

## **Online Appendix For Institutional Foundation of Diverse Immigration**

I divided the following appendix into four sections. Part A provides qualitative and quantitative evidence of the limited extent to which Australia diversified under the SSAS system of 1973. Part B provides qualitative and quantitative evidence of the limited extent to which Australia diversified under the NUMAS system of 1979. Part C addresses possible other omitted variables that may have driven diversification. Part D provides quantitative and qualitative evidence that the sources of immigrants coming to the United States did not diversify as nearly as much as they had in Canada and Australia during the period of the point system.

### **Appendix A: The Effects of Structuring Immigrant Selection with SSAS, 1973-1978**


Australia's path toward institutionally structuring immigration policy was far more tortuous, slow, and politically conflicted than in Canada. At the end of Australia's long economic boom from 1960-1973, rising terms of trade led to increased inflation, which some blamed on immigration levels (Dyster and Meredith 1990; Price 1975:3). Immigration Minister A.J. Forbes had reservations about adopting a point system after his Secretary, R.E. Armstrong, warned him in 1971 that even more Asians would come to Australia if he did so (Jordens 1989: 222). In contrast, the oppositional Labor Party candidate for Prime Minister, Gough Whitlam, partly distinguished himself from his incumbent rival by boldly promising to simultaneously introduce a points system similar to Canada, reduce the level of migration, and admit fewer non-European migrants (Jordens 1989:222-223). When Whitlam won the election, he implemented a swathe of measures that drastically diversified intake (Tavan 2008:199)<sup>1</sup>, and appointed Al Grassby as

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<sup>1</sup>Whitlam made family reunion a key priority by allowing non-European numbers to sponsor family members. He also permitted overseas students to stay. He removed restrictions on the entry of New Zealand citizens of non-European origin. He abolished the former system whereby officers had to forward admission applications from non-Europeans to Canberra for approval, and overseas posts were given the freedom to administer applications from non-European in the same way as for Europeans.

Immigration Minister. Grassby introduced a Structured Selection Assessment System (SSAS) in 1973 (Richmond and Rao 2012: 11-12).<sup>2</sup> SSAS selected half according to economic factors (Birrell and Birrell 1991 )<sup>3</sup> and half on a subjective interview report on “settlement” factors—including the applicant’s expectations and presentation (appearance, personal hygiene, speech and behavior) to family, community, sport and cultural interests, and a “comment on any convictions” with a final grade of “very good” to “not approved” (Hawkins 1989:105). Officer Wayne Gibbons recalls how many officers “didn’t like the move to an approach that didn’t discriminate on the basis of race.” Officers Peter Edwards and Ron Harrison noted that many officers did not seriously adopt the system. Departmental conflict intensified as Grassby employed new servants whom the old guard complained had no overseas experience (Martin 1992:96).

Based on the Canadian case, one might anticipate this system resulted in a greater increase in diversity than the 1966 reforms by obligating immigration officers to follow a specified procedure. While the percentage of European immigrants admitted was declining




**Graph A1: Immigrant Origins Most Affected by SSAS, 1971-75**

<sup>2</sup> In particular, Immigration sought migrants who 1) were economically viable in Australia, 2) had personal qualities that will enable them to cope with the trauma of resettlement, 3) were medically fit, 4) had a “satisfactory character record,” and 5) had a sincere intention of making a permanent home in Australia.

<sup>3</sup> Birrell and Birrell report that government issued only an approved list of occupations experiencing high labor demand

throughout the period, Graph A1, which is on a scale of 0 to 60%, shows that the average rate of decrease went from -3%/year during 1969-1972 to -5%/year over 1972-5, if one excludes Cypriot refugees fleeing the partition of Cyprus in 1973. British intake went from increasing 1%/year before the reforms to a decline of -4% afterwards. However, while many scholars may have stressed the impact of SSAS in liberalizing immigration policy, Graph A2, which is on a scale of 0 to 20%, shows that Asians<sup>4</sup> only increased their average rate of intake from 1 to 1.5%/year, once one extracts the influx of 1975 Indochinese



**Graph A2: Immigrants With Rates of Change Little Affected by SSAS, 1968-1975**

refugees from the overall Asian intake to isolate the reform's impact. If one does not exclude refugees, the Asian rate of increase went from 1 to 2%, but this increase in the latter period mainly occurred due to refugees from the war in Vietnam. Though the rate of African and Pacific Islanders intake hardly changed, Latin America, a new source for many white immigrants, interestingly raised its rate of increase from 0.8% in 1969-72 to 3.4%/year during 1972-1975,

<sup>4</sup> Unfortunately, past longitudinal analysis with these statistics may be misleading, because in 1975 Australian changed its category of Asia to exclude states in Asia that inhabit the nebulous area known as "the Middle East," which it combined with North Africa. For the sake of consistency and the fact that I have better individual country level data in late periods, I have disaggregated and re-aggregated post 1975 country level data to match their old standard of including countries where predominately people inhabit the Asian continent. This would notably exclude Russia and Turkey, where most people respectively still live west of the Bosphorus and Ural mountains. I have adjusted African figures to include North Africa, and my Asian figures by including the Middle East/North Africa minus North African countries.

while the rate of intake in particular from Chile surged from nearly zero in the period before to an average rate of increase of 2%/year over the period afterward.

While many suggest the 1973 reforms ended White Australia policy, they did not diversify intake much or provide enough structure to reduce racial bias. The increased Latin American intake resulted from efforts of officers to fulfill Grassby's policy by recruiting Argentines and Chileans, whom one recruiting officer confessed they found "halfway between Asians and Europeans." Recruiters avoided Mexico, for its ambassador warned that selecting only whites would incite protests there (Martin 1989:88; Birrell and Birrell 1987:82). In May 1973, Immigration cables advised all overseas offices of revised entry rules and an "easy visa system" to facilitate short term entry from non-Europeans, but reminded them that non-Europeans still faced restrictions on entry, needed to have applications referred to Canberra (unlike Europeans), and would receive no free passage.<sup>5</sup>

In contrast, actions taken to reduce racial discrimination were heavier in rhetoric than concrete policy. Grassby (1979) proudly became the first Immigration minister to tour Southeast Asian countries, where he actively publicized SSAS and earnestly encouraged Asians to immigrate to Australia. He therefore was infuriated to find only one office abroad had adopted his recommended "anti-racist measures."<sup>6</sup> Keith Waller, Secretary of Foreign Affairs then warned Grassby that his and Australia's reputation would be damaged with the discovery of prejudice in the processing of non-European applications and granting of assisted passage.<sup>7</sup> One

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<sup>5</sup> K. Waller to H. McGuinness, a/g secretary Department of Immigration, 11.7.1973; memorandum, "Procedures under revised rules of entry, " Waller to Heads of Mission, 25.5.1973, AA(ACT); Armstrong to Waller, 17.7.1973; Armstrong to Grassby, 19.7.1975, AA(ACT) A446/52, 73/756724.

<sup>6</sup> Cablegram, O. MN2032, Grassby Manila to Prime Minister Canberra, 23 July 1974, in series A1838, item 1632/1/2 part 1, NAA

<sup>7</sup> RE Armstrong to Minister, confidential working paper, "Immigration under a Labor government," 20/12./972, AA(ACT): A446/52, 72/95574 K. Waller to H. McGuinness, a/g secretary department of Immigration, 11/7/1973; memorandum, "Procedures under revised rules of entry," Waller to Heads of Mission, 25/5/1973; Armstrong to Waller, 17/7/1973; Armstrong to Grassby, 19/7/1975; AA(ACT): A446/52; 73/76724;

may also speculate that Immigration, by raising the price of passage from \$25 to 75 in 1973 for the first time since 1943 thought they could discourage non-European immigration. The Immigration Department, afflicted with a recession and high unemployment, was trying to cut immigration levels and may have figured this would reduce inflows. Then in early 1974, a document leaked from the Department of Foreign Affairs appeared in Australian newspapers:

It is widely believed among officers of this Department... that an approach which discriminates against non-Europeans is deliberately adopted, in each of the available avenues, by many immigration officers... Various signs have indicated that the 'word went around' (both within the Department of Immigration and its overseas officers, and to Foreign Affairs staff engaged in Immigration work at other overseas posts) that the new non-discriminatory policy should not be taken at face value—that in respect of non-Europeans nothing much had changed and it was to be "business as usual."<sup>8</sup>

Diplomatically embarrassed, Secretary of Foreign Affairs Alan Renouf, warned the Department that it "still is narrow-minded and unaware of the foreign policy issues or insensitive to them." He recommended that policy should match public statements (Dutton 1957:82). Before Grassby could tackle such problems, he narrowly lost his office in 1974. Xenophobic groups mounted an intense campaign that Grassby claimed had employed a pile of anonymous hate mail, death threats against Grassby's family and secretary, a man attacking Grassby with a knife, and a package of human feces (Grassby 1979). Yet despite such exemplary, intense grassroots resistance to SSAS and immigrant diversification, when Australia tried to reform the system six years later democratic forces suddenly stopped trying to preserve racial bias, and suddenly mobilized to eliminate it.

## **Appendix B: Turning Qualities Into Quantities and Democratic Backlash Against NUMAS, 1979-81**

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<sup>8</sup> Memorandum and attached paper, AH Loomes to Minister for Foreign Affairs, 27 February 1974, in series A1838, item 1632/1/2 part 1, NAA

Scholars often omit mention of fierce political contests over any later changes that would lead to the consolidation of a much less racially discriminatory point system. While upon leaving in 1974 Grassby advised Whitlam to demolish and reconstruct the department from scratch, Whitlam instead followed the advice of new Immigration Secretary Peter Wilenski and merged the Immigration Department with the Labor Department as Canada had done. He claimed both in his diary and an interview that this was an effort to rationalize and clean it of what he considered its more untrustworthy, prejudiced elements, though some argue this was actually an effort to depoliticize the controversial issue of immigration by converting it into a more technocratic matter and shield Immigration officials from further attacks (Lopez 2000). Whatever the true motive, while in the long run this linkage would become crucial in providing an institutional foundation for the points system, tying immigration to labor policy in the short run seemed merely to lead officials to justify racial bias on economic grounds. The new Labor and Immigration Minister, Clyde Cameron, told Parliament that overseas posts would approve the entry of both non-European and European applicants and abolish British visa privileges (Price and Martin, 1976: A7). But when he read a “favorable” report on Filipino laborers in which one technical officer noted Filipinos’ practical experience did not match their high level of technical training, Cameron concluded, “I would say that the main thrust of our recruitment from now on will be in West Germany, Denmark and the U.K.”<sup>9</sup> Later, Secretary L.W.B. Engeldow enlisted younger and better-qualified staff in 1978 to examine selection procedures. They found non-adherence to official policy widespread (Hawkins 1989:21).

Then in 1979, Minister Ian McPhee introduced the Numerically Weighted Multi-Factor Assessment System (NUMAS), a quantified version of SSAS that reduced the relative points for

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<sup>9</sup> Interview with Mr. Clyde Cameron, Minister of Labor and Immigration, by Alan Ramsey & Kenneth Randall, August 2, 1974

the occupational factor in selection (Birell and Birell 1987: 103).<sup>10</sup> NUMAS provoked a democratic backlash from the skeptical public, alarm among various ethnic lobbyists and voluntary agencies, and criticism in the press. The informed public and parliament objected to NUMAS in three ways: 1) NUMAS privileged white and wealthier immigrants, whom they believed possessed the most skills.<sup>11</sup> 2) It overvalued English and so discriminated against non-English speakers, particularly women.<sup>12</sup> 3) Lastly, it quantified too much, particularly with subjective components like personal assessment (Hawkins 1989:105-106, 142).


After NUMAS, did wealthy immigrants from English-speaking and predominately white countries increase, and non-English speaking African and Asian immigrants decrease? Jock Collins, Christian Joppke, and Laksiri Jayasuriya and David Sang, echoing the public's fears, claim this was the case (Jayasuriya and Sang 1992, 41; Joppke 2005; Collins 1988, 266-276). However, while NUMAS did seem to privilege immigrants from white countries, I do not find any particular bias for those who were more educated or spoke English after I compare average annual changes from 1975-1978 and 1978-1981. Graph A3, which is on a scale of 0 to 60%, shows how while in general European immigrants (excluding refugees) decreased at -6%/year before NUMAS, they increased 7% per year during 1978-1981 due to NUMAS, with British

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<sup>10</sup>Under NUMAS, independent applicants, including those nominated by Australian employers, had to attain 30 points on either economic factors or personal and settlement factors (50 each), though these could be averaged out if more points were obtained on one set of factors than on another. Specifically, under economic factors NUMAS gave 6 points for skills recognized in Australia, 14 points for occupational demand, 5 points for pre-arranged employment, 4 points for English, 2 points for ability to communicate a proposed employment, 5 points for occupational attributes, 6 for transferable assets to assist settlement, 5 for "economic viability," and under personal settlement factors offered 4 for education, 4 for literacy, 5 for competence in English, 6 for preparedness for migration, 6 for responsiveness, 6 for initiative, self-reliance and independence, 5 for presentation, 6 for adaptability, 2 for family unity, 6 for sponsorship. Applicants had to achieve 30 points on each of the two 50 point scales. See Form 1791 (10-78), 14, Department of Immigration, "Selection Assessment and Interview Report."


<sup>11</sup> Labor Party Leader Bill Hayden: "The implication of NUMAS is that it discriminates in favor of Anglo-Saxons. It discriminates even more in favor of people who are higher on the socio-economic ladder." *The Canberra Times*, June 24, 1980. Mick Young attacked NUMAS as favoring the migration of rich, white English speakers. See *Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates: House of Representatives*, 18 Oct 1979, pp. 2215-7

<sup>12</sup> *Parliament of Australia Hansard Debates*, 8/23/80



**Graph 9: Immigrant Origins Most Affected by NUMAS, 1975-1981**

reversing their average decline of -5%/year before NUMAS to an increase of 4% after NUMAS, a rise of 11% over 1978-1981. Yet the rate for nearby New Zealanders increased 3.5%/year before NUMAS and decreased -2%/year afterward. And while total Asians increased by 4%/year before NUMAS, converging with European intake and afterward fell by -3%/year, diverging with European intake. If one removes Indochinese and Lebanese refugees, NUMAS shifted the rate of Asian intake from a rise of 1%/year before NUMAS to a fall of -2%/year after. Africans went from increasing 1%/year before NUMAS to decreasing -0.4% after. Graph A4, which is on a scale of 0 to 20%, shows that rates of intake shifted little for non-Anglophone white and non-white migrants in Europe, the Pacific Islands, the USSR, South Korea, China, Egypt, and Turkey, and Anglophone states with strong education systems like Canada, Hong Kong,



**Graph 10: Immigrant origins least affected by NUMAS, 1975-81**



Malaysia, Singapore, and South Africa. Nor did this occur with migrants from Latin America, which decreased steadily over this period. Immigrant selection under NUMAS did increase intake of whites and British, but seemed more biased against people of color than non-Anglophones. Changing institutional factors and ongoing resistance to reforms may have limited immigrant opportunities more than NUMAS. In 1979 Australia began requiring a visa from everyone except New Zealanders. They enforced this effectively with fines against carriers who issued tickets to passengers without a visa (Jupp 2007, 144). Also, McPhee described ongoing lower level resistance to his efforts to ensure that health and criminal checks would be conducted for some Asian migrants so they could obtain appropriate clearances, to appoint immigration officers to Asian embassies, to inform Asians about how to apply, and to end assisted passages for Europeans (Dutton 2002, 82; Richards 2008, 279). But Australia's early adaptations of the point system did not reduce bias until they later approximated Canada's system much more than racial exclusionists would have liked.

### **Appendix C: Did Intake Diversify Due To Other External Causes or Changes To the Point System?**

Structural factors and later changes in point allocation permit one to test alternative hypotheses about why national origins of immigrants from the economic class<sup>13</sup> in particular diversified, isolating the impact of the point system:

1) Diplomatic Engagement: One may suspect that Australia became more open to non-European migrants as it strengthened its relationship with more proximal non-European countries.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> When I use the word immigrants from now on, I will be referring only to economic immigrants, because I now have data on them and wish to isolate the impact of changes to the point system on diversification.

<sup>14</sup> For example, Australia terminated assisted migration for Britons and some Europeans in 1981, contributed the savings to help non-English speaking migrants learn English, shifted immigration staff to Asian locations and began advertising in a wider range of places.. Dutton 2001, 82.

Guillermina Jasso and Mark Rosenweitz, in line with a gravity model of migration and trade, claim after comparing various immigration policies that “who a receiving country’s neighbors are matters substantially more [for what types of migrants they receive] than tweaks to selection mechanisms.”<sup>15</sup> Neville Meaney and Christine Inglis, cited earlier, both emphasized how over time Australia developed stronger commercial and diplomatic ties with Asia and became less engaged with Europe. Yet I do not see why these long-term developments would diversify intake so rapidly during 1982-1985 compared to other periods. A more specific proxy measure for diplomatic engagement would be consulates, since this may also reduce access to resources needed to immigrate. Taking a snapshot of Australian office coverage in 1989 reveals it to have expanded its coverage significantly to 16 locations in Europe, 13 in Asia, and 5 in North America, but it still had only its Buenos Aires office in Latin America and 3 offices in Africa (Hawkins, 1989:294). I match similarly sized countries that had an Australian office with those of the same continent that have a similarly sized population but are most distant from all other offices. I compare Kenya (15 million people, with a GDP/capita of \$365), which had a consulate, with Cameroon, one of the most distal countries from all consulates in Africa (in Cape Town, Cairo, and Nairobi) and with a comparable population (12 million people) and a slightly higher GDP/capita (\$938). Yet no economic immigrants came from Cameroon until 1992, when only one arrived, while 201 then came from Kenya. Likewise, while Argentina and Colombia had about 32,000 people in 1989, Argentina (GDP/capita \$1057), with South America’s sole consulate, had 256 successful economic immigrants, while Colombia (GDP/capita \$293), at the opposite end of South America, only had 30. Since these cases have divergent associations

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Cope and Kalantzis, 2000, pp. 259-61; John Menadue, pp 211-17. Menadue abolished automatic citizenship rights that were granted to British in 1983. Richards, 2008, 278.

<sup>15</sup> For more on the gravity model, see Rodriguez et al. 2009, p. 216 and Jasso and Rosenzweig, 2008, p.5

between income and immigrants (negative in Africa, positive in the Latin America), future research may confirm whether office access is more correlated with immigration opportunities than GDP/per capita.

3) English Requirement: As noted earlier, Ellie Vasta (2006), Robert Birrell and Lesleyanne Hawthorne (1999:36) suggest Australia limited diversification when in 1993-1996 it began to exclude non-English speaking applicants.<sup>16</sup> Prime Minister Robert Hawke suggested as much when he revealed in 1998 speech that Immigration accepted 2/3 of British and Irish applications to migrate, and only 1/3 of Asian applications.<sup>17</sup> Research on the disproportionate rise of Anglophone Singaporean immigrants to Australia during the 1980s relative to their small population suggests those from fast developing Asian countries would have the greatest outflow of their people, especially if they speak English and possessed much education/training (Lary and Inglis., 2004: 187). After comparing figures on nations with Western style institutions to those that lack them over the late 1990s, I found in the short term, the late policy seemed to either have a deterrent or exclusionary effect on non-English nationalities like Indonesians, Fijians, Koreans, and Latin Americans, most likely because the change was not expected by applicants.<sup>18</sup> Yet in general, the English requirement did not have such an exclusionary effect in the long run. First, survey data reveals that bonus points granted to graduates of Australian tertiary institutions increasingly motivated Asian students to apply to Australian universities through which they could enter the country, and then take the points test later. Second, a new

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<sup>16</sup> In particular, it gave more points for 1) occupations in demand (from 0 to 4% of the points), 2) degree-level qualifications that correlate with specific professional fields (raised from 0 to anywhere from 17 to 26% of the points), 3) Australian qualifications (raised from 0 to 4% of total), 4) Australian and "international experience" in their professional field (raised from 0 to 9% of total), 5) a spouse satisfying application criteria (5 bonus points introduced), and 7) a high level of capital with them to Australia or sponsorship by Australia based relatives (backed by an Assurance of support).

<sup>17</sup> "U.K. migrant figures prove no bias: Hawke," *The Australian*, 11 May 1984, cited in Joppke, p. 85

<sup>18</sup> From 1992-8, while economic immigrants from most English speaking countries with Western style institutions seem to fluctuate (U.K., Ireland, Singapore, Bangladesh, India), immigrants increased continuously and dramatically from Hong Kong (2.1 to 9%), South Africa (1.4 to 13%), and Pakistan (0.6 to 6.8%). Meanwhile, though immigrants from most non-English speaking countries increased consistently and greatly only from Indonesia (1.3 to 6.4%) and Fiji (1.7 to 2.3%), and immigrants decreased from Korea (2.3 to 1.1%), and South America (1.8 to 0.7%).

rule in 1999 allowed full fee paying foreign students who graduated at an Australian university from a twelve-month occupational experience requirement to apply directly for immigrant visas (Nesdale et al. 1995).<sup>19</sup> Third, studies comparing English exam scores amongst various nationals show that English speaking points no longer differ greatly amongst different Asian nationalities, with only Chinese slightly trailing behind the rest (Birell, Hawthorne, and Richardson, 2006: 112).<sup>20</sup> These factors likely encouraged Asians to immigrate. In sum, successful point system applicants come less and less from Anglophone countries, perhaps because English has become the international language and globally a more integral part of educational curricula.

4) Age, Inequality, Religion: In 2001-2004 Australia offered more points for human capital characteristics like higher education and youth, so diversity may have increased because Australia increasingly drew immigrants from younger and more educated populations (Winkelman 2001, Salt 2002, Jupp 2008)).<sup>21</sup> Since fertility had been declining and the population aging in Europe since 1963, one may suspect that given more points for younger applicants, more immigrants would come from relatively more youthful Asia.<sup>22</sup> I find that Australia did not tend to select more immigrants from younger societies after this reform, but since poorer societies from which many immigrants derive tend to be young, this variable may co-vary too much with self-selection effects.<sup>23</sup> Borjas (1988) has shown how if an origin country has more/less income inequality than a destination country, less/more educated immigrants may tend

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<sup>19</sup> Studying abroad as a route of immigration is especially the wish of students from China (78 %), Hong Kong (64 %), the Philippines (48 %), Fiji (46 %), and Malaysia and Singapore (43%).

<sup>20</sup> See the excellent chart on page 113 of the Birell et al. (2006) book

<sup>21</sup> a discussion of the reforms' increasing complexity, the general change in the end has been to give more points for skills (34% of the points, up from 30%), age (17%, up from 8%), and decreasing points to specific work experience (6%, down from 10%), and settling in area with labor shortage (3%, down from 6%). All applicants had to have a skilled occupation with qualifications recognized in Australia..

<sup>22</sup> World Bank Data on fertility rates. Available at <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN?page=6>

<sup>23</sup> If one compares changes in immigrants from 2000-2005 among medium sized countries like the very elderly Japan (.9 to 1.05%) with very youthful Pakistan (2 to 1.1%), then the proportion of immigrants coming from the large countries of elderly China (8.74 to 13.6%) and youthful India (10.74 to 13.46%), matched by the even more elderly U.K. (14.93 to 24%), they present at best mixed evidence that more youthful nations succeed at the point system.

to emigrate. However, if the country of origin has a higher/lower “rate of return” to education than the country of destination, educated individuals are less/more likely to emigrate. I find that countries with high-income inequality did seem to encourage self-selected driven emigration through the points system, confirming to Borjas’ self-selection model. Yet I also find average national per capita income seems to have an mixed effect on increased migratory opportunity before and after this change.<sup>24</sup> Future research should explore whether migratory opportunities increase with income for individuals, as my fieldwork and findings by economic historians suggests that poverty has become a new barrier to legal migration. For example, some economists suggest this is why sub-Saharan Africans represent such a low percentage of the overall immigrant intake (5%) relative to their share of the world population (about 11.4%).<sup>25</sup> Lastly, after 9/11 and the Bali bombings, Islamophobia may have biased decisions, as Australia’s anti-terrorism campaign that mainly targeted Muslims and concerns arose about those from mostly Muslim states. I find such prejudice infected Australia’s point system more than in Canada. Muslim immigrants fell, but this racial bias diminished eventually.<sup>26</sup> Such variables or changes may have affected the diversity of intake, but the point system was a more foundational force behind an increasingly diversified immigrant inflows.

## **Appendix D: But Did Not Societies Elsewhere Diversify Without a Point System? The Case of the USA**


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<sup>24</sup> The Gini coefficient measures income inequality within a country. During 2001-4, immigrants decreased from highly unequal countries like Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico. Though South Africa saw increases of 1.4 to 5.9%. this may have resulted from the push factors for whites after Apartheid ended. More came from Asian countries with higher income inequality, like Thailand (0.3 to 0.6%), Malaysia (4.5 to 4.9%), and the Philippines (2.4 to 3.3%), as opposed to dramatically decreasing arrivals from a wide range of economies with relatively more equitable income distribution like Japan (10 to 1.1%), Indonesia (7.9 to 3.4%), and Pakistan (1.4 to 1.2%).

<sup>25</sup> See Timothy Hatton and Jeffrey Williamson’s (2006) chapter, “Where Are All the Africans?” on the subject, pp. 247-264

<sup>26</sup> Jupp, 2006, cited in Richards, p. 314. Jupp, 2008, p. 201. Pape, 2005. Historically, Western terrorists (e.g. the IRA), and even the world’s most deadly terrorist network, the LTTE, were targeted less by counterterrorist efforts than Muslims. From 2000-2002, India immigrants rose (10.7 to 11.3%); those from Pakistan dropped (1.7 to 1.1%). While immigrants from Middle East to Australia have been historically flat and low, in these years Israelis slightly increased (.2 to .3%), Iranians dropped (.5 to .3%), and unlike other Southeast Asians, Indonesians dropped from 8% to 6%. Despite a comparable increase from Malaysia, Australia tends to admit more Christians than Muslims from Iraq and Iran, and none from mostly Muslim societies like Afghanistan.

One may suspect other industrialized societies would diversify just as much, since non-Europeans became more mobile and wealthier as their countries of origin developed economically. To strengthen my claim that the point system diversified immigration, I examine whether USA diversified as much over the same period as that when Canada and Australia adopted point systems. The USA lacks a point system and even after it adopted a color blind policy in 1965 only admitted about 10-20% of total intake as economic immigrants under its restricted system that gives first priority to family.<sup>27</sup> Yet while I noted earlier that with Canada the average rate of decline in European immigrant intake went from no change at 0%/year during 1962-6 to -6% in 1967-71, in the US, Graph A5, which is on a scale of 0 to 60%, shows that Europeans only declined from no change in the period before to a decrease of -2%/year in the period after. Under the Hart-Cellars Act of 1965 US abolished its racialized national origins quota system, which many argue caused the origins of its immigrants to increasingly diversify during the 1960s.<sup>28</sup> While Asians raised their rate of



**Graph A5: Origins of Immigrants to US while Canada Introduced Point System 1962-1970**


increase from 1% to over the five years before the point system to 2%/year after in Canada, Asian intake to the US did not really change but continued to increase at 2% more per year (though it shifted from an increase of 1 to 2% more per year if you extract refugees). African

<sup>27</sup> Reitz, 1998, pp. 72-74.

<sup>28</sup> For more detail on the content of the 1965 Act, the motive of US congressional representatives for passing it, and their expectations of its effects, see Hochschild and Burch, 2007.

immigrants, clinging to the bottom of the graph, barely changed their rate of entry to the US, while Canada did experience a slight increase in its African immigrants, who had little avenues for entry through family or as refugees. Even documented Latin Americans, whom one might expect to represent a larger share of immigrants to the US than Canada due to their closer proximity, only went from little change to a decrease of 1%/year. In sum the rate of Asian intake did increase slightly more in the US, but the number of Europeans decreased much more in Canada, with greater gains for other groups. I suspect limited diversification partly resulted because the USA continued to take in family members of US citizens, who resided mostly in Europe, while US military involvement and marriages to nationals in Japan, Korea and the Philippines may account for the rising number of Asian immigrants (Wolgin and Bloemraad 2010).

Since the US in the 1960s was not very diverse, perhaps a fairer comparison would be with Australia over the later period when it consolidated its point system, 1979-81, to the period after, 1982-4. Since Congress passed the Refugee Act in 1980 and North Vietnam then enacted



**Graph A6: Origins of Immigrants to US while Australia Introduced Its Point System, 1982**

its “Orderly Departure Program,” accelerating the exodus of Vietnamese (Roberts 1982: 3-8), I extract INS estimates on refugees from total immigrant numbers to provide an Asian estimate without refugees and isolate the causal impact of the reform. Graph A6, which is on a scale of 0

to 60% shows that while Australia shifted its rate of European intake from an increase of 7%/year to a decrease of -8%/year, the USA reversed its decline of Europeans from about -0.5% to an increase of 0.5%/year. While Australia raised the rate of Asians it admitted from a decrease of -3% to an increase of 6%/year, the US average rate of increase of Asians *decreased* from 3.96% to 1.71%/year. After I extracted refugees from the Asian intake, while Australia reversed its decline of Asians excluding refugees from -2% to an increase of 10%/year, in the US intake of Asians, excluding refugees, went from not changing at all in period before the reform to decreasing -1.59%/year in period after. Australia therefore increased its intake of Asians by about 12%/year more than in the US in the period after the point system than in the period before. Africans changed their rates by little in both cases. Latin Americans, who could more easily reach the US than Australia, shifted their rates of change in immigration to the US from a decrease of -4% in period before to not changing at all in period, while they went from decreasing at a rate of -2%/year the period before Australia implemented its point system to increasing at a rate of 2%/year during the period after. While Australia's proximity to Asia may explain some of the dramatic rise of Asians, much of the US's intake seems attributable to the refugee influx and subsequent family reunification. While American scholars tend to stress that US receives more immigrants than any other country in the world (Massey et al. 1998), by 1980, the foreign-born population in the US was 5%, while Canada and Australia were respectively 15% and 22% foreign-born. Since most of these more recent immigrants tend to be less white than earlier immigrants, the point system has arguably made these countries more ethnically diverse societies in percentage terms than the USA (Richards 2008:270). Though one may provisionally conclude that the US may have diversified more with a point system, research could explore if racial discrimination may have still been greater in Canada, where greater



discretion may have existed for various procedural and institutional reasons.<sup>29</sup> For example, (1) The American presidential system of government with its separation of powers may lead members of Congress to be more reluctant to leave discretion to civil servants in the executive branch than the Canadian or Australian parliament, whereas in Canada the Prime Ministers and parliamentary system tend to control the legislative agenda so that laws may leave more discretion to bureaucrats and therefore more diversification with policy changes. (2) Unlike in Canada and Australia, the US Department of State did not have the power to refuse visas and could rarely challenge consular officers through judicial review, so the Immigration and Naturalization Service may have maintained control over selection (Wildes 1989, Nafziger 1991); (3) During this period the American visa officers by law had to interview, with the exception of children under 14, every applicant, while interviews suggests that in practice Canadian officers sometimes exercised discretion in skipping the interview process.. (4) In Canada officers could exercise positive discretion and admit an applicant who failed the points test (Bouchard 2000:181). Future research could also compare how immigration flows diversified as other major immigration countries adopted point systems such as New Zealand and Britain, and how it did in similar periods in countries that did not (e.g. France, Japan) or only had done so very recently after having had a restrictive immigration policy for a long time (e.g. Germany).

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