

Terrorism: Theory and Reality

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The semantics of studies on terrorism seem to strive more for political correctness than for presenting an accurate picture of the soil in which these terrible acts are usually born, gestate, and explode. Definitions divorced from reality offer, at best, a two dimensional view of a multifaceted problem. To focus solely on acts of desperate individuals and to not equally consider official or state terrorism is not only a simplistic approach but also one that fails to make the obvious linkage of violence to violence.

I have served as a humanitarian worker for refugees and displaced persons, and as a negotiator, in areas of armed conflict in many parts of the world. I have personally witnessed the perverse impact of occupying governmental forces on innocent civilians in Srebrenica, Chechnya, Aceh, East Timor, Rwanda, and Palestine.

Where there is an overt government policy to terrorize civilian populations into a dependent, even supplicant, state, the silence of the oppressed can be very deceptive. Hatred breeds when homes, fields, schools, hospitals, water and electricity supplies, and vital records are wantonly destroyed; when well-equipped armies use overwhelming force against entire townships, killing and maiming women and children; when targeted assassinations and torture instead of the rule of law are used by sovereign states.

In this chapter, I shall offer the reflections of a fieldworker on some commonly used definitions in the “war on terrorism,” and then provide a view of terrorism as perceived and experienced on the ground by civilians under army occupation.

Definition

Look up “terrorism” on the web search engine “Google”; there are more than fifty pages of entries, many clamoring to define what it is. In the excellent book *Political Terrorism*, the authors Alex Schmid and Albert Longman offer twenty-six choices.¹

Noam Chomsky, in one of his numerous papers on the subject, offers two approaches to the study of terrorism: the literal and the propagandistic.

Pursuing the literal approach, we begin by determining what constitutes terrorism. We then seek instances of the phenomenon—concentrating on the major examples ... and try to determine causes and remedies. The propagandistic approach dictates a different course. We begin with the thesis that terrorism is the responsibility of some officially designated enemy. We then designate terrorist acts as “terrorist” just in the cases where they can be attributed (plausibly or not) to the required source; otherwise they are to be ignored, suppressed, or termed “retaliation” or “self defense.” It comes as no surprise that the propagandistic approach is adopted by governments generally, and by their instruments in totalitarian states.²

The U.S. Department of State definition is, “Terrorism is premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant groups by sub-national groups or clandestine agents usually intended to influence an audience. International terrorism is terrorism involving citizens of the territories of more than one country.”³

The U.S. Army *Operational Concept for Terrorism Counteraction* pamphlet 525-37 of 1984 defines terrorism with a commendable economy of words as “the calculated use of violence or threat of violence to attain goals that are political, religious, or ideological in nature. This is done through intimidation, coercion, or instilling fear.”

Igor Primoratz, a philosopher at Melbourne University, defines terrorism, “for the purpose of philosophical discussion ... as the deliberate use of violence, or threat of its use, against innocent people, with the aim of intimidating some other people into a course of action they otherwise would not take.” Thus, he states, “terrorism has two targets. One person or group is attacked directly, in order to get at another person or group to intimidate them into doing something they would not do. In terms of importance, the indirect target is primary and the direct target secondary. The secondary, but directly attacked target is innocent people.”⁴

Rakesh Gupta presents a simpler “philosophical” offering. “In any discussion on terrorism—whether it is criminal or political—denial of the right of life would be the basic philosophical category of analysis.” This statement seems to suggest that political terrorist acts may be legal. But Gupta continues and clears up the doubt: “Since a terrorist action today is a small group action against innocents and is against either national or international law, it is criminal.”⁵

Back to Igor Primoratz to define who the victims of terrorism are:

The innocents ... persons not guilty of any action or (omission) the terrorist could plausibly bring up as a justification of what he does to them. They are not attacking him; therefore he cannot justify his action in terms of self-defence. They are not waging war on him, nor on those on whose behalf he

presumes to act; therefore he cannot say that he is merely waging war. They are not responsible, on any plausible understanding of responsibility, for the (real or alleged) injustice, suffering, or deprivation that is being inflicted on him or on those whose case he has adopted, and which is so grave that a violent response to it can be properly considered.⁶

Primoratz importantly further defines the “innocents”: “In the context of war, according to the mainstream version of just war theory, this includes all except members of the armed forces and security services, those who supply them with arms and ammunition, and political officials directly involved in the conflict. In the context of a political conflict that falls short of war, the category of the innocent has similarly wide scope: it includes all except government officials, police and members of security services.”

This seems to imply that, at least “philosophically,” soldiers, politicians, and police are “legitimate” victims of acts of terrorism.

Violence

The key word in most definitions of terrorism is “violence,” an action that has been around since Cain slew Abel. Is there good and bad violence, a violence that liberates and a violence that enslaves? St. Thomas Aquinas maintained that, “violence is good or bad depending on the use or purpose to which it is put.” In his book *Violence*, Jacques Ellul stresses the importance of who is responsible for an act of violence and introduces the concept of “force” by quoting the well-known example used by the theologian Suarez: “a man cannot lawfully kill his neighbor, nor can two men together, nor ten thousand, but a judge can lawfully pronounce a sentence of death. His indisputable legitimate power derives from the state. There is all the difference between violence and force.”⁷

Does this “force” absolve a state from a crime of violence? Not all states and state decisions are necessarily just or right. The power that condemns to death may be tyrannical or oppressive or simply make a mistake. How legitimate is the state? Did the state or the ruler of the state achieve power justly or unjustly? Does the state’s use of force conform to law—national and international? Jacques Ellul again: “Force used by a state is just when its use conforms to the laws; when it does not conform to the laws, it is still force—not violence—but unjust force.” Scant comfort for the victim but encouragement for retribution.

Ellul has five rules, which he cautions all who contemplate violence to remember:

1. Once begun there is continuity to violence
2. There is reciprocity: violence begets violence

3. Violence begets violence ... and nothing else (I am not happy with this one)
4. There is sameness to violence—there are proportions and shades but essentially violence is violence
5. The perpetrators of violence always try to justify the violence and themselves

The Cycle of Violence, the Tandem of Responsibility

“Who started it?” Is there a parent or teacher who has not asked this question?

How often do we hear spokespersons, especially in parts of the Middle East, say, “In response to ... we have carried out ...”? In any major crisis over the past decade, it would be very difficult to define when the crisis began and by whom: Sudan, Somalia, former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Chechnya, Aceh, and Palestine, and I only choose some of those where I have served. But each and every side can point to the last incident as the one that they must revenge, and so the cycle continues. Once the violence begins it is difficult to effect reconciliation. A leader at any level who is prepared to attend talks with the other side risks the accusation of weakness or collaboration. But unless both sides can at least glimpse the view from the other side, there is no hope.

The French Franciscan Father Maillard, when Director of *Frères du Monde*, published in their magazine this observation: “It is always the violence of the oppressor that unleashes the violence of the oppressed. The time comes when violence is the only possible way for the oppressed to state their case.” Again, speaking only from personal experience, I cannot fault this.⁸

The black power leader Pastor Albert Cleage Jr. said after the race riots in Detroit: “Now we are no longer afraid; now it is the white man who is afraid.” The violence of the oppressed transfers fear to the oppressor previously secure in his dominance. This is particularly so today in Israel where the Palestinian retaliation includes a weapon that truly frightens the Israeli population: the suicide bomb. Rattle the bars of a caged lion and you must expect to be scratched or bitten.

The Perpetrator

Who is a terrorist? It depends on who applies the label. One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter. Or, to quote Noam Chomsky: “actions undertaken against oppressive regimes and occupying armies (are) considered resistance by their perpetrators and terrorism by the rulers, even when they are non-violent.”⁹

Terrorists espouse a cause. The focus of the cause can be any shade of the rainbow. They may represent the have-nots—no land, no access to education, no money, no status, no resources; the

religiously oppressed; the racially oppressed; the politically oppressed; or the culturally oppressed. More often they are to the left of the political spectrum but some of the most virulent are from the right wing. They can be from minority groups, fascists, racists. They come from all walks of life and all strata of society.

Jihad and Martyrs

A number of terrorist groups operate in and out of states where Islam is the major faith. Their campaigns are labeled “jihad” and their dead are honored as “martyrs.”

“Jihad” is the verbal noun of the verb meaning “to strive,” “to struggle,” “to exert.” While a number of other nouns can be linked to jihad to give it different connotations, it is now best known in its meaning “armed struggle” and, more specifically, “armed struggle against unbelievers.” In effect, it has the same meaning as “crusade”! Jihad is often mentioned in the Koran as *is qitaal*, which means “fighting.” The most relevant references are: K22:39, “Leave is given to those who fight because they were wronged”; K3:157–158, which encourages participation in the fighting; and K169–172, which promised rewards in heaven to those martyrs (*shuhaada*) who die in battle. K2: 190–194 has a chilling relevance in the Middle East today: “And fight in the way of God with those who fight you, but aggress not: God loves not the aggressors. And slay them wherever you come upon them, and expel them from where they expelled you.”¹⁰

As scholars pore over holy books and interpret them in different ways, the Koran is no exception. There are at least two distinct schools, the Modernists and the Fundamentalists, and two different ways of approaching the interpretations; one is to take each verse in traditional order and to examine its content in depth, the other is to gather together all the verses on one topic and to examine their relationship. The latter produces the more moderate interpretation.

Rebels

Gupta is keen to point out the difference between a terrorist and a rebel. He labels Bal Gangadhar Tilak, “who has no fetish for nonviolence,” as “a mass leader and not an alchemist of revolution,” and similarly labels Mahatma Gandhi “a rebel with his entire pacifist menace.” I am happy so far but have reservations with his next statement that: “[a rebel’s] commitment is to the cause of his people and not to himself or his group, which is the commitment of a terrorist.” This may be true in the Indian examples he gives; I am not certain it is when applied more generally. I suspect that many, if not most, terrorists believe that they represent the true voice of the people. They may be deluded but their zeal is genuine.

Edward Herman and David Peterson, in *Z Magazine*, introduce the concept of “retail” versus “wholesale” terror. “Bin Laden and his network ... is a ‘retail’ terrorist network, like the IRA or Cuban refugee terrorist network: it has no helicopter gun ships, no offensive missiles, no ‘daisy cutters,’ no nuclear weapons. Really large scale killing and torture—‘wholesale’ terrorism—is implemented by states, not by non-state terrorists.”¹¹

State Terrorism

State terrorism is a taboo term. Politicians never utter it. Newspapers rarely describe it. Academic “experts” suppress it. It is by far the most menacing form of terrorism.

—John Pilger

We must recognize that by convention—it must be emphasized only by convention—great power use, and the threat of the use, of force is normally described as coercive diplomacy, and not as a form of terrorism.

—Michael Stohl

There are states that support terrorism domestically, states that support terrorism externally overtly, states that support terrorism externally covertly, and states that do all three.

William Blum is the recorder par excellence of the activities of the United States as a purveyor of state terrorism. In his highly readable books he chronicles the participation of the U.S. interventions around the globe. In *Killing Hope*, there is a chapter for each intervention. And there are fifty-five chapters!¹² The second book is entitled *Rogue State*. It has three sections: “Ours and Theirs: Washington’s Love/Hate Relationship with Terrorists and Human Rights Violators”; “United States and the Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction”; and “A Rogue State versus the World.”¹³

Mavis Cheek, who chose the book as one of the books of the year in the UK Sunday newspaper *The Observer*, wrote, “William Blum, once of the U.S. Department, gives a chilling reminder that while there may be no justification for September 11, there may be reasons.”

William Blum is not the only U.S. citizen to criticize U.S. policy. “The guiding principle, it appears, is that the U.S. is a lawless terrorist state and this is right and just, whatever the world may think, whatever international institutions may declare” (Noam Chomsky).

John Pilger, who is much more catholic in his range of targets, writes in a post-Bali bombing report: “Today, largely unreported, the Indonesian military, with the tact approval of the United States, Britain, and Australia, is terrorizing the populations of Aceh and West Papua. Most of the ‘human rights violations’ in these provinces—the euphemism for state terrorism—have been part

and parcel of ‘protecting’ the American Exxon oil holdings in Aceh as well as the vast Freeport copper and gold mines and BP holdings in West Papua.”¹⁴ He refers to research by Edward Herman and Gerry O’Sullivan: “Covering the period since 1965, which points to the killing of several thousand people by nonstate terrorists such as al Qaeda, compared with 2.5 million civilians killed by state-sponsored terrorism. These include the violence of South African apartheid regime, the Suharto regime in Indonesia, the “Contras” in Nicaragua, and other American-backed terrorist states.”

The U.S. State Department, which, if Mr. Blum is right, should know a thing or two about the subject, itself maintains an annual list of State Sponsors of Terrorism. It includes Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria.

Is a state that pursues terrorism a terrorist state? Primoratz: “I suggest we reserve this label for states that do not merely resort to terrorism on certain occasions, but employ it in a lasting and systematic way and, indeed, are defined in part by the sustained use of terrorism against their own population. These are totalitarian states.”¹⁵

It is, however, important to note that a few nontotalitarian states have used terrorism against their own population.

Is there ever a need for external interference? Irving Kristol believes so: “Insignificant nations, like insignificant people, can quickly experience delusions of significance. ... In truth, the days of ‘gunboat diplomacy’ are never over. ... Gunboats are as necessary for international order as police cars are for domestic order.”¹⁶

A Case Study: Palestine

I choose Palestine for the simple reason that I was United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) Emergency Coordinator in Jenin Camp on loan from the Center for International Health and Cooperation. I left there six weeks before writing this chapter. I begin with a caveat: it is difficult to serve in an occupied Palestinian community and be true to the tenets of our humanitarian faith—neutrality, impartiality, and independence.

“What is the difference between state terrorism and individual terrorist acts?” asks Lev Grinberg of the Humphrey Institute for Social Research at Ben Gurion University in an oft-quoted article from the May–June 2002 *Tikkun* magazine. “If we understand the difference,” he continues, “we’ll also

understand the evilness of U.S. policies in the Middle East.” He then answers the question he posed. “Israel’s state terrorism is defined by the U.S. officials as ‘self-defense,’ while individual suicide bombers are called ‘terrorists.’”¹⁷

Grinberg is not soft on Palestinian terrorists: “Suicide bombs killing innocent citizens must be unequivocally condemned; they are immoral acts, and their perpetrators should be sent to jail ... However, they cannot be compared to state terrorism carried out by the Israeli government. The former are acts of despair of a people that sees no future, vastly ignored by an unfair and distorted international public opinion. The latter are cold and ‘rational’ decisions of a state and a military apparatus of occupation, well equipped, financed, and backed by the only superpower in the world.”

“Palestinian violence receives worldwide condemnation” (Chomsky),¹⁸ with the silent rider booming in our ears that Israeli violence rarely does.

It is bitterly ironic that the modern state of Israel, conceived by a biblical promise, born out of a terrorist/freedom fighter struggle, growing up with a population of victims of generations of oppression and constantly led by leaders whose roots lie in the Holocaust, is not able to understand the aspirations and desires of their neighbors with whom they share the land. “Do unto others what you would have them do unto you” is replaced with, “Do unto others what was done unto you.”

It is sad that in the international arena “Palestinian” is associated closely with “terrorist,” in some circles to the point of being synonymous. This image was beginning to change in the early days of the Second Intifada with frequent television coverage of the new “Davids” slinging stones at the new “Goliath” in his armored vehicle. Unfortunately, a faction of militant Palestinians—how easy it is to label all actions as Palestinian—returned to the suicide bomb as its most successful weapon. More unfortunate was the choice of target. If the suicide bombers had blown themselves up at checkpoints, in Israeli barracks, and in Israeli Defense Force headquarters, and all their victims were military, I am sure they would have maintained the tide of sympathy and may even have earned admiration for their desperate courage. Better still would have been protest suicides outside embassies or other high-profile buildings where the suicide was the sole victim. Sadly, they chose civilian targets and killed and maimed innocent women and children. They have frightened the Israelis beyond expectation, but have brought upon themselves a ruthless military retaliation and return of the dreadful epithet “terrorist.”

I was in Jenin in late April 2002 after the Israeli incursion. The talk was of a massacre. A UN mission headed by Mary Robinson, UN High Commissioner on Human Rights, was refused entry into Israel. The United Nations assembled in Geneva a team of the most respected of international senior persons: Mr. Martti Ahtisaari, former Prime Minister of Finland; Madame Sadako Ogata from

Japan, former UN High Commissioner for Refugees; and M. Cornelio Sommaruga, former President of the International Committee of the Red Cross from Switzerland, to go to Jenin to investigate what had happened. This fact-finding mission was agreed to between the UN Secretary General and the Israeli Foreign Minister and had the full support of the UN Security Council. The mission was refused entry into Israel! As well as an insult, this was a grave strategic error. Human Rights Watch (HRW), with a speed and accuracy that should be a model for all agencies, produced in early May a comprehensive investigation report that stated that there was no massacre but many severe human rights violations. I will dwell no more on this incursion but recommend the reader to view the HRW report, which is available on the Internet and whose findings I fully support.¹⁹

I further recommend the more comprehensive and measured report *Israel and the Occupied Territories, Shielded from Scrutiny: IDF Violations in Jenin and Nablus*, issued by Amnesty International on November 4, 2002. This covers the period of April–June 2002.

I left Jenin in early June and returned in mid-August to a Jenin under curfew. What did this mean? I soon discovered. The Israeli Defense Forces occupied the West Bank. It was not possible to get in and out without passing IDF checkpoints, which was time-consuming for internationals and almost impossible for the majority of Palestinians. The curfew was an added inconvenience. It was imposed either with warning or without. If with warning, the start time was given but rarely the end time.

If it was without warning, tanks and armored cars swept into the town, at least one with a loudspeaker. The population was told, “It is forbidden to move around. Go home and close your doors.” From then on anyone who moved risked being shot.

The population of Jenin camp is 13,900. Together the town and camp number 41,000.

Forty-one thousand citizens were expected to clear the streets and get home rapidly. Not too easy; very difficult when you take into consideration that more than a third of the work force of Jenin live in outlying villages. Clear the streets, clear a checkpoint with no warning. Clear the schools, clear the hospital clinics. It would be easy with a considerate occupying force. It would be safe with an occupying force with tight rules of engagement: having clear rules of when they can shoot, at whom they can shoot, and with what warning. With aggressive and often nervous troops who were told that their own safety was a paramount importance, bursts of machine gun fire were common. Fatalities and injuries were frequent events. The terrorizing of the population, constant. It is hard to imagine the fear a tank generates as it growls along narrow streets sinisterly swiveling its main barrel from object to object. And if the barrel stops on you, there is a heart-stopping moment while you silently pray the tank commander has recognized that you present no threat. More than a dozen innocent civilians were shot dead during my time in Jenin. They included women and children. Some youths

were shot dead throwing stones at tanks. In every exchange of weapon fire between Palestinian and Israeli, the Palestinian was the underdog, the odd-on favorite to lose. The Israeli response was so unequal, so disproportionate. There was no weapon in any hands in Jenin that was capable of penetrating tank armor. If there had been, they surely would have used it. The IDF could have fired pain ball or smoke or tear gas or rubber bullets and dispersed the Palestinians at no risk to themselves.

After weeks of on and off violence, more on than off, the IDF lifted the curfew and replaced it with a lesser imposition: closure. This was a reward for a lull in the attacks on Israelis.

Closure meant that the town and camp were completely blockaded. There were heavy armored checkpoints at every entrance and exit. Sounds easy. Stay within the camp and town and no problem. But what about the third of the work force who live outside the closed area? This included doctors, dentists, nurses, teachers, tradesmen, humanitarian agency staff, the mayor of the town, the governor. And what about the staff of the schools and the clinics and the university who live within the closed area but whose workplace is in outlying villages? What about farm produce, grocery stocks, medicines, baby milk powder that comes into the town from outside?

Did everything stop? No. So what happened? Everyone from the mayor to the vegetable dealer used taxis to come into or out of the town using fields, tracks, culverts, whatever cover was available. Did the IDF turn a blind eye? It knew that this must happen, had to happen. No, taxi drivers and passengers were killed and wounded. Why?

Unfortunately, there were further suicide bombs, so closure was revoked and military operation mounted. This was curfew and closure with a vengeance. Nothing moved. Houses with good views were commandeered, snipers were placed at vantage points, and armored vehicles were positioned at numerous static checkpoints or roamed the town at will. Anyone on the streets was shot at. It did not take many days before there was little food in the town, no baby milk, and, more importantly, no water. Because of two or three suicide bombers whose mission was not known by any more than a handful of controllers, 40,000 citizens suffered severe deprivation. After a while, some pipelines for essential personnel were opened. Passing through these checkpoints was time-consuming and humiliating. Hundreds were arrested; some interrogated and released, others disappeared into Israeli detention centers. Few were charged. Fewer released. Houses of known terrorists were demolished, their bewildered families left homeless.

When the town was on its knees and morale at its lowest, the operation ended, and, thanking the Lord for small mercies, we gratefully accepted the comparative liberty of closure.

I handed the office over to my successor, another international. Seven days later, he was shot dead by Israeli gunfire in the UN compound during an unannounced military operation. The IDF delayed the arrival of an ambulance, not that it would have been of any help.

It is hard to know where to begin categorizing the breaches of human rights. It will be fairest if I end this chapter with an extract from the list of recommendations of the Amnesty International report. Although written to cover April to June 2002 in Jenin, every observation is valid today.

It is not difficult to conclude that the population of Jenin is terrorized by the IDF.

It is also indisputable that suicide bombers came from Jenin. It is indisputable that there are terrorist cells operating within Jenin. It is indisputable that there have been bomb-making factories in Jenin. It is indisputable that there are armed men shooting at Israeli troops in Jenin. Perhaps they number fifty or sixty. Because of them, 39,950 are collectively punished. IDF soldiers killed more Palestinians than suicide bombers killed Israelis. No one placed curfews or closure in their towns. They are, however, now fencing themselves in, creating prisons for themselves mentally and physically.

Their tactics are increasing the numbers of hardliners in the camps and towns.

They fail to see that they escalate the cycle of violence. Suicide bombs are a reaction to violence, not an initiator of violence. Both sides have told me that there is no alternative to their tactics.

Sadly, the answer lied with the United States. As I write, an Israeli team consisting of the Defense Ministry director general, the Prime Minister's bureau chief, and the Finance Ministry director are in Washington to present a request for \$4 billion for special defense aid and \$8 billion in loan guarantees. Few doubt that they will get it.

"It is absurd that we are still witnessing, in the twenty-first century, a case of occupation where the dominant side is seen as the victim" (Lev Grinberg).²⁰

Summary of Amnesty International Recommendations

Amnesty International calls on the government of Israel to:

Ensure the IDF operations are conducted in full respect of international human rights and humanitarian law

Initiate a full, thorough, transparent, and impartial investigation into all allegations of violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, including those documented in this report, and to make the results public

Cooperate with United Nations investigations

Bring to justice those alleged to have committed serious violations of international human rights or humanitarian law in proceedings that meet international standards for fair trial

Ensure prompt and adequate reparation for victims of serious human rights or humanitarian law violations

Respect and protect the human rights of all persons living in the Occupied Territories without discrimination

Include the practices of Israeli authorities in the Occupied Territories in all reporting to UN human rights treaty bodies

Take immediate action to prevent the IDF from compelling Palestinians to take part in military operations or to act as “human shields” and to take measures against any soldier or military commander who undertakes or sanctions such practices

Fulfill its international legal obligations by ensuring that medical staff and ambulances are allowed to carry out duties without undue delays, and with safe passage

Ensure safe access for humanitarian and medical supplies

Immediately stop the use of lethal force to enforce curfews

End collective punishments, including house destruction, closures and curfews, and cutting off water and electricity

End torture or other ill treatment of those in custody

End administrative detention and release all administrative detainees unless they are to be brought to trial for a recognizably criminal offence in a trial which is in accordance with UN fair trial standards

Accept an international monitoring presence in Israel’s Occupied Territories with a strong human rights component

Amnesty International calls on the Palestine Authority to:

Take all action to prevent anyone under its jurisdiction from attacking or otherwise endangering the safety of civilians

Amnesty International calls on the Palestinian armed groups to:

Respect fundamental principles of international law that prohibit the killing of civilians

End any use of children in armed operations²¹

Addendum

Since I wrote the preceding, there has been a lot more reality and no less terrorism. Osama bin Laden is dead and buried at sea; Al Qaida has not gone away but has opened branches elsewhere. There seems to be no shortage of volunteers for suicide missions. The planting of improvised explosive devices has taken a heavy toll of lives notably in Afghanistan. Kidnapping, especially of aid workers has dramatically increased, gangsters colluding with terrorists raise the ransom demands and complicate negotiations. The continuing lawlessness in Somalia has caused one refugee camp in Kenya to swell by one thousand new arrivals per day. Dadaab is now the largest refugee camp in the world, with upward of 500,000 displaced, making it the third largest city in Kenya. In the same region piracy abounds.

I concentrated in the chapter on field examples where I had played a role. I touched on state terrorism and chose a Middle East example. Sadly I intend to do the same in this addendum.

I worked in Lebanon during the 2006 war. This was a confrontation between a State and a nonstate actor, a war between Israel and Hezbollah. It is hard to choose a start point in the lead up to the war but very easy to pinpoint when it began. On the evening of the 11th of July 2006 Lebanese went to bed after a normal day of work or school or leisure with no warning of what the following day would bring. On July 12, 2006, a stunned Beirut awoke to the sounds and sights of totally unexpected Israeli military action, damaging Beirut airport, destroying roads and bridges, blockading the ports, and invading south Lebanon. 730,000 Lebanese were displaced within Lebanon and a further 230,000 fled to neighboring countries. It was an unequal confrontation, which immediately posed the following questions:

What are the implications of a conflict between a State and a nonstate actor in a neighboring country?

What is the impact on the principle of State sovereignty?

Does a State have a responsibility to deal with its internal ‘troublemakers?’

What is an acceptable trigger for the right to self-defense?

How do we measure proportionality?

What is the impact of a conflict on international humanitarian law? And what are the consequences if it is breached?

The humanitarian response began as ever with the assessment and fulfillment of needs to the degree possible. It took a little while before it was realized that the protection of the population was the real need, which could have been achieved with the halting of the Israeli invasion. It took thirty-

four days before the international community effected a cease-fire, despite humanitarian and human rights agencies pleading for pressure to be placed on the invading force to stop the fighting, halt the shelling, lift the blockade and permit the safe passage of aid.

The toll of the 34-day war was:

1,183 Lebanese killed and 4,054 injured

At the height of the conflict, 1 million people were displaced

151 Israelis killed (119 soldiers) and 418 injured

5 UN peacekeepers and 1 Red Cross worker killed, 16 UN peacekeepers wounded Tons of heavy oil polluted 87 miles of the Lebanese coast

6,800 private homes or apartments, 630 roads, 70 bridges and 30 installations (airports, ports, water treatment plants and power stations) damaged or destroyed

778 sites in south Lebanon contaminated by cluster bombs

A reconstruction bill exceeding \$7 billion

All of this left us humanitarian responders asking a simple question: “Is a humanitarian response purely the manifestation of the politically possible or just the politically convenient?”

Back to today and to the future. My thoughts concern the harvest from the Arab Spring and the uncertain seasons following it which bring into sharp focus the quandary of a clear definition of who is a terrorist and who is a freedom fighter. History is full of good guys becoming bad guys and bad guys becoming good guys. My grandfather once said to me “Tell me who your friends are and I will tell you who you are” It is becoming increasingly difficult to recognize our friends, “our guys.”