Lilac / 2018-09-14 22:04:22 / 浏览数 3687 技术文章 技术文章 顶(1) 踩(0)

### SECT CTF crypto Gsh 思路分享

@(思路)[AES-ECB][hash forge][高斯消元]

```
题目描述:
```

About last night...

Service: nc 178.128.171.133 3333 | nc crypto.sect.ctf.rocks 3333

Download: gsh.tar.gz Author: grocid

```
这道题是\underline{\text{grocid}}出的,一直看着大佬的分享,在这谢谢大佬。reddit.txt
```

```
Submitted 2 months ago by [deleted] to /r/infoleaks I tried to login... was able to get a shell, but as a restricted user.
```

It seems horrendously badly configured. Which is what I would've expected. Fortunately, I found a source code from an old unencrypted backup drive... this one's particularly interesting...

```
class AESHash(object):
```

```
def __init__(self, key):
    self.bs = 16
    self.key = hashlib.sha256(key.encode()).digest()

def __pkcs7pad(self, s, blksize=16):
    missing = abs(len(s) - (len(s) / blksize + 1) * blksize)
    return s + (chr(missing) * missing)

def digest(self, user, password):
    cipher = AES.new(self.key, AES.MODE_ECB)
    q = 0
    data = self._pkcs7pad(user + password)
    for i in xrange(0, len(data), self.bs):
        block = data[i:i + self.bs]
        q ^= int(cipher.encrypt(block).encode("hex"), 0x10)
    return q
```

Their authentication mechanism uses some weird keyed AES-based MAC -- I've never seen anything like it before. I'd say it's insecure, but I don't know how to exploit it. Also, it's written in Python. Really?

Since the HMAC combines credentials in the following way... it's kind of moot to give it a try. I've learnt from one-oh-one that h(message | key) is secure... I think. Motherf... I'll give up; it's late and I need to go to sleep... over and out. For now.

-- .TD

The revolution will not be televised.

### 信息搜集

#### reddit上找了一通,没线索。那nc过去看看:

```
root@bin:/mnt/hgfs/CTF# nc 178.128.171.133 3333
Login (leave empty to create)
user:
Creating new user
user: 2
password:
```

```
Logged in as 2
$ 1s
            1 admin staff 27 Sep 5 19:31 flag.txt
-rw-r--r--
          1 admin staff 27 Sep 5 19:31 invoice.xls
$ cat flag.txt
$ cat /etc/shadow
admin:8f643bbafa959617b12b591f3145e5c0
  brainfuck 得到flag:SECT{th1s_1s_r34l_flag_1_Pr0mis3}.喵喵喵?提交是fake flag。
分析
class AESHash(object):
  def __init__(self, key):
      self.bs = 16
      self.key = hashlib.sha256(key.encode()).digest()
  def _pkcs7pad(self, s, blksize=16):
      missing = abs(len(s) - (len(s) / blksize + 1) * blksize)
      return s + (chr(missing) * missing)
  def digest(self, user, password):
      cipher = AES.new(self.key, AES.MODE_ECB)
      q = 0
      data = self._pkcs7pad(user + password)
      for i in xrange(0, len(data), self.bs):
         block = data[i:i + self.bs]
         q ^= int(cipher.encrypt(block).encode("hex"), 0x10)
题目提供了加密的oracle,可以任意_pkcs7pad(username+password)的AES-ECB
hash,我们的目的是伪造出hash为8f643bbafa959617b12b591f3145e5c0的一串字符。
密码是弱密码?
要不用rockyou.txt爆破试试?
爆破了一段时间,主办方检测到了,,提示:不必用admin登陆
AES-ECB, 我们能得到任意对plaintext-ciphertext.然后恢复出16byte的Key,目前计算能力还不可能,参考
q ^= int(cipher.encrypt(block).encode("hex"), 0x10)
我们可以得到一定长度(>=128)的list,则我们需要的8f643bbafa959617b12b591f3145e5c0一定在这个list的sublist的xor里,子串的空间远大于目标大小。
In [15]: a = 0
In [16]: b = 200
In [17]: for i in range(1,200):
         a+=math.factorial(200)/(math.factorial(200-i)*math.factorial(i))
  . . . :
  . . . :
In [18]: print a
1606938044258990275541962092341162602522202993782792835301374
In [19]: a>n#n=0x8f643bbafa959617b12b591f3145e5c0
Out[19]: True
In [20]: a//n
Out[20]: 4722366482869645213695L
因为目标hash的长度为128bit,我们得到128对(plaintext-ciphertext)就能在ciphertext的子集里xor后得到目标hash.
这里想到了背包求解,构造着发现xor不能放入矩阵中,又不是超递增序列,xd,放弃。
换方向,要不是算法?
google看看
动态规划?
试了试,放弃了,空间换时间,但是需要的空间太大了。
bingo
128bit xor?高斯消元问题(我好菜啊)
转换成128个mod2的方程,生成方程脚本。
```

TO error: cannot write 2:b5bbe950b1f52310ec0f986f4aeacbbb to /etc/shadow.

```
pubKey = [113602217935607289453201245405212005384L, 269903559201925776990330113614440744455L, 24156595894438163690164851676776
target = 0x8f643bbafa959617b12b591f3145e5c0
pubKey = pubKey[:128]
def _pkcs7pad(s, blksize=16):
  missing = abs(len(s) - (len(s) / blksize + 1) * blksize)
  return s + (chr(missing) * missing)
print len(pubKey)
for i in range(0,128):
  txt = ""
  for j in pubKey:
     if bin(j)[2:].zfill(128)[i] =="1":
        txt+="a"+str(pubKey.index(j))+"+"
  txt= txt[:-1]+"=="+bin(target)[2:].zfill(128)[i]
  print txt
这里我用wolfram mathematics求解(脚本见附件)
从结果可知,多解,C[1]为0,1均可,这里我取c[1]=0,得到了一组sublist:out =
验证结果:
In [71]: print a
In [72]: a= [2,4,5,9,10,11,12,13,16,17,22,24,27,28,30,31,32,35,36,38,40,43,45,47]
  ...: ,48,49,51,52,54,57,59,62,63,64,68,71,73,75,79,80,81,87,89,90,92,93,94,9
  \dots: 7,98,99,101,103,105,106,111,115,116,117,118,120,121,122,123,124,126,127
  ...: ]
In [73]:
In [73]: txt=0
  \dots: for i in a:
         txt^=pubKey[i]
  . . . :
In [74]:
In [74]: print hex(txt)
0x8f643bbafa959617b12b591f3145e5c0L
求解:
from pwn import *
context.log_level = "debug"
\# f = open("rockyou.txt","rb").read().split("\n")[::-1]
test = []
def _pkcs7pad(s, blksize):
  missing = abs(len(s) - (len(s) / blksize + 1) * blksize)
  return s + (chr(missing) * missing)
aeshash = ""
for i in out[:-1]:
  aeshash+=_pkcs7pad(str(i),16)
aeshash+=str(out[-1])
print len(aeshash)
print repr(aeshash)
for i in range(130,140):
  io = remote("178.128.171.133", 3333)
  io.recvuntil("user: ")
  # io.sendline()
  # io.recvuntil("user: ")
  io.sendline(aeshash)
```

```
io.recvuntil("password: ")
  io.sendline()
  data = io.recvuntil("Logged in as")
  io.interactive()
# $ cat invoice.xls
[DEBUG] Sent 0x10 bytes:
  'cat invoice.xls\n'
[DEBUG] Received 0x24 bytes:
  'SECT{...1_w4s_lylng_0f_c0urse_LuLz}\n'
SECT{...1_w4s_lylng_0f_c0urse_LuLz}
[DEBUG] Received 0x2 bytes:
  '#'
# $
  总结: 算法需要加强, 怼题不能放弃, 不要以分数为目的而不停的换题做。
gsh-solve.zip (0.012 MB) 下载附件
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上一篇:红队测试从0到1-PART 1 下一篇:利用动态二进制加密实现新型一句话木...
1. 0 条回复
```

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