Universität Stuttgart

Institute for Social Sciences
Department of Political Systems and
Political Sociology

Course: *Wahlen, direkte und mitgestaltende (dialogische) Bürgerbeteiligung im Vergleich* - WS 2017/18

Right-Wing Participation: who is attrackted by right populists?

Rebecca Litauer
Email: rebecca.litauer@t-online.de
Matr.: 2809173

Simon Roth
Email: nomis.roth@gmx.net
Matr.: 2805614

Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Angelika Vetter
Date of Submission: March 19, 2018

Abstract: In this study we explain extreme right-wing voting behaviour in the countries of the European Union and Norway from a micro and macro perspective. Using a multidisci- plinary multilevel approach, we take into account individual-level social background char- acteristics and public opinion alongside country characteristics and characteristics of extreme right-wing parties themselves. By making use of large-scale survey data (N = 49,801) together with country-level statistics and expert survey data, we are able to explain extreme right-wing voting behaviour from this multilevel perspective. Our results show that cross- national differences in support of extreme right-wing parties are particularly due to dif- ferences in public opinion on immigration and democracy, the number of non-Western residents in a country and, above all, to party characteristics of the extreme right-wing parties themselves.

Contents

1 Introduction **4**

2 State of Research **6**

3 Voting Right-Wing Parties **7**
3.1 Individual-level Explanations 9
3.1.1 Political Trust 9
3.1.2 Internal Efficacy 10
3.1.3 Economic Deprivation 11
3.2 Contextual Factors 13
3.2.1 Institutional Perspective 13
3.2.2 Cultural Determinants 16
3.2.3 Socio-economic Factors 18

4 Methods **19**
4.1 Research Design 19
4.2 Model Based Clustering 20
4.3 Principal Component Analysis 24
4.3.1 Trust Items 24
4.3.2 Immigration Items 26
4.4 Statistical Models 28

5 Analysis **30**
5.1 Results 30
5.2 Discussion 30

6 Conclusion **30**
6.1 Limitations 30
6.2 Future Research 30

References **31**

List of Tables

1 Cluster means and standard deviations for populist indicators 22
2 Party Cluster Membership 23

List of Figures

1 BIC Model Selection for mixture models on the CHES party positioning data set. Following Fraley and Raftery (2010), the grid component structures are labeled using: EII=spherical, equal volume; EEI=diagonal, equal volume and shape; EVI=diagonal, equal volume, varying shape; EEE=ellipsoidal, equal volume, shape, and orientation; VEV=ellipsoidal, equal shape; VII=spherical, unequal volume; VEI=diagonal, varying volume, equal shape; VVI=diagonal, varying volume and shape; EEV=ellipsoidal, equal volume and equal shape; VVV=ellipsoidal, varying volume, shape, and orientation. 21
2 Classification and Cluster Boundaries 22
3 Bivariate Scatter plots for item battery public trust 25
4 First and Second PC Dimensions for the Trust Items 25
5 scree plot and Component Contribution by Variable 26
6 Bivariate Scatter Plots for item battery immigration 27
7 PCA Dimensionality for the Immigration Items 27
8 scree plot and Component Contribution by Variable 28

1 Introduction

In the following study we are eager to answer the question whether ...

In this article, we will try to explain differences in extreme right-wing voting behaviour between 16 Western European countries. So far, cross-national empirical research on extreme right-wing voting has been scarce, even though in 1988 von Beyme emphasized that "future studies of right-wing extremism will have to pay more attention to the whole political context of the political movement" (von Beyme 1988: 16).

Bühlmann & Freitag (2006) : Any attempt to explain an individual's propensity to vote must take into account the differences in the context in which the individual lives. We mainly assume that different contextual settings will have different impacts on individual participation. We also expect different interactions between contextual and individual characteristics. In other words: differences in individual resources play a key role in explaining individual participation behaviour, but the latter also depends on the canton in which a person lives. On the one hand the cantonal context builds a framework which fosters or hinders the individual's propensity to vote, and on the other hand, the effect of individual resources on participation also differs from context to context.

Third, we advance a methodological argument. We hypothesise that an individual's propensity to vote is in uenced by both his personal characteristics as well as by contextual attributes. Individual-level explanations of electoral participation on the one hand typically argue that non-voting is determined by a combination of facilitative and motivational variables. Motivational factors as such include ideology, political attitudes, and basic tendencies, whereas facilitative determinants refer to speci c individual resources and socio-demographic factors (education, income, age etc.) (Kleinhenz 1995; Knight and Marsh 2002). Macro-level approaches, on the other hand, evaluate the determinants of total voting turnout rather than focusing on the individual (Franklin 2002; Norris 2002). In this strand of research, cross-country variance is explained by cultural, economic, and – most importantly – politico-

institutional settings (Blais and Dobrzynska 1998; Crepaz 1990; Franklin 2002; Freitag 1996, 2005; Norris 2004; Wernli 1998). While micro-level research neglects the contextual framework within which individual actions take place, macro-level approaches face the risk of ecological fallacies. Against this background, we argue that non-voting has to be explained by both individual and contextual characteristics. Moreover, the environmental context also functions in an interactive manner, in uencing the strength of the effect of individual characteristics on participation. By combining individual and contextual determinants of electoral participation and modelling them simultaneously with multilevel analysis, we contribute to the overcoming of the "midlife crisis" facing electoral studies (Curtice 2002: 6). We see multilevel analysis as a possibility to overcome the micro-macro dualism widely discussed in social sciences. With multilevel analyses, the determinants of individual behaviour can be analysed in a much more appropriate manner than with simple micro-analyses or macro-analyses (Hank 2003). For the rst time, data on the 2003 Swiss elections allows the in uence of the cantonal contexts on individual participation to be tested. We can therefore go further than the very rare existing studies on electoral participation in Switzerland, which are conducted either on the aggregate (Freitag 2005; Wernli 1998, 2001) or the individual level (Ballmer-Cao and Sgier 1998; Bühlmann et al. 2003). This contribution is divided into four sections. Before we turn to a short description of our method and our results we discuss the existing theoretical and empirical contributions to our investigation (next section). Our last section offers conclusions and outlines for future research.

2 State of Research

These past years populism has received great attention from the social science community (Mudde 2004; Mudde & Kaltwasser 2017). The term "populism" is both widely used and disputed (Roberts 2006; Barr 2009). Several scientists have taken on the challenge of conceptualising populism with only a small number of widely acknowledged characteristics. Often, the concept is broken down to political, economic, social, cultural and discursive features and analyzed from numerous theoretical perspectives including democratic and modernization theory, social movement theory, party politics and political psychology (Postel 2007; Goodliffe 2012; Acemoglu et al. 2013). Within the wide range of literature there is a general agreement that populism is context-dependent and culture-bound, therefore strongly variable across countries. By the means of cross-national analyses, Mudde & Kaltwasser (2012) were able to gain extensive insight into populism and democracy in Latin America, Canada, Eastern and Western Europe. Further scholars differentiate populism based on historical periods with studies using data going back to the late 19th century (Arter 2010; Rosenthal & Trost 2012; Levitsky & Roberts 2013). Furthermore, populism cuts across ideological cleavages (Kaltwasser 2014): in Europe, an exclusionary right-wing variant of populism emerged in the 1980s—and has intensified since—targeting mostly immigrants and national minorities (Mudde 2007; Ivarsflaten 2008; Arter 2011; Berezin 2013). Finding common traits which combine various populist activites across several countries remains a great challenge. The task therefore is to explain how specific circumstances and culture nature populists politics and how these in turn impact the political sphere (Arter 2010). Despite such difficulties, it is possible to conceptualise populism by clearly identifing the key features of the phenomenon to be observed, allowing a comparison of populist politics across contexts.

The increase of right-wing extremism is of great matter in several Western European democracies. While right-wing parties with conservative and anti-system attitudes are gaining more and more ground in the political arena, the actual democratic process is jeopardised (Coffé et al. 2007). Comparative evidence on the intentions of

right-wing voters is rather insufficient (Kai 2008). Several analyses have shown that vote intentions and therfore election outcomes for right-wing parties are affected by political, economic and social circumstances such as the political landscape, socio-econonmic characteristics, political trust, the presence of immigrants, crime rate and social capital (Carter 2002; Golder 2003; Coffé et al. 2007). Most comparative analyses either observed solely on the individual level or on the aggregate level. In aggregate-level studies, a variety of country-specific characteristics have been related to voter turnout for right-wing parties at national elections (Lubbers et al. 2002). However, when analysing the context, individual characteristics on voting for the right wing are often disregarded (Merkl & Weinberg 2014).

3 Voting Right-Wing Parties

Zunächst Political participation beleuchten konzepte usw. . . .literatur vetter

Populist politics can reshape repertoires of political mobilization, especially in the forms of mass social movements and socially engaged party organizations (Hawkins 2010; Jansen 2011). The ability of populist politics to galvanize new forms of political engagement is especially important in an era of decline in formal political participation such as turnout and party membership Skocpol & Williamson (2016). At the same time, in unconsolidated democracies populism may erode democratic institutions and usher competitive authoritarian regimes (Levistky & Loxton 2012).

Voting is only one form of political participation. There are many other ways in which citizens can get involved in the political process. Once this is recognized, the challenge is to clarify what we mean by political participation, what activities are and are not covered by the concept. (Brady et al. 1995: 38) provide the standard definition of political participation. For them, it refers to *"activity that has the intent or effect of influencing government action - either directly by affecting the making or implementation of public policy or indirectly by influencing the selection of people who make those policies."* They also specify that they focus on voluntary activity

that is, not obligatory and unpaid. 3 In practice, this amounts to, beyond electoral activity (voting and campaigning), contacting government officials, being active in groups that attempt to influence governments, and being involved in protests and demonstrations (Blais 2010).

Whether or not this fear is justified, the fact remains that many countries have witnessed a growing popularity of these parties since the 1980s and that this growth in popularity is mirrored by a declining popularity of the more traditional political parties.

Populists argue that they despise the political system of representative politics itself (Taggart 2000). Moreover, populists are characterised being against the political establishment, the economic, media and cultural elite. Each of them are portrayed as one homogeneous corrupt group acting against the "general will" of citizens (Mudde & Kaltwasser 2017). Therefore populism tends to develop an inner group working against the corrupt others. As Mudde and Kaltwasser elaborate furthermore, *"This anti-elitist impetus goes together with a critique of institutions such as political parties, big organizations, and bureaucracies, which are accused of distorting the 'truthful' links between populist leaders and 'the common people'"* (Mudde & Kaltwasser 2017). It is emphasized that voters of populist parties do not trust the political system they live in, neither are they satisfied with representative democracy in their country. Populism may be broadly defined as *"a general protest against the checks and balances introduced to prevent 'the people's' direct rule"* (Pelinka 2013). Summarizing, we can observe the great accordance of scholars, that populist electorate is not supporting the political system and wants to rebel against the established structures.

Recent events showed that numerous citizens are hesitant to further European integration and in the political arena, numerous parties air euro-criticism (De Vries & Edwards 2009). On the radical right, parties successfully mobilize national identity considerations against the European Union (Hooghe & Marks 2005), Lubbers (2008)]. In the 2009 European Parliamentary elections, especially radical right-wing parties mobilized anti-EU sentiment and gained seats in the European parliament. These parties see the foundation of a political European Union as a threat to the sovereignty

of the nation state: nearly all radical right-wing parties agree that the EU is bad and should be either reformed fundamentally or abolished (Mudde 2007). Yet, the relationship between euro-scepticism and radical right-wing voting behaviour has received little empirical attention in previous studies. Ivarsflaten (2005) showed that euro-scepticism is an important determinant for radical right-wing support in France and Denmark. Van der Brug et al. (2005) also found a positive relationship between anti-EU sentiments and radical right-wing voting in France. Using data from 2002, Lubbers & Scheepers (2007) focused on the role of euro-scepticism for radical right-wing support in national elections in 13 countries. They found that voting for radical right-wing parties can partly be explained by euro-scepticism, over and beyond other relevant socio-political attitudes. Also, Arzheimer & Carter (2009) found evidence for the relevance of euro-scepticism, although he was not able to test its effect next to the major predictor of radical right-wing voting: the unfavourable attitudes towards migrants.

3.1 Individual-level Explanations

3.1.1 Political Trust

Bühlmann & Freitag (2006) : The last bundle of resources concerns the individual's evaluation of the political system. Easton (1965) considers elections an important source of legitimisation. The political system and its representatives obtain the citizens' support only if the latter are satis ed by the output of the system (decisions and policies). Considering this, the declining turnout could be interpreted as an increasing loss of of the political system's legitimacy (Schwartz 1973). According to Westle (1990) we can distinguish between short-term (e.g. trust in parliament) and long-term support factors (e.g. satisfaction with the political system). Individual support is an essential, but not suf cient condition of participation: at least some individuals who are satis ed with the functioning of politics do not participate, precisely because things are going well. In short, we assume the probability of individual electoral participation to be higher the more a person is in possession of

the above resources. We furthermore suggest that the differences in cantonal turnout can be explained by different effects of these resources on individual participation in the different cantons. In addition, we control for age, sex, and confession. With regard to life- cycle effects, it is assumed that younger individuals are more likely to abstain from voting (Kleinhenz 1995). Gender differences, in turn, are seen as both consequences of generation effects and of structural differences (Ballmer-Cao and Sgier 1998). Lastly, in the Swiss case, confession is an important determinant of electoral participation (Wernli 2001).

3.1.2 Internal Efficacy

Bühlmann & Freitag (2006) : Since Lazarsfeld et al. (1949), socio-economic status (SES) has played a prominent role in explaining both the decision to vote and participation behaviour. Normally, socio-economic status consists of the individual's educational level, income, and her occupational status. In theory, a high SES leads to a higher propensity to participate in elections, because individuals with high education levels and/or with a high income have more disposable time and a greater capacity to understand political debates (Kleinhenz 1995). This leads not only to greater political interest, but also to a greater probability of participation. Furthermore, wealthy individuals have an interest in contributing to the stability of the political system by participating in it (Wol nger and Rosenstone 1980). • Political skills are seen as the most important resource of participation (Bühlmann 2006): individuals with a lot of political interest (Campbell et al. 1976; Lazarsfeld et al. 1949) and internal ef cacy (Campbell et al. 1976) make wider use of all the different possibilities of in uencing politics - including electoral participation - than uninterested individuals or persons who do not think they have the ability to participate in politics.2 • Political attitudes play a crucial role in the decision to vote. Since Campbell et al. (1976), party ties have been considered long-term factors which stabilise electoral choices. However, party ties are also important for participation (Dalton et al. 1984). People with only weak, or no party identi cation at all, show a lower propensity to participate in elections (Pattie and Johnston 1998). An important and widely discussed (especially

in German political science (Feist 1992))3 factor is the attitude that voting is a civic duty. If participation in elections is seen as the ful lment of one's duty as a citizen, the propensity to vote increases.

3.1.3 Economic Deprivation

text: what unites right wing populists in western europe All existing theories of party system evolution, be they inspired by the Downsean economic tradition (Downs, 1957) or by the political sociology tradition of Lipset and Rokkan (1967), agree on one point. They implicitly or explicitly argue that unless there is some sort of societal change that gives rise to a widespread public grievance, a major change in the party system is unlikely to occur.3 Thus, in the most detailed explanation yet of the pattern of party systems evolution in Western Europe, Lipset and Rokkan emphasized the intimate connections between grievances, the expansion of suffrage, and the rise of new parties.

3.1.3.1 The Protest Vote

This approach builds on a widely accepted idea that radical right-wing parties gain from political protest. From this point of view, voters for these parties are not attracted by their anti-immigrant stances, but express predominantly political dissatisfaction (Mudde 2007). Although several studies emphasize that voters not only cast a radical right-wing vote based on political dissatisfaction, the protest proposition explains at least some of the variation in radical right-wing voting (Ivarsflaten 2005). We expect people who perceive their socio-economic situation as deprived to oppose established parties. They will be dissatisfied politically, feel more powerless, and are consequently more likely to cast a radical right-wing vote, since parties on the radical right claim to listen to the dissatisfied and oppose government decisions. People who perceive deprivation in their present socio-economic situation are more likely to vote for a radical right-wing party, as they are more dissatisfied politically (Werts et al. 2013).

3.1.3.2 Ethnic competition theory

Contributors to the ethnic competition theory proposed that ethnic groups sharing similar economic interests are in competition for scarce resources, which induces perceived ethnic threat and intergroup antagonistic attitudes (Coser, 1956; Levine and Campbell, 1972). In most European countries, ethnic out-groups (search for) work particularly in the lowest labour segments, where unemployment levels tend to be higher (Kiehl and Werner, 1999). Social categories that hold similar positions to ethnic minorities perceive more ethnic threat and therefore have stronger exclusionary reactions, e.g. voting for radical right-wing parties (Lubbers et al., 2002).

Coffe (2005) and Van der Brug and Fennema (2003) stressed the relevance of more general threat perceptions: deterioration of the living environment will also nourish feelings of threat, particularly among lower social strata that are more likely to live in neighbourhoods with relatively high levels of criminality. Therefore, those people are expected to feel unsafe in their own neighbourhood more often (e.g. Hale, 1996). Moreover, people may feel directly threatened by ethnic minorities, since ethnic groups are overrepresented in criminality statistics (Dagevos and Gijsberts, 2010). Since radical right-wing parties claim to serve the interests of the in-group and suggest that foreigners are related to a variety of problems, these parties may be an attractive option for people from lower social strata. H1: Lower-educated people, manual workers and unemployed people are more likely to vote for a radical right-wing party, (a) as they experience more ethnic threat, and (b) as their level of subjective victimization is generally higher.

3.1.3.3 Theory of psychological interests

The classic study of the Authoritarian Personality (Adorno et al., 1950) gives another explanation of why lower social strata would be more likely to vote for radical right-wing parties (e.g. Lipset, 1981 [1960]; Falter and Klein, 1994). Its core idea is that the socio-economic position of lower social strata may be characterized by poverty and deprivation, which in turn would create anxiety and frustration. To deal with anxiety and frustration, these particular strata are likely to submit them- selves to strong

authorities or strong traditional norms (Scheepers et al., 1990). Radical right-wing parties serve these psychological needs, as these parties empha- size traditional norms and a strong leader (Lubbers et al., 2002). H2: Lower-educated people, manual workers, unemployed people, as well as people who perceive deprivation in their present socio-economic situation, are more likely to vote for a radical right-wing party, as they favour authoritarian attitudes.

3.2 Contextual Factors

Various approaches can be found in internationally comparative participation research which seek to explain the differing participation levels in democratic parliamentary elections. Clearly, three research directions – the politico- institutional perspective, the politico-cultural approach, and the theory of socio- economic resources – dominate the debate, while in research so far, institutional in uencing variables have proven particularly operative and signi cant (Franklin 2004; Jackman and Miller 1995; Lijphart 1997: 7; Norris 2004). In this section, we sum up the essential theoretical standpoints of these research perspectives.4

3.2.1 Institutional Perspective

In existing comparative electoral participation research, the most attention by far is paid to politico-institutional determinants (Lijphart 1997: 7). Following the tradition of neo-institutionalism, this approach conceives of institutions as “rules of the game” which facilitate certain action alternatives while preventing others. In other words: institutions, in this view, function equally as formalised rules and as social norms which facilitate, limit, or stimulate individual attitudes and actions (Immergut 1998; Mayntz and Scharpf 1995: 43). Macro-quantitative research generally distinguishes between politico-institutional conditions in the broader sense and factors concerning electoral law and administration (Norris 2004: 153). While characteristics of the electoral, party, and government system belong to the former set of conditions, primarily organisational stipulations such as the existence of compulsory voting

belong to the second category. Advocates of this institutional research perspective generally look for incentives or possible institutionalised barriers which coincide with participation in an election (Blais and Dobrzynska 1998; Jackman and Miller 1995: 469; Norris 2004).

Pursuant to the Swiss constitution (Article 149.2), the electoral system is the same in all cantons, i.e. proportional representation (PR) is used throughout all of the cantons. However, the number of available seats varies greatly from canton to canton and corresponds to the size of the population: while in the largest canton, Zurich, 34 seats are allocated, the candidates in the six smallest cantons compete for only one seat. In practice, this situation comes close to a majority vote. Relevant research identi es the type of electoral system as the rst relevant variable towards an explanation of differences in electoral participation levels (Siaroff and Merer 2002). Majority electoral systems are seen as barriers to high electoral participation, since (it is argued) elections are not controversial in safe constituencies or strongholds, and supporters of the previously defeated party or small parties stay away from the election because they consider their vote to be ineffective (Ladner and Milner 1999). Additionally, previously defeated parties reduce their mobilisation efforts. In contrast, turnout should be higher under proportional systems, since voters will not feel that their vote is wasted, more parties are likely to run, and parties will have an incentive to campaign everywhere (Siaroff and Merer 2002: 920). In Switzerland, single-seated cantons resemble majority systems. Again, in cantons with proportional systems the number of parties increases with the number of available seats (Wernli 2001). Against this background we hypothesise that an increasing number of seats leads to a higher propensity to vote.

Party system. In their search for the driving forces behind participation rates, researchers frequently refer to the competitive situation within the party system (Blais and Dobrzynska 1998: 249; Wernli 1998). This approach assumes that whilst elections with pre-determined outcomes bring about a degree of apathy and ignorance amongst voters, a strongly competitive inter-party situation at the outset has a stimulating effect.5 At the same time, the weight of each individual vote is argued

to increase with the supposed marginality of an electoral outcome. In other words: the more consequences an individual vote has for an electoral result, it is argued, the more likely citizens are to go to the ballot (Freitag 2005). Furthermore, the number of parties is assumed to have an effect on electoral participation. The more fragmented a party system, the more multi-faceted the party-ideological spectrum becomes, and thus the more possibilities the voter has to nd candidates in which he sees his interests represented and realised (Blais and Dobrzynska 1998: 248). Thus, a large party diversity is said to boost willingness to participate in political elections. Finally, a high level of electoral participation should be traceable to a polarised party system, since opposite party camps are adept at keeping their respective clientele particularly close (Crepaz 1990; Norris 2004: 167). Institutions. Two competing assessments can be formulated regarding the in uence of direct democracy on participation at parliamentary elections. The rst conjecture assumes that a culture of active referendum democracy stimulates citizens' political interest (Hajnal and Lewis 2003). Wernli (1998), for instance, comparing 10 Swiss cantons concludes, that electoral participation is higher in the cantons where a more intensive form of direct democracy is practised The opposite to this hypothesis is the assumption of a negative relationship between direct democracy and electoral democracy. At least two reasons speak for this claim: rst, sundry popular initiatives and referenda restrict the competencies of government, parliament, and parties. The voter recognises that she is in a position to decide authoritatively on important issues, independently and without recourse to members of parliament. Thus, from this perspective, political questions are decided on primarily in referenda and not at (less relevant) elections (Bühlmann et al. 2003; Linder 1999: 315). Second, where there are several pillars of political co-determination, it is conceivable that a certain fatigue could arise regarding elections and referenda, mainly at the expense of less signi cant ballots (Jackman and Miller 1995: 483) and above all in cantons where the use of direct democracy instruments is high. Furthermore, cantons with a well-developed communal autonomy could be expected to ascribe little importance to national authorities, since the latters' limited powers of action and decision mean that elections to national parliament are considered largely irrelevant. Electoral law and administration. Among the

factors concerning electoral law and administration, compulsory voting is particularly signi cant in the explanation of electoral participation (Lijphart 1997). On the international level, Italy and the Netherlands pursued this arrangement until 1993 and 1970 respectively. Today, compulsory voting continues to exist, for instance, in Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Costa Rica, Greece, Luxemburg, Lichtenstein, Mexico, Peru, Singapore, Turkey, and Cyprus. Among the Swiss cantons, compulsory voting exists only in the canton of Schaffhausen. Here, as in Australia or Belgium, citizens can be driven to vote by the threat of retrospective penalties.6 While regular participation in the democratic process leads to the acquirement of a certain political competence and to the development of an active citizen's political interest (Pateman 1970; Wernli 1998), compulsory voting leads us to expect a higher rate of participation at ballots (Franklin 2004).

3.2.2 Cultural Determinants

Exponents of the politico-cultural and socio-integrative perspective emphasise that the willingness to participate in elections is not so much a result of institutional incentives and stimulants, as, primarily, an acquired habit (Norris 2004: 154). Accordingly, other investigations attribute an in uence on the level of electoral participation to socio-political and politico-cultural factors (Crepaz 1990; Gray and Caul 2000; Siaroff and Merer 2002).

Socio-political integration characteristics. At least since Tocqueville's (1994) analyses, social science has been dealing with the signi cance of clubs and organisations for the social and political integration of individualistic societies. This perspective's fundamental ideas can be traced back to the politico-cultural research of the 1960s, when voluntary organisations are considered to be "the most important foundations" of stable democracies, and were thought to secure the latter's continued existence (Almond and Verba 1965: 220ff.). Here, organisations act not only as mediums of political socialisation, but also as "schools for democracy", since they enable the "membership role" to be combined with the "role of citizen" in social practice. We expect cantons with a high density of membership, particularly in trade unions and

parties, but also in other formal associations, to display a higher level of participation. A high cantonal degree of involvement in this respect is regarded as an environment which fosters civic behaviour, including the willingness to support the political system through electoral participation.

Politico-cultural characteristics. In the Swiss context, Catholicism is traditionally considered a signi cant, historically established politico-cultural driving force behind electoral participation. According to Wernli (1998: 96ff.), there is a particularly strong bond in the Swiss cantons between the Christian Democratic Party (CVP) and Catholics. This historically entrenched relationship dates back to the defeat of the Catholic coalition at the end of the Sonderbundkrieg (short Swiss civil war, 1847). In the aftermath of this war, the Catholic population grew to perceive itself as a minority subordinated to worldly and modernising forces, and withdrew into a kind of isolated society in the strongholds of the Catholic cantons (Linder 1999: 37; Geser 2004). In these cantons, federal order guaranteed the continuation of Catholic morals and customs. It is thought that in cantons with a Catholic majority, elections are perceived of as regular challenges to the bastion of Catholicism and essential Christian religious values. This perception, together with the clientelistic entanglements between party and ideology, is suggested to act as a mobilising force on electoral participation. In view of the enduring confessional-political culture in Switzerland (cf. Geser 2004), these connections ought also to affect more recent developments and to render political Catholicism a propulsive force on political participation. At least two reasons oblige us to take not only the confessional, but also the language, cleavage into consideration. First, we can distinguish between the cantons by their type of democratic system. In existing research, the non- German cantons have typically been seen as representative systems, while the German speaking cantons pass as more direct-democratic systems (Kriesi 1998; Wernli 2001): not only are cantonal constitutions in the Latin areas more oriented towards representative democracy, with fewer opportunities of direct legislation (Ladner 1991), but the direct democratic instruments also are used more seldom than in the German speaking cantons (Linder 1999). Second, the non-German cantons have minority status at

the national level. We therefore suggest that individuals living in these cantons concentrate more on cantonal than federal politics, and thus tend to exercise their national voting rights less intensively. The rst point of view leads us to expect that a higher degree of importance will be attached to elections, and that there will thus be a higher electoral turnout in Latin cantons. The second point, however, leads to contrary assumptions.

3.2.3 Socio-economic Factors

Besides the approaches mentioned so far, extant comparative investigations refer to the effect of socio-economic and socio-demographic factors on participation rates at political elections. Thus, for instance, economic strength and population size are mentioned as particularly relevant in uencing variables (Blais and Dobrzynska 1998: 241ff.; Norris 2004; Siaroff and Merer 2002: 917). *Economic strength and modernity.* Where existing research draws upon societies' cognitive and material resources to explain varying electoral participation rates, it refers primarily to differing levels of modernity and economic strength. A well- functioning economic system causes positive attitudes to develop towards the political system, strengthens political interest, and bestows the feeling that one's potential participation will be politically effective (Verba and Nie 1972: 125ff.). Additionally, the higher a democracy's level of socio-economic development or degree of modernity, the higher will be the rate of electoral participation (Blais and Dobrzynska 1998: 241ff.; Siaroff and Merer 2002). With a view to population size, researchers assume that less densely populated areas will display lower electoral participation, since a scattered population is more dif cult to mobilise and relevant information is less accessible (Blais and Dobrzynska 1998: 242ff.).

4 Methods

4.1 Research Design

Different data sources data set were used:

- **European Social Survey** (ESS Team 2016). The ESS is a multi-country scientific survey conducted every two years since 2002 by scientists in several European countries. The objectives of the ESS are to understand the changing attitudes and values in Europe, to explain how European institutions are changing and to develop a range of European social indicators and values (ESS8 2016). The data for the present analysis were collected from different survey waves the latest for each country.
- **Chapel Hill Expert Survey** (Bakker et al. 2014): Since 1999 CHES provides party positioning scores on European integration, ideology and policy issues for national parties in a variety of European countries. The more recent survey waves also comprise questions on non-EU policy issues, such as immigration, redistribution, decentralization, and environmental policy.
- **Varieties of Democracy** (Coppedge et al. 2017): V-DEM aims to transperently produce Indicators of Democracy that are multidimensional and disaggregated. This modern framework reflects the complexity of the concept of democracy and captures seven high-level principles of democracy: electoral, liberal, participatory, deliberative, egalitarian, majoritarian and consensual, and collects data to measure these principles.

The dependent variable from our final model is the populism cluster infered from Ches party data that has been matched and merged to the ESS micro data on voting a particular party. Variable Description ...

- summary stats

4.2 Model Based Clustering

Voting for a right wing party is often approximated by left-right scales or is time-intensiv coded. This analysis adopts Cas Mudde's clear minimalist definition of populism to identify core features that all sub types of populism have in common. In line with this definition, we suggest that populist parties are primarily shaped by their degree of anti-establishment attitudes as well as their opposition to globalization. Subsequently, we propose to classify European populist parties along a progressive and traditionalist left-right dimension. Some CHES party indicators are part of the clustering even though they are not be present in the ESS micro data.

This multidimensional classification problem is best approached by model-based hierarchical clustering (Scrucca et al. 2016). This tool set is already adopted in political science and praised for estimating meaningful clusters on high-dimensional data political science (Ahlquist & Breunig 2012; Jang & Hitchcock 2012). Model-based clustering assumes the data generating process to be driven by a mixture of underlying probability distributions in which each component represents a different cluster. Consequently each sub population is separately estimated and summarized by a mixture of these sub populations. Therefore the density tends to be centered at the multidimensional means (μ_k) and increased by geometric features (shape, volume, orientation) of the clusters being determined by the parameters of the covariance matrices Σ_k, which may also induce cross-cluster conditions (Ahlquist & Breunig 2012). In a nutshell the Gaussian Finite Normal Mixture model assumes a d-dimensional data set $y_1, \ldots, y_n$ to calculate G components with the likelihood

$$\ell_{MIX}(\theta_1, \ldots, \theta_G|y) = \prod_{i=1}^{n} \sum_{k=1}^{G} \tau_k f_k(y_i|\theta_k)$$

where f_k is the density of the θ_k mixture parameters, unlike traditional methods model-based clustering uses a soft assignment and calculates τ_k that represents the probability of a given observation belonging to the k component (Ahlquist & Breunig 2012). Unsupervised machine learning algorithms are often criticized for introducing

bias by hyper parameter settings. `mclust` addresses this by estimating a grid of different models and hyper parameter constellations. Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) is provided to pick the most useful model (Scrucca et al. 2016). The metric is penalized for the complexity of the model to ensure Osam Razor.



Figure 1: BIC Model Selection for mixture models on the CHES party positioning data set. Following Fraley and Raftery (2010), the grid component structures are labeled using: EII=spherical, equal volume; EEI=diagonal, equal volume and shape; EVI=diagonal, equal volume, varying shape; EEE=ellipsoidal, equal volume, shape, and orientation; VEV=ellipsoidal, equal shape; VII=spherical, unequal volume; VEI=diagonal, varying volume, equal shape; VVI=diagonal, varying volume and shape; EEV=ellipsoidal, equal volume and equal shape; VVV=ellipsoidal, varying volume, shape, and orientation.

The estimated grid models are represented by the following identifiers: EII, VII, EEI, VEI, EVI, VVI, EEE, EEV, VEV and VVV. The first Letter refers to volume, the second to shape and the third to orientation. E stands for “equal”, V for “variable” and I for “coordinate axes” (Kassambara 2017).

There is a clear indication of a four-component mixture with covariances having different shapes but the same volume and orientation (EVE) (VEV (ellipsoidal, equal shape)).

Following Milligan and Cooper’s (1988) finding that standardization by dividing each variable by its range gives consistently superior recovery of the underlying cluster

Table 1: Cluster means and standard deviations for populist indicators

Var	Establishment	Left Populist	Right Populist
antielite_salience	3.42	5.9	7.73
	(1.78)	(2.44)	(1.5)
civlib_laworder	4.67	3.47	8.19
	(1.75)	(1.97)	(1.07)
eu_position	6.16	3.28	2.81
	(0.51)	(1.15)	(1.24)
galtan	4.52	3.58	8.35
	(2.13)	(2.36)	(0.95)

[1] Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses

structure, all the variables are standardized by dividing by each variable's range. PCA ...



Figure 2: Classification and Cluster Boundaries

Table X displays the characteristics of each cluster through mean and standard deviation.

To validate the clusters lets inspect the party classification for three countries. For checking the consitency of the clusters, the variable means are calculated by cluster in Table @ref(tab:cluster_means). The final cluster vector is attached to the data with name `cluster`.

Table 2: Party Cluster Membership

Cluster	Parties
Establishment	CDU (ger); SPD (ger); FDP (ger); Grunen (ger); CSU (ger); PS (fra); PRG (fra); EELV (fra); UMP (fra); MODEM (fra); NC (fra); PRV (fra); AC (fra)
Left Populist	Linke (ger); Piraten (ger); DieTier (ger); PCF (fra); PG (fra); Ens (fra)
Right Populist	NPD (ger); AfD (ger); FN (fra); MPF (fra)

[1] Note: ...

4.3 Principal Component Analysis

Principal Component Analysis (PCA) another unsupervised machine learning approach is now used to reduce the dimensions of two item batteries to get a parsimonious model size. For both variables we are only interested in the first Dimension/Component that contributes most to the variability in the underlining data structure. The formal model for the first principal component of a data set is the linear combination its features

$$Z_i = \phi_{11}X_1 + \phi_{21}X_2 + \cdots + \phi_{p1}X_p$$

that has the largest variance and where is the first principal component loading vector, with elements $\phi_{11}X_1+\phi_{21}X_2+\cdots+\phi_{p1}$ are normalized, which means that $\sum_{j=1}^{p}\phi_{j1}^2 = 1$. To calculate these loadings, we must find the vector that maximizes the variance. It can be shown using techniques from linear algebra that the eigenvector corresponding to the largest eigenvalue of the covariance matrix is the set of loadings that explains the greatest proportion of the variability. This method does not depend compared to Factor Analysis or SEM on model assumptions or multivariate error distributions. Despite all dimensionality reduction methods have different background and purposes they often yield similar results. But for construct validation I recommend factor analysis or any other framework that provides hypothesis testing.

4.3.1 Trust Items

First we explore the diemnionality of the given trust items by applying standard pairwise scatter plots for each variable combination. The visual inspection confirms a strong linear association between all variables and the diagonal histograms approximate a normal distribution with a heavy tail on 0, as people are especially critical against political institutions and put more overall confidence in the police.

The next plot shows a two-dimensional representation of the data that captures most of the information in a lower-dimensional subspace. The First two components



Figure 3: Bivariate Scatter plots for item battery public trust

contribute together to nearly 80% of the total variance.



Figure 4: First and Second PC Dimensions for the Trust Items

As each principal component vector defines a direction in the feature space and all



Figure 5: scree plot and Component Contribution by Variable

arrows in Figure X point to the same direction we can be confident to approximate one trust dimension. This notion is supported by the scree plot capturing 66,7% of the total Variance by the first dimension. We can further see that the trust items for political institutions do somewhat differ in their contribution to the first PC due to different reasons. The European Parliament is often seen as disconnected from people and the police is always highly appreciated by everyone. The first PC scores are stored for later analysis as `pc_trust`.

4.3.2 Immigration Items

Next we applied the same PCA for the Immigration Items. But first we explore again the nationality of the given data by standard pairwise scatter plots for each variable combination in figure @ref(fig:imm_cor). The visual inspection again confirms a strong linear association between all variables but seem to be more noisy than the trust items before. The diagonal histograms approximate a normal distribution, despite the fact that three out of four variables have only 4 levels. This Likert scale is assumed to be equal-distant to be suitable for PCA.

The two-dimensional representation of the immigration items proposes again a strong one PC solution but points to a minor second dimension entirely rooted in imm_econ. We are only interested in the first PC that captures over 70% of the total variance.



Figure 6: Bivariate Scatter Plots for item battery immigration



Figure 7: PCA Dimensionality for the Immigration Items

The scree plot and contribution plot support these findings. The final PC scores are stored for later analysis as `pc_imm`.



Figure 8: scree plot and Component Contribution by Variable

4.4 Statistical Models

As part of this paper we built different statistical models with different repsonse functions. As detailed explained in section X and the dependent variable y_i is labeled as 1 for voters of right wing populist parties estimated by model based-clustering.

$$y_i = \begin{cases} 1: & \text{if voted for a right populist party} \\ 0: & \text{if not} \end{cases}$$

This binary data structure is best fitted by logistic regression and more generally by multilevel logistic regression. The latter takes into account that respondents are nested in their country context (Gelman & Hill 2007). The formal model is defined as

$$Pr(y_i = 1) = logit^{-1}(\alpha_{j[i]} + \beta x_{[i]} + \gamma_j z_{[i]})$$

By deploying random effects with context level predictors we are able to model country-specific heterogenity and group level variance (Steenbergen & Jones 2002). Additionally we avoid fixed effects for nested data to control model complexity and prevent overfitting. The random intercepts have the shape

$$\alpha_j \sim N(\mu_\alpha, \sigma^2_{country})$$

This means that the level-1 disturbances ϵ_i are drawn from a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance σ^2 (Gelman & Hill 2007). Since we expect justification rationality to be important for individual and group level, we include the groups mean as level 2 predictor (generally noted with z_q $(q = 1, ...Q)$). Thus, the level-2 model for the random intercept model is:

According to Gelman and Hill (Gelman & Hill 2007), multi-level models appropriately estimate with a minimum of five level-2 units. Furthermore, Gelman and Hill address the impact of little group variation. If this is the case, the multi-level model is reduced to a classical regression without any group indicators. However, multi-level models control for the remaining intra-class or cluster correlation and do not perform poorer than standard regressions on the same data (steenbergen02; gelman07). Finally, we used the restricted maximum likelihood estimator (REML) which performs less biased under the conditions of little group variation as well as a small number of groups (Elff & Shikano 2014).

5 Analysis

here we will dispaly the results

5.1 Results

5.2 Discussion

6 Conclusion

6.1 Limitations

6.2 Future Research

References

Acemoglu, Daron, Egorov, Georgy & Sonin, Konstantin 2013: A political theory of populism, *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 128, pp. 771–805.

Ahlquist, John S & Breunig, Christian 2012: Model-based clustering and typologies in the social sciences, *Political Analysis* 20, pp. 92–112.

Arter, David 2011: *Inside the radical right: The development of anti-immigrant parties in western europe*. Cambridge University Press.

Arter, David 2010: The breakthrough of another west european populist radical right party? The case of the true finns, *Government and Opposition* 45, pp. 484–504.

Arzheimer, Kai & Carter, Elisabeth 2009: Christian religiosity and voting for west european radical right parties, *West European Politics* 32, pp. 985–1011.

Bakker, Ryan et al. 2014: Chapel hill expert survey, *Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. Retrieved from chesdata. eu.*

Barr, Robert R 2009: Populists, outsiders and anti-establishment politics, *Party Politics* 15, pp. 29–48.

Berezin, Mabel 2013: The normalization of the right in post-security europe, *Politics in the Age of Austerity*, pp. 239–61.

Blais, André 2010: Political participation, *Comparing democracies* 3, pp. 165–83.

Brady, Henry E, Verba, Sidney & Schlozman, Kay Lehman 1995: Beyond ses: A resource model of political participation, *American Political Science Review* 89, pp. 271–94.

Bühlmann, Marc & Freitag, Markus 2006: Individual and contextual determinants of electoral participation, *Swiss Political Science Review* 12, pp. 13–47.

Carter, Elisabeth L 2002: Proportional representation and the fortunes of right-wing extremist parties, *West European Politics* 25, pp. 125–46.

Coffé, Hilde, Heyndels, Bruno & Vermeir, Jan 2007: Fertile grounds for extreme right-wing parties: Explaining the vlaams blok's electoral success, *Electoral Studies* 26, pp. 142–55.

Coppedge, Michael et al. 2017: V-dem dataset v7,

De Vries, Catherine E & Edwards, Erica E 2009: Taking europe to its extremes: Extremist parties and public euroscepticism, *Party Politics* 15, pp. 5–28.

Elff, Martin & Shikano, Susumu 2014: *Paper presented at the the 4th Annual General Conference of the European Political Science Association, Edinburgh.*

ESS Team 2016: European social survey round 8 data (2016). data file edition 1.0., *Norwegian Centre for Research Data, Norway.*

ESS8 2016: European social survey round 8 data, *Data file edition 1.0.NSD -*

Norwegian Centre for Research Data, Norway - Data Archive and distributor of ESS data for ESS ERIC.

Gelman, Andrew & Hill, Jennifer 2007: *Data analysis using regression and multilevel/ hierarchical models*. Cambridge University Press.

Golder, Matt 2003: Explaining variation in the success of extreme right parties in western europe, *Comparative Political Studies* 36, pp. 432–66.

Goodliffe, Gabriel 2012: *The resurgence of the radical right in france: From boulangisme to the front national*. Cambridge University Press.

Hawkins, Kirk A 2010: *Venezuela's chavismo and populism in comparative perspective*. Cambridge University Press.

Hooghe, Liesbet & Marks, Gary 2005: Calculation, community and cues: Public opinion on european integration, *European Union Politics* 6, pp. 419–43.

Ivarsflaten, Elisabeth 2005: The vulnerable populist right parties: No economic realignment fuelling their electoral success, *European Journal of Political Research* 44, pp. 465–92.

Ivarsflaten, Elisabeth 2008: What unites right-wing populists in western europe? Re-examining grievance mobilization models in seven successful cases, *Comparative Political Studies* 41, pp. 3–23.

Jang, Jaewon & Hitchcock, David B 2012: Model-based cluster analysis of democracies., *Journal of Data Science* 10.

Jansen, Robert S 2011: Populist mobilization: A new theoretical approach to populism, *Sociological Theory* 29, pp. 75–96.

Kai, Arzheimer 2008: Protest, neo-liberalism or anti-immigrant sentiment: What motivates the voters of the extreme right in western europe?, *Zeitschrift für vergleichende Politikwissenschaft* 2, pp. 173.

Kaltwasser, Cristóbal Rovira 2014: The responses of populism to dahl's democratic dilemmas, *Political Studies* 62, pp. 470–87.

Kassambara, Alboukadel 2017: *Practical guide to cluster analysis in r: Unsupervised machine learning*. STHDA.

Levistky, Steven & Loxton, James 2012: Populism and competitive authoritarianism: The case of fujimors's peru, *Populism in Europe and the Americas Threat or Corrective for Democracy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge*, pp. 160–82.

Levitsky, Steven & Roberts, Kenneth M 2013: *The resurgence of the latin american left*. JHU Press.

Lubbers, Marcel 2008: Regarding the dutchnee'to the european constitution: A test of the identity, utilitarian and political approaches to votingno', *European Union Politics* 9, pp. 59–86.

Lubbers, Marcel & Scheepers, PLH 2007: Euro-scepticism and extreme voting

patterns in europe: Social cleavages and socio-political attitudes determining voting for the far left, the far right and non-voting,

Lubbers, Marcel, Gijsberts, Mérove & Scheepers, Peer 2002: Extreme right-wing voting in western europe, *European Journal of Political Research* 41, pp. 345–78.

Merkl, Peter H & Weinberg, Leonard 2014: *The revival of right wing extremism in the nineties*. Routledge.

Mudde, Cas 2007: *Populist radical right parties in europe*. Cambridge University Press Cambridge.

Mudde, Cas 2004: The populist zeitgeist, *Government and opposition* 39, pp. 541–63.

Mudde, Cas & Kaltwasser, Cristóbal Rovira 2012: *Populism in europe and the americas: Threat or corrective for democracy?* Cambridge University Press.

Mudde, Cas & Kaltwasser, Cristóbal Rovira 2017: *Populism: A very short introduction*. Oxford University Press.

Pelinka, Anton 2013: Right-wing populism: Concept and typology, *Right-wing populism in Europe: politics and discourse*, pp. 3–22.

Postel, Charles 2007: *The populist vision*. Oxford University Press.

Roberts, Kenneth M 2006: Populism, political conflict, and grass-roots organization in latin america, *Comparative Politics*, pp. 127–48.

Rosenthal, Lawrence & Trost, Christine 2012: *Steep: The precipitous rise of the tea party*. Univ of California Press.

Scrucca, Luca et al. 2016: mclust 5: Clustering, classification and density estimation using Gaussian finite mixture models, *The R Journal* 8, pp. 205–33.

Skocpol, Theda & Williamson, Vanessa 2016: *The tea party and the remaking of republican conservatism*. Oxford University Press.

Steenbergen, Marco R. & Jones, Bradford S. 2002: Modeling multilevel data structures, *AJPS*, pp. 218–37.

Taggart, Paul 2000: Populism. concepts in the social sciences, *Philadelphia: Open*.

Van der Brug, Wouter, Fennema, Meindert & Tillie, Jean 2005: Why some anti-immigrant parties fail and others succeed: A two-step model of aggregate electoral support, *Comparative Political Studies* 38, pp. 537–73.

Werts, Han, Scheepers, Peer & Lubbers, Marcel 2013: Euro-scepticism and radical right-wing voting in europe, 2002–2008: Social cleavages, socio-political attitudes and contextual characteristics determining voting for the radical right, *European Union Politics* 14, pp. 183–205.