

CVE-2018-1259

XXE with Spring Data's XMLBeam integration

漏洞公告

Spring Data XXE 攻击

危害等级：高

漏洞描述：

XMLBeans 提供了底层XML数据的对象视图，同时还能访问原始的XML信息集合。Spring Data Commons 1.13至1.13.11以及2.0至2.0.6的版本在与XMLBeam1.4.14或更早的版本进行结合使用时，XMLBeam不会限制XML外部实体应用，导致未经身份验证的远程恶意用户可以利用Spring Data的请求绑定特定的参数，访问系统上的任意文件。

环境搭建


1. 下载官方的示例包，使用idea打开，然后等待相关插件和包的安装。

<https://github.com/spring-projects/spring-data-examples/>

<https://github.com/spring-projects/spring-data-examples/tree/master/web/projection>

进入命令行，进入目录web\projection，输入mvn clean package生成package

这里需要把idea下面的maven路径写到环境变量path中
\\IntelliJ IDEA\\plugins\\maven\\lib\\maven3\\bin



```
Terminal
+
X D:\javawork\spring-data-examples-master>cd web/

D:\javawork\spring-data-examples-master\web>cd projection/

D:\javawork\spring-data-examples-master\web\projection>mvn clean package
[INFO] Scanning for projects...
[INFO]
[INFO] -----
[INFO] Building Spring Data - JSON and XML projection web example 2.0.0.BUILD-SNAPSHOT
```

1. 进入jar包所在目录，输入命令

```
java -jar spring-data-web-projection-2.0.0.BUILD-SNAPSHOT.jar
```

访问 <http://localhost:8080>

使用burp抓包，POST过去poc查看输出

...

POST / HTTP/1.1

Host: localhost:8080


Content-Length: 204

Cache-Control: max-age=0

Connection: close

Caused by: org.xml.sax.SAXParseException; lineNumber: 2; columnNumber: 10; ████ "http://apache.org/xml/features/disallow-docty

在窗口左边的External Libraries下面右键,选择Open Library Settings,找到Maven+
org.springframework.data+spring-data-commons+2.0.2.RELEASE2把它旁边的2.0.7/2.0.8/2.10.0
什么的全部删掉,只保留2.0.2的版本,然后重新生成包。保留2.0.6版本的进行调试风味更佳



```
factory.setFeature("http://apache.org/xml/features/disallow-doctype-decl",true);
```

漏洞分析

PS：这边使用的是2.0.2版本的commons不是2.0.6版本（因为我的maven search还没更新好=.=b）

首先是spring-data-commons配合xmlbeam的洞，进入commons的代码，找到和xml有关的这个文件：org\springframework\data\web\XmlBeamHttpMessageConverter
关注调用XmlBeam的函数XBProject，line23：

```
public class XmlBeamHttpMessageConverter extends AbstractHttpMessageConverter<Object> {
    private final XBProjector projectionFactory = new XBProjector(new Flags[0]);
    private final Map<Class<?>, Boolean> supportedTypesCache = new ConcurrentReferenceHashMap();
```

进入XBProject，/org/xmlbeam/XBProjector.java:169

```
public XBProjector(XBProjector.Flags... optionalFlags) {
    this(new DefaultXMLFactoriesConfig(), optionalFlags);
}
```

可以看到这里使用的是默认的配置，接下来会使用这个projectionFactory来读取输入流中的xml里面的信息，代码走到org\springframework\data\web\XmlBeamHttpMessageConverter

```
protected Object readInternal(Class<? extends Object> clazz, HttpInputMessage inputMessage) throws IOException, HttpMessageNotReadableException {
    return this.projectionFactory.io().stream(inputMessage.getBody()).read(clazz);
}
```

跟进read函数，org/xmlbeam/io/StreamInput.java:31

```
@Scope(DocScope.IO)
public <T> T read(Class<T> projectionInterface) throws IOException {
    Document document = this.readDocument();
    return this.projector.projectDOMNode(document, projectionInterface);
}
```

跟进readDocument函数，org/xmlbeam/io/StreamInput.java:37

```
private Document readDocument() throws IOException {
    try {
        DocumentBuilder documentBuilder = this.projector.config().createDocumentBuilder();
        Document document = this.systemID == null ? documentBuilder.parse(this.is) : documentBuilder.parse(this.is, this.systemID);
        return document;
    } catch (SAXException var3) {
        throw new RuntimeException(var3);
    }
}
```


这里！终于！看到了createDocumentBuilder！

接下来跟进org/xmlbeam/config/DefaultXMLFactoriesConfig.java中的这两个函数，这两个函数就是构造DOM解析器的工厂实例，然后DOM工厂获得 DOM 解析器的位置，在这里因为没有设置工厂的一些安全属性，即禁止外部实体的引用，导致输入中的inline DOCTYPE的使用被采纳，外部实体被导入，导致xxe漏洞的发生。xmlbeam最新版本的补丁也是在这里patch的。

```
public DocumentBuilder createDocumentBuilder() {
    try {
        DocumentBuilder documentBuilder = this.createDocumentBuilderFactory().newDocumentBuilder();
        return documentBuilder;
    } catch (ParserConfigurationException var2) {
        throw new RuntimeException(var2);
    }
}

public DocumentBuilderFactory createDocumentBuilderFactory() {
    DocumentBuilderFactory instance = DocumentBuilderFactory.newInstance();
    if (!DefaultXMLFactoriesConfig.NamespacePhilosophy.AGNOSTIC.equals(this.namespacePhilosophy)) {
        instance.setNamespaceAware(DefaultXMLFactoriesConfig.NamespacePhilosophy.HEDONISTIC.equals(this.namespacePhilosophy));
    }

    return instance;
}
```



图片展示的是我们写入的并被程序读到的document的内容。

补丁分析

spring-data-commons的补丁

补丁地址：

<https://github.com/spring-projects/spring-data-commons/commit/b8974a292ab463a304eda987632be4d9c145f5f8>

src/main/java/org/springframework/data/web/XmlBeamHttpMessageConverter.java 这边在传入XMLBeam的XBProjector时候做了新的配置：

```
50 54 */
51 55 public XmlBeamHttpMessageConverter() {
52 56
57 +     this(new XBProjector(new DefaultXMLFactoriesConfig() {
58 +
59 +         private static final long serialVersionUID = -1324345769124477493L;
60 +
61 +         /*
62 +          * (non-Javadoc)
63 +          * @see org.xmlbeam.config.DefaultXMLFactoriesConfig#createDocumentBuilderFactory()
64 +          */
65 +         @Override
66 +         public DocumentBuilderFactory createDocumentBuilderFactory() {
67 +
68 +             DocumentBuilderFactory factory = super.createDocumentBuilderFactory();
69 +
70 +             factory.setAttribute("http://apache.org/xml/features/disallow-doctype-decl", true);
71 +             factory.setAttribute("http://xml.org/sax/features/external-general-entities", false);
72 +
73 +             return factory;
74 +         }
75 +     }));
76 + }
77 +
78 + /**
79 +  * Creates a new {@link XmlBeamHttpMessageConverter} using the given {@link XBProjector}.
80 +  *
81 +  * @param projector must not be {@literal null}.
82 +  */
83 + public XmlBeamHttpMessageConverter(XBProjector projector) {
84 +
85         super(MediaType.APPLICATION_XML, MediaType.parseMediaType("application/*+xml"));
86
87 -     this.projectionFactory = new XBProjector();
88 +     Assert.notNull(projector, "XBProjector must not be null!");
89 +     this.projectionFactory = projector;
90 }
91 }
```

可以看出关键的两句，给DOM 工厂设置参数，阻止了外部实体的引入，禁用inline DOCTYPE声明，防止了XML实体注入。

xmlbeam的补丁

补丁地址：

<https://github.com/SvenEwald/xmlbeam/commit/f8e943f44961c14cf1316deb56280f7878702ee1>

补丁在src/main/java/org/xmlbeam/config/DefaultXMLFactoriesConfig.java中添加了一个数组，里面是一些安全配置，然后通过循环，在createDocumentBuilderFactory方法中设置。

```
+ private static final String[] FEATURE_DEFAULTS = new String[] { "http://apache.org/xml/features/disallow-doctype-decl#true",
+ "http://xml.org/sax/features/external-general-entities#false", //
+ "http://xml.org/sax/features/external-parameter-entities#false", //
+ "http://apache.org/xml/features/nonvalidating/load-external-dtd#false" };
```

what's more

发现两个补丁里面都有写xxe的test ^_^

src/test/java/org/springframework/data/web/XmlBeamHttpMessageConverterUnitTests.java

就像直接给poc一样23333

```
15 ■■■■■ src/test/java/org/springframework/data/web/XmlBeamHttpMessageConverterUnitTests.java amHttpMessageConver

@@ -28,6 +28,8 @@
28 28 import org.springframework.data.web.ProjectingJackson2HttpMessageConverterUnitTests.UnannotatedInterface;
29 29 import org.springframework.http.HttpInputMessage;
30 30 import org.springframework.http.MediaType;
31 31 +import org.springframework.http.converter.HttpMessageNotReadableException;
32 32 +import org.xml.sax.SAXParseException;
31 33 import org.xmlbeam.annotation.XBRead;
32 34
33 35 /**

@@ -87,6 +89,19 @@ public void supportsInterfaceAfterLookupForDifferentMediaType() {
87 89         assertThat(converter.canRead(Customer.class, MediaType.APPLICATION_XML)).isTrue();
88 90     }
89 91

92 + @Test // DATA Commons-1292
93 + public void doesNotSupportEntityExpansion() throws Exception {
94 +
95 +     preparePayload("<?xml version='1.0' encoding='ISO-8859-1'>>\n" //
96 +         + "<!DOCTYPE foo [\n" //
97 +         + "<!ELEMENT foo ANY >\n" //
98 +         + "<!ENTITY xxe \"Bar\" >]><user><firstname>&xxe;</firstname><lastname>Matthews</lastname></user>");
99 +
100 +     assertThatExceptionOfType(HttpMessageNotReadableException.class) //
101 +         .isThrownBy(() -> converter.read(Customer.class, message)) //
102 +         .withCauseInstanceOf(SAXParseException.class);
103 + }
104 +

90 105 private void preparePayload(String payload) throws IOException {
91 106     when(message.getBody()).thenReturn(new ByteArrayInputStream(payload.getBytes()));
92 107 }
```

影响版本和解决方案

漏洞的问题是，xml默认配置允许外部实体等可能导致xxe的非法输入，禁止外部实体和inline DOCTYPE的那两句设置两边（data-commons和xmlbeam）都没有加，如果调用的是xmlBeam1.4.15之前的版本自己加上配置也行，或者1.4.15之后xmlBeam都默认加了
https://blog.csdn.net/qg_32331073/article/details/79941132

影响版本：

- Spring Data Commons 1.13-1.13.11 (Ingalls SR11)
- Spring Data REST 2.6-2.6.11 (Ingalls SR11)
- Spring Data Commons 2.0-2.0.6 (Kay SR6)
- Spring Data REST 3.0-3.0.6 (Kay SR6)

解决方案：

- Spring Data Commons 1.13.x的用户升级到1.13.12 (Ingalls SR12)
- Spring Data Commons 2.0.x的用户升级到2.0.7 (Kay)
- 升级XMLBeam版本到1.4.15

参考

- <https://github.com/iffloidy/myBugAnalyze/tree/master/2018/CVE-2018-1259>
- <https://pivotal.io/security/cve-2018-1259>

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