Civil Society on Democracy/Democratization

Example question:

Discuss the relationship between civic culture and democracy as illustrated by the civic culture literature such as Almond and Verba, Putnam, Inglehart, Dalton, Norris and others. Discuss any studies that challenge this relationship both in terms of causal directions and its very validity. How do the authors of the civic culture literature respond to such challenges? Please make sure you cite the empirical evidence used by the various authors to support their findings. What do you see as the opportunities for future research on this topic? (2014Spr.)

What’s civil society?

1. Almond& Verba (1963): permit changes but moderate the process
2. Putnam(1993, 2000): social capital: networks, norms and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit.; the connections among individuals' social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them.
3. Wnuk-Lipinski (2007): the totality of non-state institutions, organizations and civic associations functioning in the public domain.

What’s political culture?

1. Almond & Verba (1963): specifically political orientations--attitudes toward the politicla system and its various parts, and attitudes towards the role of the self in the system; three categories, parochial (traditional), subject(centralized), participant (democratic), and mixed. the individual citizens’ satisfaction with and support for their country’s political institutions, national identity, involvement in political activities, sense of political efficacy, social trust, and social tolerance.
2. Eckstein (1998): (Congruency theory) Authority pattern, the structures and processes by which social units are directed or, put otherwise, their structures and processes of governance. The social units refer to the collective individuals to function as entities (performing durable, civic order, legitimacy, decision efficiency).
3. Fuchs (2007): A macro-phenomenon rooting in citizens’ attitudes
4. Ross(2009): share meaning and meaning-making.
5. Elkins & Simoen (1979): A collective property of groups with a function as a control mechanism to limit the option. It should be used as a collaborator with structural and institutional explanations rather than a competitor. Good for explaining institutional difference, bad for democracy because it is too broad; nor to individual opinions, because individuals do not have culture, but only values.

Contribution

1. Almond & Verba (1963): showing that personal self internal efficacy relates to education, but their opinion to neighbors only depends on what state they live in. Showing that civic culture assures the division of labor between the political elite and ordinary citizens and political participation.
2. Eckstein (1998): Governments perform well to the extent that their authority patterns are congruent with authority patterns of other units in the society. Congruency means a condition of broadly corresponding to something or being in agreement with it in essentials; incongruent authority patterns tend to change toward increased congruence.
3. Ross (2009):
   1. Frame context in which politics occurs;
   2. Link the individuals with collective identities;
   3. Define the boundaries of groups
   4. Offer a framework for interpreting the actions and motives of others
   5. Provide resources for political organizations and motivations.
4. Putnam(1993, 2000):
   1. The difference in cultural engagement can explain the variance in democracy performances. The decline of social capital associate with the decline of democratic participation.
   2. The function of social capital
      1. makes collective problems easier to resolve
      2. makes business transactions easier
      3. widens our awareness of our mutual connectivity
      4. improves our health and happiness through both psychological and biological processes

Relation between civic culture and democracy/Democratization

1. Almond & Verba (1963): The role of social trust and cooperativeness as a component of the civic culture cannot be overemphasized. Only when political culture and political structure are congruent, can the democracy be stable.
2. Eckstein (1998): Democratic governments perform well only if their authority patterns exhibit "balanced disparities"-that is, combinations of democratic and nondemocratic traits. The key is preexisting authority pattern (institution), while the long-run foundation for democracy is the democratization of social life
3. Fuchs(2007): a crucial factor (determinant) for the persistence of a democratic regime is a political culture that is in congruence with the regime structure. He integrate Putnam’s theory about political culture and functioning of democracies into civic culture and persistence of democracy.
4. Inglehart & Welzel (2005): The causal arrow runes from self-expression values to democratic institutions, not vice versa. macro socio-economic development is linked to micro-emancipative value change, which in turn has the macro manifestation of collective freedom, where democracy is the logical outcome. - Moving up to the societal level again, when emancipative values prevail in a given society there exists a strong demand for effective rights.
5. Welzel & Inglehart (2007): democratization is explained by (1) given socioeconomic conditions being conducive to (2) specific patterns of mass beliefs that (3)motivate the collective actions that ultimately bring democratization.
6. Laitin (1995): civic culture can make political institutions function effectively, but it does not necessarily make them more democratic.

Empirical evidence

1. Almond & Verba(1963): US, UK, Germany, Italy, and Mexico (US, UK, balanced, congruent culture, Italy, Mexico the worst, Germany is in between). DV: not explicitly specified but arguing “effective democratic outcome.” IV: indicators of confidence, competences, etc. Lack of mechanism connecting culture and structure.
2. Inglehart & Welzel (2005): Empricial support (81 countries, 85% of world’s population) to the congruence theory. lthough socioeconomic development tends to bring predictable changes in people's worldviews, cultural traditions (protestantism, confucianism or communism) continue to show a lasting imprint on a society's worldview. Therefore, modernization is not linear. The increase of self-expression makes democracy increasingly likely.
3. Putnam(2000): 1900~late 1960, US meta-analysis. Showing the trend of social capital (measured by political participation, civic participation, religious participation, etc.)
4. Pharr(1990): use Japanese case on social protest showing that the attitudes and solutions of social conflicts root in traditional culture (in Japan, privatize social conflicts to restrict its spread, and save the government’s resource to get power and doing other state goals.)
5. Rose, Mishler & Munro (2006): 1992-2005 surveys show the most important factor for regime support is political culture. Also the passage of the time make the masses resigned rather than enthusiast support the regime.
6. Dalton (1999): finds a decline of trust in politicians in the 1990s in democracies, and a decline of confidence in political institutions.

Challenge to this relation

1. Should eliminate tangible controls such as income and education (A&V address education, but not sufficiently.).
2. Converse (1965): the masses do not have clear ideology, nor are they influenced by the elites too much. Shown by two-year panel interview on 20 Americans.
3. Almond & Verba (1980): downplaying political structure, poor case selection (Mexico), individualistic fallacy, causal arrow, and elite measurement.
4. Fuchs (2007): political culture must be construed by the aggregation of micro-data. Only political culture as a macro-phenomenon can affect macro-level political system. Long-term is meaningful only when the bearers can be identified(e.g., collective actors, such as party or political institution)
5. Ross(2009):
   1. Unit of analysis: Almond and Verba vs. Taylor and Geertz
   2. Unclear of the mechanism: culture works in various ways.
   3. How to explain the cultural changes.
6. Verba, Schlozman, Brandy (1995): interest (those who are interested in politics), information (how aware someone is politically), efficacy (if a person thinks they can be effective), and partisan intensity provide the impetus for people to get involved with politics but if they don’t have the wherewithal: time, money and skills, it won’t matter. (Based on a survey of 15000 individuals in the US.)
7. Foley & Edwards (1996): Putnam understates the ability of political institution to foster the civil community, also ignored the real and sharp conflicts in the civil society which is negative to democracy.
8. Jackman & Miller (2009): voting behaviors is a result of institutional arrangement. Putnam used strong assumption and way back tracing in history to belies the actual record in 1993 book, and selected information (replying mainly on a single survey question) in 2000 book.
9. Muller & Seligon (1994): civic culture is not the reason of democracy but the result. The most important explanatory variable is income inequality (The size of the top quintile of income negatively associate with democracy). Empirical evidence: three level of democracies, 1970~ 1980s.
10. Elikins & Simoen (1979): culture can’t be measured by mode or average because it is a collective property of groups. But Lane(1992) believes that the attempt to apply the political culture concept to whole nations has been a major error, since it has overly abstract conceptualizations and weakening the explanatory capacity, and each cultural group to determine assumptions that we can then use in a rational choice framework.
11. Seligon (2002): Inglehart has an individual fallacy on the relationship between trust (interpersonal trust, political satisfaction, life satisfaction) and democracy. Using aggregative data (freedom house as DV) and new data Latinbarometer, find the correlations in Inglehart’s model are very weak. Welzel and Inglehart respond that social phenomena do not have to influence the behavior of an individual as a personal attribute of this individual itself; they can also influence the behavior of an individual as an aggregate attribute of the population in which the individual lives.
12. Laitin (1995): Putnam forgets to mention that the regions that are regions that are rich in civic culture in his study are also the traditional strongholds of Italy’s fascist regime.

Variance across regions

1. Putnam (1993, 2000): the regional difference in democracy performance can be explained by cultural engagement (social capital).

Example: How do state, market, economic modernization, and technology affect media freedom and public opinion and political behavior? Please include key concepts and authors in the political communication literature, the differences and similarities of these effects in democratic and non-democratic societies, and any remaining research questions in the future study of comparative political communication. Please use concrete examples in your discussion. (2013Spr.)

1. Welzel and Inglehart (2008): the major effect of modernization is not making democracy more acceptable to elites but increasing ordinary people’s capabilities and willingness to struggle for democratic institutions.
2. Inkeles and Smith (1974): Life experience influences individual modernization, and later life experience can overcome the early ones. Using 1000 surveys in each of six developing countries showing that education, mass media directly matters to individual modernization (modern score, attitude questions), but urban residence, ethnicity, religion just affect the education and exposure to media to indirectly affect modernity. Factory experience matters, while the urban environment doesn’t.
3. Putnam(2000): the habit of watching TV affect the social capital.
4. Tang (2011):
   1. authoritarian countries where the media are controlled actually demonstrate more confidence in their media. it does indicate that freedom of media comes at cost of people’s confidence
   2. People’s distrust of key political institutions grows as level of political freedom increases.
   3. Democracy is negatively related to political support