

Can *Silhouette Execution* solve the VM Boot Storm Problem?

by

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Abstract

Both server and desktop virtualization rely on high VM density per physical host to reduce costs and improve consolidation. In the case of *boot-storms*, such high VM density per host can be a problem....

(To be filled in)

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Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Professor Saman Amarasinghe for his huge role in both this project and my wonderful undergraduate experience at MIT. Saman was my professor for 6.005 (Spring 2008), 6.197/6.172 (Fall 2009) and 6.035 (Spring 2009). These three exciting semesters not only convinced me of his unparalleled genius, but also ignited my interest in computer systems. Over the past year, as I have experienced the highs and lows of research, I have really benefited from Saman's infinite insight, encouragement and patience.

As an M-Eng student, I have been blessed to work with two truly inspirational and gifted people from the COMMIT group: Marek Olszewski and Qin Zhao. Their expertise and brilliance is probably only eclipsed by their humility and helpfulness. I have learned more from Marek and Qin than I probably realize, and their knowledge of operating systems and dynamic instrumentation is invaluable and, frankly, immensely intimidating. I hope to emulate (or even approximate) their excellence some day.

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I am humbled by the countless sacrifices made by my family in order for me to be where I am today. My father has been the single biggest inspiration and support in my life since childhood. He epitomizes, for me, the meaning of selflessness and resilience. This thesis, my work and few achievements were enabled by – and dedicated to – him, my mother and my two siblings Ali and Zahra. Ali has been a calming influence during my years at MIT; the strangest (and most unproductive) obsessions unite us, ranging from Chinese *Wuxia* fiction to, more recently, *The Game of Thrones*. Zahra’s high-school math problems have been a welcome distraction over the past year; they have also allowed me to appear smarter than I truly am.

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“It is impossible to live without failing at something, unless you live so cautiously that you might as well not have lived at all – in which case, you fail by default.”

J.K. Rowling, Harvard Commencement Speech 2008

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Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Motivation

Large organizations increasingly use virtualization to consolidate server applications in data centers, reduce operating costs, simplify administrative tasks and improve performance scalability. As a key enabling technology behind *Cloud Computing*, virtualization is shaping how computers will be used in the future.

An important reason for the success of server virtualization is that it resolves the tension between typically conflicting goals of high isolation and effective resource utilization. Ideally, organizations would assign dedicated machines for individual server applications to isolate them. However, this approach is inefficient because each application tends to utilize only a modest fraction of the underlying hardware. With the development of virtualization technology, applications can be assigned dedicated virtual machines (VMs), while many such VMs can be hosted on the same physical host for high resource utilization.

The ability to host many VMs on the same physical machine is so important to the success of server virtualization that many companies aggressively try to increase *VM density per host* by designing hypervisors for scalability. For instance, *transparent page sharing*, *ballooning* and *hypervisor swapping* (see Figures 1-1 and 1-2) allow a host to use *memory overcommit* i.e. run VMs with combined memory requirements that exceed the total underlying physical memory available [18].




Figure 1-1: *Transparent Page Sharing*




Figure 1-2: *Ballooning and Hypervisor Swapping*

Apart from improvements in virtualization technology, two additional trends are expected to boost the attainable VM density per host in the future:

- improvements in hardware available i.e. hosts with more available memory and processor cores [3], and
- the anticipated use of Virtual Desktop Infrastructures (VDIs) [17].

In a Virtual Desktop Infrastructure (or a VDI), user *desktops* are hosted in VMs that reside in a data center. Users – typically company employees – access their virtual desktops via a remote display protocol. VDIs provide simplicity in administration and management: applications on these VMs can be centrally added, deleted, upgraded and patched. Organizations are increasingly investing in VDIs to reap the same benefits that are offered by server virtualization.

VDI deployments promise even higher VM density per host than those achieved via server virtualization because desktop virtual machines typically require considerably less resources than server virtual machines. Because of VDIs, hundreds or thousands of identical VMs already are – or soon will be – hosted on individual hosts within data centers. This is possible because of the low steady-state CPU usage of a single virtual desktop and the aggressive use of memory overcommit.

While the *steady-state* behavior of desktop VMs allows many of them to be hosted on a single machine, correlated spikes in the CPU/memory usage of many VMs can suddenly cripple host machines. For instance, a *boot storm* [3, 5, 8, 14, 16] can occur after some software is installed or updated, requiring hundreds or thousands of identical VMs to reboot at the same time. Boot storms can be particularly frequent in VDIs because users typically show up to work at roughly the same time in the morning each day. Concurrently booting VMs create unusually high I/O traffic, generate numerous disk and memory allocation requests, and can saturate the host CPU. Without any idle CPU cycles, the host cannot use transparent page sharing, which also increases memory pressure. Many data centers thus simply cannot sustain a high VM density per host during boot storms without incurring prohibitively high boot latencies that result from saturated CPUs and stressed hardware.

To mitigate boot storms, data centers usually boot VMs in a staggered fashion, or invest in specialized, expensive and/or extra-provisioned hardware [4, 5]. Anecdotal evidence suggests that VDI users sometimes leave their desktop computers running overnight to prevent morning boot storms; this practice represents an unnecessary addition to already exorbitant data center energy bills [13]. While data deduplication [2] can mitigate the stress on the storage layer in a boot storm, lowered memory latency can in turn overwhelm the CPU, fibre channel, bus infrastructure or controller resources and simply turn them into bottlenecks instead [9].

With the spread of virtualization, we believe that it is important to address the boot storm problem in a way that does not skirt around the issue and enables data centers to sustain a high VM density per host even during boot storms. *Page sharing* is effective in general because many VMs access similar pages during execution. Inspired by this idea, we pose a few simple questions: if many identical VMs concurrently boot up on the same host, do they execute the same set of instructions? Even if there are some differences in the instructions executed, are they caused by controllable sources of nondeterminism? Ultimately, if there is a way to ensure that concurrently booting VMs execute mostly the same set of instructions, one way to retain a high VM density per host in boot storms may be remarkable simple in essence: the hypervisor could identify the overlap in the instruction streams of the VMs to avoid repetitive execution and reduce CPU pressure. Just like *page sharing* (i.e. eliminating page duplication) allows hosts to use memory resources in a scalable fashion in the steady-state, perhaps *silhouette exection* (i.e. eliminating instruction duplication) will allow hosts to use CPUs in a more scalable fashion during boot storms.

1.2 Goal of Thesis

This thesis aims to address the following questions:

1. When identical VMs boot up at the same time, how similar are the sets of instructions executed? What is the statistical profile of any differences in the executed instructions?

2. What are the source(s) of any differences in the multiple instruction streams of concurrently booting VMs?
3. Are there ways to minimize the execution differences (or *nondeterminism*) across multiple booting VMs?

The answers to these questions are clearly crucial in determining the feasibility of *silhouette execution* as a possible solution to the boot storm problem.

1.3 Contributions

For this work, we used Pin [6], a dynamic instrumentation framework, to study user-mode instruction streams from a few Linux services at boot-time. Specifically, we:

1. quantify nondeterminism in Linux services, and show that it is bursty and rare;
2. document the sources of nondeterminism in Linux services – both obvious and obscure;
3. mathematically model the effectiveness of *silhouette execution* in user-space. Using simulations, we provide conservative estimates for the possible change in the number of instructions executed in user-space by a host CPU when many VMs boot up with silhouette execution than without it;
4. propose several simple techniques (e.g. *I/O* and *signal alignment*, *process ID virtualization*) to reduce the overhead in silhouette execution from controllable nondeterminism.

Through our simple models, we estimate that silhouette execution *increases* the number of instructions executed in user-space by 50% (for 10 VMs) and 40% (for 100 VMs) and 30% (for 1000 VMs) over the status-quo. However, after we use our proposed strategies to reduce synthetic execution differences between VMs, silhouette execution *reduces* the number of instructions executed by 15% (for 10 VMs), 40% (for 100 VMs) and 100% (for 1000 VMs) over the status-quo.

Strategies to achieve deterministic execution have been proposed at the operating system layer [1] before, but they require modifications to Linux. Nondeterminism in multi-threaded programs can be reduced via record-and-replay approaches [12] or deterministic logical clocks [11]. Our study has different goals from both approaches: we wish to avoid changing existing software (to ease adoption); we also wish to make several distinct – and potentially different – executions *overlap* as much as possible, rather than replay one execution over and over. In our case, we do not know *a priori* whether two executions will behave identically or not. That the behavior of system calls or signals in Linux can lead to different results or side-effects across multiple executions of an application is well known: what is not documented is the application *context* in which these sources of nondeterminism originate, which we had to investigate to identify ways to improve silhouette execution.

To the best of our knowledge,

- this is the first attempt to study the statistical profile and context of execution differences across multiple instances of Linux services during boot;
- exploiting overlap in instruction streams to reduce CPU pressure (i.e. *silhouette execution*) is a novel design idea, and we are the first to introduce designs for it and mathematically model its effectiveness.

Ultimately, we hope that our work will be the foundation for a real-world implementation of *silhouette execution*, and in turn, a long-term solution to the VM boot storm problem.

1.4 Importance of Deterministic Execution

Our study of nondeterminism was driven by a specific application, deterministic execution is desirable in a variety of scenarios. The motivations for deterministic multithreading listed in [11, 12] apply to our work as well.

Silhouette Execution

Controlling nondeterminism in the execution of concurrently booting VMs greatly improves silhouette execution, because the hypervisor can hypothetically exploit the greater overlap or redundancy across distinct instruction streams to use the CPU in a scalable way during boot storms.

Transparent Page Sharing

Idle CPU cycles in the hypervisor are necessary for transparent page sharing to be effective in the background. Thus, reducing CPU pressure through determinism and silhouette execution clearly facilitates transparent page sharing during boot storms. More generally, removing synthetic differences due to controllable nondeterminism in the execution of concurrently running VMs can improve transparent page sharing as well, because the contents of data accessed/written are more likely to be similar when minor differences due to e.g. process IDs, timestamps or execution statistics are eliminated.

Mainstream Computing, Security and Performance

If distinct executions of the same program can be expected to execute similar sets of instructions, then significant deviations can be used to detect security attacks. Runtime detection of security attacks through the identification of anomalous executions is the focus of *mainstream computing* [15], and deterministic execution obviously helps in reducing false positives. Anomalous executions can also be flagged for performance debugging.

Testing

Deterministic execution in general facilitates testing, because outputs and internal state can be checked at certain points with respect to expected values. Sometimes, a particularly strong test case may be necessary for safety-critical systems: a program must execute the exact same instructions across different executions (for the same inputs).

Debugging

Erroneous behavior can be more easily reproduced via deterministic execution, which helps with debugging. Deterministic execution has much lower storage overhead than traditional record-and-replay approaches.

1.5 Thesis Organization

In what follows, Chapter 2 presents an overview of the Linux boot process, along with the dynamic instrumentation techniques we used to profile nondeterminism in Linux services. Chapter 3 presents a summary of the sources of nondeterminism discovered in this work. Chapter 4 introduces *silhouette execution*, outlines the simple simulations we used to model and evaluate its feasibility in user-space, and presents simple design strategies to improve its effectiveness. Finally, Chapter 5 concludes this thesis and discusses future work.

Chapter 2

Execution Profile of Linux Services

This chapter provides some background on the Linux startup process (Section 2.1). It then describes how we collected user-level instruction streams from some Linux services via dynamic instrumentation to measure nondeterminism in the Linux boot process (Section 2.2). Finally, it summarizes our results on the statistical nature of nondeterminism in Linux services (Section 2.3).

2.1 The Linux Boot Process


When a computer boots up:

1. The BIOS (Basic Input/Output System) gets control and performs startup tasks for the specific hardware platform.
2. Next, the BIOS reads and executes code from a designated boot device that contains part of a Linux boot loader. Typically, this smaller part (or phase 1) loads the bulk of the boot loader code (phase 2).
3. The boot loader may present the user with options for which operating system to load (if there are multiple available options). In any case, the boot loader loads and decompresses the operating system into memory; it sets up system hardware and memory paging; finally, it transfers control to the kernel's `start_kernel()` function.


4. The `start_kernel()` function performs the majority of system setup (including interrupts, remaining memory management, device initialization) before spawning the `idle` process, the scheduler and the user-space `init` process.
5. The scheduler effectively takes control of system management, and kernel stays idle from now on unless externally called.
6. The `init` process executes scripts that set up all non-operating system services and structures in order to allow a user environment to be created, and then presents the user with a login screen.

Figures 2-1 and 2-2 illustrate the CPU usage and disk activity of an Ubuntu 10.10 VM that takes about 22 seconds to complete the sixth step of the boot process (i.e. spawn the `init` process to set up the user environment). The Linux kernel version is 2.6.35-27-generic and the VM is configured with a single core processor with 2048 Mb RAM. Generated using the Bootchart utility [7], the figures illustrate that the booting process involves high memory and CPU overhead (Figures 2-1a and 2-2a); they also illustrate the well-known fact that memory and CPU overhead typically diminishes greatly after the boot process is completed and the machine reaches its steady-state (Figures 2-1b and 2-2b). This disparity in CPU/memory usage is the source of the boot storm problem; a single host can handle many VMs in steady-state usage but gets crippled when the same VMs boot up concurrently.

In the last step of the booting process (step 6), `init` typically runs many scripts located in specific directories (such as `/etc/rc` or `/etc/init.d/`). While different Linux distributions typically have their own variants of `init` binaries (e.g. `SysV`, `systemd` or `Upstart`), the `init` process always directly or indirectly launches several services and daemons to initialize the user desktop environment. Figure 2-3 provides a summary of the specific actions performed by `init` (through the subprocesses or daemons it launches) for the same Ubuntu VM used for Figures 2-1 and 2-2. The `init` process actually launched 361 children processes (directly and indirectly) over the 25 second period summarized by Figure 2-3. Most of them were ephemeral processes; several processes were repeatedly launched in different contexts (e.g. `getty` or `grep`).




(a) CPU utilization immediately after `init` is started.




(b) CPU utilization 5 minutes after `init` is started.

Figure 2-1: CPU utilization profile for a sample Ubuntu VM during boot and post-boot.



(a) Disk utilization and throughput immediately after `init` is started.



(b) Disk utilization and throughput 5 minutes after `init` is started.

Figure 2-2: Disk utilization and throughput profile for a sample Ubuntu VM during boot and post-boot.




Figure 2-3: A summary of the actions performed by `init` for a booting VM; this figure has the same timeline (0-25 seconds) as Figures 2-1a and 2-2a.

The processes singled out in Figure 2-3 are the ones that either stayed alive through most of the boot process till the end, performed important boot actions, or spawned many sub-processes themselves.

2.2 Data Collection Scheme

Pin and DynamoRio are runtime frameworks that enable inspection and arbitrary transformation of user-mode application code as it executes. We used both Pin and DynamoRio to study the behavior of Linux services independently; this allowed us to verify the accuracy of our results. However, we relied on Pin more than DynamoRio because it gets injected into application code earlier than DynamoRio and therefore provides greater instruction coverage for our purpose. Figure 2-4 shows the simple steps involved in collecting data on nondeterminism using dynamic instrumentation.




Figure 2-4: Steps involved in measuring execution nondeterminism.

The next section explains each of these steps in detail, using a simple “Hello, world!” program as an illustrative example.

2.2.1 Measuring nondeterminism in a simple *C* program

This section outlines the data collection scheme described in Figure 2-4 in detail with the help of an example: the simple “Hello, world!” program outlined in Figure 2-5. For this example, we disabled ASLR (Address Space Layout Randomization) on the Ubuntu VM described in section 2.1 by using `sysctl kernel_randomize_va_space=0`.

Execution Tracing Layer

As shown in Figure 2-4, the first step in data collection involves running the target program a few times across identical VMs. Ideally, these different executions are scheduled concurrently or as close as possible in time to model the boot storm scenario

```
1 #include <stdio.h>
2
3 int
4 main(int argc, char* argv[])
5 {
6     printf("Hello, world!\n");
7     return 0;
8 }
```

Figure 2-5: A “Hello, world!” program in C.

accurately. As part of the execution tracing layer, we wrote a Pin tool that:

1. logs each x86 instruction executed by the target process, along with the new values of any affected registers,
2. records values written to or read from memory,
3. intercepts all signals received, and records the instruction counts corresponding to the timing of any signals, and
4. monitors all system calls made by the target process, and logs any corresponding side-effects to memory or registers.

For simplicity, our Pin tool traces the main process or thread for an application and does not follow any child processes or threads that it spawns. This prevents us from including the user-mode instructions executed from child processes in our traces, but we get sufficiently high coverage to get a good understanding of the target program’s behavior. We treat spawned child processes as part of the outside world, and trace their interactions with the original process (e.g. via signals or pipes).

Implementation of the execution tracing layer required a close examination of the Linux system call interface; we had to identify the side-effects of each system call. Figure 2-6 shows an excerpt from a trace generated by our Pin tool while running the “Hello, World” program. Our tool records every instruction executed in user-space by the process for the target application once Pin gets control; this allows us to include program initialization and library code in our analysis.




Figure 2-6: Excerpts from the log files generated by the execution tracing layer. The top half shows x86 instructions executed in user-space by the “Hello, world!” process, including instruction addresses, limited symbolic information, affected register values and memory addresses. The lower half shows part of the system call log.

Analysis Script

The analysis script uses the Linux *diff* utility to perform pairwise comparisons of the log files generated by multiple executions of the target application. Using the `suppress-common`, `side-by-side` and `minimal` flags, the analysis script produces two output files:

1. A *delta* file that contains only instructions that were either conflicting between the two logs or missing in one log, and
2. A *union* file that contains all instructions executed in the two logs, but distinguishes instructions included in the delta file from others.

Figure 2-7 shows an excerpt from the union and delta files generated for the “Hello, world!” program. Given several traces, the delta and union files can be constructed from the two executions that are the most different or have the median difference.

Read 0xcb37 = *(UINT16*)0xbffff41b		Read 0xedf8 = *(UINT16*)0xbffff41b	
.text 0xb7fe4dfe movzx edx, word ptr [eax] edx = 0xcb37		.text 0xb7fe4dfe movzx edx, word ptr [eax] edx = 0xedf8	
Write *(UINT16*)0xbffff10d = 0xcb37		Write *(UINT16*)0xbffff10d = 0xedf8	
Read 0x49 = *(UINT8*)0xbffff41d		Read 0x25 = *(UINT8*)0xbffff41d	
.text 0xb7fe4e05 movzx eax, byte ptr [eax+0x2] eax = 0x49		.text 0xb7fe4e05 movzx eax, byte ptr [eax+0x2] eax = 0x25	
Write *(UINT8*)0xbffff10f = 0x49		Write *(UINT8*)0xbffff10f = 0x25	
Read 0x49cb3700 = *(UINT32*)0xbffff10c		Read 0x25edf800 = *(UINT32*)0xbffff10c	
<hr/>			
.text 0xb7fe4dea mov dword ptr [ebp-0x4], edi		.text 0xb7fe4dea mov dword ptr [ebp-0x4], edi	
Write *(UINT32*)0xbffff118 = 0xb7fff524		Write *(UINT32*)0xbffff118 = 0xb7fff524	
.text 0xb7fe4ded mov dword ptr [ebp-0x10], 0x0		.text 0xb7fe4ded mov dword ptr [ebp-0x10], 0x0	
Write *(UINT32*)0xbffff10c = 0		Write *(UINT32*)0xbffff10c = 0	
Read 0xbffff41b = *(UINT32*)0xb7fef24		Read 0xbffff41b = *(UINT32*)0xb7fef24	
.text 0xb7fe4df4 mov eax, dword ptr [ebx-0xd0] eax = 0xbffff41b		.text 0xb7fe4df4 mov eax, dword ptr [ebx-0xd0] eax=0xbffff41b	
.text 0xb7fe4dfa test eax, eax eflags = 0x286		.text 0xb7fe4dfa test eax, eax eflags = 0x286	
.text 0xb7fe4dfc jz 0xb7fe4e51		.text 0xb7fe4dfc jz 0xb7fe4e51	
Read 0xcb37 = *(UINT16*)0xbffff41b		Read 0xedf8 = *(UINT16*)0xbffff41b	
.text 0xb7fe4dfe movzx edx, word ptr [eax] edx = 0xcb37		.text 0xb7fe4dfe movzx edx, word ptr [eax] edx = 0xedf8	
.text 0xb7fe4e01 mov word ptr [ebp-0xf], dx		.text 0xb7fe4e01 mov word ptr [ebp-0xf], dx	
Write *(UINT16*)0xbffff10d = 0xcb37		Write *(UINT16*)0xbffff10d = 0xedf8	
Read 0x49 = *(UINT8*)0xbffff41d		Read 0x25 = *(UINT8*)0xbffff41d	
.text 0xb7fe4e05 movzx eax, byte ptr [eax+0x2] eax = 0x49		.text 0xb7fe4e05 movzx eax, byte ptr [eax+0x2] eax = 0x25	
.text 0xb7fe4e09 mov byte ptr [ebp-0xd], al		.text 0xb7fe4e09 mov byte ptr [ebp-0xd], al	
Write *(UINT8*)0xbffff10f = 0x49		Write *(UINT8*)0xbffff10f = 0x25	
Read 0x49cb3700 = *(UINT32*)0xbffff10c		Read 0x25edf800 = *(UINT32*)0xbffff10c	

Figure 2-7: Excerpts from the diff files generated by the analysis script. The top half shows instructions from the delta file; these all have different side-effects in the two logs (as indicated by the |). The bottom half shows instructions from the union file. Conflicting instructions are highlighted; others are found in both logs.

The much smaller size of the delta file makes it suitable for diagnosing sources of nondeterminism in an application.

Visualization Script

The visualization script reads the union file to compute statistics on the extent of any differences in the original logs, and generates diagrams to capture the different execution traces of the program.

In particular, it derives three key metrics after processing the union file:

1. *Length of Common Prefix (P)*: This is the number of instructions common to both logs starting from the beginning and up to the point of first divergence.
2. *Longest Common Substring (LS)*: This is the longest sequence of consecutive instructions that are common to both logs.

3. *Longest Common Subsequence (LCS)*: Intuitively, this is the “overlap” in the logs; it is the length of the longest sequence of identical instructions in both logs. Instructions in the LCS must be in the same order in both logs, but they are not required to be adjacent.

For instance, if the first instance of a program executes the instruction sequence $I_1 = [A, B, C, D, E, F]$, and the second instance of the same program executes the instruction sequence $I_2 = [A, B, X, D, E, F, Y]$, then: the common prefix is $[A, B]$; the longest common substring is $[D, E, F]$, and the longest common subsequence is $[A, B, D, E, F]$.

In general, the longest common subsequence (LCS) of two traces is arguably the best indicator of the extent of determinism in two executions of a program; we therefore use LCS and “Determinism” interchangeably from now on. The other two metrics are important for evaluating the feasibility of silhouette execution a solution to the boot storm problem. In general, we want the common prefix (P) and the longest common substring (LS) of the two logs to be as large as possible to ensure that concurrently booting VMs do not need to branch execution or communicate with each other too quickly (see Chapter 4).

For the “Hello, world!” program, if ASLR is enabled, the two logs have very little overlap ($< 1\%$), and the common prefix and longest common substring are on the order of 10 instructions. With ASLR disabled, one may expect the two traces to look identical (because of the simplicity of the program), but there is still some nondeterminism in the instruction sequences (see Table 2.1 and Figure 2-8).

Common Prefix	21.49 percent
Longest Common Substring	67.70 percent
Longest Common Subsequence	99.98 percent
Conflict Ratio (i.e. $1 - LCS$)	0.02 percent
Conflicting Instructions	32

Table 2.1: Nondeterminism profile of “Hello, world!” program (ASLR disabled)

Figure 2-8 shows divergences in program execution over time. This representation allows us to visually inspect the union file and figure out the distribution and nature of conflicting instructions. For the “Hello, world!” program, we can see that while divergences were spread out near the beginning and end of the program, they were bursty and short-lived (as indicated by the thin black lines). This is a common trend, even for complex programs such as Linux services, as discussed in Section 2.3.




Figure 2-8: Visualization of “Hello, world!” program execution. The thin black lines represent conflicts between the two instances of the program.

2.2.2 Quantifying Nondeterminism

As mentioned in the previous section, we use the common prefix (P), the longest common subsequence (LCS), the longest substring (LS) and the distribution of conflicting instructions in separate instruction streams to measure nondeterminism.

While the conflict ratio measured by our analysis script is usually quite small (e.g. 0.02% for “Hello, world!”), its importance and impact is disproportionately larger. As shown in Figure 2-9, the analysis script ignores the cascade effect and only considers instructions that *originate* or actively *propagate* nondeterminism in calculating the conflict ratio.

<div> <div>mov eax, [edx] \$ eax = 0x141</div> <div> <div>mov ecx, [ebx] \$ ecx = 0x241fb4</div> <div>add ecx, 1 \$ ecx = 0x241fb5</div> </div> <div><N other instructions that do not read/write to eax></div> <div>mov eax, edx \$ eax = 0x1</div> </div>	<div> <div>mov eax, [edx] \$ eax = 0x171</div> <div> <div>mov ecx, [ebx] \$ ecx = 0x241fb4</div> <div>add ecx, 1 \$ ecx = 0x241fb5</div> </div> <div><N other instructions that do not read/write to eax></div> <div>mov eax, edx \$ eax = 0x1</div> </div>
<div> <div>mov eax, [edx] \$ eax = 0x141</div> <div> <div>mov ecx, eax \$ ecx = 0x141</div> <div>add ecx, 1 \$ ecx = 0x142</div> </div> </div>	<div> <div>mov eax, [edx] \$ eax = 0x171</div> <div> <div>mov ecx, eax \$ ecx = 0x171</div> <div>add ecx, 1 \$ ecx = 0x172</div> </div> </div>

Figure 2-9: The top image shows an example of the cascade effect: the red instruction represents a real conflict in `eax`. The light-blue instructions have the same side-effects across the two logs because they do not touch `eax`. Despite this, the value of `eax` is different in the blue instructions and converges only after it is written by the green instruction. The cascade effect refers to the nondeterministic register state that results in the light-blue instructions because of an earlier conflict, even though the instructions themselves are not reading or writing any nondeterministic values. If we included the cascade effect, the measured conflict ratio in this trace excerpt is $(N + 3)/(N + 4)$ instead of the $1/(N + 4)$ we will report.

The bottom image shows an example of the propagation effect: the red instruction again represents a conflict in `eax`. The light-blue instructions do not generate any nondeterminism themselves, but they have conflicting side-effects because they read `eax`. In this case, we report a conflict ratio of 1.

Ignoring the cascade effect while including the propagation effect effectively simulates a form of *taint analysis* [10] on register and memory contents to measure the true impact of any nondeterminism in a program. Our approach automatically groups instructions that generate and propagate nondeterminism in the delta files, making

it easier for us to diagnose the sources of nondeterminism.

One element missing from our study of nondeterminism is that we do not account for timing-related nondeterminism directly. For instance, two programs that execute precisely the same set of instructions but take different amounts of time doing so (e.g. due to variable latency of blocking system calls) are fully deterministic according to our definition. We deliberately exclude timing considerations because it is acceptable for some VMs to lag behind others in the boot storm scenario, as long as the same instructions are executed. When timing-related nondeterminism affects program execution e.g. through differences in signal delivery, I/O ordering or time-related system calls (see Chapter 3), it automatically gets factored in our analysis.

2.3 Results for Linux services

Table 2.2 shows the results from applying our data collection scheme on a set of Linux services and daemons that are typically launched at boot.

Application	Prefix (P)	Longest Substring (LS)	Determinism (LCS)
acpid , 20 loop iterations	20.99%	66.84%	99.98%
anacron , 7 loop iterations	0.65%	87.27%	99.21%
cups , 10 loop iterations	0.44%	12.87%	85.08%
cron , 5 loop iterations	1.54%	57.11%	99.94%
ntp , 30 loop iterations	2.46%	4.74%	81.66%
Weighted Average	0.84%	26.41%	87.89%

Table 2.2: Nondeterminism profile of Linux services and daemons (ASLR disabled). The average reported here is weighted-average computed based on the number of instructions executed by each program. The period over which the programs were profiled was selected to be representative of their execution typically till the login screen is shown. Typically, the programs ran for 3-5 *true* (i.e without instrumentation overhead) minutes.

We can immediately see that:

1. The common prefix (P) in our sample of Linux services is on average about 1%, which is quite small and indicates that nondeterminism typically surfaces relatively early in program execution.
2. The longest substring (LS), usually close to 26%, is substantially larger than the common prefix (P). This shows that execution typically does not permanently diverge after the initial differences.
3. The longest common subsequence (LCS) or general determinism is in general much higher – about 88% on average – which indicates that a large majority of instructions in the Linux services overlap across different executions.

Given the discussion in Section 2.2.2, a conflict ratio of about 12% on average hints that there is little but non-trivial nondeterminism in our sample programs, despite a very high average LCS.

The distribution of the 12% conflicting instructions is surprisingly similar across different programs. Figure 2-10, an execution profile of `ntp` (for the first 14 out of 30 iterations) is representative of most execution traces. Generally, conflicting instructions are spread throughout the traces but tend to occur more frequently towards the end. Nondeterminism does not seem to cause permanent execution divergences, even though there is significant control-flow divergence in some programs. In fact, execution seems to diverge and reconverge very frequently (i.e. nondeterminism is bursty). The execution profile of `cron` is somewhat unique because it has a higher LCS and LS than other traces. It is difficult to reconcile the low measured conflict ratio for `cron` (less than 2%), with the higher conflict ratio visually suggested by Figure 2-11a. Figure 2-11b explains this discrepancy: it shows that while the absolute number of conflicting instructions is small, these conflicts occur in bursts and visually group together. While the bursty nature of nondeterminism is particularly prominent in Figure 2-11b, it is common to all the services we profiled. Table 2.3 shows that the longest control flow divergence or the longest string of consecutive conflicts is typically very small (i.e. $\ll 1\%$) for most of our sample programs.






Figure 2-10: Visualization of `ntp` program execution (14 iterations). The thin black lines represent conflicts between the two instances of the program, whereas the thin blue or red lines represent control flow divergences.



(a) The thin black lines represent conflicts between the two instances of the program.



(b) Looking closely at the `cron` program execution reveals that conflicts occur in short bursts that visually group together.

Figure 2-11: Visualization of execution differences in `cron` (20 iterations).

Application	Max. Consecutive Conflicts	Max. Control Flow Divergence
acpid , 20 loop iterations	0.0000%	0.0019%
anacron , 7 loop iterations	0.0335%	0.0021%
cups , 10 loop iterations	0.0120%	1.8500%
cron , 5 loop iterations	0.0004%	0.0002%
ntp , 30 loop iterations	0.0523%	0.3223%
Weighted Average	0.0185%	1.290%

Table 2.3: Measuring burstiness of nondeterminism in Linux services.

The table shows the maximum number of consecutive instructions that conflict in their side-effects or control-flow as a fraction of the total instructions of a program. These numbers are only a small fraction of the 12% conflicting instructions in a program (see Table 2.2), which establishes that execution differences are short-lived in our sample programs.

2.4 Summary

This chapter presented a brief overview of the Linux boot process, and demonstrated our methodology for both quantifying and measuring nondeterminism in programs using dynamic instrumentation. By analyzing user-mode instructions executed by Linux boot services and daemons, we offered evidence that Linux services execute highly overlapping instruction sequences across different runs. We also showed that any conflicts or nondeterminism in such services occurs in bursts; nondeterminism does not cause executions to permanently diverge; divergence and convergence occur very quickly and repeatedly in our traces.

Chapters 3 will offer insight into the sources of nondeterminism behind these statistics. Chapter 4 will look at the implications of our results for the feasibility of silhouette solution as a solution to the bootstorm problem.

Chapter 3

Sources of Nondeterminism in Linux services

In this chapter, we describe the sources of nondeterminism discovered using the data collection scheme described in Chapter 2. This study of nondeterminism reveals subtle interactions between user-mode applications, commonly used system libraries (e.g. the `libc` library), the Linux operating system and the external world. While our results are derived from analyzing a small set of complex programs, they include all sources of application-level nondeterminism that have been described in literature. Unlike existing work, however, we cover the various interfaces between user-mode programs and the Linux kernel in considerably more detail.

3.1 Linux Security Features

Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR)

Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) involves random arrangement of key memory segments of an executing program. When ASLR is enabled, virtual addresses for the base executable, shared libraries, the heap, and the stack are different across multiple executions. ASLR hinders several kinds of security attacks in which attackers have to predict program addresses in order to redirect execution (e.g. *return-to-libc* attacks).

As mentioned earlier, two execution traces of even a simple program in *C* are almost entirely different when ASLR is enabled because of different instruction and memory addresses.

Canary Values and Stack Protection

Copying a *canary* – a dynamically chosen global value – onto the stack before each function call can help detect buffer overflow attacks, because an attack that overwrites the return address will also overwrite a copy of the canary. Before a `ret`, a simple comparison of the global (and unchanged) canary value with the (possibly changed) stack copy can prevent a buffer overflow attack.

In 32-bit Linux distributions, the *C* runtime library, `libc`, provides a canary value in `gs:0x14`. If Stack Smashing Protection (SSP) is enabled on compilation, `gcc` generates instructions that use the canary value in `gs:0x14` to detect buffer overflow attacks. Because Pin gets control of the application before `libc` initializes `gs:0x14`, multiple execution traces of a program will diverge when `gs:0x14` is initialized and subsequently read. The manner in which the canary value in `gs:0x14` is initialized depends on the `libc` version. If randomization is disabled, `libc` will store a fixed terminator canary value in `gs:0x14`; this does not lead to any nondeterminism. When randomization is enabled, however, some versions of `libc` store an unpredictable value in `gs:0x14` by reading from `/dev/urandom` or by using the `AT_RANDOM` bytes provided by the kernel (see Section 3.2).

Pointer Encryption

Many stateless APIs return data pointers to clients that the clients are supposed to supply as arguments to subsequent function calls. For instance, the `setjmp` and `longjmp` functions can be used to implement a try-catch block in *C*: `setjmp` uses a caller-provided, platform-specific `jmp_buf` structure to store important register state that `longjmp` later reads to simulate a return from `setjmp`. Since the `jmp_buf` instance is accessible to clients of `setjmp` and `longjmp`, it is possible that the clients may advertently or inadvertently overwrite the return address stored in it and simulate a

buffer-overflow attack when `longjmp` is called.

Simple encryption schemes can detect mangled data structures. For instance, in 32-bit Linux, `libc` provides a *pointer guard* in `gs:0x18`. The idea behind the pointer guard is the following: to encrypt a sensitive address p , a program can compute $s = p \oplus \text{gs:0x18}$, optionally add some bit rotations, and store it in a structure that gets passed around. Decryption can simply invert any bit rotations, and then compute $p = s \oplus \text{gs:0x18}$ back. Any blunt writes to the structure from clients will be detected because decryption will likely not produce a valid pointer. Pointer encryption is a useful security feature for some APIs and is used by some versions of `libc` to protect addresses stored in `jmp_buf` structures.

The `libc` pointer guard has different values across multiple runs of a program, just like the canary value. Initialization of the `libc` pointer guard can therefore be a source of nondeterminism in program execution. In some versions of `libc`, the value of `gs:0x18` is the same as the value of `gs:0x14` (the canary). In others, the value of `gs:0x18` is computed by XORing `gs:0x14` with a random word (e.g. the return value of the `rdtsc` x86 instruction), or reading other `AT_RANDOM` bytes provided by the kernel (Section 3.2).

3.2 Randomization Schemes

As already clear from Section 3.1, randomization schemes can lead to significant nondeterminism in programs. Applications generally employ pseudorandom number generators (PRNGs), so they need only a few random bytes to *seed* PRNGs. These few random bytes are usually read from one of few popular sources:

- *The `/dev/urandom` special file.* Linux allows running processes to access a random number generator through this special file. The entropy generated from environmental noise (including device drivers) is used in some implementations of the kernel random number generator.

- *AT_RANDOM bytes.* Using `open`, `read` and `close` system-calls to read only a few random bytes from `/dev/urandom` can be computationally expensive. To remedy this, some recent versions of the Linux kernel supply a few random bytes to all executing programs through the `AT_RANDOM` auxiliary vector. ELF auxiliary vectors are pushed on the program stack before a program starts executing below command-line arguments and environmental variables.
- *The `rdtsc` instruction.* The `rdtsc` instruction provides an approximate number of ticks since the computer was last reset, which is stored in a 64-bit register present on x86 processors. Computing the difference between two successive calls to `rdtsc` can be used for timing whereas a single value returned from `rdtsc` lacks any useful context. The instruction has low-overhead, which makes it suitable for generating a random value instead of reading from `/dev/urandom`.
- *The current time or process ID.* System calls that return the current process ID (Section 3.3) or time (Section 3.4) generate unpredictable values across executions, and are commonly used to seed PRNGs.
- *Miscellaneous:* There are several creative ways to seed PRNGs, including using *www.random.org* or system-wide performance statistics. Thankfully, we have not observed them in our analysis of Linux services.

Randomization-related nondeterminism thus usually originates from any external sources used to seed PRNGs; if the seeds are different across multiple executions, PRNGs further propagate this nondeterminism.

3.3 Process Identification Layer

In the absence of a deterministic operating system layer, process IDs for programs are generally not predictable. For instance, a nondeterministic scheduler (Section 3.9) could lead to several possible process creation sequences and process ID assignments when a VM boots up.

Given the unpredictability of process IDs, system calls that directly or indirectly interact with the process identification layer can cause divergences across distinct executions of the same program. For instance, system calls that return a process ID e.g. `getpid` (get process ID), `getppid` (get parent process ID), `fork/clone` (create a child process), `wait` (wait for a child process to terminate) return conflicting values across distinct executions. System calls that take process IDs directly as arguments such as `kill` (send a signal to a specific process), `waitpid` (wait for a specific child process to terminate) can similarly propagate any nondeterminism. In fact, `libc` stores a copy of the current process ID in `gs:0x48`, so reads from this address also propagate execution differences.

Apart from system calls, there are other interfaces between the Linux kernel and executing user-mode programs where process IDs also show up:

- *Signals*: If a process registers a signal handler with the `SA_SIGINFO` bit set, then the second argument passed to the signal handler when a signal occurs is of type `siginfo_t*`. The member `siginfo_t.si_pid` will be set if another process sent the signal to the original process (Section 3.8).
- *Kernel messages*: The Linux kernel will sometimes use process IDs to indicate the intended recipients of its messages. For instance, `Netlink` is a socket-like mechanism for inter process communications (IPC) between the kernel and user-space processes. `Netlink` can be used to pass networking information between kernel and user-space, and some of its APIs use process IDs to identify communication end-points (Section 3.6).

Nondeterminism arising from the unpredictability of process IDs can be further propagated when an application uses process IDs to seed PRNGs (Section 3.2), access the `/proc/[PID]` directory (Section 3.11), name application-specific files (e.g. `myapp-[pid].log`) or log some information to files (e.g. `process [pid] started at [04:23]`) (Section 3.5).

3.4 Time

Concurrent runs of the same program will typically execute instructions at (slightly) different times. Clearly, any interactions of a program with timestamps can cause nondeterminism. For instance:

- The `time`, `gettimeofday` and `clock_gettime` system calls return the current time.
- The `times` or `getrusage` system calls return process and CPU time statistics respectively.
- The `adjtimex` system call is used by clock synchronization programs (e.g. `ntp`) and returns a kernel timestamp indirectly via a `timex` structure.
- Programs can access the hardware clock through `/dev/rtc` and read the current time through the `RTC_RD_TIME` `ioctl` operation.
- Many system calls that specify a timeout for some action (e.g. `select`, `sleep` or `alarm`) inform the caller of any unused time from the timeout interval if they return prematurely.
- The `stat` family of system calls returns file modification timestamps; also, many application files typically contain timestamps; network protocols use headers with timestamps as well (Sections 3.5 and 3.6).

Apart from nondeterminism arising from timestamps, *timing* differences can arise between distinct executions because of variable system-call latencies or unpredictable timing of external events relative to program execution (Sections 3.8 and 3.7).

3.5 File I/O

File contents

If two executions of the same program read different file contents (e.g. cache files),

then there will naturally be execution divergence. For concurrently executing Linux services, differences in file contents typically arise from process IDs (Section 3.3) or timestamps (Section 3.4) rather than semantic differences. Once those factors are controlled, file contents rarely differ.

File Modification Times

Apart from minor differences in file contents, nondeterminism can arise from distinct file modification (**mtime**), access (**atime**) or status-change (**ctime**) timestamps. The **stat** system call is usually made for almost every file opened by a program; the time values written by the system call invariably conflict between any two executions. Most of the time, these timestamps are not read by programs, so there is little propagation. On occasion, however, a program will use these timestamps to determine whether a file is more recent than another, or whether a file has changed since it was last read.

File Size

When a program wishes to open a file in append-mode, it uses **lseek** with **SEEK_END** to move the file cursor to the end, before any **writes** take place. The return value of **lseek** is the updated cursor byte-offset into the file. Clearly, if the length of a file is different across multiple executions of a program, then **lseek** will return conflicting values. Many Linux services maintain log files which can have different lengths due to conflicts in an earlier execution; **lseek** further propagates them. To overcome such nondeterminism, older log files must be identical at the beginning of program execution and other factors that cause nondeterminism must be controlled.

3.6 Network I/O

Network Configuration Files

The `libc` network initialization code loads several configuration files into memory (e.g. `/etc/resolv.conf`). Differences in the content, timestamps or lengths of such configuration files can clearly cause nondeterminism. Background daemons (e.g. `dhclient` for `/etc/resolv.conf`) usually update these files periodically in the background. Calls to `libc` functions such as `getaddrinfo` use `stat` to determine if relevant configuration files (e.g. `/etc/gai.conf`) have been modified since they were last read. In our experiments, typically the file modification timestamps – and not the actual contents – of these configuration files vary between different executions.

DNS Resolution

In our experiments, IP addresses are resolved identically by concurrently executing services. However, if DNS-based load-balancing schemes are used, the same server can appear to have different IP addresses.

Socket reads

Bytes read from sockets can differ between executions for a variety of reasons. For instance, different timestamps in protocol headers, or different requests/responses from the external world would be reflected in conflicting socket `reads`. By studying application behavior, it is possible to distinguish between these different scenarios and identify the seriousness of any differences in the bytes read.

In our experiments, we observed nondeterminism in `reads` from `Netlink` sockets. As mentioned in Section 3.3, `Netlink` sockets provide a mechanism for inter-process communications (IPC) between the kernel and user-space processes. This mechanism can be used to pass networking information between kernel and user space. `Netlink` sockets use process IDs to identify communication endpoints, which can differ between executions (Section 3.3). Similarly, some implementations of `libc` use timestamps to assign monotonically increasing sequence numbers to `Netlink` packets (Section 3.4).

Nondeterminism can also arise from sockets of the `NETLINK_ROUTE` family, which receive routing and link updates from the kernel; `libc` receives `RTM_NEWLINK` messages when new link interfaces in the computer are detected. When an interface gets discovered or reported, the kernel supplies interface statistics to `libc` such as packets sent, dropped or received. These statistics will obviously vary across different program instances.

Ephemeral Ports

A TCP/IPv4 connection consists of two end-points; each end-point consists of an IP address and a port number. An established client-server connection can be thought of as the 4-tuple (server_IP, server_port, client_IP, client_port). Usually three of these four are readily known: a client must use its own IP, and the pair (server_IP, server_port) is fixed. What is not immediately evident is that the client-side of the connection uses a port number. Unless a client program explicitly requests a specific port number, an *ephemeral port* is used. Ephemeral ports are temporary ports that are assigned from a dedicated range by the machine IP stack. An ephemeral port can be recycled when a connection is terminated. Since the underlying operating system is not deterministic, ephemeral port numbers used by Linux services tend to be different across multiple runs.

3.7 Scalable I/O Schemes

Polling Engines

Complex programs like Linux services have many file descriptors open at a given time. Apart from regular files, these special file descriptors could correspond to:

- *Pipes*: Pipes are used for one-way interprocess communication (IPC). Many Linux services spawn child processes; these child processes communicate with the main process (e.g. for status updates) through pipes.

- *A listener socket*: If the program is a server, this is the socket that accepts incoming connections.
- *Client-handler sockets*: If this program is a server, new requests from already connected clients would arrive through these sockets.
- *Outgoing sockets*: If the program is a client for other servers, it would use these sockets to send requests to them.

The classic paradigm for implementing server programs is *one thread or process per client* because I/O operations are traditionally blocking in nature. This approach scales poorly as the number of clients – or equivalently, the number of open special file descriptors – increases. As an alternative, event-based I/O is increasingly used by scalable network applications. In such designs, the main event-thread specifies a set of file descriptors it cares about, and then waits for “readiness” notifications from the operating system on any of these file descriptors by using a system call such as `epoll`, `poll`, `select` or `kqueue`. For instance, a client socket would be ready for reading if new data was received from a client, and an outgoing socket would be ready for writing if an output buffer was flushed out or if the connection request was accepted. The event-thread invokes an I/O handler on each received event, and then repeats the loop to process the next set of events. This approach is often used for design simplicity because it reduces the threads or processes needed by an application; recent kernel implementations (e.g. `epoll`) are also efficient because they return the set of file descriptors that are ready for I/O, preventing the need for the application to iterate through all its open file descriptors.

Event-based I/O can be a source of nondeterminism in programs because the timing of I/O events with respect to each other can be different across multiple executions. Even if I/O events are received in the same order, the same amount of data may not be available from ready file descriptors. Furthermore, when a timeout interval is specified by the application for polling file descriptors, `select` may be completed or interrupted prematurely. In that case, `select` returns the remaining

time interval, which can differ between executions (Section 3.4).

Asynchronous I/O Systems

Asynchronous I/O APIs (e.g. the Kernel Asynchronous I/O interface in some Linux distributions) allow even a single application thread to overlap I/O operations with other processing tasks. A thread can request an I/O operation (e.g. `aio_read`), and later query the operating system for its status or ask to be notified when the I/O operation has been completed (e.g. `aio_return`). While such APIs are in limited usage, they introduce nondeterminism because of the variable latency and unpredictable relative timing of I/O events.

3.8 Signals

A signal is an event generated by Linux in response to some condition, which may cause a process to take an action in response. Signals can be generated by error conditions (e.g. memory segment violations), terminal interrupts (e.g. from the shell), inter-process communication (e.g. parent sends `kill` to child process), or scheduled **alarms**. Processes register handlers (or function callbacks) for specific signals of interest in order to respond to them.

Signals are clearly external to instructions executed by a single process, as such, they create nondeterminism much the same way as asynchronous I/O: signals can be delivered to multiple executions of the same program in different order; even if signals are received in the same order between different executions, they can be received at different times into the execution of a program.

3.9 Concurrency

Multiple possible instruction-level interleavings of threads within a single program, or of different processes within a single operating system are undoubtedly significant sources of nondeterminism in programs. Nondeterminism due to multi-threading has

been extensively documented and can cause significant control flow differences across different executions of the same program.

Nondeterminism in the system scheduler is external to program execution, and manifests itself in different timing or ordering of inter-process communication e.g. through pipes (Section 3.7), signals (Section 3.8), or values written to shared files or logs (Section 3.5).

3.10 Architecture Specific Instructions

Architecture specific instructions such as `rdtsc` and `cpuid` can return different results across program executions. As mentioned before (Section 3.2), the `rdtsc` instruction provides the number of ticks since the computer was last reset, which will differ across executions. The `cpuid` instruction can return conflicting hardware information too.

3.11 *Procfs*: The `/proc/` directory

Instead of relying on system-calls, user-space programs can access kernel data much more easily using *procfs*, a hierarchical directory mounted at `/proc/`. This directory is an interface to kernel data and system information that would otherwise be available via system calls (if at all); thus, many of the sources of nondeterminism already described can be propagated through it.

For instance, `/proc/uptime` contains time statistics about how long the system has been running; `/proc/meminfo` contains statistics about kernel memory management; `/proc/net/` contains statistics and information for system network interfaces; `/proc/diskstats/` contains statistics about any attached disks. These files will differ across multiple executions of a program because of nondeterminism in the underlying operating system.

Apart from accessing system-wide information, a process can access information about its open file descriptors through `/proc/[PID]/fdinfo` (e.g. cursor offsets and status). Similarly, `/proc/[PID]/status` contains process-specific and highly unpre-

dictable statistics, e.g. number of involuntary context switches, memory usage, and parent process ID. Performing a `stat` on files in `/proc/[PID]/` can reveal the process creation time.

3.12 Summary

This chapter described sources of nondeterminism in Linux services discovered through our experimentation. Chapter 4 describes how knowledge of the sources of nondeterminism in these services can be used to theoretically increase the effectiveness of silhouette execution.

Chapter 4

Silhouette Execution

In the previous two chapters, we identified how and why multiple executions of the same Linux service can diverge in behavior. In light of our results, this chapter introduces a novel design strategy that aims to mitigate the bootstorm problem: *silhouette* execution (Section 4.1). For the sake of evaluation, this chapter presents some design sketches for silhouette execution for user-mode programs (Section 4.2). It also describes the simple simulation techniques we used to model the effectiveness of silhouette execution using our design sketches (Section 4.3). From the results of our simulations, we present strategies to improve the effectiveness of silhouette execution (Section 4.4) and evaluate them (Section 4.5). Our simulations show that the proposed designs can be successful in mitigating the bootstorm problem.

4.1 What is *Silhouette* execution?

The previous few chapters showed that distinct executions of the same Linux service generally execute the same number of instructions across identical VMs when they start up. If the number of booting VMs for the same physical host is large (as is the case in VDI deployments), then executing many instructions over and over again during boot represents a waste of scarce CPU cycles. *Silhouette* execution, in essence, targets redundant execution of the same instructions across distinct but identical virtual machines in order to reduce CPU pressure in bootstorm scenarios.

As shown in Figure 4-1, silhouette execution is analogous to page sharing: both design ideas aim to use hardware resources effectively to improve VM density per host in virtualization scenarios. While page sharing reduces pressure on the memory subsystem by identifying and refactoring overlapping memory contents, silhouette execution identifies overlapping instruction streams and refactors execution to reduce pressure on the CPU. Like memory overcommit, the ultimate aim is to allow a host to support VMs that together require more hardware resources than are really available in the host.

To the best of our knowledge, silhouette execution is a novel design idea that has not been suggested or implemented before. To study whether this approach can be effective in reducing CPU pressure in concurrently booting VMs, we present some design sketches for implementing silhouette execution for Linux services in the rest of this chapter. Admittedly, user-mode instruction streams from Linux services capture a subset of instructions executed by a booting VM. However, we focus on Linux services as a first step in studying the feasibility of silhouette execution. After all, as outlined Section 2.1, booting VMs can saturate host CPUs when they launch many identical user-space processes. For a complete solution, proposed design sketches need to be generalized to the execution of entire VMs themselves; this would require us to precisely identify the execution differences that can arise from all software layers inside a VM.

4.2 Silhouette Execution for Linux Services

For user-mode Linux services, our proposed design skeletons for silhouette execution use information recorded from one executing program – the *leader* – to bypass execution steps of subsequent instances of the program – the *silhouettes*. Ideally, the leader executes all instructions from the program, while the silhouettes execute a much smaller subset of these instructions.




Figure 4-1: Silhouette execution is analogous to Page Sharing.

To maintain correctness in user-space, silhouettes need only execute:

- instructions that can potentially cause the leader’s execution to differ from the silhouettes (e.g. the `rdtsc` instruction);
- instructions that propagate any earlier differences in execution;
- instructions that write to memory;
- system calls that have side-effects to entities outside a user-space program (e.g. the `read` system call mutates hidden operating system state associated with file descriptors).

If there are no differences between the leader’s execution and a silhouette’s, then the silhouette would only execute the system calls and store instructions executed by the leader until the login screen is shown. Executing all the memory writes from the leader in the silhouettes ensures that the address space and memory contents of the two instances evolves in an identical manner. Executing all the system calls with the same arguments also ensures that the silhouette’s execution is *faithful* to its semantics, that is, the side-effects to the underlying operating system are maintained till the end. After we restore the register contents, a silhouette can simply continue execution independently of the leader. When the number of system calls and memory writes is a small fraction of the leader’s execution, this approach can theoretically reduce the stress placed on the host CPU.

More generally, when there are instructions with conflicting side-effects in the leader and a silhouette, then these instructions need to be executed by each silhouette independently. This ensures that the silhouette’s execution semantics are retained. It is not known *a priori* which instructions in the two instances of the same program will behave differently or not. Our detailed analysis of the various interfaces between application programs and the operating system allows us to identify such potential sources of execution divergence via dynamic program inspection.

Note that silhouette execution for user-space programs is fundamentally different from record-and-replay approaches because it does not semantically alter subsequent executions of a program by emulating the leader’s execution. In fact, silhouettes are independent executions of a program that can potentially branch from the leader’s execution at any point.

The next few subsections outline a few design sketches for implementing silhouette execution on individual user-space programs such as Linux services. We have not implemented these designs. Instead, we present them here to evaluate the effectiveness of silhouette execution in user-space.

4.2.1 *Precise Silhouetting*

Here is a simple design that uses silhouette execution to refactor execution in a user-mode program:

1. We run one program instance – the *leader* – slightly ahead of all other program instances – the *silhouettes*.
2. Using dynamic inspection techniques on the leader, we
 - precisely identify instructions where other instances of the program could *potentially* diverge. We call these instructions *fork-points*.
 - collect an *execution signature* that summarizes the leader’s execution between successive fork-points. For a user-space program, this includes a record of memory operations and deterministic system calls.
3. When a leader reaches a fork-point, it sends its own execution signature from the previous fork-point (or the beginning of the program) till the current fork-point to all other silhouettes.
4. The silhouettes do not execute all the instructions that the leader executes. In fact, each silhouette bypasses execution between two fork-points by executing only the memory operations and system calls from the execution signature sent by the leader, and restoring the register state at the end.

5. When a silhouette reaches a fork-point, it independently executes the *forking* instruction and observes its side-effects. The forking instruction may or may not behave differently in a silhouette than the leader.

- If the forking instruction does have different side-effects in a silhouette, the silhouette branches execution and executes instructions independently from that point onwards. We call this instruction an *active* fork-point.
- Otherwise, we call this instruction a *latent* fork-point. We return to step 4: the silhouette waits for the leader’s next execution signature for bypassing execution to the next fork-point.

We name this design *precise silhouetting* because it cannot tolerate any differences in execution between the multiple instances of a program: silhouettes completely branch execution after executing a forking instruction that disagrees with the leader (i.e. an active fork-point). Our description of precise silhouetting implies that the leader executes concurrently with the silhouettes – albeit slightly ahead – but this is not necessary. This approach would work even if we run the leader to completion before we run any silhouettes. The silhouettes, of course, would only execute system calls and memory operations between successive fork-points that the leader recorded earlier until execution diverges.

4.2.2 *Optimistic Silhouetting (excluding control flow)*

Optimistic silhouetting essentially follows the same overall design principles as precise silhouetting, except that it allows silhouettes to tolerate minor execution differences before branching execution completely. In this design:

1. The leader executes slightly ahead of the silhouettes. The leader identifies fork-points and sends execution signatures to silhouettes. The silhouettes bypass execution by only executing the load/store instructions and system calls made by the leader, and restoring register contents at the end of each fork-point. This is what happens in precise silhouetting before the first active fork-point.

2. Unlike the previous design, when the leader reaches any fork-point, it always waits for the silhouettes to catch up with it. All the instances execute a forking instruction in sync and compare its side-effects.
3. If a forking instruction has different side-effects in a silhouette than the leader (i.e. at an active fork-point):
 - the silhouette does not immediately branch execution completely;
 - the leader tracks the register or memory values that are written differently in the multiple instances by marking them as *tainted*;
 - the leader treats any subsequent instructions that read tainted values as fork-points as well;
 - the silhouettes do not overwrite the values in any tainted registers with those contained in the leader’s execution signature.
4. When fork-points become too frequent, or when control flow diverges (e.g. a tainted value is compared to a constant to determine control flow), a silhouette starts executing instructions independently and branches off from the leader.

This approach does require that that the leader and its silhouettes execute fork-points at the same time and communicate their results. This is necessary so that the leader can identify subsequent instructions that propagate any earlier nondeterminism (e.g. read a tainted value) as fork points.

4.2.3 *Optimistic Silhouetting (including control flow)*

This design is similar in essence to the version of *optimistic silhouetting* described above, but it can also tolerate minor control flow differences between the leader and the silhouettes. In this design:

1. As before, the leader and the silhouettes must execute fork-points concurrently. The leader transmits execution signatures to silhouettes, and uses dynamic taint propagation to tolerate minor differences in instruction side-effects.

2. Unlike before, silhouettes do not branch off permanently from the leader at the sign of the first control flow divergence:
 - The leader uses dynamic instrumentation to create a dynamic *control flow graph* for the program execution.
 - When the leader and a silhouette reach a control flow fork-point with divergence (e.g. when a tainted value is read to determine control flow), the leader uses the dynamic control flow graph to determine the *immediate post-dominator* of the block where execution has diverged.
 - The silhouette branches off temporarily (rather than permanently) and executes independently to the point of control flow convergence. The silhouette and the leader log any memory values written or any system calls made during this *branch interval*.
 - The leader and the silhouette compare their current register state, along with the system calls made or memory values written during the branch interval.
 - An *analysis engine* figures out whether the two executions are reconcilable or not based on what happened in the branch interval.
3. If the two executions can be reconciled, any conflicting state (e.g memory addresses or register values are marked by the leader) as tainted, and the silhouettes start waiting for execution signatures from the leader again.
4. If the two executions cannot be reconciled, or when fork-points become too frequent, execution branches permanently.

Reconciling Executions

The notion of whether two distinct execution strands from a branch interval can be reconciled is a new one. If two instances do not execute any system calls or memory operations during the branch interval, then execution can be simply reconciled by marking any different register values as tainted. If two instances do execute some

memory load/store operations, then different memory contents can be marked as tainted as well to reconcile them.

If the two instances make different system calls during the branch interval, then execution may or may not be reconcilable. If the system calls are stateless (e.g. `time`), then execution can clearly be reconciled. On the other hand, if one execution strand makes system calls that change the operating system state, then the leader must know how to identify any subsequent system calls that depend on the changed state. For instance, if a silhouette does an extra `open` to a file in the branch interval, the leader must treat each subsequent `open` as a fork point, because the returned file descriptors will now be different. The leader may have previously assumed that all files to be opened were present on the identical VMs and thus not treated the `open` system call as a fork-point by default.

There is a clear trade-off in the complexity in the dynamic instrumentation layer in the leader that tracks dependencies across system calls and the extent to which we can prolong silhouette execution. For simplicity, we will assume that if any instance executes a system call in its branch interval that mutates some external state, then the executions are irreconcilable.

4.3 Evaluation Scheme

The data collection scheme described in Chapter 2 does not actually implement silhouette execution in user-space because multiple instances execute all application instructions independently. This section describes how we can still mathematically simulate silhouette execution by comparing execution traces from our data collection scheme.

There are several factors to consider in determining the effectiveness of silhouette execution. Ideally, we would like the following conditions to be true:

- The first forking instruction with conflicting side-effects (i.e. the first active fork-point) should occur as late as possible into the leader's execution. This is especially important for precise silhouetting, because silhouettes branch-off permanently after the first active fork-point.
- The number of fork-points should be much smaller than the total number of instructions executed by the leader. All the instances have to analyze the side effects of each forking instruction to determine whether execution has diverged or not, which represents a serious design overhead.
- The number of active fork-points must be small. Fewer active fork-points would create fewer tainted memory locations, and thus reduce the overhead in the leader associated with dynamic taint propagation.
- The number of control flow divergences should be very small. Any control flow divergences should preferably be short-lived, and have few system calls or memory operations. This reduces the overhead associated with reconciling executions after branch intervals and creating dynamic control flow graphs in the leader.
- The fork-points must be separated by very many instructions so that memory access logs can be compressed. We could forget intermediate values of memory locations and only remember their final values instead.
- Programs should have a high ratio of user-mode instructions to system-calls and memory operations so that silhouettes execute few instructions compared to the leader when they are bypassing execution.

4.3.1 Computed Metrics

For our data collection scheme, we can identify fork-points by simply parsing the traces collected by our Pin tool and looking for the sources of potential execution differences cataloged in the previous chapter. Once we can identify individual fork-points, we can compute:

- The number and distribution of fork-points – both latent and active – in a program,
- The number and distribution of control flow divergences in a program,
- The proportion of memory and system-call instructions between successive fork-points,
- Size estimates for execution trace files that need to be communicated between the leader and its silhouettes.

Using simple mathematical models, we can compute the number of user-space instructions the host CPU has to execute *without* silhouette execution (T_O), and the number of user-space instructions the host CPU has to execute under silhouette execution (T_S). We measure the advantage conferred by silhouette execution, A , as:

$$A(\vec{K}, N) = \frac{T_O}{T_S}. \quad (4.1)$$

A is parameterized by $\vec{K} = (k1, k2, k3...)$ and N . \vec{K} represents the constants associated with the overhead of various aspects of silhouette execution and N is the number of concurrently running instances of a program.

A value of $A > 1$ implies that silhouette execution is effective in reducing CPU overhead from concurrent program execution on the host in user-space. Generally, A should increase as N increases (holding everything else constant), and A should decrease as individual entries in \vec{K} increase (holding everything else constant). T_O is easily computed: $T_O = NI$, where N is the total instances of a program to be run, and I is the number of instructions each instance must execute. Typically, I is the

number of instructions necessary to model the start of a program or a service. For many Linux programs, a few iterations of the main scheduler loop of the program is sufficiently representative of execution before a login screen is shown. The value of T_S depends on which version of silhouette execution is being used.

Precise Silhouetting

Given multiple traces, instructions that are in the common prefix (P) broadly represent savings from precise silhouetting. Figure 4-2 summarizes how T_S and \vec{K} can be computed for precise silhouetting.

Optimistic Silhouetting (Excluding Control Flow)

Instructions in the longest common subsequence (LCS) of multiple traces *before* a control flow divergence broadly represent the savings from this variant of optimistic silhouetting. Figure 4-3 summarizes how T_S and \vec{K} can be computed for this variant of optimistic silhouetting.

Optimistic Silhouetting (Including Control Flow)

Instructions in the longest common subsequence (LCS) of multiple traces before execution diverges permanently represent the savings from this variant of optimistic silhouetting. Figure 4-4 summarizes how T_S and \vec{K} can be computed for this design.

4.3.2 Caveats

Before we present our results, we note a few limitations of our methods for evaluating silhouette execution:

- We estimate the advantage (A) of silhouette execution on user-space programs purely in terms of the number of instructions executed on the host CPU. We do not model *latency* for silhouette execution. It would be interesting to study whether the delays introduced by dynamic inspection of program execution and inter-instance communication can eclipse the potential latency reduction




Figure 4-2: A simple way to model CPU overhead from precise silhouetting. We can compare the user-space instructions executed from running a program multiple times in the status quo versus the number of instructions executed when precise silhouetting is used for the same scenario. k_1 , k_2 and k_3 are constants that represent overheads associated with this approach.




Figure 4-3: A simple way to model CPU overhead from optimistic silhouetting (excluding control flow). We can compare the user-space instructions executed from running a program multiple times in the status quo versus the number of instructions executed when optimistic silhouetting is used for the same scenario. k_1 , k_2 , k_3 , and k_4 are constants that represent overheads associated with this approach.




Figure 4-4: A simple way to model CPU overhead from optimistic silhouetting (including control flow). We can compare the user-space instructions executed from running a program multiple times in the status quo versus the number of instructions executed when optimistic silhouetting is used for the same scenario. k_1 , k_2 , k_3 , k_4 and k_5 are constants that represent overheads associated with this approach.

from reduced CPU load and bypassing execution in silhouette execution or not. In practice, the hypervisor layer rather than a dynamic instrumentation layer would implement silhouette execution, to reduce performance overhead.

- Our dynamic instrumentation tool can only inspect user-mode instructions of the main process hosting an application, so we cannot consider code executed by lower software layers or other children processes in computing A . Overall, the number of instructions we consider may be a fraction of all the instructions computed on the host CPU, which would add a dampening factor to our computed value of A .
- The values we use for \vec{K} are conservatively guessed, and we assume the overheads from various aspects of silhouette execution are linear in nature. These assumptions, while reasonable, may understate the CPU-load reduction practically attainable by silhouette execution in user-space.
- We do not factor the storage and I/O overhead associated with the transmission of execution signatures, though our experience suggest that signature files are typically very small (i.e. only a few megabytes) so they should fit in host memory.
- While we collect traces from many different silhouettes, we simply pick the worst trace (i.e. the one with the most difference from a leader) for computing T_S . Thus, our models may be overly conservative because they assume that *all* silhouettes are as different from a leader as the *worst* silhouette. This assumption simplifies the design and evaluation complexity related from the leader having to handle silhouettes with varying levels of divergence from the leader.

Despite these limitations, we believe that our model offers valuable insight into the feasibility of silhouette execution in user space because we instrument and evaluate silhouette execution on large user-mode instruction streams from Linux services, and conservatively factor in the possible overhead from silhouette execution.

4.3.3 Initial Results

Precise Silhouetting

Table 4.1 shows the results of modeling precise silhouetting on a few Linux services. For simplicity, we treat all system calls as fork-points. This assumption increases the number of fork-points (F); it also increases the overhead associated with determining if execution has diverged or not after a fork-point because the inspection layer has to presumably understand the logic of each system call to determine its side effects ($k2$). However, this assumption reduces $k1$ because an overwhelming majority of instructions that only use register operands are easily excluded from fork-points. Instructions that are system calls are also easily identifiable (i.e. `int 0x80` or `call *gs:0x10`); instructions with memory operands need their memory addresses to be compared to tainted addresses (e.g. `gs:0x14` or `gs:0x18`) to determine whether they are fork points or not. For our evaluation, we chose $k1 = 20$, $k2 = 1000$ and $k3 = 20$ as reasonably conservative values for the overhead constants.

Table 4.1 shows that precise silhouetting has values for A that are less than 1 for all of the Linux services we sampled. In fact, A is less than 1 regardless of whether we consider 8, 128 or 1024 instances. The value of A is close to 0.90 on average which represents a *degradation* on CPU load i.e. precise silhouetting would execute more instructions in user-space than the status quo. Note that:

- Because p is very small on average for our sample of Linux services, execution diverges very quickly in the simulation. This explains why, for small values of p , we get values of A that are very close to 1. There is little difference between precise silhouetting with a small value of p than the status quo.
- The higher the value of p , the greater the degradation on CPU load. Thus, the longer precise silhouetting remains active, the worse results we get. For instance, `acpid` has a higher value of p than the other services, and its value of A is correspondingly smaller. This means that precise silhouetting is ineffective in reducing CPU load because of the high overhead from executing the memory operations and fork-points.

Program	N	I	T_O	p	M	F	T_S	A
acpid	8	1.69E5	1.35E6	20.9%	4838	55	2.88E6	0.469
acpid	128	1.69E5	2.16E7	20.9%	4838	55	3.72E7	0.581
acpid	1024	1.69E5	1.73E8	20.9%	4838	55	2.94E8	0.589
anacron	8	5.47E6	4.38E7	0.649%	4686	50	4.52E7	0.967
anacron	128	5.47E6	7.00E8	0.649%	4686	50	7.14E8	0.979
anacron	1024	5.47E6	5.60E9	0.649%	4686	50	5.71E9	0.967
cron	8	2.31E6	1.84E7	1.54%	6329	60	2.02E7	0.912
cron	128	2.31E6	2.96E8	1.54%	6329	60	3.15E8	0.937
cron	1024	2.31E6	2.37E9	1.54%	6329	60	2.46E9	0.938
cupsd	8	2.45E7	1.96E8	0.445%	20114	139	2.01E8	0.974
cupsd	128	2.45E7	3.14E9	0.445%	20114	139	3.19E9	0.982
cupsd	1024	2.45E7	2.51E10	0.445%	20114	139	2.56E10	0.983
ntp	8	3.61E6	2.88E7	2.54%	11255	72	3.22E7	0.897
ntp	128	3.61E6	4.62E8	2.54%	11255	72	4.91E8	0.939
ntp	1024	3.61E6	3.69E9	2.54%	11255	72	3.92E9	0.942

Table 4.1: Preliminary Results from Modeling Precise Silhouetting.

A , the advantage ratio is calculated by $\frac{T_O}{T_S}$. T_O is the total instructions that would be executed in the status quo whereas T_S is the total instructions that would be executed under precise silhouetting. \vec{K} (not shown in the table), represents overhead constants and was selected conservatively to be (20, 1000, 20). M is the number of system calls and memory operations made by the leader before the first active fork-point; F is the number of latent fork-points before the first active fork-point. $p = 100P/I$ is the prefix ratio of the execution.

- The scheme exhibits some, but very limited scalability, again because of the small values of p . As the number of instances goes up, the values of A increase a little. For `acpid`, A increases from 0.469 to 0.589 as the number of instances increases from 8 to 1024. However, for most services, the scalability is very limited and A increases by very little as the number of instances goes up from 128 to 1024.

Thus, precise silhouetting, from our first evaluation, causes CPU load degradation. We need to find a way to reduce the overhead from memory operations and fork-points, and increase the prefix ratio p to improve the values for A and the scalability of A with respect to N , the number of instances.

Optimistic Silhouetting (Excluding Control Flow)

Table 4.2 shows the results of modeling optimistic silhouetting (without control flow) on our sample of Linux services. As before, we treat all system calls as fork-points. We use the same values of $k1 = 20$, $k3 = 1000$, $k4 = 20$ to model overheads from detection of fork-points in the leader, comparisons of side-effects of forking instructions and emulation of system calls and memory writes in silhouettes respectively. We use $k2 = 40$ to model the additional overhead from taint propagation after the first active fork-point.

Program	N	I	T_O	d	M	F	T_S	A
acpid	8	1.69E5	1.35E6	100%	16323	102	9.22E6	0.146
acpid	128	1.69E5	2.16E7	100%	16323	102	6.08E7	0.356
acpid	1024	1.69E5	1.73E8	100%	16323	102	4.45E8	0.388
anacron	8	5.47E6	4.38E7	6.11%	36095	309	6.15E7	0.714
anacron	128	5.47E6	7.03E8	6.11%	36095	309	8.05E8	0.874
anacron	1024	5.47E6	5.63E9	6.11%	36095	309	6.36E9	0.886
cron	8	2.31E6	1.84E7	98.12%	320075	814	1.43E8	0.129
cron	128	2.31E6	2.96E8	98.12%	320075	814	1.01E9	0.292
cron	1024	2.31E6	2.37E9	98.12%	320075	814	7.52E9	0.315
cupsd	8	2.45E7	1.96E8	34.21%	1037608	1176873	8.85E9	0.022
cupsd	128	2.45E7	3.14E9	34.21%	1037608	1176873	1.54E11	0.020
cupsd	1024	2.45E7	2.51E10	34.21%	1037608	1176873	1.24E12	0.020
ntp	8	3.61E6	2.88E7	15.08%	59853	3201	7.58E7	0.380
ntp	128	3.61E6	4.62E8	15.08%	59853	3201	9.71E8	0.475
ntp	1024	3.61E6	3.69E9	15.08%	59853	3201	7.65E9	0.482

Table 4.2: Preliminary Results for Optimistic Silhouetting (Excluding Control Flow). A , the advantage ratio is calculated by $\frac{T_O}{T_S}$. The variables T_O , T_S , M , F are the same as before (see Table 4.1). $d = 100D/I$ is the portion of the execution before the first control-flow divergence.

Because d in Table 4.2 is significantly larger on average than p in Table 4.1, we no longer get values of A that are close to 1.0. The values of A seen are much lower than 1.0 (as low as 0.022 for cupsd); this indicates that this version of optimistic silhouetting would lead to significant CPU performance *degradation*. This is largely because of the increase in fork-points that result from tainted memory accesses, and the high volume of memory operations that silhouettes have to emulate.

Optimistic Silhouetting (Including Control FLOW)

Table 4.3 shows the results of modeling optimistic silhouetting (including control flow) on our sample of Linux services. As before, we treat all system calls as fork-points. We use the same values of $k1 = 20$, $k2 = 40$, $k3 = 1000$, $k4 = 20$ to model overheads from detection of fork-points in the leader, taint propagation, comparisons of forking instructions and bypassing execution in silhouettes respectively. We use $k5 = 20$ to model the additional overhead from execution reconciliation after a branch interval.

Program	N	I	T_O	d	M	F	C	L_C	T_S	A
anacron	8	5.47E6	4.38E7	100%	7.2E5	26923	299	4	5.15E8	0.085
anacron	128	5.47E6	7.03E8	100%	7.2E5	26923	299	4	5.49E9	0.128
anacron	1024	5.47E6	5.63E9	100%	7.2E5	26923	299	4	4.26E10	0.132
cron	8	2.31E6	1.84E7	100%	320075	1454	5	1	1.49E8	0.124
cron	128	2.31E6	2.96E8	100%	320075	1454	5	1	1.09E9	0.271
cron	1024	2.31E6	2.37E9	100%	320075	1454	5	1	8.14E9	0.291
cupsd	8	2.45E7	1.96E8	100%	3.05E6	3.53E6	1432	89	2.62E10	0.008
cupsd	128	2.45E7	3.14E9	100%	3.05E6	3.53E6	1432	89	4.59E11	0.007
cupsd	1024	2.45E7	2.51E10	100%	3.05E6	3.53E6	1432	89	3.69E12	0.007
ntp	8	3.61E6	2.88E7	100%	4.25E5	6.06E5	812	68	4.49E9	0.006
ntp	128	3.61E6	4.62E8	100%	4.25E5	6.06E5	812	68	7.89E10	0.005
ntp	1024	3.61E6	3.69E9	100%	4.25E5	6.06E5	812	68	6.35E11	0.005

Table 4.3: Preliminary Results for Optimistic Silhouetting (Including Control Flow). We exclude `acpid` because it had no control flow differences. A , the advantage ratio is calculated by $\frac{T_O}{T_S}$. The variables T_O , T_S , M , F are the same as before (see Table 4.2). $d = D/I$ is the portion of the execution before the first control-flow divergence. C and L_C represent the number of control-flow divergences and their average length respectively. $d = 100D/I$ the portion of the execution before permanent execution divergence.

Because there is no permanent execution divergence, d is 100% for our sample services. However, the values of A are much lower than 1 partly because of the same factors as before: the number of memory writes and fork-points is very high, leading to prohibitively high overhead. Furthermore, the overhead from bursty control flow divergences can also be a problem (as is the case for `cupsd` and `ntp`).

4.4 Improving Silhouette Execution

When we analyzed the execution traces collected by our data collection scheme, we found that several causes of execution divergence across our sample of Linux services were synthetic i.e. they were an artefact of external sources of nondeterminism rather than semantic differences in program execution. We thus decided to introduce a deterministic execution layer to our previous designs to eliminate as many sources of fork-points as possible and to improve the feasibility of silhouette execution.

4.4.1 Modified Data Collection Scheme

We modified our data collection scheme from Chapter 2 (shown in Figure 2-4) to simulate and evaluate silhouette execution in the bootstorm scenario.

As shown by Figure 4-5, we run one instance of the program – the leader – before all others. For the leader, we generate an execution log, as before, but we also augment the log by summarizing information about the sources of nondeterminism described in Chapter 3. For instance, we record information about signal timing, process IDs, time-related system calls in the trace signature file. Our Pin tool uses the trace signature of the leader to modify the instruction sequences executed by subsequent executions (the silhouettes) and reduce the number of fork-points as much as possible.

We run the leader to completion before the silhouettes. As before, we also do not bypass instructions in silhouettes so our modified data collection scheme still requires us to analyze these traces to simulate and evaluate silhouette execution.

4.4.2 Reducing Execution Differences across Instances

We now describe how we attempt to reduce the source of execution differences from the sources described in Chapter 3. While we modify the instances that execute after the leader, in practice many of our techniques eliminate fork-points altogether i.e. the leader can continue execution past the forking instruction, or avoid control flow differences by navigating around variability of I/O timing and latency.




Figure 4-5: Simulation of *Silhouette Execution* in a bootstorm scenario. We use dynamic instrumentation to generate a trace signature file for the leader. While we do not bypass execution in the silhouettes, try to reduce the number of fork-points and record information about them. Our analysis and visualization scripts allow us to simulate and evaluate the effectiveness of *silhouette* execution.

Canary and Pointer Guard Values

The values of the canary (`gs:0x14`) and the pointer guard (`gs:0x18`) are initialized in user-space, so dynamic instrumentation can be used to force these values to agree across distinct executions of the same program: instructions that initialize them can be modified or replaced; the sources used to compute these values (e.g. `rdtsc`, `‘/dev/urandom’` or `AT_RANDOM`) bytes can be intercepted as well.

For a real implementation of silhouette execution, this means that a leader can simply choose to not treat the instructions that initialize `gs:0x14` or `gs:0x18` as fork-points and simply treat them as normal memory writes instead. The silhouettes will follow the leader’s execution signature and store the same canary or pointer guard as the leader into memory. All subsequent instructions that load the canary or pointer guard values from memory will also be identical and thus will not be fork-points.

Randomization

To overcome execution differences resulting from randomization, we need to address the standard techniques used by programs to seed PRNGs. In our simulations, reads performed by the leader from `‘/dev/urandom’`, the `AT_RANDOM` bytes, or the `rdtsc` instruction are intercepted and recorded in the trace execution file using dynamic instrumentation; for other subsequent instances, we simply replace the return values to match those from the leader.

For silhouette execution in practice, this means that the leader can simply exclude `rdtsc` instructions or reads from `‘dev/urandom’` from fork-points and simply execute past them. Semantically, when silhouettes replay the leader’s execution signature, this simulates the unlikely but possible case that they received the same random values as the leader from external sources.

We need a slightly different approach for `AT_RANDOM` bytes because they are not initialized in user-space. Simply excluding reads of `AT_RANDOM` bytes from fork-points is not sufficient for correctness: when execution diverges permanently, a silhouette may read `AT_RANDOM` bytes again and they will be different from those read earlier (which is impossible). To solve this minor issue, we can make the leader transmit its

AT_RANDOM bytes in its first execution signature; the silhouettes overwrite their own AT_RANDOM bytes with the leader’s values before starting execution.

These strategies eliminate any fork-points or tainted memory locations that result from external sources of randomization in programs. While eliminating such randomization can change execution semantics of a Linux service, we are still simulating a valid (and possible) execution path for each silhouette.

Time

In our simulations, system calls that return some measurement of the current time, the CPU or program execution time, or a time interval (e.g. `time` or `gettimeofday`) can be intercepted in the same manner as randomization: the timestamps logged in the trace signature file can be used to force agreement between different instances.

For silhouette execution in practice, this means that a leader can simply exclude such system calls from fork-points, and continue executing past them. Rather than including these system calls in its execution signature, the leader should include the memory side-effects of these system calls. This way, silhouettes do not perform these system calls; rather, they automatically copy the behavior of the leader when they replay its writes. This simulates the unlikely but semantically valid scenario that the various instances executed various time-related system calls precisely at the same times. Replacing such system calls with their memory side-effects works because they do not mutate any operating system state.

The timestamps returned from `stat` system calls are not as easily handled. *If* we assume that all the input, configuration and data files are identical between various instances of a program, then we can simply exclude `stat` system calls from fork-points and include them in the execution signature file instead. A leader can assume by default that only the various timestamps returned by `stat` will be different and mark them as tainted. In our experiences, these timestamps are typically ignored in an overwhelming majority of cases. Thus, tainting these values by default creates little overhead because these values are seldom read or propagated. At the same time, we avoid the overhead associated with treating `stat` system calls as fork-points.

In the rare cases where the timestamps from `stat` system calls are actually read, they are typically compared to determine “freshness” (i.e. which file is newer). When we assume that all the files accessed by a program have similar initial contents, these comparisons can also be excluded from fork-points because timestamps retain the same ordering across different instances of a program in our experiments. This can be a risky optimization, so to be absolutely sure, the leader could treat these comparisons as fork-points and verify that the comparison results are the same in all instances instead.

To model this in our simulations, we do not include `stat` system calls that contain different time-stamps across instances in our count of fork-points. However, comparisons of timestamps from `stat` system calls are included in our definition of fork-points.

Signal Delivery

In order to overcome the unpredictable timing and order of signals in our simulations, we intercept all signals received by an application and ensure they are delivered at precisely the same instruction counts and in the same order as that indicated in the trace signature file. Unlike record-and-replay systems, we only deliver signals that are *actually* received. Thus, signals that are received earlier than expected are simply delayed or reordered. If, however, a signal is not received at the expected instruction count, our instrumentation tool simply waits or inserts `nops` until the desired signal is received. If a signal simply refuses to appear for a long time, execution must diverge. In our experiments, this final case does not occur as long as other sources of nondeterminism are controlled.

For silhouette execution in practice, this means that a leader can exclude received signals from fork-points (unlike before), and simply include them in the execution signature sent to silhouettes instead. When silhouettes bypass execution using the execution signature, they delay, reorder and deliver signals at precisely the same times as the leader and thus avoid any control-flow divergences. This technique, *signal alignment*, requires each silhouette to temporarily resume execution from the




Figure 4-6: All system calls and communications between the Linux user and kernel space are intercepted; the dynamic instrumentation layer uses a PID translation table, and translates between real and virtual process IDs to ensure correctness.

instruction before which the signal is expected to be received, and then insert `nops` until the signal is received or deliver a previously received (and withheld) signal. This can prevent control flow divergences and subsequent fork-points that arise from variable signal timing and ordering. Of course, if the expected signal is not received in a silhouette within a reasonable time interval, control flow must inevitably diverge.

Process IDs

In our simulations, nondeterminism from process IDs can be controlled by *virtualizing the process ID layer*, as shown by Figure 4-6. Using dynamic instrumentation, we can replace real and unpredictable process IDs from kernel space with virtual and unpredictable process IDs in user space. As outlined in Section 3.3, all interfaces which use process IDs need to be carefully monitored so that process IDs can be translated back and forth for correctness.

In practice, this is equivalent to using an operating system that assigns process IDs in a deterministic fashion. In a complete implementation of silhouette execution, we could expect the leader VM to store process IDs in its execution signature; silhouettes would assign process IDs in the same order as the leader.

For silhouette execution purely in user-space, we could add some logic to the silhouettes and virtualize their process IDs as described in Figure 4-6. Instead of treating instructions that deal with process IDs as fork-points (e.g. `fork` or `clone`), the leader would execute past them, and simply flag them before including them in its execution signature. When silhouettes would arrive at these instructions, they would simply translate between real and virtual process IDs. This clearly adds complexity and translation overhead whenever an instance interacts with an operating system interface using virtual process IDs. However, virtualizing the process ID layer prevents a considerable number of user-space instructions that propagate differences in process IDs (e.g. in `libc` or `pthread`s) from being labeled at fork-points due to taint propagation. Note that, for correctness, silhouettes must pretend to use the same virtual process IDs that they have already used before even after they completely diverge execution.

File I/O

Differences in input file contents across executions would inevitably cause execution to diverge, but reducing fork-points arising from time, randomization or process ID system calls is typically sufficient to ensure that file contents evolve identically in Linux services. Some files that may differ between two instances on start up (e.g. cache files or logs) can simply be deleted or replaced without sacrificing correctness. Also, as mentioned already, `stat` timestamps are frequently not read, so they can be excluded from fork-points until they are actually compared with other timestamps.

For file contents that are inherently and minimally different (e.g. they contain different timestamps), taint propagation otherwise suffices to ensure that they do not cause execution to diverge permanently.

Network I/O

The content of network configuration files does not change over a booting period in our experiments, so we can mark them as immutable during the boot process and arrange for their `stat` timestamps to return identical values across different instances. In practice, this means that a leader can exclude the `stat` calls for network files or their comparisons from its set of fork-points without sacrificing correctness.

In the same vein, the leader can exclude IP address resolution instructions from its definition of fork-points, and execute past them. This disables DNS-based dynamic load balancing during the boot process and forces silhouettes to use the same resolved IP addresses as the leader. DNS-based load balancing typically uses low TTLs, so once the boot process is finished and execution diverges permanently, the IP addresses will be refreshed quickly.

If bytes read from sockets differ across different executions, we need to understand the *context* to determine whether the differences are serious (e.g. due to different requests) or synthetic (e.g. due to timestamps). Simply tainting the bytes that are different between the instances is sufficient to tolerate minor differences from external data. In some specific cases, we can avoid marking socket `reads` as fork-points: for **Netlink** sockets, typically the only differences in bytes across different instances arise from interface statistics (`RTM_NEWLINK`), sequence numbers or end-point IDs. To handle variability in interface statistics (which are rarely read, if at all), we can simply overwrite them with identical fixed values across instances; sequence numbers and end-points IDs are generated by `time` system calls and process IDs respectively, which we already handle. Thus, a leader can execute a socket `read` on **Netlink** sockets and simply add memory operations that replace any statistics read by the silhouette with what the leader read. This simulates the unlikely but semantically valid execution scenario that all instances have the same network statistics (e.g. packets dropped/transmitted) when the system call is made. Using this approach, while we introduce instrumentation overhead in the leader for handling **Netlink** sockets, we reduce the number of expensive fork-points requiring byte-by-byte comparisons related to **Netlink** socket `reads` across all instances.

To overcome fork-points related to ephemeral port assignments, the leader can monitor the `bind` or `connect` system calls and changes their arguments to explicitly request ports in the ephemeral range rather than let the kernel assign them. These system calls, then, are no longer fork-points; the silhouettes derive and use the same arguments as the leader from the execution signature files sent to them, so there are no execution differences. This allows us to avoid virtualizing ephemeral ports in a similar fashion to how we virtualize process IDs.

Scalable I/O Schemes

To handle nondeterminism caused by unpredictable ordering of I/O events, we use techniques similar to those used for reordering signals in our simulations, as described by Figure 4-7. We name our approach *I/O stalling*.




Figure 4-7: We intercept all `epoll` system calls, and use the execution signature file to achieve determinism. We do not “replay” I/O events because only events that actually do occur are delivered to the application instance. This diagram assumes `epoll` returns one event per call for the sake of illustration.

Assuming that `epoll` returns just one event, figure 4-7 illustrates three possible cases that could occur:

- The event returned by a call to `epoll` (A) is the one expected in the execution signature file (A). The instrumentation layer does not modify the system call.
- The desired event (B) has not been received yet, and `epoll` returns an unexpected event (C). The instrumentation layer stores the out-of-order event, and repeatedly calls `epoll` until the the expected event is received.
- A call to `epoll` is initiated, and the event desired (C) has already been received. The instrumentation layer does not make a system call and simulates a return from `epoll` with the expected event instead.

Even if I/O events are reordered, it is possible that different amounts of data are available for ready file descriptors across executions. We can mask this effect in the same way we handle signals: if more bytes are available (e.g. through `read`) than expected in the execution signature file, we modify return values and `read` buffers to delay the reading of these bytes until the next `read`. In some corner cases, we may have to “fake” readiness in a call to `epoll`: if all bytes to be read from a file descriptor have been read by the dynamic instrumentation layer (out of which a few have not yet been delivered to the application), there will be no more readiness events even though the application expects them. If less-than-expected bytes are available, we simply wait till they are available by waiting for another readiness update on the same file descriptor inside dynamic instrumentation layer. In our experiments, this approach has been sufficient for overcoming nondeterminism from event-based I/O schemes. For asynchronous I/O schemes (e.g. `aio_read`), strategies similar to those used for reordering and precisely-timing signals would be necessary to hide variable I/O latency and ordering.

For silhouette execution in practice, we would implement this technique – *I/O alignment* – by excluding `epoll` system calls from fork-points. An `epoll` call and its expected results would be stored in the execution signature; a silhouette would

execute `epoll` and not let differences in the observed results let execution branch immediately. Instead, the silhouette would repeatedly call `epoll` until it gets the desired event set, taking care to delay and reorder I/O events as necessary to align with the leader. The same approach can be used for determining how many bytes are available from a `read`. While this adds overhead to the instructions executed by a silhouette, it eliminates control-flow divergences and subsequent fork-points created from inherent I/O nondeterminism.

Concurrency

Execution variability resulting from multi-threading has been extensively documented; there is a significant body of work that attempts to overcome such nondeterminism by using deterministic logical clocks or record-and-replay approaches. For our experiments, we did not attempt to enforce a total order on the instructions executed in multi-threaded programs and just measured fork-points inside the main process for each Linux service. To reduce fork-points from multi-threading, we could incorporate deterministic logical clocks into our design.

As mentioned before, a nondeterministic system scheduler can cause variable timing of signals or I/O events, which we handle using signal and I/O alignment strategies. Work on deterministic operating systems can be extended to overcome this issue in a more systematic manner.

Procfs: The ‘`/proc/directory`’

A leader can exclude reads from *procfs* for statistics from fork-points; instead, the leader can simply replace them with memory operations that simulate identical results in silhouettes. A leader must be careful to flag reads from *procfs* use process IDs, so that silhouettes can translate between real and virtual process IDs accordingly.

4.5 Evaluation of Improved Silhouette Execution

In this section, we show the effectiveness of some of the techniques introduced earlier to boost the advantage ratio A in the same Linux services.

Tables 4.4 and 4.5 summarize the results of our experiments using the modified data collection scheme on a few Linux services. When we pick very high values for the overhead constants (represented by \vec{K}), our techniques yield an aggregate improvement of $5.33\times$ in the advantage ratio A . That is, we go from a CPU load *increase* of 6% due to silhouette execution to a CPU load *reduction* by a *factor* of $4.772\times$ in our simulations. When we pick reasonably conservative values of \vec{K} in our simulations, our techniques boost A by a factor of $19.01\times$, and theoretically reduce the CPU load by a factor of $19.18\times$. The next few subsections analyze some of the Linux services we sampled in our experiments individually.

Program	Preliminary Best A	Current Best A	Relative Improvement
acpid	0.589	1.16	$1.96\times$
anacron	0.980	10.26	$10.47\times$
cron	0.938	4.24	$4.53\times$
cupsd	0.982	5.91	$6.02\times$
ntpd	0.942	2.04	$2.17\times$
Average	0.886	4.772	$5.33\times$

Table 4.4: Improvements in A for Linux services for $N = 1000$ (N is the number of concurrent instances) and \vec{K} , chosen conservatively, $= (20, 1000, 20, 40, 1000)$.

Program	Preliminary Best A	Current Best A	Relative Improvement
acpid	1.031	6.20	$6.01\times$
anacron	1.01	37.92	$37.90\times$
cron	0.999	17.39	$17.41\times$
cupsd	0.999	24.31	$24.33\times$
ntpd	1.006	10.09	$10.03\times$
Average	1.009	19.18	$19.01\times$

Table 4.5: Improvements in A for Linux services for $N = 1000$ (N is the number of concurrent instances) and \vec{K} , chosen moderately conservatively, $= (10, 100, 5, 20, 50)$.

4.5.1 acpid

The program `acpid` is a user-space daemon typically launched at boot and is part of the Advanced Configuration and Power Interface (ACPI) implementation in Linux. The daemon listens for specific events triggered by external actions (e.g. pressing the power button, unplugging the AC adapter from a notebook, or closing the notebook lid). When an event occurs, it executes programs to handle that event (which are specified through some configuration files).




Figure 4-8: For `acpid`, computing A as a function of N (highly conservative \vec{K}). PS and OPT NC are lines for precise silhouetting and optimistic silhouetting (excluding control flow) without any improvements; they serve as a baseline to measure the success of our techniques in our simulations. **Scheme A** represents the improved values of A achieved through deterministic silhouette execution. There is no OPT C line for optimistic silhouetting (including control flow) because there were no control flow divergences in our `acpid` traces.

Figure 4-8 shows the results of our experiments to measure any improvements in A from the techniques described in Section 4.4. Our workload consisted of simple boot-time initialization of `acpid` i.e. a few iterations of its main loop.

Scheme A includes the techniques we described to reduce execution differences that arise from randomization, security and time; these are sufficient to eliminate active fork-points in `acpid` entirely. Thus, **Scheme A** uses precise silhouetting in which execution does not diverge till the very end of our workload. Unlike the baseline executions, **Scheme A** also simulates *write compression*: silhouettes only write the latest values to memory locations instead of wastefully replaying all intermediate writes in *execution signatures*.

As shown in Figure 4-8, **Scheme A** improves A and takes it above 1, converting a CPU load *increase* into a CPU load reduction. However, the value of A is not high and does not scale too well as N increases; this is because of the high design overhead modelled by a highly conservative \vec{K} . In fact, the overhead in `acpid` from comparing forking instructions across instances, and replaying system calls and memory writes across silhouettes is equally significant, unlike the overhead from simply detecting fork-points. Setting one of k_2 or k_3 to 0 immediately boosts A by a factor of 2 for large N ; this factor is small because of generally high design overhead.

Figure 4-9 shows how A changes with N when we pick less conservative values of overhead constants (\vec{K}) i.e. (10, 100, 5, 20, 50) rather than (20, 1000, 20, 40, 100). The achieved values of A exceed 6 for $N < 1000$, which represents a significant theoretical reduction in the number of user-space instructions executed. The value of A scales well for small N (Figure 4-9a). However, as N increases, A plateaus because some of the design overhead (e.g. executing forking instructions or system calls in the execution signature) grows with N .

The highest theoretically possible A for our sampled traces is given by $A_{MAX} = \frac{I}{F+M}$, which models the possibility that each instance only executes system calls and *compressed* memory-writes rather than I instructions. For our samples of `acpid`, A_{MAX} is about 40, and we get within a factor of 10 of that number in Figure 4-9b.





Figure 4-9: For `acpid`, A as a function of N (moderately conservative \vec{K}). The top graph is a zoomed-in version of the lower graph.

4.5.2 anacron

Anacron is a user-space service that complements `cron` by scheduling and executing tasks without requiring the system to be continuously running. Typically, `anacron` is used to schedule daily, weekly or monthly tasks for system-wide maintenance.




Figure 4-10: For `anacron`, computing A as a function of N (highly conservative \vec{K}). PS, OPT NC and OPT C are lines for precise silhouetting, optimistic silhouetting (excluding control flow) and optimistic silhouetting (including control flow) without any improvements; they serve as a baseline to measure the success of our techniques in our simulations. Scheme A and Scheme B represent the improved values of A achieved through deterministic silhouette execution: Scheme A reduces execution differences because of security, randomization and architecture-specific instructions; Scheme B incrementally adds the techniques used to virtualize the process ID layer on top of Scheme A.

Figure 4-10 shows the results of our experiments to measure any improvements in A from the techniques described in Section 4.4. Our workload consisted of simple boot-time initialization of **anacron** for the case when **cron.weekly** tasks need to be executed.

Scheme A includes the techniques we described to reduce execution differences that arise from randomization, security and time. **Scheme B** adds *process ID virtualization* to **Scheme A**; **anacron** interacts frequently with process IDs because it uses them to track child jobs spawned. **Scheme B** is sufficient to eliminate active fork-points in **anacron** entirely. Thus, **Scheme B** uses precise silhouetting in which execution does not diverge till the very end of our workload, whereas **Scheme A** elongates the execution prefix (P) slightly to 5.50%. As before, **Scheme A** and **Scheme B** simulate *write compression* to improve A .

As shown in Figure 4-10, **Scheme A** does not affect A much; because of the small increase in P (the prefix), A remains close to 1. However, **Scheme B** improves the ratio A and takes it to a reasonably high value ($A > 10$), converting a CPU load *increase* into a CPU load reduction. A scales better as N increases for **anacron** than for **acpid**, because **anacron** has a $10\times$ lower memory-writes-to-instructions (i.e. M/I) ratio than **acpid**; this means there is less overhead when silhouettes restore the leader's memory image in **anacron**. Eventually, however, the very conservative design overhead \vec{K} causes A to plateau when N becomes very large.

As before, Figure 4-11a shows how A changes with N when we pick less conservative values of overhead constants (\vec{K}). The achieved values of A exceed 50 for $N < 3000$, a significant simulated reduction in the CPU pressure from user-space. The value of A scales well for moderately high N (Figure 4-11a) before it plateaus due to expected design overhead.

The highest theoretically possible A (A_{MAX}) is equal to $\frac{I}{F+M}$. For our samples of **anacron**, A_{MAX} is about 377, and we again get within a factor of 10 of that number in Figure 4-9b.





Figure 4-11: For **anacron**, A as a function of N (moderately conservative \vec{K}). The top graph is a zoomed-in version of the lower graph.

4.5.3 cron

The program `cron` is a job scheduler that allows users to periodically execute scripts or programs; it automates system maintenance or administration and complements `anacron`. `Cron` assumes that the system is running continuously; `anacron` catches jobs missed by `cron` while the computer is turned off.




Figure 4-12: For `cron`, computing A as a function of N (highly conservative \vec{K}). `PS`, `OPT NC` and `OPT C` are lines for precise silhouetting, optimistic silhouetting (excluding control flow) and optimistic silhouetting (including control flow) without any improvements; they serve as a baseline to measure the success of our techniques in our simulations. **Scheme A** and **Scheme B** represent the improved values of A achieved through deterministic silhouette execution: **Scheme A** reduces execution differences because of security, randomization and architecture-specific instructions; **Scheme B** incrementally adds the techniques used to virtualize the process ID layer on top of **Scheme A**.

Figure 4-12 shows the results of our experiments to measure any improvements in A from the techniques described in Section 4.4. Our workload consisted of a few iterations of the main loop in `cron`. The analysis for `cron` is somewhat similar to that of `anacron` because of the similar nature of the two programs.

As before, **Scheme A** includes the techniques we described to reduce execution differences that arise from randomization, security and time. Just like `anacron`, `cron` uses process IDs in its interactions with any spawned child jobs, so **Scheme A** itself is not effective and only elongates the execution prefix (P) to 12.40%. However, **Scheme B** adds *process ID virtualization* to **Scheme A**, which is sufficient to eliminate execution differences in `cron`. Scheme B thus uses precise silhouetting in which execution does not branch till the very end of our workload. Both schemes simulate *write compression*.

As shown in Figure 4-12, **Scheme B** improves A to be slightly higher than 1. In fact, $A > 4$, which represents a theoretical reduction in CPU pressure unlike the baseline scores. However, the achieved A is much lower for `cron` than that for `anacron`, which is probably because of the lower memory-writes-to-instructions (i.e. M/I) ratio for the latter.

Figure 4-13 shows how A changes with N when we pick less conservative values of overhead constants (\vec{K}). The achieved values of A exceed 17 for $N < 1000$, which represents a significant theoretical reduction in the number of user-space instructions executed. The value of A scales well for small N (Figure 4-13a) but plateaus as expected for very large N .

The highest theoretically possible A , $A_{MAX} = \frac{I}{F+M}$ is about 120, and we get within a factor of 10 of that number in Figure 4-13b.

4.5.4 cups

The `cups` program is a printing service for Linux systems that allows a computer to act as a print server. Because of the modularity in `cups`, the print *scheduler* can easily communicate with many kinds of printers (including local, remote or virtual printers).





Figure 4-13: For **cron**, A as a function of N (moderately conservative \vec{K}). The top graph is a zoomed-in version of the lower graph.

Chapter 5

Conclusion

5.1 Limitations of Deterministic Execution

This section describes some of the drawbacks of deterministic execution.

Security

To achieve deterministic execution, we have to disable ASLR. We also have to fix canary (`gs:0x14`) or pointer guard (`gs:0x18`) values across many different VMs. Disabling ASLR increases the vulnerability of applications to external attacks. Though canary and pointer guard values are still dynamically chosen in our brand of deterministic execution, they must agree across all VMs. Thus, an adversary who can compromise one VM by guessing its canary could easily attack the other VMs. The fact that we can choose different canary or guard values between different successive bootstorms is some consolation and provides some security.

Randomization

Randomization can be essential for security (e.g. random values may be used to generate keys or certificates), performance, and sometimes simply correctness (e.g. clients may choose random IDs for themselves). Making PRNG seeds agree across all VM instances can entail a compromise on all of these fronts. Thankfully, we have not yet discovered any such issues in the Linux services. Technically, our approach simu-

lates the extremely unlikely – yet possible – scenario that all concurrently executing instances somehow generated the same seeds from external sources.

Time and Correctness

Any programs that rely on precise measurements of time (e.g. through `rdtsc`) will lose correctness. Some Linux services such as `ntp` do need to measure time accurately in order to synchronize the system clock. Our semantics can cause such services to behave incorrectly at start up, because we may give incorrect values of time to `ntp`. Thankfully, this is not a huge correctness problem because network clock synchronization programs are self-healing and because we ultimately do provide monotonically increasing time values. After the booting process is over, and all VMs branch in execution, `ntp` will synchronize the current time correctly.

I/O aggregation in Network

As indicated earlier, when file contents or bytes read over sockets differ, these could be because of synthetic differences (e.g. timestamps in headers), or because of semantic differences (e.g. different requests or data). We can study application code and use dynamic instrumentation to reconstruct file contents or network packets and overcome synthetic nondeterminism from such sources. In our experiments, we used this approach for `Netlink` packets and application files, but generalizing it to all network sockets and protocols, while possible, would clearly complicate the design of the dynamic instrumentation layer. For semantic differences in I/O, execution would have to branch out.

One possible approach for fixing nondeterminism from external socket `reads` would be to forcibly conform these reads to be identical by replaying them. This approach would work for many Linux services and would simulate the possibility that these services received responses from an external source at the exact same time containing precisely the same data. However, these semantics can also be problematic in terms of correctness for other services e.g. if a network response essentially says “*you have the lock*” or “*your print job was successfully queued*” or “*your client id is 134*”,

this approach falls apart.

5.2 Summary

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