-
-
Notifications
You must be signed in to change notification settings - Fork 9.6k
[HttpFoundation] Fix to prevent magic bytes injection in JSONP responses... (CVE-2014-4671) #11367
New issue
Have a question about this project? Sign up for a free GitHub account to open an issue and contact its maintainers and the community.
By clicking “Sign up for GitHub”, you agree to our terms of service and privacy statement. We’ll occasionally send you account related emails.
Already on GitHub? Sign in to your account
Conversation
@FineWolf I suggest you read http://symfony.com/security for the way to report security issues for the next time. Sending a PR with the fix is a public disclosure |
however, 👍 |
That issue (on a general basis) has already received public disclosure anyway thru various news organizations and blogs since July 8. Public disclosure of the issue with symfony at this point (even before the merge) is the best course of action so that people who are affected can manually merge (I am aware of the security mailing list). This isn't a symfony specific issue. However this patch mitigates future attacks on the same vector. |
👍 |
From: http://miki.it/blog/2014/7/8/abusing-jsonp-with-rosetta-flash/. I think setting such headers would be nice too. |
See https://github.com/nelmio/NelmioSecurityBundle#content-type-sniffing |
@stof it is not part of the framework AFAIK.. |
@willdurand adding a way to configure the CSP headers in FrameworkBundle has already been rejected in favor of using this bundle which implements things properly: #8515 (comment) |
@stof ok forgot about this issue. |
Not sure if we need a CVE for Symfony as it's not really a Symfony security issue per se. I'm going to merge this now as we will release a security issue for Symfony shortly anyway. |
@fabpot I think we can reference the original CVE saying we added the server-side mitigation for it. |
Thank you @FineWolf. |
…in JSONP responses... (CVE-2014-4671) (Andrew Moore) This PR was merged into the 2.3 branch. Discussion ---------- [HttpFoundation] Fix to prevent magic bytes injection in JSONP responses... (CVE-2014-4671) | Q | A | ------------- | --- | Bug fix? | yes | New feature? | no | BC breaks? | no* | Deprecations? | no | Tests pass? | yes | Fixed tickets | N/A | License | MIT | Doc PR | N/A | CVE Ticket | [CVE-2014-4671](http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2014-4671) | See Also | [Rosetta Flash](http://miki.it/blog/2014/7/8/abusing-jsonp-with-rosetta-flash/) \* Unless you are parsing the response string manually, which you really shouldn't do anyway **THIS IS A SECURITY FIX AND SHOULD BE MERGED SHORTLY** This fix prevents attacks vectors where third-party browser plugins depends on ASCII magic bytes in order to execute a plugin. This is currently exploited with Flash using a carefully crafted JSONP response, allowing the execution of random SWF data from a domain with a vulnerable JSONP endpoint. This security issue is mitigated by adding an empty comment right before the callback parameter. This does not affect the execution of the JSONP callback. Commits ------- 6af3d05 [HttpFoundation] Fix to prevent magic bytes injection in JSONP responses (Prevents CVE-2014-4671)
@fabpot You are welcome. And no, I don't think we need a Symfony specific CVE. This is a server-side mitigation measure to a client-side security issue. This is also why I didn't go thru the mailing list (again, nothing wrong with Symfony per-se). However, since we can mitigate it, I summited this patch. On peut jamais être trop prudent... |
…romainneutron) This PR was merged into the 2.3 branch. Discussion ---------- fix signal handling in wait() on calls to stop() | Q | A | ------------- | --- | Bug fix? | yes | New feature? | no | BC breaks? | no | Deprecations? | no | Tests pass? | yes | Fixed tickets | #11286 | License | MIT | Doc PR | ``wait()`` throws an exception when the process was terminated by a signal. This should not happen when the termination was requested by calling the ``stop()`` method (for example, inside a callback which is passed to ``wait()``). Commits ------- 5939d34 [Process] Fix unit tests in sigchild environment eb68662 [Process] fix signal handling in wait() 94ffc4f bug #11469 [BrowserKit] Fixed server HTTP_HOST port uri conversion (bcremer, fabpot) 103fd88 [BrowserKit] refactor code and fix unquoted regex f401ab9 Fixed server HTTP_HOST port uri conversion 045cbc5 bug #11425 Fix issue described in #11421 (Ben, ben-rosio) f5bfa9b bug #11423 Pass a Scope instance instead of a scope name when cloning a container in the GrahpvizDumper (jakzal) 3177be5 minor #11464 [Translator] Use quote to surround invalid locale (lyrixx) c9742ef [Translator] Use quote to surround invalid locale 4dbe0e1 bug #11120 [2.3][Process] Reduce I/O load on Windows platform (romainneutron) 797d814 bug #11342 [2.3][Form] Check if IntlDateFormatter constructor returned a valid object before using it (romainneutron) 0b5348e minor #11441 [Translator] Optimize assertLocale regexp (Jérémy Derussé) 537c39b Optimize assertLocale regexp 4cf50e8 Bring code into standard 9f4313c [Process] Add test to verify fix for issue #11421 02eb765 [Process] Fixes issue #11421 6787669 [DependencyInjection] Pass a Scope instance instead of a scope name. 9572918 bug #11411 [Validator] Backported #11410 to 2.3: Object initializers are called only once per object (webmozart) 291cbf9 [Validator] Backported #11410 to 2.3: Object initializers are called only once per object efab884 bug #11403 [Translator][FrameworkBundle] Added @ to the list of allowed chars in Translator (takeit) 3176f8b [Translator][FrameworkBundle] Added @ to the list of allowed chars in Translator 91e32f8 bug #11381 [2.3] [Process] Use correct test for empty string in UnixPipes (whs, romainneutron) 45df2f3 minor #11397 [2.3][Process] Fix unit tests on Windows platform (romainneutron) cec0a45 [Process] Adjust PR #11264, make it Windows compatible and fix CS d418935 [Process] Fix unit tests on Windows platform ff0bb01 [Process] Reduce I/O load on Windows platform ace5a29 bumped Symfony version to 2.3.19 75e07e6 updated VERSION for 2.3.18 4a12f4d update CONTRIBUTORS for 2.3.18 98b891d updated CHANGELOG for 2.3.18 06a80fb Validate locales sets intos translator 06fc97e feature #11367 [HttpFoundation] Fix to prevent magic bytes injection in JSONP responses... (CVE-2014-4671) (Andrew Moore) 3c54659 minor #11387 [2.3] [Validator] Fix UserPassword validator translation (redstar504) 73d50ed Fix UserPassword validator translation 93a970c bug #11386 Remove Spaceless Blocks from Twig Form Templates (chrisguitarguy) 8f9ed3e Remove Spaceless Blocks from Twig Form Templates 9e1ea4a [Process] Use correct test for empty string in UnixPipes 6af3d05 [HttpFoundation] Fix to prevent magic bytes injection in JSONP responses (Prevents CVE-2014-4671) ebf967d [Form] Check if IntlDateFormatter constructor returned a valid object before using it
* Unless you are parsing the response string manually, which you really shouldn't do anyway
THIS IS A SECURITY FIX AND SHOULD BE MERGED SHORTLY
This fix prevents attacks vectors where third-party browser plugins depends on ASCII magic bytes in order to execute a plugin. This is currently exploited with Flash using a carefully crafted JSONP response, allowing the execution of random SWF data from a domain with a vulnerable JSONP endpoint.
This security issue is mitigated by adding an empty comment right before the callback parameter. This does not affect the execution of the JSONP callback.