Example: Political legitimacy is important for all governments. How does political legitimacy differ in established democracies and in authoritarian countries such as China? What are the likely sources of any difference? How is political legitimacy related to overall regime sustainability and political stability in the two types of political system? Your essay should compare both the levels of legitimacy in the two types of political system and the internal patterns within each type. It should also include some assessment of the validity and reliability of the empirical evidence used to measure political legitimacy. (2012) [答案提纲见下一题]

**Difference**

No difference in conceptual level: three components: Hardin (2007)

1. Consents of the governed.
2. Performance to serve the people.
3. Maintenance and term shifts in the government

Difference in both the sources and the achieving means.

**Source**

*Consents are largely given.*

Democracy:

Pateman (1970) argues for a consensus on democratic norms.

Dahl (1989) also treat still believes of political activists as a condition for polyarchy.

Almond and Verba (1989) and following studies (e.g., Putnam 1994, 2000, Inglehart & Welzel 2005) demonstrate the democracies with higher consents of democratic values are more stable.

Inglehart and Welzel (2005) argue the source of the norms comes from socioeconomic development in generations in increasing the demand of expression and participation.

China:

Lieberthal (2004) argues five legacies: Confucian ideology, institution of emperor (strong personal rule and censorship), bureaucratic structure, social mobility held by families (away from citizenship), and labor-oriented economy.

*Performance: can be divided to three aspects, economic performance, public goods, and responsiveness.*

In terms of economic performance, the difference only lies on the degree of dependence between democracy and China. For democracies, a series of works since Lipset (1960) have been done demonstrating the influence of economic development at least stabilize the democracy (Geddes 2007). Nevertheless, works, such as Rustow (2007), Di Palma (1990), Przeworski (2000), Gleditsch (2004), also shows that the rise of democracy can happen in any economic conditions. If gaining legitimacy is one of the necessary conditions for the rise of a regime, these works show that economic development is not a sufficient condition for the legitimacy of democracy.

For China, however, the economic development is an important legitimacy source. Many scholars, such as Huntington (1993), Inglehart and Welzel (2005), Zheng (2009), have emphasized the influence of economic development after 1979 on the sustainability of the Chinese authoritarianism. Not only in theory, have many empirical studies also indicated that economic development and the increase of personal income reinforce the support to the regime, the incumbent government, cross-class cooperation (e.g., Tang 2015; Chen and Dickson2010).

In terms of public goods, BDM (2005) has done an excellent job showing that providing public goods is inherent to the democratic regime, regarding the nationality of decision making of the incumbent leadership. From a more institutional view, Dahl (1989) also claims that public goods can be best maintained and distributed in a democracy in both substantive and processed senses.

According to BDM, for authoritarian countries, such as China, private goods should be more favored for the leaders to public goods. However, as Tsai (2007) shows, in such case where the institutional accountability of public goods is weak, the informal institutions, such as community organizations and religious groups, are helpful for the provision of public goods.

*Finally, for responsiveness, which actually also relates to the third aspect of legitimacy, the maintenance of the regime, democracy and China have very different sources.*

For democracies, the responsiveness is realized through a fixed and clear institutional procedure---the free, fair, competitive elections. This is also the minimal process definition of democracy (Schumpeter 1947, Pateman 1970, Dahl 1989). The legitimacy comes from the regular running of the institution and the participation of the citizens. But for China, there is no such institutions. The incumbent government has to maintain a high responsiveness to ensure sufficient mass support on the established regime (Tang 2015). Nevertheless, because of the lack of relevant institution and rule of law, the responsiveness are usually directly achieved by the party and the central government over the local government or legal segments.

**Regime sustainability and stability**

*Empirical measures: survey questions about ideology, evaluation of the government performance, and political trust in various aspects.*

Political trust may not be a reliable measure for democracy, because of the post-modernization transition (Tang 2015, Inglehart & Welzel 2005). Neither does the preference to the democracy, because of the contextual definition of the term (Shi & Lu 2010). Political pressure, though, should not be overestimated (Tang 2015).

Example: Political trust is important for all governments. How does political trust differ between democratic societies and authoritarian countries? In what ways does an authoritarian regime such as China pro-mote political trust differently from a democratic government? How is political trust related to overall regime sustainability and political stability in the two types of political system? Your essay should compare both the levels of political trust in the two types of political system and the internal patterns within each type. It should also include some assessment of the validity and reliability of the empirical evidence used to measure political trust.(2013Fall)

*How does political trust differ between democratic societies and authoritarian countries?*

In democracies, diffused political support is high, but the specific support declines (Dalton 1999, Norris 1999, 2011). The SAME in China, (Chen 2004, Shi 2009).

In both democracy (Taiwan) and China, economic satisfaction bring political trusts (Lewis-Beck et al, 2014, Wang 2006, Norris 2011).

Mobilization (media and participation) does not affect China and Taiwan very much.

Economic satisfaction’s influence is stronger in China than in Taiwan.

In China, internal efficacy is slightly helpful, but in Taiwan, it is not. However they both improve the beliefs of government responsiveness as the external efficacy. In both, external efficacy’s effect is strong.

But in China, there is a big difference between central and local government support (Tang 2015).

Also participation is an important source for democracies to gain trust, but not for China (Tang 2015, O’Brien and Li 2006).

*In what ways does an authoritarian regime such as China promote political trust differently from a democratic government?*

1. Mobilization: controlled or sanctioned media (Shirk 2011, Norris 2011). But there is unintended consequences. Tang (2005): mobilization through media make people more critical to government and acceptable of liberal ideas.

Shirk (2015): media commercialization make control difficult.

Tang et al.(2014): fully controlled media does not make less trust people to trust more, but enhance people who already trust.

2. Economy: Pei (2012): regime legitimacy can be boosted by the government’s success in promoting economic development and in improving people’s living standards.

3. Scapegoat:

O’Brien and Li (2006): citizen use central policy to go against local government.

Tang (2015): China successfully leads the mass to blame the local government to avoid criticism to the central. More anger to the local and blame more to the local on the specific issues.

4. Culture: promote traditional culture.

Shi (2001): both hierarchical orientation and conflict avoidance promote regime legitimacy in China and Taiwan.

Tang (2015): confirm the Confucian value to promote support for both China and Taiwan.

5. Internal/external efficacy

Both promote trust, and external performs more important.

Increase governmental responsiveness in various ways.

*How is political trust related to overall regime sustainability and political stability in the two types of political system?*

Pei 2012: The economic success explains why China has so far survived the collapse of communism and the Arab Spring. Likewise, its future stability and sustainability will also depend on its ability to create a positive public outlook for further economic benefits

Central vs. local:

1. Much anger to local

2. Blame the local more.

3. Dissatisfaction with Beijing did not lead to more political activism; Li (2004): high trust to the central lead to more protests

4. Dissatisfaction with the local encourage political actions and demand of liberal democracy

*Your essay should compare both the levels of political trust in the two types of political system and the internal patterns within each type.*

*It should also include some assessment of the validity and reliability of the empirical evidence used to measure political trust.*

One way is to ask people’s supports for democracy (Chu et al, 2010). In democracy, high supports mean high trust to the system; in authority high supports means low trust, since they dissatisfy with the existing regime. Con: contextual definition of democracy (Shi & Lu 2010).

A more systematic way: diffused political support (system support and national identity) + specific support (trust in institutions and in leaders). However, because there is no difference between the political system and the incumbent government and CCP. The horizontal way is unclear.

Example: Describe populist authoritarianism as a political culture in certain authoritarian societies such as China. What are the necessary components of such political culture and how does it differ from the Civic Culture in explaining governance and regime sustainability? How are these components related to each other? Please try to include in your essay the existing literature as well as empirical evidence on regime legitimacy and political trust in democratic and authoritarian regimes. Try to lay out any debate in the literature whenever and wherever it is applicable. How do you justify the overall validity of populist authoritarianism in explaining authoritarian politics?

*Populist authoritarianism as a political culture in certain authoritarian societies such as China.*

Political culture is a political orientation that can be detected through mass behaviors and opinions. Populist authoritarianism is a political culture in authoritarian societies such as China, in which the authoritarian control is achieved by the close interactions between the state and the society (Tang 2015).

*What are the necessary components of such political culture and how does it differ from the Civic Culture in explaining governance and regime sustainability?*

There are six basic components of populist:

1. Mass line ideology;

2. High social capital (interpersonal trust);

3. High regime support (political trust) and national identity (nationalism);

4. High governmental responsiveness;

5. High political activism and contentions;

6. Weak institution.

It has an overlap with the classical definition of civic culture, including high social capital (Putnam 1994), high political supports (Dalton 1999), clear national identity (Gellner 1983), and high political involvement (Dahl 1989). Nevertheless, it has an essential difference with civic culture; that is, the systemic environment to achieve these aspects. Civic culture has a fully autonomy and independence from the state control, while, in populist authoritarianism, all the above aspects relates to certain governing management of the government. Moreover, high level of any of these aspects are not a necessary condition for the regime sustainability of stable democracies with a developed civic culture. That is, the regime can also gain legitimacy from the elaborate institutional process, such as competitive elections (Dahl 1989, Przeworski et al. 2000). However, for a populist authoritarianism, every aspect are important sources of regime legitimacy.

*How are these components related to each other?*

The mass line ideology is essential for populist authoritarianism, for the mass support is the crucial legitimacy source especially in a system where the institution and rule of law are not fully established. An important way to practice the mass line and gain the mass support is increasing the governmental responsiveness.

I. High social capital

Debate:

1. Trust in democracy (Almond & Verba 1989, Putnam 1994, Inglehart 2005) vs. trust support the regime (Norris 1999)

2. Confucian (Parochial); Socialist (Communal); Economic (Civic)

Factor:

Confucian: family (low)

Communal: neighbor (highest)

Economic: coworker, stranger

Consequences:

1. support regime sustainability, nationality, political efficacy.

2. promote democratic values.

II. High regime support (political trust) and national identity (nationalism);

i. support

Debate

1. horizontal (Easton 1964) vs. vertical

Factor

1. Mobilization:

Media limited and may drawback (Tang 2005, Shirk 2010)

Participation has little effect

2. economic satisfaction:

More affect China than Taiwan

3. culture:

Confucian works

4. internal/external efficacy;

Internal little, but support believes of governmental responsiveness

External salient

Consequence:

1. less blame center; high trust of center lead to more activism

2. more anger and more issue to local

ii. nationalism

Debate:

1. support the regime (Zheng 1999) vs. hard to control (Shirk 2010) vs. support democracy (Wang 2004)

2. functional (Gellner 1983) vs. culture (Smith 1998) vs. constructivism (Brass 1991, Anderson 2006)

Factor:

1. functional: urban (down), education (inverse U), income (down)

2. cultural: ethnicity (nothing)

3. constructivism: party + age (up)

Consequences

Short: reduce demand of democracy

Long: anti-market capitalism and tolerance

Int’l: anti-democracy

In sum, support the sustainability.

III. High political activism and contentions;

Debate: social crisis (Pei 2009) vs. regime durability (Chen & Dickson 2010, Tsai 2007, Kennedy 2009)

Active affect only in democracy (Tilly 2005) vs. works for authoritarianism (Lorentzen 2010)

Factor:

1. extensive dissatisfaction.

2. central successfully direct public anger from center to local, from government to economic and social organizations, and individual officials.

3. Personal

Education: increase institutional channel using

Legal knowledge: increase institutional channel using

Migrants: more militant

Disadvantage groups: old/rural more satisfied

4. Working space

Party-state: institutional channel, less success

SOE: collective bargaining, more success

Private: individual negotiation; no more dissatisfaction

Chen and Dickson 2010: recruit capitalists

Foreign: protest, more success

Consequences: there is a general tendency to encourage, tolerate and respond to popular protests, and only repress them when they go out of control.

IV. Weak institution -> responsiveness

Consequences:

Traditional:

mediation (forced, unfair, and corruption; China is still an individualist society Fu & Cullen 2011) is dominant

New: court:

1. high activism, high resolving rate; low institutional channel using

2. very sensitive to public opinion -> party intervension (Liebman 2011)

3. petition bypass the local government, destroying rule of law.

Informal: Tsai 2007: informal institution help for the provision of public goods.

How do you justify the overall validity of populist authoritarianism in explaining authoritarian politics?

1. internal validity: explain the contradictory events in China

2. similar things happen in other authoritarian countries: some electoral democracies with a strong populist orientation, such as Argentina under Peron, Venezuela under Chavez, Russia under Putin, and the populist governments under Taksin and Yingluck in Thai.

They have strong regime support (Norris 2011), responsive governments, social capital and interpersonal trust, strong public involvement and political participation, direct relationship between the state and society, the relative weakness of political institutions, and inherent political instability