

ATTN TO:

US SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
US NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR,
US CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF,
US DIRECTOR, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE,
COMMANDER, US SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND,
COMMANDER, JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND,
COMMANDER, US SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND, EUROPE

FROM:

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MEMORANDUM FOR ACTION

DATE:

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CLASSIFICATION:

NO CLASSIFICATION // NEED TO KNOW // REL US, FVEY, NATO, UKR

SUBJECT:

A Turning Point in the War: Strategic Military and Diplomatic Urgency for U.S. Special Operations Forces Involvement in Ukraine

EXECSUM:

I usually don't publicly comment on military operations conducted by Ukraine. However, I make an exception when there might be a "turning point" in the war.

This is a point of exception.

First, a brief history lesson into Ukrainian offensive operations. It is important to recall these events because an incorrect post-mission analysis leads to the repetition of mistakes.

Second, an analysis of current climate - Ukraine's operational environments and sentiment of the populace - and hard truths of LSCO and unmanned systems.

Lastly, specific calls to action.

The Counter-Offensive of 2022

The 2022 counter-offensive, especially in the Kharkiv region, was a demonstration of Ukrainian bravery and a hybrid adaptation of Western combined arms doctrine. Well executed small-unit tactics - while amateurish - reflected 'speed, surprise, and violence of action.' A readily available mechanized Army, hidden in the fog of war, sat waiting on orders to maneuver away from the failed attempts of capturing Enerhodar (the location of the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP)), and instead was tasked with moving to a hastily reformulated strategic operation towards the East. No one was fully prepared, especially the Russians. Russian logistics and defense lines in this part of the country were poorly organized and collapsed from the growing pressure of the Ukrainian army, freshly equipped with munitions by NATO and international allies.

This plan was a success. It wasn't pretty, but it accomplished the goal of recapturing the Main Service Road from Kharkiv down to the center of 'the Donbas' region, allowing for a rapid flow of logistics (personnel and equipment) to combat against the main center of gravity of Russian Ground Forces. We were eager to capitalize on this success, repeat it, and push back the Russian invaders, and retake our homeland.

The period following this strategic success, between early 2023 and early 2024, would have been a potential turning point, ultimately culminating in the now past "2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive" which, at the time, garnered explosive media attention. But it failed.

Let's examine why.

Rapid Force Modernization

To repeat these successes of the 2022 counter-offensive, we started with what we knew, what looked like was working, and adapted our outdated processes, policies, and structure, to new tools, techniques, and technologies emerging on the battlefield. This would be called 'Force Modernization' in Western discourse. We conducted this rapidly, as best as we could.

A prominent example of Force Modernization was the inclusion of Commercial Off the Shelf quadcopters for persistent collection of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (COTS ISR). This allowed us to see what Russians were doing in near-real time, everywhere on the Front Line of Troops (FLOT) and behind it.

New brigades were being formed to include this capability of persistent ISR, or carousels, and bespoke capabilities led by experienced field commanders.

Western countries were providing equipment and training our fresh recruits abroad without the threat of missile attacks in-country.

Allied Forces, together with the General Staff of Ukrainian Armed Forces, held joint strategic sessions and tabletop exercises weekly.

As stated by Western colleagues and advisors who have experiential knowledge of Large Scale Combat Operations (LSCO), drawing upon their time serving not only during the Global War on Terror (GWOT), but Desert Storm, the Korean War, indirect greyzone warfare of the Cold War era, and even the Vietnam War, a common sentiment prevailed throughout: **"Plans rarely survive first-contact with the enemy."** Bluntly: plan for alternatives, because this always goes wrong.

Even with that sentiment in mind, everyone dreamed of quickly liberating Ukrainian territories, with some even stocking up on blue and yellow flags. There were some organization problems of course, and we needed to buy time to structurally prepare for our units to adopt these changes.

Buying Time

To buy time for the preparation of newly formed units, my brigade, along with other units, defended the eastern front in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In the Fall and Winter months of late 2022 - early 2023 following these offensive operations, my units held positions in Kreminna and Bakhmut, in Luhansk and Donetsk regions of the Donbas region, respectively.

At that time, the sentiments of field commanders and Ukrainian infantry soldiers were clear: We were eager to recreate the perfect storm of tactical and strategic successes of the Kharkiv counter-offensive executed earlier in the summer of that same year. There was still a possibility of winning. A chance of victory was in the hearts and minds of the soldiers and the civilians, and spoken aloud. 2023 ushered in a new year of potential, and we were ready to defend these positions to the end.

At that time, our units consisted of the most trained, professional, and motivated warriors who had taken up arms without hesitation in February 2022 to defend the Ukrainian Motherland. Many, if not all of my men, were volunteers with Donbas combat experience, fighting since the 2014 Ukrainian Revolution of Dignity (Maidan). They were 'force multipliers' to the Territorial Defence Force (US National Guard equivalent) situated in Luhansk and Donetsk.

At that time, the men simply asked for good shovels, gloves and boots, and warm sleeping bags, and they would figure everything else to survive.

Fieldcraft ingenuity is one of the few doctrinal benefits of Soviet-era scarcity. The rest of the 'Soviet-era mentality' often quoted however, fails in modern warfare.

For the next two years, our positions in the east experienced an excruciating toll on the human life of our forces. Our positions had been heavily damaged by the Russian full-scale invasion in February 2022 or hadn't been built at all. Our infantry, arriving at the positions under heavy Russian surveillance and artillery fire, dug defensive bunkers and field-expedient hides with old, rusted shovels. Wood, in close proximity to defensive positions, became a sparse resource in the winter months, as tree branches offered minimal protection against shrapnel delivered by air-burst cluster munitions. The first withering cold-snap in September of 2022 dictated the pace of war, and froze the ground solid.

Throughout 2022 and most of 2023, no engineering equipment was visible on the Ukrainian side, and there was no sign of any major construction effort of defensive lines in this area. They were simply instructed to hold it out. The infantry was left to its own accord, poorly supported and rarely visited. Only in 2024, nearly two years later, did the Ukrainian government begin to talk about properly constructing fortifications for the Eastern Front.

Instead of reinforcing these fighting positions logistically, the now infamous city of Bakhmut is left in ruin with a mountainous pile of dead bodies in the open, as leadership decided its best course of action was to engage in urban warfare.

Operations on Urban Terrain: The "Fortress" Bakhmut

In parallel with preparing one of the most ambitious counter-offensive operations in modern war history at the Southern Front, President Zelensky and staff were convinced by our generals that the East Front needed to be defended by using Bakhmut as a kind of outpost in Donbas. Thus, the first

"Fortress", celebrated by the presidential office's jesters, was born. The problem with any such myth of a Fortress is that it takes extraordinary effort to maintain fortifications in urban terrain.

As stated in the United States Marine Corps' Military Operations on Urban Terrain (USMC MOUT):

"A well-coordinated attack, supported by adequate resources, will usually succeed. The complexity of the urban environment, the need for large numbers of troops, and the difficulty in sustaining the defense over time make the defense of an urban area particularly challenging." - MWCP 3-335.3

The MOUT is doctrine to be openly studied, and freely available online. Historical analysis of past battles can be extracted from its pages to create a successful frame of reference for tactical units conducting operations, and for strategic planners deciding whether to engage troops in urban warfare to begin with.

For our General Staff, the justification for continuing to engage in combat actions inside Bakhmut was to extract a large toll on Russian forces of military personnel and equipment. At this time, Russian Ground Forces, combined with Wagner PMC, RU Spetznaz, and VDV units, were known to be in a greater quantity of readily available forces than the Ukrainian military at the time. Remember: we were buying time for fresh recruits to train.

Bakhmut had two main roads leading into the city from the West. This route was reduced to one main road, after Wagner infiltrated through the Soledar Salt Mines, illegally wearing the uniforms of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and securing the north-western road. The remaining south-western road, dubbed the 'Highway to Hell' is littered with allied infantry fighting vehicles, tanks, and soft-skin logistics vehicles destroyed by Russian anti-tank guided missiles in combination with Russian artillery bracketed to that single road.

The orders of President Zelenskyy to hold Bakhmut, in the backdrop of broken down photo opportunities snapped by the media, disregarded the consequences and ramifications of prolonged attrition warfare - warned against by Western advisors to the General Staff - warned against by General Zaluzhniy of the Armed Forces of Ukraine himself at the time - due to the fact that ***the town of Bakhmut did not have any strategic military significance for logistics control, topographical maneuver, or any other militaristic advantage.***

As the current US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said at the time: "It [Bakhmut] has more symbolic than strategic or operational significance".

Unfortunately, one thing Secretary Austin failed to consider is how difficult it is to break the mythological symbols, which are heavily promoted by Russian propaganda, to discard the existing sunk-cost course of action.

Consequences of Attrition Warfare

As a result of needless attrition, after 10 months of defending the "fortress" of Bakhmut, where our best forces were repeatedly at risk of complete encirclement, we lost both the human and technical potential for the counteroffensive of 2023.

The new troops that were meant to be given time and space to be trained professionally had reduced training schedules, due to the excising toll of urban combat in Bakhmut. We requested troops, any available troops, to reinforce losing positions. Instead of cutting the loss there, we filled the ranks with fresh recruits which lacked fundamental warfighting skills, interlaced with experienced soldiers in the deadliest part of the war at the time. This was not the place for new soldiers to 'cut their teeth'.

Experienced soldiers would dismiss recruits as liabilities, instead of force-multipliers, and were left to hold empty positions with unsighted weapons, empty magazines, and long-lasting psychological trauma for those who survived Hell.

At the time, I warned about this, but my voice, even when I went public in the Ukrainian press, was a lone cry in the desert, echoed in the empty halls of Parliament.

The counteroffensive, unfortunately and predictably, failed.

I have read many analyses about the reasons for the counteroffensive's failure, but **the primary factor, which has not received enough attention from both Western and Ukrainian analysts, was the exhausting and unjustifiably long defense of Bakhmut.**

The misrepresentation of these facts purported by Western media led to the dismissal of Chief Commander Zaluzhniy, who himself, until the last moment, was opposed to sending new troops to Bakhmut, but didn't have political power to enforce it. The Presidential office was quick to find a party loyalist.

As it stands, currently, the explosive activity of 2022, costly attrition warfare in all of 2023, and entrenchment of troops in early 2024 has dwindled to small movements of Russian Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs) attempting positional advantage maneuvers across all territories of Ukraine. Drones have played a significant part in reducing casualty rates on both sides, providing unimpeded intelligence and observation as a new, psychically longer 'no man's land' region of the FLOT. However, Russia still continues to push, daily, successfully, with an ever-increasing toll of individual Ukrainian lives lost.

If Ukraine resorts to the bad habits of Soviet-era doctrine in which the Grand Strategy is to 'amass as large an Army as possible, gather together in a ball, and push toward the enemy', then the bigger ball will win.

The small Soviet Army will lose to the big Soviet Army.

Today, my men still hold these positions in the Eastern Front - the Luhansk and Donetsk regions today. The territories are still being fought for, under constant Russian artillery bombardment, and temporary occupation by Russian forces to this day.

Current Sentiment Analysis

Living in Kyiv, for the average Ukrainian citizen, the war in the East seems like a distant phenomenon, somewhere hundreds of kilometers away, blocked by the skyline of city buildings, and the hustle and bustle of business and administrative affairs of the capital. The air alerts condition us, as a reminder to the immediacy of danger and activity of this war, but in a twisted sense of seeking human normalcy, it is fading into the background as just another nuisance.

Abroad, across the Atlantic, Russian disinformation campaigns specifically targeting the U.S. are convincing the West that Ukraine is doing great and everything's under control. It has fallen out of priority over the last few months to other priorities in the Pacific, the Middle East, and the upcoming US election. Russia's goal of disinformation campaigns is to sow confusion, instigate de-prioritization of this war, and doubts of legitimate governance inside Ukraine. Current Information Operation (I/O) campaigns instigate questions: "Why do we need to send more support if they are doing so great?"; and in parallel, "If they [Ukraine] are doing so well, why haven't they won yet? Are they just squandering the money we give them?"

We, Ukraine, do this damage unknowingly to ourselves too. We're quick to defend slander against our country, and its servicemen, citing the bravery, sacrifice, and ferocity of which we've collectively acted to defend our sovereignty. We point to Ministries that create committees to discuss budgetary and discretionary spending for Western onlookers, appeasing Special Inspector Generals in-country, while Telegram channels of Kyvians ask why money is being spent on road beautification and movie production campaigns instead of direct expenditures of vehicle repairs and quality fuel for the armed forces of Ukraine.

These campaigns are involuntarily supported by the Ukrainian top officials and state propaganda that tries to keep at least resemblance of the "state of the union" in the country. The "*Ukrainian nation, torn apart by the war, internal scandals and enemy information and psychological operations abound, must maintain this green zone in order to keep internal stability and security.*"

These activities lead to two problems:

First, the resulting twilight zone is a shock to outsiders visiting Ukraine on official business, and to the soldiers returning from the front lines.

Soldiers who have survived the fighting in the East, the South, and all over the country, often return to the cities dismayed and disgusted by the lackadaisical nature of these center towns where 'peace and order' is maintained. Any open criticism of the current attitudes by Ukrainian veterans of war who question Ukrainian military actions and decisions of their superiors is heavily frowned upon and suppressed.

Secondly, instead of openly addressing the allegations of corruption, money-laundering activities, and instances of corporate lobbying efforts to hide these activities, we simply state that it doesn't exist. This harms the legitimacy of truthful messages.

Corruption exists, and we are managing it as best as we can. However, we cannot resort to internal investigations where, "*We have investigated ourselves and found no wrongdoing.*" International assistance in the form of intermediaries is key to solving this problem. An example is given by the international cooperative assistance of the Five Eyes (US, UK, CA, AU, NZ) community.

The Demands of the Media Sensationalism

First, as a public figure - a non-popularist Member of Parliament - I understand plainly the unquenching demands of provocative international media. Early successes of the Ukrainian military were creating a dangerous international narrative that was playing in favor of Russian propaganda that Ukraine is unconditionally winning. Our commanders were losing their heads over temporary tactical successes and politicians were giving unrealistic promises to the civilian population of prompt victory.

Such international media attention alongside very carefully crafted Russian psychological operations were unrealistically raising expectations of the public and made young unprofessional Ukrainian politicians believe in magic. This resulted in dismissing the voices of those who had a different opinion more aligned with the ground truth.

Disastrous consequences arise should generals and politicians forgo military operational security and instead prioritize chauvinistic media popularity.

The truth is rarely delivered through popular media channels. There is more truth in rumors. I am reminded of a quote by the "Iron Chancellor" of Germany:

“People never lie so much as before an election, during a war, or after a hunt.”

Otto von Bismarck

The Whole Truth

If we are to be an open, free, and democratic nation, shouldn't we - the citizenry of Ukraine, and active soldiers of its military - have the right to free and open speech?

I previously described the internal planning activities of the Ukrainian military of Modernization Efforts.

Now, let me tell you the whole truth:

- New brigades were being formed to standardize the capability of persistent ISR...

...but staffed predominantly by rear-echelon officers with little-to-no combat experience, without the delegation of authority to non-commissioned officers with exemplary combat experience.

- Western countries were training our soldiers abroad...

...but were training soldiers on doctrine and lessons-learned from a counter-insurgency war, that doesn't work for Large Scale Combat Operations in Ukraine.

- Western military equipment was donated freely...

...but this equipment was purpose-made for a past war, failing in modern warfare without a budgetary analysis and a temporal analysis of Ukraine's current operational capacity to learn operating manuals written in English military jargon.

- Allied Forces, together with the General Staff of Ukrainian Armed Forces, held joint strategic sessions and tabletop exercises...

...but were arrogantly dismissed by our General Staff due to their recent combat victories. When assisting the Ukrainian General Staff with drafting High Priority Targeting Lists, strike packages, and retrograde plans, the “lack of direct involvement in the battlefield due to administrative restrictions,” was quoted, turning away experienced help, calling Western Generals ‘pussies’.

- Everyone dreamed of quickly liberating Ukrainian territories, with some even stocking up on blue and yellow flags...

...but there is no silver bullet to war, only careful, efficient, logistical planning and well-executed servant-leadership in the field.

The two and a half years of heavy fighting has unveiled the greatest strategic challenge that has not been resolved up until today.

What is LSCO?

The world has not seen a full-scale war in 22 years.

Weapon platforms, established doctrines, Standard Operating Procedures, and habits, which have proven their combat effectiveness during the Global War on Terror (GWOT) were focused on counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism operations.

In the Areas of Responsibility of Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, and AFRICOM, foreign advisors assigned to Ukraine made gross OVER-assumptions of enemy strength in professional military training, discipline, and combined warfare maneuvers commonly required to overpower enemy forces. Our generals, in-kind, made UNDER-assumptions of the fighting capabilities of Russia, still a near-peer threat to the US, without field experience of thermal optics, night-vision goggles, air power, or a fully functioning Defence Industrial Base. These misaligned assumptions do not meet the current operational realities of Large-Scale Combat Operations (LSCO) in the Russo-Ukrainian War.

Additionally, we have never seen large scale utilizations of Electronic Warfare systems. On the topic of non-permissive communications and Electronic-Warfare, I will only speak briefly as it is not my primary forte. However, the reports from our communicators and Signals Intelligence units describe simple GPS spoofing rendering guided munitions, claiming to be precise, having a degraded combat effectiveness. Concurrently, Radio Frequency jamming in the military VHF/UHF spectrums prevent radio system from working effectively, or at all.

This reduced efficacy extends to unmanned systems.

Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) platforms, or drones provided by both official and unofficial Western channels, advertised to work, have proven little to no combat-effectiveness in Ukraine. Platforms such as AeroEnvironment tube-launched One Way Attack (OWA) Switchblade 300 and 600, Skydio X2 (quadcopters), Anduril Ghost (helicopter), FLIR Black Hornet 3 (mini helicopter), and Parrot ANAFI (quadcopter), have failed in testing environments, and operational combat activity, repeatedly. They simply do not work for this operational environment at this current time.

Additionally, my men, upon learning of the cost of these systems, are nervous to use or lose these platforms at risk of financial repercussions by military command should these platforms become lost on the battlefield, acquired by the enemy in combat, or stolen by thieves.

Lastly, the pace of development of these platforms, and updates requested by our soldiers, are measured in months and fiscal year budgets. This is a repeated sentiment among the in-country corporate lobbyists of these platforms, looking for a signatory.

We do not have time to wait months or years!

As a result of logistical and operational failures, we are relegated to utilizing COTS drones manufactured predominantly in China. We understand this bitter truth of our reliance on Chinese components, but we speak in terms of whole truths.

Commercial drones are “hacked together” to work for combat operations. Unfortunately, these “hacks” are a temporary solution that fails to meet Russia’s economic superiority and production capability. Ukraine’s fledgling Defense Industrial Base (UA DIB) prevents us from adequately servicing novel foreign machinery, such as M777 artillery barrels and HIMARS rocket pods, or afford us the capacity to buy luxury airpower capabilities that have proven combat effectiveness in other operational environments of NATO forces.

While fixed-wing airframes, quadcopter First-Person View drones, munitions, and electronics are manufactured at a significant price reduction in Ukraine, our constrictive budgets do not allow for the purchase of Western component pieces that would increase robustness, explosive/penetrative capability, or reliability of our platforms at LSCO scale.

Ukraine, by virtue of our economic position, currently engaged in kinetic warfare, is relegated to utilizing sub-standard machinery and innovations that produce the largest kinetic effect for our budget. Or again, must regrettably purchase systems and components from Russia's financier and strategic Axis partner, China.

While negotiations continue on the topic of logistics, price per unit, Intellectual Property concerns of ITAR-restricted products that don't work, etc., the Ukrainian people continue to engage in combat operations day-to-day.

The prioritization of products over people will lead us to failure.

The Hard Truth About This War

Unless we collaboratively unfuck ourselves - WE WILL LOSE THIS WAR.

BLUF: We are closer to losing one of the most strategic regions that will dictate the outcome of this war. That is the city of **Pokrovsk**.

Since Day 1 of the Russian self-proclaimed Special Military Operations, Russia's main line of effort has been to capture the Donbas region of Ukraine.

Strategic Significance of Pokrovsk

Pokrovsk is the main logistics hub for the Donbas region for allied forces. It contains pre-existing railway lines to the temporarily-occupied city of Mariupol and Donetsk, which, if captured by Russia, can be used to concentrate Russian forces, connecting their southern and eastern axis of attack and can swiftly gain swaths of land until the Dnipro River.

The Russian Main Center of Gravity is in Pokrovsk

Russian forces are conducting a strategic offensive operation during the current summer campaign of 2024, with the main attack directed towards Avdiivka–Pokrovsk. Another direction involves a supporting strike on the Bakhmut–Kramatorsk axis to the north nearby. The goal of this operation is to cut off the main communication routes and encircle the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the Toretsk–Kramatorsk area.

Capturing Pokrovsk would allow Russian forces to shift the attack direction along the Pokrovsk–Druzhkivka and Pokrovsk–Kostiantynivka routes, leading to the encirclement or expulsion of Ukrainian units in the Toretsk–Kostiantynivka–Druzhkivka area.

The next stage would involve advancing on Kramatorsk–Sloviansk.

Elsewhere in the Surrounding Region

Limited offensive actions are being carried out in the Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, and Kharkiv directions to create a threat to the southern and northern Ukrainian forces, deplete Ukrainian reserves, and thereby secure the flanks of the Pokrovsk strategic offensive operation.

Current Operations (CUOPS) Donbas

In the last week of July this year, RGF pushed towards the main city of Pokrovsk, rapidly capturing 8 kilometers of ground in a week.

Existing Ukrainian defenses previously limited Russian advancement to 150-200m per week. However, the lack of available personnel, the lack of available resources, the mounting mental and physical toll, the exertion of enemy influence operations and psychological operations (I/O) by in-country saboteurs and international online narratives by cyber forces, have severely impacted Ukraine's fighting capability.

At this current rate of advance and Ukrainian fighting capability, within the Autumn fighting season starting mid-August, the city of Pokrovsk will be overrun by this winter. The rate of advancement can slow down upon RGF's arrival at the urban villages surrounding Pokrovsk, however the main city will be in-range of Russian field artillery.

Enemy Likely Course of Action: Capture Donbas before Winter

Russia, in their Soviet-era doctrine, is throwing waves and waves of bodies at this region to ensure their assets will be in range of Ukrainian urban terrain before winter. With disregard for the perseverance of life, Russia desperately wishes to capture this land.

The casualty rates on the Russian side to accomplish this goal are both staggering, and pitiful. While I've steelled my resolve in destroying the enemy by any means possible, I am still a mother, and

knowing the truth that the sons of indoctrinated Russians will never return to their country, at the order of a party ruled by a madman, breaks my heart.

The depth of madness of Russian propaganda over the last three decades, thirty years of state-owned media and authoritarian control of the Russian populace by the Kremlin regime, continues to incapacitate outcries of social justice desperately seeking change. Russia remains in a disconnected, Orwellian, *Animal Farm*.

Simply, in the eyes of the Kremlin to their countrymen, “It is for the greater good of the state to [throw your life away] attack Pokrovsk and maintain fealty to the country [party].”

Ramifications of Losing Pokrovsk for Future Operations (FUOPS):

Should Pokrovsk fall, Russia is free to capture the remaining portions of Donetsk region without struggle, entrench themselves in the current lines, construct a Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), and announce a victory, ending its Special Military Operation.

Russia will call their Special Military Operation a success. The impact of this narrative will allow Russia to rapidly reconstitute its troops, concentrate its forces, proliferate TTPs and SOPs of their Electronic Warfare Resistant Reconnaissance Strike Complex (EWRRSC), solidify logistics and manufacturing through its reinvigorated Defence Industrial Base (DIB), deliver proven products and technologies to its Axis allies of the DPRK, PRC, Iran, Junta forces, and Russian-aligned forces in South America and Africa.

In a year, Russia will return to Ukraine and capture the rest of our homeland. In two years, the Russian boot will come on EU soil with a new invasion.

The impact will be felt around the globe and will be disastrous for the free world.

2024 Offensive Operation of Kursk

The Kursk offensive, while giving tactical and psychological advantage, amounts to a distractionary operation and omits consideration of the overall long-term strategic environment.

Analysis of open-source information indicates that Ukraine has deployed well-trained and well-equipped units, up to the strength of an Army Corps, in the Kursk offensive operation. Classified military intelligence provides specific insights to our strengths but will not be discussed in this document due to operational security.

Russian forces are unlikely to withdraw units from the Donetsk direction, as they understand the limitations of Ukrainian resources for advancing and securing positions deeper into Russian territory. Russian army and assault aviation units will be used first to buy time. The time frame allows for the transfer of reserves from deep within Russian territory to localize the Ukrainian advance. Meanwhile, the Russian military grouping will gradually build up with the aim of pushing Ukrainian Armed Forces units back beyond the state border, with a subsequent advance toward Sumy.

Media distractions of swathes of poorly armed Russian conscripts in the border regions with freshly signed military contracts starting from June and July of this year should not be indicative of strategic success.

Thus, Kursk operation is a gamble. The only logical explanation as to why Ukraine’s highest political and military command made a call to use our best reserves at this stage (which looks extremely

premature) for an adventurous offensive move is the fear of losing the biggest battle of this war - the battle for Pokrovsk. It's a desperate call for help to the world, which if remains unheard or misinterpreted will lead to further escalation and export of this war way beyond Ukraine.

Moreover, **Ukraine SHOULD NEVER open a pandora box of external “liberation” or “vigilante justice seeking” of Russian regions or bargaining of any Russian land against Ukrainian land at the negotiation table.**

Moreover, **in the framework of international law, there does not exist a non-proliferation treaty which prevents a country from dropping a chemical, biological, radioactive, or nuclear threat on its own territory, committing the act of nuclear terrorism against its own NPP and denying all responsibility, victim-blaming Ukraine for their actions.**

We don't need Kursk, Belgorod or any other centimeter of Russian land. We are not going to redefine any internationally recognized borders. Such a move will play directly into the hands of Putin, who - in their echochamber of psychosis - will call for an international coalition to “annihilate the Nazi-led Ukrainian regime”. Ukrainian military actions around the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant play into the hands of Russian propagandists, already preparing to accuse Ukraine of nuclear terrorism.

Our goal is to force Russians to respect fundamental rules of international law, and international recognized borders. We must not leave our soldiers to die, forgotten in our own lands, let alone left behind in enemy territory. I cannot imagine that President Zelensky and the military command can make such a fatal mistake.



What We Need

Without physical commitment from the Allies, Ukraine is not able to address challenges outside our current capabilities. Right now, we need assistance from our allies.

I'm asking for more than just artillery, HIMARs, F-16s and money.

WE NEED PEOPLE!

Ukraine is at war. We are not afforded the luxury of time.

Ukraine does not have time to learn complex combined arms maneuvers at a sufficient scale to gain strategic advantage on the ground.

Ukraine does not have time to create bilateral intelligence networks and processes for NATO compliant COMSEC custodianship.

Ukraine does not have time to travel across the Atlantic for meetings, or process paperwork to travel to neighboring countries in bulk.

Ukraine does not have time to wait for integration efforts of the European Air-Defence Space Command and changes to the Missile Technology Control Regime to even begin to export large Class 4 drones and counter-UAS solutions.

Ukraine does not have time to train existing soldiers in the field and wait two generations for a new command structure to take hold, and three generations to have a population capable of fighting the population of Russia.

Ukraine does not have time to build its Defense Industrial Base and manufacturing facilities at sufficient scale and conduct overt advertisements of capabilities without insider threats.

Ukraine does not have time.

What does Ukraine have?

What Ukraine has are **drones that are affordable, attritable, and attainable.**

What Ukraine has are early investors with Trusted Capital sources, and defense-entrepreneurs with appetite for risk in business and in combat.

What Ukraine has are international volunteers serving in a humanitarian capacity, raising independent funding to crowdfunded sources for a noble purpose.

What Ukraine has is a struggling process to accept military veterans from around the world, united under a blue and yellow banner to fight against Russia and experience the privilege of combat with comrades-in-arms.

What Ukraine has is an disconnected network of intelligence professionals collectively working in anti-human trafficking, anti-drug trafficking, and anti-corruption.

And most importantly, Ukraine has **no choice but to win this war!**

CALLS TO ACTION

Most urgently our European, US and UK allies need to **use the full force of security agreements recently signed with Ukraine in order to:**

- 1. Substantially increase US administrative forcecap to allow green berets, equivalent SOCEUR Special Operation Forces, and clandestine counter-terrorism professionals, to conduct in-country official business; establish the process of Letters of Authorization (LOA) for PMCs in non-kinetic technical capacities to assist in support functions of the UA DIB and its Armed Forces; establish an expedited recruitment process of expatriate NATO veterans and intelligence professionals with specific labor categories (MOS) directly into the Ukrainian Armed Forces, SSO, GUR, et al., sanctioned and subsidized by the veteran's country-of-origin.*
- 2. Provide Exception to Policy (ETP) and rapid procurement pathways for UMX requests of Western platforms proven to work in Ukrainian-led in-country Testing & Evaluation, (T&E) with specific license to Government Purpose Rights (GPR), incentivizing collaborative export control mechanisms.*
- 3. Provide operational funding and in-country international Liaison Officers for Unmanned Systems Forces (USF), CBRN Working Group, Intellectual Property attorneys, and independent military Judge Advocate General's Corps (JAG).*

Only through joint effort - a combination of intimate understanding of Ukraine's existing capabilities, and force multiplicative effects of domain knowledge of our allies in-country, will improve the operational environment on the battlefield.

I strongly urge the involvement of US special forces located just across the border to their fully trained capacity of unconventional warfare.

This physical commitment of personnel does not only signify a mythological commitment - digitally signed on a PDF document existing in a classified enclave never to be seen again; but a demonstrable physical presence, living proof, to the eyes and ears of my soldiers still fighting in the Eastern front that **you still care about us.**

People will say a lot of things - do very little - and we need you here in Ukraine.

The Men in the Arena

Tradition dictates that I leave you with a quote, and though it is usually a Ukrainian poet who takes the stage, I wish to share with you a different author at this time that may resonate with a Western audience just a little bit louder:

“It is not the critic who counts; not the man who points out how the strong man stumbles, or where the doer of deeds could have done them better.

The credit belongs to the man who is actually in the arena, whose face is marred by dust and sweat and blood; who strives valiantly; who errs, who comes short again and again, because there is no effort without error and shortcoming; but who does actually strive to do the deeds; who knows great enthusiasms, the great devotions; who spends himself in a worthy cause; who at the best knows in the end the triumph of high achievement, and who at the worst, if he fails, at least fails while daring greatly, so that his place shall never be with those cold and timid souls who neither know victory nor defeat.”

-Theodore Roosevelt,
26th President of the United States

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To the unnamed members of the community only referred to as ‘ground branch’ and the quiet professionals inside joint special operations, I extend a heartfelt thank you to your undying commitment to actions supporting the integrity of the free world which will never garner media attention publicly. And I'm sure if it ever did, you will all deny involvement.

Glory to the Heroes!
<L.A.>