

# (Pseudo)random Data



Entropy, CSPRNG

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CRCS


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# RNG types


- True RNG (TRNG)
  - collects random events:
    - hardware noise, physical phenomena
    - behaviour of system/user
  - Pros: **independent** values, **aperiodic** sequence
  - Cons: often **slow**, often **small density** of entropy
- Pseudorandom RNG (PRNG)
  - software – imitates randomness
  - Pros: **fast**
    - CSPRNG - **uniform**, **practically independent**
  - Cons: **deterministic**, **periodic**, **fixed entropy**

# Combined TRNG + (CS)PRNG

- TRNG (entropy source)
- Entropy Pool (optional)
  - collects entropy
  - entropy is increased – fresh entropy mixed into pool
- CSPRNG
  - seeded by pool or TRNG directly




# PRNG



Source: <https://pit-claudel.fr/clement/blog/how-random-is-pseudo-random-testing-pseudo-random-number-generators-and-measuring-randomness/>


## Security of PRNG

- Seed and internal state must be protected
  - must be large enough – not allowing brute force
  - seed - determines whole sequence
  - state  $state_i$  determine next values  $r_i, r_{i+1}, r_{i+2}, \dots$ 
    - inappropriate  $f_{trans}$  also previous values  $r_1, r_2, \dots, r_{i-1}$



# Insecure PRNGs

- LFSR of n-bits
  - Output bit - linear function state bits
  - Berlekamp Massey alg. can compute IS from  $2n$  output bits
- Standard random function:
  - Linear congruential generator (LCG)
  - return whole or half of IS
- RC4 –  $P(2^{\text{nd}} \text{ byte} = 0) = 1/128$  (not  $1/256$ )
- Mersenne twister – IS from 624 values
- Anything not labeled as CSPRNG...



# LCG

- gcc random(), java.util.Random, ...

$$state_{i+1} = a \cdot state_i + c \bmod m$$

Source	modulus $m$	multiplier $a$	increment $c$	output bits of seed in $rand()$ or $Random(L)$
<a href="#">ZX81, ZX Spectrum</a> <sup>[18]</sup>	$2^{16} + 1$	75	0	$(x_n - 1) / 2^{16}$
<a href="#">Numerical Recipes</a> <code>ranqd1</code> , Chapter 7.1, §An Even Quicker Generator, Eq. 7.1.6 parameters from Knuth and H. W. Lewis	$2^{32}$	1664525	1013904223	
<a href="#">Borland C/C++</a>	$2^{31}$	22695477	1	bits 30..16 in $rand()$ , 30..0 in $lrand()$
<a href="#">glibc</a> (used by <a href="#">GCC</a> ) <sup>[19]</sup>	$2^{31}$	1103515245	12345	bits 30..0

- significant part of  $state_i$  returned as random value  $r_i$
- linear state update func. - states can be **backtracked!**

# Randomness and entropy

- What is random, data or RNG? Is 4 random?
  - randomness of data determined by RNG
- Entropy is **measure** of randomness
  - expressed in bits
  - better randomness  $\Rightarrow$  larger entropy
- Entropy represents:
  - uncertainty of produced values and
  - average amount of information values carry and
  - attack complexity on key / security of system.
  - see other [definitions](#) by NIST



# Entropy computation

- **Assumption:** RNG produces **independent** values.
- Defined for RNG output represented by random variable  $X$ .
- (Shannon) entropy: 
$$\mathcal{H}(X) = - \sum_{i=1}^n p_i(X = x_i) \log p_i(X = x_i)$$
- Property: same entropy when modeled RNG differently
  - single bits  $p_0 = 0.3, p_1 = 0.7 \implies \mathcal{H}(X) = 0.88$
  - 2-bit blocks:  
 $p_{00} = 0.09, p_{01} = p_{10} = 0.21, p_{11} = 0.49 \implies \mathcal{H}(X) = 2 * 0.88$
- For impossible events:
$$p_i(x_i) = 0 \implies p_i(x_i) \log p_i(x_i) = 0$$

## Entropy estimate - example

- Source (<https://qrng.anu.edu.au/RainBin.php>):

- Estimates for sequence of 80 bits:

0110110101010011000001011000001011010000  
1001111111011100000101011000100011111111

- Model (1bit): 40x 0, 40x 1 – entropy  $\mathcal{H}(X) = 1$
  - Model (2bit): 12x'01', 6x'10', 11x'00', 11x'11' –  $\mathcal{H}(X) = 1.95$
- Estimates for two 960-bit seqs for 1-6 bit model:
  - 0.9999, 0.9992, 0.9993, 0.9910, 0.9704, 0.9470
  - 0.9998, 0.9974, 0.9913, 0.9849, 0.9734, 0.9485

# Entropy pool - mixing entropy

- Operations: replacement : XOR : Hash:
  - replacement – can decrease the entropy!
  - XOR – cannot decrease entropy
    - but may not increase if part already full!
  - hashing – increases (up to hash size) and spreads entropy

