**Hybrid Regime**

Example:

Evaluate the utility of the sharp increase over the past 15 years or so in analyses that employ the concept of a “hybrid regime.” In your response, you should define “regime” and explain its significance, clarify what a hybrid regime refers to, and describe major types of hybrid regimes that scholars have identified. (2012, 2013Spr., and 2014Spr.)

What’s regime?

Essentially, regime is a set of institutions—a series of extensively known political rules and norms. It not represents the basic characteristics of a political system, but may shape the dynamics and outcomes of political transitions (Bratton 1994). Particularly, it affects the likelihood that an opposition challenge will arise and the flexibility with which incumbents can respond.

What’s hybrid regime?

Dahl (1989) generalizes three basic regime types: democracy, guardianship, and anarchism

1. Democracy: Competitive election is the core with equality assumption.
2. Anarchism: avoid any type of coercion; voluntary association based on continuing consensus.
3. Guardianship: led by leaders with moral capacity and competition (to practice morality) and technical or instrumental knowledge.

Within the three, democracy and guardianship (autocracy) are often set as the two terminals of the regime spectrum (Boggards 2009; the anarchism is somewhat inherited by a subcategory of democracy. See also, consensus democracy [Lijphart 1999, 2012]). In between scholars define different hybrid regimes according to different attributes missing from the definition of the terminal regimes (Collier & Levitsky 1997)

Type of regime:

To properly identify different hybrid regimes, one needs to anchor the two terminals, that is, clarifying the attributes to democracy and autocracy. There are two ways to define democracy: by process and by outcome. By process, democracy can be defined with the minimum version definition by Schumpeter (1947) that the regime involves two basic components: free election and competition. Dahl(1989) follows this line giving five criteria of democracy:

1. Effective participation
2. Voting equality
3. Equal opportunity discovering and validating the choices
4. Agenda setting
5. Inclusion

From the outcome prospective, Schmitter & Karl (1991) argue that it is not adequate to define democracy only by competition and election. Cooperation should be regarded as the core feature of democracy. Munck (2014) argues that democracy is a synthesis of political freedom and political equality.

For autocracy, the most extremist version is totalitarianism. Arendit (1973) provides a four-point criteria of this regime:

1. party-state
2. multiplication of offices
3. secrete control by the leader
4. law is not equally applied

Friedrich and Brzezinski (1965) argued that totalitarianism is more extreme than authoritarianism in four aspects:

1. single mass party led by one man
2. randomly order; arrest people without reason
3. near-complete monopoly of control
4. central control and direction of the entire economy

The most common type in autocracy is authoritarianism. The aforementioned totalitarianism is usually regarded as a subcategory of authoritarianism. For example, Linz and Stepan (1996) put authoritarianism into four types:

* Totalitarianism
* Post-totalitarianism
* Authoritarianism
* Sultanism

In an earlier work, Linz (1975) creates a six-category scale for autocracy based on their different

1. Degree of limited political pluralism
2. Degree to which the regime is based on political apathy and demobilization
3. Mentality-ideology

The six categories are:

1. Bureaucratic-military regime
2. Corporate
3. Mobilization authoritarian regimes in post-democratic society.
4. Post-independent mobilizational regime
5. Post-totalitarian regime
6. Sultanistic

In terms of the power in charge, Geddes(2003) a four-category classification for authoritarianism:

1. Personal
2. Military
3. Single-party
4. Two mixture: personalist-military; single-party military

In-between democracy and authoritarianism, scholars use different classifications for hybrid regimes. For example, Diamond (2002) divides five categories: Liberal democracy, electoral democracy, competitive authoritarian, hegemonic authoritarian, political closed authoritarian. Levitsky and Way (2010) divides three categories: democracy, comparative authoritarianism, and full authoritarianism. One issue for hybrid regimes, is to identify their uniqueness from the others, especially for those in the middle of the spectrum. In Levitsky and Way’s categorization, that is comparative authoritarianism. They argue that this regime has no free election comparing to democracy but may have broad protection of civil rights and reasonable level of playing field from full authoritarianism. For Diamond, the middle area are electoral democracy and competitive authoritarianism:

1. Electoral democracy vs. Competitive authoritarian: freedom, fairness, and meaningfulness of elections.
2. Hegemonic vs. competitive authoritarian: competitive has real opposition; no party wins all the seats; no prolong presidential tenure.

Many scholars working on hybrid regimes focus on the chance for those regimes to be fully democratization or why they have not been. For example, Bunce & Wolchik (2011) argue based on their studies of six elections in the post-communist countries from 1998 to 2005 that election is a crucial tool for the opposition party wins the power. They found that opposite won because

* 1. the hard and creative work of a transnational network composed of local opposition and civil society groups
  2. members of the international democracy assistance community
  3. graduates of successful electoral challenges to authoritarian rule in other countries

On the other hand, Sovlik(2013) argues with 1946~2008 multi-level data that if an hybrid regime can effectively use party and election as the problems of power-sharing and control, hybrid regime are likely to end with authoritarianism.

**Regime and democracy:**

Example:

Does the survival of a democratic regime depend in generalizable ways on its institutional configuration? Pick one of the following sets of institutional choices and take a position on its role in democratic longevity: a) the configuration of executive power (parliamentary vs. presidential vs. mixed systems); b) the institutions linking the central government to regional ones (unitary or various types of federal systems), or c) whether constitutional review of law or policy by a court or other body exists and what form it takes. Is the impact of the choice now generally agreed upon or still controversial? If the latter, what issues are at stake in the debate? How should research proceed? (2011, 2013Fall)

One dimension on which scholars compare politics is the nature of countries' ruling regimes. In particular, many have tried in recent decades to go beyond the democracy-authoritarianism distinction by providing sub-categories for each as well as hybrids of the two. Review the major contributions to this literature. Then, make and defend an argument about how useful our current conceptual tools are for empirical comparative analyses.(2010)

Definition

Institution is an organization of rules and norms for certain decision makings, which are recurring in a society and known by the participants. Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) argue that the function of institution is essentially ensuring the power distribution persisting in the near future.

The debate of the influence of parliamentary vis-à-vis presidential governments on the consolidation of democracy started from Lijphart’s profound works (1991, 1994). They argue that democracy performs better in a parliamentary than presidential government based on the observation of 14 OECD countries. Lijphart found that parliamentary democracies performed better in a series of indicators of equality, participation, and social economy than presidential government. Moreover, the performance also interacts with party system. Lijphart argues that parliamentary with modern PR performed the best. Mainwaring (1993) further show that the PR system does not fit presidential government. It may cause

1. immobilizing executive/legislative deadlock
2. ideological polarization
3. difficulties of interparty coalition

Instead, two party system is more compatible with presidential democracy:

1. less ideological polarization
2. Median voter encourage moderation
3. absence of extremist party

Linz(1990a, 1990b) and Horowitz (1990) support Lijphart’s argument, and provide more causal explanation about why presidentialism performed worse than parliamentary. They argue that the separation of power inherently promote conflicts. The fixed term, however, increases the rigidity of the system; changing presidents is usually not a useful tool to solve power conflict inbetween elections. Neither problem suffers parliamentary PR. Fish (2006) indicates the benefits of the parliamentary government on democracy from the perspective of legislature. He argues that a more powerful legislature will improve the performance of democracy, and for parliamentary government, the following points show why it is more likely to yield powerful legislature:

1. Parliamentary ability to monitor the president and the bureaucracy
2. Parliament’s freedom from presidential control
3. Parliament’s authority in specific areas
4. The resource that it brings to the work

Przeworski (2000) offered more empirical evidence for this “parliamentary better than presidential” argument. Ames(2001) use the Brazil’s case supporting this argument. He argues that the presidential-PR system reduce the governing efficiency of the democracy of Brazil:

1. Open-list PR
   1. personalize politics
   2. weaken the party control
2. Destructive majority constraining federalism
3. Presidentialism

However, Cheibub (2007) argues that the above argument might be built upon a selection bias:

1. It is the failed countries choose presidentialism rather than presidentialism caused failure.
2. Economic development level, size of the country, geographic location are not enough to explain the survival rate in presidential democracies
3. Historical accident causes some failure in presidentialism.

Lijphart himself actually also notice the conditional effect of the historical background. He (1991, 1994) argues that European countries chose parliamentary because of the social, political structure (ethnic, religious) and the new/old party struggles in the democratization history. Lipset (1990) develops this point arguing that democratic stability is more a cultural issue than a constitutional engineering. Institutionally, he agrees with Lijphart that

* Prime minister with a majority has more authority than an president
* Party and party discipline are much stronger in parliamentary

Moreover, he emphasized Wiener’s founding that all the postwar enduring democracies are British colonies

Finally, Power and Gasioroski (1997) argue that the institutional variables may have a weaker impact on the survival of a democratic regime than imagined by analyzing 56 cases of transition to democracy in third world countries:

1. Breakdowns of presidential and parliamentary systems are nearly identical
2. Multi-Party presidential system performance was roughly the same as multi-party parliamentary systems
3. countries with 3 effective parties in government are much more likely to consolidate than countries with near dominant parties

Unitary or various types of federal systems:

The argument of unitary and federalism also started from Lijphart influential works (1999, 2012). However, the conclusion of the works focus on within unitary system. He argues based on 36 democracies, 1996-2010 that consensus democracy (e.g., Switzerland, Belgium, and EU) is superior to majoritarian system (e.g., UK) especially for deeply divided societies. Theoretically, majoritarian system cannot fully protect the minority’s interests, since it practically prevents crossover voting. Moreover, consensus democracy also have kinder, gentler traits:

* lower incarceration rates
* less use of the death penalty
* better care for the environment
* more foreign aid work
* more welfare spending

Stepan (1999) provides a different conclusion. He argues two advantages of federalism:

1. suitable for multinational democracies
2. suitable for large population, country size, and multiliguistic

He also gives a classification of federalism from origin, consequence, and structure:

In a view of origin:

1. coming together: result of a constitutional bargain
2. holding together: historical heritage

In a view of consequence:

1. demo-constraining: prevent majority

Characteristics: Subunits are represented equally; have competence; national policies are influenced by local policy

1. demo-enable: More power in federal

In a view of structure

1. Symmetrical: states have the same constitutional competence
2. asymmetrical

constitutional review of law or policy by a court:

Horowitz (2006) argues two functions of constitutional review to democracy:

1. provide a set of the enforcement of human rights and for the deliberation of the power of governmental bodies
2. let the constitution enable to shapes and directs the exercise of political power

He also generalizes two models of constitutional review:

* American: Incorporating judicial review in the ordinary judicial hierarchy with a single Supreme Court at the apex
  + Advantage: every judge can explain the constitutional issues
  + Disadvantage: Need victim and case
* Austrian Create a separate constitutional court
  + Advantage Allow for early, high-level consideration of constitutional questions and avoids the delay and uncertainty
  + Disadvantage not the final appeal court

In authoritarian regimes:

In authoritarian regimes, the institutional setting also matters. Svolik (2013) argues how the institution shape authoritarian politics and help the incumbents in authoritarian regimes to solve control and power-sharing problems, and argues this is the reason why many hybrid regimes end with authoritarianism.

* authoritarian control
  + repression: when a few in power share a disproportionate share of wealth, repression is cheaper; but authoritarian reliance on repression sows the seeds of future military interventions
  + cooperation: party as the instrument for cooperation (different from democracy)
    - hierarchical assignment of service and benefits
    - political control over appointments
    - selective recruitment and repression
* authoritarian power-sharing
  + incumbent and allies by ruling coalitions
    - often fails because dictator's desire and opportunity to acquire more power at the expense of its allies lead to allies’ rebellions
    - potential success by high-level, deliberative, and group decision making institutions.
      * + Achieve transparency

showing power-sharing signal

enable usurping power to be detected by allies

* + - * + effective only under a permissive balance of power within the ruling coalition (contested autocracy vs. established autocrats)
* Essential difference from democracy
  + absense of an independent authority enforcing mutual agreements
  + ever-present potential for violence
* Evidence
  + 1946~2008
    - country level
    - ruling-coalition level
    - leader level

**Performance**

In the past decade the focus has shifted from questions of democratic transition to a focus on democratic performance. Questions of governmental accountability and responsiveness are central to this research agenda. Define and explain these two concepts. What are some of the most – and least- compelling arguments for variation in democratic performance on the basis of accountability and/or responsiveness. You may use empirical examples from any part of the world to illustrate your argument.(2009Spr., 2010)

What’s governmental accountability

Andersen (2014): State’s capacity: monopoly on violence; administrative effectiveness.

What’s governmental responsiveness

Argument about accountability and responsiveness and democracy

Sen (1999): democracy is instrumentally important to make the government responsible and accountable.

Pateman (1970): Dahl, Sartori, Belrelson respectively argue that over-participation leads to totalitarianism, therefore, democracy does not requires universal suffrage, and absolute equality of property, race, religion.

**Development and Democratization**

Example:

Some people argue that Huntington's Third Wave of Democratization is over. Do developments in the last decade or so call for us to rethink our theories of regime change? If not, what are the important frontiers of knowledge in this body of theory?(2008Spr.)

What are theories of regime change?

*Definition*

Pye generalize three essential themes of political development:

1. A general spirit or attitude toward equality
   1. participation
   2. spirit of law
2. The capacity of political system
   1. cover the social life
   2. effectivity and efficiency to executive public policies
3. Differentiation and specialization
   1. officials and agencies have distinct and limited functions
   2. specification of various political roles in the system

*Prerequisite*

I follow Geddes’ framework (2007) to generalize the debates on this topic. He argues that empirical researches have confirmed the correlation between economic development and democracy, but the explanation are contested.

* Development
  + Development doesn't lead to democracy
    - Przeworski et al (2000); Gleditsch (2004)
    - Rustow (1970) argues that there are three phases in democratization, background condition, preparatory phase, and decision phase. To enter this process, socioeconomic situation is unnecessary. The first phase is more about the fostering of civil culture and political unifications. In the preparatory phase, the new elites arise and promote the polarization in the politics. At the meanwhile, the liberalization of the society becomes more thorough. Finally, the society comes to the decision phase to realize the political transition.
    - Di Palma (1990) agree with Rustow that democracy can arise under almost any circumstances, because it is the conscious action and rational decision of the elites that determines the outcome of democracy. The influences of the structural factors are there, but they are more prerequisite necessary conditions rather than sufficient conditions.
    - Przeworski et al. (2000): development does not cause democracy, but stabilize it. Following Rustow and Di Palma, he believes that democracy can happen at any stage of economic development. His empirical study on 135 countries 1950-90 shows that income is neither the necessary nor the sufficient condition for democratization, but it preserves democracy.
    - Two critiques from methodology:
      * Arat(1988) argues that the modernization theory is not valid. The seemingly significant results in the empirical studies are due to the non-linear correlation between modernization and democracy. The middle range developed (MRD) countries are the most unstable. Moreover, longitudinally, few fit to the theory: economic development does not lead to democracy, although in cross-national study they are sig
      * Epstein (2006) changes the dichotomous measurement of democracy to a three-way, find the nonlinear influence of development on democratization: a strong predictive power for transitions into and out of the category they call “partial democracy”(soften authoritarian regimes) but less effect on transitions from full autocracy to full democracy.
    - O’Donnell (1973) argues that social and economic modernization in the context of delayed development is more likely to lead to authoritarianism than democracy. Evidence: 1960s Argentina and Brazil, elective affinity led to high level of modernization but authoritarianism.
  + Development lead to democracy
    - Boix & Stokes (2003); Epstein (2006); Lipset (1959)
    - Lipset (1960) argues that a developed economy provide conditions for a stable democracy:
      * Reduce the gap between professional/semi-professional and regular workers.
      * Rich countries distribute consumption goods more equitably.
      * Wealth and education expose the lower classes in cross-pressure rather than ideology or extremist.
      * Middle class is enhanced.
      * High classes are more likely to accept democratic values.
      * High democratic norms

Unfortunately, his study focuses largely on correlation rather than causality. Moreover, he argues that the measure of development/modernization should not only be income, but includes wealth, industrialization, urbanization, education rather than only income.

* + - Lipset (1994) argue that the key for consolidated democracy is legitimacy, which is based on political and economic efficacy. Therefore, without economic development will make the regime lose the legitimacy and therefore, fail to develop and not institutionalize genuinely democratic systems
    - Burkhart & Lewis-Beck (1994) believe that economic development improves the democratic prospect of a country, but the effect depends on the location of the nation in the world system: the stronger for the core. Using empirical data measuring development with Energy consumption per capita
    - Boxi (2011) found that income positively influence the democratic transformation and consolidation, but the effect is decreased, and becomes zero above certain income level.
* Inequality
  + inequality doesn't lead to democracy
    - Boix(2003)
  + inequality promote democracy
    - Deutsch (1961) understand the modernization from a view of mobilization. He argues that Social mobilization is a key for modernization. It includes dismantling the old commitments and socialized into new patterns of behaviors. Modernization is defined as a social mobilization toward a new pattern of socialization and behavior. The modernization should go through three phases: economic mobilization to social mobilization to political transformation.
    - Bermeo (1997) follows the same angle as Deutsch, but goes against the moderation argument that too much popular mobilization and too much bottom-up pressure spoil democratization. He agrees with Dahl’s argument that the likelihood of democratization increase when the cost of suppression rises and the cost of toleration declines. In his model, cost of suppression and toleration are expected effect of extremism by pivotal elites.
    - Przeworski (2000) argues that in dictatorship, the economic inequality increase the vulnerability the democracies broke down.
    - Acemoglu & Robinson (2001, 2005) argue that democracy is an outcome of contestation between elites and citizens. Economic inequality leads to social unrest of the citizens. Comparing to repression and concession, democratization is less evil. They go against the argument of Boxi (2003) that democratization occurs when it is least threatening to the elites. They believe the threat of revolution from below leads elites to consider democracy as a lesser evil. Both left out the question where the demand for democracy comes from in the first place
* Other factors
  + oil and mineral exports reduces democracy
    - Barro(1996); Ross(2001); Fish (2002)
  + Muslim population reduces democracy
    - Fish(2002)
  + Britsh colonial heritage leads to democracy
    - Weiner (1987); Payne(1992); Barro(1996)
  + Education leads to democracy
    - Barro(1996)
  + Income share of the middle class
    - Barro(1996)
  + External factors:
    - Boxi(2011) argues that, in terms of decision makers, dictator prefer dictator; democracy prefers democracy but also autocracy.
    - Levitsky (2005) generalizes two ways external interactions affect democracy:
      * western leverage (vulnerability of authoritarian governments to external democratic pressures)
      * linkage to the western world: density of its ties to US and EU; neighbor democracies.
    - BDM(2006): military intervention leads to negative results to democratization.
    - Tolstrup (2013) argues that domestic elites interact with the external forces as gatekeepers.
  + Spatial concern
    - Barkan (2006) argues that spatial matters. In developing countries with significant spatial concentration of the vote type of electoral system does not affect the voting strategy
    - voters reflect their local interests. This may lead to two problems:
      * increase the level of disproportionality leading to political order breaking down
      * decrease the level of accountability of the national government, only care about the majority region
    - Huntington (1991) points out that the reversal snowballing is an important reason for the reversal wave along with the third wave of democratization.
    - O’Loughlin(1998) uses spatial-diffusion framework showing that The spread of democracy appears to be facilitated by elements shared by countries with similar characteristics, based on the democratic diffusion 1946-94.
    - Gleditsch (2006) supports the neighborhood diffusion empirically by showing neighbor democracy improve democratization.

Geddes argue this contradiction in the empirical explanations may be because of the path-dependence of the democratization. Both the historical period (before or after WWII) and prior type of regime may lead to different causality between development and democracy. Karl (1990) also argue that none of economic, cultural, or historical conditions is a sufficient single precondition based on the democratization in Latin America in the third wave. The outcomes depend less on objective conditions than subjective rules surrounding strategic choice. Therefore historical/structural context matters; the mode of transition also matters.

Another debate about the development-democracy relationship results from the level of analysis. Kitschelt (1992) generalizes this debate and attend to reconcile the arguments of the two sides. He argues that there are two patterns in studying the DD relationship:

* structure-oriented
  + explain general causes
  + Haggard(1995) argues that socioeconomic structure is the essential point to understand regime change:
    - elites' mobilization depends on the economic policies and performances
    - economic cleavages and interests are constructed in institutional context
  + Moore(1966) agrees with Lipset(1960) that bourgeois matters, but conditioned on class relations between bourgeois and landed upper class. Both too weak and too strong reduce the chance of democratization. The relation are affected by the power distribution in politics, economics, classes, and between the state autonomy vs. the dominant class.
  + Rueschemeyer et al (1992) agree with the structural level of study, but disagree with Lipset and Moore in their arguments. He points out that, in a society, the working class always pro-democracy, while the landed owners are anti-democracy. The key actor is the middle class. They will pro-authority, if threatened by popular pressures, while they may be also pro-democracy, when intransigent dominant class and beneficial to ally with urban working class. All the conclusions are based on his comparative historical study.
  + Galtung (1971) and Cardoso & Faletto (1974) argues the dependency theory of country developments largely based on the experience of the Latin American countries. They argue that development requires four conditions:
    - Condition for development
    - Open market
    - Exclusion of dependent economy
    - Continuous transfer of external capital (technology)

On these aspects, the cores and peripheries are essentially different:

* + - vertical interaction: periphery nations export primary goods and center nations export manufactured goods; causing inequality
    - Feudal interaction: High degrees of interaction between center nations, lesser degrees of interaction between center and periphery nations, and very little interaction between periphery nations; maintain and reinforce inequality

This leads to monopolistic, colonial capitalism of the periphery countries.

* Process-oriented
  + explain the timing, transition, and specific trial and error process
  + Inkeles & Smith (1974) focuses on individuals, but not the elites. They try to figure out what made some men more modernized than the other. With interviewing with 1000 sample size of each of the six developing countries (Argentina, Chile, India, Israel, Nigeria, Bangladesh), they found that Particular life experience promote individual modernity, especially working experience. Mass media has lesser but still important influence. Urban residency, ethnicity, religion affect the education and exposure to the media, thus, indirectly affect modernity.
  + Popkin (1980) also relies on the individualism. They argue that peasants are rational; their actions are a function of the ability of revolutionary organizations and the political entrepreneurs who lead them to provide and create incentives that induce participation; through the strategic manipulation of collective goods, political leaders entice rational egoistic peasants to provide support for revolutionary organizations.
  + Di Palma (1990) argues democratization results from conscious actions and from elites pursuing their own interests. Influences of the structural factors are there, but they have to be there before democracy arrives.
  + Przeworski (1991) goes along the same line arguing that it is the elites rather than the structural factor determines the outcome of democratization. He gives a “Hardliner + Moderates vs. Radicals + Reformers” game, and argues that democratization can be realized only when:
    - Reformers and the moderates have agreements
    - Reformers can deliver the consent of hardliners
    - Moderate can control radicals
    - When the relation of forces are unknown, the check and balance are easier to achieve
  + In the *Third Wave*, Huntington (1991) argues the structural and international reasons leading to democracy reverses (lack of legitimacy, reverse snowballing, emergence of new forms of authoritarianism), but he still emphasizes that political transition is based on elites' choice, perception, beliefs and actions; the consolidation is based on elite pacts and consensus.
  + O’Donnell & Schmitter (1986) believe that macro factors matter, but not determine the outcome. Democratization is an outcome of elites’ contestations. The process starts with the split between the hardliner and the moderates, filled by contestations and negotiations among different actors conditioned on political and social conditions (civil society, militarization, etc.) with full of uncertainty.