

Protection Profile for Mobile Device Management Protection Profile

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National Information Assurance Partnership

Revision History

Version	Date	Comment
1.0	2013-10-21	Initial Release
1.1	2014-02-07	Typographical changes and clarifications to front-matter Separation of MDM Agent SFRs Updated cryptography, protocol, X.509 requirements. Updated management functions to match MDFPPv2.0.
2.0	2014-12-31	Included SSH as a remote administration protocol. Removed IPsec as protocol to communicate to MDM Agent. Added X509 enrollment objective requirement. Added Optional Mobile Application Store requirements. Updates to align with Technical Decisions
3.0	2016-11-21	Added requirements to support BYOD use case Removed IPsec and SSH requirements, which are now contained in EPs Updates to align with Technical Decisions
4.0	2018-09-24	Removed platform dependency Removed TLS SFRs and utilize the TLS Functional Package Allowed for a distributed TOE

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1 Introduction

1.1 Overview

Mobile device management (MDM) products allow enterprises to apply security policies to mobile devices, such as smartphones and tablets. The purpose of these policies is to establish a security posture adequate to permit mobile devices to process enterprise data and connect to enterprise network resources.

This document provides a baseline set of Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) for an **MDM System system**, which is the Target of Evaluation (TOE). The MDM System is only one component of an enterprise deployment of mobile devices. Other components, such as the mobile device platforms, which enforce the security policies, and network access control servers, are out of scope.

1.2 Terms

The following sections list Common Criteria and technology terms used in this document.

1.2.1 Common Criteria Terms

Common Criteria (CC)	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (International Standard ISO/IEC 15408).
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory	Within the context of the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS), an IT security evaluation facility, accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and approved by the NIAP Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based evaluations.
Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM)	Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation.
Module Extended Package (ModuleEP)	An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a specific subset category of products described by a PP , which extends those in a Protection Profile
Protection Profile (PP)	An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a category of products
Protection Profile Module (PP-Module)	An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a TOE type complementary to one or more Base Protection Profiles..
Security Assurance Requirement (SAR)	A requirement for how the TOE's proper implementation of the SFR's is verified by an evaluator.
Security Functional Requirement (SFR)	A requirement for security enforcement by the TOE .
Security Target (ST)	A set of implementation-dependent security requirements for a specific product
Target of Evaluation (TOE)	The product under evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality (TSF)	The security functionality of the product under evaluation
TOE Summary Specification (TSS)	A description of how a TOE satisfies the SFRs in an ST .
TSF Data	Data for the operation of the TSF that is used to enforce its security requirements

1.2.2 Technology Terms

Administrator	The person who is responsible for management activities, including setting the policy that is applied by the enterprise on the mobile device.
Application Programming Interface (API)Application Programming Interface	A specification of routines, data structures, object classes, and variables that allows an application to make use of services provided by another software component, such as a library. API's are often provided for a set of libraries included with the platform.
Critical Security Parameter (CSP)Critical Security Parameter	Security-related information whose disclosure or modification can compromise the security of a cryptographic module and/or authentication system.
Data	Program for application or data files that are stored or transmitted by a server or mobile device MD .
Data Encryption Key (DEK)Data Encryption Key	A key used to encrypt data-at-rest .
Developer Modes	States in which additional services are available to a user in order to provide enhanced system access for debugging of software.
Enrolled State	The state in which a mobile device is managed by a policy from an MDM .
Enterprise Applications	Applications that are provided and managed by the enterprise as opposed to a public application store
Enterprise Data	Any data residing in enterprise servers or temporarily stored on mobile devices to which the mobile device user is allowed access according to the security policy defined by the enterprise and implemented by the administrator.
Enrollment over Secure Transport (EST)Enrollment over Secure	Cryptographic protocol that describes an X.509 certificate management protocol targeting public key infrastructure (PKI) clients that need to acquire client certificates and associated certificate authority (CA) certificates.

Transport

Key Encryption Key (KEK)	A key that is used to encrypt other keys, such as data encryption keys (DEKs) or storage repositories that contain keys.
Locked State	Mobile device state where the device is powered on but most functionality is unavailable for use without authentication.
Mobile Device (MD)	A device which is composed of a hardware platform and its system software. The device typically provides wireless connectivity and may include software for functions like secure messaging, email, web, VPN connection, and VoIP (Voice over IP), for access to the protected enterprise network, enterprise data and applications, and for communicating to other MDs .
Mobile Device Management (MDM)	Products that allow enterprises to apply security policies to MDs . This system consists of two primary components: the MDM Server and the MDM Agent .
Mobile Device User	The person who uses and is held responsible for a mobile device MD .
Operating System (OS)	Software which runs at the highest privilege level and can directly control hardware resources. Modern mobile devices typically have at least two primary operating systems: one which runs on the cellular baseband processor and one which runs on the application processor. The platform of the application processor handles most user interaction and provides the execution environment for apps. The platform of the cellular baseband processor handles communications with the cellular network and may control other peripherals. The term OS , without context, may be assumed to refer to the platform of the application processor.
Powered-Off State	Mobile device shutdown state.
Protected Data	All non-TSF data on the mobile device, including user or enterprise data. Protected data is encrypted while the mobile device is in the powered-off state. This includes keys in software-based storage. May overlap with sensitive data.
Root Encryption Key (REK)	A key tied to a particular device that is used to encrypt all other keys for that device.
Sensitive Data	Data that is encrypted by the mobile device. May include all user or enterprise data or may be data for specific applications such as emails, messaging, documents, calendar items, or contacts. May be protected while the mobile device is in the locked state. Must include at minimum some keys in software-based key storage.
Trust Anchor Database	A list of trusted root Certificate Authority certificates.
Unenrolled State	Mobile device state when it is not managed by an MDM .
Unlocked State	Mobile device state where it is powered on and its functionality is available for use.

1.3 Compliant Targets of Evaluation

The Mobile Device Management (MDM) system consists of two primary components: the [MDM Server](#) software and the [MDM Agent](#). Optionally, the [MDM](#) system may consist of a separate Mobile Application Store (MAS) server.

1.3.1 TOE Boundary

The [MDM](#) system operational environment consists of the mobile device on which the [MDM Agent](#) resides, the platform on which the [MDM Server](#) runs, and an untrusted wireless network over which they communicate, as pictured below.



Figure 1: MDM System Operating Environment

The [MDM Server](#) is software (an application, service, etc.) on a general-purpose platform or on a network device, or cloud architecture executing in a trusted network environment. The [MDM Server](#) provides administration of the mobile device policies and reporting on mobile device behavior. The [MDM Server](#) is responsible for managing device enrollment, configuring and sending policies to the [MDM Agents](#), collecting reports on device status, and sending commands to the Agents. The platform on which the [MDM Server](#) software runs is either a general purpose platform, a network device, or a cloud environment. The [MDM Server](#) may be standalone or distributed, where a distributed [TOE](#) is one that requires multiple distinct components to operate as a logical whole in order to fulfill the requirements of this PP (a more extensive description of distributed [MDMs](#) is given in section 3).

The [MDM Agent](#) establishes a secure connection back to the [MDM Server](#) controlled by an enterprise administrator and

configures the mobile device per the administrator's policies. The MDM Agent is addressed in the PP-Module for MDM Agents. If the MDM Agent is installed on a mobile device as an application developed by the MDM developer, the PP-Module extends this PP and is included in the TOE. In this case, the TOE security functionality specified in this PP must be addressed by the MDM Agent in addition to the MDM Server. Otherwise, the MDM Agent is provided by the mobile device vendor and is out of scope of this PP; however, MDMs are required to indicate the mobile platforms supported by the MDM Server and must be tested against the native MDM agent of those platforms.

The **Mobile Application Store (MAS)** hosts applications for the enterprise, authenticates Agents, and securely transmits applications to enrolled mobile devices. The MAS functionality can be included as part of the MDM Server Software or can be logically distinct. If the MAS functionality is on a physically separate server, then the TOE is distributed with the MDM Server and MAS Server being separate components.

1.4 Use Cases

This PP defines 4 four use cases:

[USE CASE 1] Enterprise-owned device for general-purpose enterprise use

An Enterprise-owned device for general-purpose business use is commonly called Corporately Owned, Personally Enabled (COPE). This use case entails a significant degree of Enterprise control over configuration and software inventory. Enterprise administrators use an MDM product to establish policies on the mobile devices prior to user issuance. Users may use Internet connectivity to browse the web or, access corporate mail, or run Enterprise applications, but this connectivity may be under significant control of the Enterprise. The user may also be expected to store data and use applications for personal, non-enterprise use. The Enterprise administrator uses the MDM product to deploy security policies and query mobile device status. The MDM may issue commands for remediation actions.

[USE CASE 2] Enterprise-owned device for specialized, high-security use

An Enterprise-owned device with intentionally limited network connectivity, tightly controlled configuration, and limited software inventory is appropriate for specialized, high-security use cases. As in the previous use case, the MDM product is used to establish such policies on mobile devices prior to issuance to users. The device may not be permitted connectivity to any external peripherals. It may only be able to communicate via its Wi-Fi or cellular radios with the Enterprise-run network, which may not even permit connectivity to the Internet. Use of the device may require compliance with usage policies that are more restrictive than those in any general-purpose use case, yet may mitigate risks to highly sensitive information. Based upon the operation environment and the acceptable risk level of the enterprise, those security functional requirements outlined in Section 5 of this Protection Profile PP along with the selections in the Use Case 2 template defined in Appendix E-G are sufficient for the high-security use case.

[USE CASE 3] Personally-owned device for personal and enterprise use

A personally owned device which is used for both personal activities and enterprise data is commonly called Bring Your Own Device (BYOD). The device may be provisioned for access to enterprise resources after significant personal usage has occurred. Unlike in the enterprise-owned cases, the enterprise is limited in what security policies it can enforce because the user purchased the device primarily for personal use and is unlikely to accept policies that limit the functionality of the device.

However, because the Enterprise allows the user full (or nearly full) access to the Enterprise network, the Enterprise will require certain security policies, for example a password or screen lock policy, and health reporting, such as the integrity of the mobile device system software, before allowing access. The administrator of the MDM can establish remediation actions, such as wipe of the Enterprise data, for non-compliant devices. These controls could potentially be enforced by a separation mechanism built-in to the device itself to distinguish between enterprise and personal activities, or by a third-party application that provides access to enterprise resources and leverages security capabilities provided by the mobile device. Based upon the operational environment and the acceptable risk level of the enterprise, those security functional requirements outlined in Section 5 of this Protection Profile PP along with the selections in the Use Case 3 template defined in Appendix E-G are sufficient for the secure implementation of this BYOD use case.

[USE CASE 4] Personally owned device for personal and limited enterprise use

A personally owned device may also be given access to limited enterprise services such as enterprise email. Because the enterprise may not need to enforce any security policies on this device because the user does not have full access to the enterprise or enterprise data, the enterprise may not need to enforce any security policies on the device. However, the enterprise may want secure email and web browsing with assurance that the services being provided to those clients by the Mobile Device are not compromised. Based upon the operational environment and the acceptable risk level of the enterprise, those security functional requirements outlined in Section 5 of this PP are sufficient for the secure implementation of this BYOD use case.

2 Conformance Claims

Conformance Statement

To be conformant An Security Target (ST) must claim exact conformance to this PP, an ST must demonstrate Exact Conformance, a subset of Strict Conformance as defined in [CC] Part 1 (ASE_GCL). The ST must include all components in this PP that are:

- unconditional (which are always required)
- selection-based (which are required when certain selections are chosen in the unconditional requirements)

and may include components that are

- optional or
- objective.

Unconditional requirements are found in the main body of the document, while the selection-based, optional, and objective requirements are contained in respective sections in the appendix. The ST may iterate any of these components, but it must not include any additional component (e.g. from [CC] Part 2 or 3 or a PP not conformant with this one, or extended by the ST) not defined in this PP or a PP conformant to this one.

CC Conformance Claims

the CC and CEM addenda for Exact Conformance, Selection-Based SFRs, and Optional SFRs (dated May 2017).

This PP is conformant to Parts 2 (extended) and 3 (extended conformant) of Common Criteria Version 3.1, Revision Release 5. [CC].

PP Claim

This PP does not claim conformance to any other Protection Profile PP.

Package Claim

This PP does not claim conformance to any package.

3

This PP is TLS Package Version 1.1 Conformant.

The following PPs and PP-Modules are allowed to be specified in a PP-Configuration with this PP.


- PP-Module for MDM Agent, Version 1.0
- PP-Module for VPN Client, Version 2.1
- Protection Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 3.1
- Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.3

3 Introduction to Distributed TOEs

This PP includes support for distributed MDM TOEs. MDM's can sometimes be composed of multiple components operating as a logical whole. Oftentimes Frequently we see this architecture when dealing with products hosted in the cloud and offered as Software as a Service. There are a number of different architectures; but fundamentally, they are variations of the following model where the SFR's of this PP can only be fulfilled if the components are deployed and operate together To be considered a distributed TOE, a minimum of 2 two interconnected components are required.

3.1 Registration of components of a distributed TOE


When dealing with a distributed TOE, a number of separate components need to be brought together in the operational environment in order to create the TOE: this This requires that trusted communications channels are set up between certain pairs of components (it is assumed that all components need to communicate with at least one other component, but not that all components need to communicate with all other components). The underlying model for creation of the TOE is to have a "registration process" in which components "join" the TOE. The registration process starts with two components, one of which (the "joiner") is about to join an existing TOE by registering with the other (the "gatekeeper"). The two components will use one or more specified authentication and communication channel options so that the components authenticate each other and protect any sensitive data that is transmitted during the registration process (e.g. a key might be sent by a gatekeeper to the joiner as a result of the registration). The following figures illustrate the three supported registration models. The figure illustrates a distributed TOE registration approach which uses an instance of FPT_ITT.1(1)/FPT_ITT.1(2) or FTP_ITC.1(1) to protect the registration exchange



- 1) Registration may be performed over any untrusted network
- 2) Registration performed over IPsec, TLS, SSH, or HTTPS channel
- 3) Choose FPT_ITT.1(1) if certificate revocation checking is not performed
- 4) Choose FPT_ITT.1(2) if registration is between the TSF and an MDM agent that is included in the TOE
- 5) Choose FTP_ITC.1 if certificate revocation checking is performed
- 6) Registration channel may be re-used for internal TSF communications

Figure 2: Distributed TOE registration using channel satisfying FPT_ITT.1(1)/FPT_ITT.1(2) or FTP_ITC.1(1)

The second approach (Figure 3) utilises uses an alternative registration channel and supports use cases where the channel relies on environmental security constraints to provide the necessary protection of the registration exchange.



- 1) Registration channel must be authenticated, provide integrity protection and optionally confidentiality
- 2) Registration channel relies on environmental constraints for some aspects of its protection, or to increase strength of protection, e.g. direct physical connection between Joiner and Gatekeeper (FTP_TRP.1(3))
- 3) Registration channel must not be re-used and must be replaced after registration is complete with an internal TSF channel that satisfies either FPT_ITT.1(1)/FPT_ITT.1(2) or FTP_ITC.1

Figure 3: Distributed TOE registration using channel satisfying FTP_TRP.1(3)

The final approach (Figure 4) supports use cases where registration is performed manually through direct configuration of both the Joiner and Gatekeeper devices. Once configured, the two components establish an internal TSF channel that satisfies FPT_ITT.1(1)/FPT_ITT.1(2) or FTP_ITC.1(1).



- 1) Joiner and Gatekeeper are manually pre-configured with information necessary to build inter-TOE communications channel
- 2) Once configured, Joiner and Gatekeeper establish internal TSF channel that satisfies either FPT_ITT.1(1)/FPT_ITT.1(2) or FTP_ITC.1

Figure 4: Distributed TOE registration without a registration channel

In each case, during the registration process, the ~~Security Administrator~~ administrator must positively enable the joining components before it can act as part of the TSF. The following figure Figure 5 illustrates the approaches that this enablement step may take;




Figure 5: Joiner enablement options for Distributed TOE's

Note that in the case where no registration channel is required, that is the joiner and gatekeeper are directly configured (Figure 4), enablement is implied as part of this direct configuration process.

After registration the components will communicate between themselves using a normal SSH/TLS/DTLS/IPsec/HTTPS channel (which is specified in an [ST](#) as an instance of [FPT_ITT.1\(1\)/FPT_ITT.1\(2\)](#) or [FTP_ITC.1\(1\)](#) in terms of [Section 6](#) and [Appendix A](#)). This channel for intercomponent communications is specified at the top level with the new (extended) [SFR FCO_CPC_EXT.1](#) and is in addition to the other communication channels required for communication with entities outside the [TOE](#) (which are specified in an [ST](#) as instances of [FTP_ITC.1\(1\)](#) and [FTP_TRP.1\(1\)](#)).

3.2 Allocation of requirements in distributed TOEs

For a distributed [TOE](#), the security functional requirements in this [PP](#) need to be met by the [TOE](#) as a whole, but not all [SFR](#)'s will necessarily be implemented by all components. The following categories are defined in order to specify when each [SFR](#) must be implemented by a component:

- **All Components ("All")** - All components that comprise the distributed [TOE](#) must independently satisfy the requirement
- **At least one Component ("One")** - This requirement must be fulfilled by at least one component within the distributed [TOE](#).
- **Feature Dependent ("Feature Dependent")** - These requirements will only be fulfilled where the feature is implemented by the distributed [TOE](#) component (note that the requirement to meet the [PP](#) as a whole requires that at least one component implements these requirements if they are specified in [Section 6 Security Requirements](#)).

[Table 1](#) specifies how each of the [SFR](#)'s in this [PP](#) must be met, using the categories above.

Table 1: Security Functional Requirements for Distributed TOEs

Requirement	Description	Distributed TOE SFR Allocation
FAU_ALT_EXT.1	Server Alerts	One
FAU_CRP_EXT.1	Support for Compliance Reporting of Mobile Device Configuration	One
FAU_GEN.1(1)	Audit Data Generation	All
FAU_GEN.1(2)	Audit Data Generation	Feature Dependent
FAU_NET_EXT.1	Network Reachability Review	One
FAU_SAR.1	Audit Review	Feature Dependent
FAU_SEL.1	Security Audit Event Selection	One
FAU_STG_EXT.1	External Trail Storage	All
FAU_STG_EXT.2	Audit Event Storage	Feature Dependent
FCO_CPC_EXT.1	Communication Partner Control	All
FCS_CKM.1	Cryptographic Key Generation	Feature Dependent
FCS_CKM.2	Cryptographic Key Establishment	All
FCS_CKM_EXT.4	Cryptographic Key Destruction	All
FCS_COP.1.1(1)	Cryptographic Operation (Confidentiality Algorithms)	All
FCS_COP.1.1(2)	Cryptographic Operation (Hashing Algorithms)	All
FCS_COP.1.1(3)	Cryptographic Operation (Signature Algorithms)	All

FCS_COP.1.1(4)	Cryptographic Operation (Keyed-Hash Message Authentication)	All
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1	HTTPS Protocol	Feature Dependent
FCS_IV_EXT.1	Initialization Vector Generation	Feature Dependent
FCS_RBG_EXT.1	Random Bit Generation	All
FCS_STG_EXT.1	Cryptographic Key Storage	All
FCS_STG_EXT.2	Encrypted Cryptographic Key Storage	Feature Dependent
FIA_ENR_EXT.1	Enrollment of Mobile Device into Management	One
FIA_UAU.1	Timing of Authentication	One
FIA_UAU_EXT.4(1)	User Authentication	One
FIA_UAU_EXT.4(2)	User Authentication	One
FIA_X509_EXT.1(1)	X.509 Certification Validation	Feature Dependent
FIA_X509_EXT.1(2)	X.509 Certification Validation	Feature Dependent
FIA_X509_EXT.2	X.509 Certificate Authentication	Feature Dependent
FIA_X509_EXT.3	X.509 -X.509 Enrollment	Feature Dependent
FIA_X509_EXT.4	Alternate X.509 -X.509 Enrollment	Feature Dependent
FIA_X509_EXT.5	X.509 Unique Certificate	One
FMT_MOF.1(1)	Management of functions behaviour	Feature Dependent
FMT_MOF.1(2)	Management of functions behaviour (Enrollment)	Feature Dependent
FMT_MOF.1(43)	Management of Functions in (MAS Server Downloads)	Feature Dependent
FMT_POL_EXT.1	Trusted Policy Update	One
FMT_SAE_EXT.1	Security Attribute Expiration	One
FMT_SMF.1(1)	Specification of Management Functions (Server configuration of Agent)	One
FMT_SMF.1(2)	Specification of Management Functions (Server Configuration configuration of Server)	Feature Dependent
FMT_SMF.1(3)	Specification of Management Functions (MAS Server)	Feature Dependent
FMT_SMR.1(1)	Security Management Roles	One
FMT_SMR.1(2)	Security Management Roles	Feature Dependent
FPT_API_EXT.1.1	Use of Supported Services and API's	All
FPT_ITT.1(1)	Internal TOE TSF Data Transfer	Feature Dependent
FPT_ITT.1(2)	Internal TOE TSF Data Transfer (To MDM Agent)	Feature Dependent
FPT_LIB_EXT.1.1	Use of Third Party Libraries	All
FPT_TST_EXT.1	Functionality Testing	All (except for MDM Agent components)
FPT_TUD_EXT.1	Trusted Update	All
FTA_TAB.1	Default TOE Access Banners	One
FTP_ITC.1(1)	Inter-TSF Trusted Channel (Authorized IT Entities)	One
FTP_ITC.1(2)	Inter-TSF Trusted Channel (MDM Agent)	One
FTP_ITC_EXT.1	Trusted Channel	One
FTP_TRP.1(1)	Trusted Path for Remote Administration	Feature Dependent
FTP_TRP.1(2)	Trusted Path for Enrollment	Feature Dependent
FTP_TRP.1(3)	Trusted Path for Joining	Feature Dependent

Only those [SFRs](#) included in the [ST](#) are required to be audited. The [ST](#) for a distributed [TOE](#) must include a mapping of [SFRs](#) to each of the components of the [TOE](#). (Note that this deliverable is examined as part of the ASE_TSS.1 and AVA_VAN.1 Evaluation Activities.) The [ST](#) for a distributed [TOE](#) may also introduce a "minimum configuration" and identify components that may have instances added to an operational configuration without affecting the validity of the [CC](#) certification. Appendix E describes Evaluation Activities relating to these equivalency aspects of a distributed [TOE](#) (and hence what is expected in the [ST](#)).

4 Security Problem Description

4.1 Threats

T.MALICIOUS_APPS

Malicious or flawed application threats exist because apps loaded onto a mobile device may include malicious or exploitable code. An administrator of the [MDM](#) or mobile device user may inadvertently import malicious code, or an attacker may insert malicious code into the [TOE](#), resulting in the compromise of [TOE](#) or [TOE](#) data.

T.NETWORK_ATTACK

An attacker may masquerade as an [MDM](#) Server and attempt to compromise the integrity of the mobile device by sending malicious management commands.

T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP

An attacker is positioned on a communications channel or elsewhere on the network infrastructure. Attackers may monitor and gain access to data exchanged between the [MDM](#) Server and other endpoints.

T.PHYSICAL_ACCESS

The mobile device may be lost or stolen, and an unauthorized individual may attempt to access user data. Although these attacks are primarily directed against the mobile device platform, the [TOE](#) configures features, which address these threats

4.2 Assumptions

A.COMPONENTS_RUNNING (applies to distributed TOEs only)

For distributed [TOE](#)s it is assumed that the availability of all [TOE](#) components is checked as appropriate to reduce the risk of an undetected attack on (or failure of) one or more [TOE](#) components. It is also assumed that in addition to the availability of all components it is also checked as appropriate that the audit functionality is running properly on all [TOE](#) components.

A.CONNECTIVITY

The [TOE](#) relies on network connectivity to carry out its management activities. The [TOE](#) will robustly handle instances when connectivity is unavailable or unreliable.

A.MDM_SERVER_PLATFORM

The [MDM](#) Server relies upon a trustworthy platform and local network from which it provides administrative capabilities.

The [MDM](#) server relies on this platform to provide a range of security-related services including reliable timestamps, user and group account management, logon and logout services via a local or network directory service, remote access control, and audit log management services to include offloading of audit logs to other servers. The platform is expected to be configured specifically to provide [MDM](#) services, employing features such as a host-based firewall, which limits its network role to providing [MDM](#) functionality.

A.PROPER_ADMIN

One or more competent, trusted personnel who are not careless, willfully negligent, or hostile, are assigned and authorized as the [TOE](#) Administrators, and do so using and abiding by guidance documentation.

A.PROPER_USER

Mobile device users are not willfully negligent or hostile, and use the device within compliance of a reasonable Enterprise security policy.

4.3 Organizational Security Policies

P.ACCOUNTABILITY

Personnel operating the [TOE](#) shall be accountable for their actions within the [TOE](#).

P.ADMIN

The configuration of the mobile device security functions must adhere to the Enterprise security policy.

P.DEVICE_ENROLL

A mobile device must be enrolled for a specific user by the administrator of the [MDM](#) prior to being used in the Enterprise network by the user.

P.NOTIFY

The mobile user must immediately notify the administrator if a mobile device is lost or stolen so that the administrator may apply remediation actions via the [MDM](#) system.

5 Security Objectives

5.1 Security Objectives for the TOE

O.ACCOUNTABILITY

The [TOE](#) must provide logging facilities which record management actions undertaken by its administrators.

Addressed by: [FAU_ALT_EXT.1](#), [FAU_GEN.1\(1\)](#), [FAU_GEN.1\(2\)](#), [FAU_NET_EXT.1](#), [FAU_SAR.1](#), [FAU_SEL.1](#), [FAU_STG_EXT.1](#), [FAU_STG_EXT.2](#)

O.APPLY_POLICY

The [TOE](#) must facilitate configuration and enforcement of enterprise security policies on mobile devices via interaction with the mobile [OS](#) and the [MDM](#) Server. This will include the initial enrollment of the device into management through its entire lifecycle, including policy updates and its possible unenrollment from management services.

Addressed by: [FAU_FIA_ALT_ENR_EXT.1](#), [FAUFMT_GEN.1\(1\)](#), [FAU_NET_EXT.1](#), [FAU_SAR_FMT_MOF.1\(2\)](#), [FMT_MOF.1\(3\)](#), [FMT_SAE_EXT.1](#), [FAUFMT_SEL_SMF.1\(1\)](#), [FAUFMT_STG_EXT_SMF.1\(2\)](#), [FAUFMT_STG_EXT.2_SMF.1\(3\)](#)

O.DATA_PROTECTION_TRANSIT

Data exchanged between the [MDM](#) Server and the [MDM](#) Agent must be protected from being monitored, accessed, or altered.

Addressed by: [FAU_STG_EXT.1](#), [FCS_CKM_EXT.4](#), [FCS_CKM.1](#), [FCS_CKM.2](#), [FCS_COP.1\(*1\)](#), [FCS_DTLSS_EXT_COP.1\(TLS Package 2\)](#), [FCS_DTLSC_EXT_COP.1\(TLS Package 3\)](#), [FCS_HTTPS_EXT_COP.1\(4\)](#), [FCS_IPSEC_HTTPS_EXT.1](#), [FCS_IV_EXT.1](#), [FCS_RBG_EXT.1](#), [FCS_SSHS_STG_EXT.1](#), [FCS_STG_EXT.4](#), [FCS_FIA_STGX509_EXT.2](#), [FCS_TLSC1\(1\)](#), [FIA_X509_EXT.1\(TLS Package 2\)](#), [FCS_FIA_TLSCX509_EXT.2\(TLS Package\)](#), [FCS_FIA_TLSSX509_EXT.1\(TLS Package\)](#), [FCS_TLSS3](#), [FIA_X509_EXT.2\(TLS Package 4\)](#), [FIA_X509_EXT.5](#), [FPT_ITT.1\(*1\)](#), [FIA_FPT_X509_EXT_ITT.1\(2\)](#), [FIA_FPT_X509_ITC_EXT.3](#), [FIA_X509_EXT.4](#), [FPT_ITT.1](#), [FPT_ITC.1\(*1\)](#), [FPT_ITC.1\(1\)](#), [FPT_ITC.1\(2\)](#), [FPT_TRP.1\(1\)](#), [FPT_TRP.1\(2\)](#), [FPT_TRP.1\(*3\)](#)

O.INTEGRITY

The [TOE](#) will provide the capability to perform self-tests to ensure the integrity of critical functionality, software, firmware, and data has been maintained. The [TOE](#) will also provide a means to verify the integrity of downloaded updates.

Addressed by: [FIA_X509_EXT.2](#), [FCO_CPC_EXT.1](#), [FPT_TST_EXT.1](#), [FPT_TUD_EXT.1](#)

O.MANAGEMENT

The [TOE](#) provides access controls around its management functionality.

Addressed by: [FAU_CRP_EXT.1](#), [FIA_ENR_EXT.1](#), [FIA_UAU.1](#), [FIA_UAU_EXT.4\(1\)](#), [FIA_UAU_EXT.4\(2\)](#), [FMT_MOF.1\(1\)](#),

[FMT_MOF.1\(2\)](#), [FMT_MOF.1\(3\)](#), [FMT_POL_EXT.1](#), [FMT_SMF.1\(1\)](#)
~~O.Quality~~
[FMT_SMF.1\(2\)](#), [FMT_SMF.1\(3\)](#), [FMT_SMR.1\(1\)](#), [FMT_SMR.1\(2\)](#), [FTA_TAB.1](#)
O.QUALITY

To ensure quality of implementation, conformant [TOEs](#) leverage services and [APIs](#) provided by the runtime environment rather than implementing their own versions of these services and APIs. This is especially important for cryptographic services and other complex operations such as file and media parsing. Leveraging this platform behavior relies upon using only documented and supported APIs.

Addressed by: [FPT_API_EXT.1](#), [FPT_LIB_EXT.1](#)

5.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment

- OE.COMPONENTS_RUNNING
For distributed [TOEs](#) the ~~Administrator~~ administrator ensures that the availability of every [TOE](#) component is checked as appropriate to reduce the risk of an undetected attack on (or failure of) one or more [TOE](#) components. The ~~Administrator~~ administrator also ensures that it is checked as appropriate for every [TOE](#) component that the audit functionality is running properly.
- OE.PROPER_ADMIN
[TOE](#) Administrators are trusted to follow and apply all administrator guidance in a trusted manner
- OE.PROPER_USER
Users of the mobile device are trained to securely use the mobile device and apply all guidance in a trusted manner.
- OE.IT_ENTERPRISE
The ~~Enterprise~~ enterprise IT infrastructure provides security for a network that is available to the [TOE](#) and mobile devices that prevents unauthorized access.
- OE.MOBILE_DEVICE_PLATFORM
The [MDM](#) Agent relies upon the trustworthy mobile platform and hardware to provide policy enforcement as well as cryptographic services and data protection. The mobile platform provides trusted updates and software integrity verification of the [MDM](#) Agent.
- ~~OE~~.TIMESTAMP
Reliable timestamp is provided by the operational environment for the [TOE](#).
- OE.WIRELESS_NETWORK
A wireless network will be available to the mobile devices.

5.3 Security Objectives Rationale

This section describes how the assumptions, threats, and organization security policies map to the security objectives.		
Threat, Assumption, or OSP	Security Objectives	Rationale
T.MALICIOUS_APPS	O.APPLY_POLICY, O.INTEGRITY	<p>The threat T.MALICIOUS_APPS is countered by O.APPLY_POLICY and O.INTEGRITY as this provides the capability to limit the ability to install applications on the MD.</p> <p>The threat T.MALICIOUS_APPS is countered by O.INTEGRITY as this provides the capability to perform self-tests to ensure the integrity of critical functionality, software/firmware and data has been maintained.</p>
T.NETWORK_ATTACK	O.DATA_PROTECTION_TRANSIT	<p>The threat T.NETWORK_ATTACK is countered by O.DATA_PROTECTION_TRANSIT as this provides authentication of the endpoints of a trusted communication path.</p> <p>The threat T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP is countered by O.DATA_PROTECTION_TRANSIT as this provides the capability to communicate using one (or more) standard protocols as a means to maintain the confidentiality of data that are transmitted outside and within the TOE.</p>
T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP	O.DATA_PROTECTION_TRANSIT, O.QUALITY	<p>The threat T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP is countered by O.QUALITY as this provides the capability to invoke platform resources to ensure quality of implementation.</p>
T.PHYSICAL_ACCESS	O.APPLY_POLICY	<p>The threat T.PHYSICAL_ACCESS is countered by O.APPLY_POLICY as this provides the capability to configure and apply security policies to ensure the Mobile Device can protect user and enterprise data that it may store or process.</p>
A.COMPONENTS_RUNNING (applies to distributed TOEs only)	OE.COMPONENTS_RUNNING	<p>The operational environment objective OE.COMPONENTS_RUNNING is realized through A.COMPONENTS_RUNNING.</p>
A.CONNECTIVITY	OE.WIRELESS_NETWORK	<p>The operational environment objective OE.WIRELESS_NETWORK is realized through</p>

A.MDM_SERVER_PLATFORM	OE.MOBILE_DEVICE_PLATFORM	Timestamp	A.CONNECTIVITY. The operational environment objective OE.MOBILE_DEVICE_PLATFORM Timestamp is realized through A.MOBILEMDM_DEVICE_SERVER_PLATFORM.
A.PROPER_ADMIN	OE.PROPER_ADMIN		The operational environment objective OE.PROPER_ADMIN is realized through A.PROPER_ADMIN.
A.PROPER_USER	OE.PROPER_USER		The operational environment objective OE.PROPER_USER is realized through A.PROPER_USER.
P.ACCOUNTABILITY	O.ACCOUNTABILITY		The organizational security policy O.ACCOUNTABILITY is realized through P.ACCOUNTABILITY.
P.ADMIN	OE.PROPER_ADMIN		The organizational security policy P.ADMIN is realized through OE.PROPER_ADMIN.
P.DEVICE_ENROLL	OE.IT_ENTERPRISE		The organizational security policy P.DEVICE_ENROLL is realized through OE.IT_ENTERPRISE.
P.NOTIFY	OE.PROPER_USER		The organizational security policy P.NOTIFY is realized through OE.PROPER_USER.

6 Security Requirements

This chapter describes the security requirements which have to be fulfilled by the TOE. Those requirements comprise functional components from Part 2 and assurance components from Part 3 of [CC]. The following notations are used:

- **Refinement** operation (denoted by **bold text**): is used to add details to a requirement, and thus further restricts a requirement.
- **Selection** (denoted by *italicized text*): is used to select one or more options provided by the [CC] in stating a requirement
- **Assignment** operation (denoted by *italicized text*): is used to assign a specific value to an unspecified parameter, such as the length of a password. Showing the value in square brackets indicates assignment
- **Iteration** operation: are identified with a number inside parentheses (e.g. "(1)")
- **Extended SFRs**: are identified by having an "EXT" label after the SFR name

The ~~Security Functional Requirements~~ **SFRs** included in this section are derived from Part 2 of the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 5, with additional extended functional components.

For a distributed **TOE**, the **ST** author should reference [Table 1](#) for guidance on how each **SFR** should be met. The table details whether **SFRs** should be met by all **TOE** components, by at least one **TOE** component or whether they are dependent upon the feature being implemented by the **TOE** component. The **ST** for a distributed **TOE** must include a mapping of **SFRs** to each of the components of the **TOE**. (Note that this deliverable is examined as part of the ASE_TSS.1 and AVA_VAN.1 Evaluation Activities.)

6.1 Test Environment for ~~Assurance~~ Evaluation Activities

As described in the ~~assurance evaluation~~ activities below, the **ST** for an **MDM** system is required to list all the supported **MDM** Agents ~~and MD~~ platforms with which an **MDM** Server operates. The identified ~~assurance evaluation~~ activities for testing that includes the use of an Agent should be completed for each **MDM** Agent ~~and~~ platform listed in the **ST**.

The evaluator's activities for testing that include use of an Agent will ensure that the Server interacts appropriately with the Agent (i.e. sends a policy update to the Agent), but will not ensure that the Agent handles the received data correctly (i.e. appropriately applies the policy to the device), as that is accounted for in the ~~Assurance Evaluation~~ Activities in the Mobile Device Fundamentals **PP** or the **PP-Module** for Mobile Device Management Agents.

6.2 TOE Security Functional Requirements

6.2.1 Security Audit (FAU)

FAU_ALT_EXT.1 Server Alerts

FAU_ALT_EXT.1.1

The **TSF** shall alert the administrators in the event of any of the following:

- ~~change~~ **Change** in enrollment status
- ~~failure~~ **Failure** to apply policies to a mobile device
- [selection: [assignment: other Other events], no other events]**

Application Note: An alert can be defined as any form of providing straightaway notice to the administrator. An alert is different from an audit record, however the fact that an alert was sent should be audited per FAU_GEN.1. Email, pop-up notifications, or other methods are acceptable forms of alerts.

The **MDM** Agent is required to report to the **MDM** Server on successful application of policies on a managed mobile device, and

failures can be inferred from the absence of such alerts. This requirement is intended to ensure that the [MDM](#) Server notifies administrators when policies are not properly installed. Failure to properly install policy updates does not affect the enrollment status of the mobile device.

Evaluation Activity

TSS

The evaluator shall examine the [TSS](#) and verify that it describes how the alert system is implemented. The evaluator shall also verify that a description of each assigned event is provided in the [TSS](#).

Guidance

The evaluator shall examine the guidance document and verify that it describes how the alerts can be configured, if configurable.

Tests

For each [MDM](#) Agent/platform listed as supported in the [ST](#):

- **Test 1:** The evaluator shall enroll a device and ensure that the [MDM](#) server alerts the administrator of the change in enrollment status. The evaluator shall unenroll (retire) a device and ensure that the [MDM](#) server alerts the administrator of the change in enrollment status.
- **Test 2:** The evaluator shall configure policies, which the [MDM](#) agent should not be able to apply. These policies shall include:
 - a setting which is configurable on the [MDM](#) Server interface but not supported by the platform on which the [MDM](#) Agent runs, if any such settings exist
 - a valid configuration setting with an invalid parameter, which may require manual modification of the policy prior to transmission to the deviceThe evaluator shall deploy such policies and verify that the [MDM](#) server alerts the administrator about the failed application of the policy.
- **Test 3:** (Conditional) The evaluator shall trigger each of the events listed and ensure that the [MDM](#) Server alerts the administrator.

FAU_GEN.1(1) Audit Data Generation

FAU_GEN.1.1(1)

Refinement: The TSF shall [selection: invoke platform-provided functionality, implement functionality] to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:

- a. Start - up and shutdown-shut down of the [MDM](#) System
- b. All administrative actions
- c. [selection: Commands issued to the [MDM](#) Agent, none]
- d. Specifically defined auditable events listed in [Table 2](#)
- e. [selection: [assignment: other events], no other events].

Application Note: This requirement outlines the events for which an audit record shall must be generated by either the [MDM](#) System or the [MDM](#) Server platform. Each of these audit records may be written by the [MDM](#) System or may be dispatched to the operating system on which it runs. It is acceptable to select both "invoke platform-provided functionality" and "implement functionality." It should be specified which auditable events are completed by the [MDM](#) System and which are completed by the [MDM](#) platform.

The [ST](#) author can include other auditable events in the assignment; they are not limited to the list presented. All audits must contain at least the information mentioned in [FAU_GEN.1.2\(1\)](#), but may contain more information which can be assigned.

For distributed [TOEs](#) each component must generate an audit record for each of the [SFRs](#) that it implements. If more than one [TOE](#) component is involved when an audit event is triggered, the event has to be audited on each component (e.g. rejection of a connection by one component while attempting to establish a secure communication channel between two components should result in an audit event being generated by both components). This is not limited to error cases but also includes events about successful actions like successful build up/tear down of a secure communication channel between [TOE](#) components.

Item a above requires the auditing of the start-up and shutdown of the given component of the [MDM](#) System. If the [TOE](#) is distributed, this applies to all components. If the [TOE](#) is not distributed then [MDM](#) System is equivalent to [MDM](#) Server.

Item b above requires all administrative actions to be auditable. Administrative actions refer to any management functions specified by [FMT_MOF.1\(1\)](#). Thus no additional specification for the audibility of these actions is specified in [Table 2](#) aside from those that require additional record content. If the [TOE](#) is distributed and the given component does not deal with setting the policy applied to the [MDM](#) Agent, it is acceptable to not have any administrative actions to audit.

Item c includes those commands, which may be performed automatically based on triggers or on a schedule. If the [TOE](#) component, if distributed, interacts directly with the [MDM](#) Agent, then "Commands issued to an [MDM](#) Agent" shall must be selected. If the [TOE](#) component, if distributed, does not interact directly with the [MDM](#) Agent, then it is acceptable to select "none".

Depending on the specific requirements selected by the [ST](#) author from Security Functional Requirements, Optional Requirements, Selection-Based Requirements, and Objective Requirements, the [ST](#) author should include the appropriate auditable event from [Table 2](#) in the [ST](#) for the requirements selected.

Evaluation Activity

TSS

The evaluator shall check the [TSS](#) and ensure that it lists all of the auditable events. The evaluator shall check to make sure that every audit event type mandated by the [PP](#) is described in the [TSS](#). The evaluator shall verify that for every audit event described in the [TSS](#), the description indicates where the audit event is generated (TSF, [TOE](#) platform).

If "invoke platform-provided functionality" is selected, the evaluator shall examine the [TSS](#) of the [MDM Server's ST](#) to verify that it describes (for each supported platform) how this functionality is invoked (it should be noted that this may be through a mechanism that is not implemented by the [MDM Server](#); nonetheless, that mechanism will be identified in the [TSS](#) as part of this evaluation activity).

Guidance

The evaluator shall check the administrative guide and ensure that it lists all of the auditable events. The evaluator shall check to make sure that every audit event type mandated by the [PP](#) is described.

The evaluator shall also make a determination of the administrative actions that are relevant in the context of this [PP](#) including those listed in the Management section. The evaluator shall examine the administrative guide and make a determination of which administrative commands are related to the configuration (including enabling or disabling) of the mechanisms implemented in the [TOE](#) that are necessary to enforce the requirements specified in the [PP](#). The evaluator shall document the methodology or approach taken while determining which actions in the administrative guide are security relevant with respect to this [PP](#). The evaluator may perform this activity as part of the activities associated with ensuring the AGD_OPE guidance satisfies the requirements.

Tests

The evaluator shall test the [TOE's](#) ability to correctly generate audit records by having the [TOE](#) generate audit records for the events listed in the provided table and administrative actions. This should include all instances of an event. The evaluator shall test that audit records are generated for the establishment and termination of a channel for each of the cryptographic protocols contained in the [ST](#). For administrative actions, the evaluator shall test that each action determined by the evaluator above to be security relevant in the context of this [PP](#) is auditable.

Note that the testing here can be accomplished in conjunction with the testing of the security mechanisms directly. For example, testing performed to ensure that the administrative guidance provided is correct verifies that AGD_OPE.1 is satisfied and should address the invocation of the administrative actions that are needed to verify the audit records are generated as expected.

[FAU_GEN.1.2\(1\)](#)

The TSF shall record within each [TSF](#) audit record at least the following information:

- date and time of the event;
- type of event;
- subject identity;
- (if relevant) the outcome (success or failure) of the event;
- additional information in [Table 2](#);
- [assignment: other audit relevant information].

Application Note: This requirement outlines the information to be included in audit records. All audits must contain at least the information mentioned in [FAU_GEN.1.2\(1\)](#), but may contain more information which can be assigned. The [ST](#) author shall must identify in the [TSS](#) which information of the audit record that is performed by the [TSF](#) and that which is performed by the [TOE](#) platform.

[Evaluation Activity](#)

TSS

The evaluator shall check the [TSS](#) and ensure that it provides a format for audit records. Each audit record format type must be covered, along with a brief description of each field.

Guidance

The evaluator shall check the administrative guide and ensure that it provides a format for audit records. Each audit record format type must be covered, along with a brief description of each field. The evaluator shall check to make sure that the description of the fields contains the information required in [FAU_GEN.1.2\(1\)](#).

Tests

When verifying the test results from [FAU_GEN.1.1\(1\)](#), the evaluator shall ensure the audit records generated during testing match the format specified in the administrative guide, and that the fields in each audit record have the proper entries.

Note that the testing here can be accomplished in conjunction with the testing of the security mechanisms directly. For example, testing performed to ensure that the administrative guidance provided is correct verifies that AGD_OPE.1 is satisfied and should address the invocation of the administrative actions that are needed to verify the audit records are generated as expected.

The Auditable Events table includes optional, selection-based and objective requirements. The auditing of these requirements are only required if the requirement is included in the [ST](#).

- (man) - mandatory requirement
- (sel) - selection-based requirement
- (obj) - objective requirement
- (opt) - optional requirement

Table 2: Auditable Events

Requirement	Auditable Events	Additional Audit Record Contents
FAU_ALT_EXT.1 (man)	Type of alert.	Identity of Mobile Device that sent alert
FAU_CRP_EXT.1 (obj)	None.	
FAU_GEN.1(1)	None.	

(man)			
FAU_GEN.1(2) (sel)	None.		
FAU_NET_EXT.1 (man)	None.		
FAU_SAR.1 (opt)	None.		
FAU_SEL.1 (opt)	All modifications to the audit configuration that occur while the audit collection functions are operating.	No additional information.	
FAU_STG_EXT.1 (man)	None.		
FAU_STG_EXT.2 (sel)	None.		
FCO_CPC_EXT.1 (obj)	Enabling or disabling communications between a pair of components. Disabling communications between a pair of components.	Identities of the endpoints pairs enabled or disabled	
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 (man)	None.		
FCS_CKM.1 (man)	[selection: Failure of key generation activity for authentication keys, None]	No additional information.	
FCS_CKM.2 (man)	None.		
FCS_COP.1(*1) (man)	None.		
FCS_COP.1(2) (man)	None.		
FCS_COP.1(3) (man)	None.		
FCS_COP.1(4) (man)	None.		
FCS_DTLSC_EXT.1 (TLS Package)	Failure of the certificate validity check	Issuer Name and Subject Name of certificate	
FCS_DTLSC_EXT.2 (TLS Package)	None.		
FCS_DTLSS_EXT.1 (TLS Package)	Failure of the certificate validity check	Issuer Name and Subject Name of certificate	
FCS_DTLSS_EXT.2 (TLS Package)	None.		
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 (sel)	Failure of the certificate validity check	Issuer Name and Subject Name of certificate. [selection: User's authorization decision, no additional information]	
FCS_IV_EXT.1 (sel)	None.		
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 (man)	Failure of the randomization process	No additional information.	
FCS_STG_EXT.1 (man)	None.		
FCS_STG_EXT.2 (sel)	None.		
FCS_TLS_EXT.1 (TLS Package)	None.		
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 (TLS Package)	Failure to establish a TLS session Failure to verify presented identifier.	Reason for failure. Presented identifier and reference identifier.	
Failure of the certificate validity check.	Issuer Name and Subject Name of certificate		
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2 (TLS Package)	None.		
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2 3 (TLS Package)	None.		
FCS_TLSC_EXT.4 (TLS Package)	None.		
FCS_TLSC_EXT.5 (TLS Package)	None.		
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1 (TLS Package)	Failure to establish a TLS session	Reason for failure.	
FCS_TLSS_EXT.2 (TLS Package)	Failure of the certificate validity check.	Issuer Name and Subject Name of certificate	None.
FCS_TLSS_EXT.3 (TLS Package)	None.		
FCS_TLSS_EXT.4 (TLS Package)	None.		

FIA_ENR_EXT.1 (man)	Failure of MD user authentication.	Presented username.
FIA_UAU_EXT.4(1) (manobj)	Attempt to reuse enrollment data.	Enrollment data.
FIA_UAU_EXT.4(2) (obj)	Attempt to reuse enrollment data.	Enrollment data.
FIA_UAU.1 (man)	None.	
FIA_X509_EXT.1(1) (man)	Failure to validate X.509 certificate	Reason for failure.
FIA_X509_EXT.1(2) (sel)	Failure to validate X.509 certificate	Reason for failure.
FIA_X509_EXT.2 (man)	Failure to establish connection to determine revocation status.	No additional information.
FIA_X509_EXT.3 (obj)	Generation of Certificate Request Message.	Content of Certificate Request Message.
	Success or failure of verification	Issuer and Subject name of added certificate or reason for failure.
	Generation of Certificate Enrollment Request.	Issuer and Subject name of EST Server. Method of authentication. Issuer and Subject name of certificate used to authenticate. Content of Certificate Request Message.
FIA_X509_EXT.4 (obj)	Success or failure of enrollment	Issuer and Subject name of added certificate or reason for failure.
	Update of EST Trust Anchor Database.	Subject name of added Root CA
FIA_X509_EXT.5 (man)	None.	
FMT_MOF.1(1) (man)	Issuance of command to perform function	Command sent and identity of MDM Agent recipient(s).
	Change of policy settings.	Policy changed and value or full policy.
FMT_MOF.1(2) (man)	Enrollment by a user.	Identity of user.
FMT_MOF.1(43) (sel)	None.	
FMT_POL_EXT.1 (man)	None.	
FMT_SAE_EXT.1 (obj)	Enrollment attempted after expiration of authentication data.	Identity of user.
FMT_SMF.1(1) (man)	None.	
FMT_SMF.1(2) (man)	Success or failure of function	No additional information.
FMT_SMF.1(3) (sel)	None.	
FMT_SMR.1(1) (man)	None.	
FMT_SMR.1(2) (sel)	None.	
FPT_API_EXT.1.1 (man)	None.	
FPT_ITT.1(man1) (sel)	Initiation and termination of the trusted channel.	Trusted channel protocol. Identity of initiator and recipient.
FPT_ITT.1(2) (sel)	Initiation and termination of the trusted channel.	Trusted channel protocol. Identity of initiator and recipient.
FPT_LIB_EXT.1.1 (man)	None.	
FPT_TST_EXT.1 (man)	Initiation of self-test. Failure of self-test. Detected integrity violation.	Algorithm that caused failure. The TSF code file that caused the integrity violation.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 (man)	Success or failure of signature verification	No additional information.
FTA_TAB.1 (opt)	Change in banner setting.	No additional information.
FTP_ITC.1(1) (man)	Initiation and termination of the trusted channel.	Trusted channel protocol. Non- TOE endpoint of connection.
FTP_ITC.1(2) (sel)	Initiation and termination of the trusted channel.	Trusted channel protocol. Non- TOE endpoint of connection.
FTP_ITC_EXT.1 (man)	None.	
FTP_TRP.1(1) (man)	Initiation and termination of the trusted channel.	Trusted channel protocol. Identity of administrator.
FTP_TRP.1(2) (man)	Initiation and termination of the trusted channel.	Trusted channel protocol.
FTP_TRP.1(3) (obj)	Initiation and termination of the trusted	Trusted channel protocol.

channel.

FAU_NET_EXT.1 Network Reachability Review

FAU_NET_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall provide authorized administrators with the capability to read the network connectivity status of an enrolled agent Application Note: The MDM Server establishes the network connectivity status of enrolled agents using periodic reachability event alerts from the agents according to FAU_ALT_EXT.2.1 in the MDM Agent PP-Module. This status may be determined by sending an update request from the MDM Server which the Agent is required to respond to or by using scheduled periodic notifications of connectivity initiated by the MDM Agent.

Evaluation Activity

TSS

The evaluator ensures that the TSS describes how reachability events are implemented, for each supported mobile platform The evaluator verifies that this description clearly indicates who (MDM Agent or MDM Server) initiates reachability events

Guidance

The evaluator shall verify that the guidance instructs administrators on the method of determining the network connectivity status of an enrolled agent.

Tests

For each MDM Agent/platform listed as supported in the ST:

The evaluator shall configure the MDM Agent/platform to perform a network reachability test, both with and without such connectivity and shall ensure that by following the guidance, the evaluator can determine results that reflect both.

FAU_STG_EXT.1 External Trail Storage

FAU_STG_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall be able to use a trusted channel per FTP_ITC.1(1) to transmit audit data to an external IT entity and ~~selection:~~ store audit data locally, no other method].

Application Note: The TOE ~~shall must~~ be capable of transmitting audit data to an external entity using a trusted channel as specified in FTP_ITC.1(1) and optionally can store audit data locally. If "store audit data locally" is selected, then FAU_STG_EXT.2.1 ~~shall must~~ be included in the ST.

This requirement only applies to audit data maintained by the TSF, not audit data that is maintained by the platform Audit data may include the audit records received from the Agent, in addition to the audit records generated by the MDM Server.

The TOE may rely on a non-TOE audit server for storage and review of audit records Although the TOE generates audit records and receives audit records from managed mobile devices, the storage of these audit records and the ability to allow the administrator to review these audit records is provided by the operational environment. The TSF may rely on the underlying operating system for this functionality.

Although the audit server is outside of the TOE, the MDM Server should still be able to support mutual authentication There are no requirements levied on the audit server, but the client (MDM Server) should be able to support TLS client certificate authentication. This way if the non-TOE audit server does support verifying client certs, the MDM Server is in a position to make use of that.

For distributed TOE's each component must be able to export audit data across a protected channel external (FTP_ITC.1) or intercomponent (FPT_ITT.1(1)/FPT_ITT.1(2) or FTP_ITC.1) as appropriate. At least one component of the TOE must be able to export audit records via FTP_ITC.1(1) such that all TOE audit records can be exported to an external IT entity

Evaluation Activity

TSS

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to ensure it describes the means by which the audit data are transferred to the external audit server, and how the trusted channel is provided.

Guidance

The evaluator shall also examine the operational guidance to determine that it describes the relationship between the local audit data and the audit data that are sent to the audit log server. For example, when an audit event is generated, is it simultaneously sent to the external server and the local store, or is the local store used as a buffer and "cleared" periodically by sending the data to the audit server.

The evaluator shall also examine the operational guidance to ensure it describes how to establish the trusted channel to the audit server, as well as describe any requirements on the audit server (particular audit server protocol, version of the protocol required, etc.), as well as configuration of the TOE needed to communicate with the audit server

Tests

Testing of the trusted channel mechanism will be performed as specified in the associated ~~assurance~~ evaluation activities for the particular trusted channel mechanism.

The evaluator shall perform the following test for this requirement:

- **Test 1:** The evaluator shall establish a session between the TOE and the audit server according to the configuration guidance provided. The evaluator shall then examine the traffic that passes between the audit server and the TOE during several activities of the evaluator's choice designed to generate audit data to be transferred to the audit server. The evaluator shall observe that these data are not able to be viewed in the clear during this transfer, and that they are successfully received by the audit server. The evaluator shall record the particular software (name, version) used on the audit

server during testing.

FAU_DIS_EXT.1

6.2.2 Security Audit for Distributed TOEs

FAU_DIS_EXT.1.1

For distributed [TOE](#)s the handling of audit information might be more complicated than for [TOE](#)s consisting only of one component. There are a few basic requirements to be fulfilled:

- Every component must be able to generate audit information
- Every component must be able to buffer audit information and forward it to another [TOE](#) component and optionally store audit information locally.
- For the overall [TOE](#) it must be possible to send out audit information to an external audit server

In general, every component must be able to generate its own audit information. It would be possible that every component also stores its own audit information locally as well as every component could be able to send out audit data to an external audit server. It would also be sufficient that every component would be able to generate its own audit data and buffer it locally before the information is sent out to one or more other [TOE](#) components for local storage and/or transmission to an external audit server. For the transfer of audit records between [TOE](#) components the secure connection via FTP_ITC.1 or [FPT_ITT.1\(1\)/FPT_ITT.1\(2\)](#) must be used.

Such a solution would still be suitable to fulfil the requirement that all audit-related [SFR](#)s have to be fulfilled by all [TOE](#) components, although formally not every component would support local storage or transfer to an external audit server itself.

Regarding the establishment of inter-[TOE](#) communication, error conditions as well as successful connection/teardown events should be captured by both ends of the connection.

Although all

All [TOE](#) components shall be able to generate their own audit data according to FAU_GEN.1 for all the [SFR](#)s that they implement, not all [TOE](#) components have to provide audit data about all events it implements. For distributed [TOE](#)s, a mapping shall be provided to show which auditable events according to FAU_GEN.1 are covered by which components (also giving a justification that the records generated by each component cover all the [SFR](#)s that it implements). The overall [TOE](#) has to provide audit information about all events defined for FAU_GEN.1. As a result, at least one [TOE](#) component has to be assigned to every auditable event defined for FAU_GEN.1. The part of the mapping related to [Table 2](#) shall be consistent with the mapping of [SFR](#)s to [TOE](#) components for ASE_TSS.1 in the sense that all components defined as generating audit information for a particular [SFR](#) should also contribute to that [SFR](#) in the mapping for ASE_TSS.1. This applies not only to audit events defined for mandatory [SFR](#)s but also to all audit events for optional, selection-based, and objective [SFR](#)s as defined in [Appendix A - Optional Requirements](#), [Appendix B - Selection-Based Requirements](#), and [Appendix C - Objective Requirements](#).

If one or more of the optional audit components [FAU_STG_EXT.1](#) or [FAU_STG_EXT.2](#) are selected in the [ST](#) derived from this [PP](#), then the [SFR](#) mapping for ASE_TSS.1 must include a specific identification of the [TOE](#) components to which they apply.

6.2.2.3 Cryptographic Support (FCS)

FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation

FCS_CKM.1.1

Refinement: The TSF shall [selection: invoke platform-provided functionality, implement functionality] to implement generate asymmetric cryptographic key-generation keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [selection:

- RSA schemes using cryptographic key sizes of 2048-bit or greater that meets FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", Appendix B.3,
- ECC schemes using "NIST curves" P-384 and [selection: P-256, P-521, no other curves] that meet the following: FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", Appendix B.4 ,
- FFC schemes using cryptographic key sizes of 2048-bit or greater that meet the following: FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", Appendix B.1 ,
- FFC schemes using Diffie-Hellman group 14 that meet the following: RFC3526, Section 3,
- FFC schemes using "safe-prime" groups that meet the following: 'NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3, "Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography"', and [selection: RFC 3526, RFC 7919]

].

Application Note: The [ST](#) author shall must select all key generation schemes used for key establishment and [MDM](#) authentication. When key generation is used for key establishment, the schemes in [FCS_CKM.2.1](#) and selected cryptographic protocols must match the selection. When key generation is used for [MDM](#) authentication, the public key is expected to be associated with an X.509v3 certificate.

If the [TOE](#) only acts as a receiver in the RSA key establishment scheme, the [TOE](#) does not need to implement RSA key

generation.

In a distributed [TOE](#), if the [TOE](#) component acts as a receiver in the key establishment scheme, the [TOE](#) does not need to implement key generation.

[Evaluation Activity](#)

If "invoke platform-provided functionality" is selected:

TSS

The evaluator shall examine the [TSS](#) of the [MDM Server's ST](#) to verify that it describes (for each supported platform) how the key generation functionality is invoked (it should be noted that this may be through a mechanism that is not implemented by the [MDM Server](#); nonetheless, that mechanism will be identified in the [TSS](#) as part of this evaluation activity).

If "implement functionality" is selected:

TSS

The evaluator shall ensure that the [TSS](#) identifies the key sizes supported by the [TOE](#). If the [ST](#) specifies more than one scheme, the evaluator shall examine the [TSS](#) to verify that it identifies the usage for each scheme

Guidance

The evaluator shall verify that the AGD guidance instructs the administrator how to configure the [TOE](#) to use the selected key generation [scheme\(s\)-schemes](#) and key [size\(s\)-sizes](#) for all uses defined in this [PP](#).

Tests

Key Generation for FIPS PUB 186-4 RSA Schemes

The evaluator shall verify the implementation of RSA Key Generation by the [TOE](#) using the Key Generation test. This test verifies the ability of the [TSF](#) to correctly produce values for the key components including the public verification exponent e , the private prime factors p and q , the public modulus n and the calculation of the private signature exponent d .

Key Pair generation specifies 5 ways (or methods) to generate the primes p and q . These include:

1. Random Primes:
 - a. Provable primes
 - b. Probable primes
2. Primes with Conditions:
 - a. Primes p_1 , p_2 , q_1 , q_2 , p and q shall all be provable primes
 - b. Primes p_1 , p_2 , q_1 , and q_2 shall be provable primes and p and q shall be probable primes
 - c. Primes p_1 , p_2 , q_1 , q_2 , p and q shall all be probable primes

To test the key generation method for the Random Provable primes method and for all the Primes with Conditions methods, the evaluator must seed the [TSF](#) key generation routine with sufficient data to deterministically generate the RSA key pair. This includes the random seed(s), the public exponent of the RSA key, and the desired key length. For each key length supported, the evaluator shall have the [TSF](#) generate 25 key pairs. The evaluator shall verify the correctness of the [TSF](#)'s implementation by comparing values generated by the [TSF](#) with those generated from a known good implementation

If possible, the Random Probable primes method should also be verified against a known good implementation as described above. Otherwise, the evaluator shall have the [TSF](#) generate 10 keys pairs for each supported key length $nlen$ and verify:

- $n = p * q$,
- p and q are probably prime according to Miller-Rabin tests,
- $GCD(p-1, e) = 1$,
- $GCD(q-1, e) = 1$,
- $2^{16} \leq e \leq 2^{256}$ and e is an odd integer,
- $|p - q| > 2^{(nlen/2 - 100)}$,
- $p \geq \text{squareroot}(2) * (2^{(nlen/2 - 1)})$,
- $q \geq \text{squareroot}(2) * (2^{(nlen/2 - 1)})$,
- $2^{(nlen/2)} < d < LCM(p-1, q-1)$,
- $e * d = 1 \bmod LCM(p-1, q-1)$.

Key Generation for Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)

FIPS 186-4 ECC Key Generation Test

For each supported NIST curve, i.e., P-256, P-384 and P-521, the evaluator shall require the implementation under test (IUT) to generate 10 private/public key pairs. The private key shall be generated using an approved random bit generator (RBG). To determine correctness, the evaluator shall submit the generated key pairs to the public key verification (PKV) function of a known good implementation.

FIPS 186-4 Public Key Verification (PKV) Test

For each supported NIST curve, i.e., P-256, P-384 and P-521, the evaluator shall generate 10 private/public key pairs using the key generation function of a known good implementation and modify five of the public key values so that they are incorrect, leaving five values unchanged (i.e., correct). The evaluator shall obtain in response a set of 10 PASS/FAIL values

Key Generation for Finite-Field Cryptography (FFC)

The evaluator shall verify the implementation of the Parameters Generation and the Key Generation for FFC by the [TOE](#) using the Parameter Generation and Key Generation test. This test verifies the ability of the [TSF](#) to correctly produce values for the field prime p , the cryptographic prime q (dividing $p-1$), the cryptographic group generator g , and the calculation of the private key x and public key y .

The Parameter generation specifies [2-two](#) ways (or methods) to generate the cryptographic prime q and the field prime p :

Cryptographic and Field Primes:

- Primes q and p shall both be provable primes
- Primes q and field prime p shall both be probable primes and two ways to generate the cryptographic group generator g :

Cryptographic Group Generator:

- Generator g constructed through a verifiable process
- Generator g constructed through an unverifiable process.

The Key generation specifies [2-two](#) ways to generate the private key x :

Private Key:

- $\text{len}(q)$ bit output of RBG where $1 \leq x \leq q-1$
- $\text{len}(q) + 64$ bit output of RBG, followed by a mod $q-1$ operation where $1 \leq x \leq q-1$.

The security strength of the RBG must be at least that of the security offered by the FFC parameter set.

To test the cryptographic and field prime generation method for the provable primes method and/or the group generator g for a verifiable process, the evaluator must seed the [TSF](#) parameter generation routine with sufficient data to deterministically generate the parameter set.

For each key length supported, the evaluator shall have the [TSF](#) generate 25 parameter sets and key pairs. The evaluator shall verify the correctness of the [TSF](#)'s implementation by comparing values generated by the [TSF](#) with those generated from a known good implementation. Verification must also confirm

- $g \neq 0, 1$
- q divides $p-1$
- $g^q \bmod p = 1$
- $g^x \bmod p = y$

for each FFC parameter set and key pair.

Diffie-Hellman Group 14 and FFC Schemes using "safe-prime" groups

Testing for FFC Schemes using Diffie-Hellman group 14 and/or "safe-prime" groups is done as part of testing in [FCS_CKM.2.1](#).

FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment

[FCS_CKM.2.1](#)

Refinement: The TSF shall [selection: invoke platform-provided functionality, implement functionality] to implement perform cryptographic key establishment in accordance with a specified cryptographic key establishment method: [selection:

- RSA-based key establishment schemes that meet the following: RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified in Section 7.2 of RFC 8017, "Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1",
- Elliptic curve-based key establishment schemes that meets the following: NIST Special Publication 800-56A, "Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Integer Factorization Discrete Logarithm Cryptography",
- ~~Elliptic curve~~ Finite field-based key establishment schemes that meets the following: NIST Special Publication 800-56A, "Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography",
- ~~Finite field-based key~~ Key establishment schemes using Diffie-Hellman group 14 that meets the following: RFC 3526, Section 3,
- FFC schemes using "safe-prime" groups that meet the following: NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3, "Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography", and [selection: RFC 3526, RFC 7919]

].

Application Note: The [ST](#) author ~~shall~~ **must** select all key establishment schemes used for the selected cryptographic protocols. The RSA-based key establishment schemes are described in Section 9 of NIST SP 800-56B; however, Section 9 relies on implementation of other sections in SP 800-56B. If the [TOE](#) acts as a receiver in the RSA key establishment scheme, the [TOE](#) does not need to implement RSA key generation.

The elliptic curves used for the key establishment scheme ~~shall~~ **must** correlate with the curves specified in [FCS_CKM.1.1](#).

The domain parameters used for the finite field-based key establishment scheme are specified by the key generation according to [FCS_CKM.1.1](#).
[Evaluation Activity](#)

If "invoke platform-provided functionality" is selected:

TSS

The evaluator shall examine the [TSS](#) of the [MDM](#) Server's [ST](#) to verify that it describes (for each supported platform) how the key establishment functionality is invoked (it should be noted that this may be through a mechanism that is not implemented by the [MDM](#) Server; nonetheless, that mechanism will be identified in the [TSS](#) as part of this evaluation activity).

If "implement functionality" is selected:

TSS

The evaluator shall ensure that the supported key establishment schemes correspond to the key generation schemes identified in [FCS_CKM.1.1](#). If the [ST](#) specifies more than one scheme, the evaluator shall examine the [TSS](#) to verify that it identifies the usage for each scheme.

The evaluator shall ensure that the [TSS](#) describes how the [TOE](#) handles decryption errors. In accordance with NIST Special Publication 800-56B, the [TOE](#) must not reveal the particular error that occurred, either through the contents of any outputted or logged error message or through timing variations. If KTS-OAEP is supported, the evaluator shall create separate contrived ciphertext values that trigger each of the three decryption error checks described in NIST Special Publication 800-56B section 7.2.2.3, ensure that each decryption attempt results in an error, and ensure that any outputted or logged error message is identical for each. If KTS-KEM-KWS is supported, the evaluator shall create separate contrived ciphertext values that trigger each of the three decryption error checks described in NIST Special Publication 800-56B section 7.2.3.3, ensure that each decryption attempt results in an error, and ensure that any outputted or logged error message is identical for each.

If Diffie-Hellman group 14 is selected from [FCS_CKM.2.1](#), the [TSS](#) shall describe how the implementation meets RFC 3526 Section 3.

Guidance

The evaluator shall verify that the AGD guidance instructs the administrator how to configure the [TOE](#) to use the selected key establishment scheme(s).

Tests

The evaluator shall verify the implementation of the key establishment schemes supported by the [TOE](#) using the applicable tests below.

SP800-56A Key Establishment Schemes

The evaluator shall verify a [TOE](#)'s implementation of SP800-56A key agreement schemes using the following Function and Validity tests. These validation tests for each key agreement scheme verify that a [TOE](#) has implemented the components of the key agreement scheme according to the specifications in the ~~Recommendation~~ **recommendation**. These components include the calculation of the primitives (the shared secret value Z) and the calculation of the derived keying material (DKM) via the Key Derivation Function (KDF). If key confirmation is supported, the evaluator shall also verify that the components of key confirmation have been implemented correctly, using the test procedures described below. This includes the parsing of the DKM, the generation of MACdata and the calculation of MACtag.

Function Test

The Function test verifies the ability of the [TOE](#) to implement the key agreement schemes correctly. To conduct this test the evaluator shall generate or obtain test vectors from a known good implementation of the [TOE](#) supported schemes. For each supported key agreement scheme-key agreement role combination, KDF type, and, if supported, key confirmation role-key confirmation type combination, the tester shall generate 10 sets of test vectors. The data set consists of one set of domain parameter values (FFC) or the NIST approved curve (ECC) per 10 sets of public keys. These keys are static, ephemeral or both depending on the scheme being tested.

The evaluator shall obtain the DKM, the corresponding [TOE](#)'s public keys (static and/or ephemeral), the MAC tag(s), and any inputs used in the KDF, such as the Other Information field OI and ~~TOE-id~~ **TOE-id** fields.

If the [TOE](#) does not use a KDF defined in SP 800-56A, the evaluator shall obtain only the public keys and the hashed value of the shared secret.

The evaluator shall verify the correctness of the [TSE](#)'s implementation of a given scheme by using a known good implementation to calculate the shared secret value, derive the keying material DKM, and compare hashes or MAC tags generated from these values.

If key confirmation is supported, the [TSF](#) shall perform the above for each implemented approved MAC algorithm.

Validity Test

The Validity test verifies the ability of the [TOE](#) to recognize another party's valid and invalid key agreement results with or without key confirmation. To conduct this test, the evaluator shall obtain a list of the supporting cryptographic functions included in the SP800-56A key agreement implementation to determine which errors the [TOE](#) should be able to recognize. The evaluator generates a set of 24 (FFC) or 30 (ECC) test vectors consisting of data sets including domain parameter values or NIST approved curves, the evaluator's public keys, the [TOE's](#) public/private key pairs, MACTag, and any inputs used in the KDF, such as the other info and [TOE's](#) ID fields.

The evaluator shall inject an error in some of the test vectors to test that the [TOE](#) recognizes invalid key agreement results caused by the following fields being incorrect: the shared secret value Z, the DKM, the other information field OI, the data to be MACed, or the generated MACTag. If the [TOE](#) contains the full or partial (only ECC) public key validation, the evaluator will also individually inject errors in both parties' static public keys, both parties' ephemeral public keys and the [TOE's](#) static private key to assure the [TOE](#) detects errors in the public key validation function and/or the partial key validation function (in ECC only). At least two of the test vectors shall remain unmodified and therefore should result in valid key agreement results (they should pass).

The [TOE](#) shall use these modified test vectors to emulate the key agreement scheme using the corresponding parameters. The evaluator shall compare the [TOE's](#) results with the results using a known good implementation verifying that the [TOE](#) detects these errors.

SP800-56B Key Establishment Schemes **RSA-based key establishment**

The evaluator shall verify that the [TSF](#) describes whether the [TOE](#) acts as a sender, a recipient, or both for RSA-based key establishment schemes.

If the [TOE](#) acts as a sender, the following evaluation activity shall be performed to ensure the proper operation of every [TOE](#) supported combination of RSA-based key establishment scheme:

To conduct this test the evaluator shall generate or obtain test vectors from a known good implementation of the [TOE](#) supported schemes. For each combination of supported key establishment scheme and its options (with or without key confirmation if supported, for each supported key confirmation MAC function if key confirmation is supported, and for each supported mask generation function if KTS-OAEP is supported), the tester shall generate 10 sets of test vectors. Each test vector shall include the RSA public key, the plaintext keying material, any additional input parameters if applicable, the MacKey and MacTag if key confirmation is incorporated, and the outputted ciphertext. For each test vector, the evaluator shall perform a key establishment encryption operation on the [TOE](#) with the same inputs (in cases where key confirmation is incorporated, the test shall use the MacKey from the test vector instead of the randomly generated MacKey used in normal operation) and ensure that the outputted ciphertext is equivalent to the ciphertext in the test vector.

If the [TOE](#) acts as a receiver, the following assurance activities shall be performed to ensure the proper operation of every [TOE](#) supported combination of RSA-based key establishment scheme:

To conduct this test the evaluator shall generate or obtain test vectors from a known good implementation of the [TOE](#) supported schemes. For each combination of supported key establishment scheme and its options (with or without key confirmation if supported, for each supported key confirmation MAC function if key confirmation is supported, and for each supported mask generation function if KTS-OAEP is supported), the tester shall generate 10 sets of test vectors. Each test vector shall include the RSA private key, the plaintext keying material (KeyData), any additional input parameters if applicable, the MacTag in cases where key confirmation is incorporated, and the outputted ciphertext. For each test vector, the evaluator shall perform the key establishment decryption operation on the [TOE](#) and ensure that the outputted plaintext keying material (KeyData) is equivalent to the plaintext keying material in the test vector. In cases where key confirmation is incorporated, the evaluator shall perform the key confirmation steps and ensure that the outputted MacTag is equivalent to the MacTag in the test vector. correctness of the TSF's implementation of RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 by using a known good implementation for each protocol selected in [FTP TRP.1\(1\)](#), [FTP TRP.1\(2\)](#), [FTP TRP.1\(3\)](#), [FTP ITC.1\(1\)](#), [FTP ITC.1\(2\)](#), [FPT ITT.1\(1\)](#), and [FPT ITT.1\(2\)](#) that uses RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5.

Diffie-Hellman Group 14

The evaluator shall verify the correctness of the TSF's implementation of Diffie-Hellman group 14 by using a known good implementation for each protocol selected in [FTP TRP.1\(1\)](#), [FTP TRP.1\(2\)](#), [FTP TRP.1\(3\)](#), [FTP ITC.1\(1\)](#), [FTP ITC.1\(2\)](#), [FPT ITT.1\(1\)](#), and [FPT ITT.1\(2\)](#) that uses Diffie-Hellman Group 14.

FFC Schemes using "safe-prime" groups

The evaluator shall verify the correctness of the TSF's implementation of "safe-prime" groups by using a known good implementation for each protocol selected in [FTP TRP.1\(1\)](#), [FTP TRP.1\(2\)](#), [FTP TRP.1\(3\)](#), [FTP ITC.1\(1\)](#), [FTP ITC.1\(2\)](#), [FPT ITT.1\(1\)](#), and [FPT ITT.1\(2\)](#) that uses "safe-prime" groups. This test must be performed for each "safe-prime" group that each protocol uses.

FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction

FCS_CKM_EXT.4.1

The TSF shall destroy plaintext keying material and critical security parameters by [selection:

- invoking platform-provided functionality with the following rules:
 - For volatile memory, the destruction shall be executed by [selection:
 - a single direct overwrite consisting of [selection: a pseudo-random pattern using the TSF/Platform RBG (as specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1), zeroes, ones, a new value of a key, [assignment: some value that does not contain any CSP]],
 - removal of power to the memory,
 - destruction of reference to the key directly followed by a request for garbage collection
 - For non-volatile [memory] that consists of the invocation of an interface provided by the underlying platform that [selection:
 - logically addresses the storage location of the key and performs a [selection: single, [assignment: ST author defined multi-pass]] direct overwrite consisting of [selection: a pseudo-random pattern using the TSF/Platform RBG (as specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1), zeroes, ones, a new value of a key, [assignment: some value that does not contain any CSP]],
 - instructs the underlying platform to destroy the abstraction that represents the key
- implementing key destruction in accordance with the following rules:
 - For volatile memory, the destruction shall be executed by a single direct overwrite [selection: consisting of a pseudo-random pattern using the TSF/Platform RBG (as specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1), consisting of zeroes]
 - For non-volatile EEPROM, the destruction shall be executed by a single direct overwrite consisting of a pseudo-random pattern using the TSF/Platform RBG (as specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1), followed by a read-verify.
 - For non-volatile flash memory, that is not wear-leveled, the destruction shall be executed [selection: by a single direct overwrite consisting of zeros followed by a read-verify, by a block erase that erases the reference to memory that stores data as well as the data itself]
 - For non-volatile flash memory, that is wear-leveled, the destruction shall be executed [selection: by a single direct overwrite consisting of zeros, by a block erase]
 - For non-volatile memory other than EEPROM and flash, the destruction shall be executed by a single direct overwrite with a random pattern that is changed before each write

].

Application Note: The ST author should select "invoking platform-provided functionality" if the MDM Server performs no operations using plaintext secret, private cryptographic keys, and CSPs.

Any security related information (such as keys, authentication data, and passwords) must be zeroized when no longer in use to prevent the disclosure or modification of security critical data.

The zeroization indicated above applies to each intermediate storage area for plaintext key and Cryptographic Service Provider (CSP) (i.e., any storage, such as memory buffers, that is included in the path of such data) upon the transfer of the key to another location.

Since the TOE does not include the host IT environment, the extent of this capability is necessarily somewhat limited. For the purposes of this requirement, it is sufficient for the TOE to invoke the correct underlying functions of the host to perform the zeroization--it does not imply that the TOE has to include a kernel-mode memory driver to ensure the data are zeroized. It is assumed that the host platform appropriately performs zeroization of key material in its internal processes.

Several selections allow assignment of a 'value that does not contain any CSP'. This means that the TOE uses some other specified data not drawn from a source that may contain key material or reveal information about key material, and not being any of the particular values listed as other selection options. The point of the phrase "does not contain any CSP" is to ensure that the overwritten data is carefully selected, and not taken from a general 'pool' that might contain current or residual data that itself requires confidentiality protection.

Evaluation Activity

TSS

If "invoking platform-provided functionality" is selected, the evaluator shall examine the TSS of the MDM Server's ST to verify that it describes (for each supported platform) how the key destruction functionality is invoked (it should be noted that this may be through a mechanism that is not implemented by the MDM Server; nonetheless, that mechanism will be identified in the TSS as part of this evaluation activity).

FCS_CKM_EXT.4.2

The TSF shall destroy all plaintext keying material and critical security parameters (CSPs) when no longer needed.

Application Note: Key destruction procedures are performed in accordance with FCS_CKM_EXT.4.1. Even if "invoking platform-provided functionality" is selected in FCS_CKM_EXT.4.1, the TSF shall must determine when the plaintext keying material and CSP are no longer needed and thus should be destroyed. The TSF shall must "release" the key material and CSP when no longer needed, regardless if the TSF or TOE platform destroys the key material and CSPs.

For the purposes of this requirement, plaintext keying material refers to authentication data, authorization data, secret/private symmetric keys, data used to derive keys, etc.

Evaluation Activity

Evaluation Activity Note:

The evaluation activity used is dependent on the selection made in FCS_CKM_EXT.4.1.

TSS

The evaluator shall check to ensure the TSS lists each type of plaintext key material and CSP (authentication data, authorization data, secret/private symmetric keys, data used to derive keys, etc.) and its origin and storage location.

The evaluator shall verify that the TSS describes when each type of key material and CSP is no longer needed.

If "invoke platform-provided functionality" is selected:

TSS

The evaluator shall examine the [TSS](#) of the [MDM Server's ST](#) to verify that it describes (for each supported platform) how the key releasing functionality is invoked (it should be noted that this may be through a mechanism that is not implemented by the [MDM Server](#); nonetheless, that mechanism will be identified in the [TSS](#) as part of this evaluation activity).

If "implement functionality" is selected:

TSS

The evaluator shall also verify that, for each type, the type of clearing procedure that is performed is listed. If different types of memory are used to store the materials to be protected, the evaluator shall check to ensure that the [TSS](#) describes the clearing procedure in terms of the memory in which the data are stored (for example, "secret keys stored on flash are cleared by overwriting once with zeros, while secret keys stored on the internal persistent storage device are cleared by overwriting one time with a random pattern that is changed before each write"). For block erases, the evaluator shall also ensure that the block erase command used is listed and shall verify that the command used also addresses any copies of the plaintext key material that may be created in order to optimize the use of flash memory.

Tests

For each software and firmware key clearing situation the evaluator shall repeat the following tests. Note that at this time hardware-bound keys are explicitly excluded from testing.

- **Test 1:** The evaluator shall utilize appropriate combinations of specialized operational environment and development tools (debuggers, simulators, etc.) for the [TOE](#) and instrumented [TOE](#) builds to test that keys are cleared correctly, including all intermediate copies of the key that may have been created internally by the [TOE](#) during normal cryptographic processing with that key.

Cryptographic [TOE](#) implementations in software shall be loaded and exercised under a debugger to perform such tests. The evaluator shall perform the following test for each key subject to clearing, including intermediate copies of keys that are persisted encrypted by the [TOE](#):

1. Load the instrumented [TOE](#) build in a debugger.
2. Record the value of the key in the [TOE](#) subject to clearing.
3. Cause the [TOE](#) to perform a normal cryptographic processing with the key from #1.
4. Cause the [TOE](#) to clear the key.
5. Cause the [TOE](#) to stop the execution but not exit.
6. Cause the [TOE](#) to dump the entire memory footprint of the [TOE](#) into a binary file.
7. Search the content of the binary file created in #4 for instances of the known key value from #1.

The test succeeds if no copies of the key from #1 are found in step #7 above and fails otherwise. The evaluator shall perform this test on all keys, including those persisted in encrypted form, to ensure intermediate copies are cleared.

- **Test 2:** In cases where the [TOE](#) is implemented in firmware and operates in a limited operating environment that does not allow the use of debuggers, the evaluator shall utilize a simulator for the [TOE](#) on a general purpose operating system. The evaluator shall provide a rationale explaining the instrumentation of the simulated test environment and justifying the obtained test results.

FCS_COP.1(1) Cryptographic Operation (Confidentiality Algorithms)

FCS_COP.1.1(1)

Refinement: The TSF shall [selection: invoke platform-provided functionality, implement functionality] to perform encryption/decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm: [selection:

- AES-CBC (as defined in FIPS PUB 197, and NIST SP 800-38A) mode
- AES-GCM (as defined in NIST SP 800-38D)
- AES Key Wrap (KW) (as defined in NIST SP 800-38F)
- AES Key Wrap with Padding (KWP) (as defined in NIST SP 800-38F)
- AES-CCM (as defined in NIST SP 800-38C)

] and cryptographic key sizes [selection: 128-bit, 256-bit]

Application Note: For the second selection of [FCS_COP.1.1\(1\)](#), the [ST](#) author should choose the mode or modes in which AES operates in the trusted channel protocols. For the third selection, the [ST](#) author should choose the key sizes that are supported by this functionality.

Evaluation Activity

If "invoke platform-provided functionality" is selected:

TSS

The evaluator shall examine the [TSS](#)

of the [MDM Server's ST](#)

to verify that it describes (for each supported platform) how the encryption/decryption functionality is invoked for each mode and key size selected in the [MDM Server's ST](#) (it should be noted that this may be through a mechanism that is not implemented by the [MDM Server](#); nonetheless, that mechanism will be identified in the [TSS](#) as part of this evaluation activity).

If "implement functionality" is selected:

Tests

AES-CBC Tests

- **Test 1:** AES-CBC Known Answer Tests

There are four Known Answer Tests (KATs), described below. In all KATs, the plaintext, ciphertext, and IV values shall be 128-bit blocks. The results from each test may either be obtained by the evaluator directly or by supplying the inputs to the implementer and receiving the results in response. To determine correctness, the evaluator shall compare the resulting values to those obtained by submitting the same inputs to a known good implementation.

- **Test 1.1:** KAT-1. To test the encrypt functionality of AES-CBC, the evaluator shall supply a set of 10 plaintext values and obtain the ciphertext value that results from AES-CBC encryption of the given plaintext using a key value of all zeros and an IV of all zeros. Five plaintext values shall be encrypted with a 128-bit all-zeros key, and the other five shall be encrypted with a 256-bit all-zeros key.

To test the decrypt functionality of AES-CBC, the evaluator shall perform the same test as for encrypt, using 10 ciphertext values as input and AES-CBC decryption.

- **Test 1.2:** KAT-2. To test the encrypt functionality of AES-CBC, the evaluator shall supply a set of 10 key values and obtain the ciphertext value that results from AES-CBC encryption of an all-zeros plaintext using the given key value and an IV of all zeros. Five of the keys shall be 128-bit keys, and the other five shall be 256-bit keys

To test the decrypt functionality of AES-CBC, the evaluator shall perform the same test as for encrypt, using an all-zero ciphertext value as input and AES-CBC decryption.

- **Test 1.3:** KAT-3. To test the encrypt functionality of AES-CBC, the evaluator shall supply the two sets of key values described below and obtain the ciphertext value that results from AES encryption of an all-zeros plaintext using the given key value and an IV of all zeros. The first set of keys shall have 128 128-bit keys, and the second set shall have 256 256-bit keys. Key i in each set shall have the leftmost i bits be ones and the rightmost $N-i$ bits be zeros, for i in $[1, N]$.

To test the decrypt functionality of AES-CBC, the evaluator shall supply the two sets of key and ciphertext value pairs described below and obtain the plaintext value that results from AES-CBC decryption of the given ciphertext using the given key and an IV of all zeros. The first set of key/ciphertext pairs shall have 128 128-bit key/ciphertext pairs, and the second set of key/ciphertext pairs shall have 256 256-bit key/ciphertext pairs. Key i in each set shall have the leftmost i bits be ones and the rightmost $N-i$ bits be zeros, for i in $[1, N]$. The ciphertext value in each pair shall be the value that results in an all-zeros plaintext when decrypted with its corresponding key.

- **Test 1.4:** KAT-4. To test the encrypt functionality of AES-CBC, the evaluator shall supply the set of 128 plaintext values described below and obtain the two ciphertext values that result from AES-CBC encryption of the given plaintext using a 128-bit key value of all zeros with an IV of all zeros and using a 256-bit key value of all zeros with an IV of all zeros, respectively. Plaintext value i in each set shall have the leftmost i bits be ones and the rightmost $128-i$ bits be zeros, for i in $[1, 128]$.

To test the decrypt functionality of AES-CBC, the evaluator shall perform the same test as for encrypt, using ciphertext values of the same form as the plaintext in the encrypt test as input and AES-CBC decryption.

- **Test 2:** AES-CBC Multi-Block Message Test

The evaluator shall test the encrypt functionality by encrypting an i -block message where $1 < i \leq 10$. The evaluator shall choose a key, an IV and plaintext message of length i blocks and encrypt the message, using the mode to be tested, with the chosen key and IV. The ciphertext shall be compared to the result of encrypting the same plaintext message with the same key and IV using a known good implementation.

The evaluator shall also test the decrypt functionality for each mode by decrypting an i -block message where $1 < i \leq 10$. The evaluator shall choose a key, an IV and a ciphertext message of length i blocks and decrypt the message, using the mode to be tested, with the chosen key and IV. The plaintext shall be compared to the result of decrypting the same ciphertext message with the same key and IV using a known good implementation.

- **Test 3:** AES-CBC Monte Carlo Tests

The evaluator shall test the encrypt functionality using a set of 200 plaintext, IV, and key 3-tuples. 100 of these shall use 128 bit keys, and 100 shall use 256 bit keys. The plaintext and IV values shall be 128-bit blocks. For each 3-tuple, 1000 iterations shall be run as follows:

```
# Input: PT, IV, Key
for i = 1 to 1000:
    if i == 1:
        CT[1] = AES-CBC-Encrypt(Key, IV, PT)
        PT = IV
    else:
        CT[i] = AES-CBC-Encrypt(Key, PT)
        PT = CT[i-1]
```

The ciphertext computed in the 1000th iteration (i.e., CT[1000]) is the result for that trial. This result shall be compared to the result of running 1000 iterations with the same values using a known good implementation.

The evaluator shall test the decrypt functionality using the same test as for encrypt, exchanging CT and PT and replacing AES-CBC-Encrypt with AES-CBC-Decrypt.

AES-GCM Test

- **Test 1:** The evaluator shall test the authenticated encrypt functionality of AES-GCM for each combination of the following input parameter lengths:

- 128 bit and 256 bit keys
- Two plaintext lengths. One of the plaintext lengths shall be a non-zero integer multiple of 128 bits, if supported. The other plaintext length shall not be an integer multiple of 128 bits, if supported.
- Three AAD lengths. One AAD length shall be 0, if supported. One AAD length shall be a non-zero integer multiple of 128 bits, if supported. One AAD length shall not be an integer multiple of 128 bits, if supported.
- Two IV lengths. If 96 bit IV is supported, 96 bits shall be one of the two IV lengths tested.

The evaluator shall test the encrypt functionality using a set of 10 key, plaintext, AAD, and IV tuples for each combination of parameter lengths above and obtain the ciphertext value and tag that results from AES-GCM authenticated encrypt. Each supported tag length shall be tested at least once per set of 10. The IV value may be supplied by the evaluator or the implementation being tested, as long as it is known.

The evaluator shall test the decrypt functionality using a set of 10 key, ciphertext, tag, AAD, and IV 5-tuples for each combination of parameter lengths above and obtain a Pass/Fail result on authentication and the decrypted plaintext if Pass. The set shall include five tuples that Pass and five that Fail.

The results from each test may either be obtained by the evaluator directly or by supplying the inputs to the implementer and receiving the results in response. To determine correctness, the evaluator shall compare the resulting values to those obtained by submitting the same inputs to a known good implementation.

AES-CCM Tests

- **Test 1:** The evaluator shall test the generation-encryption and decryption-verification functionality of AES-CCM for the following input parameter and tag lengths:

- 128 bit and 256 bit keys
- Two payload lengths. One payload length shall be the shortest supported payload length, greater than or equal to zero bytes. The other payload length shall be the longest supported payload length, less than or equal to 32 bytes (256 bits).
- Two or three associated data lengths. One associated data length shall be 0, if supported. One associated data length shall be the shortest supported payload length, greater than or equal to zero bytes. One associated data length shall be the longest supported payload length, less than or equal to 32 bytes (256 bits). If the implementation supports an associated data length of 216 bytes, an associated data length of 216 bytes shall be tested.
- Nonce lengths. All supported nonce lengths between 7 and 13 bytes, inclusive, shall be tested.
- Tag lengths. All supported tag lengths of 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14 and 16 bytes shall be tested.

To test the generation-encryption functionality of AES-CCM, the evaluator shall perform the following four tests:

- **Test 1.1:** For EACH supported key and associated data length and ANY supported payload, nonce and tag length, the evaluator shall supply one key value, one nonce value and 10 pairs of associated data and payload values and obtain the resulting ciphertext.
- **Test 1.2:** For EACH supported key and payload length and ANY supported associated data, nonce and tag length, the

evaluator shall supply one key value, one nonce value and 10 pairs of associated data and payload values and obtain the resulting ciphertext.

- **Test 1.3:** For EACH supported key and nonce length and ANY supported associated data, payload and tag length, the evaluator shall supply one key value and 10 associated data, payload and nonce value 3-tuples and obtain the resulting ciphertext.
- **Test 1.4:** . For EACH supported key and tag length and ANY supported associated data, payload and nonce length, the evaluator shall supply one key value, one nonce value and 10 pairs of associated data and payload values and obtain the resulting ciphertext.

To determine correctness in each of the above tests, the evaluator shall compare the ciphertext with the result of generation-encryption of the same inputs with a known good implementation.

To test the decryption-verification functionality of AES-CCM, for EACH combination of supported associated data length, payload length, nonce length and tag length, the evaluator shall supply a key value and 15 nonce, associated data and ciphertext 3-tuples and obtain either a FAIL result or a PASS result with the decrypted payload. The evaluator shall supply 10 tuples that should FAIL and 5 that should PASS per set of 15.

AES Key Wrap (AES-KW) and Key Wrap with Padding (AES-KWP) Test

- **Test 1:** The evaluator shall test the authenticated encryption functionality of AES-KW for EACH combination of the following input parameter lengths:

- 128 and 256 bit key encryption keys (KEKs)
- Three plaintext lengths. One of the plaintext lengths shall be two semi-blocks (128 bits) One of the plaintext lengths shall be three semi-blocks (192 bits). The third data unit length shall be the longest supported plaintext length less than or equal to 64 semi-blocks (4096 bits).

using a set of 100 key and plaintext pairs and obtain the ciphertext that results from AES-KW authenticated-encryption. To determine correctness, the evaluator shall use the AES-KW authenticated-encryption function of a known good implementation.

The evaluator shall test the authenticated-decryption functionality of AES-KW using the same test as for authenticated-encryption, replacing plaintext values with ciphertext values and AES-KW authenticated-encryption with AES-KW authenticated-decryption.

The evaluator shall test the authenticated-encryption functionality of AES-KWP using the same test as for AES-KW authenticated-encryption with the following change in the three plaintext lengths:

- One plaintext length shall be one octet.
- One plaintext length shall be 20 octets (160-bits).
- One plaintext length shall be the longest supported plaintext length less than or equal to 512 octets (4096-bits).

The evaluator shall test the authenticated-decryption functionality of AES-KWP using the same test as for AES-KWP authenticated-encryption, replacing plaintext values with ciphertext values and AES-KWP authenticated-encryption with AES-KWP authenticated-decryption.

FCS_COP.1(2) Cryptographic Operation (Hashing Algorithms)

FCS_COP.1.1(2)

Refinement: The TSF shall [selection: invoke platform-provided functionality, implement functionality] to perform cryptographic hashing in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [selection: SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512] and message digest sizes [selection: 256, 384, 512] bits that meet the following: FIPS Pub 180-4

Application Note: The intent of this requirement is to specify the hashing function for trusted channel protocols The hash selection must support the message digest size selection. The hash selection should be consistent with the overall strength of the algorithm used (for example, SHA-256 for 128-bit keys).

Evaluation Activity

If "invoke platform-provided functionality" is selected:

TSS

The evaluator shall examine the [TSS](#) of the [MDM Server's ST](#) to verify that it describes (for each supported platform) how the hash functionality is invoked for each digest size selected in the [MDM Server's ST](#) (it should be noted that this may be through a mechanism that is not implemented by the [MDM Server](#); nonetheless, that mechanism will be identified in the [TSS](#) as part of this assurance-evaluation activity).

If "implement functionality" is selected:

TSS

The evaluator shall check that the association of the hash function with other [TSF](#) cryptographic functions (for example, the digital signature verification function) is documented in the [TSS](#). The evaluator checks the AGD documents to determine that any configuration that is required to be done to configure the functionality for the required hash sizes is present. The [TSF](#) hashing functions can be implemented in one of two modes. The first mode is the byte-oriented mode. In this mode the [TSF](#) only hashes messages that are an integral number of bytes in length; i.e., the length (in bits) of the message to be hashed is divisible by 8. The

second mode is the bit-oriented mode. In this mode the [TSF](#) hashes messages of arbitrary length. As there are different tests for each mode, an indication is given in the following sections for the bit-oriented vs. the byte-oriented testmacs.

Tests

The evaluator shall perform all of the following tests for each hash algorithm implemented by the [TSF](#) and used to satisfy the requirements of this [PP](#).

Short Messages Test Bit-oriented Mode

- **Test 1:** The evaluators devise an input set consisting of $m+1$ messages, where m is the block length of the hash algorithm. The length of the messages range sequentially from 0 to m bits. The message text shall be pseudorandomly generated. The evaluators compute the message digest for each of the messages and ensure that the correct result is produced when the messages are provided to the [TSF](#).

Short Messages Test Byte-oriented Mode

- **Test 1:** The evaluators devise an input set consisting of $m/8+1$ messages, where m is the block length of the hash algorithm. The length of the messages range sequentially from 0 to $m/8$ bytes, with each message being an integral number of bytes. The message text shall be pseudorandomly generated. The evaluators compute the message digest for each of the messages and ensure that the correct result is produced when the messages are provided to the [TSF](#).

Selected Long Messages Test Bit-oriented Mode

- **Test 1:** The evaluators devise an input set consisting of m messages, where m is the block length of the hash algorithm. The length of the i th message is $512 + 99*i$, where $1 \leq i \leq m$. The message text shall be pseudorandomly generated. The evaluators compute the message digest for each of the messages and ensure that the correct result is produced when the messages are provided to the [TSF](#).

Selected Long Messages Test Byte-oriented Mode

- **Test 1:** The evaluators devise an input set consisting of $m/8$ messages, where m is the block length of the hash algorithm. The length of the i th message is $512 + 8*99*i$, where $1 \leq i \leq m/8$. The message text shall be pseudorandomly generated. The evaluators compute the message digest for each of the messages and ensure that the correct result is produced when the messages are provided to the [TSF](#).

Pseudorandomly Generated Messages Test

- **Test 1:** This test is for byte-oriented implementations only. The evaluators randomly generate a seed that is n bits long, where n is the length of the message digest produced by the hash function to be tested. The evaluators then formulate a set of 100 messages and associated digests by following the algorithm provided in Figure 1 of [SHAVS]. The evaluators then ensure that the correct result is produced when the messages are provided to the [TSF](#).

FCS_COP.1(3) Cryptographic Operation (Signature Algorithms)

FCS_COP.1.1(3)

Refinement: The TSF shall [selection: invoke platform-provided functionality, implement functionality] to perform cryptographic signature services (generation and verification) in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [selection:

- RSA schemes using cryptographic key sizes of 2048-bit or greater that meet the following: FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", Section 4,
- ECDSA schemes using "NIST curves" P-384 and [selection: P-256, P-521, no other curves] that meet the following: FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", Section 5

]

Application Note: The [ST](#) Author should choose the algorithm implemented to perform digital signatures. The [MDM](#) Server must perform digital signatures in accordance with the trusted channel protocols. The [MDM](#) Server is required to validate any signed policies and policy updates sent by the [MDM](#) Server.

Evaluation Activity

If "invoke platform-provided functionality" is selected:

TSS

The evaluator shall examine the [TSS](#) of the [MDM](#) Server's [ST](#) to verify that it describes (for each supported platform) how the digital signature functionality is invoked for each operation they are used for in the [MDM](#) Server (it should be noted that this may be through a mechanism that is not implemented by the [MDM](#) Server; nonetheless, that mechanism will be identified in the [TSS](#) as part of this evaluation activity).

If "implement functionality" is selected:

Tests

ECDSA Algorithm Tests

- **Test 1:** ECDSA FIPS 186-4 Signature Generation Test

For each supported NIST curve (i.e., P-256, P-384 and P-521) and SHA function pair, the evaluator shall generate 10 1024-bit long messages and obtain for each message a public key and the resulting signature values R and S. To determine correctness, the evaluator shall use the signature verification function of a known good implementation.

- **Test 2:** ECDSA FIPS 186-4 Signature Verification Test

For each supported NIST curve (i.e., P-256, P-384 and P-521) and SHA function pair, the evaluator shall generate a set of 10 1024-bit message, public key and signature tuples and modify one of the values (message, public key or signature) in five of the 10 tuples. The evaluator shall obtain in response a set of 10 PASS/FAIL values

RSA Signature Algorithm Tests

- **Test 1:** Signature Generation Test

The evaluator shall verify the implementation of RSA Signature Generation by the [TOE](#) using the Signature Generation Test To conduct this test the evaluator must generate or obtain 10 messages from a trusted reference implementation for each modulus size/SHA combination supported by the [TSF](#). The evaluator shall have the [TOE](#) use their private key and modulus value to sign these messages.

The evaluator shall verify the correctness of the [TSF's](#) signature using a known good implementation and the associated public keys to verify the signatures.

- **Test 2:** Signature Verification Test

The evaluator shall perform the Signature Verification test to verify the ability of the [TOE](#) to recognize another party's valid and invalid signatures. The evaluator shall inject errors into the test vectors produced during the Signature Verification Test by introducing errors in some of the public keys e, messages, IR format, and/or signatures. The [TOE](#) attempts to verify the signatures and returns success or failure.

The evaluator shall use these test vectors to emulate the signature verification test using the corresponding parameters and verify that the [TOE](#) detects these errors.

FCS_COP.1(4) Cryptographic Operation (Keyed-Hash Message Authentication)

FCS_COP.1.1(4)

Refinement: The TSF shall [selection: invoke platform-provided functionality, implement functionality] to perform keyed-hash message authentication in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm HMAC -[selection: SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512], key sizes [assignment: key size (in bits) used in HMAC], and message digest sizes [selection: 256, 384, 512] bits that meet the following: FIPS Pub 198-1, "The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code, and FIPS Pub 180-4, "Secure Hash Standard." Application Note: The intent of this requirement is to specify the keyed-hash message authentication function used when used for key establishment purposes for the various cryptographic protocols used by the [TOE](#) (e.g., trusted channel). The hash selection must support the message digest size selection. The hash selection should be consistent with the overall strength of the algorithm used for [FCS_COP.1\(3\)](#).

Evaluation Activity

If "invoke platform-provided functionality" is selected:

TSS

The evaluator shall examine the [TSS](#) of the [MDM Server's ST](#) to verify that it describes (for each supported platform) how the keyed-hash functionality is invoked for each mode and key size selected in the [MDM Server's ST](#) (it should be noted that this may be through a mechanism that is not implemented by the [MDM Server](#); nonetheless, that mechanism will be identified in the [TSS](#) as part of this evaluation activity).

If "implement functionality" is selected:

TSS

The evaluator shall examine the [TSS](#) to ensure that it specifies the following values used by the HMAC function: key length, hash function used, block size, and output MAC length used.

Tests

For each of the supported parameter sets, the evaluator shall compose 15 sets of test data. Each set shall consist of a key and message data. The evaluator shall have the [TSF](#) generate HMAC tags for these sets of test data The resulting MAC tags shall be compared to the result of generating HMAC tags with the same key and IV using a known good implementation.

FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Extended: Random Bit Generation

[FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1](#)

The TSF shall [selection: *invoke platform-provided functionality, implement functionality*] to perform all deterministic random bit generation services in accordance with NIST Special Publication 800-90A using [selection: *Hash_DRBG (any), HMAC_DRBG (any), CTR_DRBG (AES)*].

Application Note: The ST author should select whether the ~~Server~~ server provides its own DRBG or uses the ~~platform's~~ platform's platforms. SP 800-90A contains three different methods of generating random numbers; each of these, in turn, depends on underlying cryptographic primitives (hash functions/ciphers). The ST author will select the function used, and include the specific underlying cryptographic primitives used in the requirement or in the TSS. While any of the identified hash functions (SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512) are allowed for Hash_DRBG or HMAC_DRBG, only AES-based implementations for CTR_DRBG are allowed.

[Evaluation Activity](#)

If "invoke platform-provided functionality" is selected:

TSS

The evaluator shall examine the TSS of the ~~MDM~~ Server's ST to verify that it describes (for each supported platform) how the RBG functionality is invoked for each operation they are used for in the MDM Server (it should be noted that this may be through a mechanism that is not implemented by the MDM Server; nonetheless, that mechanism will be identified in the TSS as part of this evaluation activity).

If "implement functionality" is selected:

Tests

The evaluator shall perform the following tests.

The evaluator shall perform 15 trials for the RNG implementation. If the RNG is configurable, the evaluator shall perform 15 trials for each configuration. The evaluator shall also confirm that the operational guidance contains appropriate instructions for configuring the RNG functionality.

If the RNG has prediction resistance enabled, each trial consists of (1) instantiate DRBG, (2) generate the first block of random bits, (3) generate a second block of random bits, and (4) unstantiate. The evaluator verifies that the second block of random bits is the expected value. The evaluator shall generate eight input values for each trial. The first is a count (0 - 14). The next three are entropy input, nonce, and personalization string for the instantiate operation. The next two are additional input and entropy input for the first call to generate. The final two are additional input and entropy input for the second call to generate. These values are randomly generated. "generate one block of random bits" means to generate random bits with number of returned bits equal to the Output Block Length (as defined in NIST SP 800-90A).

If the RNG does not have prediction resistance, each trial consists of (1) instantiate DRBG, (2) generate the first block of random bits (3) reseed, (4) generate a second block of random bits, and (5) unstantiate. The evaluator verifies that the second block of random bits is the expected value. The evaluator shall generate eight input values for each trial. The first is a count (0 - 14). The next three are entropy input, nonce, and personalization string for the instantiate operation. The fifth value is additional input to the first call to generate. The sixth and seventh are additional input and entropy input to the call to reseed. The final value is additional input to the second generate call.

The following paragraphs contain more information on some of the input values to be generated/selected by the evaluator.

Entropy input: the length of the entropy input value must equal the seed length.

Nonce: If a nonce is supported (CTR_DRBG with no Derivation Function does not use a nonce), the nonce bit length is one-half the seed length.

Personalization string: The length of the personalization string must be less than or equal to seed length. If the implementation only supports one personalization string length, then the same length can be used for both values. If more than one string length is support, the evaluator shall use personalization strings of two different lengths. If the implementation does not use a personalization string, no value needs to be supplied.

Additional input: the additional input bit lengths have the same defaults and restrictions as the personalization string lengths.

[FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2](#)

The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by an entropy source that accumulates entropy from [selection: *a software-based noise source, a platform-based RBG, a hardware-based noise source, no other sources*] with a minimum of selection: 128 bits, 256 bits] of entropy at least equal to the greatest security strength (according to NIST SP 800-57) of the keys and hashes that it will generate.

Application Note: For the first selection in this requirement, the ST author selects 'software-based noise source' if any additional noise sources are used as input to the application's DRBG. Note that the application must use the platform's DRBG to seed its DRBG.

In the second selection in this requirement, the ST author selects the appropriate number of bits of entropy that corresponds to the greatest security strength of the algorithms included in the ST. Security strength is defined in Tables 2 and 3 of NIST SP 800-57A. For example, if the implementation includes 2048-bit RSA (security strength of 112 bits), AES 128 (security strength 128 bits), and HMAC-SHA-256 (security strength 256 bits), then the ST author would select 256 bits.

[Evaluation Activity](#)

TSS

Documentation shall be produced-and the evaluator shall perform the activities-in accordance with Appendix D: Entropy

Documentation and Assessment and the "Clarification to the Entropy Documentation and Assessment Annex."

In the future, specific statistical testing (in line with NIST SP 800-90B) will be required to verify the entropy estimates.

FCS_STG_EXT.1 Cryptographic Key Storage

FCS_STG_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall utilize [selection: platform-provided key storage, encryption as specified in FCS_STG_EXT.2] for all persistent secrets and private keys.

Application Note: This requirement ensures that persistent secrets (credentials, secret keys) and private keys are stored securely when not in use. If some secrets/keys are manipulated by the TOE and others are manipulated by the platform, then both of the selections can be specified by the ST author and the ST author must identify in the TSS those keys which are manipulated by the TOE and those by the platform.

If "encryption as specified in FCS_STG_EXT.2" is selected then FCS_STG_EXT.2 and FCS_IV_EXT.1 must be included in the ST.

If the TSF is an application, and not a dedicated server, then it should store its private keys in the platform-provided key storage

The ST author is responsible for selecting the manner in which the keys are stored and where they are stored in the selections above.

Evaluation Activity

TSS

Regardless of whether this requirement is met by the TSF or the TOE platform, the evaluator will check the TSS to ensure that it lists each persistent secret (credential, secret key) and private key needed to meet the requirements in the ST. For each of these items, the evaluator will confirm that the TSS lists for what purpose it is used, and how it is stored. The evaluator ~~than then~~ performs the following actions.

Persistent secrets and private keys manipulated by the TOE platform:

The evaluator shall examine the TSS of the MDM Server's ST to verify that it describes (for each supported platform) how the key storage functionality is invoked for each persistent secret and private key described in the TSS (it should be noted that this may be through a mechanism that is not implemented by the MDM Server; nonetheless, that mechanism will be identified in the TSS as part of this evaluation activity).

Persistent secrets and private keys manipulated by the TSF:

The evaluator reviews the TSS to determine that it makes a case that, for each item listed as being manipulated by the TOE, it is not written unencrypted to persistent memory, and that the item is stored by the platform.

~~===== >>>>>>> Distributed TOE~~

6.2.3-4 Identification and Authentication (FIA)

FIA_ENR_EXT.1 Enrollment of Mobile Device into Management

FIA_ENR_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall authenticate the remote ~~user~~ ~~users~~ over a trusted channel during the enrollment of a mobile device

Application Note: The MDM Server may use its own directory or a directory server to perform the authentication decision for users performing the remote enrollment of a mobile device.

Evaluation Activity

TSS

The evaluator shall examine the TSS and verify that it describes the process of enrollment for each MDM Agent/platform listed as supported in the ST. This description shall include the trusted path used for enrollment (FTP TRP.1(2)), the method of user authentication (username/password, token, etc.), the method of authentication decision (local or remote authentication services), and the actions performed on the MDM Server upon successful authentication.

Tests

- **Test 1:** The evaluator shall attempt to enroll a device without providing correct credentials. The evaluator shall verify that the device is not enrolled and that the described enrollment actions are not taken.
- **Test 2:** The evaluator shall attempt to enroll the device providing correct credentials. The evaluator shall verify that the device is enrolled and that the described enrollment actions are taken.

FIA_ENR_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall limit the user's enrollment of devices to devices specified by [selection: IMEI, [assignment: a unique device ID]] and [selection: specific device models, a number of devices, specific time period, [assignment: other features], no other features].

Application Note: This requirement is designed to permit the enterprise to restrict users' enrollment of devices.

~~In the next version of this Protection Profile, a A unique device ID will be is~~ required to limit the user's enrollment. The unique device ID can be the IMEI or an ID specific to a particular platform.

Evaluation Activity

TSS

The evaluator shall examine the TSS and verify that it implements a policy to limit the user's enrollment of devices

Guidance

The evaluator shall ensure that the administrative guidance describes the method(s) of restricting user enrollment and that it instructs the administrator how to configure the restrictions.

Tests

For each type of policy selected, the evaluator shall perform the following:

- **Test 1:** The evaluator shall attempt to configure the [MDM](#) Server according to the administrative guidance in order to prevent enrollment. The evaluator shall verify that the user cannot enroll a device outside of the configured limitation (For example, the evaluator may try to enroll a disallowed device, or may try to enroll additional devices beyond the number allowed.)

FIA_UAU.1 Timing of Authentication

[FIA_UAU.1.1](#)

Refinement: The TSF shall [selection: invoke platform-provided functionality, implement functionality] to allow assignment: list of TSF mediated actions] on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated with the Server

[Evaluation Activity](#)

TSS

If "invoke platform-provided functionality" is selected, the evaluator shall examine the [TSS](#) of the [MDM](#) Server's [ST](#) to verify that it describes (for each supported platform) how this functionality is invoked (it should be noted that this may be through a mechanism that is not implemented by the [MDM](#) Server; nonetheless, that mechanism will be identified in the [TSS](#) as part of this evaluation activity).

[FIA_UAU.1.2](#)

Refinement: The TSF shall [selection: invoke platform-provided functionality, implement functionality] that requires each user to be successfully authenticated with the Server before allowing any other [TSF](#)-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

Application Note: This requirement ensures that any user attempting to access the [TSF](#) must be authenticated. These users may be administrators attempting to administer the [TOE](#) or ordinary users attempting to enroll for management by the [MDM](#) system. The [ST](#) author is responsible for assigning the list of actions that can take place before this authentication. The [TSF](#) or [TOE](#) platform may utilize enterprise authentication to meet this requirement.

For distributed [TOE](#)'s at least one [TOE](#) component has to support the authentication of ~~Administrators~~ administrators but not necessarily all [TOE](#) components. In case not all [TOE](#) components support authentication for ~~Administrators~~ administrators the [TSS](#) shall must describe how ~~Administrators~~ administrators are authenticated and identified.

[Evaluation Activity](#)

TSS

If "invoke platform-provided functionality" is selected, the evaluator shall examine the [TSS](#) of the [MDM](#) Server's [ST](#) to verify that it describes (for each supported platform) how this functionality is invoked (it should be noted that this may be through a mechanism that is not implemented by the [MDM](#) Server; nonetheless, that mechanism will be identified in the [TSS](#) as part of this evaluation activity).

Tests

The evaluator shall perform the following tests:

- **Test 1:** The evaluator shall attempt to perform the prohibited actions before authentication. The evaluator shall verify the actions cannot be performed.
- **Test 2:** The evaluator shall attempt to perform the prohibited actions after authentication. The evaluator shall verify the actions can be performed.

FIA_X509_EXT.1(1) [X.509 Certificate Validation of Certificates](#)

[FIA_X509_EXT.1.1\(1\)](#)

The TSF shall [selection: invoke platform-provided functionality, implement functionality] to validate certificates in accordance with the following rules:

- RFC 5280 certificate validation and certificate path validation.
- The certificate path must terminate with a trusted CA certificate.
- The [TSF](#) shall validate a certificate path by ensuring the presence of the basicConstraints extension and that the CA flag is set to TRUE for all CA certificates.
- The [TSF](#) shall validate the revocation status of the certificate using selection: the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) as specified in RFC 2560, a Certificate Revocation List (CRL) as specified in RFC 5280 Section 6.3 a Certificate Revocation List (CRL) as specified in RFC 5759 Section 5].
- The [TSF](#) shall validate the extendedKeyUsage field according to the following rules:
 - Certificates used for trusted updates and executable code integrity verification shall have the Code Signing purpose (id-kp 3 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
 - Server certificates presented for TLS shall have the Server Authentication purpose (id-kp-1 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
 - Client certificates presented for TLS shall have the Client Authentication purpose (id-kp-2 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
 - CSP certificates presented for OCSP responses shall have the OCSP Signing purpose (id-kp 9 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
 - Server certificates presented for [EST](#) shall have the CMC Registration Authority (RA) purpose (id-kp-cmcRA with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.28) in the extendedKeyUsage field.

Application Note: [FIA_X509_EXT.1.1\(1\)](#) lists the rules for validating certificates. The [ST](#) author shall must select whether

revocation status is verified using OCSP or CRLs. [FIA_X509_EXT.2](#) requires that certificates are used for trusted channels; this use requires that the extendedKeyUsage rules are verified. Certificates may optionally be used for code signing and policy signing and, if implemented, must be validated to contain the corresponding extendedKeyUsage.

Regardless of the selection of implement functionality or invoke platform-provided functionality, the validation is expected to end in a trusted root CA certificate in a root store managed by the platform.

[Evaluation Activity](#)

If "invoke platform-provided functionality" is selected:

TSS

The evaluator shall examine the [TSS](#) of the [MDM Server's ST](#) to verify that it describes (for each supported platform) how the certificate validation functionality is invoked (it should be noted that this may be through a mechanism that is not implemented by the [MDM Server](#); nonetheless, that mechanism will be identified in the [TSS](#) as part of this evaluation activity).

If "implement functionality" is selected:

TSS

The evaluator shall ensure the [TSS](#) describes where the check of validity of the certificates takes place. The evaluator ensures the [TSS](#) also provides a description of the certificate path validation algorithm.

Tests

The tests described must be performed in conjunction with the other certificate services [assurance-evaluation](#) activities, including each of the functions in [FIA_X509_EXT.2.1](#). The tests for the extendedKeyUsage rules are performed in conjunction with the uses that require those rules. The evaluator shall create a chain of at least [four-three](#) certificates: the node certificate to be tested, [two](#) an Intermediate [CA](#)s CA, and the self-signed Root CA.

- **Test 1:** The evaluator shall load a certificate or certificates as trusted CAs needed to validate the certificate to be used in the function, and demonstrate that the function succeeds. The evaluator shall then delete one of the certificates, and show that the function fails.
- **Test 2:** The evaluator shall demonstrate that validating an expired certificate results in the function failing.
- **Test 3:** The evaluator shall test that the [TOE](#) can properly handle revoked certificates--conditional on whether CRL or OCSP is selected; if both are selected, then a test shall be performed for each method. The evaluator shall test revocation of the node certificate and revocation of the intermediate CA certificate (i.e. the intermediate CA certificate should be revoked by the root CA). The evaluator shall ensure that a valid certificate is used, and that the validation function succeeds. The evaluator then attempts the test with a certificate that has been revoked (for each method chosen in the selection) to ensure when the certificate is no longer valid that the validation function fails.
- **Test 4:** [Conditional] If OCSP is selected, the evaluator shall configure the OCSP server or use a man-in-the-middle tool to present a certificate that does not have the OCSP signing purpose and verify that validation of the OCSP response fails. If CRL is selected and the CA contains a Key Usage extension, the evaluator shall configure the CA to sign a CRL with a certificate that does not have the cRLsign key usage bit set, and verify that validation of the CRL fails. If the CA is a root CA with no Key Usage extension, this test is not performed.
- **Test 5:** The evaluator shall modify any byte in the first eight bytes of the certificate and demonstrate that the certificate fails to validate. (The certificate will fail to parse correctly.)
- **Test 6:** The evaluator shall modify any byte in the last byte of the certificate and demonstrate that the certificate fails to validate. (The signature on the certificate will not validate.)
- **Test 7:** The evaluator shall modify any byte in the public key of the certificate and demonstrate that the certificate fails to validate. (The signature on the certificate will not validate.)

[FIA_X509_EXT.1.2\(1\)](#)

The TSF shall [\[selection: invoke platform-provided functionality, implement functionality\]](#) to treat a certificate as a CA certificate only if the basicConstraints extension is present and the CA flag is set to TRUE.

Application Note: This requirement applies to certificates that are used and processed by the [TOE](#) or platform and restricts the certificates that may be added as trusted CA certificates.

[Evaluation Activity](#)

If "invoke platform-provided functionality" is selected:

TSS

The evaluator shall examine the [TSS](#) of the [MDM Server's ST](#) to verify that it describes (for each supported platform) how this functionality is invoked (it should be noted that this may be through a mechanism that is not implemented by the [MDM Server](#); nonetheless, that mechanism will be identified in the [TSS](#) as part of this evaluation activity).

If "implement functionality" is selected:

Tests

The tests described must be performed in conjunction with the other certificate services [assurance-evaluation](#) activities, including the functions in [FIA_X509_EXT.2.1](#). The evaluator shall create a chain of at least four certificates: the node certificate to be tested, two Intermediate CAs, and the self-signed Root CA.

- **Test 1:** The evaluator shall construct a certificate path, such that the certificate of the CA issuing the [TOE's](#) certificate does not contain the basicConstraints extension. The validation of the certificate path fails.
- **Test 2:** The evaluator shall construct a certificate path, such that the certificate of the CA issuing the [TOE's](#) certificate has

the cA flag in the basicConstraints extension not set. The validation of the certificate path fails

- **Test 3:** The evaluator shall construct a certificate path, such that the certificate of the CA issuing the **TOE's** certificate has the cA flag in the basicConstraints extension set to TRUE. The validation of the certificate path succeeds

FIA_X509_EXT.2 ~~X509~~ X.509 Certificate Authentication

FIA_X509_EXT.2.1

The TSF shall [selection:

- invoke platform-provided functionality to use X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support authentication for [selection: IPsec,

~~implement functionality]~~

- HTTPS, TLS, DTLS, SSH, no protocols], and [selection:
 - code signing for system software updates,
 - code signing for integrity verification,
 - policy signing,
 - [assignment: other uses],
 - no additional uses],
- implement functionality to use X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support authentication for \$selection:
 - IPsec as defined in the **PP-Module** for VPN Client,
 - HTTPS in accordance with **FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1**,
 - TLS as defined in the Package for Transport Layer Security
 - DTLS as defined in the Package for Transport Layer Security
 - SSH as defined in the Extended Package for Secure Shel,
 - no protocols], and [selection:
 - code signing for system software updates,
 - code signing for integrity verification,
 - policy signing,
 - [assignment: other uses],
 - no additional uses].

]

Application Note: The **ST** author's selection(s) shall ~~must~~ match the selection of **FTP_TRP.1(2)**, **FTP_ITC.1(1)**, **FTP_ITC.1(2)**, **FPT_ITT.1(1)**, and **FPT_ITT.1(2)**. Certificates may optionally be used for trusted updates of system software (**FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3**) and software integrity verification (**FPT_TST_EXT.1.2**). If some authentication services are provided by the **TOE** and others by the platform, the **ST** author shall ~~must~~ clearly identify which services are provided by the **TOE** and which by the platform.

If code signing for integrity verification is selected, the **MDM** vendor is not expected to digitally sign DLL's from other vendors that have been incorporated into their product.

~~If "IPsec" is selected the Module for IPsec VPN Clients must be included in the **ST**.~~

~~If "SSH" is selected the Module for Secure Shell must be included in the **ST**. It should be noted that due to constraints imposed by this PP that sha1 cannot be used.~~

~~If "HTTPS" is selected the appropriate selection-based **SFRs** from Appendix B must be included in the **ST**.~~

~~If "TLS" or "DTLS" is selected the TLS Functional Package must be included in the **ST**. It should be noted that due to constraints imposed by this PP that TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA cannot be used.~~

Evaluation Activity

TSS

If "invoke platform-provided functionality" is selected, the evaluator shall examine the **TSS** of the **MDM** Server's **ST** to verify that it describes (for each supported platform) how this functionality is invoked (it should be noted that this may be through a mechanism that is not implemented by the **MDM** Server; nonetheless, that mechanism will be identified in the **TSS** as part of this evaluation activity).

FIA_X509_EXT.2.2

When the [selection: TSF, **TOE** platform] cannot establish a connection to determine the validity of a certificate, the TSF shall [selection: invoke platform-provided functionality, implement functionality] to [selection: allow the administrator to choose whether to accept the certificate in these cases, accept the certificate, not accept the certificate].

Application Note: Often a connection must be established to perform a verification of the revocation status of a certificate - either to download a CRL or to perform OCSP. The selection is used to describe the behavior in the event that such a connection cannot be established (for example, due to a network error). If the **TOE** has determined the certificate is valid according to all other rules in **FIA_X509_EXT.1(1)**, the behavior indicated in the second selections shall ~~must~~ determine the validity. The **TOE** must not accept the certificate if it fails any of the other validation rules in **FIA_X509_EXT.1(1)**. If the administrator-configured option is selected by the **ST** Author, the **ST** Author must also select function d in **FMT_SMF.1(2)**.

If the **TOE** is distributed and **FIA_X509_EXT.1(2)** is selected, then certificate revocation checking is optional. This is due to additional authorization actions being performed in the enabling and disabling of the intra-**TOE** trusted channel as defined in **FCO_CPC_EXT.1**. In this case, a connection is not required to determine certificate validity and this **SFR** is trivially satisfied.

Evaluation Activity

TSS

The evaluator shall check the [TSS](#) to ensure that it describes how the [TOE](#) chooses which certificates to use, and any necessary instructions in the administrative guidance for configuring the operating environment so that the [TOE](#) can use the certificates.

If "invoke platform-provided functionality" is selected, the evaluator shall examine the [TSS](#) of the [MDM Server's ST](#) to verify that it describes (for each supported platform) how this functionality is invoked (it should be noted that this may be through a mechanism that is not implemented by the [MDM Server](#); nonetheless, that mechanism will be identified in the [TSS](#) as part of this evaluation activity).

If "implement functionality" is selected, the evaluator shall examine the [TSS](#) to confirm that it describes the behavior of the [TOE](#) when a connection cannot be established during the validity check of a certificate used in establishing a trusted channel. The evaluator shall verify that any distinctions between trusted channels are described.

Guidance

If the requirement that the administrator is able to specify the default action is selected, then the evaluator shall ensure that the operational guidance contains instructions on how this configuration action is performed.

Tests

The evaluator shall perform the following test for each trusted channel:

- **Test 1:** The evaluator shall demonstrate use of a valid certificate requiring certificate validation checking to be performed in at least some part by communicating with a non-[TOE](#) IT entity. The evaluator shall then manipulate the environment so that the [TOE](#) is unable to verify the validity of the certificate, and observe that the action selected in [FIA_X509_EXT.2.2](#) is performed. If the selected action is administrator-configurable, then the evaluator shall follow the operational guidance to determine that all supported administrator-configurable options behave in their documented manner.

FIA_X509_EXT.

2.3

5 X.509 Unique Certificate

[FIA_X509_EXT.5.1](#)

The TSF shall [selection: invoke platform-provided functionality, implement functionality] to require a unique certificate for each client device.

Application Note: Each client device will have a unique X.509v3 certificate for use by the [MDM Agent](#); the certificate is not to be reused among clients. This requirement is to ensure that the [MDM Server](#) either provides

an

a unique certificate or verifies that each client certificate is unique

Evaluation Activity

TSS

If "invoke platform-provided functionality" is selected, the evaluator shall examine the [TSS](#)

of the [MDM Server's ST](#)

to verify that it describes (for each supported platform) how this functionality is invoked (it should be noted that this may be through a mechanism that is not implemented by the [MDM Server](#); nonetheless, that mechanism will be identified in the [TSS](#) as part of this evaluation activity).

If "implement functionality" is selected then the evaluator shall examine the [TSS](#) to verify that it describes the methods to ensure that each client utilizes a unique certificate.

Tests

For each [MDM Agent/platform](#) listed as supported in the [ST](#):

The evaluator shall utilize appropriate combinations of specialized operational environment and development tools (debuggers, simulators, etc.) for the [TOE](#) and instrumented [TOE](#) builds as needed to perform this test

One of the following

test

tests must be performed depending on

if

whether the MDM agent allows for the loading of certificates

- **Test 1:** [conditional] If the MDM agent allows for the loading of certificates:

The evaluator shall initiate communications between the [MDM Server](#) and a client device over a trusted channel established using the device's unique certificate, verifying that a successful communication channel was established. The evaluator shall then attempt to initiate communications between the [MDM Server](#) and a second client device over a trusted channel established using the unique certificate from the first device, verifying that the [MDM Server](#) rejects this attempt at communication.

- **Test 2:** [conditional] If the MDM agent does not allow for the loading of certificates:

The evaluator shall concurrently enroll 10 devices and ensure that the client certificate for each is unique, per the methods

described in the TSS.

6.2.4-5 Security Management (FMT)

FMT_MOF.1(1) Management of Functions Behavior

FMT_MOF.1.1(1)

Refinement: The TSF shall restrict the ability to perform the functions

- listed in [FMT_SMF.1\(1\)](#)
- enable, disable, and modify policies listed in [FMT_SMF.1\(1\)](#)
- listed in [FMT_SMF.1\(2\)](#)
- [selection: enable, disable and modify policies listed in [FMT_SMF.1\(3\)](#), no other functions]

to [authorized administrators].

Application Note: This requirement outlines the functions that administrators will have the power to enable, disable, modify, and monitor functions and policies listed in [FMT_SMF.1\(1\)](#). It also includes functions necessary to maintain and configure the [MDM](#) Server itself.

"Enable, disable and modify policies listed in [FMT_SMF.1\(3\)](#)" shall must be selected if the [TOE](#) includes MAS functionality and the MAS SFRs shall [FMT_SMF.1\(3\)](#), [FAU_GEN.1\(2\)](#), [FMT_MOF.1\(3\)](#), [FMT_SMR.1\(2\)](#) must be included in the [ST](#).

Evaluation Activity

TSS

The evaluator shall examine the [TSS](#) and user documents to ensure that it describes they describe what security management functions are restricted to the administrator and what actions can be taken for each management function. The evaluator shall verify that the security management functions are restricted to authorized administrators and the administrator is only able to take the actions as described in the user documents.

Tests

- **Test 1:** The evaluator shall attempt to access the functions and policies in [FMT_SMF.1\(1\)](#) as an unauthorized user and verify that the attempt fails.
- **Test 2:** [conditional] The evaluator shall attempt to access the functions and policies in [FMT_SMF.1\(3\)](#) as an unauthorized user and verify that the attempt fails.

FMT_MOF.1(2) Management of Functions Behavior (Enrollment)

FMT_MOF.1.1(2)

Refinement: The [MDM](#) Server shall restrict the ability to [initiate the enrollment process] to [authorized administrators and MD users].

Application Note: This requirement outlines the enrollment functions that both administrators and MD users may perform. The enrollment actions are identified in the [TSS](#) as a part of [FIA_ENR_EXT.1](#).

The authorized administrator does not remotely initiate enrollment of the mobile devices that are in the possession of users but may enroll mobile devices when they are in the possession of the administrator, for example, before distributing the mobile devices to the users.

Evaluation Activity

TSS

The evaluator shall examine the [TSS](#) and verify that it describes how unauthorized users are prevented from enrolling in the [MDM](#) services.

Tests

The test of this function is performed in conjunction with [FIA_ENR_EXT.1](#).

FMT_POL_EXT.1 Trusted Policy Update

FMT_POL_EXT.1.1

The [TSF](#) shall provide digitally signed policies and policy updates to the [MDM](#) Agent.

Application Note: The intent of this requirement is to cryptographically tie the policies to the enterprise that mandated the policy, not to protect the policies in transit (as they are already protected by [FPT_ITT.1\(1\)](#)/[FPT_ITT.1\(2\)](#) or [FTP_ITC.1\(2\)](#)). This is especially critical for users who connect to multiple enterprises.

Evaluation Activity

TSS

Policies must be digitally signed by the enterprise using the algorithms in [FCS_COP.1\(3\)](#). The evaluator shall ensure that the [TSS](#) describes how policies are digitally signed by the [TSF](#).

Guidance

If applicable, the evaluator shall verify that the AGD guidance instructs administrators on configuring the Enterprise certificate to be used for signing policies or signing the policies before applying them.

Tests

The evaluator shall perform a policy update in accordance with [FMT_SMF.1\(1\)](#). The evaluator shall examine the policy either at the [MDM](#) Server, in transmission, or at the [MDM](#) agent, and verify the [TSF](#) signs the update and provides it to the [MDM](#) Agent.

FMT_SMF.1(1) Specification of Management Functions (Server configuration of Agent)

Refinement: The **MDM Server** shall be capable of communicating the following commands to the **MDM Agent**:

1. transition to the locked state (MDF Function 6)
2. full wipe of protected data (MDF Function 7)
3. unenroll from management
4. install policies
5. query connectivity status
6. query the current version of the MD firmware/software
7. query the current version of the hardware model of the device
8. query the current version of installed mobile applications
9. import X.509v3 certificates into the Trust Anchor Database (MDF Function 11)
10. install applications (MDF Function 16)
11. update system software (MDF Function 15)
12. remove applications (MDF Function 14)

and the following commands to the **MDM Agent**:

[selection:

- 13. remove Enterprise applications (MDF Function 17),
- 14. wipe Enterprise data (MDF Function 28),
- 15. remove imported X.509v3 certificates and [selection:
 - no other X.509v3 certificates,
 - [assignment: list of other categories of X.509v3 certificates]] in the Trust Anchor Database (MDF Function 12),
- 16. alert the user,
- 17. import keys/secrets into the secure key storage (MDF Function 9)
- 18. destroy imported keys/secrets and [selection:
 - no other keys/secrets,
 - [assignment: list of other categories of keys/secrets]] in the secure key storage (MDF Function 10),
- 19. read audit logs kept by the MD (MDF Function 32)
- 20. retrieve MD-software integrity verification values (MDF Function 38)
- 21. approve exceptions for sharing data between [selection:
 - application processes,
 - group of application processes] (MDF Function 42),
- 22. place applications into application process groups based on [assignment: application characteristics] (MDF Function 43),
- 23. revoke Biometric template,
- 24. [assignment: list of other management functions to be provided by the MD],
- no other management functions

] and the following MD configuration policies

25. password policy:
 - a. minimum password length
 - b. minimum password complexity
 - c. maximum password lifetime (MDF Function 1)
26. session locking policy:
 - a. screen-lock enabled/disabled
 - b. screen lock timeout
 - c. number of authentication failures (MDF Function 2)
27. wireless networks (SSIDs) to which the MD may connect (MDF Function 2)
28. security policy for each wireless network:
 - a. [selection:
 - specify the CA(s) from which the MD will accept WLAN authentication server certificate(s)
 - specify the FQDN(s) of acceptable WLAN authentication server certificate(s)]
 - b. ability to specify security type
 - c. ability to specify authentication protocol
 - d. specify the client credentials to be used for authentication
 - e. [assignment: any additional WLAN management functions] (WLAN Client **PP-Module** Function 1)
29. application installation policy by [selection:
 - specifying authorized application repository(s),
 - specifying a set of allowed applications and versions (an application whitelist)
 - denying application installation], (MDF Function 8)
30. enable/disable policy for [assignment: list of audio or visual collection devices] across device, [selection:
 - on a per-app basis,
 - on a per-group of applications processes basis,
 - no other method], (MDF Function 5)

and the following MD configuration policies

[selection:

- 31. enable/disable policy for the VPN protection across MD, **[selection:**
 - on a per-app basis,
 - on a per-group of application processes basis
 - no other method]
(MDF Function 3),
- 32. enable/disable policy for **[assignment:** list of radios], (MDF Function 4),
- 33. enable/disable policy for data signaling over **[assignment:** list of externally accessible hardware ports], (MDF Function 24),
- 34. enable/disable policy for **[assignment:** list of protocols where the device acts as a server], (MDF Function 25),
- 35. enable/disable policy for developer modes, (MDF Function 26),
- 36. enable policy for data-at-rest protection, (MDF Function 20),
- 37. enable policy for removable media's data-at-rest protection, (MDF Function 21),
- 38. enable/disable policy for local authentication bypass, (MDF Function 27),
- 39. the Bluetooth trusted channel policy:
 - a. enable/disable the Discoverable mode (for BR/EDR)
 - b. change the Bluetooth device name, **[selection:**
 - allow/disallow additional wireless technologies to be used with Bluetooth,
 - disable/enable Advertising (for LE),
 - disable/enable the Connection mode,
 - disable/enable the Bluetooth services and/or profiles available on the device,
 - specify minimum level of security for each pairing,
 - configure allowable methods of Out of Band pairing
 - no other Bluetooth configuration]
(MDF Function 18)
- 40. enable/disable policy for display notification in the locked state of **[selection:**
 - email notifications,
 - calendar appointments,
 - contact associated with phone call notification,
 - text message notification,
 - other application-based notifications,
 - none]
(MDF Function 19)
- 41. policy for establishing a trusted channel or disallowing establishment if the MD cannot establish a connection to determine the validity of a certificate, (MDF Function 30),
- 42. enable/disable policy for the cellular protocols used to connect to cellular network base stations, (MDF Function 31)
- 43. policy for import and removal by applications of X.509v3 certificates in the Trust Anchor Database, (MDF Function 29),
- 44. **[selection:**
 - certificate,
 - public-key]
] used to validate digital signature on applications, (MDF Function 33),
- 45. policy for exceptions for shared use of keys/secrets by multiple applications, (MDF Function 34)
- 46. policy for exceptions for destruction of keys/secrets by applications that did not import the key/secret, (MDF Function 35),
- 47. the unlock banner policy, (MDF Function 36)
- 48. configure the auditable items (MDF Function 37),
- 49. enable/disable **[selection:**
 - USB mass storage mode,
 - USB data transfer without user authentication,
 - USB data transfer without authentication of the connection system]
(MDF Function 39) ,
- 50. enable/disable backup of **[selection:**
 - all applications,
 - selected applications,
 - selected groups of applications,
 - configuration data]
] to **[selection:** locally connected system, remote system] (MDF Function 40),
- 51. enable/disable **[selection:**
 - Hotspot functionality authenticated by **[selection:** pre-shared key, passcode, no authentication] ,
 - USB tethering authenticated by **[selection:** pre-shared key, passcode, no authentication]]
(MDF Function 41) ,
- 52. enable/disable location services:
[selection:
 - across device,
 - on a per-app basis,
 - on a per-group of application processes basis
 - no other method]
(MDF Function 22) ,
- 53. enable/disable policy for user unenrollment,
- 54. enable/disable policy for the Always-On VPN protection across device (MDF Function 45)
- 55. enable/disable policy for use of Biometric Authentication Factor (MDF Function 23)
- 56. Connectivity timeout policy: **[selection:**

- allowed [**selection:** number of missed reachability events, length of time without server connectivity] ,
- when server connectivity timeout is exceeded agent shall **selection:** disable user password, wipe device] and [**selection:** [assignment: other action], none]

],

- 57. enable/disable multi-user modes,
- 58. enable/disable automatic updates of system software,
- 59. enable/disable removable media,
- 60. [assignment: list of other policies to be provided by the MD], no other policies].

]

Application Note: This requirement captures all the configuration functionality the [TSF](#) provides the administrator to configure the [MDM](#) Agent. This requirement is broken into two configurable areas: [MDM](#) Agent commands and [MDM](#) Agent policies. The [ST](#) author can add more commands and configuration policies by completing the appropriate assignment statements.

The [ST](#) author shall not claim any functionality not provided by the Mobile Device All selections and assignments performed by the [ST](#) author in this requirement should match the selections and assignments of the validated Mobile Device [ST](#).

Function-specific Application Notes:

Function-specific application notes reference Mobile Device Fundamentals (MDF) [PP](#) v3.1.

Function [12](#) may be satisfied for the BYOD use case by application blacklisting and/or disabling In the case of BYOD, and an enterprise may not want to remove "personal" applications, thus for that use case disabling the application rather than removing it would allow the user to not lose any information they might have in the application

Function [16](#) provides the [MDM](#) server to display an alert to the user of the mobile device

The audit records read according to Function [19](#) are to be transmitted to an external audit server according to [FAU_STG_EXT.1](#). The [MDM](#) Server is not expected to retain those logs

Function [34](#) provides the ability to enable/disable policy for the list of protocols where the device acts as a server, such as a mobile hotspot.

Function [56](#) corresponds to FPT_NET_EXT.1.1 in Agent If the [MDM](#) Agent has not had a successful reachability event with the [MDM](#) Server in the amount of time specified in 'a', then the agent shall perform the action selected in 'b'. It is feasible, but not required, that if multiple actions are selected in 'b', each action could be associated with a different timeout in 'a'. If function [56](#) is included in the [ST](#), then FPT_NET_EXT.1.1 shall be included in the Agent [ST](#).

Evaluation Activity

TSS

The evaluator shall examine the [TSS](#) to ensure that it describes each management function listed The evaluator shall examine the [TSS](#) to verify that any differences between management functions and policies for each supported [MDM](#) Agent/platform are listed. The evaluator shall also examine the [ST](#) of the claimed Mobile Device to verify that the selections and assignments in the functions and policies in the [TSS](#) do not exceed the capabilities of the supported MD

The evaluator shall examine the [TSS](#) to ensure that it identifies the management functions implemented for each supported [MDM](#) Agent/platform, which are likely to be subsets of the all of the management functions available to the administrator on the [MDM](#) Server.

Tests

For each [MDM](#) Agent/platform listed as supported in the [ST](#):

- **Test 1:** The evaluator shall verify the ability to command each [MDM](#) Agent functional capability and configure each [MDM](#) Agent policy listed above.

FMT_SMF.1(2) Specification of Management Functions (Server Configuration of Server)

FMT_SMF.1.1(2)

Refinement: The [TSF](#) shall be capable of performing the following management functions:

- choose X.509v3 certificates for [MDM](#) Server use
- configure the [**selection:**
 - devices specified by [**selection:** IMEI, [assignment: a unique device ID]],
 - specific device models,
 - a number of devices,
 - specific time period
] and [**selection:** [assignment: other features], no other features] allowed for enrollment
- [**selection:**

1. allow the administrator to choose whether to accept the certificate when connection cannot be made to establish validity
2. configure the [TOE](#) unlock banner,
3. configure periodicity of the following commands to the agent: **assignment:** list of commands],
4. configure the privacy-sensitive information that will and will not be collected from particular mobile devices

5. configure the length of time the enrollment authenticator is valid
 6. configure the interaction between [TOE](#) components,
 7. configure the cryptographic functionality,
- d. 8. **[assignment: other management functions]**,
9. no other management functions]

Application Note: This requirement captures all the configuration functionality in the [MDM](#) Server to configure the underlying [MDM](#) Server. The [ST](#) author can add more commands and configuration policies by completing the assignment statement

Function a can be met by relying on the platform to configure the certificates used by the [MDM](#) server, however, the [MDM](#) Server **shall must** allow the administrator to choose which certificate is used for a specific functionality. The selection in b corresponds to the selection in [FIA_ENR_EXT.1.2](#). The selection in c.1 includes a function that corresponds to the selection in [FIA_X509_EXT.2.2](#). Function e.c.3 allows the administrator to configure periodicity of assigned commands, for example "read audit logs kept by the Mobile Device". In this way the administrator can configure the [MDM](#) system to retrieve audit logs from the Mobile Device on a periodic, such as daily, basis in order to ensure freshness of log data and to minimize loss of audit logs. Function f.c.4 allows the administrator to configure the privacy-sensitive information that will and will not be collected from particular mobile devices to handle **Bring Your Own Device (BYOD)** environments where some information may not be appropriate to collect. Privacy sensitive information may include items such as device physical location and lists of installed personal applications, and would vary depending on the particular capabilities of the [TOE](#) and [MDM](#) agent. The [TOE](#) should provide the capability to group enrolled devices into categories such as enterprise-owned and personal-owned and define the information that will be collected from devices in each category. Function g.c.5 corresponds to configuring the length of time the user authenticator for enrollment is valid in [FMT_SAE_EXT.1](#). This function **shall must** be included in the [ST](#) if and only if [FMT_SAE_EXT.1](#) is included in the [ST](#).

For distributed [TOEs](#) the interaction between [TOE](#) components will be configurable (see [FCO_CPC_EXT.1](#)). Therefore, the [ST](#) author includes the selection "Ability to configure the interaction between [TOE](#) components" for distributed [TOEs](#). A simple example would be the change of communication protocol according to [FPT_ITT.1\(1\)](#). Another example would be changing the management of a [TOE](#) component from direct remote administration to remote administration through another [TOE](#) component. A more complex use case would be if the realization of an [SFR](#) is achieved through two or more [TOE](#) components and the responsibilities between the two or more components could be modified.

For distributed [TOEs](#) that implement a registration channel (as described in [FCO_CPC_EXT.1.2](#)), the [ST](#) author uses the selection "configure the cryptographic functionality" in this [SFR](#), and its corresponding mapping in the [TSS](#), to describe the configuration of any cryptographic aspects of the registration channel that can be modified by the operational environment in order to improve the channel security.

Evaluation Activity

TSS

The evaluator shall examine the [TSS](#) to ensure that it describes each management function listed. For function f.c.4, the evaluator shall examine the [TSS](#) to ensure that it describes the privacy-sensitive information that the [TOE](#) has the capability to collect from enrolled mobile devices.

Guidance

The evaluator shall verify the AGD guidance includes detailed instructions of what options are available and how to configure each management functional capability listed.

Tests

The **test tests** of functions b, c.1, d.c.2, and g.c.5 are performed in conjunction with the use of the function Test 3 also covers function f.c.4. The evaluator shall perform the following test:

- **Test 1:** The evaluator shall configure the [TSF](#) authentication certificate(s) and verify that the correct certificate is used in established trusted connections ([FPT_ITT.1\(1\)](#), [FPT_ITT.1\(2\)](#), [FTP_ITC.1\(1\)](#), and [FTP_TRP.1\(2\)](#)).
- **Test 2:** (conditional) The evaluator shall configure the periodicity for the assigned list of commands to the agent for several configured time periods and shall verify that the [MDM](#) Server performs the commands schedule
- **Test 3:** (conditional) The evaluator shall design and perform tests to demonstrate that the assigned function may be configured and that the intended behavior of the function is enacted by the [MDM](#) Server.

FMT_SMR.1(1) Security Management Roles

FMT_SMR.1.1(1)

Refinement: The [TSF](#) shall maintain the roles administrator, MD user, and **selection: [assignment: additional authorized identified roles]**, no additional roles].

FMT_SMR.1.2(1)

The [TSF](#) shall be able to associate users with roles.

Application Note: It is envisioned that the [MDM](#) Server will be configured and maintained by different user roles. The assignment is used by the [ST](#) author to list the roles that are supported. At a minimum, one administrative role **shall must** be supported. If no additional roles are supported, then "no additional roles" is selected. The MD user role is used for enrollment of mobile devices to the [MDM](#) according to [FIA_ENR_EXT.1](#).

For distributed [TOEs](#), not every [TOE](#) component is required to implement its own user management to **fulfill fulfill** this [SFR](#). At least one component has to support authentication and identification of users according to [FIA_UAU.1](#). For the other [TOE](#) components authentication as Administrator can be realized through the use of a trusted channel (either according to [FTP_ITC.1](#) or [FPT_ITT.1\(1\)](#)/[FPT_ITT.1\(2\)](#)) from a component that supports the authentication of Administrators users according to [FIA_UAU.1](#).

The identification of users according to [FIA_UAU.1.2](#) and the association of users with roles according to [FMT_SMR.1.2\(1\)](#) is done through the components that support the authentication of ~~Administrators~~ [users](#) according to [FIA_UAU.1](#).

[Evaluation Activity](#)

TSS

The evaluator shall examine the [TSS](#) to verify that it describes the administrator role and the powers granted to and limitations of the role.

Guidance

The evaluator shall review the operational guidance to ensure that it contains instructions for administering the [TOE](#) and which interfaces are supported.

Tests

In the course of performing the testing activities for the evaluation, the evaluator shall use all supported interfaces, although it is not necessary to repeat each test involving an administrative action with each interface. The evaluator shall ensure, however, that each supported method of administering the [TOE](#) that conforms to the requirements of this [PP](#) be tested; for instance, if the [TOE](#) can be administered through a local hardware interface or HTTPS then both methods of administration must be exercised during the evaluation team's test activities.

6.2.5-6 Protection of the TSF (FPT)

FPT_API_EXT.1 Use of Supported Services and APIs

[FPT_API_EXT.1.1](#)

The TSF shall use only documented platform [API](#)'s.

Application Note: This requirement applies to the [API](#)s used when "invoke platform provided functionality" is selected in an SFR. The definition of *documented* may vary depending upon whether the [MDM](#) software is provided by a third party (who relies upon documented platform [API](#)s) or by a platform vendor who may be able to guarantee support for platform [API](#)'s.

[Evaluation Activity](#)

TSS

The evaluator shall verify that the TSS lists the platform [API](#)'s used by the [MDM](#) software. The evaluator shall then compare the list with the supported [API](#)'s (available through e.g. developer accounts, platform developer groups) and ensure that all [API](#)'s listed in the TSS are supported.

FPT_LIB_EXT.1 Use of Third Party Libraries

[FPT_LIB_EXT.1.1](#)

The [MDM](#) software shall be packaged with only ~~assignment:~~ list of third-party libraries].

Application Note: This requirement applies to libraries used when "implement functionality" is selected in an SFR. The intention of this requirement is for the evaluator to discover and document ~~whether~~ which software libraries the [MDM](#) software is including unnecessary or unexpected third-party libraries. This includes ~~adware libraries which could present a privacy threat, as well as ensuring documentation of such libraries in case vulnerabilities are later discovered with those libraries.~~

[Evaluation Activity](#)

TSS

The evaluator shall ~~install the MDM software and survey its installation directory for dynamic libraries~~ verify that the TSS lists the libraries used by the [MDM](#) software. The evaluator shall verify that libraries found to be packaged with or employed by the [MDM](#) software are limited to those in the assignment.

FPT_TST_EXT.1 Functionality Testing

[FPT_TST_EXT.1.1](#)

The [TSF](#) shall run a suite of self tests during initial start-up ~~on~~ power on) to demonstrate correct operation of the [TSF](#).

[FPT_TST_EXT.1.2](#)

The TSF shall [~~selection:~~ invoke platform-provided functionality, implement functionality] to provide the capability to verify the integrity of stored [TSF](#) executable code when it is loaded for execution through the use of the ~~selection:~~ TSF, [TOE platform](#)]-provided cryptographic services.

Application Note: While the [TOE](#) is typically a software package running in the IT Environment, it is still capable of performing the self-test activities required above. It should be understood, however, that there is a significant dependency on the host environment in assessing the assurance provided by the tests mentioned above (meaning that if the host environment is compromised, the self-tests will not be meaningful).

For distributed [TOEs](#) all [TOE](#) components (except the [MDM](#) Agent components) have to perform self-tests. This does not necessarily mean that each [TOE](#) component has to carry out the same self-tests: the [ST](#) describes the applicability of the selection (i.e. when self-tests are run) and the final assignment (i.e. which self-tests are carried out) to each [TOE](#) component.

[Evaluation Activity](#)

TSS

If "invoke platform-provided functionality" is selected, the evaluator shall examine the [TSS](#) of the [MDM](#) Server's ~~ST~~ to verify that it describes (for each supported platform) how this functionality is invoked (it should be noted that this may be through a mechanism that is not implemented by the [MDM](#) Server; nonetheless, that mechanism will be identified in the [TSS](#) as part of this evaluation activity).

If "implement functionality" is selected, the evaluator shall examine the [TSS](#) to ensure that it details the self-tests that are run by the [TSF](#) on start-up; this description should include an outline of what the tests are actually doing (e.g., rather than saying "memory is tested", a description similar to "memory is tested by writing a value to each memory location and reading it back to ensure it is identical to what was written" shall be used). The evaluator shall ensure that the [TSS](#) makes an argument that the tests are sufficient to demonstrate that the [TSF](#) is operating correctly.

The evaluator shall examine the [TSS](#) to ensure that it describes how to verify the integrity of stored [TSF](#) executable code when it is loaded for execution. The evaluator shall ensure that the [TSS](#) makes an argument that the tests are sufficient to demonstrate that the integrity of stored [TSF](#) executable code has not been compromised. The evaluator also ensures that the [TSS](#) (or the operational guidance) describes the actions that take place for successful (e.g. hash verified) and unsuccessful e.g., hash not verified) cases.

Tests

The evaluator shall perform the following tests:

- **Test 1:** The evaluator performs the integrity check on a known good [TSF](#) executable and verifies that the check is successful.
- **Test 2:** The evaluator modifies the [TSF](#) executable, performs the integrity check on the modified [TSF](#) executable and verifies that the check fails.

FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Trusted Update

[FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1](#)

The [TSF](#) shall provide Authorized Administrators the ability to query the current version of the [MDM Server](#) software.

Application Note: For a distributed [TOE](#), the method of determining the installed versions on each component of the [TOE](#) is described in the operational guidance. In the requirement, "software" refers to the component of the distributed [TOE](#) to which the requirement is being applied.

[Evaluation Activity](#)

Guidance

The evaluator shall ensure that the administrator guidance includes instructions for determining the current version of the [TOE](#).

Tests

The evaluator shall query the [TSF](#) for the current version of the software according to the AGD guidance and shall verify that the current version matches that of the documented and installed version.

[FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2](#)

The [TSF](#) shall [**selection:** invoke platform-provided functionality, implement functionality] to provide Authorized Administrators the ability to initiate updates to [TSF](#) software.

[Evaluation Activity](#)

TSS

If "invoke platform-provided functionality" is selected, the evaluator shall examine the [TSS](#) of the [MDM Server's ST](#) to verify that it describes (for each supported platform) how this functionality is invoked (it should be noted that this may be through a mechanism that is not implemented by the [MDM Server](#); nonetheless, that mechanism will be identified in the [TSS](#) as part of this evaluation activity).

[FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3](#)

The [TSF](#) shall [**selection:** invoke platform-provided functionality, implement functionality] to provide a means to verify software updates to the [TSF](#) using a digital signature mechanism prior to installing those updates

Application Note: The software on the [TSF](#) will occasionally need to be updated. This requirement is intended to ensure that the [TSF](#) only installs updates provided by the vendor, as updates provided by another source may contain malicious code. If the server is not an appliance, the update will be verified by the platform on which the server software runs. If the server is an appliance, the update must be verified by the [TSF](#) software or hardware.

For distributed [TOE](#)'s all [TOE](#) components shall must support Trusted Update. The verification of the signature or hash on the update shall must either be done by each [TOE](#) component itself (signature verification) or for each [TOE](#) component (hash verification).

Updating a distributed [TOE](#) might lead to the situation where different [TOE](#) components are running different software versions. Depending on the differences between the different software versions the impact of a mixture of different software versions might be no problem at all or critical to the proper functioning of the [TOE](#). The [TSS](#) shall must detail the mechanisms that support the continuous proper functioning of the [TOE](#) during trusted update of distributed [TOE](#)'s.

[Evaluation Activity](#)

TSS

If "invoke platform-provided functionality" is selected, the evaluator shall examine the [TSS](#) of the [MDM Server's ST](#) to verify that it describes (for each supported platform) how this functionality is invoked (it should be noted that this may be through a mechanism that is not implemented by the [MDM Server](#); nonetheless, that mechanism will be identified in the [TSS](#) as part of this evaluation activity).

If "implement functionality" is selected, the evaluator shall examine the [TSS](#) and verify that it describes the standards by which the updates are digitally signed and how the signature verification process is implemented.

Guidance

The evaluator shall examine the AGD guidance to verify that it describes how to query the current version of the [TSF](#) software, how to initiate updates and how to check the integrity of updates prior to installation.

Tests

The evaluator shall perform the following tests:

- **Test 1:** The evaluator shall attempt to initiate an update digitally signed by the vendor and verify that the update is successfully installed.
- **Test 2:** The evaluator shall attempt to install an update not digitally signed by the vendor and verify that either the signature can be checked (allowing the update to be aborted) or the update is not installed.

6.2.6-7 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)

FTP_ITC_EXT.1 Trusted Channel

FTP_ITC_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and **selection**:

- an MDM Agent that is internal to the TOE,
- an MDM Agent that is external to the TOE,
- other components comprising the distributed TOE

] that is logically distinct from other communication channels, as specified in [**selection**: [FPT_ITT.1\(1\)](#), [FPT_ITT.1\(2\)](#), [FTP_ITC.1\(2\)](#)].

Application Note: This SFR describes the communication channels between the MDM Server and an Agent that may or may not be in the TOE, and optionally separate components comprising a distributed TOE, to determine which selection-based SFRs will need to be included in the ST.

If the TOE includes an MDM Agent, then the communication channel between the Agent and MDM Server TSF is internal to the TOE and thus "an MDM Agent that is internal to the TOE" shall must be selected in the first selection. Additionally [FPT_ITT.1](#) shall (2) must be selected in the second selection and [FPT_ITT.1](#) shall (2) must be included in the ST.

If the TOE interoperates with an evaluated MDM Agent built into a mobile device (i.e., the TOE does not include an MDM Agent), the communication channel between the Agent and MDM Server TSF is external to the TOE and thus "an MDM Agent that is external to the TOE" shall must be selected in the first selection. Additionally [FTP_ITC.1\(2\)](#) shall must be selected in the second selection and [FTP_ITC.1\(2\)](#) shall must be included in the ST.

If the TOE is distributed then "other components comprising the distributed TOE" shall be is selected in the first selection and then [FPT_ITT.1](#) shall (1) must be selected in the second selection. [FPT_ITT.1](#) shall (1) must be included in the ST for all internal channels used to transfer TSF data between TOE components other than an MDM Agent.

Evaluation Activity

TSS

The evaluator shall ensure that the TSS contains whether the MDM Server communication channel is internal or external to the TOE.

Tests

This testing can be completed in conjunction with the testing for [FPT_ITT.1\(1\)/FPT_ITT.1\(2\)](#), [FTP_ITC.1\(2\)](#) or [FTP_ITC.1\(3\)](#).

FTP_ITC.1(1) Inter-TSF Trusted Channel (Authorized IT Entities)

FTP_ITC.1.1(1)

Refinement: The TSF shall **selection**:

- invoke platform-provided functionality to use **selection**:
 - IPsec,

~~implement functionality] to provide a trusted communication channel~~

- - SSH,
 - mutually authenticated TLS,
 - mutually authenticated DTLS,
 - HTTPS
-],
- implement functionality using **selection**:
 - IPsec as defined in the [PP-Module](#) for VPN Client,
 - SSH as defined in the Extended Package for Secure Shell
 - mutually authenticated TLS as defined in the Package for Transport Layer Security
 - mutually authenticated DTLS as defined in the Package for Transport Layer Security
 - HTTPS in accordance with [FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1](#)
-]

] to provide a trusted communication channel between itself and authorized IT entities supporting the following capabilities: audit server, [**selection**: authentication server, **assignment**: other capabilities] that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification ~~or~~ and disclosure.

Application Note: The intent of the mandatory portion of the above requirement is to use the cryptographic protocols identified in the requirement to establish and maintain a trusted channel with authorized IT entities that the TOE interacts with to perform its functions.

Protection (by one of the listed protocols) is required at least for communications with the server that collects the audit information. If it communicates with an authentication server (e.g., RADIUS), then the ST author chooses "authentication server" in [FTP_ITC.1.1\(1\)](#) and this connection must be protected by one of the listed protocols. If other authorized IT entities (e.g., NTP server) are protected, the ST author makes the appropriate assignments (for those entities) and selections (for the protocols that are used to protect those connections).

To summarize, the connection to an external audit collection server is required to be protected by one of the listed protocols. If an

external authentication server is supported, then it is required to protect that connection with one of the listed protocols. For any other external server, external communications are not required to be protected, but if protection is claimed, then it must be protected with one of the identified protocols.

For communications with any authorized IT entities outside of the [TOE](#), the MDM Server should still be able to support mutual authentication. There are no requirements levied on the external entities, but the MDM Server should be able to support mutual authentication. This way if the non-[TOE](#) authorized entity does support mutual authentication, the MDM Server is in a position to make use of that.

The trusted channel uses IPsec, TLS, DTLS, or HTTPS as the protocol that preserves the confidentiality and integrity of [MDM](#) communications. The [ST](#) author chooses the mechanism or mechanisms supported by the [TOE](#).

If "IPsec as defined in the [PP-Module](#) for VPN Client" is selected, the ~~Module for IPsec VPN Clients must be included in the~~ [ST](#) [TSF](#) must claim conformance to a PP-Configuration that includes the VPN Client [PP-Module](#).

If the [ST](#) author selects "SSH" ~~is selected the Module as defined in the Extended Package for Secure Shell", the TSF must be included in the~~ [ST](#) validated against the EP for Secure Shell with the [MDM PP](#). It should be noted that due to constraints imposed by this PP that sha1 cannot be used.

If "HTTPS" is selected the ~~appropriate selection-based~~ [SFRs](#) from Appendix B must be included in the [ST](#).

If "TLS" or "DTLS" is selected the ~~TLS Functional Package must be included in the~~ [ST](#) [ST](#) author selects "mutually authenticated TLS as defined in the Package for Transport Layer Security" or "mutually authenticated DTLS as defined in the Package for Transport Layer Security", the [TSF](#) must be validated against requirements from the Package for Transport Layer Security with the following selections made:

- FCS_TLS_EXT.1:
 - either TLS or DTLS is selected depending on the selection made in FTP_ITC.1.1(1)
 - either client or server is selected as appropriate
- FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.1 or FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.1 (as appropriate):
 - ~~TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA cannot be selected~~ The cipher suites selected must correspond with the algorithms and hash functions allowed in FCS_COP.1.
 - mutual authentication must be selected
- FCS_DTLSC_EXT.1.1 or FCS_DTLSS_EXT.1.1 (as appropriate):
 - ~~TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA cannot be selected~~ The cipher suites selected must correspond with the algorithms and hash functions allowed in FCS_COP.1.
 - mutual authentication must be selected

Protocol, RBG, Certificate validation, algorithm, and similar services may be met with platform provided services.

The requirement implies that not only are communications protected when they are initially established, but also on resumption after an outage. It may be the case that some part of the [TOE](#) setup involves manually setting up tunnels to protect other communication, and if after an outage the [TOE](#) attempts to re-establish the communication automatically with (the necessary) manual intervention, there may be a window created where an attacker might be able to gain critical information or compromise a connection.

Evaluation Activity

TSS

If "invoke platform-provided functionality" is selected, the evaluator shall examine the ~~TSS of the MDM Server's~~ [ST](#) to verify that it describes (for each supported platform) how this functionality is invoked (it should be noted that this may be through a mechanism that is not implemented by the [MDM](#) Server; nonetheless, that mechanism will be identified in the [TSS](#) as part of this evaluation activity).

FTP_ITC.1.2(1)

Refinement: The [TSF](#) shall [selection: invoke platform-provided functionality, implement functionality] to permit the [MDM](#) Server or other authorized IT entities to initiate communication via the trusted channel.

Evaluation Activity

TSS

If "invoke platform-provided functionality" is selected, the evaluator shall examine the ~~TSS of the MDM Server's~~ [ST](#) to verify that it describes (for each supported platform) how this functionality is invoked (it should be noted that this may be through a mechanism that is not implemented by the [MDM](#) Server; nonetheless, that mechanism will be identified in the [TSS](#) as part of this evaluation activity).

FTP_ITC.1.3(1)

Refinement: The [TSF](#) shall [selection: invoke platform-provided functionality, implement functionality] to initiate communication via the trusted channel for [assignment: list of services for which the TSF is able to initiate communication].

Application Note: While there are no requirements on the party initiating the communication, the [ST](#) author lists in the assignment for [FTP_ITC.1.3\(1\)](#) the services for which the [TOE](#) can initiate the communication with the authorized IT entity

Evaluation Activity

TSS

The evaluator shall examine the [TSS](#) to determine that the methods of communication with authorized IT entities are indicated, along with how those communications are protected.

If "invoke platform-provided functionality" is selected, the evaluator shall examine the ~~TSS of the MDM Server's~~ [ST](#) to verify that it describes (for each supported platform) how this functionality is invoked (it should be noted that this may be through a mechanism that is not implemented by the [MDM](#) Server; nonetheless, that mechanism will be identified in the [TSS](#) as part of this evaluation

activity).

Guidance

The evaluator shall confirm that the operational guidance contains instructions for configuring the communication channel between the [MDM](#) Server and authorized IT entities for each supported method

Tests

- **Test 1:** The evaluators shall ensure that communications using each specified (in the operational guidance) communication method is tested during the course of the evaluation, setting up the connections as described in the operational guidance and ensuring that communication is successful.
- **Test 2:** The evaluator shall ensure, for each method of communication, the channel data is not sent in plaintext
- **Test 3:** The evaluator shall ensure, for each communication channel with the [MDM](#) Server, that a protocol analyzer identifies the traffic as the protocol under testing.

Further ~~assurance~~-evaluation activities are associated with the specific protocols

FTP_TRP.1(1) Trusted Path (for Remote Administration)

FTP_TRP.1.1(1)

Refinement: The TSF shall [selection:

- invoke platform-provided functionality to use [selection:
 - IPsec,
 - TLS,
 - HTTPS,
 - SSH],
- implement functionality

] to use

- using [selection:
 - IPsec as defined in the [PP-Module](#) for VPN Client,
 - TLS as defined in the Package for Transport Layer Security
 - HTTPS in accordance with FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1,
 - SSH as defined in the Extended Package for Secure Shell]

] to provide a trusted communication path between itself as a [selection: server, peer] and remote administrators that is logically distinct from other communication paths and provides assured identification of its endpoints and protection of the communicated data from [modification, disclosure].

Evaluation Activity

TSS

If "invoke platform-provided functionality" is selected, the evaluator shall examine the [TSS](#) of the [MDM](#) Server's [ST](#) to verify that it describes (for each supported platform) how this functionality is invoked (it should be noted that this may be through a mechanism that is not implemented by the [MDM](#) Server; nonetheless, that mechanism will be identified in the [TSS](#) as part of this evaluation activity).

FTP_TRP.1.2(1)

Refinement: The TSF shall [selection: invoke platform-provided functionality, implement functionality] to permit remote administrators to initiate communication via the trusted path.

Evaluation Activity

TSS

If "invoke platform-provided functionality" is selected, the evaluator shall examine the [TSS](#) of the [MDM](#) Server's [ST](#) to verify that it describes (for each supported platform) how this functionality is invoked (it should be noted that this may be through a mechanism that is not implemented by the [MDM](#) Server; nonetheless, that mechanism will be identified in the [TSS](#) as part of this evaluation activity).

FTP_TRP.1.3(1)

Refinement: The TSF shall [selection: invoke platform-provided functionality, implement functionality] to require the use of the trusted path for [all remote administration actions].

Application Note: This requirement ensures that authorized remote administrators initiate all communication with the [TOE](#) via a trusted path, and that all communications with the [TOE](#) by remote administrators is performed over this path. The data passed in this trusted communication channel are encrypted as defined in the protocol chosen in the first selection. The [ST](#) author chooses the mechanism or mechanisms supported by the [TOE](#).

If "IPsec as defined in the [PP-Module](#) for VPN Client" is selected, the [Module](#) for IPsec VPN Clients must be included in the [ST](#). [TSF](#) must claim conformance to a PP-Configuration that includes the VPN Client [PP-Module](#).

If the [ST](#) author selects "SSH" is selected the [Module](#) as defined in the Extended Package for Secure Shell", the [TSF](#) must be included in the [ST](#) validated against the EP for Secure Shell with the [MDM PP](#). It should be noted that due to constraints imposed by this PP that sha1 cannot be used.

If "HTTPS" is selected the appropriate selection-based [SFRs](#) from Appendix B must be included in the [ST](#).

If "TLS" is selected the TLS Functional Package must be included in the **ST**. The author selects "TLS as defined in the Package for Transport Layer Security" the **TSS** must be validated against requirements from the Package for Transport Layer Security with the following selections made:

- FCS_TLS_EXT.1:
 - TLS must shall be selected
 - server must shall be selected
- FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.1:
 - TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA cannot be selected. The cipher suites selected must correspond with the algorithms and hash functions allowed in FCS_COP.1.

Protocol, RBG, Certificate validation, algorithm, and similar services may be met with platform provided services.

Evaluation Activity

TSS

The evaluator shall examine the **TSS** to determine that the methods of remote **TOE** administration are indicated, along with how those communications are protected. The evaluator shall also confirm that all protocols listed in the **TSS** in support of **TOE** administration are consistent with those specified in the requirement, and are included in the requirements in the **ST**.

If "invoke platform-provided functionality" is selected, the evaluator shall examine the **TSS** of the **MDM** Server's **ST** to verify that it describes (for each supported platform) how this functionality is invoked (it should be noted that this may be through a mechanism that is not implemented by the **MDM** Server; nonetheless, that mechanism will be identified in the **TSS** as part of this evaluation activity).

Guidance

The evaluator shall confirm that the operational guidance contains instructions for establishing the remote administrative sessions for each supported method.

Tests

The evaluator shall also perform the following tests:

- **Test 1:** The evaluators shall ensure that communications using each specified (in the operational guidance) remote administration method is tested during the course of the evaluation, setting up the connections as described in the operational guidance and ensuring that communication is successful.
- **Test 2:** For each method of remote administration supported, the evaluator shall follow the operational guidance to ensure that there is no available interface that can be used by a remote user to establish remote administrative sessions without invoking the trusted path.
- **Test 3:** The evaluator shall ensure, for each method of remote administration, the channel data is not sent in plaintext

Further assurance-evaluation activities are associated with the specific protocols

FTP_TRP.1(2) Trusted Path (for Enrollment)

FTP_TRP.1.1(2)

Refinement: The TSF shall [selection:

- invoke platform-provided functionality to use [selection:
 - TLS,
 - HTTPS
-],
- implement functionality

] to use

- using [selection:
 - TLS as defined in the Package for Transport Layer Security
 - HTTPS in accordance with FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1

]

] to provide a trusted communication path between itself (as a server) and MD users that is logically distinct from other communication paths and provides assured identification of its endpoints and protection of the communicated data from disclosure and detection of modification of the communicated data from [modification, disclosure].

Evaluation Activity

TSS

If "invoke platform-provided functionality" is selected, the evaluator shall examine the **TSS** of the **MDM** Server's **ST** to verify that it describes (for each supported platform) how this functionality is invoked (it should be noted that this may be through a mechanism that is not implemented by the **MDM** Server; nonetheless, that mechanism will be identified in the **TSS** as part of this evaluation activity).

FTP_TRP.1.2(2)

Refinement: The TSF shall [selection: invoke platform-provided functionality, implement functionality] to permit MD users to initiate communication via the trusted path.

Evaluation Activity

TSS

If "invoke platform-provided functionality" is selected, the evaluator shall examine the **TSS** of the **MDM** Server's **ST** to verify that it describes (for each supported platform) how this functionality is invoked (it should be noted that this may be through a mechanism

that is not implemented by the [MDM](#) Server; nonetheless, that mechanism will be identified in the [TSS](#) as part of this evaluation activity).

[FTP_TRP.1.3\(2\)](#)

Refinement: The TSF shall [selection: invoke platform-provided functionality, implement functionality] to require the use of the trusted path for [all MD user actions].

Application Note: This requirement ensures that authorized MD users initiate all communication with the [TOE](#) via a trusted path, and that all communications with the [TOE](#) by MD users is performed over this path. The purpose of this connection is for enrollment by the MD user. The data passed in this trusted communication channel are encrypted as defined in the protocol chosen in the first selection. The [ST](#) author chooses the mechanism or mechanisms supported by the [TOE](#).

If "[HTTPS](#)" is selected the appropriate selection-based [SFRs](#) from Appendix B must be included in the [ST](#).

If "[TLS](#)" is selected the [TLS](#) Functional Package must be included in the [ST](#). [ST](#) author selects "[TLS](#) as defined in the Package for Transport Layer Security" the [TSF](#) must be validated against requirements from the Package for Transport Layer Security with the following selections made:

- [FCS_TLS_EXT.1](#):
 - [TLS](#) must be selected
 - server must be selected
- [FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.1](#):
 - [TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA](#) cannot be selected. The cipher suites selected must correspond with the algorithms and hash functions allowed in [FCS_COP.1](#).

Protocol, RBG, Certificate validation, algorithm, and similar services may be met with platform provided services.

[Evaluation Activity](#)

[TSS](#)

The evaluator shall examine the [TSS](#) to determine that the methods of remote enrollment are indicated, along with how those communications are protected. The evaluator shall also confirm that all protocols listed in the [TSS](#) in support of enrollment are consistent with those specified in the requirement, and are included in the requirements in the [ST](#).

If "invoke platform-provided functionality" is selected, the evaluator shall examine the [TSS](#) of the [MDM](#) Server's [ST](#) to verify that it describes (for each supported platform) how this functionality is invoked (it should be noted that this may be through a mechanism that is not implemented by the [MDM](#) Server; nonetheless, that mechanism will be identified in the [TSS](#) as part of this evaluation activity).

[Guidance](#)

The evaluator shall confirm that the operational guidance contains instructions for establishing the enrollment sessions for each supported method.

[Tests](#)

For each [MDM](#) Agent/platform listed as supported in the [ST](#):

- **Test 1:** The evaluators shall ensure that communications using each specified (in the operational guidance) enrollment method is tested during the course of the evaluation, setting up the connections as described in the operational guidance and ensuring that communication is successful.
- **Test 2:** For each method of enrollment supported, the evaluator shall follow the operational guidance to ensure that there is no available interface that can be used by a remote user to establish enrollment sessions without invoking the trusted path.
- **Test 3:** The evaluator shall ensure, for each method enrollment, the channel data is not sent in plaintext

Further assurance-evaluation activities are associated with the specific protocols

7 Security Assurance Requirements

The Security Objectives for the [TOE](#) in [Section 6 Security Requirements](#) were constructed to address threats identified in [Section 4.1 Threats](#). The Security Functional Requirements ([SFRs](#)) in [Section 6 Security Requirements](#) are a formal instantiation of the Security Objectives. The [PP](#) identifies the Security Assurance Requirements ([SARs](#)) to frame the extent to which the evaluator assesses the documentation applicable for the evaluation and performs independent testing.

This section lists the set of [SARs](#) from [CC](#) part 3 that are required in evaluations against this [PP](#). Individual Assurance-Evaluation Activities (AAs) to be performed are specified both in [Section 6 Security Requirements](#) as well as in this section.

The general model for evaluation of [TOEs](#) against [STs](#) written to conform to this [PP](#) is as follows:

After the [ST](#) has been approved for evaluation, the ITSEF will obtain the [TOE](#), supporting environmental IT, and the administrative/user guides for the [TOE](#). The ITSEF is expected to perform actions mandated by the Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM) for the ASE and ALC [SARs](#). The ITSEF also performs the Assurance-Evaluation Activities contained within [Section 6 Security Requirements](#), which are intended to be an interpretation of the other CEM assurance requirements as they apply to the specific technology instantiated in the [TOE](#). The Assurance-Evaluation Activities that are captured in [Section 6 Security Requirements](#) also provide clarification as to what the developer needs to provide to demonstrate the [TOE](#) is compliant with the [PP](#).

The [TOE](#) security assurance requirements are identified in [Table 2.3](#).

Table 2 3: Security Assurance Requirements

Assurance Class	Assurance Components
Security Target (ASE)	ST introduction (ASE_INT.1)
	Conformance claims (ASE_CCL.1)
	Security objectives for the operational environment (ASE_OBJ.1)
	Extended components definition (ASE_ECD.1)
	Stated security requirements (ASE_REQ.1)
Development (ADV)	TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS.1)
	Basic functional specification (ADV_FSP.1)
Guidance documents (AGD)	Operational user guidance (AGD_OPE.1)
	Preparative procedures (AGD_PRE.1)
Life cycle support (ALC)	Labeling of the TOE (ALC_CMC.1)
	TOE CM coverage (ALC_CMS.1)
Tests (ATE)	Independent testing - sample (ATE_IND.1)
Vulnerability assessment (AVA)	Vulnerability survey (AVA_VAN.1)

7.1 Class ASE: Security Target

The [ST](#) is evaluated as per ASE activities defined in the [CEM](#). In addition, there may be [Assurance Evaluation](#) Activities specified within [Section 5-6 Security Requirements](#) and relevant appendices that call for necessary descriptions to be included in the [TSS](#) that are specific to the [TOE](#) technology type.

7.1.1 TOE summary specification

ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification

Content and presentation elements:

[ASE_TSS.1.1C](#)

The [TOE](#) summary specification shall describe how the [TOE](#) meets each SFR.

7.2 Class ADV: Development

The design information about the [TOE](#) is contained in the guidance documentation available to the end user as well as the [TSS](#) portion of the [ST](#), and any additional information required by this [PP](#) that is not to be made public (e.g., Entropy Essay)

7.2.1 Basic Functional Specification (ADV_FSP.1)

ADV_FSP.1 Basic Functional Specification (ADV_FSP.1)

The functional specification describes the Target Security Functions Interfaces (TSFIs). It is not necessary to have a formal or complete specification of these interfaces. Additionally, because [TOEs](#) conforming to this [PP](#) will necessarily have interfaces to the Operational Environment that are not directly invocable by [TOE](#) users, there is little point specifying that such interfaces be described in and of themselves since only indirect testing of such interfaces may be possible. For this [PP](#), the activities for this family should focus on understanding the interfaces presented in the [TSS](#) in response to the functional requirements and the interfaces presented in the AGD documentation. No additional "functional specification" documentation is necessary to satisfy the [assurance evaluation](#) activities specified.

The interfaces that need to be evaluated are characterized through the information needed to perform the [assurance evaluation](#) activities listed, rather than as an independent, abstract list

Developer action elements:

[ADV_FSP.1.1D](#)

The developer shall provide a functional specification.

[ADV_FSP.1.2D](#)

The developer shall provide a tracing from the functional specification to the [SFRs](#).

Application Note: As indicated in the introduction to this section, the functional specification is comprised of the information contained in the AGD_OPE and AGD_PRE documentation. The developer may reference a website accessible to application developers and the evaluator. The [assurance evaluation](#) activities in the functional requirements point to evidence that should exist in the documentation and [TSS](#) section; since these are directly associated with the [SFRs](#), the tracing in element ADV_FSP.1.2D is implicitly already done and no additional documentation is necessary.

Content and presentation elements:

[ADV_FSP.1.1C](#)

The functional specification shall describe the purpose and method of use for each [SFR](#)-enforcing and [SFR](#)-supporting TSFI.

[ADV_FSP.1.2C](#)

The functional specification shall identify all parameters associated with each [SFR](#)-enforcing and [SFR](#)-supporting TSFI.

[ADV_FSP.1.3C](#)

The functional specification shall provide rationale for the implicit categorization of interfaces as [SFR](#)-non-interfering.

[ADV_FSP.1.4C](#)

The tracing shall demonstrate that the [SFRs](#) trace to TSFIs in the functional specification

Evaluator action elements:

[ADV_FSP.1.1E](#)

The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

[ADV_FSP.1.2E](#)

The evaluator shall determine that the functional specification is an accurate and complete instantiation of the [SFRs](#).

Evaluation Activity

There are no specific [assurance-evaluation](#) activities associated with these [SARs](#), except ensuring the information is provided. The functional specification documentation is provided to support the evaluation activities described in Section 5 and the relevant appendices, and other activities described for AGD, ATE, and AVA [SARs](#). The requirements on the content of the functional specification information is implicitly assessed by virtue of the other [assurance-evaluation](#) activities being performed; if the evaluator is unable to perform an activity because ~~the~~ there is insufficient interface information, then an adequate functional specification has not been provided.

7.3 Class AGD: Guidance Documentation

The guidance documents will be provided with the [ST](#). Guidance must include a description of how the IT personnel verifies that the Operational Environment can fulfill its role for the security functionality. The documentation should be in an informal style and readable by the IT personnel.

Guidance must be provided for every operational environment that the product supports as claimed in the [ST](#). This guidance includes:

- instructions to successfully install the [TSF](#) in that environment
- instructions to manage the security of the [TSF](#) as a product and as a component of the larger operational environment
- instructions to provide a protected administrative capability;

Guidance pertaining to particular security functionality must also be provided; requirements on such guidance are contained in the [assurance-evaluation](#) activities specified with each requirement

7.3.1 Operational User Guidance (AGD_OPE.1) ~~Developer action elements~~

AGD_OPE.1 Operational User Guidance (AGD_OPE.1)

Developer action elements:

[AGD_OPE.1.1D](#)

The developer shall provide operational user guidance.

Application Note: The ~~operation~~ [operational](#) user guidance does not have to be contained in a single document. Guidance to users, administrators and application developers can be spread among documents or web pages. Where appropriate, the guidance documentation is expressed in the eXtensible Configuration Checklist Description Format (XCCDF) to support security automation.

Rather than repeat information here, the developer should review the [assurance-evaluation](#) activities for this component to ascertain the specifics of the guidance that the evaluator will be checking for. This will provide the necessary information for the preparation of acceptable guidance.

Content and presentation elements:

[AGD_OPE.1.1C](#)

The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the user-accessible functions and privileges that should be controlled in a secure processing environment, including appropriate warnings.

Application Note: User and administrator are to be considered in the definition of user role

[AGD_OPE.1.2C](#)

The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, how to use the available interfaces provided by the [TOE](#) in a secure manner.

[AGD_OPE.1.3C](#)

The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the available functions and interfaces, in particular all security parameters under the control of the user, indicating secure values as appropriate.

[AGD_OPE.1.4C](#)

The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, clearly present each type of security-relevant event relative to the user-accessible functions that need to be performed, including changing the security characteristics of entities under the control of the [TSF](#).

[AGD_OPE.1.5C](#)

The operational user guidance shall identify all possible modes of operation of the [TOE](#) (including operation following failure or operational error), their consequences, and implications for maintaining secure operation.

[AGD_OPE.1.6C](#)

The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, describe the security measures to be followed in order to fulfill the security objectives for the operational environment as described in the [ST](#).

[AGD_OPE.1.7C](#)

The operational user guidance shall be clear and reasonable.

Evaluator action elements:

[AGD_OPE.1.1E](#)

The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

[Evaluation Activity](#)

Some of the contents of the operational guidance will be verified by the ~~assurance~~-evaluation activities in Sections 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 and evaluation of the [TOE](#) according to the [CEM](#). The following additional information is also required

If cryptographic functions are provided by the [TOE](#), the operational guidance shall contain instructions for configuring the cryptographic engine associated with the evaluated configuration of the [TOE](#). It shall provide a warning to the administrator that use of other cryptographic engines was not evaluated nor tested during the [CC](#) evaluation of the [TOE](#).

The documentation must describe the process for verifying updates to the [TOE](#) by verifying a digital signature - this may be done by the [TOE](#) or the underlying platform. The evaluator shall verify that this process includes the following steps:

Instructions for obtaining the update itself. This should include instructions for making the update accessible to the [TOE](#) (e.g., placement in a specific directory).

Instructions for initiating the update process, as well as discerning whether the process was successful or unsuccessful. This includes generation of the hash/digital signature.

The [TOE](#) will likely contain security functionality that does not fall in the scope of evaluation under this [PP](#). The operational guidance shall make it clear to an administrator which security functionality is covered by the evaluation activities.

7.3.2 Preparative Procedures (AGD_PRE.1)

AGD_PRE.1 Preparative Procedures (AGD_PRE.1)

Developer action elements:

[AGD_PRE.1.1D](#)

The developer shall provide the [TOE](#), including its preparative procedures.

Application Note: As with the operational guidance, the developer should look to the ~~assurance~~-evaluation activities to determine the required content with respect to preparative procedures.

Content and presentation elements:

[AGD_PRE.1.1C](#)

The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure acceptance of the delivered [TOE](#) in accordance with the developer's delivery procedures.

[AGD_PRE.1.2C](#)

The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure installation of the [TOE](#) and for the secure preparation of the operational environment in accordance with the security objectives for the operational environment as described in the [ST](#).

Application Note: It is recognised that the application of these requirements will vary depending on aspects such as whether the [TOE](#) is delivered in an operational state, or whether it has to be installed at the [TOE](#) owner's site, etc.

It might also be the case that no installation is necessary, for example as a Software as a Service implementation in a Cloud environment. In this case it may be inappropriate to require and analyse installation procedures and thus this requirement is implicitly satisfied.

Evaluator action elements:

[AGD_PRE.1.1E](#)

The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

[AGD_PRE.1.2E](#)

The evaluator shall apply the preparative procedures to confirm that the [TOE](#) can be prepared securely for operation.

[Evaluation Activity](#)

As indicated in the introduction above, there are significant expectations with respect to the documentation, especially when configuring the operational environment to support [TOE](#) functional requirements. The evaluator shall check to ensure that the guidance provided for the [TOE](#) adequately addresses all platforms claimed for the [TOE](#) in the [ST](#).

7.4 Class ALC: Life-cycle Support

At the assurance level provided for [TOEs](#) conformant to this [PP](#), life-cycle support is limited to end-user-visible aspects of the life-cycle, rather than an examination of the [TOE](#) vendor's development and configuration management process. This is not meant to diminish the critical role that a developer's practices play in contributing to the overall trustworthiness of a product; rather, it's a reflection on the information to be made available for evaluation at this assurance level.

7.4.1 Labeling of the [TOE](#) (ALC_CMC.1)

ALC_CMC.1 Labeling of the TOE(ALC_CMC.1)

This component is targeted at identifying the [TOE](#) such that it can be distinguished from other products or versions from the same vendor and can be easily specified when being procured by an end user.

Developer action elements:

[ALC_CMC.1.1D](#)

The developer shall provide the [TOE](#) and a reference for the [TOE](#).

Content and presentation elements:

[ALC_CMC.1.1C](#)

The [TOE](#) shall be labeled with its unique reference.

Evaluator action elements:

[ALC_CMC.1.1E](#)

The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

[Evaluation Activity](#)

The evaluator shall check the [ST](#) to ensure that it contains an identifier (such as a product name/version number) that specifically identifies the version that meets the requirements of the [ST](#). Further, the evaluator shall check the AGD guidance and [TOE](#) samples received for testing to ensure that the version number is consistent with that in the [ST](#). If the vendor maintains a ~~web site~~ [website](#) advertising the [TOE](#), the evaluator shall examine the information on the ~~web site~~ [website](#) to ensure that the information in the [ST](#) is sufficient to distinguish the product

7.4.2 TOE CM Coverage (ALC_CMS.1)

ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM Coverage (ALC_CMS.1)

~~This component is targeted at identifying the~~ Given the scope of the [TOE](#) and its associated evaluation evidence requirements, this component's ~~assurance evaluation~~ activities are covered by the ~~assurance evaluation~~ activities listed for ALC_CMC.1.

Developer action elements:

[ALC_CMS.1.1D](#)

The developer shall provide a configuration list for the [TOE](#).

Content and presentation elements:

[ALC_CMS.1.1C](#)

The configuration list shall include the following: the [TOE](#) itself; and the evaluation evidence required by the [SARs](#).

[ALC_CMS.1.2C](#)

The configuration list shall uniquely identify the configuration items.

Evaluator action elements:

[ALC_CMS.1.1E](#)

The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

Application Note: In cases where the [MDM](#) software is Software as a Service, running in a cloud environment where they have little to no control of the operating system and underlying hardware, the evaluated configuration is considered a snapshot of the [MDM](#) software with the OS and/or VM versions used at the time of testing.

[Evaluation Activity](#)

The "evaluation evidence required by the [SARs](#)" in this [PP](#) is limited to the information in the [ST](#) coupled with the guidance provided to administrators and users under the AGD requirements. By ensuring that the [TOE](#) is specifically identified and that this identification is consistent in the [ST](#) and in the AGD guidance (as done in the evaluation activity for ALC_CMC.1), the evaluator implicitly confirms the information required by this component.

Life-cycle support is targeted aspects of the developer's life-cycle and instructions to providers of applications for the developer's devices, rather than an in-depth examination of the [TSF](#) manufacturer's development and configuration management process. This is not meant to diminish the critical role that a developer's practices play in contributing to the overall trustworthiness of a product; rather, it's a reflection on the information to be made available for evaluation.

The evaluator shall ensure that the ~~developer has identified (in public-facing development documentation for their platform) one or more development environments appropriate for use in developing applications for the developer's platform. For each of these development environments, the developer shall provide information on how to configure the environment to ensure that buffer overflow protection mechanisms in the environment(s) are invoked (e.g., compiler flags). The evaluator shall ensure that this documentation also includes an indication of whether such protections are on by default, or have to be specifically enabled.~~

The evaluator shall ensure that the [TSF](#) is uniquely identified (with respect to other products from the [TSF](#) vendor), and that documentation provided by the developer in association with the requirements in the [ST](#) is associated with the [TSF](#) using this unique identification.

7.

4.3

5 Class ATE: Tests

Testing is specified for functional aspects of the system as well as aspects that take advantage of design or implementation weaknesses. The former is done through the ATE_IND family, while the latter is through the AVA_VAN family. At the assurance level specified in this [PP](#), testing is based on advertised functionality and interfaces with dependency on the availability of design information. One of the primary outputs of the evaluation process is the test report as specified in the following requirements.

Since many of the APIs are not exposed at the user interface (e.g., touch screen), the ability to stimulate the necessary interfaces requires a developer's test environment. This test environment will allow the evaluator, for example, to access APIs and view file system information that is not available on consumer mobile devices.

7.45.4-1 Independent Testing - Conformance (ATE_IND)

ATE_IND.1 Independent Testing - Conformance (ATE_IND.1)

Testing is performed to confirm the functionality described in the [TSS](#) as well as the administrative (including configuration and operational) documentation provided. The focus of the testing is to confirm that the requirements specified in Sections 5.3, and 5.4 are being met, although some additional testing is specified for [SARs](#) in Section 6. The [Assurance-Evaluation](#) Activities identify the additional testing activities associated with these components. The evaluator produces a test report documenting the plan for and results of testing, as well as coverage arguments focused on the platform/[TOE](#) combinations that are claiming conformance to this [PP](#).

Developer action elements:

[ATE_IND.1.1D](#)

The developer shall provide the [TOE](#) for testing.

Content and presentation elements:

[ATE_IND.1.1C](#)

The [TOE](#) shall be suitable for testing.

Evaluator action elements:

[ATE_IND.1.1E](#)

The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

[ATE_IND.1.2E](#)

The evaluator shall test a subset of the [TSF](#) to confirm that the [TSF](#) operates as specified.

[Evaluation Activity](#)

The evaluator shall prepare a test plan and report documenting the testing aspects of the system. The test plan covers all of the testing actions contained in the [CEM](#) and the body of this [PP](#)'s [Assurance-Evaluation](#) Activities. While it is not necessary to have one test case per test listed in an evaluation activity, the evaluator must document in the test plan that each applicable testing requirement in the [ST](#) is covered.

The test plan identifies the platforms to be tested, and for those platforms not included in the test plan but included in the [ST](#), the test plan provides a justification for not testing the platforms. This justification must address the differences between the tested platforms and the untested platforms, and make an argument that the differences do not affect the testing to be performed. It is not sufficient to merely assert that the differences have no effect; rationale must be provided. If all platforms claimed in the [ST](#) are tested, then no rationale is necessary.

The test plan describes the composition of each platform to be tested, and any setup that is necessary beyond what is contained in the part of a test or as a standard pre-test condition. This may include special test drivers or tools. For each driver or tool, an argument (not just an assertion) should be provided that the driver or tool will not adversely affect the performance of the functionality by the [TOE](#) and its platform. This also includes the configuration of the cryptographic engine to be used. The cryptographic algorithms implemented by this engine are those specified by this [PP](#) and used by the cryptographic protocols being evaluated (IPsec, TLS/HTTPS, SSH).

The test plan identifies high-level test objectives as well as the test procedures to be followed to achieve those objectives. These procedures include expected results. The test report (which could just be an annotated version of the test plan) details the activities that took place when the test procedures were executed, and includes the actual results of the tests. This shall be a cumulative account, so if there was a test run that resulted in a failure; a fix installed; and then a successful re-run of the test, the report would show a "fail" and "pass" result (and the supporting details), and not just the "pass" result.

7.5-6 Class AVA: Vulnerability Analysis

For the first generation of this protection profile, the evaluation lab is expected to survey open sources to discover what vulnerabilities have been discovered in these types of products. In most cases, these vulnerabilities will require sophistication

beyond that of a basic attacker. Until penetration tools are created and uniformly distributed to the evaluation labs, the evaluator will not be expected to test for these vulnerabilities in the [TOE](#). The labs will be expected to comment on the likelihood of these vulnerabilities given the documentation provided by the vendor. This information will be used in the development of penetration testing tools and for the development of future protection profiles.

7.56.1 Vulnerability Survey (AVA_VAN.1)

AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability Survey (AVA_VAN.1)

Developer action elements:

[AVA_VAN.1.1D](#)

The developer shall provide the [TOE](#) for testing.

Content and presentation elements:

[AVA_VAN.1.1C](#)

The [TOE](#) shall be suitable for testing.

Evaluator action elements:

[AVA_VAN.1.1E](#)

The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

[AVA_VAN.1.2E](#)

The evaluator shall perform a search of public domain sources to identify potential vulnerabilities in the [TOE](#).

[AVA_VAN.1.3E](#)

The evaluator shall conduct penetration testing, based on the identified potential vulnerabilities, to determine that the [TOE](#) is resistant to attacks performed by an attacker possessing Basic attack potential.

[Evaluation Activity](#)

As with ATE_IND, the evaluator shall generate a report to document their findings with respect to this requirement. This report could physically be part of the overall test report mentioned in ATE_IND, or a separate document. The evaluator performs a search of public information to determine the vulnerabilities that have been found in network infrastructure devices and the implemented communication protocols in general, as well as those that pertain to the particular [TOE](#). The evaluator documents the sources consulted and the vulnerabilities found in the report. For each vulnerability found, the evaluator either provides a rationale with respect to its non-applicability, or the evaluator formulates a test (using the guidelines provided in ATE_IND) to confirm the vulnerability, if suitable. Suitability is determined by assessing the attack vector needed to take advantage of the vulnerability. If exploiting the vulnerability requires expert skills and an electron microscope, for instance, then a test would not be suitable and an appropriate justification would be formulated.

Appendix A - Optional Requirements

As indicated in [Section 2 Conformance Claims](#) the baseline requirements (those that must be performed by the TOE) are contained in the body of this PP. Additionally, there are three other types of requirements specified in [Appendix A - Optional Requirements](#), [Appendix B - Selection-Based Requirements](#), and [Appendix C - Objective Requirements](#). The first type (in this Appendix) are requirements that can be included in the ST, but are not required in order for a TOE to claim conformance to this PP. The second type (in [Appendix B - Selection-Based Requirements](#)) are requirements based on selections in the body of the PP: if certain selections are made, then additional requirements in that appendix must be included. The third type (in [Appendix C - Objective Requirements](#)) are components that are not required in order to conform to this PP, but will be included in the baseline requirements in future versions of this PP, so adoption by vendors is encouraged. Note that the ST author is responsible for ensuring that requirements that may be associated with those in [Appendix A - Optional Requirements](#), [Appendix B - Selection-Based Requirements](#), and [Appendix C - Objective Requirements](#) but are not listed (e.g., FMT-type requirements) are also included in the ST. This Appendix is divided into three subsections: optional requirements that may be performed by the TSF, optional requirements that may be performed by the MDM Server or its underlying platform, and optional requirements to support a Mobile Application Store Server.

FAU_SAR.1 Audit Review

[FAU_SAR.1.1](#)

Refinement: The TSF shall [selection: invoke platform-provided functionality, implement functionality] to provide [Authorized Administrators] with the capability to read [all audit data] from the audit records.

[Evaluation Activity](#)

TSS

If "invoke platform-provided functionality" is selected, the evaluator shall examine the TSS of the MDM Server's ST to verify that it describes (for each supported platform) how this functionality is invoked (it should be noted that this may be through a mechanism that is not implemented by the MDM Server; nonetheless, that mechanism will be identified in the TSS as part of this evaluation activity).

[FAU_SAR.1.2](#)

Refinement: The TSF shall [selection: invoke platform-provided functionality, implement functionality] to provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the Authorized Administrators to interpret the information.

Application Note: The intent of this requirement is to ensure that the administrator can view and interpret the audit records and to prevent unauthorized users from accessing the logs.

[Evaluation Activity](#)

TSS

If "invoke platform-provided functionality" is selected, the evaluator shall examine the [TSS](#) of the [MDM](#) Server's [ST](#) to verify that it describes (for each supported platform) how this functionality is invoked (it should be noted that this may be through a mechanism that is not implemented by the [MDM](#) Server; nonetheless, that mechanism will be identified in the [TSS](#) as part of this evaluation activity).

Guidance

The evaluator shall check the AGD guidance and ensure that it describes how the administrator accesses the audit data and describes the format of the audit record.

Tests

The evaluator shall attempt to view the audit record as the authorized administrator and verify that the action succeeds. The evaluator shall ensure the audit records generated during testing match the format specified in the administrative guide.

FAU_SEL.1 Security Audit Event Selection

FAU_SEL.1.1

Refinement: The [TSF](#) shall [selection: invoke platform-provided functionality, implement functionality] to select the set of events to be audited from the set of all auditable events based on the following attributes:

- a. event type
- b. success of auditable security events
- c. failure of auditable security events
- d. [assignment: other attributes]

Application Note: The intent of this requirement is to identify all criteria that can be selected to trigger an audit event. The [ST](#) author must select whether the [TSF](#) or the platform maintains the audit record. For the [ST](#) author, the assignment is used to list any additional criteria or "none".

Evaluation Activity

TSS

If "invoke platform-provided functionality" is selected, the evaluator shall examine the [TSS](#) of the [MDM](#) Server's [ST](#) to verify that it describes (for each supported platform) how this functionality is invoked (it should be noted that this may be through a mechanism that is not implemented by the [MDM](#) Server; nonetheless, that mechanism will be identified in the [TSS](#) as part of this evaluation activity).

Guidance

The evaluator shall review the administrative guidance to ensure that the guidance itemizes all event types, as well as describes all attributes that are to be selectable in accordance with the requirement, to include those attributes listed in the assignment. The administrative guidance shall also contain instructions on how to set the pre-selection as well as explain the syntax (if present) for multi-value pre-selection. The administrative guidance shall also identify those audit records that are always recorded, regardless of the selection criteria currently being enforced.

Tests

The evaluator shall also perform the following tests:

- **Test 1:** For each attribute listed in the requirement, the evaluator shall devise a test to show that selecting the attribute causes only audit events with that attribute (or those that are always recorded, as identified in the administrative guidance) to be recorded.
- **Test 2:** [conditional] If the [TSF](#) supports specification of more complex audit pre-selection criteria (e.g., multiple attributes, logical expressions using attributes) then the evaluator shall devise tests showing that this capability is correctly implemented. The evaluator shall also, in the test plan, provide a short narrative justifying the set of tests as representative and sufficient to exercise the capability.

FTA_TAB.1 Default TOE Access Banners

FTA_TAB.1.1

Refinement: Before establishing a user session, the [TSF](#) shall [selection: invoke platform-provided functionality, implement functionality] to display an Administrator-specified advisory notice and consent warning message regarding use of the [TOE](#).

Application Note: This requirement is to ensure that an advisory notice and/or consent banner is presented to the user on start-up or unlock of the [TSF](#).

Evaluation Activity

TSS

If "invoke platform-provided functionality" is selected, the evaluator shall examine the [TSS](#) of the [MDM](#) Server's [ST](#) to verify that it describes (for each supported platform) how this functionality is invoked (it should be noted that this may be through a mechanism that is not implemented by the [MDM](#) Server; nonetheless, that mechanism will be identified in the [TSS](#) as part of this evaluation activity).

If "implement functionality" is selected, the [TSS](#) shall describe when the banner is displayed

Guidance

The evaluator follows the operational guidance to configure a notice and consent warning message.

Tests

The evaluator shall also perform the following test: The evaluator shall start up or unlock the [TSF](#). The evaluator shall verify that the notice and consent warning message is displayed in each instance described in the [TSS](#).

Appendix B - Selection-Based Requirements

As indicated in the introduction to this PP, the baseline requirements (those that must be performed by the TOE or its underlying platform) are contained in the body of this PP. There are additional requirements based on selections in the body of the PP: if certain selections are made, then additional requirements below must be included. As indicated in the introduction to this PP, the baseline requirements (those that must be performed by the TOE or its underlying platform) are contained in the body of the PP. There are additional requirements based on selections in the body of the PP: if certain selections are made, then additional requirements below will need to be included.

FAU_GEN.1(2) Audit Generation (MAS Server)

This selection-based component depends upon selection in [FMT MOF.1.1\(1\)](#).

[FAU_GEN.1.1\(2\)](#)

Refinement: The MAS Server shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:

- a. Failure to push a new application on a managed mobile device
- b. Failure to update an existing application on a managed mobile device.

Application Note: The MDM Agent is required to report to the MAS Server on successful receipt of an application or update on a managed mobile device, and failures can be inferred from the absence of such alerts.

[Evaluation Activity](#)

TSS

The evaluator shall check the [TSS](#) and ensure that it provides a format for audit records

Guidance

The evaluator shall check the administrative guide and ensure that it provides a format for audit records. Each audit record format type must be covered, along with a brief description of each field.

Tests

The evaluator shall verify that when an application or update push fails, that the audit records generated match the format specified in the guidance and that the fields in each audit record have the proper entries.

[FAU_GEN.1.2\(2\)](#)

Refinement: The [selection: MAS Server, MAS Server platform] shall record within each [TSF](#) audit record at least the following information:

- date and time of the event
- type of event
- mobile device identity
- [assignment: other audit relevant information]

Application Note: All audits must contain at least the information mentioned in [FAU_GEN.1.2\(2\)](#), but may contain more information which can be assigned. The [ST](#) author shall must identify in the [TSS](#) which information of the audit record that is performed by the [TSF](#) and that which is performed by the [TOE](#) platform.

[Evaluation Activity](#)

TSS

The evaluator shall check the [TSS](#) and ensure that it provides a format for audit records Each audit record format type must be covered, along with a brief description of each field.

Guidance

The evaluator shall check the administrative guide and ensure that it provides a format for audit records. Each audit record format type must be covered, along with a brief description of each field. The evaluator shall check to make sure that the description of the fields contains the information required in [FAU_GEN.1.2\(2\)](#).

Tests

When verifying the test results from [FAU_GEN.1.1\(2\)](#), the evaluator shall ensure the audit records generated during testing match the format specified in the administrative guide, and that the fields in each audit record have the proper entries.

Note that the testing here can be accomplished in conjunction with the testing of the security mechanisms directly. For example, testing performed to ensure that the administrative guidance provided is correct verifies that AGD_OPE.1 is satisfied and should address the invocation of the administrative actions that are needed to verify the audit records are generated as expected.

FAU_STG_EXT.2 Audit Event Storage

This selection-based component depends upon selection in [FAU_STG_EXT.1.1](#).

[FAU_STG_EXT.2.1](#)

The [TSF](#) shall [selection: invoke platform-provided functionality, implement functionality] to protect the stored audit records in the audit trail from unauthorized modification.

Application Note: If "store audit data locally" is selected in [FAU_STG_EXT.1.1](#), this [SFR](#) shall be included in the [ST](#).

The purpose of this requirement is to ensure that audit records are stored securely. The [ST](#) author is responsible for selecting whether audit records are maintained when audit storage or failure occurs. The [ST](#) author must choose a means by which audit records are saved and select the events during which the records will be saved. The [TSF](#) may rely on the underlying operating system for this functionality, and the first selection should be made appropriately.

[Evaluation Activity](#)

TSS

If "invoke platform-provided functionality" is selected, the evaluator shall examine the TSS of the MDM Server's ST to verify that it describes (for each supported platform) how the audit record protection functionality is invoked (it should be noted that this may be through a mechanism that is not implemented by the MDM Server; nonetheless, that mechanism will be identified in the TSS as part of this evaluation activity).

If "implement functionality" is selected, the evaluator shall ensure that the TSS describes how the audit records are protected from unauthorized modification or deletion. The evaluator shall ensure that the TOE uses audit trail specific protection mechanisms.

Tests

The evaluator shall perform the following tests:

- **Test 1:** The evaluator shall access the audit trail as an unauthorized user and attempt to modify and delete the audit records. The evaluator shall verify that these attempts fail.
- **Test 2:** The evaluator shall access the audit trail as an authorized user and attempt to modify and delete the audit records. The evaluator shall verify that these attempts succeed. The evaluator shall verify that only the records intended for modification and deletion are modified and deleted.

FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 HTTPS Protocol

This selection-based component depends upon selection in FTP TRP.1.1(1), FTP TRP.1.1(2), FTP ITC.1.1(1), FTP ITC.1.1(2), FPT ITT.1.1(1), FPT ITT.1.1(2).
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall [selection: invoke platform-provided functionality, implement functionality] to implement the HTTPS protocol that complies with RFC 2818. Evaluation Activity

TSS

If "invoke platform-provided functionality" is selected, the evaluator shall examine the TSS of the MDM Server's ST to verify that it describes (for each supported platform) how this functionality is invoked (it should be noted that this may be through a mechanism that is not implemented by the MDM Server; nonetheless, that mechanism will be identified in the TSS as part of this evaluation activity).

FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall [selection: invoke platform-provided functionality, implement functionality] to implement HTTPS using TLS in accordance with the Package for Transport Layer Security.

Application Note: The TLS Functional Package must be included in the ST, with the following selections made:

- FCS_TLS_EXT.1:
 - TLS must be selected
 - either client or server is selected as appropriate
- FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.1 or FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.1 (as appropriate):
 - TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA cannot be selected. The cipher suites selected must correspond with the algorithms and hash functions allowed in FCS_COP.1.

Validity is determined by the certificate path, the expiration date, and the revocation status in accordance with RFC 5280.

Evaluation Activity

TSS

If "invoke platform-provided functionality" is selected, the evaluator shall examine the TSS of the MDM Server's ST to verify that it describes (for each supported platform) how this functionality is invoked (it should be noted that this may be through a mechanism that is not implemented by the MDM Server; nonetheless, that mechanism will be identified in the TSS as part of this evaluation activity).

Tests

- **Test 1:** The evaluator shall attempt to establish an HTTPS connection with a web server, observe the traffic with a packet analyzer, and verify that the connection succeeds and that the traffic is identified as TLS or HTTPS.

Other tests are performed in conjunction with the TLS evaluation activities.

FCS_IV_EXT.1 Initialization Vector Generation

This selection-based component depends upon selection in FCS_STG_EXT.2.1.1.

FCS_IV_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall [selection: invoke platform-provided functionality, implement functionality] to generate IVs in accordance with Table 3.4.

Application Note: This requirement must be included in the ST if FCS_STG_EXT.2.1 is included in the ST, meaning that the selection in FCS_STG_EXT.1 indicates that the TSF is protecting private keys and persistent secrets with encryption rather than the platform-provided key storage.

Table 3.4 lists the requirements for composition of IVs according to the corresponding NIST Special Publications for each cipher mode. The composition of IVs generated for encryption according to a cryptographic protocol is addressed by the protocol. Thus, this requirement addresses only IVs generated for key storage encryption.

Table 3.4: References and IV Requirements for NIST-approved Cipher Modes

Cipher Mode	Reference IV Requirement
	SP800-

Electronic Codebook (ECB)	38A	No IV
Counter (CTR)	SP800-38A	"Initial Counter" shall be non-repeating. No counter value shall be repeated across multiple messages with the same secret key.
Cipher Block Chaining (CBC)	SP800-38A	IVs shall be unpredictable. Repeating IVs leak information about whether the first one or more blocks are shared between two messages, so IVs should be non-repeating in such situations.
Output Feedback (OFB)	SP800-38A	IVs shall be non-repeating and shall not be generated by invoking the cipher on another IV.
Cipher Feedback (CFB)	SP800-38A	IVs should be non-repeating as repeating IVs leak information about the first plaintext block and about common shared prefixes in messages.
XEX (XOR Encrypt XOR)		
Tweakable Block Cipher with Ciphertext Stealing (XTS)	SP800-38E	No IV. Tweak values shall be non-negative integers, assigned consecutively, and starting at an arbitrary non-negative integer.
Cipher-based Message Authentication Code (CMAC)	SP800-38B	No IV
Key Wrap and Key Wrap with Padding	SP800-38F	No IV
Counter with CBC-Message Authentication Code (CCM)	SP800-38C	No IV. Nonces shall be non-repeating.
Galois Counter Mode (GCM)	SP800-38D	IV shall be non-repeating. The number of invocations of GCM shall not exceed 2^{32} for a given secret key unless an implementation only uses 96-bit IVs (default length).

[Evaluation Activity](#)

If "invoke platform-provided functionality" is selected:

TSS

The evaluator shall examine the [TSS](#) of the [MDM Server's ST](#) to verify that it describes (for each supported platform) how the IV generation is invoked for each mode selected in the [MDM Server's ST](#) (it should be noted that this may be through a mechanism that is not implemented by the [MDM Server](#); nonetheless, that mechanism will be identified in the [TSS](#) as part of this evaluation activity).

If "implement functionality" is selected:

TSS

The evaluator shall examine the [TSS](#) to ensure that it details the encryption of user credentials, persistent secrets, and private keys and the generation of the IVs used for that encryption.

Tests

The evaluator shall ensure that the generation of IVs for each key encrypted by the same [KEK](#) meets [Table 3.4](#).

FCS_STG_EXT.2 Encrypted Cryptographic Key Storage

This selection-based component depends upon selection in [FCS_STG_EXT.1.1](#).

[FCS_STG_EXT.2.1](#)

The TSF shall [selection: invoke platform-provided functionality, implement functionality] to encrypt all keys using AES in the [selection: Key Wrap (KW) mode, Key Wrap with Padding (KWP) mode, GCM, CCM, CBC mode].

Application Note: This requirement states that keys used by the [TSF](#) shall not be kept in plaintext. The intent of this requirement is to ensure that the private keys, credentials, and persistent secrets cannot be accessed in the [TOE](#) in an unencrypted state, allowing an attacker to access keys without having to exhaust the AES key space.

This requirement must be including in the [ST](#) if the selection in [FCS_STG_EXT.1](#) indicates that the [TSF](#) is protecting private keys and persistent secrets with encryption rather than the platform-provided key storage.

~~If this requirement is included in the [ST](#), [FCS_IV_EXT.1](#) must also be included.~~

[Evaluation Activity](#)

TSS

The evaluator shall examine the [TSS](#) to ensure it describes in detail how user credentials, persistent secret and private keys are stored and encrypted. The evaluator shall review the [TSS](#) to determine that it makes a case that key material is not written unencrypted to persistent memory and that it identifies the mode of encryption.

If "invoke platform-provided functionality" is selected, the evaluator shall examine the [TSS](#) of the [MDM Server's ST](#) to verify that it describes (for each supported platform) how the key encryption functionality is invoked (it should be noted that this may be through a mechanism that is not implemented by the [MDM Server](#); nonetheless, that mechanism will be identified in the [TSS](#) as part of this evaluation activity).

FIA_X509_EXT.1(2) X.509 Certificate Validation of Certificates

This selection-based component depends upon selection in [FPT_ITT.1.1\(1\)](#).

[FIA_X509_EXT.1.1\(2\)](#)

The TSF shall **[selection: invoke platform-provided functionality, implement functionality]** to validate certificates in accordance with the following rules:

- RFC 5280 certificate validation and certificate path validation.
- The certificate path must terminate with a trusted CA certificate.
- The [TSF](#) shall validate a certificate path by ensuring the presence of the basicConstraints extension and that the CA flag is set to TRUE for all CA certificates.
- The [TSF](#) shall validate the revocation status of the certificate using **[selection: the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) as specified in RFC 2560, a Certificate Revocation List (CRL) as specified in RFC 5280 Section 6.3 a Certificate Revocation List (CRL) as specified in RFC 5759 Section 5, no revocation method]**.
- The [TSF](#) shall validate the extendedKeyUsage field according to the following rules:
 - Certificates used for trusted updates and executable code integrity verification shall have the Code Signing purpose (id-kp 3 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
 - Server certificates presented for TLS shall have the Server Authentication purpose (id-kp-1 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
 - Client certificates presented for TLS shall have the Client Authentication purpose (id-kp-2 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
 - CSP certificates presented for OCSP responses shall have the OCSP Signing purpose (id-kp 9 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
 - Server certificates presented for [EST](#) shall have the CMC Registration Authority (RA) purpose (id-kp-cmcRA with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.28) in the extendedKeyUsage field.

Application Note: [FIA_X509_EXT.1.1\(2\)](#) should be chosen if the [TOE](#) is distributed and the protocol(s) selected in [FPT_ITT.1\(1\)](#) utilize X.509 certificates for peer authentication. In this case, the use of revocation list checking is optional as there are additional requirements surrounding the enabling and disabling of the ITT channel as defined in [FCO_CPC_EXT.1](#). If revocation checking is not supported, the [ST](#) author should select no revocation method. However, if certificate revocation checking is supported, the [ST](#) author selects whether this is performed using OCSP or CRLs.

The [TSS](#) ~~shall~~ **must** describe when revocation checking is performed. It is expected that revocation checking is performed when a certificate is used in an authentication step. It is not sufficient to verify the status of a X.509 certificate only when it is loaded onto the device.

This [SFR](#) lists the rules for validating certificates. The [ST](#) author ~~shall~~ **must** select whether revocation status is verified using OCSP or CRLs. [FIA_X509_EXT.2](#) requires that certificates are used for trusted channels; this use requires that the extendedKeyUsage rules are verified. Certificates may optionally be used for code signing and policy signing and, if implemented, must be validated to contain the corresponding extendedKeyUsage.

Regardless of the selection of implement functionality or invoke platform-provided functionality, the validation is expected to end in a trusted root CA certificate in a root store managed by the platform.

[Evaluation Activity](#)

If "invoke platform-provided functionality" is selected:

TSS

The evaluator shall examine the [TSS](#) of the [MDM Server's ST](#) to verify that it describes (for each supported platform) how the certificate validation functionality is invoked (it should be noted that this may be through a mechanism that is not implemented by the [MDM Server](#); nonetheless, that mechanism will be identified in the [TSS](#) as part of this evaluation activity).

If "implement functionality" is selected:

TSS

The evaluator shall ensure the [TSS](#) describes where the check of validity of the certificates takes place. The evaluator ensures the [TSS](#) also provides a description of the certificate path validation algorithm.

Tests

The tests described must be performed in conjunction with the other certificate services ~~assurance~~ **evaluation** activities, including each of the functions in [FIA_X509_EXT.2.1](#). The tests for the extendedKeyUsage rules are performed in conjunction with the uses that require those rules. The evaluator shall create a chain of at least four certificates: the node certificate to be tested, two Intermediate CAs, and the self-signed Root CA.

- **Test 1:** The evaluator shall load a certificate or certificates as trusted CAs needed to validate the certificate to be used in the function, and demonstrate that the function succeeds. The evaluator shall then delete one of the certificates, and show that the function fails.
- **Test 2:** The evaluator shall demonstrate that validating an expired certificate results in the function failing.
- **Test 3:** The evaluator shall test that the [TOE](#) can properly handle revoked certificates--conditional on whether CRL or OCSP is selected; if both are selected, then a test shall be performed for each method. The evaluator shall test revocation of the node certificate and revocation of the intermediate CA certificate (i.e. the intermediate CA certificate should be revoked by the root CA). The evaluator shall ensure that a valid certificate is used, and that the validation function succeeds. The evaluator then attempts the test with a certificate that has been revoked (for each method chosen in the selection) to ensure when the certificate is no longer valid that the validation function fails.
- **Test 4:** If OCSP is selected, the evaluator shall configure the OCSP server or use a man-in-the-middle tool to present a certificate that does not have the OCSP signing purpose and verify that validation of the OCSP response fails. If CRL is

selected and the CA contains a Key Usage extension, the evaluator shall configure the CA to sign a CRL with a certificate that does not have the cRLsign key usage bit set, and verify that validation of the CRL fails. If the CA is a root CA with no Key Usage extension, this test is not performed.

- **Test 5:** The evaluator shall modify any byte in the first eight bytes of the certificate and demonstrate that the certificate fails to validate. (The certificate will fail to parse correctly.)
- **Test 6:** The evaluator shall modify any byte in the last byte of the certificate and demonstrate that the certificate fails to validate. (The signature on the certificate will not validate.)
- **Test 7:** The evaluator shall modify any byte in the public key of the certificate and demonstrate that the certificate fails to validate. (The signature on the certificate will not validate.)

[FIA_X509_EXT.1.2\(2\)](#)

The TSF shall [selection: invoke platform-provided functionality, implement functionality] to treat a certificate as a CA certificate only if the basicConstraints extension is present and the CA flag is set to TRUE.

Application Note: This requirement applies to certificates that are used and processed by the [TOE](#) or platform and restricts the certificates that may be added as trusted CA certificates.

[Evaluation Activity](#)

If "invoke platform-provided functionality" is selected:

TSS

The evaluator shall examine the [TSS](#) of the [MDM Server's ST](#) to verify that it describes (for each supported platform) how this functionality is invoked (it should be noted that this may be through a mechanism that is not implemented by the [MDM Server](#); nonetheless, that mechanism will be identified in the [TSS](#) as part of this evaluation activity).

If "implement functionality" is selected:

Tests

The tests described must be performed in conjunction with the other certificate services [assurance evaluation](#) activities, including the functions in [FIA_X509_EXT.2.1](#). The evaluator shall create a chain of at least four certificates: the node certificate to be tested, two Intermediate CAs, and the self-signed Root CA.

- **Test 1:** The evaluator shall construct a certificate path, such that the certificate of the CA issuing the [TOE's](#) certificate does not contain the basicConstraints extension. The validation of the certificate path fails
- **Test 2:** The evaluator shall construct a certificate path, such that the certificate of the CA issuing the [TOE's](#) certificate has the cA flag in the basicConstraints extension not set. The validation of the certificate path fails
- **Test 3:** The evaluator shall construct a certificate path, such that the certificate of the CA issuing the [TOE's](#) certificate has the cA flag in the basicConstraints extension set to TRUE. The validation of the certificate path succeeds

FMT_MOF.1(

4

3) Management of Functions in (MAS Server Downloads)

This selection-based component depends upon selection in [FMT_MOF.1.1\(1\)](#).

[FMT_MOF.1.1\(](#)

4

3)

Refinement: The MAS Server shall restrict the ability to download applications, allowing only enrolled mobile devices that are compliant with [MDM](#) policies and assigned to a user in the application access group to perform this function

[Evaluation Activity](#)

TSS

The evaluator shall examine the [TSS](#) to determine that all methods of initiating an application download or update push are specified.

Guidance

The evaluator shall confirm that the operational guidance contains how to initiate an application download or update push

Tests

The evaluator shall ensure that the MAS Server verifies that the mobile device is enrolled in the [MDM](#) Server and is in a compliant state. The evaluator shall verify that an application cannot be downloaded from the MAS Server prior to enrolling the device with the [MDM](#). The evaluator shall partially enroll the mobile device, so the device is connected to the [MDM](#) Server, but is not compliant and verify that applications cannot be downloaded.

FMT_SMF.1(3) Specification of Management Functions (MAS Server)

This selection-based component depends upon selection in [FMT_MOF.1.1\(1\)](#).

[FMT_SMF.1.1\(3\)](#)

Refinement: The MAS Server shall be capable of performing the following management functions:

- a. Configure application access groups

- b. Download applications
- c. [selection: [assignment: other MAS management functions], no other functions]

Application Note: This requirement captures all the configuration functionality in the MAS Server to configure the underlying MAS Server. The [ST](#) author can add more commands and configuration policies by completing the assignment statement

The MAS Server ~~shall~~ **must** be able to create groups to configure which applications a user can access based on which group they are in. If the MAS Server uses the groups defined by the [MDM](#), then it must communicate with the [MDM](#) Server (if separate server) to determine which applications the user can access.

[Evaluation Activity](#)

[TSS](#)

The evaluator shall examine the [TSS](#) to ensure that it describes each management function listed

The evaluator shall examine the [TSS](#) to determine if the MAS Server creates its own groups or relies on the groups specified by the [MDM](#) Server.

[Guidance](#)

The evaluator shall confirm that the operational guidance contains how to create and define user groups and how to specify which applications are accessible by which group.

The evaluator shall verify the AGD guidance includes detailed instructions of what options are available and how to configure each management functional capability listed.

[Tests](#)

The evaluator shall ensure that the MAS client can only access the applications specified for the group they are enrolled in. The evaluator shall create a user group and ~~do not define the user to be part of~~, making sure that the MAS client user is excluded from the group. Verify that an application accessible to that group cannot be accessed. The evaluator shall include the [MAS client](#) user in the group and assure that the application can be accessed.

FMT_SMR.1(2) Security Management Roles (MAS Server)

This selection-based component depends upon selection in [FMT_MOF.1.1\(1\)](#).

[FMT_SMR.1.1\(2\)](#)

Refinement: The TSF shall additionally maintain the roles enrolled mobile devices, application access groups, and ~~assignment:~~ additional authorized identified roles].

[FMT_SMR.1.2\(2\)](#)

Refinement: The MAS Server shall be able to associate users with roles

Application Note: It is envisioned that the MAS Server will be configured and maintained by different user roles. The assignment is used by the [ST](#) author to list the roles that are supported. At a minimum, one administrative role ~~shall~~ **must** be supported. If no additional roles are supported, then "no additional roles" is stated. The MD user role is used for enrollment of mobile devices to the MAS according to [FIA_ENR_EXT.1](#).

[Evaluation Activity](#)

[TSS](#)

The evaluator shall examine the [TSS](#) to verify that it describes the administrator role and the powers granted to and limitations of the role.

[Guidance](#)

The evaluator shall review the operational guidance to ensure that it contains instructions for administering the [TOE](#) and which interfaces are supported.

[Tests](#)

In the course of performing the testing activities for the evaluation, the evaluator shall use all supported interfaces, although it is not necessary to repeat each test involving an administrative action with each interface. The evaluator shall ensure, however, that each supported method of administering the [TOE](#) that conforms to the requirements of this [PP](#) be tested; for instance, if the [TOE](#) can be administered through a local hardware interface or HTTPS then both methods of administration must be exercised during the evaluation team's test activities.

FPT_ITT.1(1) Internal TOE TSF Data Transfer

This selection-based component depends upon selection in [FTP_ITC_EXT.1.1](#).

[FPT_ITT.1.1\(1\)](#)

Refinement: The [TSF](#) shall [selection:

- invoke platform-provided functionality to use [selection:
 - IPsec,
 - mutually authenticated TLS,
 - mutually authenticated DTLS,
 - HTTPS,
 - SSH
-],
- implement functionality using [selection:
 - IPsec as defined in the [PP-Module](#) for VPN Client,
 - mutually authenticated TLS as defined in the Package for Transport Layer Security,
 - mutually authenticated DTLS as defined in the Package for Transport Layer Security,
 - HTTPS in accordance with [FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1](#),

- SSH as defined in the Extended Package for Secure Shell

]

] to protect all data from [disclosure and modification] through use of **selection: IPsec, TLS, HTTPS, DTLS** when it is transferred between separate parts of the **TOE**.

Application Note: This requirement ensures all communications between components of a distributed **TOE** are protected through the use of an encrypted communications channel. The data passed in this trusted communication channel are encrypted as defined in the protocol chosen in the **first** **second** selection.

The trusted channel uses secure protocols that preserve the confidentiality and integrity of **MDM** communications. The **ST** author chooses the mechanism or mechanisms supported by the **TOE**. To support mutual authentication **FIA_X509_EXT.1(2)** should be included in the **ST**. This channel may also be used as the registration channel for the registration process, as described in section 3.1 and **FCO_CPC_EXT.1.2**.

If "IPsec as defined in the **PP-Module** for VPN Client" is selected, the **TSF** must claim conformance to a PP-Configuration that includes the VPN Client **PP-Module** for IPsec VPN Clients must be included in the **ST**. If "HTTPS" is selected the appropriate selection-based **SFRs** from Appendix B must be included in the **ST**.

If the **ST** author selects "SSH as defined in the Extended Package for Secure Shell", the **TSF** must be validated against the EP for Secure Shell with the **MDM PP**. It should be noted that due to constraints imposed by this PP that sha1 cannot be used.

If the **ST** author selects "mutually authenticated TLS as defined in the Package for Transport Layer Security" or "mutually authenticated DTLS as defined in the Package for Transport Layer Security", the **TSF** must be validated against requirements from the Package for Transport Layer Security, with the following selections made:

- **FCS_TLS_EXT.1:**
 - either TLS or DTLS is selected depending on the selection made in **FPT_ITT.1.1(1)**
 - either client or server is selected as appropriate
- **FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.1 or FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.1** (as appropriate):
 - The cipher suites selected must correspond with the algorithms and hash functions allowed in **FCS_COP.1**.
 - mutual authentication must be selected

Protocol, RBG, Certificate validation, algorithm, and similar services may be met with platform provided services.

Evaluation Activity

TSS

The evaluator shall examine the **TSS** to determine that the methods and protocols used to protect distributed **TOE** components are described. The evaluator shall also confirm that all protocols listed in the **TSS** in support of **TOE** administration are consistent with those specified in the requirement, and are included in the requirements in the **ST**.

If "invoke platform-provided functionality" is selected, the evaluator shall examine the **TSS** to verify that it describes (for each supported platform) how this functionality is invoked (it should be noted that this may be through a mechanism that is not implemented by the **MDM** Server; nonetheless, that mechanism will be identified in the **TSS** as part of this evaluation activity).

Guidance

The evaluator shall confirm that the operational guidance contains instructions for establishing the communication paths for each supported method.

Tests

- **Test 1:** The evaluator shall ensure that communications using each specified (in the operational guidance) communication method is tested during the course of the evaluation, setting up the connections as described in the operational guidance and ensuring that communication is successful.
- **Test 2:** The evaluator shall ensure, for each method of communication, the channel data is not sent in plaintext.

Further evaluation activities are associated with the specific protocols.

FPT_ITT.1(2) Internal TOE TSF Data Transfer (MDM Agent)

This selection-based component depends upon selection in **FTP_ITC_EXT.1.1**.

FPT_ITT.1.1(2)

Refinement: The **TSF** shall **selection:**

- invoke platform-provided functionality to use **selection:**
 - mutually authenticated TLS,

- mutually authenticated DTLS,
 - HTTPS
-],
- implement functionality using **selection**:
 - mutually authenticated TLS as defined in the Package for Transport Layer Security,
 - mutually authenticated DTLS as defined in the Package for Transport Layer Security,
 - HTTPS in accordance with FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1
-]

] to protect all data from [disclosure and modification] when it is transferred between the TSE and MDM Agent.

Application Note: This requirement ensures all communications between the TSE and MDM Agent are protected through the use of an encrypted communications channel. The data passed in this trusted communication channel are encrypted as defined in the protocol chosen in the second selection.

The trusted channel uses secure protocols that preserve the confidentiality and integrity of MDM communications. The ST author chooses the mechanism or mechanisms supported by the TOE. To support mutual authentication FIA_X509_EXT.1(

2
1) should be included in the ST

. This channel may also be used as the registration channel for the registration process, as described in section 3.1 and FCO_CPC_EXT.1.2.

If the ST author selects "mutually authenticated TLS as defined in the Package for Transport Layer Security" or "mutually authenticated DTLS

" is selected the TLS Functional Package must be included in the ST as defined in the Package for Transport Layer Security", the TSE must be validated against requirements from the Package for Transport Layer Security, with the following selections made:

- FCS_TLS_EXT.1:
 - either TLS or DTLS is selected depending on the selection made in FPT_ITT.1.1(2)
 - either client or server is selected as appropriate
- FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.1 or FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.1 (as appropriate):

TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA cannot be selected

- - The cipher suites selected must correspond with the algorithms and hash functions allowed in FCS_COP.1.
 - mutual authentication must be selected

Protocol, RBG, Certificate validation, algorithm, and similar services may be met with platform provided services.

Evaluation Activity

TSS

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to determine that the methods and protocols used to protect distributed TOE components are described. The evaluator shall also confirm that all protocols listed in the TSS in support of TOE administration are consistent with those specified in the requirement, and are included in the requirements in the ST.

If "invoke platform-provided functionality" is selected, the evaluator shall examine the TSS

of the MDM Server's ST

to verify that it describes (for each supported platform) how this functionality is invoked (it should be noted that this may be through a mechanism that is not implemented by the MDM Server; nonetheless, that mechanism will be identified in the TSS as part of this evaluation activity).

Guidance

The evaluator shall confirm that the operational guidance contains instructions for establishing the communication paths for each supported method.

Tests

- **Test 1:** The

evaluators

- evaluator shall ensure that communications using each specified (in the operational guidance) communication method is tested during the course of the evaluation, setting up the connections as described in the operational guidance and ensuring that communication is successful.
- **Test 2:** The evaluator shall ensure, for each method of communication, the channel data is not sent in plaintext

Further

assurance

evaluation activities are associated with the specific protocols

FTP_ITC.1(2) Inter-TSF Trusted Channel (MDM Agent)

This selection-based component depends upon selection in [FTP_ITC_EXT.1.1](#).

[FTP_ITC.1.1\(2\)](#)

Refinement: The [TSF](#) shall [selection:

- invoke platform-provided functionality to use [selection:
 - mutually authenticated TLS,
 - mutually authenticated DTLS,
 - HTTPS],
- implement functionality

] to use

- using [selection:
 - mutually authenticated TLS as defined in the Package for Transport Layer Security
 - mutually authenticated DTLS as defined in the Package for Transport Layer Security
 - HTTPS in accordance with [FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1](#)]

] to provide a trusted communication channel between itself and another trusted IT product (as a server) and the MDM Agent that is logically distinct from other communication channels, provides assured identification of its end points, protects channel data from disclosure, and detects modification of the channel data.

Application Note: The intent of the mandatory portion of the above requirement is to use the cryptographic protocols identified in the requirement to establish and maintain a trusted channel between the [TOE](#) and the [MDM](#) Agent. If the [TOE](#) includes a separate MAS Server, this requirement also addresses the communication between the MAS Server and the [MDM](#) Agent. Only TLS, DTLS, or HTTPS are used in this trusted channel.

This requirement is to ensure that the transmission of any audit logs, mobile device information data (software version, hardware model, and application versions), and configuration data collected by the [MDM](#) Agent and sent from the [MDM](#) Agent to the [MDM](#) Server, when commanded, or at configurable intervals, is properly protected. This trusted channel also protects any commands and policies sent by the [MDM](#) Server to the [MDM](#) Agent. Either the [MDM](#) Agent or the [MDM](#) Server is able to initiate the connection.

For TLS connections between the MDM Server and Agent, the MDM Server is the Server side of the TLS connection, therefore it is appropriate to include the selection-based [FCS_TLSS](#) SFRs in the ST, not [FCS_TLSC](#) SFRs. With respect to mutual authentication, in cases where the Agent is outside of the [TOE](#), it should be verified that the server can support mutual authentication, meaning that the server includes support for client-side certificates for TLS mutual authentication post-enrollment. However, the client side is not evaluated since the agent is not in the [TOE](#).

This trusted channel protects both the connection between an enrolled [MDM](#) Agent and the [MDM](#) Server and [FTP_TRP.1\(2\)](#) provides a trusted channel to protect the connection between an unenrolled [MDM](#) Agent and the [MDM](#) Server during the enrollment operation. Different protocols can be used for these two connections, and the description in the [TSS](#) should make this difference clear.

The trusted channel uses TLS, DTLS, or HTTPS as the protocol that preserves the confidentiality and integrity of [MDM](#) communications. The [ST](#) author chooses the mechanism or mechanisms supported by the [TOE](#).

If "HTTPS" is selected the appropriate selection-based [SFRs](#) from Appendix B must be included in the [ST](#).

If "TLS" or "DTLS" is selected the TLS Functional Package must be included in the [ST](#). The [ST](#) author selects "mutually authenticated TLS as defined in the Package for Transport Layer Security" or "mutually authenticated DTLS as defined in the Package for Transport Layer Security", the [TSF](#) must be validated against requirements from the Package for Transport Layer Security with the following selections made:

- [FCS_TLS_EXT.1](#):
 - either TLS or DTLS is selected depending on the selection made in [FTP_ITC.1.1\(2\)](#)
 - server must be selected
- [FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.1](#):
 - ~~TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA cannot be selected~~ The cipher suites selected must correspond with the algorithms and hash functions allowed in [FCS_COP.1](#).
 - mutual authentication must be selected

Protocol, RBG, Certificate validation, algorithm, and similar services may be met with platform provided services.

The requirement implies that not only are communications protected when they are initially established, but also on resumption after an outage. It may be the case that some part of the [TOE](#) setup involves manually setting up tunnels to protect other communication, and if after an outage the [TOE](#) attempts to re-establish the communication automatically with (the necessary) manual intervention, there may be a window created where an attacker might be able to gain critical information or compromise a connection.

Evaluation Activity

[TSS](#)

If "invoke platform-provided functionality" is selected, the evaluator shall examine the [TSS](#) of the [MDM](#) Server's [ST](#) to verify that it

describes (for each supported platform) how this functionality is invoked (it should be noted that this may be through a mechanism that is not implemented by the [MDM](#) Server; nonetheless, that mechanism will be identified in the [TSS](#) as part of this evaluation activity).

[FTP_ITC.1.2\(2\)](#)

Refinement: The [TSF](#) shall [selection: invoke platform-provided functionality, implement functionality] to permit the [TSF](#) and [MDM](#) Agent to initiate communication via the trusted channel.

[Evaluation Activity](#)

[TSS](#)

If "invoke platform-provided functionality" is selected, the evaluator shall examine the [TSS](#) of the [MDM](#) Server's [ST](#) to verify that it describes (for each supported platform) how this functionality is invoked (it should be noted that this may be through a mechanism that is not implemented by the [MDM](#) Server; nonetheless, that mechanism will be identified in the [TSS](#) as part of this evaluation activity).

[FTP_ITC.1.3\(2\)](#)

Refinement: The [TSF](#) shall [selection: invoke platform-provided functionality, implement functionality] to initiate communication via the trusted channel for all communication between the [MDM](#) Server [TSF](#) and the [MDM](#) Agent.

[Evaluation Activity](#)

[TSS](#)

The evaluator shall examine the [TSS](#) to determine that the methods of Agent-Server communication are indicated, along with how those communications are protected. The evaluator shall also confirm that all protocols listed in the [TSS](#) in support of remote [TOE](#) administration are consistent with those specified in the requirement, and are included in the requirements in the [ST](#).

If "invoke platform-provided functionality" is selected, the evaluator shall examine the [TSS](#) of the [MDM](#) Server's [ST](#) to verify that it describes (for each supported platform) how this functionality is invoked (it should be noted that this may be through a mechanism that is not implemented by the [MDM](#) Server; nonetheless, that mechanism will be identified in the [TSS](#) as part of this evaluation activity).

[Guidance](#)

The evaluator shall confirm that the operational guidance contains instructions for configuring the communication channel between the [MDM](#) Agent and the [MDM](#) Server for each supported method.

[Tests](#)

- **Test 1:** The evaluators shall ensure that communications using each specified (in the operational guidance) Agent-Server communication method is tested during the course of the evaluation, setting up the connections as described in the operational guidance and ensuring that communication is successful.
- **Test 2:** The evaluator shall ensure, for each method of Agent-Server communication, the channel data is not sent in plaintext.
- **Test 3:** The evaluator shall ensure, for each communication channel with the [MDM](#) Server, that a protocol analyzer identifies the traffic as the protocol under testing.

Further [assurance-evaluation](#) activities are associated with the specific protocols

Appendix C - Objective Requirements

This appendix includes requirements that specify security functionality which also addresses threats. The requirements are not currently mandated in the body of this PP as they describe security functionality not yet widely-available in commercial technology. However, these requirements may be included in the ST such that the TOE is still conformant to this PP, and it is expected that they be included as soon as possible. As indicated in the introduction to this PP, the baseline requirements (those that must be performed by the [TOE](#) or its underlying platform) are contained in the body of this PP. There are additional requirements that specify security functionality that is desirable and these requirements are contained in this Appendix. It is expected that these requirements will transition from objective requirements to baseline requirements in future versions of this PP.

At any time these may be included in the [ST](#) such that the [TOE](#) is still conformant to this PP.

This Appendix is divided into two subsections: objective requirements that may be performed by the [TSF](#) and objective requirements that may be performed by the [MDM](#) Agent or its underlying platform.

FAU_CRP_EXT.1 Support for Compliance Reporting of Mobile Device Configuration

[FAU_CRP_EXT.1.1](#)

The [TSF](#) shall provide [selection: an interface that provides responses to queries about the configuration of enrolled devices; an interface that permits the export of data about the configuration of enrolled devices] to authorized entities over an [authenticated](#)

[selection: [HTTPS](#), [TLS](#), [DTLS](#), [IPsec](#), [SSH](#)] trusted communication channel, a channel that meets the secure channel requirements in [FTP_ITC.1\(1\)](#). The provided information for each enrolled mobile device includes:

- a. The current version of the MD firmware/software
- b. The current version of the hardware model of the device
- c. The current version of installed mobile applications
- d. List of MD configuration policies that are in place on the device (as defined in [FMT_SMF.1.1\(1\)](#))
- e. [selection: [assignment](#): list of other available information about enrolled devices; no other information]

Application Note: The intent of this requirement is that the [MDM](#) Server be able to provide compliance information about enrolled

mobile devices for use by other enterprise security infrastructure systems. There are active standards efforts underway by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Security Automation and Continuous Monitoring (SACM) Working Group and others to define protocols and standards to assess and report upon endpoint device posture. We expect that this requirement will evolve in future versions of this Protection Profile as standards efforts mature.

If "IPsec" is selected the Module for IPsec VPN Clients must be included in the [ST](#).

If "SSH" is selected the Module for Secure Shell must be included in the [ST](#). It should be noted that due to constraints imposed by this PP that sha1 cannot be used.

If "HTTPS" is selected the appropriate selection-based [SFRs](#) from Appendix B must be included in the [ST](#).

If "TLS" or "DTLS" is selected the TLS Functional Package must be included in the [ST](#), with the following selections made:

- [FCS_TLS_EXT.1](#):
 - either TLS or DTLS is selected depending on the selection made in [FAU_CRP_EXT.1.1](#)
 - server must be selected
- [FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.1](#):
 - [TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA](#) cannot be selected
 - mutual authentication must be selected

Protocol, RBG, Certificate validation, algorithm, and similar services may be met with platform provided services.

Evaluation Activity

Guidance

The evaluator shall check to ensure that the operational guidance contains instructions on how to access the [MDM](#) Server's compliance reporting interface.

Tests

- **Test 1:** Using the operational guidance, the evaluator shall demonstrate the ability to access the compliance reporting interface from an authorized entity and successfully obtain information about enrolled devices.
- **Test 2:** The evaluator shall attempt to access the compliance reporting interface from an unauthorized entity and demonstrate that the attempt is denied.

FCO_CPC_EXT.1 ~~Component~~ Component Registration Channel Definition

FCO_CPC_EXT.1.1

The [TSF](#) shall [**selection:** invoke platform-provided functionality, implement functionality] to require an Administrator to enable communications between any pair of [TOE](#) components before such communication can take place

Evaluation Activity

TSS

If "invoke platform-provided functionality" is selected, the evaluator shall examine the [TSS](#) of the [MDM](#) Server's [ST](#) to verify that it describes (for each supported platform) how the audit record protection functionality is invoked (it should be noted that this may be through a mechanism that is not implemented by the [MDM](#) Server; nonetheless, that mechanism will be identified in the [TSS](#) as part of this evaluation activity).

FCO_CPC_EXT.1.2

The [TSF](#) shall [**selection:** invoke platform-provided functionality, implement functionality] to implement a registration process in which components establish and use a communications channel that uses [**selection:**

- A channel that meets the secure channel requirements in [**selection:** [FTP_ITC.1](#), [FPT_ITT.1\(1\)](#), [FPT_ITT.1\(2\)](#)],
- A channel that meets the secure registration channel requirements in [FTP_TRP.1\(3\)](#),
- No channel

] for at least [TSF](#) data.

Evaluation Activity

TSS

If "invoke platform-provided functionality" is selected, the evaluator shall examine the [TSS](#) of the [MDM](#) Server's [ST](#) to verify that it describes (for each supported platform) how the audit record protection functionality is invoked (it should be noted that this may be through a mechanism that is not implemented by the [MDM](#) Server; nonetheless, that mechanism will be identified in the [TSS](#) as part of this evaluation activity).

FCO_CPC_EXT.1.3

The [TSF](#) shall [**selection:** invoke platform-provided functionality, implement functionality] to enable an ~~Administrator~~ administrator to disable communications between any pair of [TOE](#) components.

Application Note: This [SFR](#) is only applicable if the [TOE](#) is distributed and therefore has multiple components that need to communicate via an internal [TSF](#) channel. When creating the [TSF](#) from the initial pair of components, either of these components may be identified as the [TSF](#) for the purposes of satisfying the meaning of "TSF" in this [SFR](#).

The intention of this requirement is to ensure that there is a registration process that includes a positive enablement step by an ~~Administrator~~ administrator before components joining a distributed [TOE](#) can communicate with the other components of the [TOE](#) and before the new component can act as part of the [TSF](#). The registration process may itself involve communication with the joining component: many implementations use a bespoke process for this, and the security requirements for the "registration communication" are then defined in [FCO_CPC_EXT.1.2](#). Use of this "registration communication" channel is not deemed inconsistent with the requirement of [FCO_CPC_EXT.1.1](#) (i.e. the registration channel can be used before the enablement step, but only in order to complete the registration process).

The channel selection (for the registration channel) in [FCO_CPC_EXT.1.2](#) is essentially a choice between the use of a normal secure channel that is equivalent to a channel used to communicate with external IT entities (FTP_ITC.1) or existing [TOE](#) components ([FPT_ITT.1\(1\)/FPT_ITT.1\(2\)](#)), or else a separate type of channel that is specific to registration ([FTP_TRP.1\(3\)](#)). If the [TOE](#) does not require a communications channel for registration (e.g. because the registration is achieved entirely by configuration actions by an Administrator/administrator at each of the components) then the main selection in [FCO_CPC_EXT.1.2](#) is completed with the "No channel" option.

If the [ST](#) author selects the FTP_ITC.1 or [FPT_ITT.1\(1\)/FPT_ITT.1\(2\)](#) channel type in the main selection in [FCO_CPC_EXT.1.2](#) then the [TSS](#) identifies the relevant [SFR](#) iteration that specifies the channel used. If the [ST](#) author selects the [FTP_TRP.1\(3\)](#) channel type, then the [TSS](#) (possibly with support from the operational guidance) describes details of the channel and the mechanisms that it uses (and describes how the registration process ensures that the channel can only be used by the intended joiner and gatekeeper). Note that the [FTP_TRP.1\(3\)](#) channel type may require support from security measures in the operational environment (see the definition of [FTP_TRP.1\(3\)](#) for details).

If the [ST](#) author selects the FTP_ITC.1 or [FPT_ITT.1\(1\)/FPT_ITT.1\(2\)](#) channel type in the main selection in [FCO_CPC_EXT.1.2](#) then the [ST](#) identifies the registration channel as a separate iteration of FTP_ITC.1 or [FPT_ITT.1\(1\)/FPT_ITT.1\(2\)](#) and gives the iteration identifier (e.g. "FPT_ITT.1/Join") in an [ST](#) Application Note for [FCO_CPC_EXT.1](#).

Note that the channel that is set up and used for registration may be adopted as a continuing internal communication channel (i.e. between different [TOE](#) components) provided that the channel meets the requirements of FTP_ITC.1 or [FPT_ITT.1\(1\)/FPT_ITT.1\(2\)](#). Otherwise the registration channel is closed after use and a separate channel is used for the internal communications.

Specific requirements for Preparative Procedures relating to [FCO_CPC_EXT.1](#) are defined in the Evaluation Activities [Evaluation Activity](#)

TSS

If "invoke platform-provided functionality" is selected, the evaluator shall examine the [TSS](#) of the [MDM Server's ST](#) to verify that it describes (for each supported platform) how the audit record protection functionality is invoked (it should be noted that this may be through a mechanism that is not implemented by the [MDM Server](#); nonetheless, that mechanism will be identified in the [TSS](#) as part of this evaluation activity).

Guidance

The evaluator shall examine the guidance documentation to confirm that it contains instructions for enabling and disabling communications with any individual component of a distributed [TOE](#). The evaluator shall confirm that the method of disabling is such that all other components can be prevented from communicating with the component that is being removed from the [TOE](#) (preventing the remaining components from either attempting to initiate communications to the disabled component, or from responding to communications from the disabled component).

Tests

- **Test 1:** The evaluator shall confirm that an IT entity that is not currently a member of the distributed [TOE](#) cannot communicate with any component of the [TOE](#) until the non-member entity is enabled by a Administrator/an administrator for each of the non-equivalent [TOE](#) components that it is required to communicate with (non-equivalent [TOE](#) components are as defined in the minimum configuration for the distributed [TOE](#))
- **Test 2:** The evaluator shall confirm that after enablement, an IT entity can communicate only with the components that it has been enabled for. This includes testing that the enabled communication is successful for the enabled component pair, and that communication remains unsuccessful with any other component for which communication has not been explicitly enabled.

Some [TOE](#)s may set up the registration channel before the enablement step is carried out, but in such a case the channel must not allow communications until after the enablement step has been completed.

- **Test 3:** The evaluator shall separately disable each [TOE](#) component in turn and ensure that the other [TOE](#) components cannot then communicate with the disabled component, whether by attempting to initiate communications with the disabled component or by responding to communication attempts from the disabled component.

FIA_UAU_EXT.4(1) User Authentication (Re-Use Prevention)

FIA_UAU_EXT.4.1(1)

The [TSF](#) shall prevent reuse of enrollment authentication data related to **assignment:** identified authentication mechanism(s)]. Application Note: This requirement references the authentication mechanism(s) used to authenticate the user for enrollment in [FIA_ENR_EXT.1.1](#). If a username and password is used to authenticate the user for enrollment, the password **shall must** not be reused. Thus if the user has two devices enrolled in management or needs to re-enroll the same device (i.e., after a device wipe), the password **shall must** be different for each enrollment. Additionally, if two different users are enrolling the password **shall must** be different for each user.

Evaluation Activity

TSS

The evaluator shall verify that the [TSS](#) contains a description of the process of enrollment for each [MDM Agent/platform](#) listed as supported in the [ST](#). This description shall include the method of user authentication (username/password, token, etc.) and how reuse of the authentication data is prevented.

Tests

- **Test 1:** The evaluator shall enroll a device providing correct credentials. The evaluator shall attempt to enroll a second device using the same credentials used to enroll the first device. The evaluator shall verify that the second device could not enroll.

FIA_UAU_EXT.4(2) User Authentication (Re-Use Prevention for Device Enrollment)

[FIA_UAU_EXT.4.1\(2\)](#)

The [TSF](#) shall prevent reuse of **[selection: IMEI, [assignment: a unique device ID]]** related to limiting the user's enrollment of devices.

Application Note: The [MDM](#) server ~~shall must~~ not allow two devices to be enrolled using the same unique identifier. The unique identifier is specified in [FIA_ENR_EXT.1.2](#).

[FIA_UAU_EXT.4.1\(2\)](#) can only be included in the [ST](#) if "devices specified by IMEI" or "device specified by **assignment: an a** unique device ID" is selected in [FIA_ENR_EXT.1.2](#). The same selection ~~shall must~~ be completed for this requirement.

[Evaluation Activity](#)

TSS

The evaluator shall verify that the [TSS](#) contains a description of the policy to limit the user's enrollment of devices

Guidance

The evaluator shall ensure that the administrative guidance describes the method(s) of restricting user enrollment and that it instructs the administrator how to configure the restrictions.

Tests

- **Test 1:** The evaluator shall configure the [MDM](#) Server to restrict user's enrollment to a specific unique device ID and enroll a device with that device ID. The evaluator shall attempt to enroll a second device with the same unique device ID (The evaluator may need to wipe the device without network connectivity, so the device is un-enrolled but the [MDM](#) server considers the device still enrolled.) The evaluator shall verify that the second enrollment using the same unique device ID fails.

FIA_X509_EXT.3 ~~X509~~-X.509 Enrollment

[FIA_X509_EXT.3.1](#)

The TSF shall **[selection: invoke platform-provided functionality, implement functionality]** to generate a Certificate Request Message as specified by RFC 2986 and be able to provide the following information in the request: public key and **[selection: device-specific information, Common Name, Organization, Organizational Unit, Country]**.

Application Note: The public key is the public key portion of the public-private key pair generated by the [TOE](#) as specified in [FCS_CKM.1.1](#).

As Enrollment over Secure Transport (EST) is a new standard that has not yet been widely adopted, this requirement is included as an interim objective requirement in order to allow developers to distinguish those products which have ~~do to~~ have the ability to generate Certificate Request Messages but do not yet implement [EST](#).

[Evaluation Activity](#)

TSS

If "invoke platform-provided functionality" is selected, the evaluator shall examine the [TSS](#) of the [MDM](#) Server's [ST](#) to verify that it describes (for each supported platform) how this functionality is invoked (it should be noted that this may be through a mechanism that is not implemented by the [MDM](#) Server; nonetheless, that mechanism will be identified in the [TSS](#) as part of this evaluation activity).

[FIA_X509_EXT.3.2](#)

The TSF shall **[selection: invoke platform-provided functionality, implement functionality]** to validate the chain of certificates from the Root CA upon receiving the CA Certificate Response.

[Evaluation Activity](#)

TSS

If the [ST](#) author selects "device-specific information", the evaluator shall verify that the [TSS](#) contains a description of the device-specific fields used in certificate requests.

If "invoke platform-provided functionality" is selected, the evaluator shall examine the [TSS](#) of the [MDM](#) Server's [ST](#) to verify that it describes (for each supported platform) how this functionality is invoked (it should be noted that this may be through a mechanism that is not implemented by the [MDM](#) Server; nonetheless, that mechanism will be identified in the [TSS](#) as part of this evaluation activity).

Guidance

The evaluator shall check to ensure that the operational guidance contains instructions on requesting certificates from a CA, including generation of a Certificate Request Message. If the [ST](#) author selects "Common Name", "Organization", "Organizational Unit", or "Country", the evaluator shall ensure that this guidance includes instructions for establishing these fields before creating the certificate request message.

Tests

- **Test 1:** The evaluator shall use the operational guidance to cause the [TOE](#) to generate a certificate request message. The evaluator shall capture the generated message and ensure that it conforms to the format specified. The evaluator shall confirm that the certificate request provides the public key and other required information, including any necessary user-input information.
- **Test 2:** The evaluator shall demonstrate that validating a certificate response message without a valid certification path results in the function failing. The evaluator shall then load a certificate or certificates as trusted CAs needed to validate the certificate response message, and demonstrate that the function succeeds. The evaluator shall then delete one of the certificates, and show that the function fails.

[FIA_X509_EXT.4.1](#)

The [TSF](#) shall use the Enrollment over Secure Transport (EST) protocol as specified in RFC 7030 to request certificate enrollment using the simple enrollment method described in RFC 7030 Section 4.2.

[FIA_X509_EXT.4.2](#)

The [TSF](#) shall be capable of authenticating [EST](#) requests using an existing certificate and corresponding private key as specified by RFC 7030 Section 3.3.2.

[FIA_X509_EXT.4.3](#)

The [TSF](#) shall be capable of authenticating [EST](#) requests using HTTP Basic Authentication with a username and password as specified by RFC 7030 Section 3.2.3.

[FIA_X509_EXT.4.4](#)

The [TSF](#) shall perform authentication of the [EST](#) server using an Explicit Trust Anchor following the rules described in RFC 7030, section 3.6.1.

Application Note: EST also uses HTTPS as specified in [FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1](#) to establish a secure connection to an [EST](#) server, and thus, the [ST](#) author must also include [FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1](#) in the main body of the [ST](#). The separate Trust Anchor Database dedicated to [EST](#) operations is described as Explicit Trust Anchors in RFC 7030

[FIA_X509_EXT.4.5](#)

The [TSF](#) shall be capable of requesting server-provided private keys as specified in RFC 7030 Section 4.4

[FIA_X509_EXT.4.6](#)

The [TSF](#) shall be capable of updating its [EST](#)-specific Trust Anchor Database using the "Root CA Key Update" process described in RFC 7030 Section 4.1.3.

[FIA_X509_EXT.4.7](#)

The [TSF](#) shall generate a Certificate Request Message for [EST](#) as specified in RFC 2986 and be able to provide the following information in the request: public key and **[selection]**:

- device-specific information,
- Common Name, Organization, Organizational Unit, and Country

].

[FIA_X509_EXT.4.8](#)

The [TSF](#) shall validate the chain of certificates from the Root CA certificate in the Trust Anchor Database to the [EST](#) Server CA certificate upon receiving a CA Certificates Response.

Application Note: The public key referenced in [FIA_X509_EXT.4.7](#) is the public key portion of the public-private key pair generated by the [TOE](#) as specified in [FCS_CKM.1](#).

[Evaluation Activity](#)

Guidance

The evaluator shall check to ensure that the operational guidance contains instructions on requesting certificates from an [EST](#) server, including generating a Certificate Request Message.

Tests

The evaluator shall also perform the following tests. Other tests are performed in conjunction with the TLS evaluation activities

- **Test 1:** The evaluator shall use the operational guidance to cause the [TOE](#) to request certificate enrollment from an [EST](#) server using the simple enrollment method described in RFC 7030 Section 4.2, authenticating the certificate request to the server using an existing certificate and private key as described by RFC 7030 Section 3.3.2. The evaluator shall confirm that the resulting certificate is successfully obtained and installed in the [TOE](#) key store.
- **Test 2:** The evaluator shall use the operational guidance to cause the [TOE](#) to request certificate enrollment from an [EST](#) server using the simple enrollment method described in RFC 7030 Section 4.2, authenticating the certificate request to the server using a username and password as described by RFC 7030 Section 3.2.3. The evaluator shall confirm that the resulting certificate is successfully obtained and installed in the [TOE](#) key store.
- **Test 3:** The evaluator shall modify the [EST](#) server to return a certificate containing a different public key than the key included in the [TOE](#)'s certificate request. The evaluator shall use the operational guidance to cause the [TOE](#) to request certificate enrollment from an [EST](#) server. The evaluator shall confirm that the [TOE](#) does not accept the resulting certificate since the public key in the issued certificate does not match the public key in the certificate request.
- **Test 4:** The evaluator shall configure the [EST](#) server or use a man-in-the-middle tool to present a server certificate to the [TOE](#) that is present in the [TOE](#) general Trust Anchor Database but not its [EST](#)-specific Trust Anchor Database. The evaluator shall cause the [TOE](#) to request certificate enrollment from the [EST](#) server. The evaluator shall verify that the request is not successful.
- **Test 5:** The evaluator shall configure the [EST](#) server or use a man-in-the-middle tool to present an invalid certificate. The evaluator shall cause the [TOE](#) to request certificate enrollment from the [EST](#) server. The evaluator shall verify that the request is not successful. The evaluator shall configure the [EST](#) server or use a man-in-the-middle tool to present a certificate that does not have the CMC RA purpose and verify that requests to the [EST](#) server fail. The tester shall repeat the test using a valid certificate and a certificate that contains the CMC RA purpose and verify that the certificate enrollment requests succeed.
- **Test 6:** The evaluator shall use a packet sniffing tool between the [TOE](#) and an [EST](#) server. The evaluator shall turn on the sniffing tool and cause the [TOE](#) to request certificate enrollment from an [EST](#) server. The evaluator shall verify that the [EST](#) protocol interaction occurs over a Transport Layer Security (TLS) protected connection. The evaluator is not expected to decrypt the connection but rather observe that the packets conform to the TLS protocol format.
- **Test 7:** The evaluator shall use the operational guidance to cause the [TOE](#) to request a server-provided private key and certificate from an [EST](#) server. The evaluator shall confirm that the resulting private key and certificate are successfully obtained and installed in the [TOE](#) key store.
- **Test 8:** The evaluator shall modify the [EST](#) server to, in response to a server-provided private key and certificate request, return a private key that does not correspond with the public key in the returned certificate. The evaluator shall use the operational guidance to cause the [TOE](#) to request a server-provided private key and certificate. The evaluator shall confirm that the [TOE](#) does not accept the resulting private key and certificate since the private key and public key do not correspond

- **Test 9:** The evaluator shall configure the [EST](#) server to provide a "Root CA Key Update" as described in RFC 7030 Section 4.1.3. The evaluator shall cause the [TOE](#) to request CA certificates from the [EST](#) server and shall confirm that the [EST](#)-specific Trust Anchor Database is updated with the new trust anchor.
- **Test 10:** The evaluator shall configure the [EST](#) server to provide a "Root CA Key Update" as described in RFC 7030 Section 4.1.3, but shall modify part of the NewWithOld certificate's generated signature. The evaluator shall cause the [TOE](#) to request CA certificates from the [EST](#) server and shall confirm that the [EST](#)-specific Trust Anchor Database is not updated with the new trust anchor since the signature did not verify.
- **Test 11:** The evaluator shall use the operational guidance to cause the [TOE](#) to generate a certificate request message. The evaluator shall capture the generated message and ensure that it conforms with the format specified by RFC 2986. The evaluator shall confirm that the certificate request provides the public key and other required information, including any necessary user-input information.

FMT_SAE_EXT.1 Security Attribute Expiration

FMT_SAE_EXT.1.1

The [TSF](#) shall be capable to specify a configurable expiration time for enrollment authentication data

FMT_SAE_EXT.1.2

The [TSF](#) shall be able to deny enrollment after the expiration time for the enrollment authentication data has passed

Application Note: This requirement references the user authenticator used for device enrollment in management in [FIA_ENR_EXT.1.1](#). The user authenticator ~~shall~~ **must** only be valid for a configurable time limit. If the authenticator is expired, even if ~~the~~ entered correctly, enrollment ~~shall~~ **must** not occur.

The length of the time the authenticator is valid for is configured per function ~~g.c.5~~ in [FMT_SMF.1\(2\)](#). If [FMT_SAE_EXT.1](#) is included in the [ST](#), then function ~~g~~ **shall** **must** be selected in [FMT_SMF.1\(2\)](#).

Evaluation Activity

TSS

The evaluator shall verify that the [TSS](#) contains a description of the process of enrollment for each [MDM](#) Agent/platform listed as supported in the [ST](#). This description shall the method of user authentication (username/password, token, etc.)

Guidance

The evaluator shall check to ensure that the operational guidance contains instructions to configure the expiration time for each method of user authentication listed in the [TSS](#).

Tests

- **Test 1:** The evaluator shall configure the [MDM](#) Server according to the administrative guidance to set an expiration time for the enrollment authentication data. For each method of user authentication listed in the [TSS](#), the evaluator shall attempt to enroll using authentication data that has expired. The evaluator shall verify that enrollment was unsuccessful

FTP_TRP.1(3) Trusted Path (for Joining)

FTP_TRP.1.1(3)

Refinement: The TSF shall [**selection:** invoke platform-provided functionality, implement functionality] to provide a communication path between itself and a joining component that is logically distinct from other communication paths and provides assured identification of [**selection:** the TSF endpoint, both joining component and TSF endpoint] and protection of the communicated data from modification and [**selection:** disclosure, none].

Evaluation Activity

TSS

If "invoke platform-provided functionality" is selected, the evaluator shall examine the [TSS](#) of the [MDM](#) Server's [ST](#) to verify that it describes (for each supported platform) how this functionality is invoked (it should be noted that this may be through a mechanism that is not implemented by the [MDM](#) Server; nonetheless, that mechanism will be identified in the [TSS](#) as part of this evaluation activity).

FTP_TRP.1.2(3)

Refinement: The TSF shall [**selection:** invoke platform-provided functionality, implement functionality] to permit [**selection:** the TSF, the joining component] to initiate communication via the trusted path

Evaluation Activity

TSS

If "invoke platform-provided functionality" is selected, the evaluator shall examine the [TSS](#) of the [MDM](#) Server's [ST](#) to verify that it describes (for each supported platform) how this functionality is invoked (it should be noted that this may be through a mechanism that is not implemented by the [MDM](#) Server; nonetheless, that mechanism will be identified in the [TSS](#) as part of this evaluation activity).

FTP_TRP.1.3(3)

Refinement: The TSF shall [**selection:** invoke platform-provided functionality, implement functionality] to require the use of the trusted path for [joining components to the [TSF](#) under environmental constraints identified in **assignment:** reference to operational guidance].

Application Note: This [SFR](#) implements one of the types of channel identified in the main selection for [FCO_CPC_EXT.1.2](#). The "joining component" in [FTP_TRP.1\(3\)](#) is the IT entity that is attempting to join the distributed [TOE](#) by using the registration process.

The effect of this [SFR](#) is to require the ability for components to communicate in a secure manner while the distributed [TSF](#) is being created (or when adding components to an existing distributed [TSF](#)). When creating the [TSF](#) from the initial pair of components, either of these components may be identified as the [TSF](#) for the purposes of satisfying the meaning of [TSF](#) in this [SFR](#).

The selection at the end of [FTP_TRP.1.1\(3\)](#) recognises that in some cases confidentiality (i.e protection of the data from disclosure) may not be provided by the channel. The [ST](#) author distinguishes in the [TSS](#) whether in this case the [TOE](#) relies on the environment to provide confidentiality (as part of the constraints referenced in [FTP_TRP.1.3\(3\)](#)) or whether the registration data exchanged does not require confidentiality (in which case this assertion must be justified). If "none" is selected, then this word may be omitted in the [ST](#) to improve readability.

The assignment in [FTP_TRP.1.3\(3\)](#) ensures that the [ST](#) highlights any specific details needed to protect the registration environment. Note that when the [ST](#) uses [FTP_TRP.1\(3\)](#) for the registration channel then this channel cannot be reused as the normal inter-component communication channel (the latter channel must meet [FTP_ITC.1](#) or [FPT_ITT.1\(1\)/FPT_ITT.1\(2\)](#)). Specific requirements for Preparative Procedures relating to [FTP_TRP.1\(3\)](#) are defined in the Evaluation Activities

[Evaluation Activity](#)

[TSS](#)

The evaluator shall examine the [TSS](#) to determine that the methods of joining [TOE](#) components are indicated, along with how those communications are protected. The evaluator shall also confirm that all protocols listed in the [TSS](#) in support of joining are consistent with those specified in the requirement, and are included in the requirements in the [ST](#).

If "invoke platform-provided functionality" is selected, the evaluator shall examine the [TSS](#) of the [MDM](#) Server's [ST](#) to verify that it describes (for each supported platform) how this functionality is invoked (it should be noted that this may be through a mechanism that is not implemented by the [MDM](#) Server; nonetheless, that mechanism will be identified in the [TSS](#) as part of this evaluation activity).

[Guidance](#)

The evaluator shall confirm that the operational guidance contains instructions for joining [TOE](#) components for each supported method.

[Tests](#)

The evaluator shall also perform the following tests:

- **Test 1:** *The evaluator shall ensure that the communications path for joining components to the [TSF](#) is tested for each distinct (nonequivalent) component type, setting up the connections as described in the guidance documentation and ensuring that communication is successful. In particular the evaluator shall confirm that requirements on environment protection for the registration process are consistent with observations made on the test configuration (for example, a requirement to isolate the components from the Internet during registration might be inconsistent with the need for a component to contact a license server). If no requirements on the registration environment are identified as necessary to protect confidentiality, then the evaluator shall confirm that the key used for registration can be configured (following the instructions in the guidance documentation) to be at least the same length as the key used for the internal [TSF](#) channel that is being enabled. The evaluator shall confirm that the key used for the channel is unique to the pair of components (this is done by identifying the relevant key during the registration test: it is not necessary to examine the key value).*
- **Test 2:** *The evaluator shall follow the guidance documentation to ensure that in fact the communication channel can be enabled by an administrator for all the [TOE](#) components identified in the guidance documentation as capable of initiation*
- **Test 3:** *The evaluator shall ensure that if the guidance documentation states that the channel data is encrypted then the data observed on the channel is not plaintext.*
- **Test 4:** *The evaluator shall ensure that, for each different pair of nonequivalent component types that can use the registration channel, the connection is physically interrupted during a joining attempt. The evaluator shall ensure that when physical connectivity is restored, communications are appropriately protected.*

Further [assurance](#) [evaluation](#) activities are associated with the specific protocols

Appendix D - Entropy Documentation and Assessment

This appendix describes the required supplementary information for each entropy source used by the [TOE](#).

The documentation of the entropy source(s) should be detailed enough that, after reading, the evaluator will thoroughly understand the entropy source and why it can be relied upon to provide sufficient entropy. This documentation should include multiple detailed sections: design description, entropy justification, operating conditions, and health testing. This documentation is not required to be part of the [TSS](#).

D.1 Design Description

Documentation shall include the design of each entropy source as a whole, including the interaction of all entropy source components. Any information that can be shared regarding the design should also be included for any third-party entropy sources that are included in the product.

The documentation will describe the operation of the entropy source to include, how entropy is produced, and how unprocessed (raw) data can be obtained from within the entropy source for testing purposes. The documentation should walk through the entropy source design indicating where the entropy comes from, where the entropy output is passed next, any post-processing of the raw outputs (hash, XOR, etc.), if/where it is stored, and finally, how it is output from the entropy source. Any conditions placed on the process (e.g., blocking) should also be described in the entropy source design. Diagrams and examples are encouraged

This design must also include a description of the content of the security boundary of the entropy source and a description of how the security boundary ensures that an adversary outside the boundary cannot affect the entropy rate.

If implemented, the design description shall include a description of how third-party applications can add entropy to the RBG. A description of any RBG state saving between power-off and power-on shall be included.

D.2 Entropy Justification

There should be a technical argument for where the unpredictability in the source comes from and why there is confidence in the entropy source delivering sufficient entropy for the uses made of the RBG output (by this particular [TOE](#)). This argument will include a description of the expected min-entropy rate (i.e. the minimum entropy (in bits) per bit or byte of source data) and explain that sufficient entropy is going into the [TOE](#) randomizer seeding process. This discussion will be part of a justification for why the entropy source can be relied upon to produce bits with entropy.

The amount of information necessary to justify the expected min-entropy rate depends on the type of entropy source included in the product.

For developer provided entropy sources, in order to justify the min-entropy rate, it is expected that a large number of raw source bits will be collected, statistical tests will be performed, and the min-entropy rate determined from the statistical tests. While no particular statistical tests are required at this time, it is expected that some testing is necessary in order to determine the amount of min-entropy in each output.

For third party provided entropy sources, in which the [TOE](#) vendor has limited access to the design and raw entropy data of the source, the documentation will indicate an estimate of the amount of min-entropy obtained from this third-party source. It is acceptable for the vendor to "assume" an amount of min-entropy, however, this assumption must be clearly stated in the documentation provided. In particular, the min-entropy estimate must be specified and the assumption included in the [ST](#).

Regardless of type of entropy source, the justification will also include how the DRBG is initialized with the entropy stated in the [ST](#), for example by verifying that the min-entropy rate is multiplied by the amount of source data used to seed the DRBG or that the rate of entropy expected based on the amount of source data is explicitly stated and compared to the statistical rate. If the amount of source data used to seed the DRBG is not clear or the calculated rate is not explicitly related to the seed, the documentation will not be considered complete.

The entropy justification shall not include any data added from any third-party application or from any state saving between restarts.

D.3 Operating Conditions

The entropy rate may be affected by conditions outside the control of the entropy source itself. For example, voltage, frequency, temperature, and elapsed time after power-on are just a few of the factors that may affect the operation of the entropy source. As such, documentation will also include the range of operating conditions under which the entropy source is expected to generate random data. Similarly, documentation shall describe the conditions under which the entropy source is no longer guaranteed to provide sufficient entropy. Methods used to detect failure or degradation of the source shall be included

D.4 Health Testing

More specifically, all entropy source health tests and their rationale will be documented. This will include a description of the health tests, the rate and conditions under which each health test is performed (e.g., at startup, continuously, or on-demand), the expected results for each health test, [TOE](#) behavior upon entropy source failure, and rationale indicating why each test is believed to be appropriate for detecting one or more failures in the entropy source.

Appendix E - Evaluating Additional Components for a Distributed TOE

In the case of a distributed [TOE](#) the ~~Security Target~~ [ST](#) will identify an evaluated configuration that consists of a number of separate components chosen by the [ST](#) author, which collectively satisfy the requirements of the [PP](#). This evaluated configuration need not be the minimum set of components that could possibly meet the [PP](#) (e.g. if the [TOE](#) is intended for large enterprise deployments then the evaluated configuration might include some redundancy in components in order to support expected connectivity and loads), but because this is the main configuration referred to in the [ST](#) and the evaluation, it is treated in this section as the minimum configuration of interest and is referred to here as the 'minimum configuration' as well as the 'evaluated configuration'.

In addition to the minimum configuration above, the [ST](#) may also identify (at the author's discretion, and subject to verification as described in this section) which [TOE](#) components can have instances added to an operational configuration without affecting the validity of the [CC](#) certification. The [ST](#) description may include constraints on how such components are added, including required and/or prohibited configurations of the components.

Extra instances of a [TOE](#) component must have the same hardware and software as the original component included in the evaluated configuration.

E.1 Evaluator Actions for Assessing the ST

TSS

The evaluator shall examine the [TSS](#) to identify any extra instances of [TOE](#) components allowed in the [ST](#) and shall examine the description of how the additional components maintain the [SFR](#)s to confirm that it is consistent with the role that the component plays in the evaluated configuration. For example: the secure channels used by the extra component for intra-[TOE](#) communications (FPT_ITT) and external communications (FTP_ITC) must be consistent, the audit information generated by the extra component must be maintained, and the management of the extra component must be consistent with that used for the original instance of the component in the minimum configuration.

E.2 Evaluator Actions for Assessing the Guidance Documentation

Guidance

The evaluator shall examine the description of the extra instances of [TOE](#) components in the guidance documentation to confirm that they are consistent with those identified as allowed in the [ST](#). This includes confirmation that the result of applying the guidance documentation to configure the extra component will leave the [TOE](#) in a state such that the claims for [SFR](#) support in each component are as described in the [ST](#) and therefore that all [SFR](#)s continue to be met when the extra components are present.

The evaluator shall examine the secure communications described for the extra components to confirm that they are the same as described for the components in the minimum configuration (additional connections between allowed extra components and the components in the minimum configuration are allowed of course).

E.3 Evaluator Actions for Testing the TOE

Tests

The evaluator tests the [TOE](#) in the minimum configuration as defined in the [ST](#) (and the guidance documentation).

If the description of the use of extra components in the [ST](#) and guidance documentation identifies any difference in the [SFR](#)s allocated to a component, or the scope of the [SFR](#)s involved (e.g. if different selections apply to different instances of the component) then the evaluator tests these additional [SFR](#) cases that were not included in the minimum configuration

In addition, the evaluator tests the following aspects for each extra component that is identified as allowed in the distributed [TOE](#):

- Communications: the evaluator follows the guidance documentation to confirm, by testing, that any additional connections introduced with the extra component and not present in the minimum configuration are consistent with the requirements stated in the [ST](#) (e.g. with regard to protocols and ciphersuites used) An example of such an additional connection would be if a single instance of the component is present in the minimum configuration and adding a duplicate component then introduces an extra communication between the two instances. Another example might be if the use of the additional components necessitated the use of a connection to an external authentication server instead of using locally stored credentials.
- Audit: the evaluator confirms that the audit records from different instances of a component can be distinguished so that it is clear which instance generated the record.
- Management: if the extra component manages other components in the distributed [TOE](#) then the evaluator shall follow the guidance documentation to confirm that management via the extra component uses the same roles and role holders for administrators as for the component in the minimum configuration.

Appendix F - MDM Software Equivalency Guidelines

F.1 Introduction

The purpose of equivalence in PP-based evaluations is to find a balance between evaluation rigor and commercial practicability, to ensure that evaluations meet customer expectations while recognizing that there is little to be gained from requiring that every variation in a product or platform be fully tested. If a product is found to be compliant with a PP on one platform, then all equivalent products on equivalent platforms are also considered to be compliant with the PP.

A Vendor can make a claim of equivalence if the Vendor believes that a particular instance of their Product implements PP-specified security functionality in a way equivalent to the implementation of the same functionality on another instance of their Product on which the functionality was tested. The Product instances can differ in version number or feature level (model), or the instances may run on different platforms. Equivalency can be used to reduce the testing required across claimed evaluated configurations. It can also be used during Assurance Maintenance to reduce testing needed to add more evaluated configurations to a certification.

These equivalency guidelines do not replace Assurance Maintenance requirements or NIAP Policy #5 requirements for CAVP certificates. Nor may equivalency be used to leverage evaluations with expired certifications

These Equivalency Guidelines represent a shift from complete testing of all product instances to more of a risk-based approach. Rather than require that every combination of product and platform be tested, these guidelines support an approach that

recognizes that products are being used in a variety of environments, and often in cloud environments over where the vendor (and sometimes the customer) have little or no control over the underlying hardware. Developers should be responsible for the security functionality of their applications on the platforms they are developed for, whether that is an operating system, a virtual machine, or a software-based execution environment such as a container. But those platforms may themselves run within other environments, virtual machines or operating systems, that completely abstract away the underlying hardware from the application. The developer should not be held accountable for security functionality that is implemented by platform layers that are abstracted away. The implication is that not all security functionality will necessarily be tested for all platform layers down to the hardware for all evaluated configurations, especially for applications developed for software-based execution environments such as containers. For these cases, the balancing of evaluation rigor and commercial practicability tips in favor of practicability. Note that this does not affect the requirement that at least one product instance be fully tested on at least one platform with cryptography mapped to a CAVP certificate.

Equivalency has two aspects:

1. **Product Equivalence:** Products may be considered equivalent if there are no differences between Product Models and Product Versions with respect to PP-specified security functionality.
2. **Platform Equivalence:** Platforms may be considered equivalent if there are no significant differences in the services they provide to the Product, or in the way the platforms provide those services, with respect to PP-specified security functionality.

The equivalency determination is made in accordance with these guidelines by the Validator and Scheme using information provided by the Evaluator/Vendor.

F.2 Approach to Equivalency Analysis

There are two scenarios for performing equivalency analysis. One is when a product has been certified and the vendor wants to show that a later product should be considered certified due to equivalence with the earlier product. The other is when multiple product variants are going through evaluation together and the vendor would like to reduce the amount of testing that must be done. The basic rules for determining equivalence are the same in both cases. But there is one additional consideration that applies to equivalence with previously certified products. That is, the product with which equivalence is being claimed must have a valid certification in accordance with scheme rules and the Assurance Maintenance process must be followed. If a product's certification has expired, then equivalence cannot be claimed with that product.

When performing equivalency analysis, the Evaluator/Vendor should first use the factors and guidelines for Product Model equivalence to determine the set of Product Models to be evaluated. In general, Product Models that do not differ in PP-specified security functionality are considered equivalent for purposes of evaluation against the SWApp PP.

If multiple revision levels of Product Models are to be evaluated, or to determine whether a revision of an evaluated product needs re-evaluation, the Evaluator/Vendor and Validator should use the factors and guidelines for Product Version equivalence to analyze whether Product Versions are equivalent.

Having determined the set of Product Models and Versions to be evaluated, the next step is to determine the set of Platforms that the Products must be tested on.

Each non-equivalent Product for which compliance is claimed must be fully tested on each non-equivalent platform for which compliance is claimed. For non-equivalent Products on equivalent platforms, only the differences that affect PP-specified security functionality must be tested for each product.

"Differences in PP-Specified Security Functionality" Defined

If PP-specified security functionality is implemented by the TOE, then differences in the actual implementation between versions or product models break equivalence for that feature. Likewise, if the [TOE](#) implements the functionality in one version or model and the functionality is implemented by the platform in another version or model, then equivalence is broken. If the functionality is implemented by the platform in multiple models or versions on equivalent platforms, then the functionality is considered different if the product invokes the platform differently to perform the function.

F.3 Specific Guidance for Determining Product Model Equivalence

Product Model equivalence attempts to determine whether different feature levels of the same product across a product line are equivalent for purposes of PP testing. For example, if a product has a "basic" edition and an "enterprise" edition, is it necessary to test both models? Or does testing one model provide sufficient assurance that both models are compliant?

Product models are considered equivalent if there are no differences that affect PP-specified security functionality, as indicated in [Table 4.5](#).

Table 5: Determining Product Model Equivalence

Factor	Same/Different	Guidance
PP-Specified Functionality	Same	If the differences between Models affect only non-PP-specified functionality, then the Models are equivalent.
	Different	If PP-specified security functionality is affected by the differences between Models, then the Models are not equivalent and must be tested separately. It is necessary only to test the functionality affected by the software differences. If only differences are tested, then the differences must be enumerated, and for each difference the Vendor must provide an explanation of why each difference does or does not affect PP-specified functionality. If the Product Models are separately tested fully, then there is no need to document the differences.

Table 1. Determining Product Model Equivalence

F.4 Specific Guidance for Determining Product Version Equivalence

In cases of version equivalence, differences are expressed in terms of changes implemented in revisions of an evaluated Product. In general, versions are equivalent if the changes have no effect on any security-relevant claims about the [TOE](#) or assurance evidence. Non-security-relevant changes to [TOE](#) functionality or the addition of non-security-relevant functionality does not affect equivalence.

Table 6: Factors for Determining Product Version Equivalence

Factor	Same/Different	Guidance
Product Models	Different	Versions of different Product Models are not equivalent unless the Models are equivalent as defined in Section subsection 3 .
PP-Specified Functionality	Same	If the differences affect only non-PP-specified functionality, then the Versions are equivalent
	Different	If PP-specified security functionality is affected by the differences, then the Versions are not considered equivalent and must be tested separately. It is necessary only to test the functionality affected by the changes. If only the differences are tested, then for each difference the Vendor must provide an explanation of why the difference does or does not affect PP-specified functionality. If the Product Versions are separately tested fully, then there is no need to document the differences.

Table 2. Factors for Determining Product Version Equivalence

F.5 Specific Guidance for Determining Platform Equivalence

Platform equivalence is used to determine the platforms that equivalent versions of a Product must be tested on. Platform equivalence analysis done for one MDM cannot be applied to another MDM. Platform equivalence is not general, it is with respect to a particular MDM.

Product Equivalency analysis must already have been done and Products have been determined to be equivalent.

The platform can be hardware or virtual hardware, an operating system or similar entity, or a software execution environment such as a container. For purposes of determining equivalence for MDMs, we address each type of platform separately. In general, platform equivalence is based on differences in the interfaces between the [TOE](#) and Platform that are relevant to the implementation of PP-specified security functionality.

F.5.1 Platform Equivalence, Hardware/Virtual Hardware Platforms

If an MDM runs directly on hardware without an operating system, or directly on virtualized hardware without an operating system, then platform equivalence is based on processor architecture and instruction sets. In the case of virtualized hardware, it is the virtualized processor and architecture that are presented to the MDM that matters, not the physical hardware.

Platforms with different processor architectures and instruction sets are not equivalent. This is not likely to be an issue for equivalency analysis for MDMs since there is likely to be a different version of the MDM for different hardware environments. Equivalency analysis becomes important when comparing processors with the same architecture. Processors with the same architecture that have instruction sets that are subsets or supersets of each other are not disqualified from being equivalent for purposes of an MDM evaluation. If the MDM takes the same code paths when executing PP-specified security functionality on different processors of the same family, then the processors can be considered equivalent with respect to that MDM. For example, if an MDM follows one code path on platforms that support the AES-NI instruction and another on platforms that do not, then those two platforms are not equivalent with respect to that MDM functionality. But if the MDM follows the same code path whether or not the platform supports AES-NI, then the platforms are equivalent with respect to that functionality.

The platforms are equivalent with respect to the MDM if the platforms are equivalent with respect to all PP-specified security functionality.

Table 7: Factors for Determining Hardware/Virtual Hardware Platform Equivalence

Factor	Same/Different/None	Guidance
Platform Architectures	Different	Platforms that present different processor architectures and instruction sets to the MDM are not equivalent.
PP-Specified Functionality	Same	For platforms with the same processor architecture, the platforms are equivalent with respect to the MDM if execution of all PP-specified security functionality follows the same code path on both platforms.

Table 3. Factors for Determining Hardware/Virtual Hardware Platform Equivalence

F.5.2 Platform Equivalence, OS Platforms

For MDMs that are built for and run on operating systems, platform equivalence is determined by the interfaces between the MDM and the operating system that are relevant to PP-specified security functionality. Generally, these are the processor interface, device interfaces, and OS APIs. The following factors are applied in order:

Table 8: Factors for Determining OS/VS Platform Equivalence

Factor	Same/Different/None	Guidance
Platform Architectures	Different	Platforms that run on different processor architectures and instruction sets are not equivalent
Platform Vendors	Different	Platforms from different vendors are not equivalent
Platform Versions	Different	Platforms from the same vendor with different major version numbers are not equivalent
Platform Interfaces	Different	Platforms from the same vendor and major version are not equivalent if there are differences in device interfaces and OS APIs that are relevant to the way the platform provides PP-specified security functionality to the MDM.
Platform Interfaces	Same	Platforms from the same vendor and major version are equivalent if there are no differences in device interfaces and OS APIs that are relevant to the way the platform provides PP-specified security functionality to the MDM, or if the Platform does not provide such functionality to the MDM.

Table 4. Factors for Determining OS/VS Platform Equivalence

F.5.3 Software-based Execution Environment Platform Equivalence

If an MDM is built for and runs in a non-OS software-based execution environment, such as a Container or Java Runtime, then the below criteria must be used to determine platform equivalence. The key point is that the underlying hardware (virtual or physical) and OS is not relevant to platform equivalence. This allows MDMs to be tested and run on software-based execution environments on any hardware, as in cloud deployments.

Table 9: Factors for Software-based Execution Environment Platform Equivalence

Factor	Same/Different/None	Guidance
Platform Type/Vendor	Different	Software-based execution environments that are substantially different or come from different vendors are not equivalent. For example, a java virtual machine is not the same as a container. A Docker container is not the same as a CoreOS container.
Platform Versions	Different	Execution environments that are otherwise equivalent are not equivalent if they have different major version numbers.
PP-Specified Security Functionality	Same	All other things being equal, execution environments are equivalent if there is no significant difference in the interfaces through which the environments provide PP-specified security functionality to MDMs.

Table 5. Factors for Software-based Execution Environment Platform Equivalence

F.6 Level of Specificity for Tested Configurations and Claimed Equivalent Configurations

In order to make equivalency determinations, the vendor and evaluator must agree on the equivalency claims. They must then provide the scheme with sufficient information about the [TOE](#) instances and platforms that were evaluated, and the [TOE](#) instances and platforms that are claimed to be equivalent.

The ST must describe all configurations evaluated down to processor manufacturer, model number, and microarchitecture version.

The information regarding claimed equivalent configurations depends on the platform that the MDM was developed for and runs on.

Bare-Metal MDMs

For MDM Servers that run without an operating system on bare-metal or virtual bare-metal, the claimed configuration must describe the platform down to the specific processor manufacturer, model number, and microarchitecture version. The Vendor must describe the differences in the [TOE](#) with respect to PP-specified security functionality and how the [TOE](#) functions differently to leverage platform differences (e.g., instruction set extensions) in the tested configuration versus the claimed equivalent

configuration.

Traditional MDMs

For MDMs that run with an operating system as their immediate platform, the claimed configuration must describe the platform down to the specific operating system version. If the platform is a virtualization system, then the claimed configuration must describe the platform down to the specific virtualization system version. The Vendor must describe the differences in the [TOE](#) with respect to PP-specified security functionality and how the [TOE](#) functions differently to leverage platform differences in the tested configuration versus the claimed equivalent configuration. Relevant platform differences could include instruction sets, device interfaces, and OS APIs invoked by the [TOE](#) to implement PP-specified security functionality.

Software-Based Execution Environments

For MDMs that run in a software-based execution environment such as a Java virtual machine or a Container, then the claimed configuration must describe the platform down to the specific version of the software execution environment. The Vendor must describe the differences in the [TOE](#) with respect to PP-specified security functionality and how the [TOE](#) functions differently to leverage platform differences in the tested configuration versus the claimed equivalent configuration.

Appendix G - Use Case Templates

The following use case templates list those selections, assignments, and objective requirements that best support the use cases identified by this Protection Profile. Note that the templates assume that all [SFRs](#) listed in Section 5 are included in the [ST](#), not just those listed in the templates. These templates and deviations from the template should be identified in the Security Target to assist customers with making risk-based purchasing decisions. Products that do not meet these templates are not precluded from use in the scenarios identified by this Protection Profile. Where selections for a particular requirement are not identified in a use case template, all available selections are equally applicable to the use case.

G.1 Enterprise-owned device for general-purpose enterprise use

Requirement	Action
FMT_SMF.1.1(1) Function 32	Include in ST and assign GPS.
FMT_SMF.1.1(1) Function 34	Include in ST . Assign personal hotspot connections (if feature exists).
FMT_SMF.1.1(1) Function 47	Include in ST .
FMT_SMF.1.1(1) Function 49	Include in ST and select "a. USB mass storage mode".
FMT_SMF.1.1(1) Function 51	Include in ST . Select both options.

G.2 Enterprise-owned device for specialized, high-security use

Requirement	Action
FMT_SMF.1.1(1) Function 15	Include in ST .
FMT_SMF.1.1(1) Function 16	Include in ST .
FMT_SMF.1.1(1) Function 31	Include in ST and select "no other method".
FMT_SMF.1.1(1) Function 32	Include in ST .
FMT_SMF.1.1(1) Function 33	Include in ST . Assign at least USB.
FMT_SMF.1.1(1) Function 34	Include in ST . Assign all protocols where the TSE acts as a server.
FMT_SMF.1.1(1) Function 36	Include in ST .
FMT_SMF.1.1(1) Function 37	Include in ST .
FMT_SMF.1.1(1) Function 40	Include in ST .
FMT_SMF.1.1(1) Function 42	Include in ST .
FMT_SMF.1.1(1) Function 47	Include in ST .
FMT_SMF.1.1(1) Function 52	Include in ST .
FMT_SMF.1.1(1) Function 54	Include in ST .
FMT_SMF.1.1(1) Function c	Include in ST .
FMT_SMF.1.1(1) Function d	Include in ST .
FCS_CKM.1.1	Select RSA with key size of 3072 or select ECC schemes
FCS_CKM.2.1	Select "RSA schemes" or select "ECC schemes".
FCS_COP.1.1(1)	Select 256 bits
FCS_COP.1.1(2)	Select SHA-384
FCS_COP.1.1(3)	Select RSA with key size of 3072 or select ECC schemes
FIA_X509_EXT.2.2	Select either "allow the administrator to choose..." or "not accept the certificate".

FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.1 (from TLS Package)	If included in ST , select "TLS 1.2".
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2.1 (from TLS Package)	If included in ST , select "secp384r1".

G.3 Personally owned device for personal and enterprise use

Requirement	Action
FMT_SMF.1.1(1) Function 13	Include in ST
FMT_SMF.1.1(1) Function 14	Include in ST
FMT_SMF.1.1(1) Function 21	Include in ST
FMT_SMF.1.1(1) Function 22	Include in ST
FMT_SMF.1.1(1) Function 30	Select "on a per-app basis" and/or "on a per-group of application processes basis"
FMT_SMF.1.1(1) Function 31	If included in ST , select "on a per-app basis" and/or "on a per-group of application processes basis"
FMT_SMF.1.1(1) Function 48	Include in ST
FMT_SMF.1.1(1) Function 52	If included in ST , select "on a per-app basis" and/or "on a per-group of application processes basis"
FMT_SMF.1.1(2) Function f	Include in the ST

G.4 Personally owned device for personal and limited enterprise use

At this time no requirements are recommended for this use case.

Appendix H - References

Identifier	Title
	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation -
[CC]	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Part 1: Introduction and General Model, CCMB-2017-04-001, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017. • Part 2: Security Functional Components, CCMB-2017-04-002, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017. • Part 3: Security Assurance Components, CCMB-2017-04-003, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation -
[CC]	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Part 1: Introduction and General Model, CCMB-2012-09-001, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012 • Part 2: Security Functional Components, CCMB-2012-09-002, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012 • Part 3: Security Assurance Components, CCMB-2012-09-003, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012
[CEM]	Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security - Evaluation Methodology , CCMB-2012-09-004, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
[CSA]	Computer Security Act of 1987 , H.R. 145, June 11, 1987.
[OMB]	Reporting Incidents Involving Personally Identifiable Information and Incorporating the Cost for Security in Agency Information Technology Investments , OMB M-06-19, July 12, 2006
[MDF PP]	Protection Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 3.0, June 2016
[MDM Agent PP]	Protection Profile for Mobile Device Management, Version 3.0, October 2016