## Using onion routing with CoAP

draft-amsuess-t2trg-onion-coap

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#### Essence of the document

CoAP proxying, OSCORE (with proxy support) and EDHOC give us building blocks that allow Tor-like REST operations, even on constrained devices.


We "just" need a little glue: proxy (chain) discovery and setup, and names (see also Non-IP Cluster).

#### This builds on...

- CoAP RFC 7252, OSCORE RFC 8613, EDHOC draft ietf-lake-edhoc
- OSCORE capable proxies draft tiloca-core-oscore-capable-proxies
- Transport Indication draft ietf-core-transport-indication
- Cryptographic identifiers as names and their discovery draft amsuess-t2trg-rdlink
- ...and some building blocks that may be generic enough to pull out of the current sketches (e.g. setup of reverse proxies)

# Plot, plot, networks, baby, figure 1 will be amazing<sup>1</sup>

An example network graph of many proxies




Arrow directions indicate direction of request.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>To the tune of Bad Project / Bad Romance. Note the future form of the auxiliary.  $\triangleleft = \triangleright \triangleleft = \triangleright \triangleleft = - \bigcirc \triangleleft \bigcirc$ 

### Figure 2

Peeling the onion's layers



Numbers at the initiator's side indicate the sequence of established network security contexts. Steps 8 and 9 (address announcements) and 15 (client looks up hidden service, finds P4 to be the announced address).

### It's just a choice

Opt-in by both parties.

If nobody decides to be hidden, it's plain CoAP.

(Or EDHOC, if server chooses cryptographically generated name).

#### State of the draft

Broad strokes – who talks to whom. Collection of ideas.

#### Big missing topics:

- Naming current state assumes something like draft amsuess-t2trg-rdlink, which needs updating
- Announcement of names as with names
- Announcement of proxies drawing from Tor

## Advancing Onion CoAP

- Do we lose security properties compared to Tor? Right now: Most certainly. How far can we get while still supporting constrained devices?
- Run as an experiment: 3-4 operators too few for actual anonymity, enough to gather some experience.
- Is T2TRG a good place for this?