Do Anti-Mobility Policies Make A Country Less Unattractive? The Heterogeneous Impact of Targeted Xenophobic Signals On Entries of Non-Targeted Nationalities Into the United States[1]

ABSTRACT

Scholars are accustomed to thinking about migration and travel in general as separate phenomena but in fact they are connected, because anti-mobility policies by preventing people from crossing borders reduce migratory opportunities too. Visa and refugee policies have often encouraged or discouraged entries by particular foreign nationalities for various ideological, economic, and geopolitical reasons. Although analysts have understandably been most interested how much these sudden foreign policy changes disrupt the mobility and lives of those targeted by such policies, do such policies generally lead fewer visits by non-targeted nationalities? With over 220 million observations of I-94s handed in by passengers arriving by plane to the US between November 2014 and August 2017, I consider how strongly three events—that the 2016 election outcome, the January 2017 blocked travel ban and the June 2017 court upholding of the ban—were associated with the number of nationalities entering the country but not others. I find that though three events led to unexpected decreases and increases among the nationalities that contribute the most tourist revenue to the US. I then conduct a content analysis of text in over 300 million tweets by prospective foreign visitors I examine about traveling to the U.S. during this period and find that many wanted to hurry up and enter the U.S. after the district level courts blocked the travel ban and before the court later upheld it, and that many non-targeted nationalities did not visit the U.S. because they felt a sense of linked fate with the immigrants barred entry. This

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combination of qualitative and quantitative data raises evidence of possible chilling effects and unintended consequences of governments sending xenophobic signals through policies like travel bans, raising unaccounted costs in decreased commerce between US citizens and foreigners. They also suggest scholars may want to more deeply research how different nationalities respond to such policies in terms of their preferences and motivations for visiting the US, as well as how this may result in unintended consequences, and even undermine the objectives of such policies.

INTRODUCTION

Scholars are accustomed to thinking about migration and travel in general as separate phenomena but in fact they are connected, because anti-mobility policies by preventing people from crossing borders reduce migratory opportunities too. Visa and refugee policies of many migrant destination countries have often sought to encourage or discourage travelers and migrants with particular nationalities for ideological, economic, and geopolitical reasons. Although journalists and analysts have been most concerned about how much sudden foreign policy changes impact the mobility and lives of such targeted nationalities and thereby structure inequality in global mobility, do such sudden policy changes generally affect the desirability of a destination among the untargeted? This paper examines to how the citizens of different countries visiting the United States (US) have quantitatively changed through the 45th US Presidential election in November 2016, the blocked travel ban proposal . and the court later partially upholding the ban, exploiting these events as exogenous sources of variation. Such differential quantitative trends are consequential as they has material implications not only for foreigners and many residents of the US who make a living from tourism, education and international business, but also the extent to which foreigners and residents in the US interact culturally and socially with and perceive each

other as individuals and representative of societies. More generally, this study assesses how sudden anti-immigrant political shocks can impact international population flows. It also tests for whether they can backfire by having chilling effects on visits to the US by untargeted nationalities, consequently negatively impacting the welfare of both untargeted nationalities and residents in the US that mutually benefit from international flows. If they do, then this suggests that scholars may want to further research whether such "targeted policies" succeed or fail in "otherizing" the targeted as a legitimate threat to national security, untargeted nationalities on the contrary have or lack a sense of "linked fate" with the untargeted, and targeted nationalities due to fears of further mobility and migratory restrictions take or do not take a "now or never" approach to coming to the US, limiting its impact of such policies.

In recent years, the press has documented a sequence of widely unexpected events that commentators suggest has led to a decrease in the number of foreigners entering the US. First, Donald Trump won the presidential election of 2016, defying predictions from most polling organizations. His presidential campaign discourse had for 17 months frequently taken on a tone that most foreigners and prospective immigrants perceived as hostile towards them. Then on January 27th, 2017, he signed an executive order that banned foreigners from seven countries from entering US territory for 90 days, and for 120 days if they were a refugee fleeing persecution. The ban revoked up to 60,000 previously issued visas to nationals from these seven countries. Despite candidate Trump promising that he would do this once in office, this surprised many Americans and political analysts. For about four months, various state and district courts struck down versions of this executive order until June 6th, 2017, when the Supreme Court upheld a limited version of the travel ban. This also came as a shock to many who had protested and legally challenged the ban. By December 2017, the Supreme Court would fully uphold the most recent version of the

travel ban, transforming the executive order into US law, with only exceptions for students and those granted waivers (Gladstone and Sugiyama 2018).

Although these events obviously prevented entry of targeted nationalities, to what extent did the number of visits by foreign nationals not affected by the events change? This is consequential not only for foreigners but also any residents in the US that might have counterfactually benefited from their presence in the US? In other words, did most non-targeted foreigners reconsider their plans to visit the US because such events sent a general signal that foreigners were less welcome than before?

In this paper, I first assess the broader impact of these events on traveler inflows to see whether it was greater than the impact of the law on the mobility of those targeted by the law. In sum, I find that these events reduced entries of foreigners not targeted by the US government—Africans, Europeans and Latin American visitors—far more than most of visitors from the Middle East, where most of those targeted resided. This generates various middle range hypotheses of why these numbers of specific nationalities declined to test in future research For example, although the travel ban did not specifically target Latin American visitors, the ban alongside the President's xenophobic rhetoric may have made them feel they were vulnerable. This resonates with the "linked fate" theory developed by political scientists Michael Dawson (1995) and Chris Milan-Zepeda (2017) who respectively argued that the mid-20th century African-American civil rights movement and the 2006 "day without an immigrant" protests politically mobilized many white Americans and Latino citizens who did not feel directly politically threatened but felt that their future fate was connected with that of politically threatened black Americans and unauthorized immigrants. In a similar way, foreigners who may have identified with the targeted nationalities and might have perceived generally xenophobic policies as hostile and possibly a sign that the

government might exclude them next, and correspondingly reduced the number of discretionary legal visits by Latin Americans.

In contrast, Middle-Easterners—whose liberties to legally enter the US the ban more directly threatened—might actually be driven to enter the US in larger numbers while they still could. Migration scholars Czaika and de Haas (2017) for example found from 1973-2012 visa policies from a sample of all countries that migration policies tend to reduce outflow of migrants even more than they reduced inflows. When a government was about to implement more restrictive visa policies, Czaika and de Haas suggested that migrants would enter while they still could and thereafter be even less willing to leave and engage in circular migration. This phenomenon variably goes by the name of "now-or-never," "anticipation effects," or "inter-temporal substitution." Czaika and Haas (2017) ultimately find no such significant effect and suggest this is because visa policy changes are unexpected and not announced beforehand. However, other researchers have also suggested policies like the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 that bolster border security disrupt historically circular flows of migrants and inadvertently increase the number of permanent immigrants by those who fear being unable to return if they leave (Massey and Pren 2012). Furthermore, the case of the travel ban is different from many successful visa restrictions in that soon after the government implemented policy, the court blocked it, giving targeted nationalities a window of time to enter while they still could. On the other hand, those that shared "a link fate" with the targeted foreigners may have believed they were the next nationality to be targeted and also may have taken a now-or-never approach.

Finally, although Europeans and many other Western nationals have historically viewed the US as a desirable tourism destination for reasons of homophily, recently cosmopolitan Westerners most inclined to visit the US may have simply disliked the xenophobic and America-

first values that the country began manifesting throughout 2016 and 2017. Therefore, for those that have a choice of whether to visit for the US or not, they may have found the US to be a less attractive country to visit for taste-based discriminatory reasons of maintaining cultural distinction (Bourdieu 1984) or even ethical reasons rather than the political shocks. Although my data does not allow me to definitively test the above hypotheses, they suggest why one might be interested in quantitatively assessing how strongly and significantly unexpected restrictions in travel opportunities are with inflows of foreign nationals that the policy is not supposed to impact: Due to the uncertainties in heterogeneous outcomes of traveler inflows, findings about the impacts of such policies on the non-targeted nationalities further both complement and extend previous studies that assess how states suddenly expanding migration opportunities is associated with changes in international flows of the targeted (Freier and Holloway 2019). This is also of practical and societal interest to policy-makers as it allows them to assess how such changes in government doctrine and policy toward foreigners could have chilling effects and unintended consequences to incorporate into any cost-benefit analysis of how beneficial such policies are for residents of the US. I show with a content analysis of text in over 300 million tweets of prospective foreign travelers evidence that Middle Eastern foreigners were indeed eager to enter the U.S. while they still could, that many Latin Americans were less interested in coming to the U.S. due to a heightened sense of vulnerability, and that many Europeans viewed the US to culturally be a less desirable destination after these three events.

I find with an analysis of English, French, Spanish and Arabic newspapers that global media widely broadcasted each of these events (results available upon request). Therefore, most foreigners likely heard about them. One could think of multiple reasons why the election of Trump and his policies may have increased or decreased travelers. Trump argued the ban would bar entry

of foreigners that would most likely carry out attacks against Americans (Lloyd 2015), a national security argument that citizens of other countries that have also suffered attacks might find legitimate. Yet foreigners may have developed a more negative view of the US for many reasons. Surveys suggest that amongst many foreign nationals, Trump is one of the most disliked Presidents in recent history (Wike et al. 2017), having a record of anti-immigrant rhetoric, foreign policies that other countries perceive as even more hostile to their national interests than prior administrations, and generally poor diplomatic rapport with leaders of other countries. Although the US avoided using language that could indicate that the ban targeted Muslim populations, various civil rights groups and attorneys argued that the travel ban clearly discriminated against Muslims (Acer and Barnar 2018) and therefore violated the Establishment Clause of the Constitution.[2] Therefore for many non-targeted foreigners, the US by adopting the ban signaled to foreigners that it had little respect for international law and the rights and protections its Constitution provided to foreigners,[3] which may have also had an impact on how safe foreigners felt in relation to the US. Others however might emphatize with the view of the court that the government implemented the travel ban as a measure of national security, immigration and foreign policy, which since the 1972 case of *Kleindienst v. Mandel* ("Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753") historically has been more the purview of the non-judicial branches of the US government. In sum, these three events likely could have heterogeneous effects on traveler inflows in that the 1) the election sent a general symbolic signal that foreigners were generally less welcome than during the pre-Trump era the nearly half of the 58% of US citizens that cared to vote, 2) the

[2] American Bar Association website: https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/publications/litigation_journal/2016-17/summer/civil_rights_muslim_ban_violates_us_law_and_treaty_commitments.html

[3] Specifically, by barring the entry of lawful permanent residents from Muslim majority countries, some legal scholars argue that the US violated the 5th amendment of US Constitution and its treaty obligations, including the nondiscrimination provisions in the Refugee Convention and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

executive branch's first failed move to ban the targeted nationalities sent a specific symbolic signal to specific Muslim foreigners that they were absolutely unwelcome even if the courts allowed them to come for a few months, and 3) the judicial branch later permitting the ban sent both a legal signal that all branches of government would refuse a large number of people any form of entry based on their citizenship. Due to all these above factors, I hypothesize that on net, the hostile tone of Trump toward Muslims and immigrants, and the suspected motives behind the ban and the court ruling may also have led more non-targeted foreigners to stop visiting the US than the number of people prevented from entering by the actual ban.

DATA

I draw upon data I obtained from the website of the US Government's National Tourism and Travel Office (NTTO) in May of 2018 on authorized airline entries by foreign citizens from 6 geographic regions (N=220,148,307) and the 20 countries whose citizens contribute the most tourist revenue to the US (N=193,320,827) .[4] With this data, I constructed 26 different panel datasets across 35 months (November 2014 until September 2017).[5] Note that the small difference between the two sample sizes (26,827,480) ensures that around 90% of foreign

[4] *Non-Resident Arrivals to the United States: International, Overseas, Canada, Mexico, World Regions, and Top 50 Overseas Countries: Arrivals Data-Country of Residence (COR).* 2014-2017" Data Set: ITA, National Tourism and Trade Office Statistics on I-94 Monthly/Quarterly/Annually. Available at: National Tourism and Trade Office website, https://travel.trade.gov/view/m-2017-I-001/index.asp; Accessed on 05/2018. The countries are U.K., Canada, France, Germany, Mexico, India, Russia, Australia, Taiwan, China, Argentina, Brazil, South Korea, Japan, New Zealand, Colombia, Switzerland, Ireland, Spain, Sweden, Netherlands, Italy. The regions are Europe, Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Oceania.

[5] I scraped this country of citizenship data from the National Tourism and Travel Office housed in the Chamber of Commerce in May of 2018. When I checked the website again later in September, the data was gone, replaced by longitudinally incomplete dataset under construction. The data manager told me by email the dataset would be finished and replaced in June 2019. Although this new dataset contained information on the top 50 nationalities, this unfortunately only listed visitors by country of residence (rather than citizenship). Furthermore, the data on visitors by country of citizenship is incomplete or when others and I clicked on the hyperlink link, it yields a 404 error. When I cross checked this data with the country of citizenship data I obtained a year before, I found differences in my regression results and the raw dataset I previously obtained, raising concerns about the reliability of this new data. However, in any case, since I am more interested in changes in visitors based on their citizenship—not residence. I therefore chose to settle for using only the more longitudinally complete data that was available in 2018, even though it is limited to 20 nationalities. .

visitors to the US are covered by visitors from the 20 countries, whose nationals contribute the most tourist revenue to the US. Although Venezuela was in the sample, I chose not to include it because the economic crisis has worsened and therefore it would be difficult to distinguish the effects of preference for travel to the US and a desire to seek asylum. Also the June 2017 version of the travel ban, after facing challenges that it targeted predominantly Muslim countries, included Venezuela along with North Korea, but the government only enforced it against a portion of the Venezuelan population that worked for the government. This data is based upon the number of I-94 forms passengers turned into Custom and Borders Protection officers at all US airports from November 2014 to September 2017. The data are not statistics but rather census data of all foreigners legally entering the country. I recognize that the US government may admit some arrivals who may not turn in an I-94 form because they come as asylum seekers. However, as a percentage of total travelers these asylum-seeking arrivals by air are extremely low. I recognize that many foreigners do not immediately change their travel plans, are not traveling for leisure or due to any specific preference to visit the US. Many people can make their travel decisions anywhere from several months to a few days before departure, and flight tickets are cheapest 21 to 121 days before the departure date. They also may have pre-planned reasons to come to the US after these events regardless of whether they feel welcome or not, such as to continue an educational program or finish a training, conduct business meetings required by their company, or visit family. Therefore, one may observe a lag in the impact of a travel ban, assuming people are not canceling their flight and trip because of the events. In addition to the above, I also draw upon 300 million tweets by foreign individuals that expressed an interest in traveling to the US during a comparable period covering these three events. Some of these struck to their plan and others which canceled it.

METHOD

I hypothesize that in the absence of these three events, more travelers would come to the US. However, since I can never observe this counterfactually within the framework of potential outcomes (Morgan and Winship 2015), I must infer that this is the case through observational data. Although this is a quasi-field experiment, I choose not to do a difference-in-difference analysis with another country as some other scholars have done (Freier and Holloway 2019) because for two reasons I do not believe the parallel trend assumption holds between any two cases of immigration countries. First, I see no reason to believe that another major tourist destination like Canada—which has a very different immigration policy system and political system of the US—is as comparable to the US as, say, New Jersey is to Pennsylvania. Second, the fact that other countries implemented increasingly anti-immigrant policies at the same time may have led some prospective travelers less inclined to go to the US. I have found to be the case in qualitative research about former immigrants of the US that later decided to migrate to the Canada (Author, in progress). As a result, observed data about which nationalities are arriving to Canada are not likely to be the same as they would be if these three events of interest had not happened in the US. As such, as comparative-historical methodologists have noted (Sewell 1996) the cases that are most comparable are unfortunately those that are also most interdependent, compromising how useful they are as counterfactual contrast cases.

I follow several recent other demographic articles in using unexpected policy changes or events largely unexpected by most foreign national as a "quasi-experiment" (Freier and Holloway 2019) or an "exogenous source of variation" (Nobles and McKelvey 2015) in the quantity and sources of travelers. I exploit variation in the impact of these three events to test how foreign

nationals' propensity to visit a country change as they receive signals that a country is becoming more xenophobic and unwelcoming to foreigners.

I acknowledge that these three events constitute a "bundled treatment," or a complex mix of interrelated factors, any of which may have caused a decrease in visitors to the US. To measure latent interest in visiting the US is difficult.[6] The precise impact of these shocks are difficult to infer due to stochastic changes and noise in traveler flows over time. Therefore, I include month fixed effects to control for "seasonality" or characteristics about months, like winter break, Christmas and New Year's travel during the month of December that are highly correlated with travel flows (Vergori 2017). Since overall traveler inflows are on average low during the months following both the election and the ban (e.g. January, December) and high after the months of the court ruling (e.g. July, August), this should account for changes in traveler inflows that annually result from seasonal fluctuations. Ideally, I would be able to control for daily fixed effects because in a month like December you have many more people traveling on certain dates—like those before and after Christmas and New Year—than others, but the administrative data provided by the US government is assembled by month. Of the other variables I can address with monthly fixed effects, I find that all but one (predictably income per capita in the country of origin) in separate regressions was significantly associated with the quantity of travelers over the period of interest (results available upon request): Oil prices, exchange rates, media attention, mass shootings and income per capita. These might affect the propensity of foreigners to come to the US and attitudes of foreigners toward the US did become increasingly negative after the election. However, my monthly fixed-effects controls for these time-varying confounders. In terms of the mechanism by which prospective travelers may have

[6] I tried to obtain Google Trends data on searches for flights, but I found this not very reliable for many countries. Furthermore, many people may search for a flight but never purchase a ticket.

known about these changes, I also find that sources of visitors were not significantly associated with the number of news stories about the election and the travel ban that appeared in the Associated Press, El Pais, and Al-Jazeera, which are some of the most widely consumed media sources for English, Spanish and Arabic language readers (results available upon request). Unfortunately, to my knowledge comparable large data about traveler motives —which would be useful as evidence for each of my theories—is not available. Finally, although data about "traveler purpose" might in theory be useful in demonstrating different rates of changes in nationalities with different purposes of travel like for study, pleasure, and business, the NTTO has only recently provided such data for each year, making it impossible to distinguish between my three different treatments or control for monthly fixed effects. Furthermore, such data is by country of residence and other studies have suggested such government-collected administrative data about traveler purposes is often not reliable compared to qualitative data (Freier and Holloway 2019).

I have separate models and plots for each country and each region because what I am most interested in is to compare how the visits by specific nationalities are rising and falling over time. I choose not to include a dummy variable for every nationality because I capture variation of specific nationalities dynamically over time if I run a separate model for each nationality. I also assume every nationality is affected at the same time by my treatments so I can compare the impact of each events across nationalities.

Since my data is heavily right skewed, I employ Poisson models rather than negative binomial models for each country, with counts of monthly traveler inflows from each country regressed upon both whether each event had already taken place ("the treatment") and a fixed effect term for the calendar month. Since each event occurred at a different point at time, the

overall coefficient measure of the event measures the average number of traveler inflows across all months in the period after the event to the same quantity from the period before the event. The number of months before and after will vary depending on the event. I perform each of these regression for each count of visitors from a given region or country c for event x (the election, the travel ban and the court ruling). Or more formally:

$$\textbf{Count}_{c} = \textbf{event}_{x} + \textbf{month}_{\text{fixed effects}} \quad (1)$$

I then run an additional set of three models which includes a treatment by month fixed effects interaction term, or more formally,

$$\textbf{Count}_{c} = \textbf{event}_{x} + \textbf{month}_{\text{fixed effects}} + \textbf{event}_{x} * \textbf{month}_{\text{fixed effects}} \quad (2),$$

Finally, I show a separate plot for total visitors from each region and country that reveal the percentage change in traveler inflows from specific countries for a given month compared to the same month in the previous year:

$$\textbf{Percentage change}_{\text{visitors from c this year/nationality n previous year}} = [(\textbf{year}_{y}, \textbf{month}_{x} - (\textbf{year}_{y-1}, \textbf{month}_{x})]/(\textbf{year}_{y}, \textbf{month}_{x}) \quad (3)$$

This enables me to compare the count of arrivals from that specific country in relation to a same month during the prior year. If the number is negative, then fewer foreigners of a given nationalities entered the US during that month than during the same month in the previous year. Conversely, if the number is positive, then fewer foreigners of a given nationalities entered the US during that month than during the same month in the previous year.

RESULTS

The Impact of the 2016 Election on Traveler Inflows to the US

Table 1 display my coefficients and standard errors for the Poisson regression of

[Table 1]

total visitors, from six regions and 20 countries, for each event. (Table 2 for results for model 2 are on the online appendix.) All coefficients are statistically significant at a 0.05 alpha level and nearly all are also significant at a 0.0005 alpha level and so I exclude indicators of this from the table. The coefficients for the month fixed effects range are anywhere from 2 to 5 times larger than the coefficient for the event, suggesting that time-varying effects explains much of the variation and therefore the calendar month fixed effects enable me to more accurately measure the impact of the events than simply observations of declines in visitors often made by journalists and commentators in mass and social media. African arrivals decreased more than any others during the period of the election compared to the period before (coefficient -0.28), with Latin American travelers declining by roughly half that amount (coefficient -0.14). Asian travelers overall had a tiny increase in the period after the election compared to the period before (coefficient=0.02). Travelers overall and those from most other regions had a small decline (Total Travelers, Europe, Middle East Oceania, coefficient=-0.05).

In terms of raw numbers in visitors, each shock resulted on average 15,000 fewer visitors each month compared to the previous year. This is greater than the roughly 1,000 fewer people legally prohibited from entering the US as a result of the ban during the brief period in 2017 when it was in effect (Torbati 2019). Therefore, the greatest impact of these political shocks was not due to the ban, but due to the symbolic signal the events sent to foreigners.

These coefficients mask much heterogeneity amongst visitors from these regions. Although generally many foreigners reacted to the 2016 election with both surprise and many were disappointed by the result, the intensity of disapproval of president-elect Trump varied across nationalities. For example, most polls suggested that a majority of Chinese (54.4%) and Russians (82.6%) held more positive views of president-elect Trump (US News & World Report 2017).

Despite this, I observe that visitors from Russia (coefficient=-0.30) and Brazil (coefficient=-0.29) declined the most, followed by Switzerland (coefficient=-0.18) then Colombia (coefficient=-0.13). The remaining countries all saw moderate to small declines except for increases in visitors from (in descending order) South Korea (coefficient=0.22), followed by Spain, Ireland, Taiwan, China, and Italy which all had a coefficient of 0.8 or less.

The Impact of the January Travel Ban on Traveler Inflows to the US

My first model shows that in contrast to the election, fewer visitors from every region came to the US in the period after the government passed the first travel ban than in the period before. African travelers again declined the most (coefficient=-0.35), followed by travelers from Latin America (coefficient =-0.18). Although the first travel ban did not target Latin Americans, as targets of xenophobic rhetoric they may have felt a sense of linked fate with those Africans and Middle Easterners banned from entering. However, the decline in Middle Eastern travelers after the ban was about the same as European and Oceanian travelers. This may be a result of Middle Easterners taking a "now or never " approach to entering the country because of fears that they would be unable to re-enter from abroad. This may have offset what one would expect would be much larger decline in visitors from the Middle East, both due to how unwelcome the US was making such targeted nationalities feel.

Within regions, Russian arrivals were lower after the ban than before the ban (coefficient -0.37). followed by Brazilians (coefficient=-0.37), Argentines (coefficient=-0.21), and Swiss (coefficient=-0.16). Most other nationalities declined modestly (-0.01 to -0.9) except for the South Koreans who came in far greater numbers after the ban than before (coefficient=0.23) and the more moderate increases of visitors from Ireland (coefficient=0.05), Spain (coefficient=0.04), and Taiwan (coefficient=0.01).

The Impact of the Supreme Court Upholding Travel Ban On Travelers to the US (June 2017)

After the Supreme Court partially upheld the ban the US had the largest declines in African arrivals (coefficient=-0.36) and Latin American arrivals (excluding Mexico) (coefficient=-0.29), with the other regions having the same moderate declines as after the ban. Within Latin America, my model estimates that the largest declines in arrivals were from Argentina (coefficient=-0.31), Colombia (coefficient=-0.20), and Brazil (coefficient=- 0.24). The declines from Argentina, Colombia, and Brazil might offer evidence of the linked fate hypothesis, especially since among all Latin Americans many Argentines and Brazilians may identify the least with the Mexicans, Central Americans, and the Muslims who had been the primary targets of the US governments' policies. The large declines in Russian arrivals (coefficient=-0.38) may seem puzzling but despite the executive branch's warm attitude toward the Russian government, it later placed sanctions on the country. Notably, the only countries from which arrivals increased were South Korea (coefficient=0.22), Canada (coefficient=0.05) and Ireland (coefficient=0.04). Arrivals from India—a country with a large Muslim minority—declined a bit as well (coefficient=-0.1) suggesting linked fate may be at work.

Summary of Results In Three Models with Interaction Effects

My model with interaction effects reveals fewer stark differences in declines of visitors due to the election than the model without interaction effects, in part because much of the overall impact of the election is how that impact interacts with the calendar month. Overall the election in itself is not significantly associated with a slightly increase in travelers (coefficient=0.01). However, arrivals from Latin America (coefficient=-0.14), and the Middle East (coefficient=-0.05) still declined by roughly similar large amounts. The election resulted in a smaller decrease in African arrivals (coefficient=-0.08) and European arrivals (coefficient=-0.02) compared to the full

model. Amongst countries, the only differences from model 1 is that in model 2 the election is not significantly associated with as great of a decline in Russians as in model 1 and no significant decline or increase in the travelers from Canada or Mexico. The election with interaction terms suggests that the election in itself was no longer significantly associated with large decreases in travelers but that it still led to decrease in travelers from many non-targeted countries.

In Model 2 reveals that the ban was associated with an equivalent significant drop in overall travelers and a much larger significant decline in travelers from Latin America (coefficient=-0.29 versus only -0.18 in model 1), but little other differences for travelers from other regions of the world. Amongst countries, the main difference was in how the ban was associated with a much larger decline in visitors from Japan in model 1 (coefficient = -0.12) than in model 2 (coefficient -0.03) from Argentina (coefficient = -0.44 in model 2 compared to -0.21 in model 1) and Colombia (coefficient= -0.3 in model 2 versus -0.15 in model 1).

Finally, in model 2 the court ruling alone was significantly associated with an increase in total visitors (coefficient=0.06) Europeans (coefficient=0.04), the Middle East (coefficient=0.15) and African (coefficient =0.07), and a much less rapid decrease in viistors from Latin America (coefficient=-0.06) suggesting that nearly all the negative impact is in the way it interacted with month. The main changes in Model 2 is a much greater decrease in visitors from Italy (coefficient=-0.1), the Netherlands (coefficient=-0.9), Japan (coefficient=-0.12), Argentina (coefficient=-0.44) and Columbia (coefficient=-0.3).

Change In Travelers From Same Month in Previous Year

Although the coefficients are helpful in measuring overall changes in visitors from different countries over the entire period following the three events, some of these events like the ban were also followed by political contestations like protests and courts blocking the ban. These

may have had a meaningful monthly impact on travel inflows. Figures 1-9 and Figures A1-A9 (in the online appendix)[7] plot the percentage change in various foreign visitors in each calendar month during the year of the events relative to the same month during the prior year, as calculated in equation 3. The horizontal line marks the point along which the number of travelers is no different from the prior year, with the points above/below the line respectively points where you observe greater/fewer arrivals of the specific nationality in a given month than the same month during the prior year. Note that the position of the line and the scale of each figure may vary in each plot depending on how far the percentage change figure is above or below the line.

Figure 1 displays how between November 2015 and November 2016 a lower number of total foreigners came to the US during the same month in previous year, although slightly fewer came in the period compared to the same month in the previous year. Although the annual percentage change had been plummeting in the month before and after the travel ban, it immediately spiked in the month following the district courts blocking the ban in February.

[Figure 1]

Many may have taken a now-or-never attitude toward entering the US while they still could, a hypothesis future qualitative research about prospective foreign visitors' motives can confirm.

Two regions of interest are Africa and the Middle East, since they respectively included two and five nationalities included in the original ban. Many nationalities from Africa and the Middle East may have feared that the US government might later expand the ban to apply to them, since those countries impacted by the ban seemed to be somewhat geographically clustered

[7] Table 2 and other figures of other nationalities are in online appendix for paper at https://ucla.app.box.com/file/548797211697

and share common traits: most are majority Muslim, inhabited by people of color, have a low

[Figure 2]

income per capita, and have a relatively low level of political freedom. Figure 2 shows how fewer Middle Easterners entered during the twelve months before the 2016 election than they had during the same month in the prior year. This became negative shortly after December 2015 when candidate Trump promised that if elected he would totally shut down on all Muslims entering the US. This then increased by a full 0.1 of a percentage point (though still negative) right after the travel ban. After the Supreme Court partially approved of the ban, the percentage change increases from -0.15 to 0.2% suggesting that a large number of nationals in the Middle East were eager to enter the US before the ban went into effect. Their inflow remained roughly positive for the entire period after the court had approved a partial upholding of the ban.

[Figure 3]

Figure 3 illustrates how the annual percentage change in African visitors was positive during the period before the election. But then this quickly became negative in the period after Trump won the election. The ban targeted Somalia and Sudan, but the court holding the ban—rather than the travel ban itself—is associated with a slight increase in the number of visitors. Perhaps knowing that the US government had tried and failed to implement a travel ban targeting some African nationalities, other Africans were taking a "now or never" approach to enter the US while they still could.

[Figure 4]

[Figure 5]

Figure 4 reveals that the US had fewer European arrivals during election year compared to the prior year. Figure 5 reveals how more Latin American visitors (excluding Mexicans)

entered the US compared to the previous year, but then fewer entered right after the election. This continued to drop even more rapidly after the ban. Many Latinos may have been terrified by Trump's rhetoric and less inclined to come to the US. This raises the possibility that Latin Americans may have recognized such extreme anti-immigrant measures may eventually threaten them as well and therefore preferred to not visit the US or to protest the ban even though it did not affect them. For example, they began marching and protesting across the country in the Immigrant Rights marches alongside Muslims. Interestingly, just like the Muslims the annual percentage change of Latin Americans began to increase right after the court upheld the ban, suggesting they might have taken a "now-or-never" attitude too.

Amongst countries, I detect five patterns in the percentage change of visitors. The first pattern, illustrated by the Figures A1 (Russia) and A2 (India) show some nationalities that came in much larger numbers before the election (Russia) or roughly equal numbers (India) and dropped drastically after the election—from 0% percent change with Russians to a -0.6% change, and from 0.1% to -0.2% for Indians, with both slightly rebounding after the Supreme Court approved the ban. This pattern also pertains to Chinese and Colombian visitors. Both India and Russia, being large countries, have a sizeable Muslim minority population. Many Hindu

Indians and particularly Punjabi Sikhs may be aware that often Americans due to ignorance have mistaken them as Muslim-majority Pakistanis. Therefore, it is understandable why they may have concerns about coming to the US. Many Chinese may perceive the US public and politicians broadly have an unfairly adversarial attitude toward China. They therefore might have believed, like non-Jewish minorities in Nazi Germany, that they could become the next foreign scape-goat.

[Figure 6]

[Figure 7]

The second pattern illustrated by Figure 6 (Mexican arrivals) and 7 (Argentine arrivals) is where a higher percentage of visitors entered in the calendar months before the election compared to the same months during the prior year, and then a lower percentage of visitors during the calendar months after the election compared to the same calendar months in the prior year. One also observes this pattern with visitors from Colombia and Haiti. But the percentage change in Mexican visitors decreased greatly both after the election and the travel ban. The fact that Argentines also decreased although much more gradually suggests that future researchers may want to determine if they felt a sense of linked fate with Latin Americans. Although Argentines are Latin Americans, of all Latin Americans they might be the most inclined to identify as Europeans. Nonetheless, despite this, the trend of their arrivals seems to track that of Mexicans and Latin Americans much more than Europeans. The European visitors may have found the US was equally unattractive both during and after its very conflicted presidential campaign and the cultural changes that they found distasteful.

The third pattern illustrated by Figure A3 (Brazil) and A4 (South Korea) and consists of nationalities that are either higher or lower both before and after the shocks. Brazilian visitors had a fewer arrivals compared to the same calendar months during the prior year before and after all events. South Korean arrivals before and after the events had a more arrivals compared to the same calendar months during the prior year.

In the fourth pattern illustrated by Figure A5 (Japan) and A6 (Spain), the annual percentage change in visitors fluctuated greatly before and after the shocks so on net there was no annual change in visitors. Visitors from Japan were fewer compared to the same months during the prior year before the travel ban, but slightly higher than the prior year after the travel ban. Still, fewer

Spaniards visited during the months after the travel ban than during the same months before, but higher numbers entered the US after the US blocked it compared to the year before. Further qualitative research could seek to establish whether this was because they felt a sense of linked fate with other Spanish-speaking nationalities that the US government might target next.

Finally, the fifth pattern, illustrated by figure A7 (France) and A8 (Canada), shows how fewer visitors from these countries entered the US before the election compared to the same calendar months during the prior year. However more entered compared to the same calendar months during prior year after the court blocked the ban, a pattern followed by only Australians and most other Western nationalities. This raises the question of whether these changes resulted from taste-based disapproval of the policies and how poorly they reflected what other Westerners perceived to be liberal values.

Together, these five general patterns offer a more nuanced and heterogeneous portrayal of how traveler inflows have changed since the 2016 election than those frequently offered by the general media and tourism analysts, which often do not control for other time varying confounders like seasonality and a strengthening dollar that such analysts often for the reportedly $32 billion loss in foreign travelers. and 100,000 job loss (Reed, Dan 2019), as I did in my analysis. They also offer suggestive evidence that the three events had chilling effects and unintended consequences of changing travel inflows. They raise further questions for qualitative researchers about travelers' motivations as to whether this resulted from a sense of linked fate distinct nationalities that had on various types of ethnic/religious/geographic affinities (e.g. Mexicans and Argentines), the "now-or-never" impetus to enter the country when the government drastically restricts entry (e.g. Africans and Middle Easterners), why many might generally might find the US a less attractive to visit due to a desire for distinction taste and ethics

(e.g. Canadians and French), or possibly other rationales that could account for sudden annual percentage changes in visitors after these three events compared to the period before.

Robustness Checks

Nationalities in many countries require visas to come to the US, so the US government also decides whether they can come. Therefore, the number of foreigners visiting from all countries might not be a reliable proxy for how attractive the US is as a place to visit, as this more clearly applies to those nationals who do not need a visa. Most nationalities in my sample do not require a visa, though some coming from the most highly-populated countries—like China, Russia, India—do. As a robustness check of the local average treatment effect of the election, ban, and court ruling for those who 1) do not require a visa and 2) those that do, I subset the data into one group A that contains nationals that require a visa to legally come to the US and a second group B that contains nationalities that do not. If one takes the average of these three changes in the number of the travelers that do not require visas from the same month in the prior year and divides it by the average change in the travelers that do require visas from the same month in the prior year, then one obtains a coefficient very close to 0. This shows that visa requirements and the inability to obtain a visa do not account for the decline in visitors (results available upon request).

Finally, I run several placebo regression models in which I change the month in which the election and ban happened to a month when it did not happen (e.g. months other than November 2016 for the election). If the real ban or election did not have a significant impact, then we should observe a similar drop if the election had happened at a later month. I do not run a placebo regression for the court upholding the ban due to lack of data for later months. Figures 8 and 9

[Figure 8]

[Figure 9]

respectively display the coefficient plots for a placebo effect of the election and the ban respectively for all foreign visitors. All the confidence intervals cross zero suggesting insignificant changes in traveler inflows when the events did not happen compared to when they did.

DISCUSSION, LIMITATIONS OF STUDY, DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

For decades, apart from its status as the largest country of immigration in the world, the US has also for many foreigners been the second most popular tourist destination after France. Since World War II, the US also is one of the most attractive countries into which to invest, do business with or undertake a risky enterprise; the premier country in which to pursue higher education and research; and one of the ideal locales to both train and perform for professionals in nearly every field. A recent Pew Research survey estimates that on average still roughly half of the world's population still has a favorable view of the US, though this is mostly due to their high opinion of US popular culture products and to its past defense of civil liberties. Recently this favorable view of the US has fallen due to foreigners having increasingly negative views of American customs and the form of its democratic system (Pew Research Center 2018).

However, my findings suggest that the US may not maintain that attractiveness in the future. Perhaps many events discussed in this paper might seem at first to most affect very specific groups of nationalities that the current US government is consciously trying to stop from entering ostensibly in order to put the security of Americans first. Naturalized Iranian-Americans that had left or had parents that left before or during the Iranian Revolution, for example, may not be so concerned about such migration control policies targeting Iranians if they do not perceive them as directly impacting them.

My results suggest that these events have even more greatly reduced the number of visitors from 20 countries that contribute the most revenue to the US, many whom the US government had

not intended to discourage from visiting. This seems to track other trends in the US reputational decline, like Spain in 2018 overtaking the US as the second most popular tourist destination in the world, a 6% decline of tourists coming to the US in 2017 compared to 2016 (BBC News 2018), and a study by the *Institute of International Education* which found that both applications to US colleges and enrollment have declined by 7% during 2017, leading to cuts in entire programs for many public universities (Saul, 2018). As fewer people visit the US for both pleasure and education, its desirability as a place for business and practical training may subsequently decline in the future too.

This raises the possibility that the new administration and its policies have reduced the attractiveness of the US as a place to visit among foreign nationals that it did not to intend to exclude, like the Russians, Argentines, Indians, Italians, French, Canadians, Chinese, Mexicans, British, Colombians, Swedes, Swiss, and Brazilians. These nationalities represent well over two-thirds of its tourist revenue and most come from countries which the US historically has considered political allies. On the other hand, many might still desire to visit the US but may enter it and not leave because they fear being unable to re-enter. For example, many university international offices have advised their students not to take trips home to visit families and friends before they finish their educational program, which can last anywhere from three to ten years. Although the ban temporarily revoked more than 20,000 visas for a few days and turned away thousands of refugees, this is a small fraction of the expected 130,771 fewer foreign nationals that visited the US in the three months after the ban compared to those same months the year before. The number of Latin American visitors declined by an even larger magnitude after the three events than Middle Eastern visitors, suggesting that the symbolic and social impact of the government's policies may be far greater than the mechanical impact of legal restrictions. Immigration lawyers interviewed

by the author have recounted how they advised their other Middle Eastern clients to enter the US and obtain immigration documents as soon as they could due to concerns that the government would expand the number of nationalities included in the ban. If some of the targeted Middle Easterners did take a "now or never" expectation, they seem to have been prescient: the US government denied 15,384 more applications for immigrant visas and 21,645 more applications for non-immigrant visas in 2018 than in 2017 after the Supreme Court allowed the ban to go "largely" into effect in December 2017. By June 2018 the Supreme Court upheld a new version of the ban, which has now become the law in the United States. Perhaps as a result, visitors from Iran, Libya, Somalia, Syria and Yemen received 80% fewer visas during the fiscal year of October 2017 to September 2018 than the 2016 fiscal year (Anderson 2019).

That many fewer Mexicans were coming to the US after the election is not surprising in light of hostile remarks Trump made about Mexican immigrants from the day he announced his candidacy, the very low opinion Mexicans hold of Trump in Pew opinion polls, and Trump's campaign platform item of building a wall. Yet media had publicized Trump's views for a full 16 months before the fall of Mexican visitors that followed the election. Admittedly, relations between Mexico and the US both at the elite and non-elite level have historically always been tense. But they arguably have become less tense and the interdependence between the two countries increased greatly since the passing of the North American Free Trade Agreement. Ironically, Trump's rhetoric may have in fact greatly reduced the number of Mexican visitors far more quickly than an expensive wall or more restrictive immigration and asylum policies ever would.

I stress that my hypotheses about motivations behind these changes are suggestive but not confirmatory due to a current lack of reliable data. My demographic findings however call for

more qualitative ethnographic studies, in-depth interviews, and surveys to confirm the extent that non-Americans feel more alienated from the US and why that is the case. Although people travel for often superficial and compulsory reasons, the commonly observed phenomenon of social homophily (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001) and global network analyses of both migration and travel flows (Danchev and Porter 2018; Windzio 2018) suggests that the median individual is probably much more comfortable visiting a foreign country for which they feels much more political and cultural affinity than one that seems relatively more different. For many other Western visitors from countries that the US has historically considered its allies like the British, Germans, Italians and Australians, the US for a long time has represented such a country. But due to the recent decrease in visits compared to earlier years the election might actually change that for the future.

Some foreign nationals such as the Irish, Koreans, Taiwanese and Chinese increased their visits after the election compared to the period before. The finding of South Korean arrivals increased greatly after the election is a bit more perplexing, though perhaps they did not perceive any of the discourse from Trump and his supporters to be hostile and may have even hoped he would be more successful than his predecessors in bringing peace to the Korean Peninsula. The drastic decline in Russian visitors after the ban may likely be confounded by a number of later events, such as US sanctions against Russia in March and subsequent cruise missile strikes on Syrian air bases, which led to a souring in relations between the US and Russia.

While the enormous sample size and statistical power of the data I have allowed me to demonstrate that significantly far fewer foreigners are coming to the U.S, from some countries than others, my data is limited. The US National Tourism and Travel Office (NTTO) only releases data aggregated at the monthly level, concealing much heterogeneity within months in travel flows.

Also, the previously free data only contained foreign nationals grouped by 21 countries. As noted earlier, one might be concerned about the validity of more recent data released by the NTTO which pertains to those from country of residence rather than country of citizenship. Although I have been unable to locate comparable large scale data sets about traveler motives through hospitality, business or government libraries and could only rely on qualitative limited data, if such big data about traveler motivations becomes available in the future or a reliable proxy emerges, we may be able to provide stronger and more representative evidence for the reasons why visitors to the US changed as a result of these events. The data about traveler motivations the government only recently began, only pertains to whether the visitors' purpose of travelers was business, tourism and study, and that data—aside from concerns about its reliability—is only available on an annual basis, so it is difficult to isolate the impact of these events.

This study has practical implications for more than just for those engaged in tourism, education and business within the US. If fewer people are coming to the US, the level of contact between US residents and different foreign nationals will also likely decline. This therefore potentially will change who Americans do business with, befriend and marry, and even in regard as allies and enemies. This cost to US citizens—in terms of the foregone economic gains from receiving foreign tourists, students and business visitors, and increasing inter-cultural understanding and American soft power—may arguably be greater in the long run than the actual socio-legal costs imposed on the minority of potential visitors that come from the eight targeted countries. Assessing and accounting for such harms upon US citizens—rather than merely refugees and foreign nationals from the targeted countries—may be more a comprehensive and politically efficacious way for members of Congress in all political parties to objectively assess the long-run benefits and costs of such xenophobic immigration doctrines and policies for their constituents,

other residents in the United States and foreign nationals that might otherwise come. In the future, such a cost-benefit analysis of such changes might provide a basis for a bipartisan agreement on whether the oppose or support similar foreign policies and politics that reduce international mobility.

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Tables and Figures

TABLE 1

POISSON REGRESSION OF CHANGES IN NUMBER OF FOREIGNER ENTRIES TO USA ON ELECTION, TRAVEL BAN, AND COURT UPHOLDING TRAVEL BAN WITH MONTH FIXED EFFECTS, NOVEMBER 2014-SEPTEMBER 2017 (N=193,320,827 (COUNTRY), N=220,148,307 (CONTINENT)

	elect	SE	const	SE	ban	SE	const	SE	court	SE	const	SE
Total	-0.05	0.00	15.54	0.00	-0.06	0.00	15.52	0.00	-0.06	0.00	15.52	0.00
Europe	-0.05	0.00	13.58	0.00	-0.06	0.00	13.56	0	-0.06	0.00	13.56	0.00
Latin America (Excl. Mexico)	-0.14	0.00	13.34	0.00	-0.18	0.00	13.29	0.00	-0.21	0.00	13.29	0.00
Asia	0.02	0.00	13.73	0.00	-0.01	0.00	13.74	0	-0.02	0.00	13.74	0.00
Middle East	-0.06	0.00	11.58	0.00	-0.06	0.00	11.55	0.00	-0.03	0.00	11.55	0.00
Africa	-0.28	0.00	10.48	0.00	-0.35	0.00	10.39	0.00	-0.36	0.00	10.39	0.00
Oceania	-0.05	0.00	11.73	0.00	-0.05	0.00	11.71	0.00	-0.06	0.00	11.71	0.00
Canada	-0.02	0.00	9.97	0.00	-0.01	0.00	14.20	0.00	0.02	0.00	14.20	0.00
Mexico	-0.07	0.00	11.58	0.00	-0.08	0.00	14.21	0.00	-0.09	0.00	14.21	0.00
France	-0.08	0.00	12.30	0.00	-0.08	0.00	12.28	0.00	-0.10	0.00	12.28	0.00
Germany	-0.06	0.08	14.20	0.00	-0.01	0.00	11.55	0.00	-0.03	0.00	11.55	0.00
Ireland	0.05	0.00	14.23	0.00	0.05	0.00	9.99	0.00	0.04	0.00	9.99	0.00
Italy	0.01	0.00	10.96	0.00	0.00	0.00	10.97	0.00	-0.02	0.00	10.97	0.00
Netherlands	-0.02	0.00	10.43	0.00	-0.02	0.00	10.42	0.00	-0.02	0.00	10.42	0.00
Russia	-0.30	0.00	10.11	0.00	-0.37	0.00	10.02	0.00	-0.38	0.00	10.02	0.00
Spain	0.08	0.00	10.61	0.00	0.04	0.00	10.63	0.00	0.03	0.00	10.63	0.00
Sweden	-0.09	0.00	10.54	0.00	-0.11	0.00	10.51	0.00	-0.14	0.00	10.51	0.00
Switzerland	-0.18	0.00	10.07	0.00	-0.16	0.00	10.01	0.00	-0.15	0.00	10.01	0.00
United Kingdom	-0.08	0.00	12.28	0.00	-0.08	0.00	12.28	0.00	-0.10	0.01	12.28	0.00
India	-0.09	0.00	11.40	0.00	-0.14	0.00	11.37	0.00	-0.16	0.00	11.37	0.00
Japan	-0.02	0.00	12.49	0.00	-0.03	0.00	12.48	0.00	-0.03	0.00	12.48	0.00
South Korea	0.22	0.00	12.02	0.00	0.23	0.00	12.10	0.00	0.22	0.00	12.10	0.00
China	0.02	0.00	12.54	0.00	-0.04	0.01	12.55	0.00	-0.05	0.00	12.55	0.00
Taiwan	0.04	0.00	10.53	0.00	0.01	0.00	10.55	0.00	-0.01	0.00	10.55	0.00
Australia	-0.06	0.00	11.56	0.00	-0.06	0.00	11.54	0.00	-0.06	0.00	11.54	0.00
Argentina	-0.12	0.00	11.19	0.00	-0.21	0.00	11.15	0.00	-0.31	0.00	11.15	0.00
Brazil	-0.29	0.00	12.30	0.00	-0.28	0.00	12.22	0.00	-0.24	0.00	12.22	0.00
Colombia	-0.13	0.00	10.96	0.00	-0.15	0.00	10.92	0.00	-0.20	0.00	10.92	0.00

Notes: all variables significant at $p<0.001$ level (two-tailed tests),

SE=standard error

Figure 1: Annual % Change in Entries, All Arrivals



Figure 2: Annual % Change in Entries, Middle East



Figure 3: Annual % Change in Entries, Africa



Figure 4: Annual % Change in Entries, Europe



Figure 5: Annual % Change in Entries, Latin America



Figure 6: Annual % Change in Entries, Mexico



Figure 7: Annual % Change in Entries, Argentina



Figure 8: Association between change in actual visitors & election happening later



Figure 9: Association between change in actual visitors & ban happening later