**Hybrid Regime**

Example:

Evaluate the utility of the sharp increase over the past 15 years or so in analyses that employ the concept of a “hybrid regime.” In your response, you should define “regime” and explain its significance, clarify what a hybrid regime refers to, and describe major types of hybrid regimes that scholars have identified. (2012, 2013Spr., and 2014Spr.)

What’s regime?

A set of institutions.

Dahl (1989): classical regimes

1. Democracy: Competitive election is the core with equality assumption.
2. Anarchism: avoid any type of coercion; voluntary association based on continuing consensus.
3. Guardianship: led by leaders with moral capacity and competition (to practice morality) and technical or instrumental knowledge.

Bratton(1994): the nature of the preexisting regime shapes the dynamics and outcomes of political transitions

1. the likelihood that an opposition challenge will arise
2. the flexibility with which incumbents can response

What’s hybrid regime?

Diamond (2002): Liberal democracy, electoral democracy, competitive authoritarian, hegemonic authoritarian, political closed authoritarian.

1. Electoral democracy vs. Competitive authoritarian: freedom, fairness, and meaningfulness of elections.
2. Hegemonic vs. competitive authoritarian: competitive has real opposition; no party wins all the seats; no prolong presidential tenure.

Bogaards (2009): use democracy and authoritarian as two terminals to locate a regime.

Collier & Levitsky (1997): diminished subtypes: the types with missing attributes.

Type of regime:

*In general*

Levitsky & Way (2010): democracy; comparative authoritarianism (no free election, broad protection of civil rights, reasonable level playing field); full authoritarianism.

*Democracy*

*Process:*

Schumpeter (1947): election + competition

Dahl (1989):

1. Effective participation
2. Voting equality
3. Equal opportunity discovering and validating the choices
4. Agenda setting
5. Inclusion

*Outcome*:

Schmitter & Karl (1991): cooperation is the core feature; representative do most of the real work; competition and election are not sufficient condition for democracy.

Munk (2014): democracy is a synthesis of political freedom and political equality.

*Authoritarianism*

Linz(1975):

Criteria

1. Degree of limited political pluralism
2. Degree to which the regime is based on political apathy and demobilization
3. Mentality-ideology

Type

1. Bureaucratic-military regime
2. Corporate
3. Mobilization authoritarian regimes in post-democratic society.
4. Post-independent mobilizational regime
5. Post-totalitarian regime
6. Sultanistic

Linz & Stepan (1996): about political transition

* Agree Cardoso and Faletto that democratic transition is contingent on the legacy of political system
* Arenas for a consolidated democracy
  + civic society
  + political society
  + rule of law
  + bureaucratic structure
  + economic society
* Four pre-democracy regimes
  + Totalitarianism
  + Post-totalitarianism
  + Authoritarianism
  + Sultanism

Geddes (2003)

1. Personal
2. Military
3. Single-party
4. Two mixture: personalist-military; single-party military

*Totalitarianism (e.g., Soveit Union, Nazi Germany)*

Arendt (1973):

1. party-state
2. multiplication of offices
3. secrete control by the leader
4. law is not equally applied

Friedrich & Brzezinski(1965): difference from authoritarianism

1. single mass party led by one man
2. randomly order; arrest people without reason
3. near-complete monopoly of control
4. central control and direction of the entire economy

*Challenge of hybrid regime:*

Bunce & Wolchik (2011): six elections in postcommunist countries from 1998 to 2005, where the oppoistion party defeated the authoritarian incumbent.

1. Opposite won because
   1. the hard and creative work of a transnational network composed of local opposition and civil society groups
   2. members of the international democracy assistance community
   3. graduates of successful electoral challenges to authoritarian rule in other countries
2. elections can serve as a powerful mechanism for democratic change

**Regime and democracy:**

Example:

Does the survival of a democratic regime depend in generalizable ways on its institutional configuration? Pick one of the following sets of institutional choices and take a position on its role in democratic longevity: a) the configuration of executive power (parliamentary vs. presidential vs. mixed systems); b) the institutions linking the central government to regional ones (unitary or various types of federal systems), or c) whether constitutional review of law or policy by a court or other body exists and what form it takes. Is the impact of the choice now generally agreed upon or still controversial? If the latter, what issues are at stake in the debate? How should research proceed? (2011, 2013Fall)

One dimension on which scholars compare politics is the nature of countries' ruling regimes. In particular, many have tried in recent decades to go beyond the democracy-authoritarianism distinction by providing sub-categories for each as well as hybrids of the two. Review the major contributions to this literature. Then, make and defend an argument about how useful our current conceptual tools are for empirical comparative analyses.(2010)

Definition

Institution is an organization of rules and norms for certain decision makings, which are recurring in a society and known by the participants.

Acemoglu & Robinson (2005): institutions ensure the power persisting in the near future; democracy can be consolidated by limiting the majority power in the institutions.

parliamentary vs. presidential vs. mixed systems:

Lijphart (1991, 1994): Democracy performs better in parliamentary-PR than presidential.

1. The author empirically test the 14 OECD countries, and found the democratic indicators (equality, participation, socioeconomic) are better in parliamentary-PR than presidential
2. Moderate PR performs better than extreme PR.
3. European countries chose parliamentary because of the social, political structure (ethnic, religious) and the new/old party struggles in the democratization history.

Lijphart (1999, 2012)

* Two dimensions
  + Federal-Unitary Dimension
  + Executives-Parties Dimension
* Consensus pattern is better than majoritarian pattern, good esp. for deeply divided societies
  + On some indicators do better, e.g., inflation
  + On others not worse
  + majoritarian practically prevent crossover voting, i.e., being tomorrow's majority
    - majority and minority's interests do not overlap much
  + Consensus democracy also have kinder, gentler traits
    - lower incarceration rates
    - less use of the death penalty
    - better care for the environment
    - more foreign aid work
    - more welfare spending
  + Example
    - Majoritarian: UK
    - Consensus: Switzerland, Belgium, and EU
* Evidence : 36 democracies, 1996-2010

Linz(1990a, with Horowitz 1990 and Linz 1990b):

1. Parliamentary produce more stable democracy than presidential, especially for those nations with deep political cleavages or numerous political parties. It can change the leader or government to solve the conflict.
2. Presidential system obstacle good performance by two reasons:
   1. Fixed term: increase the rigidity of the system; the change of president rarely happened inbetween elections
   2. Separation of power: promote conflicts.

Lipset (1990): Democratic stability is more a cultural issue than a constitutional engineering.

* Institutional
  + Prime minister with a majority has more authority than an president
  + Party and party discipline are much stronger in parliamentary
* Culture
  + long-enduring democracies are wealthier and more Protestant
    - Wiener: All the postwar enduring democracies are British colonies

Mainwaring (1993): institutional combination matters.

1. Multiparty + presidentialism is the worst:
   1. immobilizing executive/legislative deadlock
   2. ideological polarization
   3. difficulties of interparty coalition
2. Two party system is more compatible with presidential democracy
   1. less ideological polarization
   2. Median voter encourage moderation
   3. absence of extremist party

Cheibub (2007):

1. it is the failed countries choose presidentialism rather than presidentialism caused failure.
2. economic development level, size of the country, geographic location are not enough to explain the survival rate in presidential democracies
3. historical accident causes some failure in presidentialism.

Fish (2006):

1. powerful legislature benefits the democracy (restrict the power of the president and improve party development);
2. Power of legislature:
   1. Parliamentary ability to monitor the president and the bureaucracy
   2. Parliament’s freedom from presidential control
   3. Parliament’s authority in specific areas
   4. The resource that it brings to the work

Przeworski (2000): empirical evidence shows presidency is less stable.

Power & Gasiorowski (1997): institutional variables may have a weaker impact on the survival of a democratic regime than imagined.

Evidence :56 cases of transition to democracy in third world countries

1. Breakdowns of presidential and parliamentary systems are nearly identical
2. Multi-Party presidential system performance was roughly the same as multi-party parliamentary systems
3. countries with 3 effective parties in government are much more likely to consolidate than countries with near dominant parties

Unitary or various types of federal systems:

Stepan (1999):Federalism

Advantage:

1. suitable for multinational democracies
2. suitable for large population, country size, and multiliguistic

Forming:

In a view of origin:

1. coming together: result of a constitutional bargin
2. holding together: historical heritage

In a view of consequence:

1. demo-constraining: prevent majority

Characteristics: Subunits are represented equally; have competence; national policies are influenced by local policy

1. demo-enable: More power in federal

In a view of structure

1. Symmetrical: states have the same constitutional competence
2. asymmetrical

Ames: explain why Brazil's democratic institution is so inefficient

1. Open-list PR
   1. personalize politics
   2. weaken the party control
2. Destructive majority constraining federalism
3. Presidentialism

All these lead to many veto players to reduce the governing efficiency.

constitutional review of law or policy by a court:

Horowitz (2006):

Function

1. provide a set of the enforcement of human rights and for the deliberation of the power of governmental bodies
2. let the constitution enable to shapes and directs the exercise of political power

Model

* American: Incorporating judicial review in the ordinary judicial hierarchy with a single Supreme Court at the apex
  + Advantage: every judge can explain the constitutional issues
  + Disadvantage: Need victim and case
* Austrian Create a separate constitutional court
  + Advantage Allow for early, high-level consideration of constitutional questions and avoids the delay and uncertainty
  + Disadvantage not the final appeal court

In authoritarian regimes:

Svolik

* components shape authoritarian politics
  + authoritarian control
    - repression: when a few in power share a disproportionate share of wealth, repression is cheaper; but authoritarian reliance on repression sows the seeds of future military interventions
    - cooperation: party as the instrument for cooperation (different from democracy)
      * hierarchical assignment of service and benefits
      * political control over appointments
      * selelctive recruitment and repression
  + authoritarian power-sharing
    - incumbent and allies by ruling coalitions
      * often fails because dictator's desire and opportunity to acquire more power at the expense of its allies lead to allies’ rebellions
      * potential success by high-level, deliberative, and group decision making institutions.

Achieve transparency

showing power-sharing signal

enable usurping power to be detected by allies

effective only under a permissive balance of power within the ruling coalition (contested autocracy vs. established autocrats)

* + Essential difference from democracy
    - absense of an independent authority enforcing mutual agreements
    - ever-present potential for violence
* explain why many hybrid regimes end with authoritarianism,
  + the institutions help to solve the power-sharing and control problems
* Evidence
  + 1946~2008
    - country level
    - ruling-coalition level
    - leader level

**Performance**

In the past decade the focus has shifted from questions of democratic transition to a focus on democratic performance. Questions of governmental accountability and responsiveness are central to this research agenda. Define and explain these two concepts. What are some of the most – and least- compelling arguments for variation in democratic performance on the basis of accountability and/or responsiveness. You may use empirical examples from any part of the world to illustrate your argument.(2009Spr., 2010)

What’s governmental accountability

Andersen (2014): State’s capacity: monopoly on violence; administrative effectiveness.

What’s governmental responsiveness

Argument about accountability and responsiveness and democracy

Sen (1999): democracy is instrumentally important to make the government responsible and accountable.

Pateman (1970): Dahl, Sartori, Belrelson respectively argue that over-participation leads to totalitarianism, therefore, democracy does not requires universal suffrage, and absolute equality of property, race, religion.

**Development and Democratization**

Example:

Some people argue that Huntington's Third Wave of Democratization is over. Do developments in the last decade or so call for us to rethink our theories of regime change? If not, what are the important frontiers of knowledge in this body of theory?(2008Spr.)

What are theories of regime change?

*Definition*

Pye (1971): three themes of political development

1. A general spirit or attitude toward equality
   1. participation
   2. spirit of law
2. The capacity of political system
   1. cover the social life
   2. effectivity and efficiency to excutive public policies
3. Differentiation and specialization
   1. officies and agencies have distinct and limited funcitons
   2. specification of various political roles in the system

*Prerequisite*

Kitschelt(1992)

* structure-oriented
  + explain general causes
* Process-oriented
  + explain the timing, transition, and specific trial and error process

Lipset: The key for consolidated democracy is legitmacy

* the democratic government needs political and economic efficacy
  + one way to do that is take the high road to economic development
  + no economic development will fail to develop and not institutionalize genuinely democratic systems

Rustow (1970):

Background condition:

1. Identity to one single political community
2. A series of nationality
3. Dynamic/administrative process of unification
4. Socioeconomic situation is unnecessary

Preparatory phase:

1. Rise of new elites.
2. Polarization
3. No divisions on regional lines
4. Liberalization.

Decision phase: see Przeworski (1991).

Przeworski (1991): Hardliner + Moderates vs. Radicals + Reformers

Condition for democratization

1. Reformers and the moderates have agreements
2. Reformers can deliver the consent of hardliners
3. Moderate can control radicals
4. When the relation of forces are unknown, the check and balance are easier to achieve

Di Palma (1990):

1. Democracy can arise under almost any circumstances
2. Result from conscious actions and from elites pursuing their own interests
3. Influences of the structural factors are there, but they have to be there before democracy arrives.

Lipset (1960): stable democracy always have a developed economy.

Reason:

1. Reduce the gap between professional/semi-professional and regular workers.
2. Rich countries distribute consumption goods more equitably.
3. Wealth and education expose the lower classes in cross-pressure rather than ideology or extremist.
4. Middle class is enhanced.
5. High classes are more likely to accept democratic values.
6. High democratic norms

Shortcoming: no causality study

Measure of development/modernization should includes wealth, industrialization, urbanization, education rather than only income.

Haggard(1995): socioeconomic structure is the essential point to understand regime change

1. elites' mobilization depends on the economic policies and performances
2. economic cleavages and interests are constructed in institutional context

Huntington

* Three waves
  + 1828~1926
    - economic and social development of the Western countries
  + 1943~1962
    - victory of western allies in WII
  + 1974~1990
    - cyclicial wave in Latin America
    - revival of stable democracy
    - de-colonization
* Reversal wave
  + performance legitimacy
  + reverse snowballing
  + emergence of new forms of authoritarianism
* Transition based on elites' choice, perception, beliefs and actions
  + further consolidation is based on elite pacts and consensus

Moore(1966): agree with Lipset(1960) that bourgeois matters, but conditioned on class relations between bourgeois and landed upper class:

1. Too weak: limited in growth; the peasants become the main role in revolution. E.g., China, Russia.
2. Too strong: upper class go with the crown; lead to capitalist fascism. E.g., Germany, Japan.
3. Adequate: European countries, and U.S.

Five factors for the relationship

1. Power distribution in elites
2. Power distribution among classes
3. Economic basis of the agrarian upper-class
4. Class constellation
5. State’s autonomy vis-à-vis the dominant class

Rueschemeyer et al (1992): Rueschemeyer et al

* Disagree with Lipset and Moore
  + 1) All ways pro-democratic: urban working class
  + 2) Landed upper class: all time anti-democracy
* Democratization depends on how the middle class sees the situation
  + threatened by popular pressure, then pro-authority
  + intransigent dominant class and beneficial to ally with urban working class, then pro-democracy
* Evidence
  + historical study on western Urope and western Hemisphere.
  + comparative historical work is the most important in explaining causal relationships and in developing an adequate theoretical framework for the transition to democracy.

Burkhart & Lewis-Beck (1994): Economic development improve the democratic prospect of a country, but the effect depends on the location of the nation in the world system: the stronger for the core. Using empirical data measuring development with Energy consumption per capita.

Przeworski et al. (2000): development does not cause democracy, but stabilize it.

1. Reject the endogenous theory: democracy can happen at any stage of economic development
2. Support the exogenous theory: income is neither the necessary nor the sufficient condition for democratization, but it preserves democracy. (Evidence: 135 countries, 1950-90)
3. Potential critiques: model does not include rights, freedoms, socioeconomic aspects, civil-military relations
4. In dictatorship, it is the same that the economic inequality increase the vulnerability the democracies broke down.

Epstein (2006): change the dichotomous measurement of democracy to a three-way, find the nonlinear influence of development on democratization: a strong predictive power for transitions into and out of the category they call “partial democracy”(soften authoritarian regimes) but less effect on transitions from full autocracy to full democracy.

Boxi (2011):

1. Internal: Income positively influence the democratic transformation and consolidation, but the effect is decreased, and becomes zero above certain income level.
2. External: dictator prefer dictator; democracy prefers democracy but also autocracy.

Levitsky (2005): two level of external interactions affect democracy:

1. western leverage (vulnerability of authoritarian governments to external democratic pressures)
2. linkage to the western world: density of its ties to US and EU; neighbor democracies.

BDM(2006): military intervention leads to negative results to democratization.

Gleditsch(2006): neighbor democracy improve democratization.

Tolstrup (2013): domestic elites interact with the external forces as gatekeepers.

O’Donnell & Schmitter (1986): Macro factors matter, but not determine the outcome. Democratization is an outcome of elites’ contestations.

1. Start with the splite between the hardliner and the moderates
2. Process: full of uncertainty, filled by contestations and negotiations among different actors conditioned on political and social conditions (civil society, militarization, etc.)

Deutsch (1961):

1. Social mobilization is a key for modernization. It includes dismantling the old commitments and socialized into new patterns of behaviors. Modernization is defined as a social mobilization toward a new pattern of socialization and behavior.
2. Process: economic mobilization to social mobilization to political transformation.

Galtung (1971): dependency theory

1. mechanism of imperialism
   1. vertical interaction: periphery nations export primary goods and center nations export manufactured goods; causing inequality
   2. Feudal interaction: High degrees of interaction between center nations, lesser degrees of interaction between center and periphery nations, and very little interaction between periphery nations; maintain and reinforce inequality
2. Result: trade partner concentration (periphery nations only have trade to one central nation); commodity concentration (periphery only produces one or a few products) resulting to periphery depends on the center.

Cardoso and Faletto (1974): Latin America

1. Condition for development
   1. Open market
   2. Exclusion of dependent economy
   3. Continuous transfer of external capital (technology)
2. The development path of cores and peripheries are different
   1. Core: free market
   2. Periphery: monopolistic, colonial capitalism

Inkeles & Smith (1974): figure out what made some men more modernized than the other.

1. Theory: Particular life experience promote individual modernity, especially working experience.
   1. Negate the view that early life experience can't be overcome by later ones
2. Empirical: Interview with 1000 sample size of each of the six developing countries (Argentina, Chile, India, Israel, Nigeria, Bangladesh)
   1. DV: modern scores with attitude questions
3. Finding:
   1. Education impacts a lot
   2. Mass media has lesser but still important influence
   3. Urban residency, ethnicity, religion affect the education and exposure to the media, thus, indirectly affect modernity
   4. Factory experience matters, but the urban environment doesn't

Popkin (1980): Peasants are rational; individiualism

1. Against structuralism
   1. rejecting that social structures should be the central analytic variable
      1. Peasants' action is a function of the ability of revolutionary organizations and the political entrepreneurs who lead them to provide and create incentives that induce participation;  
         Through the strategic manipulation of collective goods, political leaders entice rational egoistic peasants to provide support for revolutionary organizations;
      2. Whether or not engaging in collective actions or rebel determined by individual cost-benefit assessments to improve their minimum subsistence level.
2. Against Scott and Wolf's moral economy of the peasant
3. Contribution: explain
   1. How do peasants react to changes-especially colonialism and expanding market economies?
   2. Why and under what circumstances do peasants organize or rebel?

Acemoglu & Robinson (2005): democracy is an outcome of contestation between elites and citizens.

1. Economic inequality leads to social unrest of the citizens. Comparing to repression and concession, democratization is less evil.
2. Boix: democratization occurs when it is least threatening to the elites; Acemoglu & Robinson: the threat of revolution from below leads elites to consider democracy as a lesser evil. Both left out the question where the demand for democracy comes from in the first place
3. Determinants of democracy/democratization
   1. strength and nature of civil society; the middle class
   2. shocks and crises: short-term fluctuation in de facto power, lead to democratization
   3. source of income for elites: landowner or human/capital owner
   4. inter-group inequality
   5. globalization

Bermeo (1997): against the moderation argument that too much popular mobilization and too much bottom-up pressure spoil democratization.

1. Dahl: the likelihood of democratization increase when the cost of suppression rises and the cost of toleration declines.
2. Cost of suppression and toleration are expected effect of extremism by pivotal elites.

Arat(1988): the modernization theory is not valid

1. Cross-nationally, non-linear correlation between modernization and democracy
   1. Middle range developed (MRD) countries are the most unstable
2. Logitudinally, few fit to the theory: economic development does not lead to democracy, although in cross-national study they are sig
3. Method
4. logitudinal (1948-1977); 127 nations
   1. X: energy consumption per capita (Burkhart used the same X)
   2. Y: various aspects of democratic measures

Barkan (2006): spatial matters

1. in developing countries with significant spatial concentration of the vote type of electoral system does not affect the voting strategy
2. voters reflect their local interests
3. Problem
   1. increase the level of disproportionality leading to political order breaking down
   2. decrease the level of accountability of the national government, only care about the majority region

Geddes (2007): Historical context and multi-causality

* empirical research confirmed thecorrelation between economic development and democracy
* the explanations of the correlaiton are contested
  + Development
    - Development doesn't lead to democracy
      * Przeworski et al (2000); Gleditsch (2004)
    - Development lead to democracy
      * Boix & Stokes (2003); Epstein (2006); Lipset (1959)
  + Inequality
    - inequality doesn't lead to democracy
      * Boix(2003)
    - inequality promote democracy
      * Acemoglu & Robinson (2001, 2005)
  + Other factors
    - oil and mineral exports reduces democracy
      * Barro(1996); Ross(2001); Fish (2002)
    - Muslim population reduces democracy
      * Fish(2002)
    - Britsh colonial heritage leads to democracy
      * Weiner (1987); Payne(1992); Barro(1996)
    - Education leads to democracy
      * Barro(1996)
    - Income share of the middle class
      * Barro(1996)
* Potential explanation
  + path-dependent
    - historical period when democratizaiton happened (before or after WWII)
    - prior type of regime
  + multi-caulsality

Empirical evidence:

Karl (1990) : based on the democratization in Latin America in the third wave.

1. None of economic, cultural, or historical conditions is a sufficient single precondition
2. contingent choice framework
   1. Outcomes depend less on objective conditions than subjective rules surrounding strategic choice.
      1. historica/structural context
      2. mode of transition

O’Donnell (1973): social and economic modernization in the context of delayed development is more likely to lead to authoritarianism than democracy.

Evidence: 1960s Argentina and Brazil, elective affinity led to high level of modernization but authoritarianism.

O’Loughlin(1998): use spatial-diffusion framework showing that The spread of democracy appears to be facilitated by elements shared by countries with similar characteristics, based on the democratic diffusion 1946-94.