PART IV

Actors

The ultimate challenge early in humanitarian crises is to maintain a necessary equanimity in the face of terrible disorder, so that one can forge an effective response. One must channel the skills and energies of the multiple actors that are required to change, at first, chaos into a semblance of stability, and later, hopefully, into peace. As a physician, I have been accustomed to employing the tools of public health in dealing with epidemics. The logic, and even the terminology, of preventive medicine, is understandable to politicians, diplomats, military, journalists, and academics, as well as the medical profession. A number of the contributors in this section have employed medical analogies in fashioning their texts.

One of the supreme creations of the human spirit is the idea of prevention. Like liberty and equality, it is a seminal concept drawn from a reservoir of optimism that centuries of epidemics, famines, and wars have failed to deplete. It is an amalgam of hope and possibility, which assumes that misery is not an undefiable mandate of fate, a punishment only redeemable in a later life, but a condition that can be treated like a disease, and sometimes cured or even prevented.

Such optimism is essential for those who choose disaster relief work as a profession. This section includes profound reflections by realists who have seen the devastation of conflicts and disasters, yet know there is also beauty and hope in our profession. I have selected two UN Secretary Generals, a university President, a long-term UN humanitarian relief leader, two renowned diplomat/scholars, a military-civilian authority, and a journalist to represent the many actors I have met on a journey of healing and solidarity in disaster areas. In several chapters I have purposely maintained the tense used by the authors at the time of writing in order to demonstrate the urgency and dilemmas faced by senior decision makers.

The Challenges of Preventive Diplomacy

The Role of the United Nations and Its Secretary-General

Boutros Boutros-Ghali

> One system of metaphors that I have recently used extensively is the comparison between peace and health. … Peace research and health research are metaphors for each other, each can learn from the other. Similarly, both peace theory and medical science emphasize the role of consciousness and mobilization in healing.
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> —Johan Galtung[1]

Introduction and Definitions

In matters of peace and security, as in medicine, prevention is self-evidently better than cure. It saves lives and money and it forestalls suffering. Since the end of the Cold War, preventive action has become a top priority for the United Nations.

From the beginning, a preventive role had been envisaged for the Organization. Article 1 of its Charter had stated that one of the purposes of the United Nations was "to take effective collective measures for *prevention* and removal of threats to the peace" (emphasis added). But the Cold War reduced almost to zero the Organization's capacity to take such measures collectively.

When the Cold War began to thaw in the mid-1980s, two consequences followed. First, it became possible at last for the Member States to act collectively in matters of peace and security. Second, the need for preventive action was made brutally clear to them. The Cold War might have been over, but the world was still plagued by a number of wars that it had spawned, almost all of them wars within states. These were the so-called proxy wars in which each of the protagonists was backed, politically and in *materiel*, by one of the Cold War power blocs. The United Nations Security Council was now able to take effective action to end most of them. But the cost was high. Major peacekeeping operations had to be established in Namibia, Angola, and Mozambique, between Iran and Iraq, in Afghanistan, in Cambodia, and in Central America. At the same time, the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe was creating a new set of conflicts, one of which was to bring about the deployment in the former Yugoslavia of the UN's largest-ever peacekeeping operation.

It is not surprising that the Member States began to look for more economical ways of maintaining peace and security. On December 5, 1988, the General Assembly adopted a

"Declaration on the Prevention and Removal of Disputes and Situations Which May Threaten International Peace and Security and on the Role of the United Nations in this Field." Through that instrument, the General Assembly declared that States should act so as to prevent in their international relations the emergence or aggravation of disputes or situations. It encouraged the Secretary-General to approach the States directly concerned with a dispute in an effort to prevent it from becoming a threat to the maintenance of international peace and security; to respond swiftly by offering his good offices if he were approached by a State directly concerned with a dispute; to make full use of fact-finding capabilities; and to use at an early stage the right accorded to him under Article 99 of the Charter (namely to bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter that in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security). This decision represented a marked departure from the Cold War culture, in which the legitimacy of a political initiative by the Secretary-General had usually been challenged if not taken explicitly under Article 99.

On January 31, 1992, at the end of the first-ever meeting of the Security Council at the level of Heads of State and Government, the Council adopted a statement that *inter alia* invited me to prepare an analysis and recommendations on ways of strengthening and making more efficient the capacity of the United Nations for preventive diplomacy, for peacemaking and for peacekeeping. As I worked on the resulting report, which was later published as "An Agenda for Peace,"[2] it quickly became clear that preventive diplomacy is in fact a portmanteau for a range of prophylactic measures that can be taken by States, groups of States, or international organizations to help maintain peace and security between and within States. Since that report was published, the United Nations has gained experience not only in preventive diplomacy, strictly defined, but also in preventive peacekeeping, preventive humanitarian action and preventive peace-building. Let me define these four main types of preventive action.

Preventive diplomacy is the use of diplomatic techniques to prevent disputes from arising, or from escalating in armed conflict if they do arise, and, if that fails, to prevent the armed conflict from spreading. Article 33 of the Charter requires parties to disputes that could endanger peace and security to seek a solution by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means the protagonists may choose. To those techniques can be added confidence-building measures, a therapy that can produce good results if the patients, i.e., the hostile parties, will accept it. Central to the idea of preventive

diplomacy is the assumption that the protagonists are not making effective use of these techniques on their own initiative and that the help of a third party is needed if the threatened conflict is to be prevented by diplomatic means.

The techniques employed in preventive diplomacy are the same as those employed in *peacemaking* (which, in United Nations parlance, is a diplomatic activity, not the restoration of peace by forceful means). The only real difference between preventive diplomacy and peacemaking is that the former is applied before armed conflict has broken out, while the latter is applied thereafter. But in the world today there are many endemic situations where the causes of conflict are deeply rooted and chronic tension is punctuated from time to time by acute outbreaks of virulent fighting. Examples of such situations are those arising from the conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, Israel's occupation of parts of southern Lebanon, and the conflict in southern Sudan. In such cases it may be artificial to make a distinction between preventive diplomacy and peacemaking or indeed between preventive and postconflict peace-building. Those who want to help control and cure such chronic maladies need to maintain their efforts over a long period of time, varying the therapies they prescribe as the patients' condition improves or deteriorates.

One is sometimes asked to give examples of successful preventive diplomacy. It is not always easy to do so. Confidentiality is usually essential in such endeavors. Time may have to pass before one can say with such confidence that success has been achieved. Many different peacemakers may have been at work, and it can sound presumptuous for just one of them to claim the credit.

A conspicuous success, which history now permits us to claim for the United Nations, was the Good Offices Mission undertaken in great secrecy in 1969/1970 by Under-Secretary-General Ralph Bunche, on behalf of U Thant, to resolve an Iranian claim to Bahrain before that country achieved full independence. U Thant said of it: "the perfect Good Offices operation is one which is not heard of until it is successfully concluded or even never heard of at all."

Preventive peacekeeping involves the deployment of international military and police personnel to perform a variety of possible functions: to deter aggression, to help maintain security, to build confidence, to create conditions favorable to negotiations and/or to assist in the provision of humanitarian relief. As with all peacekeeping, a wide range of tasks can be considered, but it is essential that each mandate should specify with absolute precision which tasks the force will actually perform.

Preventive humanitarian action is action that, in addition to its humanitarian purpose of bringing relief to those who suffer, has the *political* purpose of correcting situations, which, if left unattended, could increase the risk of conflict. A wide range of measures may be required. They may include

planning for the humanitarian action that will be required if a crisis breaks, e.g., the stockpiling of relief goods in certain places. But they may also include creating conditions that will help to persuade refugees or displaced persons to return to their homes, e.g., improvements in security and gender, greater respect for human rights, and creation of jobs, etc. One example is the efforts of the international community to facilitate the return to their homes of the Rwandese refugees in Zaire and thereby alleviate the tensions that their presence has created between the Governments of Rwanda and Zaire.

Preventive peace-building is the application to potential conflict situations of the idea of postconflict peace-building, which I set out in "An Agenda for Peace." Like its postconflict cousin, preventive peace-building is especially useful in internal conflicts and can involve a wide variety of activities in the institutional, economic, and social fields. These activities usually have an intrinsic value of their own because of the contribution they make to democratization, respect for human rights, and economic and social development. What defines them as peace-building activities is that they additionally have the political value of reducing the risk of outbreak of a new conflict, or the recrudescence of an old one.

An example in the context of potential interstate conflict is the offer in 1951 by the then International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (now the World Bank) to provide its Good Offices to India and Pakistan to help both countries resolve their dispute over the waters of the Indus River by approaching it as a technical and engineering problem rather than a legal and political one. The Bank's offer was accepted and after nine years of negotiation, the parties signed the Indus Waters Treaty, which became the basis of the biggest waterpower and irrigation project in the world at the time. In due course it made the two countries independent of each other in the operation of their water supplies, thereby removing the risk of conflict on that set of issues.

The Secretary-General's Role in Diagnosis and Prescribing Preventive Therapy

None of these preventive treatments need exclude use of any of the others. Indeed, a fully integrated international response to an impending conflict could prescribe them all. Nor does the United Nations have—nor claim—an exclusive right to prescribe and administer these treatments. The most effective prophylaxis may be achieved through coordinated team work by the United Nations, various of its specialized agencies, one or more regional organizations, individual Member States and nongovernmental organizations.

There are five generic conditions that have to be fulfilled if the Secretary-General of the United Nations is to be able to apply the preventive treatments effectively. They are discussed in the

following paragraphs with particular reference to the most pressing situations, which, at the time this chapter was written, demanded preventive action by the international community. That was the internal crisis in Burundi. It is worth recording in this context that, in the week this chapter was finalized, the Minister of Human Rights of Burundi, in a statement to the United Nations Human Rights Commission, described her country as being "a patient on the operation table" and appealed to the international community to help in finding "a permanent cure."

Fulfillment of the conditions becomes more difficult when, as is so often the case, the potential conflict is an internal one. More than 60 percent of the actual or potential conflicts in which the United Nations played an active peacemaking or peacekeeping role related to disputes within states, though several of them also had a significant international dimension too. As is well known, Article 2 (7) of the United Nations Charter provides that the United Nations should not intervene in matters that are essentially within the jurisdiction of a State or require its Members to submit such matters to settlement under the Charter. The General Assembly's declaration of December 5, 1988, to which I have already referred, provided that, "States should act so as to prevent *in their international relations* the emergency of aggravation of disputes or situations" (emphasis added).

Since the end of the Cold War, however, there has been a growing readiness by the Member States to accept, or even insist, that the United Nations' preventive, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace-building services should not be denied to a conflict simply because it is a conflict within a State and not one between States. At the same time, Member States have continued to insist on the inviolability of their sovereignty and strict respect for Article 2(7). Because the sovereign state is the basic building block of the international system and will so remain, it is not possible to resolve this contradiction on a generic basis; Member States will continue to defend their sovereign rights. But in practice the contradiction will continue to be resolved on a pragmatic basis in certain situations where there is broad agreement within the international community that an internal conflict is so dangerous and/or cruel that international efforts have to be made to control and resolve it.

As a result, however, the United Nations cannot take preventive action without a specific request from, or at least the consent of, the Member State or States concerned. From the Secretary-General's point of view, the ideal is that he should receive a request from the government. But sometimes, when the threat of imminent conflict is evident, he feels compelled by his general mandate for preventive action to take the initiative in suggesting a course of preventive therapy. Even when such an idea is put forward tentatively and confidentially, it can be taken as a slight to the sovereignty of the state concerned and the Secretary-General is blocked from further action.

The Secretary-General also has to be ready to propose preventive action in cases where a country no longer has a government capable of exercising sovereignty in an effective way, the so-called failed state syndrome epitomized by Somalia. In such cases, the Security Council may decide that the state of war is so threatening to the country's neighbors or is causing so much suffering that the Council is obliged to establish a UN operation to bring it under control without seeking governmental consent. But the United Nations will still need the consent and cooperation of those who actually control the situation on the ground in the various parts of the country. As has been demonstrated in Somalia and Bosnia, the lack of such consent and cooperation can prevent the United Nations operation from carrying out the tasks entrusted to it by the Security Council, even when the Council's decision has been taken under Chapter VII of the Charter.

The first of the five conditions for preventive action is that the Secretary-General should have the necessary capacity for the collection and analysis of information. One of the main reasons for my decision in 1992 to bring all the Secretariat's political work into a single Department of Political Affairs was to create this early warning capacity. That department, working with the Department of Humanitarian Affairs, has its own early warning system to detect impending humanitarian emergencies. With the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, it has created a "Framework for Coordination," which is essentially a set of procedures for ensuring that the three departments review at regular intervals all information relevant to a potentially threatening situation and institute timely consultations with other elements in the United Nations system that may have information to contribute and/or a role to play in a concerted preventive action.

It is sometimes said that the United Nations is handicapped in its peace efforts by the lack of an intelligence service of its own. I do not believe that this need be the case. Much information is available to the Secretariat from the media and from academics and nongovernmental organizations, which often contribute their own interesting perspectives to the analysis. Above all, Member States have responded generously to my request in "An Agenda for Peace," which asked that Member States be ready to provide me with the information needed for effective preventive diplomacy. Of course, the information they provide may sometimes reflect their own national interests and their own preferences for action by the United Nations. But if information on the same situation is sought from several States, it is not difficult to form an accurate picture.

That said, the United Nations, like the rest of the international community, was caught unaware by the assassination of the President of Burundi in October 1993, as it was by the shooting down of the aircraft carrying the Presidents of Burundi and Rwanda in Kigali six months later, and by the horrors that followed both incidents. There will always be acts of extreme political violence that

cannot be predicted with precision. But the United Nations needs both to be sensitive to the conditions that can lead to such acts and able to contribute to contingency planning for an adequate response by the international community when they occur.

The second condition is that the Secretary-General should have the clinical capacity to prescribe the correct treatment for the condition diagnosed. To fulfill this condition, he needs to be able to assess both the factors that have created the risk of conflict and the likely impact of the various preventive treatments available. Making those judgments in an interstate situation is easier than in an internal one. In the first case, much can be learned from consultation with the States involved and their neighbors, friends, and allies. In the second, the crisis is often due to ethnic or economic and social issues of an entirely internal nature and of great political sensitivity, in which the potential protagonists may include nonstate entities of questionable legitimacy and with shadowy chains of command. If in such circumstances the Secretary-General probes for the information needed to identify the right treatment, he can find himself accused of professional misconduct by infringing the sovereignty of the country concerned.

Another potential source of difficulty for the Secretary-General at this stage of the process is the need for triage. His analysis of the symptoms may lead him to conclude that there is no preventive action that the United Nations can usefully take. This could be because he judges that, contrary to the general impression, conflict is not actually imminent and that what is being observed is posturing or shadow-boxing rather than serious preparations for war. Or he may judge that there is no effective treatment that would be accepted by the parties, or even that there is no effective treatment at all. Such conclusions will not always be welcome to the Member States. They rightly want the Secretary-General to do everything possible to prevent conflicts. But the reality is that not all—perhaps not even many—actual or potential conflicts are susceptible to the United Nations treatment at all times. Selectivity and careful timing are necessary, especially when Member States are so reluctant to make resources available for the Organization’s peace efforts.

In Burundi, the ethnic massacres of October 1993, to which reference has already been made, led me to dispatch a Special Representative to that country with instruction to inform himself about the situation, to help prevent it from deteriorating further, to facilitate national reconciliation and to recommend to me further preventive measures that the United Nations could take. His initial advice was that the situation was so threatening that the United Nations’ efforts should be concentrated on stabilizing the patient and that, for the moment, the modalities for longer-term treatment were a matter of second priority.

After my Special Representative's efforts and those of other peacemakers had brought about a certain stabilization, notably through the signatures of almost all the political parties of a "Convention of Government" in September 1994, attention was turned to longer-term therapy. This required action on two fronts: promotion of a political dialogue and national reconciliation, for which a country-wide "National Debate" was the chosen remedy; and measures to improve security. For the latter, I had already proposed to the Security Council at various times a number of possible remedies. These had included the establishment of a humanitarian base, manned by the United Nations troops, at Bujumbura Airport; the maintenance in a neighboring country of a military presence capable of intervening rapidly if the situation in Burundi should deteriorate rapidly; and the deployment of a contingent of United Nations guards to protect humanitarian activities. However, these ideas had not found favor either with the government of Burundi, whose armed forced were strongly opposed to the stationing of any foreign troops in the country, or with the members of the Security Council.

The situation in Burundi began to deteriorate further. I warned its leaders and parliamentarians that they could not count on continuing support from the international community unless they produced convincing evidence that they were ready to reconcile their differences. In other words, I told them that unless the patients took their physicians' advice seriously, the physicians would turn elsewhere. The country's condition did not improve, and I reaffirmed to the Security Council my conviction that the international community should prepare for the possibility of a humanitarian emergency so severe that foreign forces would have to intervene. I again put forward the ideas of the United Nations guards and/or preventive deployment of foreign forces in a neighboring country. This proposal again proved unacceptable to the government of Burundi and to the Security Council. Then, I urged that Member States should at least undertake contingency planning so that troops could be quickly deployed to Burundi if the worst happened and a humanitarian intervention became imperative. The Security Council responded by inviting me to pursue consultations with Member States to this end.

The third condition for preventive action is that the parties to the potential conflict (the patients) should accept the action proposed by the Secretary-General. This is a *sine qua non* because he has no power to impose any remedy on them and can act only with their consent. In any case the remedy will have no effect unless the patients have confidence in it. Sadly, this is usually the most difficult condition to fulfill. There are, of course, at least two patients in every potential conflict. Usually one of them is more favorable than the other to international involvement; indeed, the very fact that Party A wants international involvement is often cause enough for Party B to oppose it. Sometimes also there exists earlier agreements committing the governments involved to give priority to bilateral

means. An example of this is the Simla Agreement of July 1972, in which India and Pakistan agreed "to settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations or by any other peaceful means mutually agreed between them." At other times, powerful countries in the region concerned may object to United Nations involvement and may insist that the parties have recourse to regional mediators.

In internal conflicts, sovereignty is an added complication. A government faced with an opposition that is threatening to take up arms is understandably reluctant for an international organization to come on stage, professing its impartiality and apparently treating government and opposition as equals. The Secretary-General has to proceed with great delicacy and finesse in such circumstances if he is to succeed in persuading both patients to consult the doctor and to take the medicine he prescribes.

Returning to the example of Burundi, the parties have very different views about the desirability of United Nations—or any other foreign—intervention. The main political party representing the Hutu majority has welcomed proposals for contingency planning for a possible humanitarian intervention. But the main party representing the Tutsi minority has reacted very negatively, as have the Burundi Armed Forces, which are largely recruited from the minority.

The fourth condition for action is that the Secretary-General, having prescribed a preventive treatment and got the patients to accept it, must persuade the other Member States, and especially the members of the Security Council, to give him steady political support. Unless they are ready to use their influence in a concerted effort by the international community as a whole, the efforts of the Secretary-General alone are unlikely to produce the desired results. The reactions of the Security Council to my various proposals for preventive action in Burundi have already been described.

The Secretary-General must also—and this is the fifth and final condition for success—persuade the Member States to provide the necessary resources to finance the agreed preventive action. The mandates given to him by Article 99 of the Charter, by the Security Council statement of January 31, 1992, and by the Resolutions and Statements adopted by the General Assembly and the Security Council, respectively, in response to "An Agenda for Peace," provide the Secretary-General with considerable freedom of maneuver in diagnosis and prescription, as will be evident from the foregoing description of my own initiatives related to Burundi. But he has no power to commit funds without the authority of the General Assembly, which will have to be convinced of the legitimacy, feasibility, and likely efficacy of the prescribed treatment. If it includes the deployment of military personnel, more than financial authority will be needed. The political authority of the Security Council will also be necessary, as well as a readiness on the part of Member States to contribute the

troops and equipment required, whether as a UN peacekeeping operation or as a multinational force authorized by the Security Council but under national command.

To sum up, the salient fact that emerges from this analysis is that the Secretary-General's ability to take effective preventive action depends most critically on the political will of the parties to the potential conflict. In international politics, as in human medicine, the physician cannot impose treatment that the patient is not prepared to accept. Important improvements have been made in the Secretary-General's capacity to diagnose and prescribe. Failure to take effective preventive action is, in any case, only rarely due to lack of early warning; the symptoms are usually there for all to see. What is too often lacking at present is a predisposition by the parties to accept third-party assistance in resolving their dispute. Ways have to be found to persuade them, without infringing on their sovereignty or other rights, that it is in their own interests to accept the help of the United Nations and other international players, rather than to allow their dispute to turn into armed conflict. And the Member States of the United Nations have to be persuaded to pay the costs of providing that help.

The Secretary-General's Role in the Application of Preventive Therapy

Once a course of therapy has been defined and agreed upon by all concerned, decisions have to be taken on the modalities for its application. There is no fixed pattern. Specific modalities have to be worked out for each case. The Secretary-General's role can take many different forms. He can do the work himself, directly or through his Secretariat. He can refer the patients to specialists, such as specialized agencies of the United Nations system, regional organizations, individual Member States, or nongovernmental organizations, and work with them to apply the therapy. He can coordinate the work of others or simply provide them with political and moral support.

The Secretary-General often performs his role through a senior United Nations official or outside personality, appointed as his Special Representative or Special Envoy, who takes up residence in the country or region concerned or visits it on a regular basis. The mere appointment of a Special Representative or Envoy can have a political impact. It alerts the Member States of the United Nations to a possible new conflict and alerts the potential protagonists to the international community's concern. There are other conspicuous actions available to the Secretary-General that can achieve similar results—the dispatch of goodwill or fact-finding missions, a public offer of his good offices, briefing of the media, a report to the General Assembly or Security Council, or a formal notification to the Council under Article 99 of the Charter.

Such public manifestations of the Secretary-General's concern can sometimes have a useful therapeutic effect. But more often he will prefer to provide his good offices quietly, especially where

the looming conflict is an internal one. Quite apart from sovereignty-related sensitivities, it is easier for parties to make concessions when it is not publically known that they are being urged to do so by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who can guarantee little or nothing in return. As already mentioned, preventive diplomacy is usually best done behind closed doors, which can make difficulties for the Secretary General if the world is clamoring for the United Nations to do something but he knows that to reveal what he is actually doing would impair his chances of success, as well as being the diplomatic equivalent of violating the Hippocratic oath.

Where preventive peacekeeping takes the form of a United Nations operation, the Secretary-General's role is more clearly defined and more exclusive. It is he who designs the operation; obtains the Security Council's authority to establish it; assembles the necessary troops and equipment from Member States; deploys, commands, and manages the operation; and reports on it to the Council. But even in this situation the Secretary-General can find himself exposed to considerable pressure from countries directly or indirectly involved in the conflict.

It is not, however, to be assumed that preventive peacekeeping will always be done through a United Nations operation. In the case of Burundi, I believe that the peacekeeping therapy would be so demanding militarily that it could be provided only by Member States capable of responding with the necessary rapidity to a crisis in a distant theater, and that the correct prescription would, therefore, be a multinational force authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter. In such a case the Secretary-General's role is likely to be less than if the operation were under United Nations command.

In the case of preventive humanitarian action, one aspect of the Secretary-General's role is to establish adequate arrangements for the coordination of relief activities. Another is to take, or support, the political action required to persuade the governments concerned to create the conditions that will permit resolution of the humanitarian crisis. As already noted, these can include a wide range of measures in the fields of security, law and order, human rights, institution building, reconstruction, restoration of economic activity and social programs, and may, therefore, require the Secretary-General to play a coordinating role in this field also.

Peace-building is perhaps the preventive therapy where the Secretary-General's role is least well defined. In the case of preventive diplomacy and humanitarian action he has the necessary authority to administer the therapy that he has agreed upon with the parties. For preventive peacekeeping he has to obtain the authority of the Security Council, but well-established procedures exist for him to do so, and for the operation to be deployed once authority has been obtained.

But peace-building is more complicated. It can require a wide range and variety of actions, not all of which will fall under the direct executive responsibility of the Secretary-General. His functions in this context are essentially those of a general practitioner. He can diagnose the patients' condition and advise them that certain general measures of a political, economic, or social nature will help reduce the risk of conflict. Such therapies can include confidence-building measures, increased respect for human rights, more just law enforcement, strengthening democratic institutions, improving social services, addressing gross economic injustices, sharing natural resources more fairly, and so on. But for a detailed prescription and for help in administering the therapy, the general practitioner will have to refer the patients to various specialists inside and outside the United Nations system, including nongovernmental specialists.

This gives the Secretary-General three roles in the implementation of preventive peace-building, all of them delicate. The first is to persuade the specialists to apply the therapy that he has prescribed and the patients have accepted. The best way of doing this, of course, is to associate the specialists with the earlier consultations and make them a part of the diplomatic process, through which the parties are brought to accept the desirability of preventive action and the nature it should take.

The Secretary-General's second role is to coordinate implementation of all the agreed upon peace-building actions. In some cases this can be done through the standard arrangements for coordinating the United Nations system's operational activities for development through a United Nations Resident Coordinator. But usually wider coordination will be necessary, especially if the overall prescription includes diplomatic, peacekeeping, and/or humanitarian elements. In that case, the normal arrangement is for the Secretary-General to appoint a resident Special Representative, who should have not only diplomatic skills but also sufficient experience in the economic and social fields to give him or her credibility with the specialists in those fields.

The Secretary-General's third role is to monitor the political impact of the agreed peace-building measures, so that he can assess how well the patients, i.e. the parties to the potential conflict, are responding to the therapy and whether the prescription needs to be modified—or, of course, discontinued if the risk of conflict has been sufficiently alleviated. Obviously, the Secretary-General will depend, to a considerable extent, upon the advice of his Special Representative; but this is an area where visits by the Secretary-General himself or by his senior officials to the country or region concerned, and direct contacts with their leaders, can be of great value.

Epilogue

Prevention is indeed better than cure. I hope that this chapter demonstrates the high priority that my colleagues in the Secretariat and I attach to improving the United Nations' capacity in the preventive field, as desired by the Member States for well-founded political, humanitarian, and financial reasons. But the chapter should also have shown that preventing the malady of conflict is even more difficult than preventing the diseases that afflict the mind and the body of human beings.

There are no guaranteed vaccinations to prevent conflicts from starting and no miracle cures to end them once they have started. The best prevention is for the region or country concerned to follow a strict and healthy regimen of democratization, human rights, equitable development, confidence-building measures, and respect for international law, while eschewing indulgence in such unhealthy practices as nationalism, fanaticism, demagoguery, excessive armament, and aggressive behavior. Most of the elements of such a regimen are prescribed in the United Nations Charter and in the corpus of international law.

The difficulties of prevention in the field of peace and security do not arise because the warning signs of conflict are more difficult to detect than those of human disease; on the contrary, they are usually more obvious. Nor is it that the therapies are less effective; many effective therapies have been devised over the years. The United Nations dispensary is well stocked and many experienced consultants and specialists are on call.

The problem is with the patients and with the friends and enemies of the patients. Human beings may be full of phobias and superstition about disease but they can usually be relied upon to respond fairly rationally to the diagnoses and prescriptions of their physicians. The same cannot, alas, be said of governments and other parties to political conflicts. Many general practitioners would have been tempted to retire in despair long ago if their advice had been disregarded by those to whom they prescribed therapies. But the Secretary-General of the United Nations cannot abandon his principal duty to avert imminent conflict any more than a conscientious physician can abandon a difficult case. The Secretary-General's duty is to use all the means available to him, be they political, military, economic, social, or humanitarian, to help the peoples and governments of the United Nations to achieve the goal, emblazoned in the first paragraph of its Charter, of saving succeeding generations from the scourge of war.

Initial Response to Complex Emergencies and Natural Disasters

Ed Tsui

On January 17, 2002, one of Africa's most active volcanoes unexpectedly erupted in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). As lava rapidly advanced toward the lakeside city below, fuel depots erupted into slow burning fires, tremors and shocks crumbled buildings and collapsed houses, heat and lava flows destroyed water and electrical systems, ash covered the landscape and lava-turned-to-rock covered parts of the lake.

As a result, about 400,000 of Goma's 500,000 habitants were forced to flee to unstable areas of the DRC and Rwanda, where rebel elements remained active. Nine died, and one hundred were wounded. About 40 percent of the town's infrastructure was destroyed, leaving thousands without electricity or potable water.

If ever there were a typical natural disaster, the eruption of Mount Nyirangongo was not it. Its location on a contentious border in an area plagued by armed conflicted placed it squarely in the middle of a long-standing, regional, complex emergency, where state and nonstate actors compete for control, misinformation is rampant, and humanitarian access is limited.

A number of other factors added to the complexity of the response including the many actors involved; the threat of further eruptions or factures from associated volcanic *and* seismic activity, whose interplay was classified by both vulcanologists and seismologists alike as a new phenomena; and the potential for contamination of Lake Kivu, a primary source of both food and drinking water in an already impoverished area and, ironically, of noxious gases that threatened to ignite.

Yet the international humanitarian response was as quick as it was comprehensive, and, in spite of the complexity of the situation, largely succeed in alleviating the immediate needs of those most affected.

The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) was but one of many players who made this response a success. OCHA and its partners over the years have learned a great deal about the types of tools, mechanisms, and processes needed for an effective emergency response. New technologies, increases in the scope and magnitude of both complex emergencies and natural hazards, as well as the need for common tools to address them, and a growing appreciation by the Member States of the importance of humanitarian assistance and the protection of civilian to the achievement of peace, security, and development are only a few of the trends that have shaped the

nature of emergency response as we know it today. But despite the growing need for humanitarian interventions in ever more complex operating environments, the key lessons learned by the international humanitarian community regarding emergency response in the last two decades are straightforward. In short, over time we have come to understand that an effective response depends on the following:

1. Solid needs assessments that allow relief agencies to jointly determine who does what where, under the umbrella of a comprehensive humanitarian action plan
2. The proper staff and emergency response tools available at the right time in the right place
3. Common tools for natural disasters and complex emergencies, to be adapted for application
4. Emergency funding mechanisms that ensure money is readily available and easily dispersed
5. Well-developed information management networks through which accurate-as-possible data are immediately available to key decision makers
6. Reviews that draw the lessons learned from each response and help apply them to the next

Each of these lessons was manifested in the Goma response, which included, among other actions, early reinforcements of experienced humanitarian staff, including a senior emergency manager; the provision, through daily updates, of credible and timely information about the crisis at both the field and international levels; the on-site establishment of extraordinary information exchanges and a specialized center to process, analyze, and share humanitarian data; the issuance of an interagency emergency appeal for funds; the rapid dispatch of vulcanologists to the field; and the procurement of emergency nonfood items for the affected population.

As such, this particular response to a sudden onset emergency highlights not only the need for, but also the increasing efforts by, aid actors, in particular OCHA, to ensure that the above elements are consistently at the disposal of the international system, so that each response is timely yet flexible, specialized when needed, and above all, well coordinated.

As an example of how aid can effectively reach it victims also provides a benchmark of comparison to other international emergency responses, where, for whatever reasons, action was neither as swift nor as decisive. Thus, it further highlights the need for greater consistency in the application of the emergency response tools and mechanisms at the disposal of the international humanitarian community.

Before I elaborate on these lessons and themes, it is useful to understand the increasingly challenging and multifaceted backdrop against which aid workers struggle to deliver assistance in the field and that has shaped the formulation of emergency response.

Natural Disaster and Complex Emergencies

In the last two decades alone, more than three million people have died in natural disasters caused by extreme weather resulting from global warming and other related atmospheric changes, as well as by deforestation and soil erosion caused by unsustainable development practices. Combined with poverty and population pressure, growing numbers of people are being forced to live in harm's way, on floodplains, unstable hillsides, and earthquake-prone zones.

Similarly, the end of the Cold War has resulted in profound changes not only in the number but also in the nature of armed, internal conflicts. In the last decade of the twentieth century, regions once thought to be beyond war, such as Europe, became entrenched in it; simmering socioeconomic tensions in many African countries resurfaced; and the war on terrorism gave way to far reaching humanitarian implications in Central Asia and the Middle East. In this period, conflicts have claimed more than five million lives and driven many times that number of people from their homes. At present, it is estimated that more than 40 million people have been displaced by conflict worldwide.

Increasingly, as we saw in Goma, the traditional distinctions between the two types of crises—natural disasters and complex emergencies—are not always so clear. Interplay between the two has become common. This is particularly true in the case of drought, which differs from most natural disasters in that it is slow in onset and may continue for a prolonged period of time, which can lead to a conflict over scarce resources. In ongoing emergencies, drought can also exacerbate existing tensions.

Whatever the cause, the resulting effects of these emergencies are similar. They include extensive violence and loss of life, increasingly among innocent noncombatants and civilians, massive displacements of people, and widespread damage to societies and economies. But despite the similarities, key differences in the immediacy, duration, scope, and political complexity of a crisis have increasingly called for special capacities or services in the initial response.

Immediacy

In the event of a natural disaster, such as an earthquake or volcano, thousands of lives are put at immediate risk. Many can be lost within hours or days of the incident if search and rescue and other life-saving efforts are delayed. In these cases, a rapid initial response is critical, and often more easily applicable, to the goal of saving lives.

Complex emergencies, on the other hand, are characterized by a total or considerable breakdown of authority. They usually involve more deliberate violence—and therefore violations of human

rights and international humanitarian law—targeted at civilians, as well as political and military constraints that hinder response and pose more significant and sinister security risks to aid workers.

Duration

As a result of these differences in immediacy, the life-saving stage that follows a natural disaster response may be over within a matter of days or weeks, notwithstanding the reconstruction efforts that may follow.

The chronic humanitarian needs arising from war, however, often continue for months and even years. Additionally, as the nature of an emergency changes—for example, from the immediate aftermath of military action, to a long-simmering standoff between government and militant groups, to a negotiated peace—humanitarian assistance programs may evolve and become more varied, encompassing simultaneous relief programs as well as rehabilitation and reintegration activities. These situations necessitate longer-term initiatives designed to minimize human suffering over time.

Scope

Natural disasters increasingly span several countries. For instance, when successive cyclones hit southeastern Africa in February 2001, rivers and dams over-flowed throughout the region, resulting in widespread flooding in Mozambique, Swaziland, Botswana, Malawi, Zimbabwe, and South Africa, affecting more than two million people. But although several neighboring countries can be affected by the same natural disaster, especially in case of drought, their relationships are not always strained, and cooperation is more common.

In complex emergency situations, however, the international and cross-border dimensions are almost always characterized by political differences between those concerned. One need not look further than the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Great Lakes region of Africa, or the West African subregion for examples of how conflict spreads, displacing thousands in a tangled web of cross-border movements. Responding to such crises requires a higher level of regional coordination and interaction with a greater multiplicity of actors, who are often at odds with each other.

Key Elements of a Successful Response

Against this backdrop, the international community has seen an increasing trend toward more integrated, as well as more standardized, yet flexible, application of initial response procedures, tools, and mechanisms in crises. This versatility entails being able to deal with the full range and

potential interplay of crises, from purely complex emergency and natural disasters situations to every possible combination in between, based on common platform of response practices, tools, and mechanisms that consist of the following:

1. *Solid needs assessments that allow relief agencies to determine jointly who does what where, under the umbrella of a comprehensive humanitarian action plan*

When a crisis erupts, the international community—including government, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), donors, member states, the Red Cross Movement, and the United Nations—is usually alerted by an array of monitoring systems, including individual as well as shared sources of information, ranging from the field reports to earthquake bulletins, weather notices, and press reports. Once alerted to a crisis, the international humanitarian community must gauge the willingness of the affected state to accept assistance. Although the primary responsibility for taking care of the victims of crisis always rests with the affected state, governments whose national capacities are not sufficient to meet the needs may either directly request assistance or pose no objections to humanitarian assistance.

Once the acceptance or nonobjection to aid is established, the humanitarian community focuses its attention on ensuring the impartial and timely interagency assessment of the humanitarian situation on the ground. These assessments, often led by OCHA in its role as a nonoperational and therefore unbiased facilitator of humanitarian response, are vital to ensuring that a wide spectrum of policy and decision makers are well informed from the outset of crisis, when time sensitive decisions regarding funding, deployments of staff and assets, and staff security must be made under enormous pressure. OCHA’s experience has shown the importance of striking a balance between the depth and speed of reporting and the accuracy of the initial assessments. In crisis situations, initial assessments often must be updated hourly to reflect new, incoming information resulting from fast-moving events. Emphasis must therefore be placed on conveying what is known at the moment.

They also form the basis for the coordination of assistance in a rapidly evolving situation involving a multiplicity of actors with sometimes overlapping mandates. Especially critical is the prioritization of needs—whether they be in the food, shelter, health, water, sanitation, or protection sectors—and the subsequent assignment of tasks and responsibilities based on the individual mandates, strengths, and comparative advantage of each organization. Thus in response to a sudden onset crisis, initial actions may focus on determining who does what where. OCHA’s role is to ensure that, drawing on system-wide capacities, all needs are met without duplication and that often-scarce resources are efficiently used.

Ongoing assessments throughout the crisis will then form the basis of longer-term interagency planning efforts designed to ensure that there is (1) a common understanding of the problems and constraints besetting affected populations, (2) a joint and complementary action plan for addressing them, and finally (3) an effective use of limited resources for those activities that are of mutual concern to all—such as communication, logistics, security, and information management. These are often realized through the development of a Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP), which forms the basis of an inter-agency appeal process, of which OCHA is the custodian. Through this process—known as the Inter-Agency Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP)—national, regional, and international relief organizations jointly develop a common humanitarian programming, strategic planning, and resource mobilization document, which is regularly reviewed and revised. In the event of a sudden deterioration of an existing emergency for which a CAP has already been developed, the plans to respond to the evolving crisis may already have been incorporated in the CAP as possible planning scenarios. If not, the CAP may be rapidly reviewed and revised to reflect the new needs. Similarly, in cases where a natural disaster occurs in a country with a CAP, a revised CAP is usually issued, reflecting the new needs presented by the natural disaster.

In natural disaster settings, needs are determined jointly by the resident agencies on the basis of rapid assessments, which are conveyed along with funding needs in situation reports that are issued within the first twenty-four hours of a crisis and then updated daily.

2. *The proper staff and emergency response tools available at the right time in the right place*

No matter how experienced the first in-country responders to an emergency are, the sudden onset of a crisis is inevitably marked by alarm and confusion as national authorities and their UN and NGO counterparts struggle to assess the situation, often in conditions of extreme danger and limited access. Depending on the type of crisis, the leading humanitarian official on the ground, usually the UN Resident Coordinator (RC), may be forced to deal with many competing concerns, ranging from assessing the situation to evacuating nonessential staff to dealing with the media. Coordination at this stage is especially critical to ensuring that humanitarian assistance is delivered in a targeted, effective, and complementary manner.

OCHA facilitates this process by either rapidly establishing a field presence and coordination structures in country or by providing extra support to actors already in the country in the form of temporary rapid response teams, otherwise known as “surge” capacity.

Usually, existing resident agencies—headed by the RC—will support the government’s efforts to respond to a disaster or complex emergency. If new structures are needed, OCHA’s head, the Under-

Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and the Emergency Relief Coordinator (USG/ERC), in consultation with a range of humanitarian actors, determines—based on analysis of the humanitarian, political, military, and security situation—whether the crisis warrants a country or regional response, and decides which coordination mechanisms best fit, including whether there is a need to appoint a Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) to oversee the coordination of international aid efforts. Often the Resident Coordinator will also serve as the Humanitarian Coordinator (R/HC). These permanent structures help ensure not only the success of the initial response, but the development of common strategic planning and monitoring of humanitarian assistance throughout a crisis.

Either way, quick and decisive leadership from the USG/ERC in the initial phase of an emergency is critical. In consultation with UN agency and Secretariat department heads in New York, the USG /ERC may decide to visit the stricken country personally in order to assess the damage first hand, and then report back to the Secretary-General, the Security Council, donors, agencies, and NGOs on an appropriate course of action. Or she/he may deploy one of OCHA's senior managers or an OCHA Regional Disaster Response Advisor (RDRA) already in the region to the emergency site, in order to support resident UN agencies, the R/HC, and the local government in the initial assessment and response.

It has become clear from numerous evaluations of OCHA's initial response that such senior leadership is a perquisite to success. The presence of these additional senior staff can lend the necessary authority and legitimacy to build consensus for effective coordination; deal with other senior officials, especially in situations requiring access negotiations; and draw worldwide attention and resources to the aid efforts. In East Timor, for instance, despite the lack of a meaningful contingency plan to respond to the outbreak of mass destruction and violence on September 4, 1999, the Assistant Emergency Relief Coordinator managed to fly into Dili by September 6, 1999, where he remained as one of only two international humanitarian representatives in East Timor until the reentry of the humanitarian community on September 20. Under his leadership, coordination was immediately established and a preliminary assessment document begun.

The ERC may also decide to deploy interdisciplinary rapid response teams or "surge capacity" to support the government and/or the R/HC in assessing the situation and coordinating the relief response.

These working-level emergency reinforcements, by providing specialized capacities or boosting existing ones in times of extreme demand, can help take strain off governments, resident UN

agencies and other organizations; focus attention on the need for extraordinary levels of coordination and contingency planning; and if necessary reorient resident agencies from their normal development focus to the different demands of disaster response.

Their timely arrival can also be critical to the success of an initial response. In the past decade, OCHA has been increasingly called upon to provide such surge capacity on very short notice to R /HCs at the outset of a new crisis, when an existing emergency intensifies or to relieve temporarily or replace a critical staff member of an existing unit. In Goma, for instance, within thirty-six hours OCHA had fielded a UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) team and staff with specialized skills from nearby offices in Eritrea and Kenya, as well as from Geneva. The Assistant Emergency Relief Coordination (AERC) was on the ground within forty-eight hours. Within seventy-two hours, OCHA had a total of fourteen staff members on the ground, backed up with support from desk offices in New York and Geneva.

While OCHA in the past has drawn staff on ad hoc basis to respond to a sudden onset or deterioration in a complex emergency, the need for more systematic internal procedures has been recognized. As a result, OCHA, borrowing from the expertise of its more automated initial response to natural disasters, has also built up its own in-house capacity to deploy within twenty-four hours OCHA-trained staff, who are fully conversant with OCHA's mandate and the operational specifics of the organization, in order to establish immediate and effective coordination mechanisms in a sudden-onset emergency. Depending on the crisis, these may include information management and technology, operations, logistics, administration, and communications capacities.

Increasingly, one of their first tasks is to establish what has become known as a Humanitarian Information Center (HIC). By providing a venue for humanitarian exchange, HICs promote communication and cooperation, especially in crises involving a multitude of actors. Typically staffed by information management and data specialists borrowed from humanitarian agencies and international NGOs, HICs offer a range of products and services that make coordination and response possible. These include, but are not limited to, Internet-based data repositories containing baseline information on at-risk countries: Who? What? Where? (3Ws) databases containing vital statistics on population, internal displacement, refugee movement, and needs; country encyclopedias and digital libraries of UN reports and documents; road maps to assist relief convoys and missions; and thematic maps illustrating key sectorial data including housing damage, schools and clinics, and the location of mines. HICs also often provide humanitarian aid workers with accessible, central meeting rooms, common office equipment and announcement boards as well as Internet and fax access.

3. *Common tools for natural disasters and complex emergencies, which build on the comparative advantage of the others without losing their ability to be applied in unique situations*

The international humanitarian community has increasingly recognized the need to have at its disposal a range of flexible and integrated emergency response tools that can be used in either complex emergency or natural disaster situations. OCHA, based on its experiences over the years and the increasing demands of its partners, is increasingly attempting to provide the international humanitarian community with an integrated menu of emergency response tools, which include the following subjects.

United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC)

Originally designed to provide assessment capacity and support for the coordination of incoming relief at the site of sudden-onset natural disaster, UNDAC teams are drawn from a roster of volunteer national emergency managers, who are nominated and funded by more than forty participating countries, together with staff from OCHA, UN agencies, and other international organizations. They can be deployed within twelve to twenty-four hours anywhere in the world and are capable of performing a variety of tasks, including assessment, coordination, and information management, as well as providing experts in specialized fields of disaster management, such as search and rescue, chemical spill management, and infrastructural engineering.

Until very recently UNDAC was used primarily as a natural disaster response mechanism. Since 1993, it has also been deployed in response to complex emergencies, and UNDAC continues to strengthen its capacity to respond to these types of situations.

International Search and Rescue Advisory Group (INSARAG)

At the same time, OCHA recognizes the benefit of retaining the unique nature and purpose of some specialized response mechanisms. To that end, OCHA continues to help mobilize international urban search and rescue (SAR) teams, who specialize in rescuing victims trapped by rubble. They are drawn from a network of government-provided experts known as INSARAG. Additionally, in cooperation with the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP), OCHA facilitates the deployment of rapid response teams with environmental expertise to coordinate the UN emergency response to environmental emergencies, such as chemical or oil spills and forest fires.

On-Site Operations Coordination Centers (OSOCC)

The rapid establishment—usually by UNDAC or the first international search and rescue team on the ground—of a temporary OSOCC at the site of a disaster can help provide a locus for information management and sharing as well as the coordination of various aid actors, particularly when infrastructure or communication facilities are lacking. But although initially conceived of to assist local authorities of the affected country in managing the disaster, in particular to coordinate international search and rescue teams, OSOCCs have proved valuable in their flexibility and adaptability to various situations and needs.

Internet-based virtual OSOCCs can also be used in both complex emergency and natural disasters to exchange information, identify needs, and plan ongoing responses in real time from anywhere in the world. Virtual OSOCCs proved vital in the initial response to earthquakes in El Salvador, India, and Peru, as well as in Afghanistan.

Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC)

In crises in which there is a peacekeeping mission already in place or in which militaries are heavily involved in the humanitarian response, OCHA staff, sometimes based in HICs, will often liaise with CIMIC staff attached to various militaries or peacekeeping operations in order to ensure the complementarity of peacekeeping and humanitarian programming and to share vital security information. They also help facilitate the most effective use of military and civil defense assets in humanitarian operations by promoting interaction between the humanitarian and military cells of a relief operation. In most cases, individual UN agencies and the larger NGOs establish their own links with military cells. However, in some instances, OCHA will serve as the hub for the mobilization and deployment of these assets and act as a direct liaison between humanitarian and military cells during a humanitarian relief operation. In this case, OCHA identifies personnel experienced in civil-military coordination to work closely with the R/HC.

UN Joint Logistics Centers (UNJLC)

OCHA may also assist in the establishment of UNJLCs where logistical information, data about the estimated global need for food and nonfood items, and information about distribution of relief to beneficiaries is exchanged and shared with the humanitarian community. For example, during the response to the flood in Mozambique in early 2001, OCHA’s Military and Civil Defense Unit (MCDU) participated in establishing a joint logistics center to coordinate the use of military planes, boats, and communications equipment for rescue, water purification, food distribution, and shelter activities.

Physical Assets

It goes without saying that the rapid deployment of emergency aid items is critical to meeting the needs of the affected population. But when contingency plans are lacking or the emergency is entirely unpredicted, it can take days for relief organizations to reposition stocks. Recognizing the need for instant access to relief supplies, the UN, with support from key donors, has established a permanent renewable stock of donated disaster relief items at the UN Humanitarian Response Depot in Brindisi, Italy, which includes tents, blankets, kitchen sets, generators, water purification /distribution equipment, and tools. Together with the World Food Program (WFP), which administers the depot, OCHA organizes the immediate transport free of charge of these basic nonfood survival items to disaster-affected areas, subject to the donor agreement and availability.

OCHA also maintains a database of relief sources for use by the broader humanitarian community. Designed to function as humanitarian yellow pages, the Central Register includes a list of stockpiles for noncommercial equipment and supplies, directories for search and rescue teams, national emergency response offices, a register of available military and civil defense assets, and a roster of disaster management experts. This enables emergency response staff to identify and approach quickly the potential providers of the required international assistance.

4. *Emergency funding mechanisms that ensure money is readily available and easily dispersed*

It goes without saying that an effective response to sudden-onset emergencies and disasters depends heavily on the availability of funds to support immediate action. The willingness of donors to fund such response is often high, largely because when compared to protracted emergencies, the immediate needs of an initial response are more easily defined, direct life-saving results are more visible, and public pressure to act is at its greatest. But, in its efforts to capitalize on this fact, the international humanitarian community faces two main challenges.

The first is to provide donors accurately and quickly with interagency funding and needs assessments. In natural disaster situations, this is typically accomplished by including funding needs, determined jointly by the resident agencies on the basis of rapid assessments, in its situation reports, which begin being issued within the first twenty-four hours of a crisis.

In a new complex emergency situation, the mechanisms for immediately communicating needs to donors are less clear. Typically, ad hoc “flash appeals” or “donor alerts” covering needs for one month may be issued within the first few weeks of a new crisis. As the crisis evolves, the initial requirements presented in flash appeals or donor alerts are subsequently incorporated into the more formal CAP.

In support of broader humanitarian objectives, OCHA also provides emergency cash grants of up to $50,000 from its own reserves to meet immediate, specific relief needs, such as the purchase and transport of blanket, tents, and tools; manages a Trust Fund for Disaster Relief for life-saving activities; and often acts as a channel for bilateral donor contributions in sudden-onset natural disasters.

5. ***Well-developed information management networks through which accurate-as-possible data are immediately available to key decision makers***

Although vital to coordination throughout an emergency, the role of information technology and management initial response is increasingly being recognized by a wide spectrum of policy and decision makers as being the most vital at the outset of a crisis, when accurate, timely data are needed to make time-sensitive decisions. Technological advances, as well as the increased expectations they generate among ourselves and the public at large, are in part responsible for this dilemma. As television and satellite transmissions increasingly focus public attention on poverty and suffering through real-time images of the victims of disaster and conflict across the globe, we face greater pressure to respond not within weeks, but within days or hours. Indeed, it is not uncommon for journalists to reach the scene of a disaster and start broadcasting before we do. In short, humanitarian actors must ensure that accurate information rises quickly to top decision makers.

Although the first task of the R/HC, with support from rapid deployment or assessment teams, is to survey the situation quickly and define the needs and type of assistance required, doing so in a both timely and accurate manner can be challenging, especially in the deep field. Information flow in an emergency is often limited by the lack of national information management capacity, limited access, damaged communication systems, insecurity, and poor communication among actors, all of which can lead to isolated decision making on the basis of disparate analysis.

All too often, when a crisis erupts, valuable time is wasted gathering baseline information about an affected area, which is often already available by the internet. Even more troubling are the instances in which our greatest challenge is not the *lack* of information but rather too much of it from too many, sometimes conflicting sources—making it difficult to discern the most critical and relevant data from the not so useful. Just as the uncoordinated arrival of relief supplies can clog a country's logistics and distributions system, the onslaught of unwanted, inappropriate, and unpackaged information can impede decision making and rapid response to an emergency.

These challenges highlight the need for more systematic ways to process and standardize information, as well as to begin information gathering and sharing on vulnerable countries well in advance of crises.

At the most basic level, OCHA does this by issuing situation reports on the overall humanitarian situation in country. These situation reports chronicle information on changes in the humanitarian situation, loss of life, material damage, national response, agency response, relief needs by sector and region, and the resultant funding appeals. Before on-site actors are able to develop or adjust their Common Humanitarian Action Plan and present comprehensive funding needs, these situation reports serve as vital conduit for communicating to donors the scope of the needs. They are ideally informed by the individual or joint assessments, the R/HC typically issues these reports at least daily, and often twice a day, during the first few days of a crisis and then weekly or biweekly as the crisis becomes less acute. The reports are shared with the host government of the affected country, the UN system on the ground, donor embassies, and with the NGO community.

Time-critical documents such as these used to be distributed by fax, telex, and cable. Today they are available to these partners and the public through two OCHA information-sharing platforms, the Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN, www.irinnews.org) and ReliefWeb (www.reliefweb.int). The former is a humanitarian news service that provides unbiased reporting on humanitarian crises through updates, analysis, and alerts on a range of political, economic, and social issues on forty-six countries in Africa and eight in Central Asia. The latter provides, via the Web, twenty-four-hour coverage of relief, preparedness, and prevention activities for complex emergencies and natural disasters worldwide and acts as a gateway to documents and other sources of information related to humanitarian assistance and relief.

As part of its efforts to provide a more integrated response through all phases of a crisis, OCHA also deploys information specialists to the field as a part of its surge capacity or rapid response teams. Similarly, information management, as opposed to technology, is increasingly being recognized as a core function of UNDAC.

At the more sophisticated level, OCHA information managers also support initial response by working closely with their humanitarian partners to develop information products and tools, such as geographical and thematic maps, databases and digital reference libraries, and virtual coordination centers that improve the coordination of humanitarian assistance. In particular, much work remains to be done in the critical area of identifying cost-effective and simple technologies that work in the deep field, from which information is often most scarce.

6. ***Reviews that draw the lessons learned from each response and help them apply them to the next***

When all is said and done, continued improvements in the initial response to crises depends largely on the extent to which the lessons learned in one situation are both recorded and then applied in similar contexts. To this end, lesson-learning reviews can help identify strengths and weaknesses in international response coordination mechanisms and ensure that lessons identified are integrated into future contingency planning and coordination structures. Given the need for actors to focus on the work at hand, so-called real-time exercises may be less appropriate in the context of an initial response but should be undertaken almost routinely at the end of each emergency activity. These need not be full-fledged and lengthy exercises; important to their success is a relatively light design, one that uses a method that facilitates joint learning and provides instant feedback.

OCHA is fully committed to such systematic reviews of lessons learned for all its emergency activities and is currently experimenting with different modalities for such reviews—one of the first being lessons review of the 2002 Goma earthquake. Clearly the usefulness of these reviews depends very much on the interest and will of participants—staff and key partners alike—to genuinely reflect on what work and what did not and to identify workable recommendations for future activities. Over time OCHA hopes to distill lessons from these country-specific exercises and review their broad validity for similar activities and complex emergency situations.

Another way to identify lessons are external evaluations undertaken by independent consultants. In 2001, for example, OCHA asked independent evaluators to analyze its performance in response to the 2000 Gujarat earthquake, address some broader issues about the efficacy of the UN system's disaster-response capacity and to identify lessons for future activities. Similarly, OCHA also commissioned an independent evaluation of its response to the East Timor crisis in 2000. Both exercises produced sound and transparent basis for reviewing OCHA's performance.

However, unless such individual activity or country-specific exercises are systematically reviewed for their potential application in similar activities, fully incorporated into institutional memory and applied in policy- and decision making, their usefulness is limited. Recognizing this challenge, OCHA recently created an Evaluation Studies Unit within its Policy and Studies Development Branch and is in the process of putting in place an evaluative framework and strategy, in consultation with its key partners.

The strategy recognizes the evaluation activities provide little added value, if their recommendations and lessons are not applied in current and future programming, as well as policy

and decision making. To that end, OCHA's strategy aims also to create and/or improve systems for sharing the results of evaluations and reviews in a meaningful way, and to establish follow-up mechanisms.

Conclusion

Through this combination of shared experience, the international humanitarian community has made great strides in its efforts to create a common platform of response practices and tools. Overall, it is reacting more quickly and in a more coordinated manner to bring relief to the victims of disasters and emergencies. But as the war on terrorism and other sources of conflict continue, we are certain to face ever increasing and perhaps unanticipated challenges in the delivery of humanitarian assistance. To that end, we must look beyond improvements in how we respond to crisis. We must learn to be quicker and detect and prepare for crises before they occur. The earlier we intervene, the more likely we are to have a meaningful impact on the ground. Similarly, we must more consistently enter all crisis situations with a clearly defined and viable exit strategy that guides all of our actions, even in the initial response, toward the ultimate stability and recovery of the affected country.

Greater advocacy efforts before, during, and after an acute crisis can also help us to better harness public and political attention, especially in the early days of the crisis when international attention is the highest. The very fluidity of the situations in which we work has focused us to remain flexible, and that has led to many improvements in our response. In the coming years, we must continue to demonstrate the same level of versatility and ability to learn from our past interventions so that we may ultimately save more lives.

The Peacekeeping Prescription

Kofi A. Annan

If I were a doctor examining the health of the world today, I would be greatly alarmed at the state of my patient. The international community, vibrant in its resolve to achieve a strong, stable, and healthy political environment as the post–Cold War era began, has been drained and weakened by one bout after another of violent conflict during the last decade. In Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Kosovo, and elsewhere, it has had to weather the massive displacement of people, extensive loss of life, and irreparable damage, which are conflict's concomitants. Clearly, this is a pattern that must be broken.

Ideally, each of these bouts of conflict would either have been prevented completely or nipped in the bud. Prevention is—and would have been—by far the best medicine. But the practice of prevention, in both medicine and politics, is uneven. Some diseases resist early treatment. Some patients resist treatment until their conditions become critical—or even longer. Because of this, it becomes necessary to address conflict fully blown, to treat the bout of conflict at or near its height.

Even at this stage, the efforts undertaken, while hopefully curative and sometime palliative, also have a preventive aspect to them. They can prevent the escalation of conflict or the resumption of it. As in the case in which a primary tumor is discovered, intervention of this kind can prevent metastasis and hopefully bring the disease into remission. Thus, when we speak here of the "peacekeeping prescription" or the "treatment" it entails, we must always be clear that, while we have one eye on the crisis of the moment, we have the other on protecting the future and preventing the threat now posed against it from becoming a reality. Prevention is a great part of the goal of peacekeeping, and, in many instances, has constituted a large (and often overlooked) part of its success.

Many of the conflicts of the last ten years have had to be treated using the peacekeeping prescription, for various reasons. And, as with any other ailment, the disease has manifested itself differently in each instance, and the treatment has had to be adapted to those variations. Peacekeeping has proved itself a flexible remedy. Since the first edition of *Preventive Diplomacy*, we have deployed new United Nations peacekeeping operations in Haiti, Guatemala, the Balkans, Sierra Leone, the Central African Republic, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. While these have been adapted to differing circumstances, the main themes I enumerated in this volume in 1996

remain valid today. As Secretary-General, I remain committed to enhancing the Organization's capacity to understand conflict and to respond in a meaningful and timely way.

If we are to strengthen the international community, if we are effectively to confront the conflicts before us and those that await, if we are to prevent their spread or resumption, we need to understand three things as clearly as possible: the disease we are addressing, the treatment we are applying, and the changes to both of them that are occurring. It is to those points that I wish to turn here.

Diagnosis

In the context of peacekeeping, how do we define and diagnose the disease of conflict? What are its symptoms? Technically, peacekeeping is prescribed for conflicts that constitute a threat to international peace and security. The civil strife in the former Yugoslavia was identified as constituting this kind of threat, as were the genocide that ravaged Rwanda and the interclan warfare that engulfed Somalia in the early 1990s.

A quick cross section of these conflicts alone can highlight two of the most important characteristics of conflicts for which peacekeeping has been prescribed: most of them are intrastate wars, and many of them have been identified as ethnic conflicts.

Peacekeeping through the first forty years of the more than fifty-five-year history of the United Nations was devoted primarily to the treatment of conflicts between clearly delimited armed forces on either side of a cease-fire line; missions were deployed to separate antagonists, verify cease-fires, and promote accord. Following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the bipolar system, however, a seminal change occurred. Increasingly, the conflicts for which peacekeeping was prescribed were internal in nature. More than two-thirds of the operations deployed since the end of the Cold War—and more than two-thirds of those currently in the field—have been sent to respond to internal conflicts. These recent wars, which include the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, Rwanda, Sierra-Leone, and Kosovo, share other traits. These conflicts have displaced hundreds of thousands or even millions of people, riven entire societies, devastated economies, caused irreparable physical and psychological damage, and risked involving or have actually involved other countries.

Many of them have also been perceived as showing strong symptoms of ethnic conflict. Ethnic conflict as a symptom is, at best, extremely difficult to assess. Looking at any of the internal conflicts we have mentioned, most of us would be hard pressed to say exactly where ethnic differences were the cause of conflict and where they were the result of it. Ethnic differences are not in and of themselves either symptoms or causes of conflict; in societies where they are accepted and respected, people of vastly different backgrounds live peacefully and productively together. Ethnic

differences become charged—conflictual—when they are used for political ends, when ethnic groups are intentionally placed in opposition to each other. Of the conflicts we have mentioned, it has been said that they are not really ethnic conflicts, but political conflicts in ethnic clothing. It is a point that we will have to continue to observe and consider.

The broader range of symptoms, which it has become necessary to address, have created what are basically new strains of conflict. Although the kinds of conflict to which peacekeeping traditionally responded are still very active—and even still virulent in certain areas—the kind of conflicts that occupy us principally today (and that will probably do so well into the future) constitute more of a complex or syndrome in nature. They display many different but connected symptoms and usually require multiple medications.

Prescription

In developing and prescribing treatments for these conflicts, the United Nations has attempted to focus upon and reflect the complexity and individuality of the cases before it. We have attempted to better identify and understand both the new strains of conflict appearing and the possible responses to them. We have reconfirmed the necessity of the core elements of the treatment. We have expanded its range of application. And we have improved our understanding of when it should be applied, in what dosages, and when it should be withdrawn.

In response to the symptoms and strains just mentioned, mandates prescribed in the last few years have far exceeded the traditional supervision of truces and separation of antagonists; they have expanded to include elements as diverse as monitoring free and fair elections, guaranteeing the delivery of humanitarian aid, overseeing land reform, observing and reporting on human rights abuses or violations, maintaining presence in towns and villages under attack to prevent loss of life, establishing safe and secure environments, assisting in the strengthening or rebuilding of social and political structures, and even acting to save failed States.

We have found, however, that regardless of the symptoms of the conflict, their variety, or the other elements of our treatment, three core components of the peacekeeping prescription remain crucial: humanitarian, political, and security. The common element of all the cases we have confronted is that each of them has required treatment for the individuals and groups who have suffered the consequences of conflict, for the political structure that has been either shaken or broken, and for the social environment that has been drained of trust, confidence, and any semblance of stability.

We have learned painfully that even in the case of an active civil war, a purely humanitarian response is both dangerous and impractical. The treatment we attempted in Somalia confronted both the international and national communities with the grim reality that it is sometimes not enough to unload aid and expect a problem to right itself. When the United Nations entered Somalia, it faced a situation in which thousands of people were dying daily. As time went on and the effects of the famine were countered, it became patently clear that the continuing high death rate was being caused not so much by the absence of food and the presence of natural disaster as by a group of ambitious armed men who prevented food from reaching the needy.

To allow ourselves the simplistic response of funneling aid into a port, only to have it sequestered and sold on the black market by the men controlling that port, would have been less than inadequate—it would actually have worsened the problem. Alain Destexhe, the former Secretary-General of *Médecins Sans Frontières*, referred to this kind of prescription as "the humanitarian placebo," explaining that, when it is applied, "aid becomes the pretext for political inaction, which leads only to catastrophe."

We have learned that the linkage of the humanitarian, political, and security components, handled well, can ensure a mission's progress. And we have realized that, handled poorly, this linkage created only a vicious cycle. Where security is present, humanitarian aid reaches those who need it, political instability is diminished, and restoration can move forward. Where security is absent, humanitarian aid is blocked, violence increases, political stability is weakened, and the situation is exacerbated. All three elements are essential.

Rwanda, Somalia, and Bosnia have also reinforced the lesson that we must not only prescribe the right elements, but also prescribe them in the right dosages. Because of this, there has been movement, both within the United Nations and outside it, toward peacekeeping with a credible deterrent capacity. The easiest way to see the extent of the change in dosage is to compare the United Nations mission in Bosnia in 1992–95 with two other missions: its NATO-led successor and the UN operation in neighboring Eastern Slavonia.

For nearly four years, the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia spanned not only Bosnia and Herzegovina, but Macedonia and parts of Croatia as well. Its mandate included guaranteeing the delivery of humanitarian aid, observing cease-fires, aiding the evacuation of displaced persons, remaining present in towns under siege to deter attacks upon them and prevent loss of life, and keeping Sarajevo Airport open throughout what became the longest humanitarian airlift in history. All this it did with little over thirty thousand people (of which only roughly twenty thousand were in Bosnia and Herzegovina), at an annual cost of roughly $1.7 billion.

The NATO Implementation Force (IFOR), which was deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina alone, was considered robust in comparison to the UNPROFOR. Within a narrower area, a far more restricted mandate, and with far more equipment, it deployed sixty thousand troops for a period of one year, after which it was replaced by the smaller, but still robust, Stabilization Force (SFOR). This was in addition to the United Nations International Police Task Force, the UN Civil Affairs and Human Rights teams, UNHCR, the OSCE staff present to support the election process, and other international actors who took on various tasks within the mission area. Beyond these, the operation in Macedonia continued to be run by the United Nations until 1999. IFOR, with fewer tasks, a smaller mission area, three times the personnel, at three to five times the cost, constituted a stronger, and no doubt more potent, prescription for peace in the Balkans. Similarly, when the United Nations deployed a multinational peacekeeping operation in Eastern Slovenia, it arrived with a strong, well-equipped force that provided credible deterrence against violations. Partly as a result of this, the operation was able to successfully and peacefully provide protection to the transitional administration in what had been a highly volatile region of the former Yugoslavia. The UN brought another advantage, as well. By deploying a well-integrated, multidimensional operation under sole UN authority, the Organization was able to implement a comprehensive strategy to address the conflict in its various manifestations, thus laying the groundwork for a lasting peace.

The concept of a stronger presence, a critical mass, has in fact long been supported by the United Nations. When the six Safe Areas in Bosnia were being mandated, the United Nations asked for 34,000 troops to “provide deterrence through strength.” The Security Council agreed to allow it only 7,600, and the UN’s Member States took nearly a year to provide them. There was also concern expressed within the Organization regarding Somalia when UNITAF, the U.S.-backed coalition operation, was replaced by UNOSOM II. UNITAF, a well-armed and well-trained coalition force of 37,000, was deployed in southern Somalia alone, with a mandate limited to the establishment of a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance. When UNOSOM II, the United Nations Peacekeeping Operation in Somalia, replaced it, it was deployed throughout the country with a nation-building mandate that included pursuing disarmament, repatriating refugees, establishing a national police force, and fostering national reconciliation. But it was given a force of only 28,000 to achieve it. In other missions at other times, the same kind of problem has occurred.

It is important that we realize at this point (and remember as future crises arise) that, if we want an intervention to succeed—if we want to counter the symptoms that are present, halt their spread and prevent their recurrence—two things are necessary. First, its mandate must be practicable. Second, it must be provided resources adequate to achieve its mandate.

These recent years, when internal conflict has been so prevalent, have brought us a number of late, expensive, large-scale operations. But they have also broadened the other end of the spectrum with the first United Nations Preventive Deployment Operation (UNPREDEP). The UNPREDEP in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, though in the same theater of operations with UNPROFOR, and later IFOR, played a very different role in the treatment of the region. As the Balkan situation worsened, many worried that it would also spread laterally, involving or enveloping one country after another. Those working to address the conflict in 1992 had the conflict of 1914 in the back of their minds. For that reason or others, as the situation in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia grew increasingly unstable and the Balkan conflict threatened to spread through and beyond it, the United Nations' first preventive deployment was mandated. With the strength of 11,225, UNPREDEP monitored activities at the country's border and worked to contribute to the maintenance of peace and security within it. By applying the right elements in the right strength over the right period, the international community created what might well be a paradigm for future preventive deployment missions and what was certainly a highly successful element of its treatment in the Balkans.

In 1999, United Nations peacekeeping missions are treating different variants of the same disease worldwide. A number of them are classical peacekeeping missions, whose mandates consist primarily of observing cease-fires and separating antagonists. The others are, as Cambodia was, more complex and multidimensional in nature, treating the abuse of human rights through the deployment of observers to monitor the human rights situation; treating the presence of mines with the implementation of demining programs; treating the need to return both military and guerillas productively to the civilian sector with demilitarization and demobilization programs; treating the absence of broadly representative, legitimate government with the administration and supervision of fair and free elections; treating the absence of effective administration by building the capacity of newly legitimated authorities and addressing a wide range of other symptoms. In each case, as in the missions just examined, the questions of the proper diagnosis and prescription, correct medication and dosages are essential. So, for all of them, are two other parameters: When should the treatment begin? For how long should it run?

The beginning point of treatment is, perhaps, the most difficult decision of all. We have learned that peace can be neither coerced nor enforced. There must be a genuine desire for peace among the warring parties. No system can achieve peace when leaders use negotiation not to end conflict but

merely to prolong it to advantage. And no agreement, however well intentioned, can guarantee peace if those who sign it see greater benefit in war. The patient must embrace the treatment fully and willingly.

Yet, can we always wait for a conflict to ebb and the will for peace to emerge before we intervene? Recent experience has shown us that, if anything, urgent intervention is sometimes necessary at the very height of conflict, even if only to keep the disease and its symptoms from raging completely out of control. It is preferable—and more prudent—to intervene at a moment of relative stability, but situations like Rwanda, and more recently East Timor, have made us realize that emergency measures might first be required simply to stabilize the patient enough so that treatment can be administered. Measures of this kind are not likely to lead to recuperation on their own, but they can help the patient to survive until the tumor of conflict is ripe for removal. And, as we have seen in Rwanda, they are far preferable to the devastation that is their alternative. Along with preventive deployment, it is this kind of intervention that constitutes the preventive element of peacekeeping. It is preventive not in the prophylactic sense, but rather in the sense that, given a conflict in progress, it can help avoid the worst.

Intervention of this kind, however, is risky, costly, and not always effective. Where the will to pursue treatment and cure cannot be mustered, where the patient has not responded—as in Somalia and more recently in Angola—there is, beyond a point, no real alternative to curtailing the treatment and hoping that the body proves capable of treating itself. These are the cases that are most frustrating for us, the cases where we realize that what we have is an imperfect instrument at best, even if the only ones available. They highlight the fact that our approach to violent conflict is very similar to our approach to cancer or AIDS: an incomplete understanding of the nature of the disease means that our response to it will have to follow the law of successive approximations, requiring us to learn from failure as well as success.

But even where a treatment is effective, should it be limited in time? Long-term therapy is never popular with those who have to pay for it. It is often difficult to see progress, and it is nearly always impossible to prove the benefit achieved by avoiding further deterioration. In this context, the call for quick cures and sunset clauses has become nearly clamorous. This is dangerous for a number of reasons. First of all, in situations like Cyprus, where the United Nations has had an operation for over thirty years, political accord has proven frustratingly elusive, but armed conflict has been halted. The dynamics of the situation are such that there is little doubt that conflict could quickly

rekindle were the mission withdrawn. With roughly $44 million a year, we are able to keep the Cyprus conflict in check. Is it worth risking having to spend far more in the wake of new devastation and bloodshed to avoid that preventive investment?

Second, the larger missions, the international coalitions, partly because of their large size and cost, usually deployed with very firm and tight deadlines. In each case, however, they went into situations where the problems that plagued the patient were deeply embedded and where more than a symptomatic treatment most probably required more time than they allowed. In this context, the great hazard of an arbitrary deadline is that it can actually subvert the process of reconciliation and recovery rather than move it forward. We need to understand and acknowledge that for a treatment to be effective it must run until it has achieved what it can and needs to do, not just until the insurance coverage runs out.

We have applied this lesson in Kosovo, where no arbitrary time limit has been imposed on the international presence. Furthermore, in 1999, the UN mission in Sierra Leone has been expanded due to the increasing demands of the situation. And a mission has been sent to the Democratic Republic of Congo, following movement in the peace process there. These cases reveal a determination not to be swayed by pressure for quick and conclusive results. Long-running, deeply rooted conflicts cannot be resolved overnight.

The efforts we have made have improved our sense of what we are dealing with and how we must handle it. They have allowed us to respond to the complexities of the crises that have faced us and to broaden the range of our response to them. They have refined our sense of what dosages should be applied when and for how long. And they have reminded us that peacekeeping as a therapy is valuable (sometimes vital) in both its curative and preventive capacities.

Prognosis

Stepping back from all of this, however, we realize that the outcome of our efforts will and must depend upon other things as well. An effective response to conflict, as to cancer, must nourish the body as best it can, giving particular attention to organs within it that are vulnerable. We must ensure that the circulatory system allows nourishment to move throughout every limb; we must prevent and treat blockages and dysfunctions. We must use the presence of peacekeepers like a form of chemotherapy, to contain the spread of the tumor and, hopefully, to reduce it to an operable size. We must do what we can to bring about a remission and move toward a cure. Above all, we must be patient and persistent. We must not allow hope to be lost, and we must not lose it ourselves.

Hope, the desire of the people on the ground to cure the conflict that afflicts them, it the single most essential factor in determining its probable outcome. This becomes eminently clear to us when we reflect upon the definition of an epidemic: an agent that acts literally “against the people.” The participation of the people is necessary to mount and sustain conflict. They, ultimately, bear in greatest part its consequences. Without their support it is impossible to bring it to a halt.

A number of other factors, however, are also crucial in developing prognosis. Generally, they fall into two categories: those relating to the patient’s general health and will to live and those relating to the level of care received. Strength and hope alone are not enough. Perseverance and dedication to the course of treatment prescribed are vital. Like the diabetic who takes an intentionally liberal interpretation of his dietary restrictions, the government whose commitments to peace are honored more in the breach than in the making, and the group that uses a peace process not so much to end conflict as to prolong it to its own advantage, undermine their own future and perhaps foretell their own doom. The will to sustain life or peace needs to be accompanied by the commitment to do what is necessary to sustain it.

But what of the factors that are not within direct control of the patient? When we consider the level of care received, a number of important criteria come quickly to mind. The most immediate is the rapidity of response. A clear diagnosis and practical prescription are also essential. The presence of a treatment team that is unified in its approach, consulting and working closely, is also vital. Adequate resources, technology, training, and equipment are indispensable.

Rapid response is vital, particularly from a preventive perspective, because in cases like Rwanda, the conflict’s worst effects are often felt at the earliest stages. A rapid response is thus essential if we are effectively to limit the range, extent and momentum of a conflict. Of the million lives lost in the Rwandan genocide, the vast majority occurred in the first three months of the conflict between the deaths of the Presidents in an air crash on April 6, 1994, and the installation of the new government on the following July 19. We must be clear, however, that a rapid response means more than simply examining or diagnosing the problem early. It means establishing an adequate presence on the ground as quickly as possible. In the case of Rwanda, Member States of the United Nations passed a resolution in the Security Council five weeks after the crash, authorizing a mission of 5,500 to treat the conflict. Four months later, only 550—ten percent of that number—had been contributed and deployed. The mission did not reach its full strength until October, nearly half a year after the crash and months after the bulk of the killing had occurred. Rwanda is clear proof that, as a number of people have said, “we shouldn’t wait until we hear a fire alarm to begin putting a fire department together.”

Closely tied to this point is the need for adequate resources, personnel, equipment, and training. In the context of public health and medicine, where the fragility of the organism with which we are dealing is understood, the importance of proper training and equipment should need no emphasis. What could 550 peacekeepers do at the height of the Rwandan genocide, when they were surrounded by armed factions that totaled over fifty thousand? What good can a contingent do when deployed to the Balkans in winter if its government sends it without winter clothes and other supplies, untrained and unprepared? To mount and sustain an effective operation, appropriate resources are required.

Even where we have the will and resources to react rapidly, however, we do not yet have enough. For treatment to be effective in and beyond its initial stages, a clear understanding and unified approach among all involved in the treatment is vital. This means that the mandates passed by the Security Council must be clear, pointed and practicable; that member governments and troop contributors must be willing to provide and sustain the support necessary to implement them; that ongoing consultations between the obstacles and difficulties that arise as the mission pursues its tasks; that unified command must be observed and respected both within the mission and by all who support it from the outside; and that agencies and organizations cooperate maximally. This is no small task, but we are making substantial and encouraging progress toward it. My reform program has placed great emphasis both on clean lines of authority as well as effective mechanisms to ensure that all parts of the UN system that can contribute to the success of a mission can work together in a single, integrated effort.

But if the international community is truly to become more effective, whatever steps we take within the Secretariat must be complemented by corresponding action from Member States. The unfortunate reality up to now has been that the will to act differs greatly from case to case. It is important for the Security Council to respond with consistency and for governments to follow up to those decisions by making troops available, when necessary, to help implement them.

Clear and achievable mandates are also vital if we are to respond adequately to the needs of a situation, present a credible and effective response, and maximize the safety and productivity of those who have gone to serve. Initial international intervention in the former Yugoslavia was hampered by both vague and limited mandates. The Security Council must, thus, identify the right medications and the right dosages. And the “right dosages,” in this context, need to be determined not only in the light of the needs on the ground, but also in the light of support that will be available (or be made available) from member governments. The strength and structure of a peacekeeping operation must permit it to do two things: carry out its mandate and defend itself. Determining the right dosage is the first step toward achieving this; ensuring that governments promptly provide

adequately trained and equipped troops is the second. Our ability to respond more rapidly, preventively, and effectively depends very much on this.

Further actions will need to be taken if we are to intervene more effectively in either a preventive or curative capacity. We must have adequate information sharing. Many countries possess information facilities far beyond anything available to the United Nations. Enhanced information sharing by those governments could be of significant use in addressing the conflicts that face us. It would have a direct impact upon our capacity to analyze situations and the ways in which they are likely to develop, another factor that is crucial to a rapid and effective response.

Beyond the Secretariat, beyond its Member States, however, there lays one other step to be taken. As we approach each crisis, we must ensure that the public at large has the firmest possible understanding of what lays before us. Strong, sustained support on their part is absolutely vital. For this reason and others, we must above all work to mobilize and optimize understanding. The health profession realized long ago that there were a number of benefits in pursuing this goal: it helps those who are ill better understand what they are dealing with; it helps those who are concerned better understand how they can best contribute; and it helps each of us understand how we can best stave off the disease or recognize it early. The heart disease and breast cancer campaigns are admirable models of this.

We are slowly learning the same lessons in the area of conflict, but there are a number of obstacles impeding our progress. The first of these is that the general public has come to misunderstand to a great degree what peacekeeping missions were meant to do and can do. Second, too few of us are aware of the positive side of the peacekeeping prescription—what it can achieve and has achieved. To take a few examples, what have most of us read of Cambodia, Namibia, Mozambique, or El Salvador? And how many realized, when the UN was under fire from public opinion for failing to stop the fighting in the former Yugoslavia, that our troops had not the mandate, much less the means, to do so? At the same time, the successful facilitation of the delivery of humanitarian aid received precious little coverage. Last, it is true that today we hear, see and read far more of conflicts in various parts of the globe than we did during the Cold War. Full-blown crises are news, nascent conflicts are not. In an age when international intervention is decided by governments, and governments are propelled by public opinion, this means that effective and preventive rapid reaction is remarkably difficult. Neither do ongoing concern the media unless there is a reason for renewed interest. In many countries, the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan were followed by revived media coverage of the Kashmir dispute. Apparently of no direct concern to other parts of the world, the conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia floats in and out of the media.

When global attention reaches a conflict at its height, a number of problems can occur. Acting at this point is the costliest and most dangerous way to intervene. It is also the least likely to succeed. Without any doubt, media coverage has generated in recent years a degree of attention and response that the conflicts examined here would otherwise never have known. But it also has shown that the public needs to be aware earlier of what is happening and could happen in a conflict area. Technology has made it possible for governments (and often the media) to know about many conflicts very early on, yet this information often takes far too long to reach the public at large. The problem is one of focus, priorities, and, once again, political will. If our efforts are indeed to become more preventive, if they are to limit more tightly the incidence and escalation of violent conflict, that focus must shift.

The steps that we have taken and the problems that we have identified show us that, while we have made substantial progress in developing and applying the peacekeeping prescription, our understanding of both conflict and its cure are far from complete. As with AIDS and cancer, each step brings us closer, but the disease itself changes even as we work, making a cure even more evasive. This, however, must not daunt us. We realize today that peacekeeping is not a wonder drug, that it is not applicable to every situation and not guaranteed to cure every case. But, as we struggle to understand better the disease of conflict, the most intractable that humanity has known, we cannot help but be encouraged by the inroads we are making.

Conclusion

Having looked at the developments of both the disease of violent conflict and the peacekeeping prescription, having examined the prognosis of both the patient and the treatment, we have given a clearer context and direction to our efforts. In closing, I would like to broaden it.

As I reflected on the idea of the peacekeeping prescription, on the concept of peace as an integral and essential component of international public health, I recalled a speech in a similar vein given more than sixty years ago by former U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt. In October 1937, as the first shadows of World War II gathered, President Roosevelt delivered what has since become known as the “Quarantine the Aggressors” speech, in which he warned that the “epidemic of world lawlessness is spreading.” Taking the public-health perspective that we have adopted here, he asserted that:

> War is a contagion, whether it be declared or undeclared. It can engulf states and peoples remote from the original scene of hostilities. We are determined to keep out of war, yet we cannot insure ourselves against the disastrous effects of war and the dangers of involvement. … We cannot have complete protection in a world of disorder in which confidence and security have broken down. If

> civilization is to survive … the will for peace on the part of peace-loving nations must express itself to the end that nations that may be tempted to violate their agreements and the rights of others will desist from such a cause. There must be positive endeavors to preserve peace.

These words remain both sobering and encouraging. They are sobering because they reemphasize the depth and breadth and length of the challenge before us; they remind us that violent conflict is as old as humankind itself. They are encouraging because they show us very clearly and tangibly the recent progress that we have made in addressing it.

Roosevelt's necessity of quarantining the aggressors is no longer the only option. Even in instances where conflict is advanced, the peacekeeping prescription does not simply quarantine the victim and leave him to his fate. The new tools and approaches that we have developed have allowed us to remedy cases where the patient would otherwise have been lost. As in medicine, we have developed techniques for detecting problems earlier. Through research and experience, we have honed our understanding and our methods. New tools and technologies have made it possible for intervention to be more targeted, separating, identifying, and correcting in treating specific symptoms and improving the prognosis. We have, as Roosevelt urged us, undertaken "positive endeavors to preserve peace."

In doing so we have achieved a great deal. In places like Namibia, Mozambique, El Salvador, and the Aouzou Strip, cures have been achieved. In other areas we have been able to bring the conflict into remission. In yet others we have halted its growth. Some areas—like Somalia—have proven resistant to treatment, and the international presence has had to be withdrawn, with the hope that the body's own defenses would help stabilize it. But these are the exception, not the rule. What will develop in Iraq and Kosovo remains to be seen. In Africa we continue to respond to ever more complicated and distressing situations.

I admitted earlier that, if I were a doctor examining the health of the world today, I would be greatly alarmed at the state of my patient. And indeed I would. But what I did not tell you is that I would not be pessimistic about his prognosis. My work, and particularly those aspects of it which we have had a chance to discuss here, has given me a keen sense of what we can achieve together—and what we should do. I believe that we have made great progress in this treatment. I believe that we will continue to do so. And I believe that the challenges ahead will demand nothing less of us.

Reviving Global Civil Society After September 11

Richard Falk

9/11 challenged the American way of life in a manner that is unprecedented, and it is evolving with a significance of which we are only beginning to grasp. To uphold the blessings of democracy, we must start with the understanding that as members of a constitutional republic, we are citizens and not subjects. Subjects discharge their political responsibilities to society by unconditionally obeying the government. Citizens face a more complex challenge. Their need, especially in periods of crisis, is to strike a balance between loyalty and patriotism on one side and conscience and independent judgment on the other. A passive citizenry forfeits the virtues of democracy as well as betrays a lack of confidence in public debate on controversial issues. Without the benefits of vigorous debate and a genuine political opposition, alternatives to war and militarism tend to be bypassed. The more extreme voices counseling political leaders gain influence, a climate of chauvinistic nationalism is likely to dominate public discussion. This pattern of behavior represents both a general observation and is intended as a critical commentary on the drift of American domestic and foreign policy since 9/11.[1]

This assertion of citizen responsibilities might have seemed too obvious in this country to comment upon only a few years ago. It has suddenly become a matter of some urgency in the aftermath of the mega-terrorist attacks in 2001. Because these attacks caused such great symbolic and substantive harm, and because the adversary was a concealed terrorist network operating by stealth in sixty or more countries in such a manner as to be everywhere and nowhere, there was a tendency on the part of the citizenry to close ranks behind our political leaders, relying on their capacity to fashion an effective response that would restore our sense of security. This call for unity by the government was a natural response to such an unprecedented challenge, but it has had several serious unfortunate side effects, including the disruption of some very positive global developments of a humanitarian character that had been moving forward in the decade after the end of the Cold War. These developments owed a great deal to the activism of citizens from democratic societies around the world, as well as to their organizations, which often took the shape of voluntary transnational associations.[2]

What makes the present context particularly disturbing is a rediscovery of the fragility of societal reality. Despite American power and wealth, the country has become vulnerable to hostile extremism

as a reaction to a presence and policies around the world that are generating intense resentment. Despite the achievements of modernity, existing forms of democratic governance are unable to control either the passions that animate politics or the technologies that are relied upon to establish security. There may be a tragic predicament that is embedded in these realizations. Security for the citizenry is likely to remain elusive despite impressive technological innovations and the greatly intensified efforts of regulatory institutions.[3] We confront a serious possibility that the pursuit of security in our daily lives may prove to be both ineffectual and repressive at the same time, thereby imperiling the quality of democracy without providing protection against these new forms of extremism directed against our nation and people. What is more, which is the relevant point of this essay, the pressures exerted by the challenges of mega-terrorism have diverted energies and resources away from some exceptionally promising developments in the humanitarian sector that were occurring in the 1990s. These developments were exciting in several distinct ways, raising hopes for significant improvement in the human condition, as well as representing encouraging steps from the perspective of global justice. Such initiatives exhibited both the growth of transnational social forces emerging out of civil society, often acting internationally as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and an unusual spirit of collaboration between governments and NGOs that was giving rise to a distinct type of diplomacy that could be described as “a new internationalism” motivated by ethical concerns, entirely different from the preoccupations with power and wealth that formed the subject matter of geopolitics as practiced by leading states.

It seems reasonable to maintain that prior to September 11 there was a multifaceted upsurge of humanitarian initiatives that had already within the space of a decade established a rather remarkable record of achievement, with prospects for continuing progress. I have previously described this set of developments as the first global normative revolution in human history, that is, a definite trend in international relations emphasizing the relevance of ethical values and issues of justice that were posing a challenge to the dominant realist paradigm that reduced international relations to calculations of power.[4]

A Global Normative Revolution in the 1990s

The centerpiece of the emergent normative revolution was the genuine rise of human rights from the outer margins of diplomacy and international concern to a position that seemed close to the center of foreign policy, bearing directly on issues of whether or not to seek economic gains in relation with countries whose governments were responsible for repressing their own populations. Some prominent observers of the global scene insisted that human rights had become the secular religion of

our era.[5] Such a sweeping generalization undoubtedly reflected wishful thinking, but it was also a historic comment on some extraordinary reversals of expectations that had occurred in the 1990s. The collapse of the Soviet system of internal and regional domination was facilitated by strong grassroots resistance that had long been demanding the implementation of human rights. The amazing surprise transformation that took place in South Africa without bloodshed early in the same decade was definitely hastened by the anti-apartheid movement that was inspired by the global consensus condemning the institutionalized racism of Pretoria as a crime against humanity. Such positive outcomes owed a great deal to pressures exerted by people acting on their own on behalf of human right goals, organized at the level of civil society, and mounting moral outrage that persuaded governments to override material and strategic interests by joining in the struggles to achieve change.

These encouraging initiatives reflected the interplay of many different influences, but in this chapter the focus will be on the distinctive contributions made by the NGO world, and civil society generally. This contribution is particularly evident in relation to the expanding role of human rights in world politics. The domain of human rights as a subject for NGO activism goes back to the period immediately after World War II.[6] It is doubtful that sovereign states in the late 1940s would have assented to an international framework imposing duties to respect human rights if their leaders had thought such standards were meant in any but an aspirational spirit. What made the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR, 1948) a feasible *political* project was the expectation that the rights set forth would remain internationally unenforceable. This expectation was formalized by calling the document a “declaration” thereby signaling that it lacked the legal stature of a treaty, and hence was not obligatory. It was also evident after World War II that very few countries were governed in accordance with the UDHR, and that their governments would never have lent their approval to an international instrument that gave the UN or other states a legal basis to push for implementation.

Human rights NGOs in the years following 1948 realized that a great opportunity existed to use this aspirational document to promote some desired modifications of behavior by repressive states, and at least to depict persuasively severe human rights abuses. Amnesty International took advantage of their realization that governments increasingly care about their reputation, and that allegations of human rights abuses are black marks when backed up by genuine information and given wide distribution by the world media. Such allegations could not be dismissed as the propaganda of ideological adversaries as was the case in the exchange of Cold War charges and countercharges being made by officials in Washington and Moscow. NGOs put human rights on the world policy map long before the 1990s, and paved the way for many governments to adjust their regulatory

policies.[7] To begin with, the UDHA was converted in the mid-1960s into a pair of treaties called "covenants" that were widely ratified by states around the world. It became a matter of political legitimacy for states to commit themselves formally and existentially to the overall goal of conforming their political practices to human rights standards. This evolution, although welcome, was less attributable to changes of heart on the part of governments and more to a combination of sustained pressure by human rights organizations and some parts of the media over the years and a closely related trend toward the democratization of political life. Thus, despite its modest beginnings, human rights NGOs and international institutions increasingly viewed the UDHR as a framework of rights to be seriously implemented, which included the push for treaty-making procedures and for the further elaboration of specific rights that deserved wider recognition (for instance, prohibition of racial discrimination, protection of women and children, prohibition of torture).[8]

This NGO role was then reinforced by historical circumstances that led to opposition groups in authoritarian societies to rely on *international* human rights standards to back up their demands for political reform. This process of opposition was most dramatic in the settings of Eastern Europe and South Africa where the wider struggle for fundamental change showed that human rights would no longer be reduced to a set of pieties but were now a serious dimension of political conflict. The same dynamic was to a degree also visible in the Asian pro-democracy movements of the 1980s, which did not achieve success in all instances, but exhibited the degree to which people everywhere were inspired by growing feelings of entitlement to fundamental human rights.[9]

What happened in the 1990s that was so encouraging was that human rights seemed to become an active ingredient of international public policy, generally exhibiting a sincere concern of the general public about the suffering endured by vulnerable populations, groups, and individuals victimized by governmental wrongdoing.[10] This upgrading of human rights was also institutionally expressed within the United Nations, principally by establishing a High Commissioner for Human Rights, which in turn led to more prominence being accorded the work of the Geneva-based UN Human Rights Commission.

The second development in the previous decade that formed part of the normative revolution getting underway, even though it remained controversial in some settings, was the willingness of the organized international community, or portions of it, to undertake humanitarian intervention designed to rescue or protect vulnerable populations or minorities from oppressive practices of their government.[11] The idea behind humanitarian intervention is the claim by an *external* political factor that it refuses to respect the supremacy of territorial sovereignty in the face of extreme abuse of

human rights. The occasion giving rise to humanitarian intervention in the 1990s was the accusation of ethnic cleaning of a disfavored ethnic or religious component of the territorial population with the goal of expulsion, an abusive policy that was also often coupled with genocidal practices involving massive rape and massacres. Humanitarian intervention generated the sort of debate that was also in the background of discussion about the implementation of human rights generally.[12] There were several issues: Should the obligation to uphold human rights be implemented by force? Were the motives underlying humanitarian intervention truly humanitarian or were those claims masking geopolitical goals? Must the UN Security Council always authorize humanitarian intervention? Did the results of such interventions bring benefits to the vulnerable peoples?

To be sure, there were disappointments and ambiguities associated with purported humanitarian interventions. The Kosovo intervention seemed almost a reward for the violence of the KLA; NATO relied on tactics that caused extensive death among Serbian civilians, while acting to minimize its own; it proceeded without formal mandate from the United Nations; and during its aftermath, insufficient effort was made by occupying forces to protect the Serbian minority against "reverse ethnic cleansing." At the same time, the intervention provided the only available means to ensure that the great majority of the Kosovars would be rescued from a repetition of the ethnic cleansing that had earlier caused so much death and destruction in Bosnia.

Of potentially even greater significance for the future of world order, a consensus seemed to be slowly taking shape among leading states insisting that sovereignty was no longer an absolute grant of authority, and that the moral, political, and legal prerogatives of rulership were conditioned upon adhering to the most basic human rights standards. If a government henceforth severely abused its people, or a portion thereof, respect for its sovereign rights would be diminished, if not ignored, by the international community. Human rights NGOs cannot take the major credit for instances of humanitarian intervention, but it has often been their presence on the ground in the society experiencing, and their credibility validating, oppressive circumstances that leads to media emphasis, which in turn tips the balance toward intervention within governmental circles and at the United Nations.

It is important to recall the 1994 massacre of upwards of 800,000 in Rwanda when the UN refused to respond to urgent calls for humanitarian protection, and in Bosnia during the first half of the 1990s when an overly passive engagement by the UN seemed partly responsible for a particularly brutal enactment of ethnic cleansing, culminating in the 1995 massacre of about 7,000 Muslim males at Srebrenica.[13] This subject matter of humanitarian intervention remained problematic whether the decision is to take positive action or to refrain from doing so. There is no

doubt that powerful states use the cover of humanitarian intervention to advance strategic goals, and refuse to allow such responses in comparable situations if their interests so dictated. It is reasonable for smaller states and for ex-colonial states, and the non-Western world generally, to be deeply suspicious of humanitarian intervention as it invariably has involved the Euro-American complex of states imposing its political will with mixed motives on one or another non-Western state. Such suspicions are deepened if, as in Kosovo, the UN is bypassed to avoid a veto of a resolution in the Security Council authorizing force, and if supporters argue that in the future, not even the imprimatur of a regional grouping such as NATO is necessary, but that it is sufficient to enlist "coalitions of the willing."

The third dimension of this focus on the ethical side of international relations that assumed significance in the 1990s were various efforts to obtain redress in various forms for historic grievances.[14] This surge of concern disclosed an increased willingness to treat the crimes of the past as unresolved: the activism of Holocaust survivors; of comfort women in the Japanese setting; of a variety of slave labor initiatives seeking compensation after the Cold War ended; of claims for reparations associated with the institutions of slavery and colonialism; of an array of commissions devoted to "truth and reconciliation"; and of grievances advanced by indigenous people who had been dispossessed from their historic lands and endured humiliations and deprivations.[15] This sense of the obligations of present society for past abuses of state power, most of which were treated as legal and valid at the time of their occurrence, represented an extraordinary recognition that these historic wounds continued to cause suffering to victims and their descendants, and would never be healed without some active curative response. Many of these grievances had persisted without serious notice for decades, if not centuries. Why had these past injustices abruptly generated formal responses and increased activism in the 1990s when they had been ignored for so long? There is no simple response, no single explanation. Certainly, the end of the Cold War removed obstacles that had shielded some governments from accountability. Also relevant were the trends toward upholding human rights and democratization. But perhaps most important was the spreading awareness of civic empowerment. Holocaust survivors and their descendants led the way, but also led others with grievances to push for acknowledgement, compensation, apology, and other types of redress.

In this climate of opinion, the credibility of claimants was greatly enhanced. To be sure, there was also practical and principled resistance. Those accused tended to be defensive, contending that there was no current responsibility for what had been done previously in an atmosphere where values and legalities were different. There was no consistent response from issue to issue, and from country to country. There were some impressive symbolic and substantive steps taken toward reconciliation,

and in the direction of reversing past injustice. Swiss banks were induced to return deposits and settle many claims of Holocaust victims valued in the billions. Corporations using slave labor in Germany offered compensation. Apologies were expressed by leaders such as President Bill Clinton for the institution of slavery, and by the British queen for the imposition of colonial rule. The Canadian and Australian governments established education and compensation funds that were dedicated to preserving what traditional remnants of indigenous civilizations remained, and to provide symbolic recompense for past wrongs.

These evidences that the international community and civil society were coming to some sort of acknowledgement of these historic injustices was again, I think, an important element in this unexpected normative revolution that was beginning to take shape in the 1990s. Its essential character was to exhibit the interaction of governments and civil society with respect to a series of issues bearing on the responsibility of the state. The state, as well as other international actors, was being humanized by this process by which injustices, even if in the distant past, were being heeded, and to some extent addressed. Such a process reflected the capacity of NGOs to help generate an ethical climate of accountability that exerted influence on all global actors, including the United Nations.

There was a still further fourth major element of this normative revolution that again exhibited the growing strength of civil society to reshape the role of the state and its institutions with regard to issues of global justice. This element concerned dramatic efforts to make leaders individually accountable for crimes of state committed against their own peoples.[16] The Pinochet litigation, arising out of action taken in Spanish courts leading to an extradition request directed at the British government, came about as a result of tireless efforts by those individuals and their relatives who had been victimized in Chile during the period of dictatorship not giving up on the pursuit of justice when living in exile in Spain. The dramatic fact of Pinochet's 1998 detention in Britain and the series of legal challenges associated with the detention produced some notable achievement. The practice of torture was confirmed by the House of Lords, the highest British judicial tribunal, as an international crime that can be apprehended and punished anywhere in the world, not just in the country where it occurred.[17]

Also significant was the renewal of the Nuremberg idea that even leaders of sovereign states are not exempt from individual criminal accountability for their official deeds, that the shield of sovereign immunity is not available. What happened unexpectedly in the 1990s after a lapse of more than forty-five years—first in relation to the Balkans and Rwanda—was the revival of the radical idea applied to defeated countries after World War II that political and military leaders of sovereign

states are not above the law. Of course, the pursuit of Pinochet, which in the end failed because he was found medically unfit to stand trial and returned to Chile, suggested the analogous criminality of a host of other leaders still at large around the world. Some of those accused were linked to powerful states. The most widely discussed instances were Henry Kissinger, especially for his role in the wrongdoing of the Pinochet government, and Ariel Sharon for his alleged responsibility for the massacres that took place in the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila back in 1982. Questions were raised as to whether the world is ready for such criminal accountability, which, given the realities, would lead to very uneven and selective enforcement of such standards of accountability.

The moves to detain and prosecute Pinochet stimulated civil society by suggesting that the rule of law might reach those responsible for the worse excesses of governmental and military authority. The Pinochet controversy, together with the experience of the ad hoc tribunal in The Hague dealing with crimes attributed to individuals associated with managing the breakup of former Yugoslavia, led civil society activists to embark upon an ambitious project to institutionalize the process in some enduring way through the establishment of a permanent international criminal court entrusted with the prosecution of the most serious international crimes. What ensued was an effective collaboration between a transnational coalition of NGOs and a series of moderate governments that generated a political process that led in 1998 to the Treaty of Rome and then to the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2002. Such a major institutional innovation was brought into being with surprising speed, securing more than the required sixty ratifications in a period of a few years.

This experiment in institutionalization is still in its infancy. It is opposed vigorously at present by the United States, and ignored by several other powerful countries, including China and Russia. If it could come later to obtain universal participation (as is the case with the UN), it would likely be viewed as the greatest institutional innovation since the United Nations itself. Its significance, symbolically and substantively, is that it expresses a determination to extend accountability and the rule of law to those who represent the state at the highest level. The creation of procedures by which to impose such accountability is a step forward in the efforts to overcome the impunity, at least on the international level, previously enjoyed by those who control sovereign states. Also, even compared to Nuremberg, the ICC is ambitious. The earlier criminal prosecutions of leaders were linked to a war, and embodied “victors’ justice,” the winners judging the loser.[18] Here, any leader at any point is, theoretically at least, subject to indictment, whether of a powerful or a weak country. The establishment of the ICC in an interdependent globalizing world could yet become an

extraordinary step forward in the struggle to create global democracy as a complement to national democracy, yet to reach this goal there are major obstacles that must be overcome.

The fifth component of the normative revolution involves the rise of the global civil society, which has become a source of lawmaking and global policy formation. Literally thousands of NGOs are now associated with the representation of transnational social forces in a variety of regional and global arenas. Their presence was a robust and influential feature in the first half of the 1990s of such UN conferences as those on population, environment, human rights and women's rights that advanced a people-oriented agenda on these matters of global concern. This agenda clashed with the priorities of leading governments and global corporations and banks.[19] Increasingly, the focus of efforts emanating from global civil society was placed upon the supposed excesses of neoliberal globalization. The emphasis on globalization led to demonstrations around the world that gained major attention from the media, particularly in the aftermath of "the battle of Seattle" in late 1999. The demonstrators and their discussion forums highlighted the antidemocratic operations of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organization (WTO), as well as the lending practices of the World Bank.

This antiglobalization movement, although diverse and inchoate, is properly considered as part of the normative revolution that is being described. Its main thrust was to resist some of the capital-driven impacts of globalization that seemed to be producing increasing inequality within and among states, as well as leaving some states that lacked investment trade opportunities out in the cold. This global civil society movement was not opposed to globalization as such. It was insisting on reforms that would lead to what might be described as "humane globalization." These criticisms were increasingly engendering a response from some of those most closely associated with the world economy in its recent globalizing phase. George Soros and Joseph Stiglitz echoed many of the complaints that were being shouted by the demonstrators about the way the global economy policy was proceeding.[20] As a result, the language associated with globalization began to exhibit more concern with such issues as the reduction of world poverty, the promotion of greater economic equality, the protection of human rights, particularly labor rights, and matters of environmental protection.

The 9/11 Attacks: Detour or Derailment?

Against this background of positive initiatives, I want to raise the question as to whether the 9/11 attacks have resulted in a permanent detour from this normative revolution, or merely caused its temporary derailment. There is little doubt that the energies and attention given to the initiatives

discussed above have been abandoned, especially in the United States, and replaced by a renewed foreign policy preoccupation with security and the dynamics of the war against global terror. In light of this shift, how should we interpret the overall impact of 9/11? Instead of seeking to build the structures of global governance, and strengthen further a global rule of law as a means of exerting constraints on sovereign states, the new emphasis is on claiming the authority to engage in whatever actions contribute to antiterrorist goals. This kind of claim to carry on violent conflict has two particularly disturbing aspects.

The first concern is that there has resulted the first borderless war in history. Both principal adversaries disavow respect for the territorial sovereignty of states. The Al Qaeda network declared a violent *jihad* against America, its cadres seem determined to launch attacks wherever such targets can be found, that is, anywhere in the world. The United States, in turn, claims the right to attack anywhere that it can locate an al Qaeda threat. This pattern of conflict is quite subversive from the perspective of international law, which evolved to deal with conflicts among territorial sovereigns. Of course, international law never enjoyed great success in relation to wartime situations, but it did have some role in moderating the scope of conflict by confining the zone of violent operations to the territorial domains of combatants.

The United States is militarily the most powerful country in human history. Since 9/11 its leadership portrays itself as the vehicle of good against this evil of anti-state terrorism. To destroy this evil, it is determined, as is the case with its Al Qaeda adversary, to suspend limits on the way force is used to achieve goals. Prisoners suspected of Al Qaeda connections are denied rights under the Geneva Conventions governing the standards of international humanitarian law. The White House issues orders to assassinate suspects in foreign countries as a permissible tactic. American investigative procedures have relied on relying on torture.[21]

There are additional reasons to be troubled. The antiterrorist banner is being waved, but the goals of American foreign policy were extravagant before September 11, and now seem to be pretending that the struggle against terrorism validates the project to exert control over virtually the entire planet. Such contentions can best be understood by reference to such other American strategic undertakings as the militarization of space, the realization that U.S. defense spending exceeds that of the next fifteen countries combined, and there have been Pentagon leaks disclosing an increased willingness to rely on nuclear weaponry in battlefield situations.

Under these circumstances can we, should we, search for new limits on the discretion to use force in world politics? This is a vital question, especially for Americans, which need to be addressed in the present world setting. I want to answer such a question rather subjectively, by offering some

tentative thoughts about the reconstruction of limits, and how this might bear upon the wider agenda of humanitarian action. As a starting point, the only acceptable way to rediscover a framework of limits is to recognize that our own values and traditions as a free society based on constitutionalism depend upon nurturing a respect for law and for the opinions of others, including those situated beyond our borders, and a reluctance to embark upon warfare outside of the Western Hemisphere. This ethical outlook is part of the federalist idea and the republican vision that has guided our sense of ourselves as a country, despite notable departures from time to time, since the national point of origin in the American Revolution. To protect this heritage at this point, given the pressures of the mega-terrorist challenge and the ambitions of the geopoliticians in the White House and Pentagon, will require a high level of citizen vigilance. This vigilance must be provided by the American people, by interior states such as Kansas and Minnesota, by activism on college campuses, and by the religious community and organized labor. Even to contemplate such prospects may seem utopian at this point, given an aggressive nationalism that grips the country, reinforced by the disturbing passivity of Congress, the provocations of the Tea Party, and inappropriate cheerleading by the mainstream media.

At stake here also is the matter of fundamental national identity. Aside from this acceptance of the self-limiting character of the state is the traditional American claim to be a republic and not an empire. However, if you assess the plans put forth by the Pentagon or peruse recent issues of *Foreign Affairs*, it is assumed that America has become, whether intentionally or not, an empire. The issue that remains more uncertain in these interpretations is whether the United States is likely to be a benevolent empire or whether it will be its fate to be an irresponsible, and probably, self-destructive empire.[22] The question that has so far not been raised, at least in these discussions within the American establishment, is whether being an empire is itself subversive of the self-proclaimed constitutional identity of this country as a republic. To be a republic is to be sensitive to the fragility of power, including the acute dangers of its abuse. The main purpose of the constitutional structure, based on checks and balances, is to protect the society against the destructive effects and multiple dangers of unchecked power. This prospect threatens our liberties as citizens, but internationally, the menace of unchecked power involves ignoring the well-being and viewpoints of others who lack the means of resisting.

The second problematic aspect of the response to 9/11 was a missing part of U.S. foreign policy and political consciousness for many years, that is, diagnosing and responding to the legitimate grievances that exist throughout the world, which if ignored, give rise to severe resentment. This resentment is especially directed against those political actors that are perceived to be responsible for

unacceptable conditions and possess the capabilities to fashion just solutions to outstanding conflicts. The United States, as the predominant actor throughout the world, is seen as having contributed to the suffering of peoples due to its relationship to some of these legitimate grievances. From the moment of the attacks, the American leadership has failed to connect anti-American sentiments, including those that give rise to political and religious extremism, and terrorist tactics with their real causes. Instead, avoiding the slightest willingness to allow self-criticism, the explanation of "why they hate us" is reduced to envy directed at our values and achievements.

These spiraling patterns of resentment pertain to the relations between the United States and the Islamic world, and especially the Arab Middle East. Of course, commentary is speculative. But it certainly seems much more likely that September 11 would not have happened if the Palestinian problems of self-determination had been solved years ago in a manner that was fair to both peoples. This conflict should have been dealt with long ago in a balanced way, not only for prudential reasons associated with regional stability, but as part of a more intrinsic commitment to a realization of the right of self-determination for the Palestinian people, who had been denied independence and statehood despite the dynamics of decolonization having swept across the world in recent decades.

Reviving the Normative Revolution: Temptations and Commitments

In effect, the construction of a humane framework for global governance, which was proceeding in a generally encouraging way in the 1990s, has been abandoned in this period after September 11. Can it be revived? Can global civil society renew its pressures that proved effective in the prior decade? What sorts of issues should take priority? Despite adverse trends, whatever integrity and courage are found, there remains the possibility of positive action with respect to the agenda of the normative revolution.

In conclusion, returning to the spirit of the normative revolution in the 1990s is not currently feasible. The continuing security consciousness, coupled with a prolonged economic recession, discourages use of energies and resources for humanitarian purposes. If this direct security threat is further diminished, a deeper security argument strongly supports the revival of the normative revolution, starting with fashioning equitable responses to legitimate grievances around the world. Without resuming the struggle to achieve humane global governance, the likelihood is that violent resistance will occur in forms that will jeopardize Western security in various ways. We need the moral and political imagination to realize that the security of the rich and powerful in a globalizing world depends over time on improving the circumstances and raising the hopes of the poor and weak. If September 11 has taught us anything, it should be that the weapons and tactics of the weak

are capable of inflicting severe harm with significant adverse material and psychological consequences. To learn from such a traumatic experience means nurturing our ethical impulses as well as sharpening our swords!

The Academy and Humanitarian Action

Joseph A. O'Hare, S.J.

Humanitarian action is ordinarily understood to involve a response to the needs of individuals and communities afflicted by different kinds of calamities, both those that are natural, like earthquakes and typhoons, and those that are the result of human intervention, like wars and political repression. Some calamities, of course, represent a convergence of natural disasters and human mischief; famine, for example, can be the result both of climactic changes in a particular region and a flawed distribution system created by a world market dominated by a profit motive.

Humanitarian action can also be understood in a broader sense, namely the continuing attempts to achieve a more human world, one where wealth and opportunity are more evenly distributed among nations and among classes within nations. In this sense, humanitarian action is the enduring effort to create a world where a respect for human dignity and inalienable rights of the individual are the cornerstone of society.

At first glance, the world of the academy is more directly engaged in the second, broader meaning of humanitarian action. The expansion and communication of knowledge, which is the life of the academy, is more directly related to the continuing search for wisdom and a vision of the human than to the more episodic responses to the needs of victims of wars and famines. At the present moment, however, the possibilities of direct humanitarian action in support of the afflicted in different parts of the world are limited and threatened by a new kind of world conflict that is rooted in a clash of the fundamental values and traditions that have always engaged the energies of scholars and teachers. The possibilities of humanitarian actions, in the conventional sense of a response to a crisis but also in the broader sense of a continuing search for a more human world, are today linked together in an unusual and more immediate relationship.

In this chapter, I propose to first describe the specific character of the present world conflict that threatens the possibility of humanitarian action and the threat this conflict poses for the integrity of the academy or, more specifically, the freedom of the university. I will then argue that the dangers of the present moment underline the urgency of recognizing that the contemporary university must be an international institution, one that fosters authentic intercultural understanding and maintains an environment where interreligious dialogue can take place and religious traditions can be renewed. One important dimension of this conflict involves the inexorable process of globalization, which

demands that contemporary education must be international in character, on every level in appropriate fashion.

The University and International Terrorism

The university, the most typical institution of academia, encourages differences, believing that the free competition of ideas is a necessary condition for the expansion of knowledge that can lead to a glimpse of the truth and the best available wisdom to guide our lives and our world. Given this inherent diversity, does the contemporary university offer a distinctive perspective on the possibilities of humanitarian action in a world where traditions and values can be locked in conflicts that can seem insoluble?

The dangers of the present moment arise from a network of international terrorists and terrorist organizations whose motivation and objectives are far more obscure than the causes that have, in the past, led nation-states into armed conflicts. International terrorism transcends national borders and political ideology. Its objective appears vague and shifting, its passion rooted in popular resentment rather than patriotic cause, its vision of the future vague and inarticulate. The amorphous character of international terrorism—the absence of any proposal for an alternative future coupled with its willingness to attack the innocent at random—only adds to the unsettling, because undefined, character of its threat to international society.

In such a climate of fear and uncertainty, legitimate concerns about national security can escalate into unnecessary restrictions on civil liberties and the repression of legitimate differences on how to meet the dangers of international terrorism. In the wake of the terrorist attack of September 11, the desire to retaliate overwhelmed the need to better understand the passions behind this murderous assault. Debate on university campuses over the Middle East crisis quickly became politicized, and the legitimacy of conflicting views on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was challenged. In the rush of patriotic feeling, many were impatient with any call for an examination of the international posture of the United States as the sole remaining superpower in the world.

Yet, any attempt to contain and eventually eliminate the dangers of international terrorism must include a better understanding of its deep, involved roots. This search for understanding is the mission of the university. To fulfill this mission, however, the university must protect its autonomy and encourage the kind of academic freedom that is a condition of authentic discovery. Such freedom, which encourages the competition of ideas, is not a luxury that can be surrendered in a time of national danger, but a necessity if we are to understand the nature of the danger that surrounds us.

The Internationalization of Education

One source of the energy of international terrorism is resentment of the current division of wealth and power in international community. Such resentment can create coalitions of protest among groups with different agenda and ideologies. The demonstrations against the present economic order that have marred international meetings around the world have brought together a wide variety of groups and organizations; religious activists calling for the cancellation of the debts of poorer nations and anarchists seeking to undermine civil order, united only in a resistance to the inexorable but bewildering process of globalization, driven by the dynamics of world markets and information technology. In this world economy that transcends national boundaries, new wealth is created and whole societies can be transformed, but the distribution of this wealth is uneven and individuals and communities can be left behind and left out.

The very process of globalization seems to strip individuals and communities of their autonomy and self-determination, and provokes the fury of those who consider its cost, both economically and culturally, dehumanizing. These critics of globalization insist it has created a wider gulf between the rich and the poor, between nations and regions, and between classes within nations. Meanwhile, distinctive cultural traditions are being undermined by a homogeneous popular culture that comes with mass consumerism.

Resentment of the economic and cultural consequences of globalization is a common passion that connects a broad array of critics with different causes and agendas. The violent protests that have exploded at several international meetings have bewildered many, while legitimate questions concerning globalization have been obscured by the destructive behavior of radical groups. But the process of globalization, driven by the appeal of world markets and the revolution in information technology, cannot be reversed, nor should it be.

If the university is to contribute to a better understanding of both the challenges and the opportunities that globalization presents, then the university must be transformed into an international institution, recognizing that in our contemporary world, all education must be international in nature.

This does not mean that individual institutions must compromise their distinctive identities and missions. In the twenty-first century we live in one world, whether we like it or not, but it is a world of differences, and our challenge is not to diminish those differences or paper them over in the interests of some superficial unity. On the contrary, the challenge for the university as an institution is the same challenge that confronts all nations and institutions in this new millennium: How to make our differences a source of enrichment rather than division? How to better appreciate our own

traditions and values by recognizing and respecting the traditions and values of others? How to redeem the promise of cultural and religious traditions of others? How to redeem the promise of cultural and religious traditions by a creative renewal of their deepest meanings? How to find in the renewal of such traditions a more human response to the opportunities made possible by the technological revolution? How to make it clear that modernization does not, in the end, mean Westernization?

The Development of Intercultural Understanding

The most obvious sign of the increasingly international character of higher education is the growth in exchange programs that brings students and scholars from other nations and cultures to our campuses here in the United States and encourages faculty and students from the United States to spend time at other institutions in other nations and cultures. But while the exchange of faculty and students is necessary, it is not enough. The university must encourage and support the development of authentic intercultural understanding.

The promotion of multiculturalism on American campuses can be an easy target for those critics who see it as a surrender of the defining values of Western civilization. It was with some chagrin that I learned some years ago of a campus debate here at Fordham that posed the question: multiculturalism versus the Jesuit educational tradition. We need only think of historic Jesuit experiments at inculturation, like those that led to the Chinese Rites controversy and the Paraguay Reductions, to realize that the Jesuit education over the past four and a half centuries has always been multicultural.

It is unfortunate that the debate about multiculturalism in American education has too often been mired in arguments about what texts should be included in college curricula in order to include underrepresented groups. It is a debate that has often degenerated into academic politics in its least appealing posture. To achieve the goals of an authentic intercultural sensibility, a program of immersion in another language and culture should be part of the required curriculum in any program of liberal studies. At present time, for example, the Beijing Center for Language and Culture offers a program for undergraduates at Jesuit colleges and universities in the United States that is far more demanding and far more rewarding in terms of an intercultural experience than prescribed readings, in translation, of a faculty member’s favorite neglected author.

An understanding and appreciation of non-Western cultures should enrich our understanding of Western civilization and not diminish it. To achieve this end, however, the enduring goals of a liberal education have to be continually affirmed and realized. The study of other cultures should not lead to

a collapse of community into separate national and ethnic enclaves but rather should lead to a deeper and richer appreciation of the common human values we share.

This process is assuredly not automatic. To be successful we cannot shy away from cultural critiques and ethical judgments. Accepting a bland moral relativism as the necessary corollary of multicultural appreciation will not guide the development of a more human world. At the same time, moral judgments that have no appreciation of different cultural sensibilities will remain irrelevant abstractions.

The Challenge of Interreligious Dialogue

The university has always been an institution where tradition is not only recovered and remembered but also renewed and transformed. In its classrooms, libraries, and laboratories, the wisdom of the past should confront each day the questions of tomorrow. In the life of the ideal university community, new questions are not feared and suppressed but welcomed and debated. In actual life, of course, university communities do not always resist the narrow politicization of activist and advocates that declare what is and is not acceptable thinking.

In the wake of the September 11 terrorist attack and the continuing violence in the Middle East, debate over the fundamental causes of the conflicts has often become polarized and the legitimacy of dissident scholars challenged because of their political views. If the university is to fulfill its historic role as a forum for competing views, we must insist on the conditions for civil debate: mutual respect and honest recognition of differences. Civility does not compromise moral commitment, although this is not obvious to campus activists who find demonstrations more satisfying than debates.

The need to balance passion and civility is particularly acute in the continuing conversation that should be interreligious dialogue. Perhaps the secular university is not the most congenial environment for such dialogue, since the recognition of the importance of religious experience and the legitimacy of intellectual inquiry into such experience can be absent from the prevailing ethos of the secular academy, the legacy of the children of the Enlightenment.

For the secularist, religion itself, with its absolutist claims, can appear to be the source of inevitable conflict, and certainly human history has demonstrated in many different ages that violence to the human spirit can be done in the name of religion. The terrorist attack on September 11 was not the only instance in history of the destructive purposes to which religious passion can lead. To protect the purity of the faith, heretics were tortured and beheaded in the name of Christendom. Closer to our own day, we have seen false messiahs inspire mass suicides by their followers.

Religious passion is a powerful flame that can inspire the radiant example of St. Therese of Lisieux and the heroic service to the poor by generations of missionaries. But religious passion, we recognize, can be turned to darker and more destructive purposes, as it surely was on September 11 when the terrorists committed the ultimate blasphemy of destroying the innocent in the name of the Almighty.

All religious traditions, if they are to be continually renewed, must be engaged in a dialogue with history. In the Catholic tradition, we speak of the development of doctrine, where the test of continuity is applied to new understandings of the received tradition. Every religious tradition, if the tradition is to be a living tradition, must deal with the tension between fundamentalism and modernity. There is no easy resolution of this tension; instead, it involves a continuing conversation, and the university offers a privileged forum for such a conversation. This has been the experience of Catholicism from the first development of the university as an institution born from "the heart of the church" (*Ex corde ecclesiae*) in the medieval universities of Europe.

This challenge of renewal confronts the powerful tradition of Islam. The dangers of Islamic fundamentalism can, in the end, only be resolved within Islam itself. The renewal of Islam, as a living religious tradition, must take place in the dialogue with history and modernity that must engage all religious traditions. The world of the university remains a privileged forum for this indispensable conversation and renewal. Those universities that are themselves animated by a living religious tradition would seem to be a particularly congenial home for such dialogue.

In our observance of the first anniversary of the September 11 terrorist attack at Fordham University, interreligious memorial services were held at each of our campuses. The readings for these services were drawn from the New Testament, Buddhist texts, and the Koran. Though obviously different in tone and accent, all of these readings converged on the primacy of human dignity as the test of any religious passion. Respect for those who differ from us in national identity or religious belief does not imply an indifference toward the truth. A healthy religious pluralism fosters the renewal of distinctive religious traditions and respect for the truth claims they make, even when one chooses to disagree with those claims. But the critical test of such claims is their relevance to the dignity of the human person. Does this religious vision recognize and enhance the human person or diminish and violate human dignity? While different cultures may manifest different expressions of what it means to be human, the assumptions of liberal education is that there is a common humanity we all share. To destroy the innocent on behalf of a religious cause is the ultimate blasphemy. Religious passion, then, becomes a vicious abstraction, demonic in origin rather than divine. Part of the legacy of September 11 is the painful reminder that religious faith can be betrayed

by those who use it to justify violence. The search for understanding among differences, the mission of the university, is an essential guardian of religious integrity.

The fundamentalist instinct in all religious traditions, of course, can slide into a kind of anti-intellectualism that resists the kind of questioning of tradition that is part of the life of the university. The university, as an institution of inquiry rather than indoctrination, is suspect to the fundamentalist. The irony here is that without such inquiry religious tradition can become distorted, frozen into harmless irrelevancy or distorted into the more dangerous sense of absolute righteousness that can become absolute ruthlessness. Dare one suggest that the blasphemous attack of September 11 was an extreme instance of a religious tradition that had refused the essential dialogue with modernity that is the mission of the Catholic university and remains the best hope of a creative renewal of the deepest truths of the Islamic tradition?

Conclusion

The contemporary university should provide a context for humanitarian action in the broad sense of creating a more human world and enable individuals to respond to the need of the afflicted in the more narrow sense of humanitarian action by fostering an authentic intercultural understanding and encouraging the renewal of religious traditions, and particularly the Islamic tradition, through interreligious dialogue. In a world threatened by international terrorism, the university must resist restrictions on academic freedom that would inhibit the task of understanding the sources of the deep-seated, if inarticulate, resentment at the heart of such terrorist campaigns.

Government Responses to Foreign Policy Challenges

Peter Tarnoff

Different Paths to Common Goals

It is remarkable how much the preambles of constitutions have in common. Even when their authors come from different historical, religious, and cultural traditions, these documents extol the dignity of all citizens and defend the exercise of freedom and rights while proclaiming the unity of a people in a national politic. Founders of nations and their successors invariably appeal to universal sentiments common to all humankind. No doubt some of the constitution writers are sincere in evoking aspirations that elicit a general will to work for the common good. Other founders may be more cynical or manipulative, knowing full well that even a morally correct constitution does not always reflect the realities of governance.

In order to understand the true intentions of governments, we may want to distinguish between those that are value-oriented and results-oriented. Value-oriented regimes commit themselves to govern according to traditional—usually religious—texts or laws. The highest authorities in value-oriented states are clerics and the most venerated documents of state are scriptures. High religious authorities are empowered to interpret religious texts in ways that apply to everyday life including commerce, contracts, laws, and the definition and punishment of crime. In these societies, severe restrictions usually are imposed on the behavior of ordinary citizens and close ties with foreign powers are regarded with suspicion for fear of contamination or subversion.

Results-oriented governments aim to bring about tangible improvements in the well-being of society in areas such as health care, prosperity, education, public safety, national security, and infrastructure. When a government is results-oriented, its laws can be based on a body of traditional doctrine, but its constitutional foundation is consistently being interpreted and reinterpreted by secular, often elected, judiciaries and parliaments.

The U.S. government is, for the most part, results-oriented. Its constitution affirms the separation of church and state. A strong federal system and independent judiciary constrain the power of the central government. The two national political parties compete for public favor in terms of concrete deliverables. While public rhetoric, especially during electoral periods, embraces traditional values and moral principles, elections themselves usually are won or lost on the basis of policy prescriptions or records of achievement.

Can the same be said of American foreign policy? Is it also results-oriented, or is the propagation of an American value system becoming more central to U.S. objectives around the world?

In the immediate post–World War II period, American foreign policy was driven principally by the need to establish a network of coalitions under U.S. leadership that were prepared to defend—militarily, if necessary—the Western world against encroachments from the Communist bloc, led by the Soviet Union. During the forty-five years of the Cold War, there were superpower proxy wars in the developing world but no armed conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The two alliance adversaries made little effort to convert the other; both were principally concerned with controlling their own members and preserving their respective systems of governance and economic organization.

Suddenly, a quarter-century ago, the USSR collapsed and the Cold War ended.

An “end of history” was proclaimed by some and it looked to many Americans as if liberal democratic forms of governments and free market economies had triumphed over the Communist and totalitarian alternatives and that there would be a universal recognition that something close to a U.S. model had become the system of choice for most societies. In the absence of overarching military and ideological threats and a diminished need for the “sole remaining superpower” to tend to minding its alliances, there was more talk in Washington than before about a moral foreign policy and greater confidence that American values (often portrayed as “universal values”) would be a central component of Washington’s worldwide reach.

A Doctrinaire Foreign Policy

Doctrines and values are not new to American foreign policy. In the early nineteenth century, the Monroe Doctrine alerted Europeans that the United States “should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety.”

Shortly after World War II, the Truman Doctrine made clear that the United States would act to oppose any Soviet attempt to extend its influence into Greece and Turkey. Under President Jimmy Carter, human rights were placed high on the U.S. foreign policy agenda and, although Carter was denounced by balance-of-power realists for sacrificing American interests on the altar of idealism, his successor, Ronald Reagan, strengthened democracy-building efforts primarily to weaken the hold of the Communist regimes. The first President Bush announced the coming of a “new world order” that was understood to rely heavily on the American experience and influence.

President Clinton came to stand for what some of his aides described as a doctrine of "humanitarian interventionism," where the international community—assisted and sometimes led by the United States—intervenes, with force if necessary, to prevent or stop human slaughter.

The second Bush administration was more ambitious than its recent predecessors in proclaiming the need for a new doctrinal structure and the obligation to spread American political, economic, and moral values far and wide. It justified this redefinition of American interests and strategies on the basis of what is required to defend the United States against new enemies and new threats in the post–Cold War world.

The Bush II administration was, of course, heavily influenced by the need to retaliate following the attacks in New York and Washington, D.C. The new Bush Doctrine was published as the "National Security Strategy of the United States." The document makes clear that the United States intends to preserve and use its position as the dominant military power in today's world. Washington will decide what threatens the American way of life and, while there are passing references to international partners, it is clear that the United States is prepared (even eager) to act alone. It is not hard to see in the text the strength of the administration's unilateralist impulse that so concerned many foreign governments.

In the case of Iraq, the doctrinal and pragmatic strains of Bush administration thinking meet and fuse. President Bush repeatedly stated that the United States would act quickly, decisively, and alone (if necessary) to remove the threat that Saddam Hussein represented. He had been so clear and consistent that it is hard to imagine the President's being satisfied by anything less than a convincing cleansing of all weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and the ouster of Saddam as well. Most world leaders, including those in the Arab nations, would like nothing better than to rid Iraq of such weapons, and there was little support around the world for the murderous regime of Saddam Hussein. Yet, why then was there so much suspicion regarding Washington's demands when America's objective (Iraqi disarmament) was so widely shared?

For three reasons: The first is that many governments believed that American policy in Iraq was not based on a legitimate fear of Iraqi intentions or capabilities, but that Washington was using Iraq as a convenient excuse to assert America's paramount political power and military superiority and its willingness to use them. This skepticism was reinforced when it turned out that Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction. The second: Many Muslim leaders believed that the United States wanted to transform Iraq into a Western-style democracy. The third: The United States sought improved access to oil.

But back again to doctrine. Now that there was a clearly stated official Bush Doctrine, it became awkward for the administration to flexibly and creatively innovate new policies or react to new emergencies. But it did. The announcement by North Korea that it was pursuing a nuclear weapons program was a clear candidate for preemptive military attack by the United States. However, the Bush administration reacted cautiously and cooperatively to the North Korean program while defending itself against charges from the right that it was handling the challenge no differently from the way a Democratic administration would have reacted.

The United States forcibly installing democracy in Baghdad, and beyond, alarmed many in the Middle East who will not soon forget the crusader spirit of those American officials eager to assert that the United States has the right to remake Muslim societies. In the real world of international politics and diplomacy, imposing Western ways by force of arms following a military victory on countries determined to preserve their distinctive cultures and religions would have catastrophic consequences.

The Obama administration has generally adhered to the approach to foreign policy practiced by the predecessors of George W. Bush. It has stressed collegiality “whenever possible” and case-by-case decisions regarding the extent of U.S. involvement. And it has functioned at a time when the very nature of warfare and so-called soft nonmilitary pressures are rapidly changing.

Good vs. Evil: An Age of Absolutes

American presidents have called foreign adversaries “evil” before. Ronald Reagan labeled the Soviet Union an “evil empire,” but he then went on to become a serious negotiating partner with Mikhail Gorbachev. The second President Bush described Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as constituting an “axis of evil,” and he warned the rest of the world that countries have a choice: they can be either for or against the United States in the war on terror. But since World War II, the United States has worked harder at persuading and cultivating its political, military, and economic partners than at negotiating with its enemies. Presidents from Truman to Obama understood how much American security depended on having close friends and allies, even when there were differences of views to bridge and difficult compromises to swallow.

It is also true that diplomatic conditions have changed: America’s new enemies are both more and less threatening: less threatening because, whatever their destructive power, they are unable to obliterate the planet (although some might do so if they could), but also more threatening because they do not seek to reach accommodations with us. They have no interest in summitry or state visits. In the Middle East, some have a political agenda: the destruction of the State of Israel and the

overthrow of the Gulf monarchies, especially that of Saudi Arabia. They see the United States as the principal obstacle to their aims and have shown themselves ready to use terror to weaken and hurt us. In the case of the most fanatic extremists, no negotiation is possible, and the United States has no choice but to work with others to destroy them.

Does their suicidal fanaticism make all of the terrorists' demands evil? What happens when countries in the Middle East that we need for security cooperation and oil express some sympathy for the political agenda of the terrorists? The problem with labeling governments and groups as either good or evil and demanding (rhetorically, at least) that they be for us or against us is that it may play well in American politics but it outrages many important non-Americans whose cooperation is essential to us in the war on terror and who insist on making a distinction between the aims and the methods of terrorist states and organizations.

The overuse of "evil" to describe countries and governments also places an implicit obligation on the United States to dispose of such regimes. Although the United States can fight and win wars in many places at once, few in America want Washington to be the world's enforcer. Indeed, less talk of good versus evil and us versus them might allow the United States to recapture the moral high ground in the war on terror. The more insidious the threat, the more important it will be for the United States to be less absolutist in its approach. During the Cold War, the United States could have fought alone against the USSR. But there is no way that the United States can win the war on terror alone, even if America is statistically more powerful than ever before when compared to the rest of the world.

Shifting Fault Lines

Living as I do in an earthquake zone in California, I am extremely sensitive to the danger when fault lines start to shift, even to a small degree. I also know that it is hard to predict when and where these movements will occur and what will be the extent of the damage they are likely to cause. It is clear, however, that even the most democratic and well-intentioned governments behave uncharacteristically when they feel threatened or destabilized. For example, they can:

- relax their definition of what constitutes torture (e.g., waterboarding) and permit a degree of corporal punishment and nonphysical pressures (e.g., sleep deprivation, noise and light harassment, extreme and indefinite isolation, threats to family members, constant interrogation)
- resort to the extrajuridical and covert assassinations of suspected terrorists

- invoke a political form of “force majeure” as reason for selectively applying or ignoring the Geneva Conventions
- restrict immigration, especially from countries or cultures perceived to be strange or hostile. Anti-immigrant sentiment also leads to the formation of sometimes-powerful neofascist political movements in developed countries
- pay less attention to issues of discrimination against women and children
- amend domestic judicial practices so that terms of indictment and confinement are radically tightened. Punishments then become much more severe for crimes stemming from the new threats
- impose restrictions on the media that result in less information being made available to the general public. Invoking national security considerations is a frequent excuse for withholding information that might prompt citizens to oppose the policies of their governments.

It is reasonable, even necessary, for societies under threat to resort to extraordinary measures to defend themselves. But it is also essential that in open societies there be a continuing public and political debate about how much security can be gained by limiting how much freedom. Such a debate can be acrimonious but it becomes unhealthy only if stifled. As frustrating as it is to policymakers, the struggle between security and liberty is endless. Should conditions change, practices can be loosened or tightened. The tectonic plates of policy are always shifting and the number of independent variables at play in a crisis can be huge. Nevertheless, as long as governments are committed to the proposition that it is ultimately desirable for there to be more freedoms not less and more information not less, citizens can expect that liberties and openness will someday be restored. But beware of those—even in democracies—who seek to make emergency restrictions permanent, because the threat is potentially infinite. Their aim is to transform, not simply defend, society because they live in a world of absolutes, including the illusion of absolute security.

Because the very nature of post–Cold War threats is indefinite and universal, there are some who believe that it will be necessary to modify fundamentally the character of free societies in order to defeat them. We know wars that end with a V-E Day or V-J Day, and where we can see the battle lines changing in our daily newspapers. But there will never be a V-Terrorism Day.

Like foreign policy itself, the campaigns against the new global threats will be an endless process where success will be measured incrementally, never conclusively. In the long haul, however, it will be the free and open societies that are best able to sustain the efforts and sacrifices necessary to stay the course in the interminable wars against the new challenges of the twenty-first century.

All Alone or All Together

When confronted with complex and ever-shifting fault lines, governments incline either toward the unilateral or the multilateral. Smaller and more vulnerable countries—especially those firmly embedded in regional political or economic alliances—are prone to turn to their neighbors for help in times of crisis. Most Member States of the European Union act that way. Especially in matters of economic policy, the EU nations tend to stick together and face the rest of the world in a united fashion after setting common economic policies. However, EU solidarity is less firm in political and security matters. Since the United Kingdom and France are permanent members of the UN Security Council and most EU nations are also members of NATO, there are not yet common European diplomatic or security policies on most issues.

The unilateralist impulse is more prevalent in the case of major powers and those opaque and dangerous regimes sometimes identified as “rogue states.” Major powers are the most inclined to act and stand alone. They have the wherewithal to operate with a high degree of autonomy and their domestic political climate favors policies of “national interest” over “international comity.” China and the United States are prime examples of powerful countries that are readier than most to stand alone on matters of high policy and principle. In the case of what might be called “outcast regimes,” their very isolation and opaqueness create a shield that makes it hard for outsiders to have a clear view of their intentions and capabilities. North Korea is such a case in point.

The world and the cause of peace would be better served if international organization and agreements were effectively respected by all nations. In principle, most countries claim that they favor a rule of international law and order that prevents conflict and humanitarian chaos.

But nations differ over whether a threat to international peace and stability exists and, if it does, how international players should react. The discussions in the UN Security Council over how to disarm Saddam tended to overshadow international concerns about the scope and nature of the threat itself. Since the United States and others invaded Iraq, the multilateral approach to solving international problems has suffered a blow unless it makes the major powers more circumspect about using their armed forces to achieve political aims.

In principle, the new global threats of the twenty-first century are mostly multilateral in nature. They include environmental degradation, international crime, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, ethnic and religious conflicts, disease, extreme poverty, and violations of human and civil rights. These threats generally know no borders and governments are not usually the sole entities with influence and resources. In fact, governments are coming to understand that

nongovernmental organs (business, labor, the media, academia, religious groups, and private voluntary organizations) are increasingly important components of international affairs.

Today's multilateral diplomacy extends vertically to nonstate entities and horizontally to like-minded governments and international organizations. Effective international coalitions are no longer limited to ministers and generals. Nonstate players from business, academia, labor, private voluntary organizations, and the media are represented at the diplomatic negotiating table whether or not they are physically present. International diplomacy is now played like multidimensional chess.

Sanctions and Fence-Mending

When countries clash over what they consider to be important issues of policy or principle, there is always a risk that they will resort to military force. However, most governments at least pay lip service to the proposition that they will use force only as a last resort and many leaders actually do their best to resolve disputes peacefully. Moreover, there has emerged in recent decades a long menu of ways that governments and international organizations can bring nonmilitary pressure to bear on adversaries or outlaw states:

Economic Sanctions

Multilateral: Usually imposed by the UN Security Council. Generally regarded as the most effective because the most widely observed. Can be lifted once offending country meets certain conditions but requires a confirming vote by the UN Security Council to do so.

Unilateral: Country-to-country. May have political/moral effect, but porous economically because most countries are not bound to restrict trade or investment with targeted regime. If sanctioning country has sufficient power in International Financial Institutions (IFIs), it can block IFI loans and grants as well.

Extraterritorial: Sanctioning country applies economic penalties to third countries trading with targeted country. Hotly contested politically and legally by countries unwilling to accept jurisdiction of sanctioning country over their sovereign trading practices.

Coalition of the Willing: Although generally referring to military groupings, there can be coalitions of sanction imposing governments operating without formal UN Security Council approval. The imposition of economic sanctions can, however, be a broad and blunt weapon. Unless they are targeted on the offending country's leadership, sanctions can cause serious suffering among the civilian population. If the pain from sanctions on the innocents is prolonged and serious, states—especially in the region—will circumvent them. The United

States has imposed sanctions more than any other country in recent years, but because most American sanctions are bilateral, they have had only marginal economic effects.

Moral/Political Sanctions—Multilateral or Unilateral

This form of sanction is often applied in the area of human rights. The UN Human Rights Commission meets annually to pronounce itself on alleged human rights violators around the world. Charges and countercharges are debated in Geneva before the violations are put to a vote by the Commission. In addition, and uniquely, the United States publishes annually a human rights report describing and condemning what it considers to be human rights violations around the world.

Shunning

A more discrete form of official displeasure occurs when a country decides to have no or limited diplomatic representation in another capital. Shunning can be augmented by ordering its diplomats to avoid all contact and dialogue with representatives of the foreign power.

Sanctions are nonmilitary methods of pressure and punishment, but the diplomatic arsenal also contains devices to promote reconciliation and dispute resolution. They include:

Mediation/Arbitration

Ideally, such interventions occur before international disputes turn violent. Successful conflict prevention is better than settlement negotiations but resolving conflict that has already erupted is sometimes the only way that peace can be restored. International organization negotiators (usually, but not always, with the UN) abound but there are skilled national mediators as well. For decades, the United States has played a unique role in the Middle East peace process and now, more recently, in the Balkans and the EU is reinforcing its dispute resolution capacities. Regional organizations should play greater roles in settling disputes, although the disputing parties must also be convinced that there are positive consequences for them to settle. This means that the developed countries and the IFIs have to be prepared to provide financial rewards for good political behavior.

Constructive Engagement

This is a diplomatic way to describe “good cop, bad cop” routine for dealing with a recalcitrant state. It involves at least one outside government maintaining contact with the regime that is under pressure to change or to cease and desist. Constructive engagement works best when the “good cop” coordinates its initiatives with the international community pressing for change. Often times neighbors are good in this role although it helps to have a major power also involved so that the

"target" country believes that any eventual political and economic rewards it gains in return for compliance will have broad international support.

How Democracies Should Make Foreign Policy

When governments are confronted with cataclysmic threats or emergencies, traditions, values, and humanitarian actions can be incinerated by the intense heat of the moment. Especially in democracies where public pressure on governments is greatest, political leaders often feel that they have to act first and ask (moral) questions afterwards. In the United States it is commonly accepted that the president's first responsibility is to come to the defense of the country. Voices calling for measured and appropriate responses consistent with a nation's traditions and values rarely hold sway in the command centers and cabinet rooms of beleaguered governments. There are, however, ways that elements of morality and humanism can be inserted into the decision-making process.

The first way is to have the public be as well informed as possible about exceptional measures that a government believes it must undertake. Ultimately, it is the public and its elected representatives that should have the final say when it comes to deciding how drastic and how durable these measures must be. But without fairly full disclosure, the public will be kept in the dark and domestic discontent will grow.

The second way is to improve the legislative oversight of foreign policy. For the first two hundred years of our nation, it was generally accepted that foreign policy was the purview of the executive branch. Only rarely were presidents and secretaries of state subjected to the degree of scrutiny that administrations received on domestic issues. Then came the Vietnam War and television news. Trust in government was further eroded by Watergate, and serious oversight of foreign affairs by the Congress began. As a result, American foreign policy may be less coherent and well managed than before. But foreign policy is also more transparent than before and it turned out to be no harder than domestic policy for the American people to understand.

The third way is to broaden the uniquely American practice of having high officials shuttle between private careers and public service. Government careerists find our system arbitrary and inefficient and it often is. But a government dominated by career politicians and civil servants runs the risk of isolation and excess. Moreover, having men and women who were successful in nongovernmental careers appointed to high diplomatic office increases the chances that decisions will better reflect the attitudes of society at large and that policies will be made by people who are used to being held accountable for their actions because they come from professions where rapid merit-based advancement and abrupt dismissals can occur.

The fourth way is for citizens to understand that values are as essential to their security as military might and economic strength. A country true to a legacy of humanism is easier to defend and harder to attack. Its population will rally to the defense of the homeland. Its government will have standing in calling for international aid and support. Its enemies will know that world opinion will turn against them. Such a country is not guaranteed to be invulnerable but it will be much safer if it makes every effort to adhere to practices and conventions accepted by most of humanity as genuinely beneficial to all.

In modern democratic societies, the pressures for demanding high levels of accountability, freedom, and openness come from the bottom up not the top down. Governments under threat will always seek greater control and autonomy and it is hard to strike a perfect balance between a government's ability to manage a crisis and a free people's need to know, judge, and change what a government is doing. Still, if the balance of power tilts too strongly and indefinitely in government's favor, the new global challenges that it is trying to manage will be hard to overcome.

Disasters and the Media

Jeremy Toye

For the media, a disaster is not a tragedy. It is a challenge, an opportunity. A challenge for the traditional media to find out what is happening, how to get there, what is at stake, who is to blame. For the nontraditional media, the tweeters, Facebook friends, and bloggers, it is how to get the message out, who to include, when to retweet someone else's tweet. And for all of them, there is the chance to inform, to activate, or to enrage, for a vast audience always turns to the media whenever a disaster strikes.

Those are some of the challenges, but there are opportunities too. It is not necessarily wrong, nor even cynical, for a decent journalist to see a disaster as an opportunity to get a good story. Journalists wept at the site of the Twin Towers falling. But they and their employers had a job to do, and in a disaster, no matter whether it is "natural" or "man-made," it gets harder but potentially more rewarding. And most media outlets will claim that they are there to serve noble ideals, that challenging authority and revealing the facts will lead to change for the better.

For the owners of commercial media, there is not only an opportunity to show expertise and concern for suffering but also a chance to revive flagging circulations and audiences.[1] In that large slice of the world where the state controls the media, it is a chance to show that government can move fast and help—unless, of course, it is the regime itself which is to blame for the disaster. For those among the millions of social media users who want to go beyond their circle of friends and what they had for breakfast, disasters spell a chance to get help, to rally support, or to let their compassion or concern show through.

The media have traditionally been reactive to disaster. It has happened, so now let us surf the feelings of revulsion and compassion and maybe someone will do something about it. But the explosion of digital connectivity via instant satellite links, social media, and above all the cell phone is leading some to question whether the media should do something more about disasters before they happen: to educate, teach, and inform people in areas vulnerable to drought, famine, or flood; to build, plant, save water, stock grain, or practice first aid. While more traditional media may argue that their role is to present the facts and let others decide, social media opens the door for communities of all stripes to take charge of their destiny.

It is left to the readers, listeners, and viewers who turn to the media, particularly in times of disaster, to distinguish reality from rumor, fact from fiction, promotion from propaganda. In the middle of all this cacophony sits a wide variety of enterprises lumped together as "the Media" (often friends, sometimes foes) and the "aid professionals," whose role is not only to find out what is going on in what they may call a disaster-related scenario, but also to do something about it.

Media and Disasters

Disasters have always been part of the media's staple diet, but in early times the dish was eaten cold. After the eruption of Vesuvius in A.D. 79, before anyone had time to react, the elegant city of Pompeii was preserved in ash.[2] By the time of Abraham Lincoln's assassination in 1865, the invention and rapid expansion of the telegraph system meant the news spread across the United States in minutes.[3] Two world wars tested first print, then broadcast journalism (and the extent that censorship would be tolerated), while advocates for change used media to move into the public glare. The suffragettes battling for votes for women, who chained themselves to London railings, calculated well that their photos would be used around the world.[4]

The Ethiopian famine of 1983–84[5] was a milestone in putting a remote human disaster into the living rooms of what used to be called the first world. But even in the world's first TV war in Vietnam,[6] instant communication to the public, and therefore instant reaction, was rare because of limited technology and high expense. And there was still time for judicious editing along the way: The most gruesome scenes could be cut, prompting accusations of media manipulation and official sanitization.

CNN coverage of the bombing of Baghdad bridged the technology gap to show the Iraqi capital as it was bombed. Later, mobile telephony, web-cams, and YouTube matched technology with portability and minimal price. The death of protester Neda Agha-Soltan,[7] broadcast from a cell phone camera in an Iranian demonstration attacked by government forces, took the process to a point where the traditional media, in the sense of providing a link between event and audience, were almost redundant.

The events of the Arab Spring of 2011 showed that not only could you use the new media to inform the uninformed and marshal support, you could also tell your fellow demonstrators what was going on just a few meters away. And since there is a dark side to almost everything, security forces could monitor those same calls and sift through YouTube videos for the faces they could identify. A sinister side of social media was demonstrated in the UK riots in 2011,[8] when rioters with no

political agenda could use encrypted messaging to give news on which shops were ripe for looting. BlackBerrys, so long seen as the smart tool for the wheelers and dealers of the commercial world, found a new, unwelcome market among gangs of youths who knew open SMS messages would be monitored by police. Huge numbers of passive security cameras recorded images of looters blithely trying on shoes.

Like a knife or an ax, media in the wrong hands can be a fearful weapon. The videotapes of Osama bin Laden fueled al Qaeda's campaigns and inspired its followers to further violence. As in the filming of journalist Daniel Pearl's murder in Karachi in 2002, instant communication was another weapon to be used to support a campaign.[9] Pearl's death was also a reminder that dozens of journalists have been killed in conflicts such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria.[10]

No wonder, then, that much of the monitoring of social media and instant communications is being done by representatives of the more traditional media. Twitter feeds, recalling for wire-agency veterans like me the brief Snaps and Bulletins used to alert media outlets to breaking news, could keep a single journalist in touch with a dozen places at once. Backed by two-way satellite communications and an array of gear, the BBC's man in Beirut, Jim Muir, could keep track of a host of Syrian cities under attack by the forces of a government that refused entry to anyone identified as a journalist.

While journalists on the frontline donned flak jackets to ride with rebel forces into Tripoli, others were scouring the airwaves in case Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi should suddenly send an SMS message that he needed, say, sticking plasters. When he was found, his summary execution on screen [11] caused genuine shock, even in a world becoming inured to the blood and gore of battle. The execution was carried out by individuals in a remote place, but a cell phone camera made it a public event.

Natural disasters seem to happen most where access is least: an earthquake in the mountains of Pakistan; a tsunami from a quake deep below the Indian Ocean; drought and famine in one of Africa's most forbidding spots, Somalia. Yet even when a disaster happens in a country as sophisticated and accessible as Japan, and affects an industry as modern as nuclear power, the media are often hard pressed to get there. That being said, the single-minded determination of a journalist seeking out a story means that relief agencies often find that the media are alongside and even ahead of them.

No matter how reliable the firsthand source, or how venerated the wire services, every media outlet worth its salt wants its own staffer's byline, voice, or face to tell the story. And that costs money. Cut-price airfares suddenly fade away as affected airports close, helicopter hire soars like the

machines themselves, and even the cost of a taxi will multiply if the driver thinks he might not be able to get back.

But for a while, some parts of the media seemed to have money to burn. The second half of the twentieth century saw a major expansion in the money spent gathering news of all kinds, especially disasters, and much of it was driven by television. *The Guardian* editor C.P. Scott could famously predict that "no good" would come of television,[12] but one of his rivals[13] in the UK's first commercial network could equally famously boast that he had been issued "a license to print money." The rival U.S. networks of NBC, CBS, and ABC could outbid each other in their coverage, each fronted by a household name, while CNN in unfashionable Atlanta endeavored to unseat them. The era of twenty-four-hour news channels had arrived, concentrating on breaking news, whatever its actual significance. On quiet news days, they would play the same video or audio clip again and again. On the disaster days, they would swing into action, using prearranged links to a welter of broadcasters whose own styles have moved inexorably from studio sets to street scenes.

In the twenty-first century, mobile telephony has opened whole continents to information access like never before. African villages that may still have only one communal TV set now have smart phones. African populations have made an enormous leap across a technology spectrum that had offered them nothing before.[14] Contrast this with a few years ago when the headmistress of a large secondary school in Swaziland told me that her pupils had no idea where their World Food Programme (WFP) aid came from—"and neither do I."

With a little help, that headmistress could now show her pupils where the food comes from, tapping into smart phone links on YouTube, or running Skype chats with the people who might help them grow better crops themselves. Such access might encourage the donors to ask their "beneficiaries" what is required before they supply, and also combat the stultifying fatalism that leaves so many children just as stunted as their lack of vitamins. Media campaigns, such as *The Guardian*'s regular reports from the Ugandan village of Katine,[15] help that process, but real change may come when means of communication sit firmly in the hands of the villagers themselves. And that day is not far off, as cell phones spread like wildfire across the world.

For many, information overload led directly to compassion fatigue. A new drought in East Africa—or is it West Africa? (In fact, in 2011, it was both.) Urgent pleas for donations from a familiar group of agencies were met by an unusually slow response from Western governments battling budget cuts and fighting to maintain levels of aid pledged in rosier times. Members of the public gave generously, but there were legitimate questions about how many more times they would be asked to save the starving child. Proponents of development rather than emergency handouts

trotted out the cliché that if you give a man a fish, he will eat for a day, if you teach a man to fish, you will feed him for life, to which a weary aid official responded: "Yes, but the lake's dried up."[16] Templated stories gave the idea that disaster was recurrent, predictable, and followed patterns: from rubble to tented cities to cholera outbreaks to stories written on the first anniversary that so often begin with a child's name: "Muhammad lost half his family. …"

With global financial turmoil gripping both the developed and developing worlds since 2008, the media could not escape a cold blast of reality. Famous titles disappeared from the newsstands as rising costs and falling audiences swamped them.[17] Equally famous names such as the BBC found financial support waning, forcing news teams from different divisions to work together to keep down costs. Advertising revenue, in particular for television and print, dropped away.[18] (Insurance costs alone could scupper the chances of sending a news team to cover an event that may or may not turn into a major disaster.)

In some cases, the use of social media mirrored the agendas of the more familiar news outlets: delirious flattery for the latest music sensation; rage at a rape case; fervent support or ferocious condemnation of politicians like President Obama, who used the network brilliantly to help his election, and perhaps came to rue its impact on his ratings. At other times, the social network made its own agenda. A thirty-minute video that attracted more than 70 million online viewers in a week is a case in point. A small charity had a committed filmmaker produce a video on their work and on one of their targets—Joseph Kony.[19]

So it is no wonder that many branches of traditional media turn to cell phone screens, blogs, and onsite video channels to supplement and even substitute their own coverage. In one sense, they have been doing this for years: the international wire agencies[20] were the Twitters of their day, with largely anonymous correspondents filing reports from every capital and major city as wholesalers to the world's media retailers. They too have had to change their approach, providing elements of their coverage without charge on innumerable websites while charging premium rates for their very best material—most of it related to financial and commercial markets.

But disasters have a habit of echoing right through those trading floors, as carefully analyzed scenarios are turned upside down by events on the coast of Japan or in Haiti.

Disasters and Stakeholders

While the traders hit their keys in response to the latest disasters, a disparate set of groups spring into action. These are the "stakeholders," in the parlance of the aid world, who are thrown together whenever a disaster strikes:

- the government departments whose job it is to safeguard a nation's health, safety, security, and general well-being;
- the official international agencies, such as the United Nations (UN) humanitarian family, with global mandates to serve the vulnerable and dispossessed, backed by national and international funding; agencies such as USAID and Europe's ECHO;
- the myriad nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), ranging from the Red Cross/Crescent Society and Bill Gates's Global Fund, to religious charities, to a couple of Texas carpenters building one home at a time for tsunami victims, all responding to the natural wave of sympathy and support that a disaster brings;
- communities, national, regional or local, that may be drawn from the victims of a disaster or from others threatened by it, or from generous people far away.

Almost all of them, in an emergency, will find themselves seeking the oxygen of publicity—or being sought out by a demanding media when they are already overwhelmed. How these groups use, and might better use, the media is a key factor in whether they emerge in the aftermath of disaster honored or ignored.

Stakeholders, Disasters, and the Media

Alistair Cooke, once the doyen of foreign correspondents with his weekly broadcast "Letter from America," remarked that the only way to judge a journalist was by the quality of his sources. Anyone in media hoping to present her readers, listeners, or viewers with a portrait of what is happening in the world of aid would make little headway without sources within the community of stakeholders. Some sources would be known to many, such as a minister or an agency head. Other sources may never show their faces in public—the "Deep Throat" of Watergate, the "usually informed" or "reliable" sources where trust lies more with the believing journalist than with the potentially opportunistic whistleblower.

How the potential sources among stakeholders interact with the media may not directly affect the work they do or should do. But how their supporters and critics see them, and how their supporters react when asked for help or reject hindrance, can be influenced by how the stakeholders are presented in the media.

Governments, Disasters, and the Media

When disaster strikes—either on a national or regional scale, or closer to home, say, within a government agency itself—is the time when a government's relationship to the media is put to the test. It may have to face international media if the crisis attracts global attention, but it is often at local and national levels that a good relationship with the local press pays off best.

Until the onset of social media, some governments could bask in the comfort of an entirely state-controlled media. They had little to fear from the Soviet-era *Pravda*, President Mubarak's fawning *Egyptian Gazette*, or the broadcasts of Radio Peking under Mao Zedong. While a more open press has flourished in many countries since the fall of the Berlin Wall, radio and television, both with a wider reach, have remained a principal tool of dictators everywhere.

The products of such systems are invariably dull, pedantic, and so far removed from reality that even a disaster can be buried alive. Editorial staff who work under the yoke of malicious state control lose their perspective in their constant search for the ultrapositive. For the rest of the world, a lively, driven media may actually get read, heard, or seen—but it means their governments have to work harder to get a sympathetic hearing.

One of the first acts of any new government is to appoint an information minister. For journalists, alas, they rarely live up to their title.[21] The government spokesman (occasionally a woman, but more often than not, a man) usually has more to say, and, if they are truly professional, will always be ready to say it. But a journalist who relied on speaking only to spokespersons of any hue would have a lackluster career, because the spokespeople must invariably be "on message" and, if threatened, must guard the gates of government against assault.

Given half a chance, the spokesperson will attempt a more sophisticated role, that of "spin-doctor." Turning a nightmare catastrophe into a glorious triumph by becoming a spin-doctor is much resented by journalists, but there will always be those officials that cannot resist trying to put a positive spin on a clearly negative story. Another more mundane role of the spokesperson is equally important: They are a route to the top. Most journalists want to speak to the organ grinder, not the monkey, and they work hard to get the most senior voice they can. A friendly word with a spokesperson often works. This cozy relationship between the media and their principal sources may not look much like the bombast coming out of a dictator in front of his cowering head of broadcasting, but the aim is the same—to keep the message sweet.

In disasters beyond the control of government, events themselves will take precedence over the words of even the most powerful leader. But sooner or later the spotlight turns on who needs to fix

the roads, drain the fields, house the homeless and open the airports. Invariably it is government that finds itself in the limelight. For journalists, the questions are easy: Why was help too slow or too rushed; why has so little or so much been spent; why wasn't this fixed last time; what's to stop it from happening again?

Counterintuitively, the sooner those questions get posed, the easier they will be to answer. A good government mouthpiece should be out there immediately saying what is known so far. At that stage, few journalists will have their own information to challenge what is being said. But if the government waits "until the situation becomes clearer," chances are it will have become muddier. The spokesperson may now have some beautiful charts to show what has been done, but the enterprising journalist has been there, seen a different picture, and has the quotes and photos to challenge the official line.

It is at this point that officialdom starts to stonewall and denials multiply, not only of facts but also of obvious conclusions.[22] Some spokespersons are very proud of being able to handle any question, no matter how tough. The trouble is they can look like a boxer who builds a great defensive shield but fails to land the punch that wins the bout. Some spokespersons defend so well that they rarely get around to saying anything positive about the organization that pays them so well.

Some are masters, however: The U.S. ambassador to the UN under George W. Bush, John Bolton, once declined to answer a tough question. When it was asked again in a different form, he said, "Go ahead, it will be interesting to see how many times you pose that question before you give up." It was Bolton, the archetypal neocon, who also said that you could chop ten floors off the top of the United Nations building in New York and "it wouldn't make a bit of difference."[23]

The UN, Disasters, and the Media

Lose ten floors off the UN HQ and a journalist might miss a couple of useful sources, but it is more likely to have a greater impact on the ground. When the UN Offices in Baghdad were bombed in 2003 it robbed the UN of sixty staff including its highly respected Iraq chief Sergio Vieira de Mello. Furthermore, it robbed journalists covering the conflict in Baghdad of the expertise, experience, and data gathering that makes the UN much sought after by the media.

In times of disasters, journalists can rely on the UN for more than just quotes—for access, for vital statistics to back up their own anecdotal evidence, for protection if the story gets too hot. That is not to say that the UN is universally popular among journalists who often like to see themselves as

much more in touch with events on the ground. It is quite easy to paint a picture of the UN as overpaid suits operating behind heavily protected walls, breezing around town in gleaming white Land Cruisers and ready to cut and run at the slightest hint of trouble.

What is undeniable is that the UN's hierarchical system of checking and rechecking can mean that its reports and responses take days to appear. It can also lead to heavy self-censorship to avoid upsetting the Member States who in the end own the UN—and some of whom themselves see the UN as the enemy within.

UNICEF is widely judged by its sister agencies in the UN to be the most adept at news management. "They don't move without thinking about the media," grumbled a UN veteran who knows his agency has fewer media professionals worldwide than UNICEF has in one office. Another agency organizing a huge convoy into Iraq seethed when UNICEF turned up with a handful of trucks emblazoned with its name—and stole all the media thunder.

But one other reason why UNICEF is so well known—in spite of having an acronym whose original meaning is often forgotten[24]—is that it has National Committees. These organizations, independent of the agency itself and of each other, run much of the publicity and fundraising at the local level in many developed countries. Other agencies rely on their top executive to get their message across. Josette Sheeran came from a media background to head the WFP, and frankly, her glamorous appearance did no harm either.[25] UNICEF chief Carol Bellamy[26] may have been a tough taskmaster, but she could turn on the gritty charm for the media whenever required.

Increasingly, UN agencies are looking to social media to go beyond their own circles to the public at large. Punchy blogs stripped of the UN's love for acronyms and words like "psychosocial" are posted within minutes of an event, as are emailed invitations to support a named child with a small donation.[27] Yet for many senior UN staff, releasing the genie from the social network bottle means losing control, and increased risk of stepping on the toes of their masters.

Some of those toes belong to the funding agencies, the donors whose decisions can make the difference between life and death in a disaster. For the UN and most other aid agencies, funding only flows in when a disaster strikes, the result of urgent appeals that make up so much of the early media coverage. But once funds start to arrive, the UN teams on the ground are in the eye of the storm, and part of that storm is whipped up by another set of initials, the NGOs.

NGOs, Disasters, and the Media

One UN agency counts more than 1,100 NGOs as its partners. Though the term NGO might not be on everyone's lips, the individual names are among the world's best-known "brands"—the Red Cross and Red Crescent, World Vision, Oxfam, Save the Children, Greenpeace, *Médecins Sans Frontières* (MSF). And they are so well known because above all they know how to use the media.

The suffering child with huge eyes and a swollen belly is an enduring symbol of innumerable campaigns. Though glossy or homespun posters, charity workers shaking tins on street corners, and subsidized advertising play their part, it is the extent of media coverage that marks the successes from the also-rans. Public relations lore suggests that an unpaid article written by a real journalist is worth many times more than paid advertising space. The one-minute video promotions shown between TV bulletins may be fully sponsored, but an interview embedded in the bulletin itself will have a greater impact.

In disasters, television leads the way—and some of its material is made by the NGOs themselves. The high quality of even the smallest cameras, complete with realistic shaky images, means that broadcasters can show aid workers as they move in. NGO bloggers and tweeters have much more freedom than their UN counterparts not only to describe what they are doing, but also to pin down those they feel should do more. MSF is renowned for calling everyone to task, lambasting all and sundry. The impact can be twofold—to prompt the slow-footed into action, and to raise funds from members of the public who admire their forthright manner—which in turn won MSF a Nobel Peace Prize.

As with the UN, NGOs are not universally popular. Their heavy guns sent into an emergency can shoulder aside their local colleagues and sour the work done in building good relations on the ground. Their solutions, worked out around a desk in a distant capital, might not gel with local communities who resist change. In their home countries, NGOs are frequently questioned about how much of the funds they collect actually go to their beneficiaries and how much is spent on administration or travel.

And in all the turmoil of a disaster, the media are there looking over their shoulders. Once behind a lens, a news photographer will stop at little to get the shot—and if there is a crowd, they will jostle along with their text counterparts. Like the UN, NGOs spend many hours training their staff to accept media as a necessity rather than a mere nuisance or an actual hindrance.

Some of the larger agencies try to ensure media coverage by taking selected journalists in with them. The journalists might insist on paying their way, and though they will be grateful for the access, the best of them will still keep their professional distance, and the wise trip organizer will keep a watchful eye in case the whole thing goes wrong.

Courting publicity for any cause can backfire. An aid worker in West Africa complained bitterly that a campaign to help people deliberately mutilated by rebel forces had turned sour when insistent photographers made them "into a freak-show," prompting revulsion rather than sympathy.[28] The maker of the Kony video mentioned earlier won notoriety himself when he was filmed running naked and in distress near his home.[29]

Providing access is only one of the ways an agile NGO can improve its media coverage. High-quality data-gathering pays off if boiled down to easily assimilated facts. Introductions to the main players or even something as simple as offering recorded samples of local music to a radio reporter yields dividends. Willingness to answer questions while providing graphic details on the importance and success of their work is the hallmark of an excellent NGO spokesperson—and they will be sought out wherever they land.

The Public, Disasters, and the Media

Journalists love to recount their adventures in getting to the scene of a disaster against insuperable odds. But even the most agile reporter cannot beat the victim of a catastrophe who pulls out a mobile phone, snaps a surprisingly high-quality shot, and sends it off around the world (even if in fact it was only meant for a faraway member of the family). Communities of such people have begun to exercise their advantages of local presence and knowledge to campaign on their own behalf.

Some communities use the NGO route, though it can be difficult to sort the genuine from the grifters.[30] Social media work well at the other end of the pipeline, too. Email campaigns based on the old principle of chain letters can raise large amounts of cash in very few days—though they too need careful scrutiny for scams and spams.

As the instant access of social media spreads to every corner of the planet, the possibilities of community-inspired media getting ahead of a disaster are increasing. Rather than wait for a drought to hit, a well-organized community can launch a targeted appeal for money to buy grain, or sponsor wells, or agricultural extension work to identify more resilient crops. This puts powerful mitigating tools in the hands of those most affected.

Disasters and the Big Picture

Earthquakes, drought, floods, and fire have been with us since time began, and media of all types know about handling them. But what of the big-ticket items that worry so much of the world's thinkers and planners: climate change, environmental damage, deepening poverty, crippling disease,

and the demand for universal education? If the media are adept at handling instant disasters, they are perhaps less assured in how to deal with these ongoing challenges. And while the media struggle, voices in the wings insist that they can do much more than report passively what they see and hear.

All media, from the self-important "Thunderer" (as the *Times of London* once styled itself) to the humblest blogger, thrive on change. But they are also addicted to speed, and no matter how big the looming disaster of climate change, no matter how destructive rising poverty to the future of the global village, actual change can be very hard to spot and track day by day. Add a third motivator, which is controversy, and much of the media will struggle—to use an old print-era phrase—to "hold the front page!"

For example, it is well established that human-made climate change will have a catastrophic impact, but perhaps not for years to come. Polar ice melt will swamp whole island nations but is just an almost imperceptible drip-drip every day. The media might report the first findings and the most dramatic, but struggle to find the vital new "angle" they need on a regular basis to avoid the unforgivable journalistic sin of running the same story twice. That the vast majority of the world's experts agree that human-made climate change is a huge threat and must be checked makes matters worse: Where is the opportunity for the "on the one hand, on the other hand" adversarial style of most established media?

No small wonder, then, that to the fury of the conventionally wise, the mavericks that decry climate change as "media hysteria" themselves become the ones who find journalists beating a path to their door.[31] Mix in the fact that media love a rogue more than a saint, and "good causes" have a hill to climb. There is also a risk that well-meaning campaigners will "cry wolf," overstating their case in the interests of people who are genuinely suffering.

Concerns about life-threatening health risks fare better in the media. Bulletins from the World Health Organization about bird or swine flu are given huge publicity, which in turn drives governments to act fast.[32] Most journalists try hard to be careful with stories on the latest miracle cure for cancer, but it can be tough to separate hyperbole from reality when a highly respected agency or a world-famous actor is warning that an entire region is about to suffer the worst disaster it has ever faced.

Human-made disasters, principally wars, have an easier route to the front page. This time the old cliché that the first victim of war is truth is difficult to avoid for the media and their sources alike. Like soldiers sending letters home from the front, almost all media will respect a degree of censorship in wartime—unless they are reporting for the other side, but then that tends to be called spying.

On the inside pages and in the TV and radio documentaries, there is a chance to take a more nuanced view of the long-term impact of a slow- burning threat, and many responsible media outlets do just that.[33] Plus, media outlets can hardly be blamed if the public prefers the celebrity scandal, the reality TV show or, enormously important for most media, the sport. So, can the media be more proactive in saving the planet, and can they ever be seen, as some would like, as "a Force for Good"?

Media: A Force for Good, Neutral, or a Necessary Evil?

Whenever media are in the dock—as they were after journalists at the Murdoch-owned *News of the World* in Britain were found to have hacked into the phones of a large number of its targets—the charges are familiar. The media are intrusive, abusive, disrespectful, money-grabbing, salacious—and everyone knows that because they all read, see, and hear the media.

When a media house does a clear public service—the *Washington Post*'s exposure of Watergate, the *Sunday Times*'s campaign on behalf of disfigured victims of the thalidomide drug—its achievement is honored by jealous peers and grudgingly respected by the public. But since the media can only be judged by their latest story, the glory fades fast. Some media identify with carefully selected good causes, especially at festive times such as Christmas in Western countries.

Campaigners[34] argue that the media can do much more to educate and advise their audiences on critical issues affecting their lives. In the case of disasters, members of the public could be advised to stock certain types of food during periods threatened by drought, to erect flood defenses, to build stronger quakeproof houses, to boil drinking water, or to sleep under malaria-proof bed nets.

Along with every other communicator, the media cannot just say useful things. They must also say interesting things. Unlike a boss who can oblige a subordinate to read her demand to cut down on paperclips, the media cannot oblige anyone to look or listen to what they write or say. Journalists constantly look for new angles on old stories, but the burden also rests on their sources to make their material interesting, and not just important.

So, can media ever be neutral, a disinterested but by no means uninterested recorder of whatever happens? The unsung heroes (to this entirely biased writer) are the local, national, and international news agencies, the "wire services" who feed a constant flow of as-it-happens reports to almost all the world's established media, who then choose what they will use.

The blunt instrument of media can certainly be evil in the wrong hands. The radio stations in Rwanda that goaded and screamed the murdering gangs into genocide were using the same basic medium that Aung San Suu Kyi in Burma used to address her followers after years of government-

imposed silence.[35] The walls of the Schindler's Factory museum in Poland display chilling Nazi newssheets alongside schoolgirl letters describing the devastating effects on their wartime lives.[36]

To get the most good out of media, campaigners for any cause must make what they say as persuasive and interesting as possible. Fortunately, there are some well-tried tools that help do the job.

Tools for Disasters

The dedicated media campaigner can tap into a range of tools that have long been used successfully to attract and maintain media attention, but first a word about preparation. "I have no idea what this interview is about" is an awful admission. A campaigner should use any encounter with the media as an opportunity to get across what is happening, what is being done and what is needed. Translating everything into the language of the café from that of the office is a vital step. Only then will the maximum benefit come.

The humble press release remains a staple of almost all aid agency media campaigns. It should be brief, tightly edited and contain all the salient facts, backed up by a powerful quote or two, and supplied with useful contact details. Thousands upon thousands hit the media every hour, and sadly most end up "spiked," in the bin.

A news release can be reworked as a series of tweets, a usable set of Q&As, or an op-ed piece penned by the most senior person available. But for maximum impact, a human being is required. And an interview, broadcast live, is still one of the best ways of getting the messages across. While it is more comfortable to chat with a reporter on the phone or (rare in these hectic times) over a beer or lunch, the journalist involved remains at liberty to select whatever elements he wants. A live interview reduces that risk dramatically, and a well-prepared and practiced interviewee will win out almost every time over even the most aggressive interrogator.

Once a journalist is "hooked," a field trip to a disaster area is a popular means of promoting a cause. Careful planning is essential, as is monitoring of results,

as such trips are rarely cheap in financial terms and sometimes very expensive in terms of reputation.

Perhaps most risky of all is a poorly planned news conference, because if one journalist is a threat, a group of journalists is a radioactive hazard. Our advice at MediaTrain is to explore every aspect of media relations before resorting to a press conference, and then have it very firmly handled by a seasoned press officer who is not afraid to be a policeman for the day.

Whatever tools are used, they all need regular polishing. Practice interview techniques in front of a mirror, write a new report in the alternative style of an op-ed piece, sit in on a press conference with the journalist's best-loved tool, a notebook. Many worry that too much practice can make messages sound overrehearsed and stilted: In this author's experience, the vast majority of people facing the media are far away from reaching that point in their media-facing lives.

Disasters and the Media: A Never-Ending Story

Whether a disaster is instant, such as an earthquake, or ongoing, such as climate change, the basic human urges to know what is going on, and to listen to a frightening story, will remain.

Whether the media transmit information to the inside of your eyeball, or boil it all down to an entirely arbitrary 140 characters, or blast it out of rows of loudspeakers no one can ignore, the awful, the terrible, the catastrophic will always be with us.

Though the media may never want to be a force for good (and sometimes want to be deliberately evil), there are going to be well-meaning people who, with skill, speed, and ingenuity, can make the media a critical part of their toolbox. In turn, that may help prevent, predict or mitigate an impending disaster. Whatever happens, the media, in one form or another, will always be there to report it.

Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination

Looking Beyond the "Latest and Greatest"

Christopher Holshek

There is a tendency, in a world of increasingly ephemeral attention spans, to pay greater attention to the "latest and greatest" developments to generalize about current topics. Behavioral psychologists and economists call this the "availability heuristic." The well-publicized tensions between nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and particularly the U.S. military at various times would suggest that civil-military coordination in humanitarian crises has been perpetually poor. However, when the span of these relations is examined both horizontally across the globe and vertically through time, a more assuring picture comes into view. By and large, the humanitarian civil-military relationship has had more stories of success than failure, suggesting it is not doomed from the start.

Even amidst the most contentious moments in the humanitarian civil-military relationship, in 2005, the U.S. Institute of Peace noted that "interaction between humanitarians and militaries had deepened over the last decade to include formalized exchanges, coordination, and institutional development of centers and institutes. Indeed, an emergent consensus on coherence—coordination of intervention and humanitarian action—was emerging by the turn of the millennium."[1] Nonetheless, the difficulties experienced in post-9/11 international interventions such as in Afghanistan and Iraq evinced serious ongoing challenges. An overview of how these relations have evolved would not only provide some perspective, but point to some ways ahead.

After the Cold War, the relationship between the military and civilian organizations providing relief services in the wake of natural or man-made disasters or conflicts was maturing. While the 1990s were by no means a halcyon era, demand for the services of both civilian and military providers of humanitarian services grew exponentially. During that time, some clear trends with impact on this relationship emerged. A report by The Challenges Project noted:

> One obvious change in peace operations over the last decade has been an increase in the numbers and disciplines of contributors: international and national, governmental and nongovernmental, and military and non-military. The inability, however, of this broad, diverse and complex set of layers to conceive, plan and work together in managing a crisis and implementing a peace plan, despite the massive commitment of financial and human resources, is a major challenge in crisis management and modern peace operations today. On some occasions, civil and military elements have worked

> together constructively and harmoniously, but on others the inability to achieve an appropriate level of cooperation has seriously weakened the overall effectiveness of the mission. The reasons are many and, although experience varies, the all-too-frequent instances of inability to cooperate willingly, to coordinate effectively and efficiently and to pursue common objectives collectively and professionally are sometimes referred to as the "Civil-Military Cooperation Issue (CIMIC) issue."[2]

Beyond the mere proliferation of players, however, civilian relief organizations grew increasingly more capable of taking on a greater role—indeed, the lead—in humanitarian assistance operations. The United Nations has steadily improved since the initial implementation of the 2001 *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, better known as the "Brahimi Report," in the wake of the peacekeeping disasters of the 1990s. Better resourced, more professionally staffed, and more operationally adept, the UN, NGOs, and (as of late) regional organizations and even private industry have been taking on roles and tasks that the military had been performing, more or less, by default since before the Second World War.

With its own maturation, the "humanitarian community" eventually developed a universal set of principles and guidelines for the conduct of humanitarian assistance—what the military calls "doctrine"—beginning with the *Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief* in 1994 as well as the first humanitarian civil-military guidelines: UNHCR's *UNHCR and the Military—A Field Guide*, now in its second edition. By the middle of the first decade of the new century, the maturation of the UN's Office for the Coordinator of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA), which has become an authority on humanitarian civil-military coordination, resulted in additional guidelines, the most important of these being *The Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defense Assets in Disaster Relief*, better known as the "Oslo Guidelines." This is the preeminent document codifying what is known as "humanitarian space" defined by the principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality—for many humanitarian organizations a catechism if not a doctrine.[3]

They have also developed their own coordinating structures, first in conjunction with UN lead agencies such as UNHCR, and then with the adoption of the UN's Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) "cluster" approach in 2005. In many cases, the relationship between these lead organizations or consortia and many of the especially smaller NGOs are contractual or subcontractual in the sense of market specialization in relief or predevelopment services.

This growth in civilian capability and sophistication has been good news, but it has also led to the corresponding need for the military to better understand and coordinate with civilian activities, as these actors demand a greater say, not so much in the international political decision-making process, but in related operational decisions on the ground. This has complicated matters for the military.

Even more significant, however, NGOs now appear in many more forms, including the local or indigenous NGO, which tends to take over the brunt of relief activity, either supplanting international civilian relief groups or as competing organizations, as the situation develops. In addition, many (especially indigenous) NGOs, are sponsored by (or affiliated with) political and religious organizations, thus blurring the distinction between a humanitarian NGO and the plethora of like but different "civil society organizations." The humanitarian space, in turn, has experienced its own version of "mission creep," in which development organizations, advocacy or activist groups, and some other private assistance organizations have cloaked themselves in the humanitarian principles. Beyond making it much more difficult not only to define what an NGO is, this has made if vastly more complex and difficult for the military to determine by what rule sets these organizations should indeed play. (This is why it is instructive to "follow the money"—i.e., investigate the donor sources of an NGO in order to determine its real aims and interests.) And what of those NGOs, more established and having a record of adhering to the principles that should afford them their special status, that choose to collaborate with, albeit for practical reasons, less impartial and neutral organizations, or obtain funding from government agencies? Has their own impartiality and neutrality in this process been compromised? These questions have further exacerbated the challenge of civil-military coordination.

As for the military, Karen Guttieri, in "Civil-Military Relations in Peacebuilding," notes:

> Just as we must ask *which civilians* form the civil-military relationship, it also matters *which military forces* are involved. Some militaries bring international political baggage. Accepting troop contributors from interested regional actors or major powers may increase the odds of military effectiveness at the expense of political impartiality. Secondly, militaries have different orientations toward society. Some have been segregated from society and oriented toward defense against uniformed adversaries on a defined battlefield. … Other militaries have more recent experience with counter insurgencies and other internal control functions.[4]

In spite of all these developments, the military remains a relatively dominant player. Beyond leadership, planning and training, the military enjoys comparative advantages in organization, intelligence, operations, logistics, medical services, engineering, etc., along with large amounts of

funding. Parallel to the rising competence of civilian organizations has been the military's growing ability for civil-military synchronization, often at the hands of specialists. In the United States, it is called civil affairs (CA); in NATO, civil-military cooperation (CIMIC); and, in the UN, civil-military coordination (CM-Coord for civilian humanitarians, UN-CIMIC for peacekeeping forces).

Depending on national policies, the civil-military relationship, and doctrinal culture, civil-military operations could mean different things. CA, for example, grew out of the U.S. Army's experiences with military government dating back to the 1830s. Now, its "full-spectrum" capabilities support U. S. global strategy, concerned lately with antiterrorism and counterinsurgency. NATO CIMIC, looking to coordinate numerous national approaches, was formed by post Cold War adventures in the Balkans and other "out-of-area" operations, emphasizing support of the military mission within a specific political mandate. The UN concept, which is newest, is less about command and control and more about coordination. This diversity of civil-military approaches has likewise complicated matters for civilian organizations trying to work with the military.

Furthermore, the "complexity of interdependence between civilian-military is not simply because both communities are engaged in all functional categories of peace operations, but due to other complicating factors"[5]:

- The plethora of civil and military organizations in number, type, and status, as well as their activities in a given mission area;
- The relative impact of progress or failure in one activity on another (among them, security operations on humanitarian assistance actions);
- Changes in the roles and capabilities among players at various times;
- Obstacles, misunderstandings, and dilemmas (discussed below) impacting civil-military cooperation and coordination, some derived from fundamental differences in corporate culture and others from circumstances;
- The ability and willingness of each community to appropriate resources, personnel, money and technology to civil-military coordination.

However, an additional complication came into greater play following 9/11; namely, the simultaneity of conflict and peace operations. Again, the Challenges Project noted:

> In the 1990s … peacekeeping followed a sequence: if conflict prevention failed then one moved on to various means of peacemaking; once there was an agreement to pursue a peaceful solution then traditional methods of peacekeeping could be applied; and finally, once peace had taken hold, peace-

> building could begin. … The reality of today's operations, however, is that there is essentially no such tidy sequence. Conflict prevention, diplomatic peacemaking, peace enforcement actions, classic peacekeeping, peace-building and nation-building (development) are often all taking place simultaneously. In addition, humanitarian assistance operations have been required in addressing the consequence of these recent conflicts.[6]

More than any other complicating factor, it was the commingling of conflict and peace operations that caused the greatest rub between NGOs and U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. The major difference is that, prior to 9/11, relief workers had been used to being much more in "postconflict" situations and thus relatively permissive environments for humanitarian assistance. Working under more hostile conditions was more the exception than the rule. Following 9/11, the reverse happened. In short, peace operations, to include humanitarian assistance, have become a considerably more dangerous business for the military and civilians alike.

In response to methodologies used by U.S. forces, many NGOs issued strong protests, fearing these methods compromised the neutrality of NGOs and, in blurring the ostensible distinctions between combatants and noncombatants, endangered NGO personnel working with or in proximity to military forces attempting to "win hearts and minds" through humanitarian actions and in attempts to "coordinate" civil-military humanitarian responses. Some, such as U.S. Special Forces troops, operated in civilian clothing in order to better blend in.

Already by December 2002, NGOs began to articulate what were to become enduring concerns about these methodologies as employed in Afghanistan. While NGOs "welcomed the shift in Coalition focus to the establishment of a more secure environment in which reconstruction can take place," they also contended that "using military structures to provide humanitarian assistance and reconstruction support will both prematurely deflect attention from Afghanistan's deteriorating security situation and also engage the military in a range of activities for which others are better suited." Namely, they were concerned that "(1) long-term impact will be sacrificed for short-term political and military dividends, (2) communities that oppose the current government may get different levels of aid than those who support the government, (3) communities in conflict areas may receive different levels of aid than those in areas considered stable and (4) the military will aim to use NGOs as "force multipliers" to achieve political or security-related ends."[7]

The NGOs also posited that "(1) military expenditures on assistance activity could go much further in the hands of assistance professionals, and (2) because those expenditures will be counted as a contribution to the assistance on Afghanistan rather than as an internal expenditure of the military, this commitment will substitute for, rather than supplement, the commitments that the

donors have already made to help rebuild Afghanistan." Then came the crux argument, as detailed in a local coordinating agency report:

> Local populations on the ground often cannot or will not distinguish between soldiers and civilian aid workers engaged in humanitarian and reconstruction activities. Military participation in assistance may significantly enhance antagonism towards humanitarian professionals and the risks that those the military chooses to disengage from its reconstruction efforts, NGOs will be required to take over and will be perceived as agents of the larger political and military strategy as a result. While military-led assistance may be short term, the impact on community perceptions of civilian humanitarians may be lasting.[8]

In addition to having the military focus exclusively on security missions, the NGOs recommended that the military "should not engage in assistance work except in those rare circumstances where emergency needs exist and civilian assistance workers are unable to meet those needs due to a lack of logistical capacity or levels of insecurity on the ground," and if it does engage in such activities, that they should fall under civilian leadership, be documented through a "transparent accountability mechanism," and be held accountable to a "code of conduct agreed upon between the military and representatives of the civilian assistance community." This led, in great part, to the Oslo Guidelines of 2006–2007.

The Pentagon's response to this was, having already ordered soldiers back into uniforms in the spring of 2002, to create Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) to create more "whole-of-government" U.S. military and civilian interagency responses for stability and reconstruction in outlying areas in Afghanistan, including military CA personnel and civilian representatives from governmental agencies, mainly the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), but not NGOs. More familiar coordinating mechanisms such as civil-military operations centers (CMOCs) were also employed. Despite all this, many NGOs maintained their objection to the military conduct of humanitarian assistance per se. In July 2004, following the murder of five of its aid workers, *Médecins Sans Frontières* (MSF) announced its withdrawal from Afghanistan under protest, marking the nadir of the humanitarian civil-military relationship.

Yet, the dilemma remains that, while civil-military coordination is essential to the success of either community, civilian interaction with the military risks compromised humanitarian space. In finding a way through the thicket of civil-military issues in humanitarian assistance operations in general and under semi- or non-permissive conditions in particular, it is helpful to reorient through examination of these essential characteristics of the two communities.

Regardless of the level of progress in civil-military coordination over the years, there are essential differences in the *modus operandi* of military and civilian organizations. While the military normally focuses on reaching clearly defined objectives through linear operational (planning and execution) progressions with given timelines under a unified command and control structure, civilian organizations are concerned with a process of fulfilling changeable political or social interests through a fluctuating sequence of dialogue, bargaining, risk-taking, and consensus-building.[9]

British Army Major General Timothy Cross, in an earlier publication in this Series, provides an excellent detailed analysis of the differences between military and civilian organizations in humanitarian assistance fundamental to corporate cultures:

> Any operational development has a number of "lines of operation"; the military line is alongside the political, diplomatic, legal, economic, media, and humanitarian lines. To be effective, military commanders must face up to the challenges of shattered societies as well as direct military threats. They need to remain focused on their primary imperative, that of establishing a secure environment to enable the other lines to be developed, but balancing the various frictions is not easy … taken to an extreme the military can be too "task" orientated, becoming over-controlling, autocratic, and critical; the individual is held to be subservient to the greater good. State focused, with legitimacy coming from the State, the military are, by definition, political servants and are neither neutral, impartial or independent. Too often we can forget individual needs and close our minds to others' views; often our head rules our heart.[10]

Cross lists the strengths of NGOs as: being principled in humanitarianism, which is the basis for their legitimacy; knowledgeable, in having served in many countries and skilled in their work; committed to the longer-term, which is often the nature of such operations; networked with other organizations and locals, much more adept at "relationship-building"; linked to the media and thus able to command a moral imperative for humanitarian intervention; and enhancing the role of women. Their weaknesses, however, often include low material resources, the inability to respond quickly to changing conditions, overemphasis on single issues and a view of other organizations, military and civilian, often as competitors. Cross notes:

> The NGOs exhibit softer, more manageable cultural traits than the military; traits that make them, generally, less confrontational and, generally, fairly effective in multicultural environments. There is rooted in their souls, a "bloody line" divide … put there in their early years and which many struggle to cross in their search for moral and ethical virtues and a "what I stand for" doctrine. Nonetheless,

> taken to extremes, they can be self-indulgent, too focused on their particular human issue and, living within a "rights-based" culture, they can be resentful of control, morally arrogant, and blind to the dark side of individual human nature; often their heart rules their head.[11]

These differences between military and civilian organizations are also reflected along the "security-development nexus," suggesting they are more fundamental when seen across the whole spectrum of peace and conflict. As Fouzieh Melanie Alamir has noted:

> By nature, security and development actors are ascribed to different roles and mandates in peace-building processes. … Different roles yield different self-conceptions and organizational cultures. While the military is entitled with the mandate and capacities to use force, development policy relies on mutual acceptance and cooperation. Consequently, this results in opposed self-conceptions: being an instrument of power on the one hand, and a provider of aid/supporter on the other. The point of reference of the military is the nation state; its ultimate legitimacy (in democratic societies) is the political will of the legitimate authorities, based on national interests. The point of reference for development actors, however, is ambivalent and differs among donor nations. … Military actors conduct operations, development actors implement programs and projects. This is not only a difference in terminology, but also in approaches, procedures, and time horizons.[12]

The considerable differences between the nature and *modus operandi* of military and civilian organizations cannot be eliminated: The gap can never be closed. It can, however, be considerably narrowed through mutual acceptance and a careful balance between humanitarian space and civil-military coordination. Instead of focusing on differences, the impetus for better civil-military coordination in humanitarian assistance can be well understood by thinking of such differences as comparative advantages, which can be managed to achieve a workable degree of complementarity (rather than compatibility):

> Although civilian organizations have taken the lead in crisis responding and "nation-building," the military maintains certain comparative advantages which complement the operational shortcomings of much of the civilian peace operations community. … Beyond its primary role of securing the peace operations environment, the military can play a vital role in … the success of the civilian peace operation community. This is particularly true in the early phases when civilian organizations are not as well-deployed and resourced in the field as the military, yet at the very time when certain actions, taken or not taken, can have long-lasting impact on the legitimacy and effectiveness of the international presence. This, paradoxically, is in the direct interests of the military and sending states in order to minimize the military's role—i.e., in supporting the "exit strategy" and reaching the "end state."[13]

Particularly in the post-9/11 world, military and civilian players are more code-pendent than ever before, driven by two overarching strategic imperatives: the constraints of a transforming environment for peace and security; and the restraints of diminishing resources in the face of higher costs, risks, and demand for intervention. In other words: we all have to do more, together, with less.

The roots of both confrontation and cooperation in civil-military relations in humanitarian assistance extend well before 9/11; if anything, the more dangerous and complex environments in Afghanistan and Iraq have demonstrated to experienced soldiers, diplomats, and aid workers an even greater need to find more practical means to work together and bridge their more principled differences.

Thus, while it is important for the military to understand and respect the principles under which NGOs operate, it is likewise important for NGOs to understand that their involvement has an unavoidable political context. If anything, because of the emerging realities explained earlier, NGOs are now more politically relevant—or at least perceived to be—than ever. Thus, while NGOs and other civil society organizations should never abandon humanitarian space, which sets them apart from other intervening entities, they must also temper their principles with a certain degree of pragmatism, in order not to defeat their own purposes. One author reflected that:

> In any case, inasmuch as [the] military community needs to better understand and accommodate the ways of the civilian community whose success in peace operations is essentially a prerequisite, civilian organizations and their practitioners in peace operations—the majority of whom have no military experience—must likewise be prepared to work with the military, operating from its side of the Clausewitzian continuum, this time between politics and peace. Nevertheless, “the natural reluctance of governmental and nongovernmental agencies to be seen as working with the military in complex emergencies has diminished in recent years, and NGOs in particular are finding that collaboration can benefit all parties.”[14]

Even before 9/11, terrorists, insurgents, criminal organizations, and many other informal power structures against the international interventions that can be called “spoilers,” particularly in areas where culture and religion shape the dialogue, often have little to no interest in NGOs improving life for indigenous populations—unless they can take credit for it or at least have it perceived that way. If the spoilers cannot co-opt or gain advantage from the presence and activities of NGOs, they will do everything or anything necessary to frustrate them—from intimidation tactics to kidnapping or even killing them. Because the spoilers are often most interested in the status quo or status quo ante, they resent the presence and activities of relief and development organizations that help people to move

toward and become more oriented on the future, regardless of their association with the military or any other government organizations. Moreover, NGOs and other "change agents" come with information and perspectives (such as the role of women and public education) that resent competing ideas to the orthodoxy of many spoiler groups, helping to connect these hitherto disconnected societies to the world outside.

It was no accident, for example, following the bombing of the UN compound in Baghdad in August 2003, that many relief workers were killed, kidnapped, or otherwise dissuaded from continuing to be a force for positive change in that country. In military terms, this was a deliberate campaign to attack the "operational center of gravity"—the presence, willingness, and ability of these change agents to transition local dependence on the military and other "occupiers" to more sovereign political and economic control, a key feature of the "exit strategy." In short, by attacking NGOs and other civilian relief and development groups—again, often regardless of their relationship with the military—the spoilers are attacking the military and the political cachet it represents and at least the perception of legitimacy so central to their operations. The presence of NGOs and other change agents helps to legitimize this process of change—the more an international intervention looks like the whole-of-world (let alone the whole-of-society or whole-of-government) has come to help a distraught population, the more legitimacy it has. This essential impact of the presence of NGOs has been one of the main reasons why the military sometimes—and incorrectly—terms NGOs as "force multipliers." The error is not so much in recognizing the reality of this legitimizing factor, but in particular U.S. forces forgetting that good civil-military operations are essentially an application of the civil-military relationship in democratic societies.[15]

The military, however, is not alone in its clumsiness. In a rejoinder to the MSF arguments for quitting Afghanistan, a *Wall Street Journal* journalist noted:

> It's a different world out there, and unless they want to get out of the aid business altogether, they'll have to come to terms with it. … The new generation of terrorists does not spare unarmed humanitarians. They do not leave clinics, schools and other benign civilian projects untouched: They destroy them especially because they want civilians to suffer and reconstruction to fail. Fear and backwardness are a kingdom they can rule; healthy, secure and prosperous populations have no use for them. This means that humanitarian aid workers are not neutral in the eyes of the terrorists; rather, because they work to make things better, they represent a threat. … Whoever supports progress, stability and the well-being of civil society is the enemy. In this deeply regrettable new situation, security, development and aid are parts of an inseparable whole.[16]

The question, therefore, should not be whether there should be civil-military coordination in humanitarian assistance, even in the least permissive of operational environments, but how. Fortunately, much has already been developed on the ways and means that military and civilian organizations can cooperate—and more needs to be written. Nonetheless, any discussion of humanitarian civil-military coordination should include an exploration of the following areas:

Security. While security is primarily the military's job, it is not exclusively their concern. That is because security has become "more than globalized; it has also become more humanized, civilianized and democratized."[17] "Human security," which is predicated on the security of the individual and the community, has gained ascendancy over "national security," which is state-centric. On one hand, the delivery of a secure environment, which is primarily a military responsibility, may have a much wider application for the military than either community is at first willing to admit, especially in less permissive environments. Unfortunately, the military often falls into the trap of security becoming an end in itself, rather than as an enabler to the broader goal of peace. On the other hand, relief organizations not only have an increasing stake in the security situation, but also a greater impact on stabilization, which the military now sees as essential to security.

Often, immediately following a conflict or crisis, there is a vacuum of governance in essential public services (among them security), which intervening military forces have no other choice but to fill (or the spoilers will) until competent and legitimate civilian authorities are in place. The rule of law, repair or development of essential political, economic, and communications and transportation infrastructure, and so on, are necessary to initiating a virtuous cycle of security and relief and recovery in that critical period. Freedom of movement, for example, is as important to security operations as to humanitarian assistance. At least early on, the military will need to be involved more directly and robustly in humanitarian assistance, providing it themselves, securing civilian relief supplies, convoy escorts, clearing mines, and unexploded ordnance, and so on. In any case, any military humanitarian involvement should be done with a view to creating a lodgement for humanitarian space, then looking to "civilianize" and "localize"—that is, turn it over to international or, ultimately, local civilian authorities for service delivery.

In this respect, the military should actually look at how it can be a "multiplier" to civilian relief capability and efforts. In this respect, the role of the military should be seen as "enablers," because the success of the change agent is a prerequisite to the success of the military. This is in keeping both with the quest for an "exit strategy" and the longer-term intent to empower locals. Understanding

this enabler-change agent relationship in terms of the applied democratic civil-military relationship is the crux to resolving the security-relief conundrum and maintaining the delicate balance between military and civilian interveners.

Security, for example, has both physical and psychological dimensions, as well as humanitarian, economic, political, social, and cultural elements. While the military may rely on more physical means to provide security, civilian organizations such as the ICRC depend on their transparency and neutrality to be able to work among all sides. The Red Cross or Red Crescent on their vehicles may have greater protective value than the armor plating of a 70-ton tank. Who can contribute what to a safe and secure environment must be clearly understood and respected by all players in the intervention, regardless of mission and operating principles.

Information. Information transparency is the engine of civil-military coordination, in both directions. While NGOs often have knowledge of the local culture and community, socio-psychological conditions, and humanitarian needs, the military is privy to information on the security situation and threats to safety, mines, infrastructure assessments, weather, topography, and so forth. Information management and database sharing, from the Afghanistan Information Management Service or AIMS (www.aims.org.af) to OCHA's One Response (http://oneresponse.info) to humanitarian clustering, used with great effect in the response to the Haitian earthquake, have made great strides in humanitarian coordination over the past few years.

Still, there is much progress to be made, particularly considering every organization's tendency to work with its own systems and information sets, the "information-is-power" psychology that pervades many organizations seen to be in competition with others, and the military's sensitivity to information and thus operation security and the habit of classifying information that may not require classification. Because of the sensitivity of certain information, such as regarding spoilers, mines, and other critical elements NGOs may encounter, civilian organizations need to understand that providing the military such information, especially on a voluntary basis, may serve their interest in helping the military create a more secure environment. The military in turn must view civilian organizations only as sources of information—not intelligence. Despite the clear value of civilian organizations as sources of operationally exigent information, particularly in what the military calls "human intelligence" (more important to stability, antiterrorist, and counter-insurgency operations), both communities must establish, in advance, clear rules of engagement on the collection, dissemination, and attribution of such information—the more discreet and indirect, the better.

Coordination. Beyond virtual means of civil-military information exchange, specific physical coordination nodes, often built by the military, are necessary to facilitate the most efficient and

effective use of humanitarian assistance resources, to the benefit of the affected population. This not only avoids the issue of duplicity and underlap, but it also helps to minimize the military's direct involvement in humanitarian assistance, helps collectively prioritize projects, takes advantage of shared information in support of decision making, and most importantly, enables civilian organizations to more quickly take the lead in humanitarian assistance, mainly because it provides an overhead capability many (especially smaller) civilian relief organizations lack in terms of resources and management expertise to put together. It also often helps mitigate a common problem in humanitarian assistance areas, which can simply be called "assessment fatigue."

From the point of view of the recipients of aid, there is nothing more frustrating than watching countless organizations, civilian and military, show up to assess—rather than address—their needs before aid finally arrives. In this respect, there is no quicker way to delegitimize even the most well-intentioned relief efforts, and not just for a few. Whatever these coordination nodes are called is secondary. The deployment of liaisons to help deconflict civil-military issues in the planning and preparation phases, as well as to provide the civilian relief community the opportunity to exercise its advocacy in reminding the military of its humanitarian obligations, for example, is targeting.[18] Beyond that, it suggests the idea of civil-military preventative actions—before the outbreak of a crisis.

Among these actions could be capacity-building among regional organizations and local governments. The most important thing is that the civilian organizations take control of the coordination effort—the sooner, the better. In addition, both organizations need to be disciplined about personnel designated to play a liaison role. For the military, this should be civil-military specialists (CA, CIMIC, etc.); for relief organizations, it should be designated liaison personnel, preferably with a background in working with the military (e.g., CMCoord), to represent one or many organizations. This not only minimizes confusion, but also protects both communities from under- and overcommitment. As with security and information, clear lines of coordination, through commonly agreed civil-military rules of engagement, are even more important in hostile or semipermissive environments, and as any business person knows, always with an eye to the market.

Logistics. Next to security and information, this is the most practical—and most benign—area of civil-military cooperation. In fact, ideally, the majority of issues between military and civilian relief organizations are and should be logistical. Better shared resourcing not only enables more effective civilian-led relief, but also minimizes the resources the military has to draw from its core security operation—mitigating "mission creep." Nonetheless, the military may need to realize the quickest and most effective way to get civilian relief activities up and running effectively is to provide an

initial surge of logistical support effort. Logistical information-sharing tools have vastly improved the ability of military and civilian organizations to work together. And logistical support and especially logistical information-sharing is perhaps the most discreet way the military can enable the success of change agents like NGOs in a low-key, less visible manner with less risk of compromising (at least the perception) of humanitarian space. Notable examples include AIMS, One Response, or the Humanitarian Logistics Software developed by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. In addition, logisticians—or logistically versed operators—from both communities should be key members of the civil-military planning and coordination cast.

Training and Education. As mentioned before, one of the greatest comparative advantages the military maintains is in professional development, due to the tremendous value many militaries place not just in training and education but also in lesson-learning. In the U.S. Army, for example, an officer can spend as much as 40 percent of his or her career going to school. Unlike most civilian relief organizations, the military can and must afford the overhead. While training and education should be seen as an "allowable expense" by both civilian executive and donor boards, the military (and other government agencies), again in the role as an "enabler," as a matter or programmed budgeting, should open the doors of many of its institutions to civilians. This is enlightened self-interest, not just in improving the capacity of these organizations to more quickly espouse roles the military (and other government agencies) would ultimately rather have civilian relief (and development) organizations take on.

Moreover, their presence—prior to operations—has a co-educational value, for operators and not just executives. Such steady state relationship-building helps improve cross-institutional understanding, deconstructs often long-held stereotypes, and ultimately improves civil-military and interagency coordination. It reduces the learning curve while operators focus on the problem at hand and critical time is going by, in addition to feeling out implementation partners. It also enables selective collaboration on training and capacity-building of regional and local organizations and leverages localization by allowing local players to more quickly become stakeholders in the peace process and thus mitigate the threats of spoilers.

Civilian institutions, however, are themselves offering more and more high-quality training in many areas of peace operations such as those created by OCHA and the Peace Operations Training Institute (www.poti.org). Some are, in fact, collaborations between civil and military providers. There are too many to list here, but many are listed with the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centers, or IAPTC (http://www.iaptc.org). Both civilian and military organizations should redouble efforts to host information seminars and problem-solving oriented

workshops to allow executives and especially operators to come together and inform each other on their views of civil-military coordination and respective principles and procedures, as well as capabilities and limitations, in order to mitigate obstacles, misunderstandings, and dilemmas—before the intervention takes place and precious time and credibility is lost on both sides. This is an application of the insight that what you do in the "steady state" builds the strategic and operational capital upon which players draw during crisis response operations or in the field in general, with corresponding levels of success or failure. That is because peace operations, including humanitarian assistance, are more than a knowledge-based enterprise; they are essentially about building relationships. For that reason, beyond training and education, it should never be forgotten:

> We can promulgate all the information and education in the world, but the face-to-face coordination of two to eight people is irreducible. This NGO/military relationship is about people. The ones controlling the operation in theater are the most important linchpins in the entire endeavor. Good people matter—they must be selected carefully.[19]

What is remarkable about especially the development of civilian (or collaborative) references, guidelines, and tools on humanitarian civil-military coordination, is a tacit recognition of more than the inevitability of such, but more important its value—by both sides. With all the talk about "paradigm shifts" in the civil-military relationship in humanitarian actions over the past few years, the basis of the civil-military imperative in these situations, years before the situations in Afghanistan and Iraq made them center stage, has long been recognized:

> Operating to the principle of altruistic self-interest allows each community to more properly assume its comparative advantage. Each community has something unique to offer. NGOs bring humanitarian expertise, a familiarity with the affected area, and sustained commitment. The military brings in infrastructure that provides communication, logistics, and security. In its most simple form, the equation works like this: the military's infrastructure leverages the NGOs into collaboration, which the NGOs provide the military with their ticket home. In other words, NGOs are willing to participate in collaboration and eventual coordination because of the need for a comprehensive effort, not to mention that the military will sometimes move their relief supplies and personnel for free. The military, on the other hand, needs to transition to civilian agencies in order to withdraw quickly—something to which both sides agree.[20]

While the challenges to civil-military coordination in humanitarian assistance are greater than ever, due to the more complex, difficult, and dangerous operational environments facing both military and civilian organizations, the risks and rewards, likewise, at a higher level, are increasingly

intertwined between these two communities, who have become more co-dependent than ever to achieve respective and collective success. If the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq have demonstrated the limits of civil-military coordination in humanitarian assistance in non-or semi-permissive environments, the widespread international and multilateral efforts to provide assistance to the victims of the tsunamis and earthquakes are reaffirming its potential. Much has been achieved and much has yet to be achieved. They key will be continuing to improve understanding the relationship between these communities of actors and the political, social, and other human equities they represent. This is where civil-military coordination writ large should be seen as an application of the societal civil-military relationship.

Above all, the civil-military coordination in humanitarian assistance should be about managing expectations, within and between these organizations and with the affected population itself. The nirvana of complete integration and unity of effort is just that, but it is also not necessary. Often, it is about mutual understanding of the principles and missions that define their presence and operations, looking for common aims and interests. Even if you agree to disagree, it may, as a minimum, be about getting together in order to stay out of each other's way. Coordination on the practical issues of security, information management and information sharing, coordination mechanisms and methods, and logistical matters should be the greater area of concentration, and will help balance out the thornier issues of philosophical or even political differences. As in business, the customer (i.e., the recipient of humanitarian assistance) should be king, and therefore have the greatest common priority. One thing is clear—failure in civil-military coordination means not just the failure of one or the other, but the failure of all and the suffering of many.