
Revenues

If country A cooperates

If country B cooperates




gets: \$960

If country B cheats

If country A cheats


e O

gets: \$700




е 4

gets: 121



B gets: 1,260













Consider this situation when A cheats and B cooperates: This is a Nash equilibrium, because neither player has an incentive to do otherwise:





A can not increase his payoff by switching to cooperate

B can not increase his payoff by switching to cheat





Consider this situation when A cooperates and B cheats: This is also a Nash equilibrium, because neither player has an incentive to

do otherwise:


A can not increase his payoff by switching to cheat

B can not increase his payoff by switching to cooperate










Nash Equilibrium

Revenues



Consider this situation when A cheats and B cooperates: This is a Nash equilibrium, because neither player has an incentive to do otherwise:

A can not increase his payoff by switching to cooperate B can not increase his payoff by switching to cheat

Consider this situation when A cooperates and B cheats: This is also a Nash equilibrium, because neither player has an incentive to do otherwise:

A can not increase his payoff by switching to cheat

B can not increase his payoff by switching to cooperate

Nash Equilibrium