

# THE SWISS E-ID

## FIVE ANCHORS TO PRESERVE DIGITAL AUTONOMY & DEMOCRATIC SOVEREIGNTY

*Christopher Allen — Trust Architect*

swiyu 2025-10-02

# WHO AM I?

- **Technologist & Trust Architect**
- Co-author of **IETF TLS 1.0** (the  lock in your browser) in the 1990s

*“WE BELIEVED THAT TECHNOLOGY COULD  
PROTECT PEOPLE BY PRESERVING DIGNITY  
AND AUTONOMY. THAT IT COULD BE A  
SHIELD AGAINST COERCION, RATHER THAN  
A CONDUIT FOR IT. THAT IT COULD  
PRESERVE CHOICE AND AGENCY FOR  
INDIVIDUALS AND COMMUNITIES.  
WE WERE WRONG.”*

- Originator of **Ten Principles of Self-Sovereign Identity**
- Co-author of the **W3C DID Standard** for decentralized identifiers
- Advisor on **digital identity & digital asset law** in the US & abroad

**TLS still secures billions of connections daily, 25+ years later**

# IMPORTANT CLARIFICATION ON SSI

**The Swiss e-ID is NOT *Self-Sovereign Identity***

- **Self-Sovereign Identity:** Citizens control their digital identity infrastructure
  - a focus on personal agency to protect civil and human rights
- **Swiss e-ID:** Government controls issuance, revocation, infrastructure
  - government-managed for institutional trust
  - with democratic oversight
- **This isn't criticism — it's clarity about what you're building**

**The Swiss e-ID is a *government digital identity system*.**

# ANNOTATION: WHAT IS SELF-SOVEREIGN IDENTITY? (1/3)

## **Self-Sovereign Identity Definition:**

- Individual controls their own digital identity and credentials
- No central authority required for identity verification
- Citizens own their data and decide what to share, when, and with whom
- Identity works across different services and platforms

## **Key SSI Characteristics:**

- **Decentralized:** No single point of control or failure
- **Portable:** Identity works everywhere, not locked to one service
- **Private:** Minimal disclosure of personal information
- **Persistent:** Identity survives even if organizations disappear

## ANNOTATION: TEN PRINCIPLES OF SELF-SOVEREIGN IDENTITY (2/3)

**Christopher Allen's Ten Principles (2016):**

1. **Existence:** Users must have an independent existence
2. **Control:** Users must control their identities
3. **Access:** Users must have access to their own data
4. **Transparency:** Systems must be transparent
5. **Persistence:** Identities must be long-lived
6. **Portability:** Information must be transportable
7. **Interoperability:** Identities should be widely usable
8. **Consent:** Users must agree to the use of their identity
9. **Minimalization:** Disclosure should be minimized
10. **Protection:** Users' rights must be protected

# ANNOTATION: WHY SWISS E-ID USES SSI TECHNOLOGY DIFFERENTLY (3/3)

## Key Differences:

- **SSI**: Citizens control issuance, revocation, and infrastructure
- **Swiss e-ID**: Government controls issuance, revocation, and infrastructure
- **SSI**: No central authority required
- **Swiss e-ID**: Government serves as trusted central authority

## Why This Distinction Matters:

- Different governance requirements for government vs. citizen-controlled systems
- Understanding the architecture helps design appropriate democratic safeguards
- Clarifies what you're actually governing and how to do it effectively

# GOVERNMENT DIGITAL IDENTITY

## **Swiss Legal Foundation:**

Current regulation requires citizens to REQUEST e-ID issuance - voluntary by design.

## **THE CRITICAL QUESTION:**

Can this voluntary principle survive when:

- Private sector creates speed/price advantages for e-ID users?
- Platform dependencies make alternatives second-class?
- Economic reality pressures citizens into "voluntary" adoption?

*As other countries learned:*

**legal voluntary ≠ practical voluntary**

# HOW "VOLUNTARY" GETS ERODED: INTERNATIONAL CASE STUDIES

## Estonia: 99% Adoption Makes Refusal Impractical

- Digital-first government services create speed advantages
- Physical alternatives become second-class citizen experience
- Social pressure: "Everyone has one, why don't you?"
- Result: Legally voluntary, practically mandatory

## Ireland: Public Services Card Controversy

- Started voluntary for welfare services
- Gradually required for driver's license, passports, employment
- Citizens forced to choose: get card or lose access to essential services
- Court challenges took years to resolve

## India: Aadhaar "Voluntary" Expansion

- Initially voluntary biometric ID for welfare
- Banks, schools, telecom required it for service
- Supreme Court had to intervene to limit scope
- Economic coercion made legal voluntary meaningless

### **Switzerland's Advantage:**

- Democratic institutions can prevent this erosion
- Five Anchors create systematic protection
- Learn from others' mistakes before implementing, not after

### **The Pattern:**

1. Start voluntary with good intentions
2. Private sector creates advantages for adoption
3. Economic pressure makes voluntary meaningless
4. By the time courts intervene, infrastructure dependency is entrenched

# INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY

**Personal and family resilience supports choice and agency**

- “*I can choose how much to share, when, and with whom.*”
- “*We can protect our family's privacy and security across generations.*”

# SWISS DEMOCRATIC SOVEREIGNTY

**Constitutional principle that sovereignty resides in the people**

- Swiss democratic institutions enable meaningful oversight
- “We collectively govern the systems that govern us”

## WHY BOTH MATTER

- Individual autonomy gives substance to democratic sovereignty.
- Without meaningful personal choice, democratic control rings hollow.

*These must work together for Swiss e-ID to succeed.*

# THE SWISS ADVANTAGE

Your democratic institutions can preserve individual autonomy and resilience.  
Other countries may copy your technical architecture but lack this governance foundation.

***The moment is now:*** Your referendum has passed.

Choices you make today influence the world for 20 years.

# THE TLS WARNING

- We finished **TLS 1.0** in 1996, but only ratified in 1999
- We knew about problems, we thought we'd fix them in **3-5 years**
- Those fixes didn't ship until **TLS 1.3** in 2019 — **20 years later**
- 38% of websites **still** don't use this more secure version
  - More do not fully enable or support all features

**Lesson:** Once you ship, “good enough” becomes “stuck with it”

# FIVE ANCHORS FOR SWISS DIGITAL AUTONOMY

## 1. Preserve Choice by Design

- Voluntary must mean voluntary-in-practice

## 2. Build a 20-Year Architecture, Not 2-Year Product

- Infrastructural thinking

## 3. Maintain Platform Independence

- Resistance to technical capture

## 4. Require Duties for Non-Governmental Parties

- Private sector accountability

## 5. Implement Institutional Safeguards

- Democratic oversight of digital power

# 1) PRESERVE CHOICE BY DESIGN

*The Individual Autonomy Anchor*

**Problem Statement:**

Choice disappears when alternatives become second-class

**Swiss Reality:**

Will the e-ID become mandatory in practice, even if voluntary in law?

## 1) PRESERVE CHOICE BY DESIGN

*How Digital Choice Erodes*

Trust builds gradually. Show your age, not your address; your eligibility, not your identity; what's needed now, not everything you have.

*This is how physical identity works — digital should match.*

You *shouldn't* have to hand over your entire personal profile to be copied just to prove you're over 18.

**"WE NOW FACE SYSTEMS THAT PRESUME  
COMPLIANCE BY DEFAULT  
AND ELIMINATE MEANINGFUL CHOICE."**

# ANNOTATION: SWISS DIGITAL SERVICE EROSION EXAMPLES (1/3)

## International Context:

- Banking sector globally shifting to digital-first with physical branch closures
- Government services worldwide adopting "digital by default" policies post-COVID
- Payment systems transitioning from cash-optional to digital-preferred models

## Problems/Issues:

- **Swiss banking consolidation:** UBS closing 85 branches (1/3 reduction) by 2025 after Credit Suisse merger
- **Government service digitization:** easyGov platform expanding, QES signatures required for employment contracts
- **Payment infrastructure shift:** TWINT now accepted by 81% of stores, creating speed/convenience advantages over cash

# ANNOTATION: DIGITAL SERVICE EROSION IMPACT ANALYSIS (2/3)

## Implications:

- Legal voluntary status maintained while practical voluntary erodes through convenience and scarcity
- Citizens face increasing economic pressure to adopt digital services for basic needs
- Physical alternatives becoming second-class through reduced availability and efficiency
- **Swiss Choice Point:** This pattern can be prevented through proactive design, not just accepted as inevitable

# ANNOTATION: SWISS CHOICE PRESERVATION OPPORTUNITY (3/3)

## Swiss Application:

- e-ID risks following same pattern: legally voluntary, practically mandatory within 5-10 years
- Current digitization trends demonstrate both the risk and the opportunity for intervention
- Swiss democratic advantage: institutions can enforce meaningful choice preservation where other countries cannot
- Swiss scale enables maintaining dignified alternatives if designed systematically from the start

# 1) PRESERVE CHOICE BY DESIGN

*Solutions for Meaningful Choice*

- **Governance structure with enforcement power:**
  - **Essential service inclusion** — no services (government OR private) limited to digital-only
  - **Economic neutrality** — similar price, speed, dignity for physical alternatives
  - **Legal accountability** — real penalties for coercive practices
- **User-controlled technical architecture:**
  - **Progressive revelation** — citizens control what they share, when, and with whom
  - **Progressive trust UX** — "no, not now, maybe later" instead of "accept or cancel"

# **ANNOTATION: PROGRESSIVE TRUST IMPLEMENTATION MODELS**

## **Progressive Trust Success Cases:**

- Apple's "Ask App Not to Track" — simple, clear choice without penalties
- GDPR consent interfaces (when done right) — granular, revocable permissions
- Swiss banking: graduated disclosure for different transaction types

## **Progressive Trust Design Principles:**

- "No, not now, maybe later" instead of "accept or cancel"
- Citizens control what they share, when, and with whom
- Trust builds gradually through voluntary interactions
- Physical identity model: show age not address, eligibility not full identity

## 1) PRESERVE CHOICE BY DESIGN

### *Implementation & Enforcement*

- **Without enforcement, voluntary becomes meaningless**
- **Need-to-Know schedules**
  - clearly define what data is legitimate for what purposes
- **Hold all sectors accountable**
  - government and private sectors live by similar standards
- **Dark pattern auditing**
  - public transparency on coercive practices

## 2) BUILD A 20-YEAR ARCHITECTURE, NOT A 2-YEAR PRODUCT

*The Infrastructure Anchor*

**Problem Statement:**

MVP thinking optimizes for shipping, not decades of democratic evolution

**Swiss Reality:**

Democracy moves slowly, technology moves fast — and technical debt can quickly get entrenched

**Remember TLS:** "Good enough" becomes "stuck with it" for 20+ years

## 2) BUILD A 20-YEAR ARCHITECTURE

*Infrastructural Thinking*

- **You're building Switzerland's digital infrastructure, not a startup app**
- **Minimum Viable Architecture, not MVP** — plan now for 20 years, not 2-year shipping
- **Open development practices** — transparency, participation, stewardship
- **Invest in commons** — fund standards participation and library development

# ANNOTATION: MVA VS MVP - ARCHITECTURAL DESIGN (1/3)

## International Context:

- **US Federal Government**: \$7 billion technical debt from MVP-style decisions that became permanent
- **TLS/SSL success**: Modular plug-in architecture enabled 25+ years of cryptographic evolution
- **Estonia e-ID**: Successful but locked into specific technical choices, difficult to evolve

## Problems/Issues:

- **MVP approach** optimizes for immediate shipping, creates inflexible technical debt
- "Good enough" solutions become permanent when replacement costs are prohibitive
- Architectural decisions lock governments into specific vendors and technologies for decades

## ANNOTATION: MVA RESEARCH FOUNDATION (2/3)

### Core MVA Principle:

- **Quote from MVA research:** "We don't always know the right solutions... the best we can do is create architectures that won't lock us in to specific decisions about the future"

### Implications:

- Swiss e-ID architectural choices will constrain democratic evolution for 20+ years
- MVP thinking creates competitive vulnerabilities and limits future innovation
- Without modular design, Switzerland becomes dependent on current technology assumptions

## ANNOTATION: SWISS MVA IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY (3/3)

### Swiss Application:

- **MVA principles**: "Hollow out spaces in architectures for future development"
- **Modular and expandable design**: Separate core identity specifications from implementation details
- **Swiss open source strategy**: EMBAG law enables collaborative "coopetition" development
- **Architectural flexibility**: Design identity system to accommodate future, currently unanticipated developments
- **Democratic timeline advantage**: Switzerland can afford slower, more thoughtful architectural choices that serve 20-year democratic evolution

## 2) BUILD A 20-YEAR ARCHITECTURE

*Focus on Architectures of Data Minimization*

- **Secure data at rest** — transport security alone is insufficient
- **Need-to-Know by design** — technical architecture should enforce legitimate purpose limits
- **Verify and forget capability** — no silent data retention, cross-service linking, or logging of authentication
- **Future-proof selective disclosure** — architecture must support evolving technology
  - SD-JWT + VCs have good intentions for privacy, but called “dead end” by many standards and cryptographic experts
  - *Be prepared to swap it out soon!*

# ANNOTATION: SD-JWT CRITICAL ASSESSMENT (1/3)

## International Context:

- Hash-based selective disclosure provides solid privacy foundation for digital credentials
- SD-JWT represents one specific implementation approach with known limitations
- Cryptographic experts have identified significant architectural constraints in current SD-JWT specification

## Problems/Issues:

- **Rigid Structure:** Hard-coded format makes evolution difficult for 20-year systems
- **No Unlinkability:** Signatures correlate across different verifications, limiting privacy
- **Cryptographic Lock-in:** Each new crypto method requires rebuilding entire payload structure

# ANNOTATION: EXPERT CONSENSUS ON SD-JWT LIMITATIONS (2/3)

## Expert Assessment:

- **Expert Consensus:** Multiple cryptographic specialists note these as "serious flaws" for long-term deployment

## Implications:

- BBS+, zero-knowledge proofs, other advances require complete reimplementation in SD-JWT
- Cannot evolve cryptographically without replacing entire credential format
- A 20-year timeline exposes these architectural limitations more than short-term deployments

## ANNOTATION: SWISS ARCHITECTURAL DECISION POINT (3/3)

### Swiss Application:

- Switzerland's democratic deliberation advantage allows time to address these architectural issues
- Better architectural approaches exist that preserve privacy benefits with more flexibility
- Swiss technical choices will influence global democratic digital identity for decades
- **Critical Decision Point:** SD-JWT's architectural limitations conflict with Swiss 20-year infrastructure requirements

## 2) BUILD A 20-YEAR ARCHITECTURE

*Architectures of Resilience*

- **Resilience-first design** — function offline, like physical cards
  - Network failures, emergencies, conflicts cannot disable Swiss identity
  - Maintains Swiss tradition of preparedness and independence
  - *Technical options*: vc-barcodes or animated QRs (QR-UR) for resilient offline verification
- **Technical preparedness**: Prepare for changing to quantum-safe infrastructure now

# ANNOTATION: SWISS RESILIENCE INFRASTRUCTURE MODELS (1/3)

## International Context:

- **Alpine data centers:** Swiss providers embed infrastructure deep in solid rock for physical protection
- **Geographic redundancy:** Swiss cloud systems maintain copies in both Zurich and Geneva (100km+ separation)
- **Telecommunications resilience:** Dual fiber paths and automatic failover systems across Switzerland

## Problems/Issues:

- Digital identity systems typically have single points of failure
- Network dependencies make government services vulnerable during emergencies
- Most identity systems cannot function without internet connectivity
- Physical verification often unavailable when digital infrastructure fails

## ANNOTATION: EMERGENCY RESILIENCE REQUIREMENTS (2/3)

### Implications:

- Swiss preparedness traditions require digital systems to match physical resilience standards
- Emergency situations expose critical infrastructure vulnerabilities
- Citizens lose access to essential services during network disruptions
- Network failures, emergencies, conflicts cannot disable Swiss identity

### Swiss Preparedness Heritage:

- **Physical resilience tradition:** 7,200 emergency sirens, universal bomb shelters, wired mountain defenses
- **Historical emergency examples:** Japan 2011 tsunami (digital systems failed, physical ID cards enabled evacuation), Puerto Rico 2017 hurricane (power out for months), Texas 2021 winter storm (digital infrastructure disabled)

# ANNOTATION: OFFLINE INDEPENDENCE IMPLEMENTATION (3/3)

## Swiss Application:

- **Technical implementation requirements:** Physical verification must work when digital infrastructure fails
- **Emergency preparedness integration:** Digital identity systems must function during natural disasters
- **Emergency ID models:** California's Instant Identity Card for wildfire victims - enables immediate access to services when documents destroyed
- **Swiss Emergency models:** Identity verification needed after earthquake, flood, landslide, without network connectivity
- **Offline-first architecture:** QR codes and cryptographic signatures working without network connectivity
- **Swiss preparedness culture:** "Trust but verify" includes verifying systems work when infrastructure fails

## 2) BUILD A 20-YEAR ARCHITECTURE

*Swiss Pathway to Greater Autonomy*

- **Today:** Government digital identity with democratic safeguards
- **Future:** Start researching alternative models where citizen-control is more appropriate:
  - LESS (legally enabled self-sovereign) Identity
  - State-endorsed but citizen-controlled systems (Utah model)
- **Swiss advantage:** Democratic foundation enables smooth transition

# ANNOTATION: GOVERNMENT-TO-CITIZEN IDENTITY EVOLUTION MODELS (1/2)

## International Context:

- **Utah model:** State-endorsed but citizen-controlled digital identity systems
- **Estonia lessons:** Government e-ID success but limited citizen control over long-term evolution
- **LESS Identity research:** Legally Enabled Self-Sovereign Identity as bridge between government and citizen control

## Problems/Issues:

- Government-issued digital identity can become government-controlled digital identity
- Citizens have limited input on long-term digital identity system evolution
- Technical choices made for government convenience may conflict with citizen autonomy

# **ANNOTATION: GOVERNMENT-TO-CITIZEN IDENTITY EVOLUTION MODELS (2/2)**

## **Implications:**

- Democratic institutions need pathways to evolve toward greater citizen control
- Switzerland's federal structure enables gradual autonomy increases
- Technical architecture today determines citizen empowerment possibilities for decades

## **Swiss Application:**

- **Swiss democratic foundation:** Federal system with cantonal experimentation enables smooth transitions
- **Phase 1:** Government digital identity with strong democratic safeguards (current e-ID implementation)
- **Phase 2:** Research LESS Identity models with state endorsement but citizen control
- **Phase 3:** Evaluate full citizen-controlled systems based on democratic feedback and technical maturity
- **Swiss advantage:** Democratic institutions can manage identity evolution better than authoritarian or purely market-driven systems

# THREE LAYERS OF SWISS DIGITAL SOVEREIGNTY

The next three anchors address different sovereignty vectors:

- **3) Maintain Platform Independence:**
  - TECHNICAL sovereignty (platform infrastructure control)
- **4) Require Duties for Non-Governmental Parties:**
  - COMMERCIAL sovereignty (private sector constraints)
- **5) Implement Institutional Safeguards:**
  - INSTITUTIONAL sovereignty (democratic checks and enforcement)

All are about Swiss digital sovereignty but from different angles of control.

### 3) MAINTAIN PLATFORM INDEPENDENCE

*The Technical Sovereignty Anchor*

#### **Problem Statement:**

- Dependence on Apple/Google OS app stores
- Government wallets risk becoming surveillance tools
- Platform vendors become unelected gatekeepers of identity

#### **Swiss Reality:**

Platforms profit from lock-in, not user autonomy

## 3) MAINTAIN PLATFORM INDEPENDENCE

*The Surveillance Risk*

- **Imagine:**

- Someone gets a ping when your hotel room door opens
- An accusation of spam disables your Google account, and thus your phone
- A platform locks you into their other proprietary services
- OR, you lose access to these services when you change platforms

**If platforms can arbitrarily cut off access,  
they control Swiss digital sovereignty!**

**This must be a line in the sand!**

**Swiss Principle:** Make digital occupation costly and temporary, like the Réduit strategy

# ANNOTATION: DIGITAL WALLET IMPLEMENTATION RISKS AND SWISS ADVANTAGES (1/2)

## International Context:

- **EU Digital Identity Wallet:** Privacy advocates warn of "farming citizen data" by governments and corporations
- **Japan My Number Card:** 80% of citizens distrust government's ability to protect digital ID information
- **Singapore/Nigeria:** Elderly populations locked out of services due to biometric system failures

## Problems/Issues:

# **ANNOTATION: DIGITAL WALLET IMPLEMENTATION RISKS AND SWISS ADVANTAGES (2/2)**

## **Implications:**

- Digital identity architectures require careful design to prevent misuse
- Even well-intentioned systems can be repurposed by future administrations
- Switzerland's international reputation creates responsibility for democratic digital identity models

## **Swiss Application:**

## 3) MAINTAIN PLATFORM INDEPENDENCE

### *Technical Actions*

- **Prohibit platform telemetry** during identity transactions
  - and not just in the e-ID stack!
- **Mandate dignified alternative app distribution**
  - beyond Apple/Google stores
  - accessible to all citizens buying phones retail in Switzerland
- **Require platform accountability** — demand transparency reports on denials of service, timely fixes for critical bugs, etc.
  - *Enforcement mechanism: See Anchor 5, Government Enforcement Capabilities*

# ANNOTATION: PLATFORM ALTERNATIVE IMPLEMENTATION MODELS (1/2)

## International Context:

- **Japan's App Store Law:** Forces Apple/Google to allow third-party app stores and payment systems
- **EU Digital Markets Act:** Requires "gatekeeper" platforms to allow alternative distribution methods
- **F-Droid Model:** Open-source app distribution used by privacy-focused European governments

## Problems/Issues:

- Platform gatekeeping prevents government control over critical identity infrastructure
- Native app dependencies create single points of failure for national services
- Platform updates can break government functionality without warning or consent

# ANNOTATION: PLATFORM ALTERNATIVE IMPLEMENTATION MODELS (2/2)

## **Implications:**

- Swiss digital sovereignty requires technical independence from foreign platforms
- Citizens need guaranteed access regardless of corporate platform decisions

## **Swiss Application:**

### 3) MAINTAIN PLATFORM INDEPENDENCE

#### *Governance Actions*

- **Acknowledge surveillance risks** beyond the e-ID stack
- **Mandate Swiss jurisdiction** — independent oversight with enforcement power

**Swiss Reality:** This requires contractual obligations, not just technical solutions.

# ANNOTATION: SWISS JURISDICTION ENFORCEMENT MODELS (1/2)

## International Context:

- **UK Competition Authority:** Forcing platform openness through market power investigations
- **EU GDPR:** Extraterritorial jurisdiction compelling foreign company compliance
- **China Cybersecurity Law:** National data sovereignty requirements overriding platform terms

## Problems/Issues:

- Platform terms of service currently override Swiss law in practice
- No direct government leverage over platform operational decisions affecting citizens
- Swiss courts cannot enforce decisions against foreign platform companies

# ANNOTATION: SWISS JURISDICTION ENFORCEMENT MODELS (2/2)

## Implications:

- Platform control over identity infrastructure undermines democratic sovereignty
- Citizens have no legal recourse when platforms restrict government service access

## Swiss Application:

- **Government procurement power:** Require Swiss jurisdiction compliance for public contracts
- **Market access requirements:** Platform services must accept Swiss legal authority
- **Financial penalties:** Sanctions must be sufficient to change corporate behavior (not token fines)
- **Service guarantee bonds:** Platforms post collateral ensuring continued service availability

# 4) REQUIRE DUTIES FOR NON-GOVERNMENTAL PARTIES

*The Commercial Sovereignty Anchor*

## **Problem Statement:**

- Private sector will likely dominate e-ID usage
- High risk of profiling and surveillance by businesses
- Existing data protection law advises data minimization, however...
  - FADP enforcement fragmented across cantonal prosecutors, lacks consolidated oversight
  - Business surveillance models adapt faster than enforcement can respond
  - Even EU with stronger penalties sees continued massive violations

## **Swiss Reality:**

The bigger risk isn't government surveillance — it's commercial profiling

# **ANNOTATION: SWISS FADP VS EU GDPR ENFORCEMENT REALITY (1/2)**

## **Swiss FADP Enforcement Gaps:**

- No direct fining power for Federal Data Protection Commissioner (FDPIC)
- Enforcement scattered across 26 cantonal prosecutors
- Maximum fines CHF 250,000 vs GDPR's 4% global revenue
- FDPIC can only "file grievances" and "participate as private plaintiff"

## **EU GDPR Despite Strong Penalties:**

- €5.88 billion in cumulative fines by 2025
- Meta alone fined €1.2 billion in January 2025
- Yet surveillance capitalism business models persist and adapt
- Some member states create "regulatory safe zones"

# **ANNOTATION: SWISS FADP VS EU GDPR ENFORCEMENT REALITY (2/2)**

## **Business Intelligence Reality:**

- Hotels, employers, landlords will use e-ID daily for verification
- Without clear rules, becomes profiling and tracking goldmine
- Current retention laws actually conflict with privacy goals
- "Verify and forget" requires legal reform, not just technical solutions

## **Private Sector Economic Coercion Patterns:**

- Airlines charging "paper ticket fees" for non-digital transactions
- Banks requiring smartphone apps for basic services access
- Apartment rentals demanding "digital verification only" creating housing discrimination
- E-ID verification becoming defacto requirement for employment, services, housing

## 4) REQUIRE DUTIES FOR NON-GOVERNMENTAL PARTIES

### *Core Principles*

Private sector dominates usage, but no obligations for privacy protection

**Your technology choices become theirs — but with different incentives**

Required Duties:

- **Purpose limitation** — strict limits to stated business needs
- **Verify and forget** — businesses should not store e-ID data
  - Requires legal reform
  - current liability and retention laws conflict with privacy
- **Unlinkable** — no silent pings, no tracking across services

# ANNOTATION: TECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF "VERIFY AND FORGET" (1/2)

## International Context:

- **Zero-Knowledge Proofs:** Google's open-source ZKP for EU age verification without revealing birthdates
- **Differential Privacy:** US Census Bureau injects noise to protect individuals while releasing statistics
- **Privacy-Preserving Credentials:** Systems enable age verification without disclosing unnecessary personal data

## Problems/Issues:

- Most business verification systems store complete credential data permanently
- "Verify and forget" lacks standardized technical implementation models
- Current Swiss retention laws conflict with privacy minimization goals
- Businesses have economic incentives to retain data for profiling

# ANNOTATION: TECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF "VERIFY AND FORGET" (2/2)

## **Implications:**

- Without technical enforcement, "verify and forget" becomes voluntary compliance theater
- Swiss e-ID could become business intelligence goldmine without architectural protection
- Legal requirements need technical implementation standards to be enforceable

## **Swiss Application:**

## 4) REQUIRE DUTIES FOR NON-GOVERNMENTAL PARTIES

### *Private Sector Accountability*

- **Temporary storage only** — default to immediate deletion
- **Best practices defined** — clear guidance, lose trusted status if caught profiling
- **Public transparency** — audit and publish violations

**Reality:** Business adoption will be rapid — rules must be ready before widespread use.

# ANNOTATION: INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS ACCOUNTABILITY MODELS (1/2)

## International Context:

- **Singapore Singpass:** 97% citizen adoption, 1,700+ private sector services with government oversight
- **UK Digital Identity Framework:** 34% of firms international, strict accountability standards
- **GDPR enforcement:** €5.88 billion in fines, but Meta still paid €1.2 billion and continued surveillance practices

## Problems/Issues:

# **ANNOTATION: INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS ACCOUNTABILITY MODELS (2/2)**

## **Implications:**

- Swiss e-ID private sector adoption will be rapid but accountability frameworks lag behind
- Without proactive accountability, businesses will optimize for data collection
- International experience shows fines alone insufficient to change behavior

## **Swiss Application:**

- **Preventive accountability:** Regular audits and published violation reports before problems escalate
- **Trusted status system:** Clear guidance with loss of trusted verifier status for profiling violations
- **Real-time monitoring:** Automated compliance monitoring rather than reactive investigation
- **Swiss procurement leverage:** Government contract requirements for private sector accountability standards
- **International cooperation:** Learn from Singapore's oversight model while maintaining Swiss privacy standards

# 5) IMPLEMENT INSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARDS

*The Democratic Sovereignty Anchor*

## **Problem Statement:**

- **Revocation power concentrated** — Office of Police can disable citizen's digital access
- **Administrative separation only** — appeals handled by different office, but same Federal Councillor (Beat Jans)
- **No guaranteed human review timeframes** — citizens may be locked out indefinitely
- **What happens when political winds change?** — both offices under same political leadership

**Swiss Principle:** Sovereignty resides in the people

## **The Balance:**

Swiss democracy requires both empowering government to protect citizens from private sector abuse AND constraining government overreach.

# **ANNOTATION: SWISS FEDERAL AUTHORITY STRUCTURE & INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS (1/2)**

## **Current Swiss Structure (per Rolf Rauschenbach):**

- Federal Office of Police: e-ID issuance and revocation
- Federal Office of Justice: appeals for overidentification, impersonation, illegitimate use
- Both offices under Federal Department of Justice and Police (FDJP)
- Both report to same Federal Councilor: Beat Jans
- Third office (FOITT) runs infrastructure but limited authority over policy

## **Revocation Risks:**

- Immediate loss of access to e-ID dependent services
- Could affect housing, employment, banking if private sector adopts widely
- Appeals process may be too slow for time-sensitive needs
- Political pressure could influence both issuance and appeals

## **ANNOTATION: SWISS FEDERAL AUTHORITY STRUCTURE & INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS (2/2)**

### **International Separation Models:**

- UK: Independent Information Commissioner separate from government departments
- Germany: Federal Commissioner for Data Protection reports directly to Parliament
- Canada: Privacy Commissioner independent from executive branch
- Estonia: e-Residency appeals handled by courts, not administrative offices

### **Revocation Safeguards (Other Countries):**

- Two-party authorization required for revocation
- Mandatory court review within 48 hours
- Automatic temporary restoration pending appeal
- Public transparency reports on revocation statistics and reasons

## 5) IMPLEMENT INSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARDS

### *Revocation Safeguards*

- **Two-party authorization required** — no single office can revoke e-ID credentials
- **Mandatory court review within 48 hours** — judicial oversight of revocation decisions
- **Automatic temporary restoration pending appeal** — citizens not locked out during review
- **Public transparency reports** — revocation statistics, reasons, and appeal outcomes published quarterly

## 5) INSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARDS

*Political Independence*

- **Independent oversight authority** — reports to Parliament, not Federal Councilor
- **Cross-party appointment process** — prevents single-party control of digital rights
- **Fixed terms with cause-only removal** — insulates from political pressure
- **Separate data governance** — government departments cannot share e-ID transaction data

## 5) IMPLEMENT INSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARDS

### *Institutional Enforcement Capacity*

- **Guaranteed human review across all sectors** – no automated denials of core rights by government or private entities
- **Clear explanations required** – citizens deserve to know why decisions were made
- **Service level commitments** – response times guaranteed by law
- **Sustained enforcement budget** – 20-year capacity to investigate and remedy violations
- **Cross-agency coordination** – institutional framework to enforce all five anchors

# ANNOTATION: INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT MODELS (1/3)

## International Service Protection Models:

- **Germany**: Onlineausweis-Gesetz requires government services maintain offline alternatives
- **Canada**: Digital Charter ensures "right to disconnect" from digital services
- **EU Accessibility Directive**: Physical access required alongside digital services

## Cross-Sector Enforcement Authority:

- **EU GDPR**: €5.88 billion in fines across government and private violations
- **UK ICO**: Authority over both public and private sector data processing
- **Australian Privacy Commissioner**: Oversight of government agencies and businesses

## ANNOTATION: ENFORCEMENT REALITY REQUIREMENTS (2/3)

### Enforcement Effectiveness Standards:

- **Real penalties:** Without substantial sanctions, voluntary compliance becomes theater
- **Legal binding standards:** Need-to-Know schedules must be legally enforceable, not suggestions
- **Systematic auditing:** Dark pattern detection requires dedicated resources and public transparency
- **Cross-sector accountability:** Government and private sectors held to equivalent standards

# ANNOTATION: SWISS INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY FRAMEWORK (3/3)

## Swiss Institutional Capacity Requirements:

- **Human Review Guarantees:** No automated denials of core rights by any sector
- **Service Level Commitments:** GDPR-style "without undue delay" response requirements with specific timeframes
- **20-Year Sustainability:** Independent budget allocation prevents political defunding
- **Professional Standards:** Career protection for oversight personnel ensures institutional memory
- **Democratic Accountability:** Treaty-level commitments ensure sustained enforcement capacity

# **ANNOTATION: INTERNATIONAL REVOCATION SAFEGUARDS EXAMPLES (1/2)**

## **Two-Party Authorization Models:**

- US Data Protection Review Court: Two-level redress mechanism with independent review
- EU GDPR: Supervisory authorities require transparent procedures for appointment/dismissal
- Australia: Draft legislation prevents law enforcement access without warrant

## **Court Oversight Examples:**

- Sri Lanka: District-level Registration of Persons Tribunals for ID card appeals
- US DPPC: Independent court reviews intelligence agency determinations
- EU: Court of Justice emphasizes independent authority control as "essential component"

## **ANNOTATION: INTERNATIONAL REVOCATION SAFEGUARDS EXAMPLES (2/2)**

### **Automatic Restoration Practices:**

- EU institutions: DPOs cannot be dismissed without EDPS consent
- GDPR: Dismissal only for "serious misconduct" or failing to meet qualifications
- Fixed terms (3-5 years) with limited removal grounds

### **Transparency Requirements:**

- GDPR requires transparent appointment procedures to minimize political influence
- Philippines: Legislation prevents sharing personal information with third parties
- Brazil: Digital ID adopted through legislative reform, not executive action

# **ANNOTATION: INDEPENDENT OVERSIGHT: INTERNATIONAL MODELS (1/2)**

## **Appointment Process Best Practices:**

- EU: Transparent procedures, professional qualifications, experience requirements
- Cross-party involvement prevents single-party control
- Independent from "any direct or indirect external influence" (GDPR standard)

## **Fixed Term Protections:**

- EU institutions: 3-5 year terms, reappointment possible
- Dismissal only with consent of independent authority (EDPS model)
- "Complete independence" with decision-making power free from external influence

## **ANNOTATION: INDEPENDENT OVERSIGHT: INTERNATIONAL MODELS (2/2)**

### **Structural Independence Examples:**

- EU Data Protection Authorities: Independent from three branches of government
- UK Information Commissioner: Reports to Parliament, not executive
- German Federal Commissioner: Direct parliamentary reporting relationship

### **Resource Protection:**

- GDPR requires "sufficient resources" allocation
- Independent budget authority prevents political pressure through funding
- "Meaningful decisions without external interference" standard

# THE VISION: SWISS DIGITAL AUTONOMY

**Success Looks Like:**

- **Choice preserved:** Digital and physical options remain equivalent
- **Architecture sustainable:** 20-year thinking, not 2-year shipping
- **Technical sovereignty maintained:** Platform independence with democratic oversight
- **Commercial sovereignty secured:** Businesses verify and forget, not profile and hoard
- **Institutional sovereignty protected:** Appeals, explanations, and human review guaranteed

**This reflects one fundamental principle...**

# THE RIGHT TO REFUSE

**The Foundation:**

*"If a system cannot hear you say no, it was never built for **us**. It was built for **them**."*

**The Swiss e-ID must preserve the right to refuse — that's what makes it Swiss**

**Because in Switzerland, sovereignty resides in the people.**

Your digital identity must reflect this constitutional principle: you delegate authority to systems, but you never surrender it.

# THANK YOU!



**Christopher Allen <ChristopherA@LifeWithAlacrity.com>**

***Available for policy review, technical consultation, and trust architecture***

- ***Schedule with me:***
  - Technical deep-dive on complexities of minimal and selective disclosure
  - Moving toward alternative models:
    - LESS (legally enabled self-sovereign) Identity
    - State Endorsed Identity (Utah is exemplar)
  - UX issues and Progressive Trust prototypes
  - Threat-model wallet designs for Swiss democratic values