
## Revenues

# If country A cooperates

### If country B cooperates



#### 


#### gets: \$960

#### If country B cheats

### If country A cheats


# е 84

## B gets: \$840




# $\varTheta$ 6

#### ets. a 17



#### -

B gets: 1,260



# If country A cooperates

#### If country B cooperates

### If country A cheats

# Dominant Strategy for A: cheat!

# If both countries follow their own self interest


# Both countries will cheat the agreement

# Both countries will be worse off: they will each make \$840 in revenue

Less than what they would have made cooperating!







## Both countries cheat: produce 28m barrels; price \$60


# Dominant Strategy for B: cheat!

Both countries cooperate: produce 16m barrels; price \$120

# Consumers are better off when companies do not or not allowed to collude


If both countries follow their own self interest

Consumers are better off when companies do not or not allowed to collude



Both countries will **cheat** the agreement

Both countries will be worse off: they will each make **\$840** in revenue



# Games Without a Dominant Strategy

Let's find the best strategy for Country B

	If country B cooperates		If country B cheats	
If country A cooperates	A gets: \$960	B gets: \$960	A gets: \$720	B gets: \$1,260
If country A cheats	A gets: \$1,260	B gets: \$720	A gets: \$840	B gets: \$840