Understanding and Controlling Nondeterminism in Linux Services

by

Syed Aunn Hasan Raza

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Submitted to the Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
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Abstract

Both server and desktop virtualization rely on high VM density per physical host to reduce costs and improve consolidation. In the case of *boot-storms*, such high VM density per host can be a problem....

(To be filled in)

Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Saman P. Amarasinghe
Title: Professor

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Professor Saman Amarasinghe for his huge role in both this project and my wonderful undergraduate experience at MIT. Saman was my professor for 6.005 (Spring 2008), 6.197/6.172 (Fall 2009) and 6.035 (Spring 2009). These three exciting semesters not only convinced me of his unparalleled genius, they also ignited my interest in computer systems. Over the past year, as I have experienced the highs and lows of research, I have really benefited from Saman's infinite insight, encouragement and patience.

As an M-Eng student, I have been blessed to work with two truly inpsirational and gifted people from the COMMIT group: Marek Olszewski and Qin Zhao. Marek and Qin's expertise and brilliance is probably only eclipsed by their humility and helpfulness. I have learned more from them than I probably realize, and their knowledge of Dynamic Instrumentation and Operating Systems is invaluable and, frankly, immensely intimidating. I hope to emulate (or even approximate) their excellence some day.

This past year, I have also had the opportunity to work with Professor Srini Devadas, Professor Fraans Kaashoek, and Professor Dina Katabi as a Teaching Assistant for 6.005 and 6.033. It has been an extraordinarily rewarding experience, and I have learned tremendously from simply interacting with these peerless individuals. Professor Dina Katabi was especially kind to me for letting me work in G916 over the past few months.

I would like to thank Abdul Munir, whom I have known since my first day at MIT; I simply don't deserve the unflinchingly loyal and supportive friend I have found in him. I am also indebted to Osama Badar, Usman Masood, Brian Joseph, and Nabeel Ahmed for their unrelenting support and encouragement; this past year would have been especially boring without the never-ending arguments and unproductive 'all-nighters' that accompany our friendship. I also owe a debt of gratitude to my partners-in-crime Prannay Budhraja, Ankit Gordhandas, Daniel Firestone and Maciej Pacula, who have been great friends and collaborators over the past few years.

I am humbled by the countless sacrifices made by my family in order for me to be where I am today. My father has been the single biggest inspiration and support in my life since childhood. He epitomizes, for me, the meaning of selflessness and resilience in life. This thesis, my work and few achievements were enabled by – and dedicated to – him, my mother and my two siblings Ali and Zahra. Ali has been a calming influence during my years at MIT; the strangest (and most unproductive) obsessions unite us, ranging from Chinese *Wuxia* fiction to, more recently, *The Game of Thrones*. Zahra's high-school problems have been a welcome distraction over the past year; they have also allowed me to appear smarter than I truly am.

Finally, I would like to thank my wife Amina for her unwavering love and support throughout my stay at MIT, for improving and enriching my life every single day since I have known her, and for knowing me better than even I know myself. Through her, I have also met two exceptional individuals, Drs. Fatima and Anwer Basha, whom I have already learnt a lot from.

> *"It is impossible to live without failing at something, unless you live so cautiously that you might as well not have lived at all – in which case, you fail by default."*
>
> J.K. Rowling, Harvard Commencement Speech 2008

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Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Motivation

Data centers increasingly use server virtualization to reduce operating costs, simplify administrative tasks and improve performance scalability. Through virtualization, it is possible to achieve high resource utilization and isolation at the same time: each application is typically assigned a dedicated server virtual machine (VM), while many VMs are consolidated on powerful host computers to reduce wasted cycles. The use of techniques such as memory overcommitment (including *transparent page sharing, ballooning* and *hypervisor swapping*) [18] has further improved the consolidation ratios and cost-effectiveness of server virtualization, and augurs well for the future of the technology.

Given the success of server virtualization, many companies are extending the use of virtualization to their desktop computers. In a Virtual Desktop Infrastructure [17] (VDI), desktop operating systems and applications are hosted in virtual machines that reside in a data center; users access virtual desktops from desktop PCs or thin clients via a remote display protocol. A VDI provides simplicity in administration and management: applications can be centrally added, deleted, upgraded and patched. VDI deployments also promise even higher consolidation ratios than those achieved via server virtualization because desktop virtual machines typically require less resources than server virtual machines.

Consolidation ratios (measured by VM density per host) in data centers are expected to increase in the future, not only because of improvements in virtualization technology, but also because new generations of processors support more cores and more memory [4]. Because a single VM would typically utilize only a modest fraction of a host's hardware resources, a high VM density per host is desireable in most cases for effective resource utilization. However, correlated spikes in the CPU/memory usage of many VMs can suddenly cripple host machines. For instance, a *boot storm* [4, 6, 9, 14, 16] can occur after some software is installed or updated, requiring hundreds or thousands of identical VMs to reboot at the same time. Bootstorms can be particularly frequent in VDIs because users typically show up to work at roughly the same time in the morning each day.

Concurrently booting VMs create unusually high I/O traffic, generate numerous disk and memory allocation requests, and can saturate host CPUs. To avoid the prohibitively high boot latencies that result from boot storms, data centers usually either boot machines in a staggered fashion, or invest in specialized, expensive and/or extra-provisioned hardware for network/storage [5, 6]. There is also anecdotal evidence that VDI users sometimes leave their desktop computers running overnight to avoid morning boot storms; this practice represents an unnecessary addition to already exorbitant data center energy bills [13]. Data deduplication [3], through which hosts reclaim/reuse disk blocks common to several VMs, has been proven to reduce the memory footprint of concurrently booting machines. However, while data deduplication can mitigate the stress on the memory subsystem in a boot storm, lowered memory latency can in turn overwhelm the CPU, fibre channel, bus infrastructure or controller resources and simply turn them into bottlenecks instead [10].

With the spread of virtualization, it is important to address the bootstorm problem in a way that does not involve simply skirting around the issue. Data deduplication is partly effective because identical VMs load the same data from disk when they boot up. In this thesis, we pose the following question: is it possible to generalize deduplication of data to deduplication of *execution*? If many identical VMs are concurrently booting up in a data center, do they execute the same set of instructions?

Even if there are some differences in the instructions executed, are they caused by controllable sources of non-determinism? Ultimately, if there is a way to ensure that concurrently booting VMs execute mostly the same set of instructions and perform the same I/O requests, one way to solve the boot storm problem may be remarkable simple in essence: instead of booting N identical VMs concurrently, we can boot one VM as a leader; the remaining $(N-1)$ VMs minimally follow the leader by executing a tiny subset of the instructions they would otherwise execute; we fork execution into N different instances as late as possible into the boot process. This approach could potentially reduce pressure on the underlying host hardware, and thereby enable data centers to handle boot storms effectively.

1.2 Goal of Thesis

This thesis aims to address the following questions:

1. When identical VMs boot up concurrently, how similar are the sets of instructions executed? What is the statistical profile of any differences in the executed instructions?

2. What are the source(s) of any differences in the instruction streams of concurrently booting VMs? Are there ways to minimize the non-determinism in booting VMs?

The answers to these questions are clearly crucial in determining the feasibility of *deduplication of execution* as a possible solution to the boot storm problem.

1.3 Contrbutions

For this work, we used dynamic instrumentation frameworks such as Pin [7] and DynamoRio [2] to study user-level instruction streams from a a few representative Linux services at boot-time.

In this document, we:

1. show that nondeterminism in Linux services is bursty and extremely rare;
2. document the sources of non-determinism in Linux services – both obvious and obscure – and specify strategies for overcoming them in the boot storm scenario;
3. use simple dynamic instrumentation techniques to show that *fully* deterministic execution is achievable without *any* modifications to Linux or an executing service.

Strategies to achieve deterministic execution have been studied at the operating system layer [1] before, but they require modifications to Linux. Deterministic execution can be achieved in multi-threaded programs using record-and-replay approaches [12] or deterministic logical clocks [11]. Our study of non-determinism has different goals from from both approaches: we wish to avoid changing existing software (to ease adoption); we also wish to make several distinct – and potentially different – executions *overlap* as much as possible, rather than replay one execution over and over. In our case, we do not know *a priori* whether two executions will behave identically or not. That the behavior of system calls or signals in Linux can lead to different results or side-effects across multiple executions of an application is well known: what is not documented is the application *context* in which these sources of nondeterminism originate. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to study the statistical profile and context of nondeterminism in Linux services in such detail. While we we hope this work ultimately proves the basis for an implementation of our proposed solution to the boot storm problem, we also note that deterministic execution can immediately improve the effectiveness of existing virtualization technologies such as transparent page sharing and data deduplication.

1.4 Importance of Deterministic Execution

While our study of nondeterminism is driven by a specfic application, deterministic execution of programs can be beneficial in many different scenarios in its own right.

The motivations for deterministic multhreading listed in [11, 12] apply to our work as well.

Mainstream Computing, Security and Performance: If distinct executions of the same program can be expected to execute the same set of instructions, then any significant deviations can be used to detect security attacks. Runtime detection of security attacks through the identification of anomalous executions is the focus of *mainstream computing* [15], and deterministic execution obviously helps in reducing false positives. Anomalous executions can also be flagged for performance debugging.

Testing: Deterministic execution in general facilitates testing, because outputs and internal state can be checked at certain points with respect to expected values. Our version of determinism allows for a particularly strong kind of test case that may be necessary for safety-critical systems: with deterministic execution, a program must execute the exact same instructions across different executions for the same inputs.

Debugging: Erroneous behavior can be more easily reproduced via determininstic execution, which helps with debugging. Deterministic execution has much lower storage overhead than traditional record-and-replay approaches.

1.5 Thesis Organization

In what follows, Chapter 2 presents an overview of the Linux boot process, along with the dynamic instrumentation techniques we used to profile non-determinism in Linux services. Chapter 3 presents a summary of the sources of non-determinism we discovered in this work. Chapter 4 presents a detailed case study of three Linux services to identify the common context in which non-determinism arises and the strategies that can be used to control it. Chapter 5 presents design ideas for an implementation of deduplication of execution. Chapter 6 summarizes related work. Finally, Chapter 7 concludes this thesis and discusses future work.

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Chapter 2

Execution Profile of Linux Services

This chapter first provides some background on the Linux startup process (Section 2.1). It then describes how we collected user-level instruction streams from some Linux services via dynamic instrumentation to measure nondeterminism in the linux boot process (Section 2.2); finally, it summarizes our results on the statistical nature of nondeterminism in Linux services (Section 2.3).

2.1 The Linux Boot Process

When a computer boots up:

1. The BIOS (Basic Input/Output System) gets control and performs startup tasks for the specific hardware platform.

2. Next, the BIOS reads and executes code from a designated boot device that contains part of a Linux boot loader. Typically, this smaller part (or phase 1) loads the bulk of the boot loader code (phase 2).

3. The boot loader may present the user with options for which operating system to load (if there are multiple available options). In any case, the boot loader loads and decompresses the operating system into memory; it sets up system hardware and memory paging; finally, it transfers control to the kernel's `start_kernel()` function.

4. The `start_kernel()` function performs the majority of system setup (including interrupts, remaining memory management, device initialization) before spawning the `idle` process, the scheduler and the user-space `init` process.

5. The scheduler effectively takes control of system management, and kernel stays idle from now on unless externally called.

6. The `init` process executes scripts that set up all non-operating system services and structures in order to allow a user environment to be created, and then presents the user with a login screen.



Figure 2-1: CPU and disk activity for a booting Ubuntu VM in the first 35 seconds after `init` is spawned. The first few seconds show no activity because the data collection daemon takes a few seconds to start.



Figure 2-2: (... continued from Figure 2-1) CPU and disk activity for a booting Ubuntu VM 35 seconds after `init` is spawned.

Figures 2-1 and 2-2 illustrate the CPU usage and disk activity of an Ubuntu 10.10 VM that takes about 70 seconds to complete the sixth step of the boot process (i.e. spawning the `init` process to set up the user environment). The Linux kernel version is 2.6.35-27-generic and the VM is configured with a single core processor with 512 Mb RAM. Generated using the Bootchart utility [8], the figures illustrate that the booting process involves high memory and CPU overhead (5-70 seconds); they also

show a glimpse of the well-known fact that memory and CPU overhead typically dimishes greatly after the boot process is completed and the machine is ready for login (70+ seconds). This disparity in CPU/memory usage is the source of the boot storm problem; a single host can handle many VMs in steady-state usage, but the host gets crippled when the same VMs boot up concurrently.

In the last step of the booting process (step 6), `init` typically runs many scripts located in specific directories such as '`/etc/rc`' or '`/etc/init.d/`'. While the myriad Linux distributions can have their own variants of `init` binaries (e.g. `SysV`, or `systemd` or `Upstart`), the `init` process always directly/indirectly launches several services and daemons to initialize the user desktop environment. Figure 2-3 provides a summary of the specific actions performed by `init` (through the subprocesses or daemons it launches) for the same Ubuntu VM used for Figures 2-1 and 2-2.



Figure 2-3: A summary of the actions performed by `init` for a booting VM; this figure has the same timeline (0-70 seconds) as Figures 2-1 and 2-2.

In fact, the `init` process actually launched 361 children processes (directly and indirectly) over the 70 second period summarized by Figure 2-3. Most of them were ephemeral processes; several processes were repeatedly launched in different contexts (e.g. `getty` or `grep`). The processes singled out in Figure 2-3 are the ones that either stayed alive through most of the boot process till the end, performed important boot actions, or spawned many sub-processes themselves.

2.2 Data Collection Scheme



Figure 2-4: Steps involved in measuring execution nondeterminism.

Pin and DynamoRio are runtime frameworks that enable inspection and arbitrary transformation of user-mode application code as it executes. We used both Pin and DynamoRio to study the behavior of Linux services together because this allowed us to verify the accuracy of our results. However, we relied on Pin more than DynamoRio

because it gets injected into application code earlier than DynamoRio, which allows for greater instruction coverage for our purpose. Figure 2-4 shows the simple steps involved in collecting data on nondeterminism using dynamic instrumentation. The next section explains each of these steps in detail, using a simple "Hello, world!" program as an example.

2.2.1 Analyzing a simple "Hello, world!" program

This section outlines the data collection scheme described in Figure 2-4 in detail with the help of an example: the simple "Hello, world!" program outlined in Figure 2-5. For this example, we disabled ASLR (Address Space Layout Randomization) on the Ubuntu VM described in section 2.1.

```
1 #include <stdio.h>
2
3 int
4 main(int argc, char* argv[])
5 {
6   printf(``Hello, world!\n'');
7   return 0;
8 }
```

Figure 2-5: A "Hello, world!" program in C.

Execution Tracing Layer

As shown in Figure 2-4, the first step in data collection involves running the target program a few times across identical VMs. Ideally, these different executions are done concurrently or as close as possible in time to model the boot storm scenario accurately. In our scheme, we wrote a Pin tool that:

1. logs each x86 instruction executed by the target process, along with the new values of any affected registers,

2. records values written to or read from memory,

3. intercepts all signals received, and records the instruction counts corresponding to the timing of any signals, and

4. monitors all system calls made by the target process, and logs any corresponding side-effects to memory or registers.

Implementation of the execution tracing layer required a close examination of the Linux system call interface, because we had to identify the side-effects of each system call. Figure 2-6 shows an excerpt from a trace file generated by our Pin tool while running the "Hello, World" program. Our tool records and analyzes every instruction executed in user-space by the process for the "Hello, world" program once Pin gets control; this allows us to include program initialization and library code in our analysis.

```
_dl_make_stack_executable       0xb7ff6210  pop edx                                 $ edx = 0xb7ff1040, esp = 0xbffff29c
        Read 0xbffff2d4 = *(UINT32*)0xbffff29c
_dl_make_stack_executable       0xb7ff6211  mov ecx, dword ptr [esp]                $ ecx = 0xbffff2d4
_dl_make_stack_executable       0xb7ff6214  mov dword ptr [esp], eax
        Write *(UINT32*)0xbffff29c = 0xb6415b90
        Read 0xb7fff8f8 = *(UINT32*)0xbffff2a0
_dl_make_stack_executable       0xb7ff6217  mov eax, dword ptr [esp+0x4]        $ eax = 0xb7fff8f8
        Read 0xb6415b90 = *(UINT32*)0xbffff29c
_dl_make_stack_executable       0xb7ff621b  ret 0xc                             $ esp = 0xbffff2ac
__libc_start_main       0xb6415b90  push ebp                                    $ esp = 0xbffff2a8
        Write *(UINT32*)0xbffff2a8 = 0
__libc_start_main       0xb6415b91  mov ebp, esp                                $ ebp = 0xbffff2a8
__libc_start_main       0xb6415b93  push edi                                    $ esp = 0xbffff2a4
        Write *(UINT32*)0xbffff2a4 = 0x80482f0
__libc_start_main       0xb6415b94  push esi                                    $ esp = 0xbffff2a0
        Write *(UINT32*)0xbffff2a0 = 0x1
__libc_start_main       0xb6415b95  push ebx                                    $ esp = 0xbffff29c
        Write *(UINT32*)0xbffff29c = 0xb7ffeff4
__libc_start_main       0xb6415b96  call 0xb6415aaf                             $ esp = 0xbffff298
        Write *(UINT32*)0xbffff298 = 0xb6415b9b
        Read 0xb6415b9b = *(UINT32*)0xbffff298


__NR_mmap2() called.
        addr = 0
        length = 4096
        prot = 3
        flags = 34
        fd = -1
        pgoffset = 0
        ret_val = b62dd000
__NR_mmap2() returning.

__NR_write() called.
        fd = 1
        pBuf = 0xb62dd000
        count = 14
        bytes written = 14
        buf contents:
        buf[0] = H
        buf[1] = e
        buf[2] = l
        buf[3] = l
        buf[4] = o
        buf[5] = ,
        buf[6] =
        buf[7] = w
        buf[8] = o
        buf[9] = r
        buf[10] = l
        buf[11] = d
        buf[12] = !
        buf[13] =
__NR_write() returning.
```

Figure 2-6: An excerpt from the log files generated by the execution tracing layer. The top half shows the set of x86 instructions executed in user-space by the "Hello, world!" process, including instruction addresses, symbolic information (whenever available), affected register values and memory addresses. The lower half shows an excerpt from the system call log.

Analysis Script

The analysis script uses the Linux *diff* utility to perform pairwise comparisons of the log files generated by multiple executions of the target application. Using the `suppress-common`, `side-by-side` and `minimal` flags, the analysis script produces two output files:

1. A *delta* file that contains only instructions that were either conflicting between the two logs or missing in one log, and

2. A *union* file that contains all instructions executed in the two logs, while distinguishing instructions included in the delta file from others.

Figure 2-7 shows an excerpt from the union and delta files generated for the "Hello, world!" program. Given several traces, the delta and union files can be constructed from the two executions that are the most or least different, or have the median difference. In either case, these generated files can be used to detect and diagnose sources of nondeterminism in an application.



Figure 2-7: Excerpts from the side-by-side diff files generated by the analysis script. The top half shows a few instructions at the start of the delta file; all these instructions are different in the two logs (as indicated by the | in the middle of the line). The bottom half shows the corresponding instructions in the union file. Conflicting instructions are marked with the color red in the union file (along with the | symbol); the other instructions are found in both logs.

Visualization Script

The visualization script reads the union file to compute statistics on the extent of differences in the original logs, and generates diagrams to capture the different execution traces of the program.

In particular, it derives three key metrics from the "union" file:

1. *Length of Common Prefix* **(P):** This is the number of instructions common to both logs starting from the beginning and up to the point of first divergence.

2. *Longest Common Substring* **(LS):** This is the largest sequence of adjacent instructions that are common to both logs.

3. *Longest Common Subsequence* **(LCS):** Intuitively, this is the "overlap" in the logs; it is the length of the longest sequence of instructions found in both logs. Instructions in the LCS must be in the same order in both logs, but they are not required to be adjacent.

For instance, if the first instance of a program executes the instruction sequence $I_1 = [A, B, C, D, E, F]$, and the second instance of the same program executes the instruction sequence $I_2 = [A, B, X, D, E, F, Y]$, then: the common prefix is $[A, B]$; the longest common substring is $[D, E, F]$, and the longest common subsequence is $[A, B, D, E, F]$.

In general, the longest common subsequence (LCS) of the two traces is arguably the most indicative of the extent of determinism in two executions of a program. The other two metrics are important for evaluating the feasibility of deduplication of execution as a solution to the boot storm problem. In general, we want the common prefix (P) and the longest common substring (LS) of the two logs to be as large as possible to ensure that concurrently booting VMs do not need to branch execution or communicate with each other too quickly. This is further discussed in chapter 5.

For the "Hello, world!" program, if ASLR is enabled, the two logs have very little overlap ($< 5\%$), and the common prefix and longest common substring are on the order of 10 instructions. With ASLR disabled, one may expect the two traces

Table 2.1: Nondeterminism profile of "Hello, world!" program (ASLR disabled)

Common Prefix	21.49 percent
Longest Common Substring	67.70 percent
Longest Common Subsequence	99.98 percent
Conflicts	0.02 percent
Conflicting Instructions	32

to look identical (because of the simplicity of the program), but there is still some nondeterminism in the instruction sequences (see Table 2.2 and Figure 2-8).



Figure 2-8: Visualization of "Hello, world!" program execution. The thin black lines represent conflicts between the two instances of the program.

Figure 2-8 shows divergences in program execution over time. This representation allows us to visually inspect the union file and figure out the distribution and nature of conflicting instructions. For the "Hello, world!" program, we can see that while divergences were spread out near the beginning and end of the program, they were bursty and short-lived (as indicated by the thin black lines). This is a common trend, even for complex programs such as Linux services, as discussed in Section 2.3.

2.2.2 Alternative metrics for measuring nondeterminism

As mentioned in the previous section, we use the common prefix (P), the longest common subsequence (LCS), the longest substring (LS) and the distribution of conflicting instructions in separate instruction streams to measure nondeterminism.

While the conflict ratio measured by our analysis script is usually quite small (e.g. 0.02% for "Hello, world!"), its importance and impact is disproportionately larger. As shown in Figure 2-9, the analysis script only considers instructions that originate nondeterminism or actively propagate it in computing the conflict ratio.



Figure 2-9: The top image shows an example of the cascade effect: the red instruction represents a real conflict in `eax`. The light-blue instructions have the same side-effects across the two logs because they don't touch `eax`. The register state only converges after `eax` is written by the green instruction. The cascade effect refers to the nondeterministic register state that results in the light-blue instructions because of an earlier conflict, even though the instructions themselves are not reading or writing any nondeterministic values. If we include the cascade effect, the measured conflict ratio in this trace excerpt is $(N+3)/(N+4)$ instead of $1/(N+4)$.

The bottom image shows an example of the propagation effect: the red instruction again represents a conflict in `eax`. The light-blue instructions do not generate any nondeterminism themselves, but they have conflicting side-effects because they read `eax`. In this case, We report a conflict ratio of 1.

As shown in Figure 2-9, the analysis script effectively simulates a taint analysis on register and memory contents to measure the true impact of any nondeterminism in a program. Grouping instructions that generate and then propagate nondeterminism makes it easier for us to diagnose the sources of nondeterminism.

2.3 Results for Linux services

Table 2.2: Nondeterminism profile of Linux services and daemons (ASLR disabled)

Application	Prefix (P)	Longest Substring (LS)	Determinism (LCS)
`ntp`, 14 loop iterations	11.65%	22.08%	89.21%
`cron`, 30 loop iterations	1.58%	53.21%	98.38%
`cups`, 10 loop iterations	2.45%	25.20%	94.25%
`daemon A`, i loop iterations	p%	ls%	lcs%
`daemon B`, i loop iterations	p%	ls%	lcs%
`daemon C`, i loop iterations	p%	ls%	lcs%
`daemon D`, i loop iterations	p%	ls%	lcs%
`daemon E`, i loop iterations	p%	ls%	lcs%
`daemon F`, i loop iterations	p%	ls%	lcs%
`daemon G`, i loop iterations	p%	ls%	lcs%
Aggregate	x%	y%	z%

Table 2.2 shows the results from applying our data collection scheme on a set of Linux services and daemons that are typically launched at boot. We can immediately see that:

1. The common prefix (P) in our sample of Linux services is on average about 3%, which is quite small and indicates that nondeterminism typically surfaces relatively early in program execution.

2. The longest substring (LS), usually close to 25%, is substantially larger than the common prefix (P). This shows that execution typically does not permanently diverge in control flow after any initial conflict.

3. The longest common subsequence (LCS) or general determinism is in general much higher – about 90% on average – which indicates that a large majority of instructions in the Linux services overlap across different executions.

Given the discussion in Section 2.2.2, a conflict ratio of about 10% on average hints that there is a non-trivial amount of nondeterminism in our sample programs, despite a very high average LCS. The distribution of the 10% conflicting instructions is surprisingly similar across different programs: Figure 2-10, an execution profile of `ntp`, is representative of most execution traces. Generally, conflicting instructions are spread throughout the program execution, but tend to occur more frequently towards the end. Nondeterminism does not seem to cause permanent execution divergences, even though there is nontrivial amount of control-flow divergence in some programs. In fact, execution seems to diverge and reconverge very frequently.



Figure 2-10: Visualization of `ntp` program execution. The thin black lines represent conflicts between the two instances of the program, whereas the thin blue lines represent control flow divergences.

The execution profile of `cron` is somewhat unique because it has a higher LCS and LS than other traces. It is difficult to reconcile the low measured conflict ratio for `cron` (less than 2%), with the higher conflict ratio visually suggested by Figure 2-11. Figure 2-12 explains this discrepancy: it shows that while the absolute number

of conflicting instructions is small, these conflicts occur in bursts and visually group together.



Figure 2-11: Visualization of `cron` program execution. The thin black lines represent conflicts between the two instances of the program.

Figure 2-12: Looking closely at the `cron` program execution reveals that conflicts occur in bursts.

While the bursty nature of nondeterminism is particularly prominent in Figure 2-12, it is common to all the services we profiled. Table 2.3 shows that the longest control flow divergence or the longest string of consecutive conflicts is typically very small (i.e. $<< 1\%$) in our sample programs.

Table 2.3: Measuring burstiness of nondeterminism in Linux services

Application	Max. Consecutive Conflicts	Max. Control Flow Divergence
`ntp`, 14 loop iterations	0.03%	2%
`cron`, 30 loop iterations	0.08%	0.003%
`cups`, 10 loop iterations	c%	c%
`daemon A`, i loop iterations	p%	ls%
`daemon B`, i loop iterations	p%	ls%
`daemon C`, i loop iterations	p%	ls%
`daemon D`, i loop iterations	p%	ls%
`daemon E`, i loop iterations	p%	ls%
`daemon F`, i loop iterations	p%	ls%
`daemon G`, i loop iterations	p%	ls%
Aggregate	x%	y%

2.4 Summary

This chapter presented a brief overview of the Linux boot process, and demonstrated our methodology for both quantifying and measuring nondeterminism in programs using dynamic instrumentation. By analyzing user-mode instructions executed by Linux boot services and daemons, we offered evidence that Linux services execute highly overlapping instruction sequences across different runs. We also showed that any conflicts or nondeterminism in such services occurs in bursts; nondeterminism does not cause executions to permanently diverge; divergence and convergence occur very quickly and repeatedly in our traces.

Chapters 3 and 4 will offer insight into the sources of nondeterminism behind these statistics. Chapter 5 will look at the implications of our results for a possible solution to the bootstorm problem.

Chapter 3

Sources of Nondeterminism

This chapter summarizes some of the myriad sources of nondeterminism in Linux services we encountered in this work. The study of such sources of nondeterminism reveals the complex interactions between user-mode applications, commonly used system libraries (e.g. `libc`), the Linux operating system and the external world. Existing literature on nondeterminism is not as comprehensive and does not analyze Linux system calls in as much detail.

3.1 Linux Security Features

3.1.1 Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR)

Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) involves random arrangement of key data areas for an executing program. When ASLR is enabled, the base of the executable, the position of libaries, heap and the stack in the process address space can be different every time the program is run. ASLR hinders several kinds of security attacks in which attackers have to predict program addresses for redirecting execution (including *return-to-libc* attacks).

As mentioned earlier, when ASLR is enabled, two execution traces of a simple "Hello, World!" program in C are almost entirely different. Almost every instruction executes from a different address; memory addresses (especially stack addresses) are

all different as well.

Existing record-and-replay systems handle ASLR by forcing the operating system to create the same address space layout across different runs. A slightly more complicated approach involves using base-and-offset computations to translate equivalent addresses between two different executions. For simplicity, we disabled ASLR for our experiments using the following command: `sudo kernel.randomize_va_space=0`

3.1.2 Stack Protection: `libc` Canary

Copying a *canary* (a dynamically chosen global value) onto the stack below the return address can help detect buffer overflow attacks, because the stack copy will also be overwritten if an attacker overwrites the return address. A simple comparison of the global (unchanged) canary value with the stack copy before a `ret` can prevent a buffer overflow attack.

In 32-bit Linux distributions, the C runtime library, `libc`, provides a canary value in `gs:0x14`. There are many different ways for this value to be calculated (discussed later), but this value will obviously be different between multiple executions of the same program. This feature combines with `gcc`'s stack smashing protection (SSP), in which any function reads `gs:0x14` and pushes its value below its own stack frame as a canary before making a function call. After the function call, the caller function makes sure that the value on the stack is still the same as `gs:0x14`, to detect if its own return address has been tampered with.

Since Pin gets control of the application before `__libc_main` starts executing (prior to intialization of `gs:0x14`), multiple execution traces of a program can diverge when `gs:0x14` is initialized.

Different versions of libc initialize `gs:0x14` in different ways. If randomization is disabled, some versions of libc add a terminator canary value (0xff0a0000) to `gs:0x14`. The reason for using a terminator canary value is that most buffer overflow attacks exploit string operations which end at terminators. However, the disadvantage of this approach is that attackers can predict canary values in advance and circumvent them. For us, if libc uses terminator canary values, then multiple executions of the

same program do not diverge wherever `gs:0x14` is read or written.

The following source code from a version of sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/dl-osinfo.h shows the logic for canary initialization:

```
static inline uintptr_t __attribute__ ((always_inline))
_dl_setup_stack_chk_guard (void)
{
  uintptr_t ret;
#ifdef ENABLE_STACKGUARD_RANDOMIZE
  int fd = __open ("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY);
  if (fd >= 0)
    {
      ssize_t reslen = __read (fd, &ret, sizeof (ret));
      __close (fd);
      if (reslen == (ssize_t) sizeof (ret))
        return ret;
    }
#endif
  ret = 0;
  unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *) &ret;
  p[sizeof (ret) - 1] = 255;
  p[sizeof (ret) - 2] = '\n';
  return ret;
}
```

To overcome the drawbacks of terminator canaries, many versions of libc use randomization schemes to initialize `gs:0x14`. As shown in the code excerpt, some versions of libc generate a random word by reading from "/dev/urandom". Since this word will be different across multiple runs of the program, execution will diverge in libc's `__read()` and subsequently whenever `gs:0x14` is written or read. Luckily, using Pin and DynamoRio, we can intercept system calls, and make all reads to "/dev/urandom" return fixed values chosen by us, so that canary values do not cause execution to diverge.

Modern versions of libc do not use "/dev/urandom" for randomization because of the performance overhead of the associated system calls. These versions use kernel provided AT_RANDOM bytes to write `gs:0x14`. AT_RANDOM bytes were recently added; the Linux kernel provides a few random bytes to programs as elf auxiliary vectors (see Section 3.5). On 32-bit machines, a few random kernel-provided bytes

are written to `gs:0x14` for canary usage. These random bytes exploit kernel entropy, are different across multiple runs of a program, and thus make it difficult for attackers to guess canary values.

To make program execution deterministic in this case, we can use Pin or DynamoRio to add instrumentation that directly overwrites the AT_RANDOM bytes provided by the kernel before the program gets control. The address to the AT_RANDOM bytes is stored on the program stack as an elf-auxiliary vector below `main`'s arguments and also below any environmental variables on the program stack (see Section 3.5) and can thus be accessed programatically via DynamoRio and Pin. Alternatively, with ASLR disabled, we can just read the address of the AT_RANDOM bytes by running our target program with `LD_SHOW_AUXV=1`:

```
$ LD_SHOW_AUXV=1 /bin/true
...
AT_RANDOM:      0xbffff7eb
...
```

Thus, while the bytes stored in the AT_RANDOM array are always different between runs, we can find where they are stored for a program (e.g 0xbffff7eb) and overwrite them to make execution deterministic. Note that in many current implementations of libc that use AT_RANDOM, only 3 bytes of the first random word are used in the canary; the lowest byte is left as 0x00 to serve as a terminator byte for string operations used by buffer overflow attacks.

All the above schemes prevent programs from diverging due to initialization and usage of `gs:0x14`.

3.2 Randomization

3.3 Process Identification Layer

3.4 Time

3.5 File I/O

3.6 Network I/O

3.7 Signals

3.8 Inter-thread Communication/Scheduling

3.9 Misc System Calls

3.10 Summary

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Chapter 4

Case Studies of Linux Services

This chapter summarizes the context and extent of non-determinism found in three Linux services (`cron`, `cupsd` and `ntp`) in detail.

4.1 Cups

4.2 Cron

4.3 Ntp

4.4 Summary

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