

Using the Alternative Minimum Tax to Estimate the Elasticity of Taxable Income for High Earners*

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Abstract

Personal Income tax revenue in the United States draws heavily from high-income taxpayers. How high earners respond to tax changes has repercussions for tax revenue, the efficiency costs of taxation and the optimal progressivity of the tax schedule. Prior research that uses bunching methods to estimate the taxable income response of taxpayers has presented no evidence of high-income bunching at the top kink in the regular, federal income tax schedule. I argue that the regular schedule does not identify the actual tax-related incentives that apply to high-income individuals. At the federal level, high earners are subject to a combination of the regular income tax and the Alternative Minimum Tax. I use annual tax codes and publicly available samples of Internal Revenue Service individual income tax return data from 1993-2011 to characterize the combined schedule for each taxpayer. I discover previously undetected bunching at the top kink in this schedule and use it to estimate the elasticity of taxable income with respect to the net-of-tax rate for high earners to be between 0.15 to 0.28. This estimate implies a lower bound on the optimal top marginal tax rate of 70 percent, suggesting an optimal rate that is higher than prevailing top rates. I also use this setting to make a unique methodological contribution: I show that the location of the top kink in the combined schedule for each taxpayer varies across the distribution of taxable income. This generates novel variation in marginal tax rates that is separable from variation in taxable income, allowing me to mitigate a key endogeneity concern associated with the use of bunching estimators on fixed kink points.

Keywords: Elasticity of taxable income, personal income tax, alternative minimum tax, bunching

JEL Classification: H21, H24, H26

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I. Introduction

Personal income taxation is a key source of revenue for financing public goods and redistributive schemes. However, non-lump sum personal income taxes alter the after-tax price of labor, incentivizing individuals to change their labor supply (Pencavel, 1986; Hausman, 1991; MaCurdy et al., 1991), shelter earned income from taxation by consuming more tax-deductible items such as healthcare and housing (Glaeser and Shapiro, 2003), or illegally under-declare income (IRS, 2016). These responses can generate deadweight loss in the economy and cause tax revenue loss if the size of the taxable economy shrinks, making the marginal tax rate structure a highly debated policy and political issue. These debates rest in large part on how high-income individuals respond to changes in the marginal tax rate in the top income bracket.

I focus on high income taxpayers because of three reasons. First, the top quintile (percentile) of income earners by households in the United States contribute approximately 88 percent (38 percent) of personal income tax revenue (Tax Policy Center, 2019), so taxable income responses in this group can have substantial revenue consequences.

Second, the response to tax changes in the right-tail of the income distribution can itself be higher relative to the rest of the distribution, given high earners' access to diverse financial strategies including income-shifting across tax bases, retiming of income realization, and the increased use of itemized deductions such as home mortgage and business expense allowances (Saez, Slemrod and Giertz, 2012). For example, part of the income of high earners such as executives could be in the form of stock options, which face lower marginal tax rates on the capital gains schedule as compared to the top marginal tax rate on the income tax schedule (Hanlon et al., 2005). Taxpayers can also retime capital gains realizations, as documented by Goolsbee (2000b), Parcell (1995) and Samartino and Weiner (1997). Increased bargaining power of these taxpayers such as top executives can also allow them to substitute taxable income with non-taxable fringe benefits at work, such as improved work facilities and better healthcare benefits (Piketty et al., 2014). Top earners also have access to sophisticated tax planning services, and self-employment income that is not reported by third parties creates space for tax evasion (Slemrod, 2007; Hurst et al., 2010).

Third, the magnitude of the ETI parameter for high earners is highly contested in the public finance literature. However, it is the hypothesized high responsiveness of top earners and the sensitivity of revenues to the high-income tax base that served as a factor in the Reagan tax cuts of 1981 that reduced the top marginal tax rate from 70 percent to 50 percent; and again, in 1986

when the top rate was decreased to 28 percent. Contested views on the responsiveness of the high-income tax base continue to pervade the policy and political discourse.

Measuring taxpayer responses along the labor, avoidance, and evasion margins separately is infeasible due to the inability to observe all the dimensions of behavior. Instead, Feldstein's (1999) canonical model shows that all such margins of taxpayer responses that affect taxable income and generate deadweight burden are captured by the elasticity of taxable income (ETI) with respect to the net-of-tax rate.¹ This makes the ETI a sufficient statistic for estimating efficiency costs of income taxation and conducting welfare analyses², assuming no transfer costs³ of sheltering (Chetty, 2009) and no fiscal externalities⁴ (Slemrod, 1998; Saez, 2004). This makes the ETI a core parameter in the public economics literature. Previous work on estimating the magnitude of high-income taxpayer responsiveness has generated mixed results. For example, Feldstein (1995) estimates the ETI for high earners to be as high as 1.7, while others studying bunching behavior around the top kink in the regular income tax schedule have found no response (Saez, 2010; Mortenson & Whitten, 2016).

In this paper, I employ a bunching estimator to study the responsiveness of top earners in the United States to changes in marginal tax rates by using the intersection of the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) and the regular income tax schedules. To date, no prior research has studied the combined schedule, especially for estimating the ETI for high earners.

Existing literature on estimating the ETI for high earners in the United States predominantly uses two approaches. The first approach uses taxable income responses related to tax reforms that change top marginal tax rates to estimate the ETI. However, rising inequality that differentially affects secular growth rates in different parts of the taxable income distribution presents a challenge, since it becomes difficult to disentangle the effect of secular income growth on taxable income from the effect of tax rates. Estimates vary significantly, in the range of 0 to 1.7. Initial estimates tended to be high (Lindsey, 1986; Feldstein, 1995). More recent studies that have attempted to isolate variation in taxable income from secular income growth have generated lower estimates. These issues and the relevant literature are discussed in more detail in Section II.

¹ The net-of-tax rate is the post-tax, take-home portion of the marginal dollar earned by a taxpayer.

² This is because in the canonical model, the marginal private value of sheltering an additional dollar of income and the marginal social value of earning an additional dollar of income are both pegged to the tax rate.

³ Chetty (2009) shows that transfers costs to taxpayers of avoiding or evading taxes can be offset by a positive externality on other agents. For example, penalties paid to the government due to tax evasion are redistributed; and an increase in deductible charitable contributions generates positive externalities for other agents in the economy.

⁴ Tax revenue losses due to income shifted from one stream can be partially offset by taxation in another stream.

The second approach uses bunching methods on cross-sectional data to avoid identification issues created by secular income growth. The use of this approach in the United States involves estimating the magnitude of bunching at kinks in the regular, federal income tax schedule. This bunching is presumably a result of taxpayers strategically locating on the side of the kink that offers the lower marginal tax rate. Excess bunching is then compared to the tax rate differential around the kink point to estimate the ETI. This approach has revealed no high-income responses around the top kink in the regular, federal income tax schedule (Saez, 2010; Mortenson and Whitten, 2016). On the other hand, the estimated ETI for low-income individuals in these studies is higher, in the range of 0.1 - 0.3, raising the question of why bunching estimators have failed to show evidence of economically significant elasticities for high earners who have more margins along which they can respond.

I argue that the federal, regular income tax schedule used by previous bunching studies does not identify the actual, tax-related incentives that apply to high-income individuals. At the federal level, high earners respond to a combination of the regular income tax and the AMT. The AMT is a concomitant income tax schedule with its own definition of taxable income and marginal tax rates. The purpose of the AMT is to ensure that high-income taxpayers do not take disproportionate advantage of deductions – which reduce taxable income – offered by the regular income tax schedule. The AMT disallows major deductions such as personal exemptions, the standard deduction, and important itemized deductions such as the state and local tax (SALT) deduction, and miscellaneous deductions used primarily by business owners.⁵ By redefining taxable income, the AMT causes a larger part of earned income to be counted as taxable that is otherwise sheltered from taxation on the regular income tax schedule. However, the AMT provides a substantial fixed deduction that prevents low- to middle-income taxpayers from being affected by it.

Taxpayers separately calculate their income tax liabilities on the regular income tax and the AMT schedules and are liable for the higher of the two taxes. The effective schedule is, therefore, the upper envelope of the interaction of the two schedules. The intersection kink – where the two schedules cross – is the top kink in the combined schedule. I find that between 1993-2011, less than 0.5 percent of taxpayers with real 2007 adjusted gross income (AGI) of less than \$100,000 were subject to the combined AMT-regular schedule. For real AGIs between \$100,000 to \$200,000, this rate rises to approximately 3 percent. Amongst taxpayers with real AGI above

⁵ The AMT also partially disallows medical and dental deductions, accelerated depreciation, and deductions on home mortgage interest on non-primary property, among others.

\$300,000, more than 65 percent were subject to the combined schedule, implying a large proportion of high earners for whom the correct schedule to analyze is the combined, rather than just the regular income tax schedule.

Studying taxpayer behavior around the top kink in the regular income tax schedule in isolation can reveal low ETI estimates for two reasons. First, the top kink in the combined schedule does not systematically align with the top kink in the regular schedule. Studying bunching behavior only around the latter will introduce measurement error and bias estimates of the ETI downward. The top kink in the regular schedule does not affect taxpayers who are subject to the combined schedule. For these taxpayers, strategic decision-making occurs around the top kink in the combined schedule. Second, the difference in marginal tax rates on the two sides of the top kink in the regular schedule can be too small to elicit a substantial bunching response, even in the absence of the combined schedule. Larger tax rate differentials around kinks create stronger incentives for taxpayers to bunch on the side of the kink point that offers a lower tax rate (Chetty et al. 2011). Such differentials exist on the combined schedule. The marginal tax rate changes from 28 percent to the left of the top kink on the combined schedule to approximately 38 percent to its right, as compared to the approximately 36 to 39 percent (33 to 35 percent) change across the top kink in the regular income tax schedule between 1993-2002 (2003-2011).

Using annual federal income tax codes and publicly available Internal Revenue Service (IRS) income tax return data from 1993-2011, I construct the two piecewise linear functions associated with the regular income tax and the AMT schedules for each taxpayer in each tax year, adjusting for taxpayer-level deductions. Across years, the shape of the two tax functions is determined by legislative rules related to the size of income tax brackets and corresponding marginal tax rates. Within years and across individuals, the location of the intersection kink is determined by the amount of deductions allowed by the regular income tax relative to the AMT. Once constructed, I solve these two tax functions for each taxpayer in my sample to find the complete set of intersection kinks. The intersection kink for these taxpayers lies on average, at \$430,200 for time period 1993-2002, and at \$679,307 for time period 2003-2011.

Since the location of the intersection kink varies for each taxpayer, I recenter these kink points and overlay the observed distribution of taxable income to provide visual evidence of the aggregate bunching response of high earners. I estimate this excess mass as compared to an estimated counterfactual density⁶ that is a fitted polynomial of the seventh order and use it in a

⁶ The counterfactual density is the underlying distribution if there was no kink point and therefore, no differential taxpayer response to changing tax rates.

standard bunching estimator to measure the ETI for high earners. I also test the robustness of my estimates by using weaker assumptions for the functional form of the counterfactual density. Earlier bunching studies that have estimated the ETI for high earners have made stronger functional-form assumptions. For example, the counterfactual density is assumed to be linear in Saez (2010) and a polynomial of order seven in Chetty et al. (2011). I use the method proposed in Bertanha et al. (2020) to estimate non-parametric bounds on the ETI, by using the area of the observed distribution as a constraint on the counterfactual density to restrict its range of slopes in the bunching region.

The location of the top kink in the combined schedule varies across the distribution of taxable income for each taxpayer, providing novel variation in marginal tax rates that is separable from variation in taxable income. This feature allows me to mitigate an important endogeneity concern associated with the use of bunching estimators on fixed kink points (Blomquist and Newey, 2017; Bertanha et al., 2020).

I estimate the average ETI for high earners to be 0.15. This estimate is bounded below at 0.12 and above at 0.17. The estimated ETI for high earners rises to 0.20 for taxpayers who are unaffected by the additional complexity of the capital gains schedule. I also generate the estimates by time-period. The Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act (JGTRRA) of 2003 was followed by annual increases in the AMT fixed deduction amount, pushing the intersection kink to higher income levels where taxpayers are plausibly more responsive to changes in marginal tax rates. For these higher-income taxpayers between 2003-2011 who unaffected by the additional complexity of the capital gains schedule, the estimated ETI is 0.28. High earners' responsiveness to marginal tax rates increases over time, with taxpayers who report any self-employment income responding more than others. I apply simplified formulas in the literature that use the estimated ETI parameter in conjunction with marginal tax rates and the shape of the income distribution to estimate efficiency costs and optimal top marginal tax rates, as discussed in Section VII. Intuitively, higher taxpayer responsiveness generates larger distortions in the economy leading to higher efficiency costs and lower optimal top marginal tax rates.

My estimates for the average ETI for high earners of 0.15 - 0.28 imply an efficiency cost ranging from 22 cents to 45 cents per dollar of additional tax revenue collected. The estimated optimal top marginal tax rate lies between 70 percent and 82 percent. In the presence of transfer costs and fiscal externalities, these estimates serve as upper bounds on efficiency costs and lower bounds on optimal top marginal tax rates (Chetty, 2009).

I make three key contributions to the literature. First, I account for the interaction of the regular income tax and AMT schedules in the United States to provide evidence of substantial bunching around the top kink in the combined schedule, resulting in elasticities of 0.15 to 0.28. In contrast, earlier studies show no response at the top kink in the regular income tax schedule (Saez, 2010; Mortenson and Whitten, 2016). To date, no prior study has studied the combined schedule for estimating the ETI for high earners.

The second contribution that I make is methodological. I provide a unique setting that mitigates recent endogeneity concerns related to the use of bunching methods on kink points fixed in taxable income (Blomquist and Newey, 2017; Bertanha et al., 2016, 2020). Since fixed kinks at which marginal tax rates change are jointly determined with taxable income, observed taxable income is likely correlated with unobserved heterogeneity. Intuitively, it is plausible that individuals select into particular bins of the income distribution not as a result of strategic responses to marginal tax rates but because of some underlying preferences for those income levels. If this occurs, then observed bunching (or troughs) in the taxable income distribution might reflect preferences rather than strategic decision-making related to tax rates, causing bias in the estimation of the ETI of unknown direction. However, in the setting that I leverage, the top kink in the combined schedule varies for each taxpayer across taxable income generating a distribution of top kinks, as illustrated in Section III.B. This unique feature of the combined schedule weakens the correlation between taxable income and unobserved heterogeneity, increasing confidence in the ability of my estimator to estimate an unbiased ETI parameter.

Third, I contribute to the small literature on the AMT by providing the only estimates on taxpayers' responses to the AMT. Previous literature in this area has specifically focused on forecasting the coverage and revenue impact of evolving AMT laws of the early 2000s (Burman et al., 2003), its impact on average marginal tax rates (Feenberg and Poterba, 2003), and the role of the AMT as a fiscal stabilizer (Galle and Klick, 2011). However, the AMT has not been leveraged to assess taxpayer behavior and its impact on efficiency and the optimal schedule.

From a policy perspective, my results point to optimal top marginal tax rates that are higher than prevailing rates. The higher ETI for self-employed individuals confirms the previously documented relationship between the absence of third-party reporting and higher tax avoidance behavior. And a comparison of the relationship between the size of the marginal tax rate change around kinks and bunching responses suggests that a larger number of income tax brackets with smaller marginal tax rate changes across brackets will reduce taxable income responses, leading to lower efficiency costs of taxation.

II. Prior Literature

I contribute to the literature on estimating the elasticity of taxable income (ETI) with respect to the net-of-tax rate for high earners. The ETI measures the taxable income response of taxpayers to changes in marginal tax rates. As discussed in Section I, this parameter can be a sufficient statistic for estimating efficiency costs and optimal top marginal tax rates (Feldstein, 1999) under no transfer costs (Chetty, 2009) and no fiscal externalities (Slemrod, 1998; Saez, 2004). In particular, the large share of tax revenue generated by high-income taxpayers and their greater hypothesized ability to respond to changes in tax rates makes studying the ETI of high earners extremely important. I use a bunching estimator and leverage the conjoined nature of the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) and the regular, federal income tax schedule to estimate the ETI of high earners to be approximately 0.15 to 0.28.

The core challenge with estimating the ETI is related to the endogeneity of tax rates, since taxable income and tax rates are jointly determined. As taxable income rises, the marginal tax rate that the taxable income is subject to increases under a nonlinear schedule. This makes it difficult to disentangle variation in marginal tax rates from variation in taxable income. Prior literature has predominantly used two methods to address this endogeneity concern. The first approach to estimating the ETI for high earners leverages tax reforms that introduce plausibly exogenous changes in marginal tax rates. The major, federal tax reforms that have been studied in the literature include the Economic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA) of 1981, the Tax Reform Act (TRA) of 1986, the Omnibus Reconciliation Acts (OBRA) of 1990 and 1993 and the American Taxpayer Relief Act (ATRA) of 2012.⁷ I compare the estimates from some of the seminal studies using tax reforms in Figure 1.⁸ Panel A sorts these estimates by publication year of the study and shows that studies using tax reforms have found a wide array of estimates, ranging from 0 to 1.7, with more recent studies finding lower estimates of the ETI for high-income taxpayers. Panel B sorts the studies by the median year of analysis considered in each study. It shows how the ETI estimates related to tax reforms in the 1980s were higher than those that were introduced later. It is possible that structural ETI was higher in the 1980s due to features of tax audit system or the specific aspects of tax reforms in this time-period, or that earlier studies did not sufficiently account for the endogeneity of marginal tax rates. Details on the studies represented in Figure 1 are provided in Table A of the Appendix.

⁷ ERTA 1981 and TRA 1986 reduced the top marginal tax rate from 70 percent to 50 percent, and from 50 percent to 28 percent, respectively. OBRA 1990 and 1993 increased the top marginal tax rate from 28 percent to 31 percent, from 31 percent to 39.6 percent. ATRA 2012 increased the tax rate from 35 percent to 39 percent.


⁸ If a study has multiple estimates for the ETI of high earners, I average the estimated ETI.

Initial estimates using the tax reforms approach tend to be high (Lindsey, 1986; Feldstein, 1995). Lindsey (1986) and Feldstein's (1995) identification strategies rely on secular growth rates of real income being the same for the groups being compared. If these growth rates vary across groups due to non-tax related reasons, then taxable incomes of taxpayers in high-income groups would be different from taxpayers in low-income groups across time, even in the absence of tax changes. This differential income growth is well documented. Saez and Zucman (2020) find that between 1980-2018, the national income share of the top one percent grew by 2 percent per year, compared to an annual, average growth rate of 0.2 percent for the bottom 50 percent of the income distribution. The higher secular growth in the income share of high-income groups would bias the estimate of the ETI for high earners in Lindsey (1987) and Feldstein (1995) upwards, plausibly accounting for the high estimates found in these studies. To deal with the issue of secular income growth, most tax reform studies conducted after 1995 controlled for time trends and exploited instrumental variables to disentangle variation in tax rates from variation in taxable income, producing smaller estimates (Gruber and Saez, 2002; Saez, 2003).⁹ As shown in Panel A of Figure 1, the estimated ETI of high-income taxpayers is lower, in the range of 0 to 1 from year 1997 onwards.

The second approach to estimating the ETI attempts to avoid the identification issues caused by differential secular income growth rates by using cross-sectional income tax data and employing bunching methods. This approach involves overlaying the observed taxable income distribution across a stable, income tax schedule. Observed bunching in this distribution around kinks in the tax schedule plausibly reflects strategic taxable income responses of taxpayers, with taxpayers locating on the side of the kink where the marginal tax rate is lower. The excess mass in the distribution captures this strategic response and is compared to the magnitude of the change in marginal tax rates at the kink to estimate the ETI. However, while studies using tax reforms have found a wide range of estimates, bunching methods have found no taxable income response at the top kinks of the income tax schedule in the United States (Saez 2010; Mortenson and Whitten, 2016). In Panel A of Figure 1, I compare estimates for the ETI of high earners in the US with estimates from bunching studies conducted using Danish tax data. It is notable that unlike in the US, bunching estimates are non-zero for Danish data and in the range of 0.1 to 0.3. In fact, recent estimates for the ETI of high earners in China, not included in the figure, stand at 0.41 (He et al., 2018).

⁹ For a detailed discussion of other identification issues related to studies using tax reforms, review Saez, Slemrod and Gertz (2012).

Panel A



Panel B




Figure 1: Historical Estimates of the ETI for High-Income Taxpayers

Notes: Panel A illustrates estimates of the ETI of high-income taxpayers in the prior literature, sorted by Publication year. Panel B contains the same estimates sorted by the median year of the analysis sample used by each study. Studies are divided into four types: tax reforms (non-bunching), bunching studies in the US, bunching studies in Denmark, and estimates obtained in this study.

There are two potential reasons for the difference between estimates of the observed ETI for high earners in the United States and in other countries. First, it is possible that high-income taxpayers in the United States simply do not respond to the top kink in the income tax schedule, as compared to their global counterparts, due to reasons including a lack of salience of the top kink and low structural elasticities. It is also plausible that earlier studies in the US do not consider relevant features of the income tax code when measuring taxpayer bunching responses, resulting in measurement error that introduces downward bias in these estimates. In this paper, I argue that the federal, regular income tax schedule used by previous bunching studies is insufficient to map the effective tax schedule that applies to high-income individuals. At the federal level, high earners are likely subject to both the regular income tax and the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) schedules. The AMT has its own marginal tax rates and allowable deductions. Taxpayers separately calculate their income tax liabilities on the regular income tax and the AMT schedules and are liable for the higher of the two taxes. The effective schedule, therefore, is the upper envelope of the interaction of the two individual schedules. I discuss the structure of the combined schedule in more detail in Section III.

By considering taxpayer behavior along the combined schedule, I provide evidence of previously undetected bunching at the top kink of the combined schedule, in contrast to studies using the top kink in the regular income tax schedule, resulting in higher estimates of the ETI for high-income taxpayers as shown in Figure 1. My estimates of 0.15 to 0.28 are more in line with bunching studies conducted in other countries. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper to study taxpayer responses to kinks in the combined schedule, specifically in relation to the AMT. Earlier literature has forecasted the coverage and revenue impact of evolving AMT laws of the early 2000s (Burman et al., 2003), assessed the AMT's impact on average marginal tax rates (Feenberg and Poterba, 2003), and studied the role of the AMT as a fiscal stabilizer (Galle and Klick, 2011). However, the AMT has not been leveraged to assess taxpayer behavior and its impact on efficiency costs of taxation.

I also provide a unique setting that mitigates endogeneity concerns related to the use of bunching methods on kink points fixed in taxable income. By providing a unique setting where the location of the top kink in the personal income tax schedule varies across taxpayers, I am able to disentangle variation in marginal tax rates from variation in taxable income to better address endogeneity concerns related to traditional bunching estimators. Earlier bunching studies use tax schedule kinks that are fixed in taxable income in a given tax year. For a single budget set, variation in tax rates across the budget set occurs with variation in taxable income as well as with

variation in preferences. The correlation of taxable income and underlying preferences makes it challenging to distinguish the taxable income elasticity from unobserved heterogeneity (Blomquist and Newey, 2017; Bertanha et al., 2016). Intuitively, it is impossible to know if an individual chooses to locate at a kink because of tax rate variation or due to underlying preferences. The variation in the location of the top kink in the combined schedule across high-income taxpayers however, generates multiple budget sets, limiting exposure to such selection bias by delinking variation in marginal tax rates from variation in taxable income.

The next section provides a detailed overview of the AMT focusing on its features that interact with the regular income tax schedule to give rise to the combined, effective personal income tax schedule at the federal level in the United States.

III. Conceptual Framework for the Combined Income Tax Schedule

In this section, I assess the coverage of the combined income tax schedule and unpack specific features of the regular income tax and AMT schedules that give rise to the top, intersection kink in the combined schedule. I show how the location of the top kink in the combined schedule is misaligned with the top kink in the regular income tax schedule, potentially creating a downward bias in earlier estimates of the ETI for high-income taxpayers that only looked at the top kink in the regular schedule. I also discuss how the variation in the location of the top kink in the combined schedule can be used to address endogeneity concerns associated with the earlier use of bunching estimators on fixed kink points and provide evidence for this variation.

The AMT reduces the ability of high-income taxpayers to shelter income from taxation with the use of deductions. The AMT and the regular income tax schedules function in parallel to each other. Taxpayers calculate their income tax liability using both the regular income tax form (Form 1040) as well as the AMT form (Form 6251). Once taxpayers have calculated personal income tax liabilities based on both schedules, they are liable to pay the higher of the two amounts represented by the upper envelope of the interaction of the two schedules.

The number of taxpayers who are subject to the upper envelope of the combined AMT-regular tax schedule increases at higher income levels. For example, I find that approximately 0.03 percent of the population of taxpayers with real adjusted gross income (AGI) less than \$50,000 face the combined AMT-regular schedule. On the other hand, 47 percent (60 percent) of taxpayers with real AGI greater than \$200,000 (\$300,000) face the AMT. Table 1 provides details

on the fraction of taxpayers who are subject to the combined schedule by real 2007 AGI brackets. The table also provides this breakdown for the subpopulation that submitted Form 6251, the form used to report AMT liability. Since taxpayers submitting this form already expect to be subject to the combined schedule, the fraction of taxpayers who are subject to the AMT, conditional on submitting Form 6251 is close to 100 percent at high income levels.

Table 1: Fraction of Taxpayers Facing the Combined AMT-Regular Tax Schedule

Real (2007) AGI Brackets in '000s of \$	% of taxpayers facing combined schedule	% of taxpayers facing combined schedule, conditional on submitting Form 6251
less than 50	0.03	1.64
50 to 100	0.35	8.36
100 to 200	3.11	23.56
200 to 300	33.09	62.63
300 to 400	63.05	94.97
400 to 500	68.11	97.58
more than 500	57.2	93.5

Studying the taxable income response of high earners around the top kink in the regular income tax schedule without accounting for the AMT and the presence of the combined tax schedule can affect bunching-based estimates of their ETI through two channels. First, the top kink in the combined schedule does not systematically align with the top kink in the regular income tax schedule. Studying bunching behavior only around the latter will introduce measurement error and bias estimates of the ETI downward, because the top kink in the regular schedule does not affect taxpayers who are subject to the combined schedule. For these taxpayers, strategic decision-making occurs around the top kink in the combined schedule.

Second, taxpayers on the margin are incentivized to locate on the side of the kink offering the lower marginal tax rate. In fact, as shown by Chetty et al. (2011), the utility loss associated with larger changes in marginal tax rates can justify higher adjustment costs for taxpayers to relocate on the side of the kink offering the lower marginal tax rate. The top kink on the combined schedule provides a more substantial jump in marginal tax rates relative to the regular schedule at high income levels. Specifically, the marginal tax rate at the top kink in the combined schedule increases from 28 percent to approximately 39 percent (35 percent) between 1993-2002 (2003-2011). Compare this to changes at the top kink in the regular schedule, where the marginal tax rate increases from 36 percent to approximately 39 percent between 1993-2002, and from 33

percent to 35 percent between 2002-2011. The top kink in the combined schedule therefore, becomes a valuable device for assessing taxpayer responsiveness to changing marginal tax rates. Below, I discuss the features of the regular schedule, the AMT schedule, and their interaction that results in misalignment of kinks between the regular and combined schedules. I also detail the larger changes in marginal tax rates at the top kink in the combined schedule relative to the regular schedule.

A. Tax Brackets, Marginal Tax Rates, and Taxable Income

The AMT differs from the federal, regular income tax schedule in three distinct ways that are related to taxable income brackets, marginal tax rates, and the definition of taxable income.¹⁰ First, the regular income tax and AMT schedules contain taxable income brackets of different sizes. The regular income tax schedule had five brackets between 1993-2001, and then six brackets between 2002-2012. In contrast, the AMT schedule contains two statutory taxable income brackets. However, a fixed deduction provided by the AMT is phased out at high income levels, causing the AMT to have four distinct effective taxable income brackets. Second, both schedules exhibit different marginal tax rates corresponding to each taxable income bracket. As an example, for tax year 2000, the differences in taxable income brackets and corresponding marginal tax rates for married joint filers are provided in Table 2.

Table 2: Taxable Income Brackets and Marginal Tax Rates for the Regular Tax and AMT in Year 2000

Regular Taxable Income (MFJ)		AMT Taxable Income (MFJ)		Tax Rates
\$0 - \$43,850	15%	\$0 - \$105,000		26%
\$43,850 - \$105,950	28%	\$105,000 - \$161,000		32.5%
\$105,950 - \$161,450	31%	\$161,000 - \$285,000		35%
\$161,450 - \$288,350	36%	\$285,000 and above		28%
\$288,350 and above	39.6%			

From 1993-2001, the marginal tax rates in the regular income tax schedule increase from 15 percent in the lowest bracket to 39.6 percent in the highest bracket. From 2002 to 2011, marginal tax rates range from 10 percent in the lowest bracket to 35 percent in the highest bracket. In comparison, The AMT has a non-graduated schedule in terms of effective marginal tax rates. In 1993, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) altered the AMT schedule by eliminating a

¹⁰ The detailed legislative history of the AMT is provided in Table B of the Appendix.

flat marginal tax rate of 24 percent and introducing a two-tiered schedule, with statutory tax rates of 26 percent and 28 percent. The Act also provided a fixed AMT deduction of \$45,000 to married joint filers and \$33,750 to single filers. These exemption amounts are phased-out at higher taxable income levels. For example, in year 2000, this phaseout begins at \$105,000 for married joint filers and \$78,750 for single filers. In the phaseout range, every additional dollar of taxable income reduces the fixed deduction by 25 cents leading to effective marginal tax rates that are 1.25 times the statutory marginal tax rates. The fixed deduction completely phases out at taxable income of \$285,000 (\$213,750) for married joint filers (single filers) in year 2000, creating an effective AMT schedule consisting of four distinct marginal tax rates: 26 percent, 32.5 percent at the point where the exemption phaseout begins, 35 percent where the 28 percent statutory rate begins and exemption phaseout continues, and 28 percent, the point where the fixed deduction is completely phased out.

Third, taxable income is defined differently on the two schedules. The regular income tax schedule does not tax all earned income. Instead, it allows taxpayers to subtract certain deductible consumption and excludable income items from their total earned income for taxation purposes. The residual income forms the tax base on which prevailing tax rates are applied. While a discussion of all the exemptions is beyond the scope of this paper, some of the excluded income items include portions of retirement income, certain types of scholarship income, interest gained from municipal bonds and charitable donations received. As compared to excluded income, deductible consumption expenses that favor certain uses of a taxpayer's income include charitable contributions, state and local taxes paid, real estate taxes paid, interest paid on home mortgage, medical expenses, business expenses and miscellaneous expenditure. High-income taxpayers disproportionately use these excludable income and deductible consumption items that are subject to favorable tax treatment. For example, in fiscal year 2010, taxpayers with incomes below \$50,000 used 8.8 percent of all medical deductions, 1.4 percent of all state and local tax deductions, and 2.8 percent of mortgage interest deductions. Compare these utilization rates to those of taxpayers with incomes above \$100,000, for whom the shares of these deduction amounts were 49.3 percent, 85.6 percent, and 78.3 percent, respectively.¹¹ The regular income tax code also provides a fixed standard deduction that can be used by taxpayers for whom the above deduction amounts are less than the standard deduction. Prior to the Tax Cuts and Jobs

¹¹ Estimates computed using the Joint Committee on Taxation's (JCT) "Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 2011-2015".

Act (TCJA) 2017, the regular tax schedule also allowed for personal exemptions for each member of the family.

On the other hand, the AMT disallows major deductions such as personal exemptions, the standard deduction, and important itemized deductions such as the state and local tax (SALT) deduction, and miscellaneous deductions used primarily by business owners.¹² By redefining taxable income, the AMT causes a larger part of earned income to be counted as taxable that is otherwise sheltered from taxation on the regular schedule. However, the AMT provides a substantial fixed deduction that keeps low- to middle-income taxpayers out of the AMT.

B. Interaction of the Regular Income Tax and AMT Schedules

In Panel A of Figure 2, I illustrate the regular income tax schedule using tax rules prevailing in year 2000. Marginal tax rates increase at each kink in the schedule, represented by the change in slope at the kink points. For example, the marginal tax rate in the lowest taxable income bracket is 15 percent, while the marginal tax rate in the highest bracket is 39.6 percent. The length of each interval between kink points depends on the size of income tax brackets. Marginal tax rates and the length of income tax brackets are fully contingent on the prevailing tax law, and common to all taxpayers. In contrast, the starting point of the tax schedule along pre-tax income represented by the x-intercept is determined by the total amount of allowable regular income tax deductions that a taxpayer claims and therefore, this parameter varies across taxpayers.

Panel B of Figure 2 provides a similar representation for the AMT schedule with corresponding tax brackets and effective marginal tax rates. The x-intercept of the AMT schedule is equal to the sum of the fixed AMT deduction and the regular tax deductions allowed by the AMT. At higher income levels, deductions under the regular tax schedule are on average lower than those under the AMT, by design. Therefore, Figure 2 relates to a high-income/high-deduction type taxpayer with $x\ intercept_{AMT} < x\ intercept_{regular}$. Note that on average, $x\ intercept_{AMT} > x\ intercept_{regular}$ for a low-income/low-deduction type taxpayer. The differences across taxpayers in the amount of deductions taken on the regular income tax and AMT schedules generates variation in the location of the point at which the two tax schedules intersect. This variation is the key reason for the misalignment of the top kinks on the combined schedule and the regular income tax schedule. Further, as I explain in Section IV.D, this variation in the location

¹² The AMT also partially disallows medical and dental deductions, accelerated depreciation, and deductions on home mortgage interest on non-primary property, among others.

of the intersection kink disentangles variation in marginal tax rates from variation in taxable income, severing the link between taxable income and unobserved heterogeneity and mitigating a key endogeneity concern associated with the use of bunching estimators on fixed kink points.

Figure 3, Panel A brings together the regular income tax schedule with the AMT schedule for a high-income/high-deduction type taxpayer.¹³ Taxpayers pay the higher of the two personal income taxes and therefore, the combined income tax schedule is the upper envelope of the interaction of the two piecewise linear tax functions. The upper envelope of the combined schedule is shaded in gray. The point at which the AMT and the regular tax schedules interact is the intersection kink of the combined schedule.

The case for a low-income/low-deduction type taxpayer is different. The substantial, fixed deduction provided by the AMT shifts the AMT function to the right of the zero pre-tax income point. Across 1993 to 2011, the fixed deduction is as low as \$45,000 and as high as \$74,450 for married joint filers. This ensures that low- and middle- income taxpayers are only subjected to the regular income tax schedule. In general, this holds true if allowable deductions under the regular tax schedule are less than the fixed deduction provided by the AMT. Such a scenario for a hypothetical low-earner/low-deduction type taxpayer is illustrated in Panel B of Figure 3. For these taxpayers, the regular income tax schedule continues to be the effective tax schedule. This is potentially one reason for prior studies detecting bunching responses for low-income taxpayers when using the regular income tax schedule, but not for high earners who are in fact, subject to the combined schedule. In this paper, I focus on the high-income/high-deduction type of taxpayer responding to the combined schedule in Panel A of Figure 3 to estimate the ETI of high earners in the United States.

¹³ High earnings do not automatically translate into higher deductions. However, high earners disproportionately use larger deduction items such as state and local taxes, mortgage interest deduction and medical deductions (JCT Estimates, 2011-2015), which are fully or partially offset by the AMT, leading to high earners having lower deductions on the AMT schedule relative to the regular income tax schedule, on average.




Figure 2: The Regular Income Tax and the AMT Schedules

Notes: Panel A illustrates the regular, federal income tax schedule for a hypothetical taxpayer. The slopes and the length of line segments in the piecewise linear function are based on marginal tax rates and the size of income tax brackets as provided in the tax code for year 2000. The x-intercept is determined by the amount of allowable deductions claimed by the taxpayer under the regular schedule. Panel B illustrates the AMT schedule. This piecewise function corresponds to marginal tax rates and income tax brackets on the AMT schedule. The x-intercept is determined by the amount of allowable deductions claimed under the AMT. The figures are not drawn to scale.




Figure 3: The Combined Schedule

Notes: Panel A is a representation of the combined schedule for a hypothetical high-income/high-deduction type taxpayer. Taxpayers pay the higher of the two taxes, leading to the effective schedule being the upper envelope of the combined schedule highlighted in grey. Panel B illustrates the combined schedule for a hypothetical low-income/low-deduction type taxpayer. For such a taxpayer, deductions on the AMT are, on average, greater than deductions on the regular tax schedule, leading to the AMT function being shifted further to the right relative to the regular schedule. Since taxpayers pay the higher of the two taxes, the regular tax schedule continues to be the effective schedule for such a taxpayer.

Variation in the location of the top kink in the combined schedule is driven by variation in the difference in the x-intercepts of the two schedules, with the latter depending on the difference in the amount of deductions allowed under the regular tax and AMT schedules. Specifically, one could imagine a range of differences in the x-intercepts, only one of which is illustrated in Figure 3, Panel A, generating a range of intersection kinks. In Figure 4, I provide the observed distribution of intersection kinks along regular taxable income to illustrate the variation in the location of the intersection kinks. The figure disaggregates the overall, bimodal distribution into two separate distributions corresponding to time periods 1993-2002 and 2003-2011. Changes made to the tax code through increases in AMT fixed deduction amounts from 2003 onwards increasingly shifted the AMT function to the right, shifting intersection kinks on average, to higher income levels.




Figure 4: Distribution of the Location of the Intersection Kink Relative to Regular Taxable Income

Notes: The location of the intersection kink in the combined schedule varies across taxable income, unlike kinks in the individual schedules that are fixed in taxable income. The bimodal distribution is divided in two, with the shaded distribution representing the time period 1993-2002, and the unshaded distribution representing the time period 2003-2011. Tax reforms of 2003 followed by annual increases in AMT exemption amounts shifted the underlying AMT schedule to the right, leading to the intersection kink also shifting to the right in the combined schedule. This causes the intersection to appear on average, at higher taxable income levels between 2003-2011.

In Section IV, I use the features of the regular income tax and AMT schedules discussed in this section to construct the two tax functions for each taxpayer in my sample from 1993-2011. For each taxpayer who is captured in Table 1 and who is subject to the combined schedule, I solve the two piecewise linear tax functions to find the top, intersection kink in the combined schedule. I use information on each taxpayer's observed taxable income and the location of the taxpayer-specific intersection kink to assess how far the individual's reported taxable income lies from the top, intersection kink. Aggregating across taxpayers, I show evidence of bunching to the left of the intersection kink where the marginal tax rate is 28 percent, as compared to approximately 38 percent to the right of the kink.

IV. Empirical Methodology

A. Data

I use income tax return data from 1993-2011, housed at the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). The Statistics of Income (SOI) division of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has published annual samples of individual income tax returns in the form of Public Use Files (PUF) since 1960. These microdata are generated using a stratified random sample of tax filers. Sampling weights have varied and high earners face a larger sampling rate, with those at the very top of the income distribution facing an approximately 33 percent chance of showing up in the data. Since this study specifically looks at high earners, such oversampling allows me to capture greater variation in tax returns for this subpopulation.

I peg the start and end dates of the analysis time-period to the introduction of tax reforms that substantially altered the AMT. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1993 changed the AMT schedule by eliminating the flat marginal tax rate of 24 percent and introducing a two-tiered schedule, with statutory tax rates of 26 percent and 28 percent. OBRA 1993 also introduced a fixed deduction of \$45,000 on alternative minimum taxable income for married joint filers and \$33,750 for single filers. As discussed in Section III, the phaseout of the fixed deduction creates four effective marginal tax rates: 26 percent, 32.5 percent, 35 percent, and 28 percent. I end the period of analysis at year 2011. The American Taxpayer Relief Act (ATRA) of 2012 indexed the AMT exemption amounts to inflation. To avoid this tax year with characteristics that are significantly different from those found in other tax years, I omit the year from the analysis.

I divide the sample into two time periods for the heterogeneity analysis: 1993-2002 and 2003-2011. I choose 2002 as the endpoint for the first time-period because while the AMT fixed deduction amounts were relatively stable before 2003, Congress increased the deduction amounts annually on an ad-hoc basis from 2003 onwards. These increases shifted the AMT schedule to the right along the range of pre-tax incomes, leading to the intersection kink appearing at higher income levels.

I limit the data to tax returns submitted by married joint filers and single filers, leading to a dataset containing 2.3 million observations, representing approximately 2 billion unique tax returns. Out of the total number of taxpayers filing these returns, 5.3 percent submit Form 6251, the form used to compute AMT liability (the unweighted fraction in the data sample is 34 percent). However, this fraction increases to 24 percent for taxpayers with adjusted gross income (AGI) in real 2007 terms greater than \$100,000 and to 58.5 percent for taxpayers with real AGI greater than \$200,000. The IRS puts the burden of submitting the AMT form on the taxpayer. This implies that in case Form 6251 is not submitted and the IRS predicts that the taxpayer would owe AMT liability, then there is a possibility of audit. From 2006 to 2011, taxpayers also had access to an IRS-provided web tool called the AMT Assistant, which required responses to a handful of questions related to the income level and filing status of the taxpayer for the tool to make a recommendation regarding the submission of Form 6251.

I remove taxpayers who do not face the combined schedule as illustrated in Figure 3 Panel B from my analysis sample. Since these taxpayers do not face the combined schedule, the regular income tax schedule continues to be the effective schedule that applies to them. This leads to an analysis sample containing 273,856 observations representing approximately 5.9 million tax returns. Further, in line with earlier literature, I restrict the frame of the analysis to a range within which the effective kink lies. I limit the sample to individuals within \$300,000 (-\$150,000, +\$150,000) of their effective kink. This is my analysis sample, with a total of 36,639 observations, representing approximately 1.2 million individual income tax returns.

The population median AGI for these individuals is \$679,400 in real 2007 dollars, corresponding to taxpayers in the top percentile of the income distribution. The median effective, taxable income for these taxpayers is \$536,600. The intersection kink for these taxpayers lies on average, at \$430,200 for time period 1993-2002, and at \$679,307 for time period 2003-2011.

B. Solving for the Top Kink in the Combined Schedule

This section discusses the methodology that I use to construct the combined schedule. Recall that the combined schedule is the upper envelope of the federal regular income tax and AMT schedules. As discussed, a taxpayer can shelter part of his or her pretax income from taxation by taking deductions under both the regular income tax and the AMT schedules. Let the pre-tax income in a calendar year for a given taxpayer be Y . Let the income sheltered from the regular income tax schedule be S_R , which is equal to D_R , the regular income tax deductions.

The AMT also allows for some income sheltering denoted by S_{AMT} . The AMT has a fixed deduction for each tax return filing category that I denote by D_{AMT} . Further, the AMT disallows a fraction of the deductions α claimed under the regular income tax. Therefore, deductions taken under the regular income tax schedule that are partially allowed under the AMT are $D_R(1 - \alpha)$. If $S_R = S_{AMT}$, then $D_R = D_{AMT} + D_R(1 - \alpha)$, or $\alpha = \frac{D_{AMT}}{D_R}$. If $S_{AMT} < S_R$, as is the case in Figure 5, Panel A, then the taxpayer has a unique intersection kink. If $S_{AMT} \geq S_R$, the taxpayer's combined schedule can either have two intersection kinks – one at a low level of taxable income and the other at a high level of taxable income, or no intersection kinks, as shown in Panels B and C, respectively.

To ensure that the analysis covers a unique intersection kink, I restrict the sample to taxpayers for whom $S_{AMT} < S_R$, retaining approximately 35 percent of observations. The median regular taxable income of the population of taxpayers in Panel A is \$365,700 in real 2007 dollars. For individuals in Panels B and C whom I exclude, the median real income is \$80,100. Therefore, by restricting the sample to taxpayers facing the combined schedule as in Panel A, I study the taxable income response of a group that reports a high level of taxable income and is likely to respond to the top kink on the combined schedule.

The two schedules are piecewise linear. The IRS data does not provide exhaustive information on deductions, so $S_{AMT} < S_R$ cannot be observed directly. However, taxable incomes on the two schedules that are observed can be used as a proxy. Let T_R be regular taxable income, defined as $T_R = Y - S_R$. Let T_{AMT} be AMT income, defined as $T_{AMT} = Y - S_{AMT}$.

Then,

$$T_{AMT} - T_R = (Y - S_{AMT}) - (Y - S_R) = S_R - S_{AMT} \quad (1)$$

The difference in taxable incomes based on the two schedules precisely equals the difference in deductions allowed under the two schedules. Therefore, I operationalize $S_{AMT} < S_R$ by using $T_{AMT} > T_R$ to find the difference between the x-intercepts of the two functions.




Figure 5: Relationship between Deductions and the Location of the Intersection Kink

Notes: These figures show how the location of the intersection kink varies when the difference in deductions allowed between the regular income tax and the AMT schedules varies. The current study isolates the analysis to taxpayers who exhibit a structure of deductions and the combined schedule like the one shown in Panel A.

I solve the system of the two piecewise linear functions to find the location of the intersection kink. Because the location of the intersection kink varies across taxpayers, I standardize the location of this kink in the aggregate. I do this by estimating the distance of effective taxable income for each taxpayer from the top, intersection kink in their respective effective schedule and plotting the distribution of these differences relative to the intersection kink. For example, consider the case of three taxpayers for whom the intersection kinks are located at \$380,000, \$400,000, and \$420,000 in terms of effective taxable income, respectively. Assume that all three of these taxpayers are bunching to the left of their respective intersection kinks, with their corresponding observed incomes being \$379,000, \$399,000, and \$419,000, respectively. To observe this bunching behavior in the aggregate, I subtract the location of the intersection kink from their observed taxable income, leading to their taxable incomes with respect to the intersection kink being -\$1,000 each. The centered distribution has the intersection kink at the \$0 point, while all three of the taxpayers locate at \$1,000 to the left of the centered intersection kink.

C. Estimation Method

To estimate the elasticity of taxable income, I use the traditional bunching estimator developed by Saez (2010). Saez (2010) models the behavior of taxpayers around kink points using quasi-linear utility increasing in after-tax income (consumption) and decreasing in before-tax income (effort). Income effects are assumed to be negligible. In the case of changing tax rates, taxpayers who locate to the right of the kink point in a no tax scenario would instead prefer to locate at or close to the kink point under non-linearities introduced by changing marginal tax rates. This relationship is illustrated in Figure A-1 of the Appendix. The kink in the income tax schedule generates a kink, which leads individuals with indifference curves of the type H to cluster at the kink point.

For the base estimator, I employ a simple parameterized model with a quasi-linear and iso-elastic utility function of the form:

$$u(c, k) = c - \frac{n}{1 + 1/e} \left(\frac{k}{n} \right)^{1+1/e} \quad (2)$$

where c is consumption, k is before-tax income, n is an ability parameter distributed with density $f(n)$, and e is compensated elasticity of reported income (Saez, 2010).¹⁴ In a no-tax scenario, the

¹⁴ By using a quasi-linear utility function, I abstract from any income effects for simplicity (Gruber and Saez, 2002). This is standard in the literature and a study of income effects is beyond the scope of this paper.

marginal tax rate is constant at τ_0 throughout the cumulative distribution, denoted by $L_0(k)$. The introduction of a different marginal tax rate of τ_1 at K creates a convex kink in the budget set. Taking this kink point into account, individuals with $n \in [K/(1 - \tau_0)^e, K/(1 - \tau_1)^e]$ choose $k = K$ and bunch at the kink point. This leads to the fraction of the population bunching to be:

$$b = K \left[\left(\frac{1 - \tau_0}{1 - \tau_1} \right)^e - 1 \right] \frac{l(K)_- + l(K)_+ / \left(\frac{1 - \tau_0}{1 - \tau_1} \right)^e}{2} \quad (3)$$

This function can be solved explicitly to express e as a function of observed or empirically estimable variables. Simplification leads to (Wang et al., 2020):

$$\epsilon = \frac{b(\tau_0, \tau_1)}{K \log \left(\frac{1 - \tau_0}{1 - \tau_1} \right)} \approx \frac{\hat{b}}{\left| \frac{K}{W} \cdot \frac{\Delta \tau}{1 - \tau_0} \right|} \quad (4)$$

where τ_0 and τ_1 are the effective marginal tax rates on either side of the intersection kink and are observed. For example, in year 2000, τ_0 is 28 percent and τ_1 is 39.6 percent. W is the binwidth chosen for binning taxpayers in effective income groups. The traditional bunching estimator uses a fixed K in taxable income. However, since the location of the intersection kink varies along the regular taxable income spectrum, I take the weighted (population) average of the effective taxable income in the bunching region as an estimate of K .

The difference between the observed taxable income density in the presence of the kink point and the counterfactual density that would plausibly have existed in the absence of the kink point is denoted by \hat{b} . In other words, \hat{b} quantifies excess mass, or the magnitude of bunching in the bunching region. To estimate b , Saez (2010) assumes the counterfactual density to be linear in the bunching region. In contrast, I fit a polynomial function of order p across the bunching region to estimate the counterfactual density. Dividing the range of taxable incomes relative to the intersection kink into bins of size W , I fit a polynomial of order p to the counts for each of the taxable income bins, excluding data near the kinks after estimating a regression of the form:

$$C_j = \sum_{i=0}^p \beta_i Z_j^i + \sum_{r=-l}^u \phi_r D_j + \epsilon_j \quad (5)$$

where C_j is the count of observations found in bin j , Z_j is the midpoint level of the effective taxable income in bin j , and D_j is a dummy for each bin found in the bunching region. Therefore, there

are $l + u$ indicators such that $D_j = 1$ if $Z_j \in [K - l, K + u]$, where K is the location of the kink and l is the distance to the left of the kink and u is the distance to the right of the kink measured in terms of effective taxable income. I choose a polynomial of order 7 based on the joint minimization of the Akaike Information Criterion and the Bayesian Information Criterion. The counterfactual frequency of observations, \hat{C}_j , is then derived using predicted counts from $\hat{C}_j = \sum_{i=0}^p \hat{\beta}_i Z_j^i$, which omits the impact of the dummies $\widehat{\phi}_r$. Using the actual and the estimated counterfactual densities, the quantity of “excess bunching” can be estimated using:

$$\hat{b} = \sum_{j=-l}^u \frac{(C_j - \hat{C}_j)}{N} \quad (6)$$

where the numerator sums the difference between the number of observations in each bin of the observed density and the counterfactual density in the bunching region. The denominator N scales the excess bunching by the number of bins in the bunching region.

I further impose the constraint that taxpayers who bunch do so by reducing their taxable income, so that the number of taxpayers missing from the right of the intersection kink is equivalent to the number of individuals bunching to the left of the intersection kink (Chetty et al., 2011). I calculate the standard error for \hat{b} using a parametric bootstrap procedure by drawing from the estimated vector of errors for the counterfactual estimation equation with replacement to generate a new set of counts and applying the above technique to calculate a new estimate of \hat{b}^k . I define the standard error of \hat{b} as the standard deviation of the distribution of \hat{b}^k s. This ensures that the number of observations represented by the area of the counterfactual density does not exceed those in the observed distribution. Plugging in the observed marginal tax rates, binwidth, estimates of excess bunching \hat{b}^k , and the location of the kink point K into (4) provides my base estimates of the elasticity of taxable income.

D. Robustness to Endogeneity Concern

The present setting where the location of the top kink in the combined schedule varies across taxpayers provides a unique opportunity to mitigate recent endogeneity concerns related to the use of bunching methods on kink points fixed in taxable income (Blomquist and Newey, 2017; Bertanha et al., 2016, 2020). Since fixed kinks at which marginal tax rates change are jointly determined with taxable income, observed taxable income is likely correlated with unobserved

heterogeneity. Intuitively, it is plausible that individuals select into particular bins of the income distribution not as a result of strategic responses to marginal tax rates but because of some underlying preferences for those income levels. If this occurs, then observed bunching (or troughs) in the taxable income distribution might reflect preferences rather than strategic decision-making related to tax rates, causing bias in the estimation of the ETI of unknown direction.

However, in the setting that I leverage, the top kink in the combined schedule varies for each taxpayer across taxable income generating a distribution of top kinks. This is unique feature of the combined schedule weakens the correlation between taxable income and unobserved heterogeneity, increasing confidence in the ability of my estimator to estimate an unbiased ETI parameter.

E. Parameter Selection and the Functional-Form Assumption

In this subsection, I discuss my method for selecting the bandwidth and the binwidth for my estimate for the average ETI of high-income taxpayers. I close the section with a brief discussion on how I relax the standard functional-form assumptions for the shape of the underlying counterfactual density to test the robustness of my estimate.

The choice of binwidth leads to a trade-off between noise and precision: the greater the binwidth, the less noisy and smoother the histogram; the smaller the binwidth, the noisier the histogram, since it reveals more variation in the data. I compute the optimal binwidth using a data-driven approach. I also use other binwidths for comparison as discussed in Section VI. For the optimal binwidth selection, I use the Freedman-Diaconis method:

$$W = 2 * IQR * n^{-1/3} \tag{7}$$

where W is the binwidth, IQR is the interquantile range of the distribution of effective taxable income, and n is the number of observed tax returns. I find W to be \$8,106.

I estimate the bandwidth and construct the bunching region using the algorithm for bandwidth-selection proposed by Bosch et al. (2020). The construction of the bunching region comprises two choices: the choice for the location of the bunching region (symmetric or asymmetric) and the length of the bunching region on either side of the kink point. Earlier methods in the literature for selecting the location and range of the bunching region have used either one of two approaches. The first approach uses a symmetric bunching region around the kink point

and assesses the sensitivity of the bunching estimate to the symmetric widening or contraction of the bunching region. The second approach considers graphical evidence of bunching and pegs the lower and upper bounds of the bunching region to visually obvious starting and ending points of anomalous bunching. The sensitivity of bunching estimates is tested by varying the size and location of this bunching region. In this paper, I allow the bunching window to be defined by a data-driven procedure as described below.

The algorithm for selecting the bandwidth is as follows. Initially, the bin containing the kink point is assumed to be the excluded region as in (5), so that the excluded region becomes $(z_-, z_+) = (0, 0)$, where z_i identifies taxable income bins. A local linear regression with $p = 1$ is fitted through the scatterplot of frequencies of observations in each bin versus bin identifiers that are sorted by income. However, the regression omits the impact of the excluded region: the bin containing the kink point $(z_-, z_+) = (0, 0)$. I form a 95 percent confidence interval around this local linear regression line. Contiguous bins around the kink point for which the frequencies lie outside the 95 percent confidence interval form my data-driven bunching region under $(z_-, z_+) = (0, 0)$. The left-most bin of this bunching region is the lower bound of the bunching region, while the right-most bin is the upper bound.

I then add one bin to either side of the excluded region, so that $(z_-, z_+) = (-1, +1)$ and repeat the process, to obtain a fresh pair of lower and upper bounds for the bunching region under $(z_-, z_+) = (-1, +1)$. I keep adding bins to either side of the excluded region such that $z_- \in \{-Z, (-Z + 1), (-Z + 2), \dots, 0\}$ and $z_+ \in \{0, 1, \dots, Z\}$ and in process, generate a distribution of lower and upper bounds for the data-driven bunching region. I pick the modal bins from the distributions of the lower bounds and the upper bounds. The modal bin of the distribution of lower bounds serves as the lower bound of the bunching window in my analysis. Similarly, I pick the modal bin of the distribution of upper bounds to be the upper bound of the bunching window in my analysis. This process results in an asymmetric bunching window of $(-\$40,529, +\$16,212)$. While I use this bunching window for my base analysis, I also test the sensitivity of the average ETI estimate for high earners to varying choices of bandwidth in Section VI.

I also test the robustness of my estimate for the ETI of high-income taxpayers by using weaker assumptions for the functional form of the counterfactual density in the bunching region. I leverage the method developed by Bertanha et al. (2020) and assume that the counterfactual density belongs to the family of Lipschitz continuous functions. In the context of the counterfactual density assumed to be defined by a Lipschitz function, there exists a real number such that the line connecting the endpoints of a given bunching region has a slope which is not greater than

the absolute value of this real number, known as the Lipschitz constant. This limits the magnitude of the slope of the counterfactual density in the bunching region. Such a limitation is achieved by constraining the area under the counterfactual density by the area of the observed distribution.¹⁵ By limiting the slope of the counterfactual density in the bunching region, I establish upper and lower bounds on the size of the excess mass resulting in bounds on the estimated ETI. Results for this robustness check are provided in Section V.B.


V. Results

A. Graphical Evidence

I find graphical evidence of clustering to the left of the top, intersection kink in the combined schedule, as shown in Figure 6, Panel A. This figure provides the weighted distribution of taxable income relative to the intersection kink for taxpayers in the sample. Note that to give an expanded view of the distribution around the intersection kink point, I plot the observed distribution within - \$200,000 to +\$200,000 of the intersection kink. Panels B and C provide histograms disaggregated by the time periods 1993-2002 and 2003-2011. Both periods reveal bunching responses just to the left of the intersection kink with more pronounced bunching for the latter period. With increasing AMT bunching amounts, the intersection kink shifts to the right along the taxable income distribution. The accentuated bunching response revealed in the time period 2003-2011 arguably captures the potentially higher behavioral response at relatively higher income levels.

Figure 7 contrasts the bunching responses to the top kink in the combined schedule and the regular income tax schedule. To provide a more granular view of any potential bunching, I provide histograms with smaller binwidths of \$4,000. Panel A of Figure 7 replicates Panel A of Figure 6 with a smaller binwidth, confirming bunching at the top kink of the combined schedule. Panel B of Figure 7 confirms the lack of bunching at the top kink in the regular schedule, first studied in Saez (2002).

¹⁵ I thank Nathan Seegert at the University of Utah for providing me with early access to his statistical program for identifying these bounds. The final Stata package is available under the label “bunching”.



Panel C





Figure 6: Graphical Evidence of Bunching

Notes: The figures show bunching of taxpayers in the aggregate around the intersection kink. Histograms are constructed with binwidths of \$10,000. Panel A shows the distribution of effective taxable income relative to the intersection kink for all observations in the study sample. Panels B and C show the distributions for subpopulations disaggregated by two time periods: 1993-2002 and 2003-2011.




Figure 7: Bunching Responses around the Top Kink in the Combined and the Regular Tax Schedules

Notes: The figures show bunching responses around the intersection kink in the combined schedule (Panel A) and the top kink in the regular income tax schedule when the combined schedule is not considered (Panel B). Histograms have binwidth of \$4,000.

I further disaggregate the total sample into wage earners and the self-employed. Self-employed individuals are defined as taxpayers who reported any non-zero income from non-wage sources including sole proprietorships, partnerships, S-Corporations, and farming. Wage earners are those taxpayers who reported zero earnings from these sources. I will refer to taxpayers with any positive self-employment earnings as “self-employed” though this does not preclude them having wage-based income as well. Existing literature has predicted and provided evidence for other segments of the income distribution, significant avoidance behavior by self-employed individuals as compared to wage earners. Pure wage earners in the United States face third-party reporting, with their employers sending the W-2 form containing information on the employees’ earnings to the IRS. The IRS uses this third-party reported information to cross-check employee-reported income and mismatches between employee- and employer-reported incomes increase the probability of audit for pure wage earners. Self-employed individuals face third-party reporting only for a fraction of their overall income corresponding to the part of their incomes that comes from wages. These taxpayers have greater flexibility in how they report self-employment income providing them with a larger margin to manipulate taxable income.

Graphical evidence in Figure 8, Panel A shows that high-income pure wage earners also cluster to the left of the intersection kink, though relatively less sharply as compared to taxpayers who have access to self-employment income (Panel B). The substantial bunching for high-income wage earners is in contrast to earlier studies that show very low bunching for wage earners in the




Figure 8: Bunching Responses of Wage Earners and the Self-Employed

Notes: These figures provide visual evidence of bunching around the top, intersection kink for pure wage earners (Panel A) who do not report any self-employment income, and for taxpayers with any positive self-employment earnings (Panel B). Histograms are constructed using binwidths of \$10,000.

overall taxable income distribution (Saez, 2010; Chetty et al. 2011). Two reasons possibly lead to this divergence. First, high-income wage earners have increased bargaining power, allowing them to negotiate the substitution of highly taxed monetary compensation with untaxed fringe benefits. Second, high-income managers and executives get a larger share of their earnings in the form of stocks as compared to lower-income wage earners. The realization of gains or losses on such stocks can be timed flexibly as compared to annual wage earnings.

The availability of capital stock and strategic realizations of capital gains and losses provide high-income taxpayers with the ability to optimize tax sheltering. Note that between 1993 and 2011, short-term capital gains are taxed at the same rates as ordinary income and therefore, divergent strategies for tax sheltering using short-term capital gains are unlikely. However, if long-term capital gains or losses are realized strategically across time, then studying long-term capital stock activity can shed light on tax avoidance mechanisms.¹⁶ If realizations are timed according to current and future expected tax rates, then avoidance behavior can give rise to fiscal externalities that also need to be incorporated into estimates of the ETI.

Assessing strategic behavior on the capital gains channel, however, is difficult for two reasons. First, the cross-sectional nature of publicly available IRS tax return microdata is not amenable to assessing the timing of realizations for the same taxpayers. Using panel tax data can allow for more flexibility in studying these mechanisms. Second, in the context of the interaction of the regular income tax schedule and the AMT, assessing the impact of capital gains implies overlaying a third schedule on top of the first two schedules. To avoid this problem, Saez (2010) considers all taxable income net of capital gains. While I replicate this for the main analysis, I also divide the sample into individuals reporting long-term capital gains and those who do not report such gains, and separately find graphical evidence and elasticity estimates for both groups. Thus, estimates for the subpopulation of tax returns only impacted by the combined schedule and not the capital gains schedule provides the clearest insights into taxpayer behavior around the intersection kink. Figure 9 illustrates my results. I find that individuals who report no long-term capital gains in a given year (Panel B) have a greater bunching response demonstrated by the larger excess mass to the right of the intersection kink, as compared to taxpayers who do report such gains (Panel A).

¹⁶ Realizations of short-term capital gains do not occur in isolation from strategies related to long-term capital gains. For simplicity however, I treat all short-term capital gains as ordinary income and abstract from their effect on the ability of taxpayers to realize long-term capital gains.




Figure 9: Bunching Responses Related to Long-Term Capital Gains

Notes: These figures provide visual evidence of bunching around the top, intersection kink for taxpayers reporting long-term capital gains (Panel A) and those not reporting such gains (Panel B). Histograms are constructed using binwidths of \$10,000.

B. Elasticity Estimates

Figure 10 illustrates the observed and counterfactual distributions of effective taxable income relative to the kink point for high earners in my sample of tax returns filed between 1993-2011. The line connecting frequencies per taxable income bin represents the observed density and the smooth line running through the observed distribution represents the counterfactual density, estimated using (5). The zero point in the support of the distribution represents the recentered location of the top, intersection kink point. The vertical dashed lines represent the bounds of the bunching region. The density of observed effective taxable income around the top kink of the combined schedule provides evidence that high earners bunch to the left of the intersection kink, with the difference between net-of-tax rates between the left and the right of the intersection kink being approximately 10 percentage points.

Using this bunching response, I use the approach discussed in Section IV.C to estimate the ETI for high earners to be 0.15, estimated precisely within a 95 percent confidence interval. This estimate is economically significant as compared to earlier estimates of close to zero for high-earners in the United States obtained with the use of bunching estimators on the regular income tax schedule (Saez, 2010; Mortenson & Whitten, 2016). The difference in estimates confirms the evidence provided in figure 7, where I compare bunching at the top kink of the combined schedule and the lack of bunching at the top kink of the regular income tax schedule

for the same taxpayers in my sample. I use the approach for estimating non-parametric bounds for the average ETI estimate discussed in Section IV.C. The average ETI estimate of 0.15 is bounded below at 0.12 and above at 0.17.




Figure 10: Distribution of Observed Versus Counterfactual Effective Taxable Incomes

Notes: The bold, vertical line (red) represents the centered intersection kink. Dashed, vertical lines (red) represent the lower and upper bounds of the bunching region defined as -\$40,529 and \$16,212. Observations are binned with the optimal binwidth of \$8,106. The connected line illustrates the observed distribution of taxable income. A seventh-order polynomial is used to construct the counterfactual density represented by the smooth line running through the observed taxable income distribution. Estimates for the excess mass and the ETI are provided at the top-right. Bootstrapped SEs are shown in parentheses.

Figure 11 disaggregates taxpayers by type of income, the presence or absence of capital gains, and time period. Panels A and B in Figure 11 show that both pure wage earners and taxpayers with some self-employment income bunch to the left of the intersection kink. However, this bunching is more pronounced for taxpayers with self-employment income as compared to taxpayers with only wage earnings. I estimate the ETI for wage earners of 0.12. In contrast, the estimated ETI is 0.24 for individuals reporting non-zero self-employment income, twice that of wage earners. The estimated elasticity for the self-employed is remarkably similar to the observed elasticity for this subpopulation in Denmark (Chetty et al., 2011).

In my analysis sample, 28 percent of taxpayers report at least some non-zero self-employment income. The remaining 72 percent only report pure wage earnings. As I discuss in Section V.A, taxpayers with self-employment income do not face third-party reporting for at least some part of their incomes, creating space for tax avoidance behavior that can be more aggressive relative to the behavior of pure wage earners for whom such tax avoidance space is more limited. However, high-wage employees such as executives and managers might also have greater bargaining power as compared to low-wage employees vis-à-vis fringe benefits and access to stock options. While previous research has shown that bunching responses of wage earners for the overall population are weaker, it is plausible that these responses are non-trivial for high-income wage earners.

I also divide the analysis sample across taxpayers who do not report long-term capital gains and those who do. Approximately 43 percent of the population represented by the analysis sample does not report long-term capital gains, as opposed to 57 percent that reports non-zero long-term capital gains. Panels C and D in Figure 11 provide evidence of bunching to the left of the intersection kink for both groups. However, this bunching response is accentuated for taxpayers not reporting long-term capital gains. It is possible that for the group reporting such gains, the added complexity of the capital gains schedule combined with the interaction of the regular income tax and AMT schedules results in some of the bunching at the kink point being dispersed. Specifically, the capital gains schedule can create a wedge between the combined AMT-regular income tax schedule and the true combined schedule. Therefore, the cleanest estimate of the ETI of high earners responding to the top kink point in the combined schedule comes from the group of individuals for whom, the combined schedule is just the upper bound of the AMT and regular income tax schedule: taxpayers who are unaffected by the long-term capital gains schedule. For this group, the estimated ETI is 0.20, as compared to 0.11 for taxpayers reporting some form of long-term capital gains.

I also explore taxpayers' differential responses to the top kink in the combined schedule across time. I separately estimate the ETI of high-income taxpayers for the time periods 1993-2002 and 2003-2011. In my sample, 58 percent (42 percent) of the population comes from the first (second) time period. The response to the top, intersection kink is greater for the latter time period as shown in Panels E and F of Figure 11. The ETI is 0.12 in time period 1993-2002 and is 0.20 in time period 2003-2011.




Figure 11: Distribution of Observed versus Counterfactual Effective Taxable Income (Disaggregated)

Notes: This figure illustrates the distribution of the observed and counterfactual taxable income densities for pure wage earners (Panel A); taxpayers reporting any self-employment income (Panel B); taxpayers reporting long-term capital gains (Panel C); taxpayers reporting no long-term capital gains (Panel D); time period 1993-2002 (Panel E); and time period 2003-2011 (Panel F). The bold, vertical line (red) represents the centered intersection kink. Dashed, vertical lines (red) represent the lower and upper bounds of the bunching region defined as $-\$40,529$ and $\$16,212$. Observations are binned using binwidths of $\$8,106$. A seventh-order polynomial is used to construct the counterfactual distribution. Estimates for excess mass and the ETI are provided at the top-right for each figure. Bootstrapped SEs are shown in parentheses.

There are three institutional features that can explain the difference in the elasticity estimates across the two time periods. First, key features of the AMT schedule including the fixed deduction amount and marginal tax rates remained consistent from 1993 to 2000, with a slight increase in the fixed deduction amount for years 2001 and 2002. On the other hand, Congress increased the fixed deduction amount annually from 2003 to 2011, reducing certainty around the future AMT structure. Learning effects would predict that the inconsistency of the AMT schedule from 2003-2011 would lead to taxpayers optimizing behavior around the top, intersection kink with increased informational frictions leading to reduced bunching. On the other hand, a stable policy environment allows taxpayers to gradually learn how best to optimize their economic and taxpaying behavior. This learning is also a function of the diffusion of information about avoidance strategies across taxpayers about a tax policy (Chetty, Friedman & Saez; 2013). Such diffusion of information plausibly slows down when policies change rapidly. Similarly, adjustment and search costs can also hamper optimization of real labor supply and tax strategies (Chetty, Friedman, Olsen, and Pistaferri, 2011). In terms of real outcomes, adjustment costs of switching jobs (extensive margin) or altering hours worked (intensive margin) in response to rapidly changing marginal tax rates are plausibly prohibitive (Gelber, Sacks & Jones; 2020). Tax strategies to maximize taxpayer utility can also take time to devise and implement. For example, income-shifting across time by design will be observed in future time periods. On the other hand, tax sheltering such as a higher use of charitable contributions and mortgage interest deductions might be constrained in the current time period due to contractual obligations and housing market effects, respectively. If this is the case, then I would expect to find bunching behavior to be more pronounced between 1993-2002 when the AMT and regular income tax policies remained largely stable over time, and less so between 2003-2011 when policies changed more frequently.

Second, with the fixed deduction increasing substantially over the time period 2003-2011, the intersection kink shifted to the right relative to 1993-2002, thereby affecting individuals with higher earnings. Since higher-income taxpayers have enhanced ability to change their behavior in response to changing marginal tax rates at the top intersection kink, it is possible that the bunching response would be higher in the second time period. Third, improvements in tax technology¹⁷ used by taxpayers across time can reduce optimization frictions, leading to increased bunching in later years. Observed bunching responses shown in Panels E and F suggest that the aggregate effects of the second and third institutional features outweigh learning effects related to the first

¹⁷ “Tax technology” here refers to digital tools that allow for fast and flexible planning of annual income flows to minimize tax liability; gradual improvement of abilities of tax accountants and advisors; and an increase in information flow regarding tax avoidance strategies and easier access to such information via the internet.

institutional feature, leading to the estimated ETI in the second time period being higher than in the first time period.

Table 3 summarizes the average ETI estimate for high earners and the estimate ETI for different subpopulations. The average ETI estimate is 0.15. The estimate is higher at 0.25 for self-employed individuals, and lower at 0.12 for pure wage earners. For taxpayers unaffected by the complexity of the long-term capital gains schedule and therefore, corresponding to the cleanest estimates, the estimated ETI is 0.20. These estimates are statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level, except for the estimate on taxpayers reporting long-term capital gains, for whom the estimate is statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level.

Table 3: Summary of Elasticity Estimates for High Earners Around the Intersection Kink

Years	MTR Change	All Filers	Self-employment Income	Wage earners only	Positive Long-Term Cap Gains (LTCG)	Non-positive LTCG
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
1993-2011	28% - 37.3%	0.15*** (0.04)	0.25*** (0.07)	0.12*** (0.04)	0.11** (0.05)	0.20*** (0.05)
1993-2002	28% - 39.5%	0.12* (0.07)	0.25** (0.11)	0.08 (0.07)	0.11 (0.09)	0.14 (0.11)
2003 - 2011	28% - 35%	0.20*** (0.04)	0.26*** (0.07)	0.19*** (0.04)	0.13*** (0.04)	0.28*** (0.06)

Notes: The table presents estimates of the ETI for high-income taxpayers based on bunching evidence around the top kink in the combined schedule as described in Sections III and V.B in the text. The time period 1993-2002 covers two tax acts (OBRA 1993 and EGTRRA 2001) and the time period 2003-2011 covers JGTRRA. The marginal tax rate change relates to the tax rates on either side of the top kink in the combined schedule. For 1993-2011 and 1993-2002, the top marginal tax rates are calculated as the average of the top tax rate in the years during those time periods, weighted by the number of years for which a tax rate applied. The subpopulation with self-employment income (column 2) is defined as individuals who reported any earnings from sole proprietorships, partnerships, S-Corporations, or farming. Wage earners only (column 3) are defined as individuals who did not receive any such self-employment income. The subpopulation reporting capital gains (column 4) is defined as individuals who reported any non-zero long-term capital gains between 1993-2011. Non-positive long-term gains (column 5) relate to individuals who did not report any long-term capital gains. Bootstrapped SEs are reported in parentheses.

As compared to the average ETI estimate of 0.15, the ETI estimates tend to be lower in the first time period. The average ETI estimate for the time period 1993-2002 is 0.12, as compared to 0.20 between 2003 and 2011. Trends within the two time periods are similar to those found in the entire time period: self-employed individuals respond more than wage earners, and the estimated ETI for individuals not reporting long-term capital gains is higher than the average elasticity estimate. Between 1993-2002, only the estimates for the average ETI and the ETI estimate for the self-employed are statistically significant at the 90 percent and 95 percent

confidence levels, respectively. The time period 2003-2011 provides evidence of much higher responsiveness of high earners to the top kink in the combined schedule. The average ETI estimate is 0.20, with the self-employed continuing to respond more than wage earners. In fact, the highest estimate comes from high earners not reporting long-term capital gains, for whom the estimated ETI is 0.28. This is the cleanest estimate for the time period 2003-2011, given that it avoids the additional complexity of the capital gains schedule. All estimates for time period 2003-2011 are statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level. I illustrate these results in Figure 12, together with the confidence intervals corresponding to each estimate.




Figure 12: Elasticity Estimates for High Earners Disaggregated by Population Type

Notes: The figure presents the ETI estimates for high income taxpayers, disaggregated by type and time-period. The first bar in each case is related to the overall time-period; the second bar corresponds to 1993-2002; and the third bar is related to 2003-2011. The 95 percent confidence interval for each estimate is also indicated. The self-employed are defined as individuals who reported any earnings from sole proprietorships, partnerships, S-Corporations, or farming. Wage only individuals comprise taxpayers who did not receive any self-employment income. The subpopulation labeled “positive long-term capital gains” (LTCC) is defined as individuals who reported any non-zero long-term capital gains. Individuals with non-positive long-term gains (Non-Positive LTCC) are defined as taxpayers who did not report any long-term capital gains.

In Section VII, I use the average estimated ETI of 0.15 for the overall sample, and the cleanest estimates from the most recent time period of 0.28 to estimate efficiency costs and optimal top marginal tax rates.

VI. Sensitivity to Model Parameters

In this section, I test the sensitivity of my average ETI estimate to the choice of the binwidth and the bandwidth. Choosing the binwidth involves a tradeoff between noise and bias. Recall that I use an IRS-provided sample of income tax return data. For this sample, the fraction of high earners in the population is low. This is illustrated by Figure A-2 in the Appendix, which shows the distribution of regular taxable income, truncated at \$10,000 and \$1 million. It resembles a Pareto distribution, with a thin right-tail with a smaller fraction of individuals at higher income levels providing for fewer observations to use when estimating the ETI. Further, my analysis window comprises the distribution of taxpayers with taxable incomes relative to the intersection kink point. This window comprises a further subsample of the data. Choosing a binwidth that is too small risks generating noisy estimates, with inference significantly affected by increased variance.

While I use a data-driven binwidth of \$8,106 for my estimate of the average ETI for high earners, I assess the sensitivity of this estimate to varying binwidths. To do so, I pick binwidths between \$500 and \$12,000, reconstruct the counterfactual density and find estimates for the ETI corresponding to each binwidth. I plot these estimates and their 95 percent confidence intervals in Figure 13. It is reassuring to see that the average ETI estimate for high earners remains stable over the range of binwidths considered.




Figure 13: Sensitivity of Elasticity Estimates to Binwidth

Notes: This figure presents the sensitivity of the estimated ETI for high earners to the choice of binwidth. The solid line represents the estimated ETI corresponding to each binwidth at \$2,000 intervals. The dashed lines capture the confidence interval related to the estimated ETI across binwidth size.

The choice of bandwidth relates to the decision regarding the size of the bunching region. Unlike regression discontinuity designs where a smaller bunching region minimizes bias by ensuring that the treatment and control groups on either side of a given cutoff are similar to each other, bunching estimators leverage the manipulation itself around the cutoff point. The cutoff point in the current context is the top, intersection kink in the combined schedule. If the bandwidth is too narrow, then some bunching that represents strategic decision-making by taxpayers might lie outside the assumed bunching window and not be captured, leading to the ETI to be underestimated. On the other hand, a wide bandwidth might a) capture part of the distribution where no manipulation due to the kink point is taking place leading to the ETI being biased in an unknown direction, or b) capture manipulation related to other parts of the tax schedule, such as other kink points leading to overestimation of the elasticity parameter.

Besides using the algorithm developed by Bosch et al. (2020), I test the sensitivity of the average ETI estimate for high earners to different bandwidths. I do this for the entire time period,

where the marginal tax rate on either side of the top kink in the combined schedule was 28 percent on the left, and 37.5 percent (weighted average across years) on the right of the kink point. I hold the binwidth constant at \$8,106 to assess the sensitivity of my estimates exclusively to changes in the bandwidth. Visual evidence suggests that taxpayers' bunching response is captured within two bins to the right of the kink point. Therefore, I only extend the bandwidth to the left of the kink point for the sensitivity analysis presented here.

Table 4 shows the results of this sensitivity check. A smaller bunching window cuts into visually observed bunching, plausibly excluding excess mass outside the assumed bunching window, leading to the ETI parameter being underestimated. Compared to the average ETI estimate of 0.15 obtained with the use of the base bandwidth, the estimated ETI is 0.12 when a smaller bandwidth is used as shown in the first row of Table 4. Increasing the bunching window, however, does not affect the average elasticity estimate. This holds true if there is no strategic bunching in other parts of the distribution within the analysis window, or if other bunching cancels out in the aggregate. In such a case, increasing the bunching region would not impact the estimation of the ETI parameter.

Table 4: Sensitivity of Elasticity Estimates to Bandwidth

Years	MTR Change	Binwidth (\$)	Bunching region (\$)	All Filers
1993-2011	28% - 37.5%	8,106	-32,423, +16,211	0.12*** (0.03)
			-40,529, +16,211	0.15** (0.04)
			-48,634, +16,211	0.15*** (0.04)

Notes: The table presents the estimates of the ETI for high-income taxpayers under varying bandwidth sizes. The marginal tax rate on either side of the top kink in the combined schedule is 28 percent on the left, and 37.5 percent (weighted average across years) on the right. The binwidth is held constant at \$8,106. Bandwidths to the left of the top kink in the combined schedule increase in absolute terms from -\$32,423 to -\$48,634. The estimated ETI corresponding to each bandwidth is provided in the last column (column 5). Bootstrapped SEs are shown in parentheses.

VII. Efficiency Cost and the Optimal Top Marginal Tax Rate

The elasticity of taxable income with respect to the net-of-tax rate provides key insights into the responsiveness of taxpayers to changing marginal tax rates. It also serves as a core

parameter for estimating the efficiency cost of taxation and for conducting welfare analyses. In fact, assuming no externalities and market failures and under negligible income effects, the elasticity parameter serves as a sufficient statistic for estimating efficiency costs of taxation (Feldstein, 1999). I return to the tenability of these assumptions at the end of this section.

Simplifying the model in terms of behavioral and mechanical costs of taxation, Saez, Slemrod and Giertz (2012) discuss how the literature has evolved to show that the marginal deadweight burden (MDB) or marginal excess cost of funds (MECF) is equal to $1 - dB/dR$, where dB is the extra amount of utility lost over and above additional tax revenue collected through a tax increase. dR is overall change in tax revenue due to a tax increase. This translates to:¹⁸

$$MECF(\tau, \varepsilon, \alpha) = \frac{1 - \tau}{1 - \tau - \varepsilon \cdot \alpha \cdot \tau} \quad (8)$$

where τ is the prevailing top marginal tax rate, ε is the elasticity of taxable income, and α is the Pareto parameter. Greater responsiveness of taxpayers to higher marginal tax rates corresponds to higher values for the ETI parameter, ε . A larger behavioral change is economically more distortionary than a small change. Therefore, efficiency costs increase in ε . Similarly, as the marginal tax rate τ increases, the loss of social utility to the taxpayer at the margin increases, leading to higher efficiency costs to the economy. The right-tail of the income distribution can be shown to be Pareto distributed. The Pareto parameter, α , estimates the thickness of the right tail. A thicker (thinner) right tail corresponds to a lower (higher) α . The thinner the tail and higher the Pareto parameter, the higher the efficiency costs. This is because with a thinner tail, the loss of social utility on the margin is greater than inframarginal revenue gains in the right tail due to marginal tax rate increases.

I use my estimates for the average ETI for high earners corresponding to the overall sample, and for the sample unaffected by the additional complexity of the capital gains schedule in the second half of my analysis time-period to estimate efficiency costs using the above formula. I assume the α parameter to be equal to 1.5 based on the analysis of the US income distribution conducted by Piketty and Saez (2003). Similar to Saez et al. (2012), I assume the average top state income tax rate to be 5.9 percent, the Medicare payroll tax rate to be 2.9 percent, and the average sales tax rate to be 2.3 percent. The weighted average of the top marginal tax rate for my analysis period is 37.3 percent. Considering the deductibility of state income taxes from the

¹⁸ See Saez et al. (2012) for the detailed simplification of the formula.

federal income tax schedule and the deductibility of the Medicare payroll tax from both state and federal income tax schedules, I estimate the average aggregate top marginal tax rate to be 44.8 percent. This leads to the following marginal excess cost of funds:

$$MECF(0.448, 0.15, 1.5) = \frac{1 - 0.448}{1 - 0.448 - (0.15 * 1.5 * 0.448)} \approx 22\%$$

This estimate for the efficiency cost of income taxation suggests that an additional dollar of income tax collected generates an efficiency cost of 22 cents. Similarly, using the ETI parameter for taxpayers with no long-term taxable capital gains in the more recent time period covering years 2003 to 2011, where the overall top marginal tax rate is 42.5 percent due to a lower federal top marginal tax rate of 35 percent, I estimate the efficiency cost to be 45 cents for an additional dollar collected in tax revenue:

$$MECF(0.425, 0.28, 1.5) = \frac{1 - 0.425}{1 - 0.425 - (0.28 * 1.5 * 0.425)} \approx 45\%$$

By combining efficiency costs with social welfare weights, I can use the estimated taxpayer behavioral response to conduct welfare analyses. The estimated ETI is a key ingredient in the estimation of optimal top marginal tax rate. Building on the subliteration on optimal top marginal tax rates initiated by Mirrlees (1971), Diamond and Saez (2011) show that under the mechanical and behavioral effects on revenue of increasing taxation and under a quasi-linear utility function increasing in consumption but decreasing in effort, the optimal top marginal tax rate can be represented by:

$$\tau^* = \frac{1 - \bar{g}}{1 - \bar{g} + (\alpha * \varepsilon)} \quad (9)$$

where \bar{g} is the weighted average of the social marginal weights (g_i) for high-income taxpayers. The social marginal weight g_i can be thought of as the social marginal value of providing an additional dollar of consumption to individual i . Under a Rawlsian social welfare function where social marginal weights are concentrated at the bottom of the income distribution, $\bar{g} \approx 0$. Under a utilitarian social welfare function with concave utility functions, the social marginal value of consumption for high earners decreases rapidly at the top of the income distribution, also approaching zero. Therefore, (9) simplifies to:

$$\tau^*(\alpha, \varepsilon) = \frac{1}{1 + (\alpha * \varepsilon)} \quad (10)$$

I plug the Pareto parameter of 1.5 and my two main estimates of 0.15 and 0.28 for the ETI of high earners into (10) and find corresponding optimal top marginal tax rates of 82 percent and 70 percent, respectively:

$$\tau^*(1.5, 0.15) = \frac{1}{1 + (1.5 * 0.15)} \approx 82\%$$

$$\tau^*(1.5, 0.28) = \frac{1}{1 + (1.5 * 0.28)} \approx 70\%$$

The range of estimated optimal top marginal tax rates coincides with emerging research on this question (Diamond and Saez, 2011; Saez, Slemrod and Giertz, 2012; Piketty, Saez and Stantcheva, 2014).

The formulae used to estimate efficiency costs and optimal top marginal tax rates here make relatively strong assumptions related to externalities, long-term responses to taxation, and the type of costs associated with taxation. For example, increasing marginal tax rates along the income tax schedule can cause individuals to shift their income across tax bases in search of lower-taxed income streams. It is also possible that if income realized at a future point in time is taxed at a non-zero rate that is different from the current rate, then taxpayers' retiming of income gains can create a wedge between short-run and long-term elasticities. This wedge will affect the estimation of efficiency costs in the current time period. Such fiscal externalities (Saez et al., 2012) lead to some of the efficiency costs of income taxation to be recouped on other tax schedules or across time, leading to higher optimal top marginal tax rates.

A similar argument can be made for classical externalities. Individuals avoiding taxes via charitable giving or increased mortgage interest deduction amounts can generate externalities for other economic agents, reducing the efficiency cost of income taxation. Further, Chetty (2009) argues that if the costs of taxation are not purely real resource costs but instead include transfers to other agents as well – say, via tax penalties imposed for illegal tax avoidance or evasion that are redistributed to other agents – then the ETI parameter is not sufficient for estimating efficiency costs.

The study of these externalities is beyond the scope of this paper. However, in the presence of externalities that can offset efficiency costs, my estimates for the ETI of high-income taxpayers suggest a lower bound on the efficiency cost of 22 cents per dollar of additional tax revenue collected. This implies a lower bound on the optimal marginal tax rate of 70 percent, much higher than the prevailing, effective top marginal tax rate at the federal level.

VIII. Conclusion

The standard bunching approach to measuring the ETI for high earners in the United States has been to construct the federal regular income tax schedule, overlay the distribution of taxable income across it, and then use taxpayer bunching responses around kink points to estimate the elasticity. This paper argues that the regular income tax schedule is not the correct schedule for estimating the elasticity for high earners. High-income taxpayers face an effective tax schedule that is the upper bound of the interaction of the piecewise linear regular income tax and AMT schedules. This combined schedule is what taxpayers respond to when optimizing taxpaying behavior and therefore should form the underlying tax schedule used in bunching studies for higher earners. The use of the combined schedule for analysis of high earners' behavior resolves the inconsistency between previous elasticity estimates that found substantial responsiveness amongst low-income taxpayers but no responsiveness amongst high-income taxpayers (Saez, 2010; Mortenson and Whitten, 2016)

I characterize this combined schedule and highlight its properties. The combined schedule allows me to capture larger bunching responses at its top kink. The combined schedule contains its own kink points that do not necessarily align with kinks in the regular income tax schedule when the latter is considered in isolation. In fact, the intersection kink in the combined schedule – the point where the regular income tax and AMT schedules intersect – provides a novel device for measuring taxpayer response. The intersection kink presents a larger change in the marginal tax rate, plausibly generating stronger taxpayer responses as compared to top kinks in the regular income tax schedule. Further, the location of the intersection kink varies for each taxpayer as compared to kinks in the regular income tax schedule that are fixed in taxable income. This variation provides me with estimates for the ETI that mitigate endogeneity concerns affecting earlier studies that use bunching methods on fixed kink points. By using the variation in the location of the top, intersection kink in the combined schedule, I disentangle variation in taxable income from variation in underlying preferences, increasing confidence in the ability of my estimator to capture the true ETI parameter.

Using publicly available IRS taxpayer microdata from 1993-2011, I find that the average ETI estimate for high earners in the United States is 0.15, as compared to earlier estimates in the literature that were close to zero. For the sample unaffected by the complexity of the capital gains schedule, the estimated elasticity is 0.20 – rising to 0.28 for the time period 2003-2011 when annual changes in the tax code shifted intersection kinks for taxpayers to higher parts of the

income distribution. Self-employed individuals respond twice as much as wage earners, with an estimated elasticity of 0.24. However, wage earners also reveal non-trivial responsiveness to tax rates, with an estimated ETI of 0.12. This sheds light on the increased ability of taxpayers at the top of the income distribution to alter work hours, or to convert monetary compensation to fringe benefits. Back of the envelope calculations reveal efficiency costs bounded above at 45 cents per dollar of additional tax revenue collected and the estimated optimal top marginal tax rate bounded below at 70 percent.

The current analysis creates a range of avenues for future work. In the context of the United States, further analyses should examine the interaction of the regular and AMT schedules together with the capital gains schedule. A related issue is the differential treatment of tax credits, specifically the foreign tax credit on the regular income tax and AMT schedules. Studying the impact of this tax credit on the location of the intersection kink and ensuing bunching behavior would provide greater insights into taxpayer behavior. Future work should also consider the dynamic responses of taxpayers by using tax panels available at the IRS, to a) unpack the mechanisms underlying individuals' responses to the combined schedule across time, and b) to shed light on short-term versus long-term responses to the combined schedule. Beyond the United States, this paper expounds the importance of considering details of the tax code that give rise to effective schedules with characteristics including kinks that are different from the primary tax schedule being considered. Such under-the-hood work is necessary for identifying the true incentive structure faced by taxpayers, when estimating taxpayer responsiveness to such incentives.

From a policy perspective, my results point to optimal top marginal tax rates that are higher than prevailing top marginal tax rates. The higher estimated ETI for self-employed individuals confirms the previously documented relationship between the absence of third-party reporting and higher tax avoidance behavior. And a comparison of the relationship between bunching responses and the size of the marginal tax rate change around kinks suggests that a larger number of income tax brackets with smaller marginal tax rate changes across brackets will reduce taxable income responses leading to lower efficiency costs of taxation.

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Appendix

Table A: Previous Estimates of the Elasticity of Taxable Income for High Earners

Author(s)	Data (Years)	Tax Change	Income Definition	Methodology	Elasticity Estimate
<i>Panel A: Regression-based, Difference-in-differences, Instrumental Variable</i>					
Lindsey (1986)	1979-1984	ERTA 81	Taxable Income	DiD	1.7
Feldstein (1995)	1985, 1988	TRA 1986	Taxable Income	DiD	1.25 - 2.14
Sammartino and Weiner (1997)	1989-1995	OBRA 1990 and OBRA 1993	AGI	DiD	Close to zero permanent AGI response
Carroll (1998)	1989-1995	OBRA 1991 and OBRA 1993	Taxable income	Regression-based	0.4
Moffitt and Wilhem (1998)	1983, 1989	TRA 1986	AGI	DiD; FE; IV	0 to 2 (depending on instruments)
Goolsbee (2000)	1991-1995	OBRA 1993	Taxable Income	Fixed Effects and First Differencing	Short-run > 1; Long-run: 0 - 0.4
Gruber and Saez (2002)	1979-1990	Changes across pairs of years	Taxable income	IV Approach	0.57
Saez (2003)	1979-1990	Bracket creep 1979-1981	Taxable Income	Instrumental Variable Approach	0.3 (not statistically significant)
Saez (2017)	2011-2015	2013 top bracket tax rate increase	Taxable income	Comparison of income shares	Short-run: 1.16; medium-run: 0.26
<i>Panel B: Bunching</i>					
Saez (2010)	1988-2004	Income Tax Kinks	Taxable income	Bunching	0.006 to 0.031
Mortensen and Whitten (2016)	1996-2016	Income Tax Kinks	Taxable Income	Bunching	0 (no response)
Chetty et al. (2011) ***	1994-2011	Income Tax Kinks	Taxable Income	Bunching	0.02
Kleven et al. (2011) ***	2007-2008	Income Tax Kinks, Audit Probability	Taxable income	Bunching, Experimental	Self-employed: 0.16; Stock income: 2.24
Kleven et al. (2014) ***	1991-2010	Danish preferential foreigner tax scheme	Annualized Earnings	Bunching	0.3

*** Studies indicated with asterisks are based on income tax data from Denmark

Table B: Legislative History

Policy Instrument (Year)	Description
Tax Reform Act of 1969 (P.L. 91-172)	Introduced the “add-on” minimum income tax of 10% in excess of an exemption of \$30,000.
Excise, Estate, and Gift Tax Adjustment Act of 1970 (P.L. 91-614)	Allowed deduction of the “unused regular tax carryover” from the base for the minimum tax.
Revenue Act of 1971 (P.L. 92-178)	Imposed minor provisions regarding foreign income.
Tax Reform Act of 1976 (P.L. 94-455)	Raised rate of minimum income tax to 15% and lowered exemption to \$10,000 or half of regular taxes.
Tax Reduction and Simplification Act of 1977 (P.L. 95-30)	Reduced minimum tax preference for intangible costs of drilling oil and gas wells.
Revenue Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-600)	Introduced AMT alongside minimum income tax and moved certain itemized deductions and capital gains to AMT. AMT had graduated rates of 10%, 20%, and 25%, and an exemption of \$20,000.
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (P.L. 97-34)	Lowered AMT rates to correspond with reductions in rates of regular income tax.
Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (P.L. 97-248)	Repealed “add-on” minimum tax. Made AMT rate a flat 20% of AMT income after exemptions of \$30,000 for individuals and \$40,000 for joint returns.
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (P.L. 98-369)	Made minor changes concerning investment tax credit, intangible drilling costs, and other items.
Tax Reform Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-514)	Raised AMT rate to 21%. Made high-income taxpayers subject to phase-out of exemptions. Increased number of tax preferences. Allowed an income tax credit for prior year AMT liability.
Revenue Act of 1987 (P.L. 100-203)	Made technical corrections related to Tax Reform Act of 1986.
Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988 (P.L. 100-647)	Made technical corrections related to Tax Reform Act of 1986.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 (P.L. 101-239)	Made further technical amendments.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-508)	Raised AMT rate to 24%.
Energy Policy Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-486)	Changes regarding intangible costs of drilling oil and gas wells.
Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1993 (P.L. 103-66)	Introduced graduated AMT rates of 26% and 28%. Increased exemption to \$33,750 for individuals and \$45,000 for joint returns. Changed rules about gains on stock of small businesses.
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (P.L. 105-34)	Changes regarding depreciation and farmers’ installment sales.
Tax Technical Corrections Act of 1998 (P.L. 105-206)	Adjusted AMT for new capital gains rates.
Tax Relief Extension Act of 1999 (P.L. 106-170)	Changed rules about nonrefundable credits.

EGTRRA (2001)	Tax Cuts and No change in AMT
2006	Introduction of calculator
American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012	Indexes to inflation the income thresholds for being subject to the tax
2001-2012	Changes in Exemption Rates

Table C: Exemption Rates Across Time

Years	Individual tax rate	Married filing jointly (\$)	Single or head of household (\$)
1986–1990	21%	40,000	30,000
1991–1992	24%		
1993–2000	26% / 28%	45,000	33,750
2001–2002		49,000	35,750
2003–2005		58,000	40,250
2006		62,550	42,500
2007		66,250	44,350
2008		69,950	46,200
2009		70,950	46,700
2010		72,450	47,450
2011		74,450	48,450
2012		78,750	50,600
2013		80,800	51,900
2014		82,100	52,800
2015		83,400	53,600
2016		83,800	53,900
2017		84,500	54,300
2018		86,200	55,400

Table D: Exemption Rates and Phase-Out in the Early 2000s

Status	Single	Married filing jointly	Married filing separately	Trust	Corporation
Tax Rate: Low	26%*	26%*	26%*	26%*	20%*
Tax Rate: High	28%*	28%*	28%*	28%*	20%*
High Rate Starts (2012 and earlier)	\$175,000	\$175,000	\$87,500	\$175,000	n/a
High Rate Starts (2013)	\$179,500	\$179,500	\$89,750	\$179,500	n/a
Exemption in 2009	\$46,700	\$70,950	\$35,475	\$22,500	\$40,000
Exemption in 2010	\$47,450	\$72,450	\$36,225	\$22,500	\$40,000
Exemption in 2011	\$48,450	\$74,450	\$37,225	\$22,500	\$40,000
Exemption in 2012	\$50,600	\$78,750	\$39,375	\$22,500	\$40,000
Exemption in 2013	\$51,900	\$80,800	\$40,400	\$23,100	\$40,000
Exemption phase-out starts at (2012 and earlier)	\$112,500	\$150,000	\$75,000	\$75,000	\$150,000
Exemption phase-out starts at (2013)	\$115,400	\$153,900	\$76,950	\$76,950	\$150,000
No more exemption in 2009 at	\$299,300	\$433,800	\$216,900	\$165,000	\$310,000
No more exemption in 2010 at	\$302,300	\$439,800	\$219,900	\$165,000	\$310,000
No more exemption in 2011 at	\$306,300	\$447,800	\$223,900	\$165,000	\$310,000
No more exemption in 2012 at	\$314,900	\$465,000	\$232,500	\$165,000	\$310,000
No more exemption in 2013 at	\$323,000	\$477,100	\$238,550	\$165,000	\$310,000
Long-term capital gains rate	15%	15%	15%	25%	20%

* For income within the exemption phase-out, marginal tax rates are effectively multiplied by 1.25, which changes 20% to 25%, changes 26% to 32.5%, and changes 28% to 35%.

Taxpayer Bunching Behavior in Response to Kinks in the Income Tax Schedule




Figure A-1: Impact of Kinks in the Tax Schedule on Taxpayer Behavior

Notes: The effect of a change in the marginal tax rate represented by a kink in the budget set on taxpayer behavior. At the kink, the tax rate increases by t to dt above income level z^* . Individual L who chooses z^* before the reform stays at z^* after the reform. Individual H chooses z^* after the reform and was choosing $z^* + dz^*$ before the reform. Source: Saez (2010)

Distribution of Regular Taxable Income




Figure A-2: Distribution of Regular Taxable Income for the Time Period 1993-2011.

Notes: Binwidth is \$10,000. The distribution is truncated below at \$10,000 and above at \$1 million.