolic nature of terrorism, and some may view that violence in the category of 'control' does not fall into that category. Terrorism is aimed at pursuing some social, economic or political goal through the use of violence. Surely, the use of violence to either persuade one of your political goal or deter one from supporting the other falls under this category.

While previous literature argues that terrorism is a 'weapon of the weak', in civil war literature it can be thought of as a weapon of the rich.

Rebels rely on the local populations for several types of support. This includes things like information, using homes for hiding, supplies, and potential recruitment. Rebels that gain the support of the local population will face a war only on one front (the government) rather than needing to control the population as well. This is especially the case for newer rebel groups and those that lack territory. According to Cunningham et. Al. the local population is a type of defensive strength. In fact, the authors explicitly state that at the outset of an insurgency there is much uncertainty around the amount of popular support a rebel group needs. Rebels can overestimate the amount of support they are likely to receive, leading to their downfall. Overall, popular support can be a crucial part of a rebellion's success.

Rebel funding is another crucial part of a rebel's success or survival. Natural resources are lucrative sources of finance for rebels. Fearon (2004) finds that conflicts last longer when rebels derive substantial funding from contraband sources such as diamonds. Collier et al. (2004) find that a decline in the price of primary commodities shortens conflict by potentially hurting the finances of rebels, granted without directly testing whether rebels are funded by the resource. When a country has limited legal economic opportunities, rebel groups that control natural resources should be better at recruitment, which allows a group to continue over time (Elbadwi and Sambanis 2000). Natural resources are positively related with rebel group survival.

Natural resource funds have several implications for rebel's ability and willingness to carry out terror attacks. First, rebels are better equipped to carry out attacks since they have more resources. Rebels with greater resources can hit more targets, harder targets, and further targets than before. In other words, rebels can transition their military power gained from funds

to their ability to use terrorism. This is a reasonable assumption, given that most terrorist attacks use weapons and explosives that rebels also use in their fights against the government.

Additionally, rebels with natural resource funding have better ability to access information to plan terror attacks. Rebels can use natural resource funding to buy information from government workers to target officials or other previously out of reach targets. According to Cunningham et al. (2009) natural resource funding increases the offensive strength, or in this case the ability to pick and choose targets, and attack them more frequently.

Rebels can also use the funds from natural resources to replace the popular support they would have otherwise needed. Natural resource funds can be used to buy weapons, soldiers, information from bureaucrats and more. None of which relies on the population in order for the group to be successful. When groups needed the population before instead they can exploit the population and create a new type of leverage. This creates an opportunity for rebels to commit human rights violations and acts of terrorism against their home population that they wouldn't normally be able to commit. Rather than cooperate, groups coerce the population. Not only do natural resource funds enhance a groups ability to use violence, but they also give the group less of a need for popular support of their movement, allowing the group to commit acts of terrorism.

H1: Rebel groups that are funded by natural resources are more likely to commit acts of terrorism.

While theoretically the groups are more likely to commit acts of terrorism, they are also more likely to be deadly. The increase in funds from natural resources gives the group access to more advanced weapon and greater information to inflict more deadly terrorist attacks. Also, groups that can replace popular support with natural resource funding should be less afraid of the

backlash with citizens in the country. This logic follows directly from the logic concerning an increase in terrorist attacks.

H2: Rebel groups that are funded by natural resources are more likely to be lethal in their acts of terrorism.

Research Design and Empirical Results

This paper measures the relationship between the use of terrorism by rebel groups in armed conflicts from 1990-2012. I use the Global Terrorism Database(GTD) to measure terrorist incidents and fatalities and match it with rebel groups(sideb) from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program(UCDP), keeping group-years from UCDP. The data is panel, with each observation being group-year, with an N of 1,447. A group-year is included in the data set if in a given year the group experience 25 or more battle deaths in its conflict with the state. The length of time a group exists ranges from one year to the full 23 years(1990-2012). Data from rebel funding was taken from the Rebel Contraband Data set(Walsh, Conrad, Whitaker, and Hudak), which codes rebel funding strategies for all years a rebel was involved in a civil war with a country.

Dependent Variables: The dependent variables of interest are number of terrorist attack and number of people killed in terrorist attacks in a given year for each group. This data was created by aggregating the GTD events by Group ID, and then matching those to UCDP's SideB variable. This process involved ensuring that group acronym's and aliases were correctly matched up. GTD has a specific definition for what terrorism can and cannot be. GTD includes events that meet three criteria: the incident is intentional, entails some level of violence or threat thereof, and the perpetrator is a sub-national actor), plus at least two out of three additional criteria:

- 1) the act is aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious or social goal,

2) there is evidence of intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey a message to a larger audience beyond the immediate victims,

3) the action is outside the context of legitimate warfare, i.e., against international humanitarian law “particularly the prohibition against deliberately targeting civilians or non-combatants.”(GTD Codebook)

Criteria number three is crucial for this study, as it separates those who are killed in the intensity variable from those killed in acts of terrorism. Both dependent variables are a count variable. At this time, I recognize that Fortna et al.’s new data is most definitely superior to mine and may be driving some of my results. However, until that data becomes public this is the best I can do.

Independent Variables

The independent variable of interest is Natural Resource Funding, which is coded as a 1=The group is financed by natural resources in that year, or 0= The group is not. This variable is coded using the Rebel Contraband Data set. This data is a major improvement from previous data that rely on country level commodity data, resource location data, or data that does not vary over time. The data set also includes more fine grained data on what resources the rebels were exploiting and a rough estimate(sometimes more accurate) of how much money the rebels were making. However, those variables do not have enough variation between groups and years to run standard models(fixed effects, robust standard errors) which limits their usage.(In future studies I want to incorporate some of the fine grained data.

An additional variable labeled Extortion is also included in the model. This variable also comes from the Rebel Contraband Data set. The definition of extortion is as follows: “The group the group may try to “tax” much of the economic activity that occurs in a particular area.

Examples can include roadblocks, providing “protection” to marketplaces and villages, and so on. These are cases of extortion that do not involve drugs or other natural resources.” A 1=A rebel engaged in extortion activities in a year, a 0= the group did not.

Controls

I control for several variables that may affect rebel funding as well as a group’s ability to use terrorism. External support is a known factor in the terrorism literature in shaping a groups behavior and strategy of violence. I code External Support as 1=Group receives support or 0=Group does not receive support from the UCDP External support data set.

Regime type is a known variable that is associated with both a governments ability to combat terrorism as well as a rebel groups ability to recruit new members. In order to control for regime type I use the POLITYIV variable. This variable is a scale of -10 to 10 that measures whether the state is closer to an Autocracy or a Democracy respectively.

Population is a significant factor in determining whether a state experiences civil war and how much the state experiences terrorism. I use the IMF’s population data to code this variable.

The state capacity measure I chose to use is the tax revenue a government receives as a percentage of GDP. This variable is excellent at measuring a state’s ability to combat terrorism compared to other existing variables such as GDP and CIRI scores. Tax capacity better gets at the dynamic of a state’s ability to police terrorism by directly measuring the funds that may be channeled for that purpose. A better measure would be to have agency level data, but this is not consistent across states or years. This variable is coded with data from WDI.

Territorial control is a variable measuring whether group has control over territory in a given year. Territorial control is strongly associated in the civil war literature as well as the terrorism literature with strong groups. This variable can be thought of as a competing measure

of group power compared to natural resource exploitation. This variable was coded with data from UCDP.

Intensity is a measure of individuals killed in a conflict in a year. This variable was coded with data from UCDP. (It should be noted that at this point I don't know if this variable picks up any of the deaths in GTD as well. I am not sure how to approach this or if it is even possible.)

Incompatibility is a dichotomous variable coded as 1 if the group is a separatist movement and a 0 if the group is attempting to overthrow the existing state. The reason this variable is coded this way is that separatist conflicts are generally more violent and last longer than those attempting to overthrow the government. This variable has no variation within groups.

Methodology

I fit a factor analysis with three factors to determine whether there are over types of civil wars that may heavily influence my results. I use a scree plot to determine where the 'elbow' is in my data to determine how many factors to use. I use the same variables in my negative binomial analysis in order to provide a basic data reduction. I use variables in the factor analysis that are based on my theory and past findings. I used different orthogonal rotation techniques until I decided that varimax simplified the data the best compared to no rotation or other orthogonal techniques. I then plot the loadings for factors one, two and three.

In order to test my hypotheses, I use a Negative binomial regression with fixed effects. This is the appropriate model given that my dependent variables are both count variables and fixed effects accounts for possible heterogeneity issues within group years. In many terrorism

studies researchers include a lagged dependent variable as one of the regressors. The theoretical reasoning behind this is that previous terrorism incidents are excellent predictors of future events. However, using a lagged dependent variable as a regressor while using fixed effect leads to serial autocorrelation when T is significantly small enough. Considering that my T=23 years it is inappropriate for me to include the lagged dependent variable in my model. I examine two negative binomial models for my two dependent variables: terrorist act count and number killed in attack.

Results

Table 1: Number of Attacks

Variable Name	Estimate	Standard Error	Pr(>t)
Constant	-.77	.39	.05*
Natural Resource Exploitation	-.16	.21	.4650
Extortion	.026	.21	.9
External Support	.0001	.18	.2657
Regime Type	.003	.02	.87
Population	.0009	.0006	.1718
Tax Capacity	-.0003	.006	.96
Territorial Control	-.15	.25	.5505
Intensity	.93	.19	.000001*
Incompatibility	.074	.28	.79

*= .05 Significance

Table 2: Number Killed in Attacks

Variable Name	Estimate	Standard Error	Pr(>t)
Constant	-3.431	.41	.0000...2*
Natural Resource Exploitation	.18	.2	.3756
Extortion	.28	.19	.1512
External Support	.15	.19	.4286
Regime Type	.087	.02	.00003*
Population	.0000000009	.0004	.99
Tax Capacity	.01	.006	.0756
Territorial Control	-.4	.22	.0483*
Intensity	1.58	.23	.000001*
Incompatibility	-.36	.24	.1357

*= .05 Significance

Figure 1: Scree Plot




Table Three: Factor Analysis Results

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Factor Analysis using method = ml
Call: fa(r = TerrFund1, nfactors = 3, rotate = "varimax", fm = "ml")
Standardized loadings (pattern matrix) based upon correlation matrix
      ML1    ML2    ML3    h2    u2    com
nkill    0.09  0.48  0.21  0.284  0.72  1.5
nr_extortion 0.29  0.21 -0.18 0.159  0.84  2.6
nr_smuggling 0.07  0.37 -0.19 0.181  0.82  1.6
extortion  0.57  0.22  0.09  0.383  0.62  1.3
external_exists -0.01 0.22  0.00  0.049  0.95  1.0
imf_pop    0.57 -0.06 -0.23 0.385  0.61  1.3
wdi_taxipcgt 0.07 -0.28  0.48  0.313  0.69  1.7
p_polity2  0.67 -0.07  0.27  0.533  0.47  1.3
Territory  -0.11  0.16 -0.05  0.042  0.96  2.0
intensity  -0.06  0.72  0.05  0.521  0.48  1.0
incomp     0.33 -0.15  0.07  0.135  0.87  1.5
imf_gdpc   0.25  0.01  0.54  0.355  0.65  1.4
rebpol     0.06 -0.09 -0.19  0.049  0.95  1.6

      ML1    ML2    ML3
SS loadings    1.40  1.17  0.82
Proportion Var    0.11  0.09  0.06
Cumulative Var    0.11  0.20  0.26
Proportion Explained 0.41  0.34  0.24
Cumulative Proportion 0.41  0.76  1.00

Mean item complexity = 1.5
Test of the hypothesis that 3 factors are sufficient.

The degrees of freedom for the null model are 78 and the objective function was 1.66 with Chi Square of 2385.47
The degrees of freedom for the model are 42 and the objective function was 0.46

The root mean square of the residuals (RMSR) is 0.07
The df corrected root mean square of the residuals is 0.09

The harmonic number of observations is 968 with the empirical chi square 692.39 with prob < 1.2e-118
The total number of observations was 1447 with Likelihood Chi Square = 661.89 with prob < 2e-112

Tucker Lewis Index of factoring reliability = 0.5
RMSEA index = 0.101 and the 90 % confidence intervals are 0.094 0.108
BIC = 356.24
Fit based upon off diagonal values = 0.82
Measures of factor score adequacy
      ML1    ML2    ML3
Correlation of (regression) scores with factors 0.84 0.81 0.73
Multiple R square of scores with factors 0.70 0.66 0.54
Minimum correlation of possible factor scores 0.40 0.32 0.08

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Figure 2: No Rotation Loadings




Figure 3: Varimax Loadings




Figure one shows the scree plot. There is a clear ‘elbow in the data after three factors. The proportion of variance explained(PVE) starts to taper off. Any more factors included in the analysis beyond three would find that there are very few variables that load with any kind of significance. This is because the loading is positively related to the proportion of variation explained by a factor. Figures two and three compare the loadings on factors one and three. Figure two is a plot with no rotation of the loadings, while figure four shows the varimax rotation of the loading. The goal of rotation is to simplify the interpretation of the factor analysis. In comparing the plots the varimax results move several observations in quadrant three closer to zero on their factor three loading. This is easier to show that these variables are better at explaining factor one compared to factor three. This is a clear improvement to the analysis without any rotation.

Table three shows the results of the factor analysis with three factors and a varimax rotation. Based on the Chi-squared statistic the model fits the data. However, the proportion of variation explained in the data by the model is cumulatively .26. This shows that despite using variables that are known to explain many factors in civil wars such as duration, intensity etc. they still only explain roughly a quarter of the variation in the data. The Tucker Lewis Index of factoring reliability is .5. This value is supposed to be .7 in order to be completely satisfied with the model. However, many of Thurstone’s criteria are satisfied by the models. All three of the factors have three zero loadings. Additionally, all of the loading are significant on one or two factors and close to zero on at least one factor. There are also only a few complex variables on each factor.

Substantively speaking, factor one appears to civil wars in which the states are democratic. In the literature democracies are usually better equipped to fight civil wars and

experience shorter civil wars. The other complex loading on this factor is funding by extortion. Extortion is generally associated by weaker rebel groups that can't exploit natural resources, which follows the logic of civil wars in democracy. Factor two picks up the very intense civil wars. The significant loadings are number killed in terrorist attacks, natural resource smuggling and conflict intensity. Groups that are strong from natural resources have more funding for terrorist attacks and resources to fight the government. Factor three represents civil wars in which the government dominates. The significant loadings are population, GDP per capita, and the percentage of GDP that is taken as tax. This factor has close to zero loadings on intensity, territory and external support. These states are strong and put down rebellions without the need of outside assistance.

Overall, the factor analysis picked up three predominant patterns that have been found in prior literature. This reaffirms my usage of these variables in my analysis in determining whether a rebel group is more likely to use terrorism.

The variable of interest, Natural Resource Exploitation, was not found to be significant in either of the models. The coefficients are positive in the death count model but negative in the attack count model indicating an interesting relationship between those dependent variables. Additionally, the Extortion, External Support, and Population variables are not significant in either of the models.

The variables Regime type and Territorial Control were significant for the number killed model. Rebels in regimes that are more democratic are more likely to kill people in terrorist attacks. This is an unexpected result, given that democracies are associated with better counterterrorism forces. However, the literature does state that democracies are more likely to experience terrorism as the public forum allows for their acts to be shown. This result supports

that finding to an extent. Rebels that control territory are less likely to kill people in terrorist attacks. This supports Stanton's(2013) finding that weaker rebels are more likely to resort to terrorism in order to fight the state through other means.

The only variable that was significant in both models is the Intensity variable. Earlier in my paper I expressed doubts of whether those included in terrorist incidents may also be included in the intensity variable UCDP includes. However, this finding is robust with the terrorist action count model as well, indicating that something else is going on. The finding suggests that when civil wars get violent, relationship between the rebel group and the whole population becomes violent.

Conclusion

This paper set out to provide evidence for the notion that rebel groups funded by natural resources are more likely to use terrorism. The empirical tests do not support this claim, as the finding was null. Future research may need to develop better measures for rebel power and capabilities, or it may be the case that terrorism is indeed the weapon of the weak. Rebels that control territory are significantly less likely to kill people in terrorist attacks. I think this finding is the most interesting and look to develop this further in future research by using GIS methods and geospatial data to map territorial control and terrorist attacks.

All together the findings were not what I expected them to be, but there were a few interesting results that have sparked new ideas for future research.

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