

# Tachacoin Whitepaper

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**Abstract.** Blockchain-enabled smart contracts that employ proof-of-stake validation for transactions, promise significant performance advantages compared to proof-of-work solutions. For broad industry adoption, other important requirements must be met in addition. For example, stable backwards-compatible smart-contract systems must automate cross-organizational information-logistics orchestration with lite mobile wallets that support simple payment verification (SPV) techniques. The currently leading smart-contract solution Ethereum, uses computationally expensive proof-of-work validation, is expected to hard-fork multiple times in the future and requires downloading the entire blockchain. Consequently, Ethereum smart contracts have limited utility and lack formal semantics, which is a security issue. This whitepaper fills the gap in the state of the art by presenting the Tachacoin smart-contract framework that aims for sociotechnical application suitability, the adoption of formal-semantics language expressiveness and the provision of smart-contract template libraries for rapid best-practice industry deployment. We discuss the Tachacoin utility advantages compared to the Ethereum alternative and present Tachacoin smart-contract future development plans for industry-cases applications.

**Key words:** smart contract, business network model, DAPP, mobile, information logistics, cross-organizational, peer-to-peer, distributed system, e-governance, Tachacoin framework

## 1 Introduction

Orchestration and choreography protocols that facilitate, verify and enact with computing means a negotiated agreement between consenting parties, are termed smart contracts. The latter initially find application in diverse domains such as, e.g., financial-technology [6], Internet-of-Things (IoT) applications [33], digital-signing solutions [11]. An essential aspect of smart contracts is a decentralized validation of transactions, initially by means of so-called proof-of-work (PoW) [42]. The core technology that enables smart contracts is a public distributed ledger termed the blockchain, which records transaction events without requir-

ing a trusted central authority. Blockchain technology spreads in popularity with the inception of Bitcoin [23], a peer-to-peer (P2P) cryptocurrency and payment system that comprises a limited set of operations on the protocol layer. Bitcoins use PoW for transaction validation that is computationally expensive and electricity intensive.

In contrast to Bitcoins, many smart-contract systems are equipped with the Turing-complete language Solidity<sup>1</sup> that resembles JavaScript syntax and targets for enactment, e.g., the Ethereum Virtual [44] machine. Ethereum is the de-facto leading smart-contract system despite being plagued by several deficiencies. First, proof-of-work transaction validation diminishes scalability to the point where Ethereum is considered to not be feasible for most industry applications. Second, in a recent crowdfunding case study, the Ethereum affiliated Solidity smart contract was hacked<sup>2</sup> because of security flaws resulting from a lack in the state of the art with respect to tools for formal verifications [3]. The security flaw resulted in a loss of ca. \$50 million. Consequently, Ethereum performed a hardfork resulting in a schism yielding two separate Ethereum versions<sup>3</sup>. Yet another Ethereum hardfork<sup>4</sup> was caused by a denial of service attack, and more hardforks must be expected<sup>5</sup> for realizing proof-of-stake [2] transaction validation and blockchain sharding [20].

More reasons limit widespread Ethereum industry adoption [8]. For example, an inability to automate cross-organizational information-logistics, lacking privacy protecting differentiations between external- versus related internal private contracts, secure and stable virtual machines for blockchains with better performing proof-of-stake [2] transaction validation, formally verifiable smart-contract languages, lite wallets that do not require downloading the entire blockchain, and mobile-device solutions for smart contracts with simple payment verification (SPV) [14]. The latter means that clients merely download block headers when they connect to an arbitrary full node [23].

While Tachacoin uses the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) for a current lack of more suitable alternatives, according to [19], the EVM has deficiencies such as earlier experienced attacks against mishandled exceptions and against dependencies such as for transaction-ordering, timestamps, and so on. It is also desirable for a smart-contract system to achieve industry-scalability with employing sidechains [10] and unspent transaction outputs (UTXO) [10], achieving compatibility to other blockchain systems such as Bitcoins [23], or Colored coins [36]. Furthermore, an adoption of features from the Bitcoin Lightning Network [35] yields scalability via bidirectional micropayment channels.

<sup>1</sup> <http://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/develop/>

<sup>2</sup> <https://www.wired.com/2016/06/50-million-hack-just-showed-dao-human/>

<sup>3</sup> <https://bitcoinsmagazine.com/articles/ethereum-classic-hard-forks-diffuses-difficulty-bomb-1484350622/>

<sup>4</sup> <https://cointelegraph.com/news/ethereum-hard-fork-no-4-has-arrived-as-dos-attacks-intensify>

<sup>5</sup> <https://forum.daohub.org/t/whats-up-with-casper-proof-of-stake-and-sharding/6309>

While smart-contract systems such as Ethereum attract attention, a widespread industry adoption does not exist for the above discussed reasons. This whitepaper addresses the gap by specifying the Tachacoin<sup>6</sup> framework for smart-contract systems that answers the question of how to develop a smart-contract solution to satisfy critical customer requirements for enabling cross-organizational information logistics to reduce costs and time? To establish a separation of concerns, we pose the following sub-questions. What differentiating technological performance advantages do Tachacoin smart-contract solutions provide? What are critical smart-contract requirements the Tachacoin framework satisfies? What are the unique features of cross-organizational information logistics automation the Tachacoin framework aims to support?

The remainder of this whitepaper is structured as follows. First, Section 2 focuses on concrete advantages of the Tachacoin framework for achieving technological performance increases in comparison to related solutions. Section 3 gives functional- and quality goals in combination with involved stakeholders for sociotechnically organized smart-contract systems. Section 4 shows how the running case is supported by the Tachacoin-framework value-transfer protocol. Finally, Section 5 concludes this whitepaper together with discussing limitations, open issues and future development work.

## 2 Tachacoin Performance Advantage

One of the primary goals of Tachacoin is to build the first UTXO-based smart-contract system with a proof-of-stake (PoS) [37] consensus model. The latter means the creator of the next block is chosen based on the held wealth in cryptocurrency. Thus, blocks are usually forged, or minted instead of being mined, there are block rewards in addition to transaction fees and forgers receive a percentage of "interest" for the amount of funds they stake.

Tachacoin is compatible with the Bitcoin- and Ethereum ecosystems and aims at producing a variation of Bitcoin with Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) compatibility. Note that differently to Ethereum, the Tachacoin EVM is constantly backwards compatible. Pursuing a pragmatic design approach, Tachacoin employs industry use cases with a strategy comprising mobile devices. The latter allows Tachacoin promoting blockchain technology to a wide array of Internet users and thereby, decentralizing PoS transaction validation.

The remainder is structured as follows. Section 2.1 compares the advantages of Bitcoin UTXO versus the Ethereum account model. Next, Section 2.2 discusses the consensus platform for the Tachacoin blockchain. Section 2.3 shows the integration of Tachacoin contracts into the EVM. Finally, Section 2.4 describes the payment model for Tachacoin operations.

<sup>6</sup> <https://tachacoin.tech/>

## 2.1 UTXO Versus Account Model

In the UTXO model, transactions use as input unspent Bitcoins that are destroyed and as transaction outputs, new UTXOs are created. Unspent transaction outputs are created as change and returned to the spender [1]. In this way, a certain volume of Bitcoins are transferred among different private key owners, and new UTXOs are spent and created in the transaction chain. The UTXO of a Bitcoin transaction is unlocked by the private key that is used to sign a modified version of a transaction. In the Bitcoin network, miners generate Bitcoins with a process called a coinbase transaction, which does not contain any inputs. Bitcoin uses a scripting language for transactions with a limited set of operations <sup>7</sup>. In the Bitcoin network, the scripting system processes data by stacks (Main Stack and Alt Stack), which is an abstract data type following the LIFO principle of Last-In, First-Out.

In the Bitcoin client, the developers use `isStandard()` function [1] to summarize the scripting types. Bitcoin clients support: P2PKH (Pay to Public Key Hash), P2PK (Pay to Public Key), MultiSignature (less than 15 private key signatures), P2SH (Pay to Script Hash), and OP\_RETURN. With these five standard scripting types, Bitcoin clients can process complex payment logics. Besides that, a non-standard script can be created and executed if miners agree to encapsulate such a non-standard transaction.

For example, using P2PKH for the process of script creation and execution, we assume paying 0.01BTC for bread in a bakery with the imaginary Bitcoin address "Bread Address". The output of this transaction is:  
 OP\_DUP OP\_HASH160 <Bread Public Key Hash> OP\_EQUAL OP\_CHECKSIG  
 The operation OP\_DUP duplicates the top item in the stack. OP\_HASH160 returns a Bitcoin address as top item. To establish ownership of a bitcoin, a Bitcoin address is required in addition with a digital key and a digital signature. OP\_EQUAL yields TRUE (1) if the top two items are exactly equal and otherwise FALSE (0). Finally, OP\_CHECKSIG produces a public key and signature together with a validation for the signature pertaining to hashed data of a transaction, returning TRUE if a match occurs.

The unlock script according to the lock script is:  
 <Bread Signature> <Bread Public Key>

The combined script with the above two:  
 <Bread Signature> <Bread Public Key> OP\_DUP OP\_HASH160  
 <Bread Public Key Hash> OP\_EQUAL OP\_CHECKSIG

Only when the unlock script and the lock script have a matching predefined condition, is the execution of the script combination true. It means, the Bread Signature must be signed by matching the private key of a valid Bread Address signature and then the result is true.

Unfortunately, the scripting language of Bitcoin is not Turing-complete, e.g., there is no loop function. The Bitcoin scripting language is not a commonly used programming language. The limitations mitigate the security risks by preventing

<sup>7</sup> <https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Script>

the occurrence of complex payment conditions, e.g., generating infinite loops, or other complicated logic loopholes.

In the UTXO model, it is possible to transparently trace back the history of each transaction through the public ledger. The UTXO model has parallel processing capability to initialize transactions among multiple addresses indicating the extensibility. Additionally, the UTXO model supports privacy in that users can use Change Address as the output of a UTXO. The target of Tachacoin is to implement smart contracts based on the innovative design of the UTXO model.

Versus the UTXO model, Ethereum is an account based system<sup>8</sup>. More precisely, each account experiences direct value- and information transfers with state transitions. An Ethereum account address of 20 bytes comprises a nonce as a counter for assuring one-time processing for a transaction, the balance of the main internal crypto fuel for paying transaction fees called Ether, an optional contract code and default-empty account storage.

The two types of Ether accounts are on the one hand, private-key controlled external and on the other hand, contract-code controlled. The former code-void account type creates and signs transactions for message transfer. The latter activates code after receiving a message for reading and writing internal storage, creating contracts, or sending other messages.

In Ethereum, balance management resembles a bank account in the real world. Every newly generated block potentially influences the global status of other accounts. Every account has its own balance, storage and code-space base for calling other accounts or addresses, and stores respective execution results. In the existing Ethereum account system, users perform P2P transactions via client remote procedure calls. Although sending messages to more accounts via smart contracts is possible, these internal transactions are only visible in the balance of each account and tracking them on the public ledger of Ethereum is a challenge.

Based on the discussion above, we consider the Ethereum account model to be a scalability bottleneck and see clear advantages of the Bitcoin-network UTXO model. **Since the latter enhances the network effect we wish to offer, an essential design decision for the pending Tachacoin release is the adoption of the UTXO model.**

## 2.2 Consensus Management

There are ongoing discussions about consensus and which platform meets the needs of respective project requirements. The consensus topics most widely discussed are: PoW [41], PoS [2], Dynamic PoS<sup>9</sup> and Byzantine Fault Tolerance [7] as discussed by HyperLedger. The nature of consensus is about achieving data consistency with distributed algorithms. Available options are, e.g., the Fischer Lynch and Paterson theorem [5] that states consensus cannot be reached without 100% agreement amongst nodes.

<sup>8</sup> <https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/White-Paper>

<sup>9</sup> <http://tinyurl.com/zxgayfr>

In the Bitcoin network, miners participate in the verification process by hash collision through PoW. When the hash value of a miner is able to calculate and meet a certain condition, the miner may claim to the network that a new block is mined:

$$\text{Hash}(\text{BlockHeader}) \leq \frac{M}{D}$$

For the amount of miners  $M$  and the mining difficulty  $D$ , the  $\text{Hash}()$  represents the SHA256 power with value range  $[0, M]$ , and  $D$ . The SHA256 algorithm used by Bitcoin enables every node to verify each block quickly, if the number of miners is high versus the mining difficulty.

The 80 byte BlockHeader varies with each different Nonce. The overall difficulty level of mining adjusts dynamically according to the total hash power of the blockchain network. When two or more miners solve a block at the same time, a small fork happens in the network. This is the point where the blockchain needs to make a decision as to which block it should accept, or reject. In the Bitcoin network, the chain is legitimate that has the most proven work attached.

Most PoS blockchains can source their heritage back to PeerCoin<sup>10</sup> that is based on an earlier version of Bitcoin Core. There are different PoW algorithms such as Scrypt<sup>11</sup>, X11<sup>12</sup>, Groestl<sup>13</sup>, Equihash [4], etc. The purpose of launching a new algorithm is to prevent the accumulation of computing power by one entity and ensure that Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASIC) can not be introduced into the economy. Tachacoin Core chooses PoS based on the latest Bitcoin source code for basic consensus formation.

In a traditional PoS transaction, the generation of a new block must meet the following condition:

$$\text{Proof Hash} < \text{coins} \times \text{age} \times \text{target}$$

In ProofHash, the stake modifier [40] computes together with unspent outputs and the current time. With this method, one malicious attacker can start a double-spending attack by accumulating large amounts of coin age. Another problem caused by coin age is that nodes are online intermittently after rewarding instead of being continuously online. Therefore, in the improved version of PoS agreement, coin age removal encourages more nodes to be online simultaneously.

The original PoS implementation suffers from several security issues due to possible coin age attacks, and other types of attacks [16]. Tachacoin agrees with the security analysis of the Blackcoin team [40] and adopts PoS 3.0<sup>14</sup> into the latest Tachacoin Core. PoS 3.0 theoretically rewards investors that *stake* their coins longer, while giving no incentive to coin holders who leave their wallets offline.

<sup>10</sup> <https://peercoin.net/>

<sup>11</sup> <https://litecoin.info/Scrypt>

<sup>12</sup> <http://cryptorials.io/glossary/x11/>

<sup>13</sup> <http://www.groestlcoin.org/about-groestlcoin/>

<sup>14</sup> <http://blackcoin.co/>

### 2.3 Tachacoin Contract and EVM Integration

The EVM is stack-based with a 256-bit machine word. Smart contracts that run on Ethereum use this virtual machine for their execution. The EVM is designed for the blockchain of Ethereum and thus, assumes that all value transfer use an account-based method. Tachacoin is based on the blockchain design of Bitcoin and uses the UTXO-based model. Thus, Tachacoin has an account abstraction layer that translates the UTXO-based model to an account-based interface for the EVM. Note that an abstraction layer in computing is instrumental for hiding the implementation details of particular functionality to establish a separation of concerns for facilitating interoperability and platform independence.


**EVM Integration:** All transactions in Tachacoin use the Bitcoin Scripting Language, just like Bitcoin. In Tachacoin however, there exist three new opcodes.

- OP\_EXEC: This opcode triggers special processing of a transaction (explained below) and executes specific input EVM bytecode.
- OP\_EXEC\_ASSIGN: This opcode also triggers special processing such as OP\_EXEC. This opcode has as input a contract address and data for the contract. Next follows the execution of contract bytecode while passing in the given data (given as CALLERDATA in EVM). This opcode optionally transfers money to a smart contract.
- OP\_TXHASH: This opcode is used to reconcile an odd part of the accounting abstraction layer and pushes the transaction ID hash of a currently executed transaction.

Traditionally, scripts are only executed when attempting to spend an output. For example, while the script is on the blockchain, with a standard public key hash transaction, no validation or execution takes place. Execution and validation does not happen until a transaction input references the output. At this point, the transaction is only valid if the input script (ScriptSig) does provide valid data to the output script that causes the latter to return non-zero.

Tachacoin however, must accommodate smart contracts that execute immediately when merged into the blockchain. As depicted in Figure 1, Tachacoin achieves this by the special processing of transaction output scripts (ScriptPubKey) that contain either OP\_EXEC, or OP\_EXEC\_ASSIGN. When one of these opcodes is detected in a script, it is executed by all nodes of the network after the transaction is placed into a block. In this mode, the actual Bitcoin Script Language serves less as a scripting language and instead carries data to the EVM. The latter changes state within its own state database, upon execution by either of the opcodes, similar to a Ethereum contract.

For easy use of Tachacoin smart contracts, one has to authenticate the data sent to a smart contract as well as its creator stemming from a particular pubkeyhash address. In order to prevent the UTXO set of the Tachacoin blockchain from becoming too large, OP\_EXEC and OP\_EXEC\_ASSIGN transaction outputs are also spendable. OP\_EXEC\_ASSIGN outputs are spent by contracts when their code sends money to another contract, or to a pubkeyhash address. OP\_EXEC outputs



**Fig. 1.** Tachacoin transaction processing.

are spent whenever the contract uses the suicide operation to remove itself from the blockchain.

**Tachacoin Account Abstraction Layer** The EVM is designed to function on an account-based blockchain. Tachacoin however, being based on bitcoin, uses a UTXO-based blockchain and contains an Account Abstraction Layer (AAL) that allows the EVM to function on the Tachacoin blockchain without significant modifications to the virtual machine and existing Ethereum contracts.

The EVM account model is simple to use for smart-contract programmers. Operations exist that check the balance of the current contract and other contracts on the blockchain, and there are operations for sending money (attached




to data) to other contracts. Although these actions seem fairly basic and minimalist, they are not trivial to apply within the UTXO-based Tachacoin blockchain. Thus, the AAL implementation of these operations may be more complex than expected.

A Tachacoin-blockchain deployed smart contract is assigned and callable by its address and comprises a newly deployed contract balance set to zero. There is currently no protocol in Tachacoin that allows a contract to be deployed with a non-zero balance. In order to send funds to a contract, a transaction uses the OP\_EXEC\_ASSIGN opcode.

The example output script below sends money to a contract:

```
1; the version of the VM
10000 gas limit for the transaction
100; gas price in Tachacoin satoshis
0xF012; data to send the contract
(usually using the Solidity ABI)
0x1452b22265803b201ac1f8bb25840cb70afe3303;
ripemd-160 hash of contract txid
OP-EXEC-ASSIGN
```


The simple script above hands over transaction processing to the OP\_EXEC\_ASSIGN opcode. Assuming no out-of-gas, or other exceptions occur, the value amount given to the contract is OutputValue. The exact details of the gas mechanism we discuss below. By adding this output to the blockchain, the output enters the domain of the contract owned UTXO set. This output value is reflected in the balance of the contract as the sum of spendable outputs.



**Fig. 2.** Assign Funds and/or a message contract TX.

Although Figure 2 shows sending funds to a contract from a standard public key hash output, the method for sending money from one contract to another is nearly identical. When the contract sends funds to another contract or public key hash address, the former spends one of its owned outputs. The sending

contract involves Expected Contract Transactions for the fund sending. These transactions are special in that they must exist in a block to be valid for the Tachacoin network. Expected Contract Transactions are generated by miners while verifying and executing transactions, rather than being generated by consumers. As such, they are not broadcast on the P2P network.



**Fig. 3.** Tachacoin block validation showing the Expected Contract Transaction List.

The primary mechanism to perform Expected Contract Transactions is the new opcode, `OP_TXHASH` that is part of Figure 3. Internally, both `OP_EXEC` and `OP_EXEC_ASSIGN` have two different modes. Upon their execution as part of the output script processing, the EVM is executed. When the opcodes are executed as part of input script processing, however, the EVM is not executed to avoid double execution. Instead, the `OP_EXEC` and `OP_EXEC_ASSIGN` opcodes behave similar to no-ops and return either 1 or 0, i.e., spendable or not spendable respectively, based on a given transaction hash. This is why `OP_TXHASH` is so


important to the functioning of this concept. Briefly, OP\_TXHASH is a new opcode added which pushes the current spending transaction's SHA256 hash onto the Bitcoin Script stack. The OP\_EXEC and OP\_EXEC\_ASSIGN opcodes check the Expected Contract Transaction List during a spend attempt.

After the transaction passes (usually from OP\_TXHASH) to the opcodes that exist in the Expected Contract Transaction List, the result is 1, or spendable. Otherwise, the return is 0, or not spendable. In this way, OP\_EXEC and OP\_EXEC\_ASSIGN using vouts are only spendable when a contract and thus, the Account Abstraction Layer, requires that the vout is spendable, i.e., while the contract attempts sending money. This results in a secure and sound way of allowing contract funds to be spent only by a respective contract in alignment with a normal UTXO transaction.

A specific scenario occurs if a contract has more than one output that can be spent. Each node may pick different outputs and thus, use completely different transactions for spending OP\_EXEC\_ASSIGN transactions. This is resolved in Tachacoin by a consensus-critical coin picking algorithm. The latter is similar to the standard coin picking algorithm used within a user wallet. However, Tachacoin significantly simplifies the algorithm to avoid the risk of denial of service (DoS) attack vectors and to realize simple consensus rules. With this consensus-critical coin picking algorithm, there is now no possibility for other nodes to pick different coins to be spent by a contract. Any miner/node who picks different outputs must fork away from the main Tachacoin network and their blocks are rendered invalid.

When an EVM contract in Figure 4 sends money either to a pubkeyhash address, or to another contract, this event constructs a new transaction. The consensus-critical coin-picking algorithm chooses the best owned outputs of the contract pool. These outputs are spent as inputs with the input script (ScriptSig) comprising a single OP\_TXHASH opcode. The outputs are thus, the destination for the funds, and a change output (if required) to send the remaining funds of the transaction back to the contract. This transaction hash is added to the Expected Contract Transaction List and then the transaction itself is added to the block immediately after the contract execution transaction. Once this constructed transaction is validated and executed, a confirmation check of the Expected Contract Transaction List follows. Next, this transaction hash is removed from the Expected Contract Transaction List. Using this model, it is impossible to spoof transactions for spending them by providing a hardcoded hash as input script, instead of using OP\_TXHASH.

The above described abstraction layer renders the EVM contracts oblivious to coin picking and specific outputs. Instead, the EVM contracts know only that they and other contracts have a balance so that money can be sent to these contracts as well as outside of the contract system to pubkeyhash addresses. Consequently, contract compatibility between Tachacoin and Ethereum is strong and very few modifications are required to port an Ethereum contract to the Tachacoin blockchain.



**Fig. 4.** Spend contract OP\_EXEC\_ASSIGN transaction.

**Added Standard Transaction Types:** The following are the standard transaction types that we add to Tachacoin. They are documented here as Bitcoin script templates: Deploying a new contract to the blockchain requires an output script as follows:

```
1; the version of the VM
[ Gas limit ]
[ Gas price ]
[ Contract EVM bytecode ]
OP-EXEC
```

Sending funds to an already deployed contract on the blockchain requires the script below:


```
1; the version of the VM
[ Gas limit ]
[ Gas price ]
[ Data to send to the contract ]
[ ripemd160 hash of contract transaction id ]
OP-EXEC-ASSIGN
```

Note there are no standard transaction types for spending as that requires the Expected Contract Transaction List. Thus, these spending transactions are neither broadcast nor valid on the P2P network.

## 2.4 Gas Model

A problem Tachacoin faces with adding Turing-completeness to the Bitcoin blockchain is relying on only the size of a transaction, which is not reasonable for determining the fee paid to miners. The reason is that a transaction may infinitely loop and halt the entire blockchain for transaction-processing miners. As Figure 5 shows, the Tachacoin project adopts the concept of gas from Ethereum. In the gas concept, each EVM opcode executed has a price and each transaction has

an amount of gas to spend. Post-transaction remaining gas is refunded to the sender.



**Fig. 5.** Gas refund model.

When the gas required for contract execution exceeds the amount of gas available to a transaction, then the actions of a transaction and state changes are reverted. Thus, any modified permanent storage is reverted to its original state including any spending of contract funds so that the latter are not spent. Despite a reversion, all gas of a transaction is consumed and given to the processing miner since the computing resources have already been spent.

Although Tachacoin uses the gas model from Ethereum, we expect the gas schedule, i.e., the gas price of each EVM opcode, to significantly differ from Ethereum. The exact values are determined by comparing existing prices in Ethereum with the amount of processing and blockchain resources required for each opcode to Tachacoin.

When creating a contract funding-, or deployment transaction, the user specifies two specific items for gas. The GasLimit determines the amount of consumable gas by a contract execution. The second item is the GasPrice to set the exact price of each unit of gas in Tachacoin Satoshis. The latter are currently a smaller unit of the Bitcoin currency that the blockchain records. The maximum Tachacoin expenditure of a contract execution equates the multiplication of GasLimit by GasPrice. If this maximum expenditure exceeds the transaction fee provided by

the transaction then the latter is invalid and can not be mined, or processed. The remaining transaction fee after subtracting this maximum expenditure is the Transaction Size Fee and analogous to the standard Bitcoin fee model.

To determine the appropriate priority of a transaction, miners consider two variables. First, the transaction size fee must match the total size of a transaction, i.e., usually determined by a minimum amount of coins per kilobyte formula. The second variable is the GasPrice of a contract execution. In combination, PoS miners choose the most important and profitable transactions to process and include in a block. Consequently, there exists a free-market fee model with miners and users optimizing for the best fee that suits their transaction speed and the price they are willing to pay.

**Refunds:** Using the UTXO model, funds sent to miners as transaction fees are non-negotiable. It is impossible for a miner to partially refund a fee if the transaction is easier for the miner to process than expected. Still, for the gas-model to be useful, a method must exist to refund funds back to the sender. Moreover, it must be possible to roll back the state of a transaction that runs out of gas and return gas-fees to miners.

Refunding gas-fees in Tachacoin is enabled by creating new outputs as part of the coinbase transaction of a miner. We add a new block validation consensus rule to ensure refunding outputs are required to exist in the coinbase transaction. Otherwise, miners may choose to not refund gas. The refund is given back to the sender of a transaction fund by copying the output script. For security reasons, this script is currently a standard pay-to-pubkeyhash, or pay-to-scripthash script. We plan to lift the restriction after further security studies.

For reference, the OP\_EXEC\_ASSIGN has the following format to assign contract funds:

Inputs: (in push order)

- Transaction hash for spending [optional]
- version number (VM version to use, currently just 1)
- gas limit (maximum amount of gas that can be used by this exec)
- gas price (How much tachacoin each gas unit is)
- data (data to be passed to this smart contract)
- smart contract address

Outputs: (in pop order)

- Spendable (if the funds are currently spendable)

Consequently, we give an example EXEC\_ASSIGN below:

```
1
10000
100
0xABCD1234...
3d655b14393b55a4dec8ba043bb286afa96af485
EXEC_ASSIGN
```

If the VM execution results in an out-of-gas exception, this vout is spent by the next transaction in the block using the redeem script OP\_TXHASH.

The generated vout for this transaction is a pubkeyhash script taken from the vin[0].prevout script. In this early version of Tachacoimly pubkeyhash senders are allowed for VM funding transactions. Although other forms can be accepted into blocks to result in VM execution, the msg.sender in the EVM is "0" and any out-of-gas, or gas-refund needed results in the contract keeping the funds.

**Partial Refund Model:** Pertaining to the gas model, it is also necessary to refund the unspent portion for several reasons. On the one hand, users can spend a large amount of funds to ensure their contract is executed properly. Still, the unused gas returns as a Tachacoin refund.

The return address for gas is expressed on the blockchain as a vin[0].prevout script of the sending transaction. Gas is sent to a contract by using the standard bitcoin transaction-fee mechanism. Thus, the new fee model slightly augments this to make the transaction fee:

```
gas_fee = gas_limit * gas_price
tx_fee = vin - vout
tx_relay_fee = tx_fee - gas_fee
refund = gas_fee - used_gas
```

A proposal exists for enabling miners to evaluate both the tx\_relay\_fee and the gas\_price under a single "credit price" value for determining transaction priority.

During contract execution, gas tokens are subtracted from the total fee, i.e., multiplying by gas\_price. After completing the contract execution, the remainder of this gas\_fee must be returned to the given gas return script by adding an output to the coinbase transaction the miners use to retrieve their block reward. The coinbase added vout is a pubkeyhash from vin[0].prevout. In order to receive a gas refund, this must be a spent pubkeyhash vout. Otherwise, the gas refund remains with the miner in an out-of-gas condition and the funds sent will remain with the contract.

Note that it is currently only possible to have one EVM contract execution per transaction. Thus, never does the case arise where two contract executions attempt to share the transaction fee. This scenario may be enabled after solving existing problems with multiple EVM executions per transaction. The current design support multiple contract executions per transaction.

**Important GAS Edge Cases:** Miners must be cautious with contract-gas, and fund-return scripts. If the latter script output causes a block to exceed the maximum size then the contract transaction can not be put into this block. Instead, the gas-return script execution must take place again in the next mined block. Miners must ensure sufficient capacity exists in the candidate block for the gas-return script before attempting to execute the contract. Not following this rule results in a contract requiring repeated execution, if the refund script

does not fit into the current block. If there are no gas funds to return, no vout requirement exists for returning the funds.

It is consensus critical that the transaction fee includes the gas\_fee. A transaction is invalid when adding it to a block results in a negative gas refund, or when the gas\_fee is lower than the transaction fee.

No transaction output script is valid that has more than one OP\_EXEC, or OP\_EXEC\_ASSIGN opcode. While this limits scripting abilities, it is preferable to potential recursion- and multiple-execution problems. Consequently, static analysis suffices to determine if a script is invalid.

After very blockchain-oriented Tachacoin technicalities, we next describe conceptually the management of smart-contract lifecycles. Note that the conceptual presentation in the sequel is backed by scientific literature [12, 13, 24, 18, 26, 27, 32].

### 3 Smart-Contract Management

As stipulated above, we assume that lifecycle management is essential for securing smart contracts in that a proper vetting of potential collaborating parties takes place before enactment. We consider a real-life case from a failed seafood delivery<sup>15</sup> where a business-transaction conflict emerges from an underspecified conventional contract (CC). An EU company (buyer) orders 12 920 kg of cuttlefish from a South-Asian company (seller). In the CC, the liability of the product quality rests with the seller until the carrier obtains the goods. The underspecification pertains to the quality of the goods that is not specified in the CC and the buyer does not check the goods before transferral to the shipping company (carrier).


The smart-contract alternative resolves the underspecification conflict that exist in the CC. Thus, in Section 3.1 the presented Tachacoin-framework goal model reflects the properties of a smart-contract lifecycle that is fully formalized in [18, 26, 27, 32]. Next, Section 3.2 gives a small lifecycle example for the seafood-shipment case.

#### 3.1 Lifecycle-Management Goals

For discussing goals, we use the following approach. The Agent-Oriented Modeling (AOM) method [38] is a socio-technical requirements-engineering approach that takes into account that humans who may belong to organizations use technology to collaborate for solving problems. In this section, we use the AOM goal-model type to capture important socio-technical behavioral features for the Tachacoin smart-contract system that supports the running case. Goal models enhance the communication between technical and non-technical stakeholders to increase the understanding of the problem domain. Note that AOM goal models are also instrumental [39] for novel agile software development techniques.

<sup>15</sup> <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/090324s4.html>






**Fig. 6.** Modeling elements for AOM goal models.

A goal model comprises three main elements depicted as in Figure 6. Functional requirements we refer to as goals and are depicted as parallelograms, roles we depict as sticky men, and non-functional requirements. The latter has two variants, namely quality goals for software-related non-functions requirements depicted as clouds, and human-related emotional goals depicted as ellipses. The goal model starts with a central root value proposition that is not atomic. Consequently, the value proposition is decomposed in a tree-hierarchy into sub-goals where each sub-goal represents an aspect for achieving its parent goal [21] and the lowest sub-goal must be atomic. Goals may have assigned roles, quality- and emotional goals that are inherited to lower-level goals.

**Value Proposition of the Tachacoin Framework** The root of the goal for the Tachacoin-framework we depict in Figure 7 and it is the value proposition of cross-organizational information- and value-transfer logistics automation. We split the complex value proposition into goals for smart-contract lifecycle management [26, 27, 32], i.e., *setup*, *rollout*, *enactment*, *rollback*, *termination*. These refined goals we further explore in Section 3.2.



**Fig. 7.** Tachacoin value proposition with lifecycle-management refinement [26, 27, 18].

An essential emotional goal for industry adoption in Figure 7 is *trust* in the sociotechnical Tachacoin-system [34]. It is a goal that enables the system to reliably perform the intended behavior. In this case, trust pertains to the dependencies among humans who use technology to achieve goals. We consider *economically viable* and *easy to adopt* as additional emotional goals that influence widespread industry diffusion. The former means

that using the Tachacoin-system results in economic return on investment, while the latter means the personal barrier of entry for working with Tachacoin is low.

There are quality goals affiliated with the value proposition that affect all refining parts of the Tachacoin-system. These quality goals we derive from a reference architecture [28] for cross-organizational business-process aware collaboration. The quality goals below are structured in accordance with [9, 17]. The following quality goals are not discernible during system execution time.

*Modifiable* means the Tachacoin-system changes and adapts during its lifecycle to the business context. Additionally, it harmonizes cross-organizationally heterogeneous system environments comprising regularly updating commercial software. *Integrable* systems consists of separately developed and integrated components for which the interface protocols between the components must match. Hence, integrability between the components of Tachacoin must be assured.


Next, we specify the quality goals for Tachacoin that are discernible during runtime. *Interoperable* means Tachacoin must interoperate at runtime with systems supporting business functions such as planning, logistics, production, external partner systems, and so on. Dynamic interoperability challenges are business-, conceptual-, and technical heterogeneity. *Secure* refers to resisting unauthorized attempts at usage and denial of service while providing services to trusted users with good reputation. To address security, trust- and reputation problems, several strategies are possible for Tachacoin. blockchain-supported authentication service checks collaborating parties, monitors, inspects and logs network events. The communication of a system may be encrypted, and so on. *Highly automated* collaboration requires systems must cover the entire smart-contract lifecycle. Hence, Tachacoin must provide for possibilities of a high degree of meaningful collaboration automation that processes tedious and repetitive work while allowing humans to focus on the remaining creative action. *Flexible* collaboration is a highly dynamic process enacting activities by diverse partners exchanging heterogeneous data [25]. Hence, Tachacoin must enable diverse cross-organizational collaboration scenarios harmonizing heterogeneous concepts and technologies. *Usable* means Tachacoin must be easy to use for cross-organizational information-logistics automation and decomposes into three areas. Error avoidance must anticipate and prevent commonly occurring collaboration errors. Error handling is system support for a user to recover from errors. Learnability refers to the required learning time of users to master the Tachacoin-system.

Finally, there exist quality goals that are architecture specific. *Completeness* is the quality of Tachacoin comprising the set of components for smart-contract lifecycle management. *Scalable* refers to the ability of Tachacoin to combine more than two collaborating parties into one configuration. *Applicable* means that Tachacoin is instrumental for automating cross-organizational information logistics and value transfers. *Portable* means Tachacoin supports information logistics independent of the industrial domain and collaboration heterogeneity with respect to business-, conceptual-, and technological system infrastructure. Note this also includes mobile devices. *Performant* means the computational and communicational strain is low for information-logistics automation. Hence, it is important to ensure that

all phases of a smart-contract lifecycle are carried out within a desirable response time and without an exponential need for computing power.

### 3.2 Lifecycle Management Example

The goal model of Section 3.1 we map into Figure 8 for projecting in the running seafood case. The modeling notation in Figure 8 is the business process model and notation BPMN [22] and the complete lifecycle is formalized in [26, 27, 18]. The green circle denotes a start of the lifecycle and the red circle the lifecycle end. The rectangles with plus signs are so-called subprocesses that correspond to lifecycle stages in Section 3.1. A subprocess is a compound activity that hides lower-level business-process details.



**Fig. 8.** Tachacoin smart-contract lifecycle management.

The starting point of each smart-contract lifecycle in Figure 8 is the business case of seafood transportation that requires cross-organizational information logistics automation. Assuming there exists a collaboration hub [29] that serves as a preparation platform for the inception of smart contracts, a designer creates a template for a business-network model (BNM) into which service types are inserted together with roles.

The BNM template enters the population phase. The roles affiliated to respective service types are filled with organizations that collaborate in the smart contract, i.e., *bank2*, *seller*, *fridge1*, *carrier*, *fridge2*, *buyer* and *bank1*. Note that it is possible for several candidate organizations to compete for filling a specific role. In order to reinforce the desire to fill a role, potential partner organizations must match a service offer into the service type a role is affiliated with. A service consumer can evaluate the proposal and decide if a service offer is acceptable.

When all roles are filled and service-types match with acceptable service offers, the smart-contract negotiation commences. We assume no party from the

running seafood-delivery case has a desire to disagree and bring the setup phase to a sudden end. Instead, the buyer provides a counter offer that introduces obligations pertaining to the temperature inside containers where the seafood is stored. We assume the shipment containers are equipped with Internet-of-Things (IoT) [15] sensors that inform the shipper, seller and buyer in realtime when a temperature-threshold violation occurs. The counteroffer of the *buyer* defines in this case that either a price reduction follows in accordance with the reduced quality of the seafood. If the temperature change results in the seafood not being fit for consumption any more, the *buyer* has the right to reject purchasing the shipment on arrival.

The counteroffer is accepted by all other parties and a consensus occurs, which is the prerequisite for a contract establishment. The smart contract is a coordinating agent from which a distributed governance infrastructure (DGI) must be deduced. Thus, each party of the running case receives a local contract copy from which a set of respective obligations are deduced. For example, an obligation for the *carrier* is that the temperature inside of a seafood-shipping container must never be above 20C. The obligations are observed by monitors and assigned business-network model agents (BNMA) that connect to IoT-sensors.

Next, all collaborating parties can assign their respective private processes [12] into an emerging (DGI). For example, we assume peer-to-peer payment by Bitcoins that the *buyer* first must purchase with Euros. That purchase and payment via *bank1* involves a process that comprises compliance- and reporting steps as government impose regulations on the use of crypto-currencies. For enabling information exchanges between *bank1* and *bank2* of the *seller*, the communication endpoints must be established. That way, the management of seller compliance data is automated.

Assuming a temperature-threshold obligation violation occurs in the domain of *fridge1*, an assigned BNMA escalates the event and the *buyer* checks the breach severity. If the temperature breach lasts for a period of time resulting in diminished seafood quality that still allows a successful sale for a lower price that the *buyer* tolerates, a response may be the latter requests further cooling by a different company that slips into the role *fridge1*. Assuming the seafood is severely spoiled and can not be sold in the target country, the *buyer* triggers a disruptive rollback that collapses the transaction. If the seafood shipment arrives with the buyer in the agreed upon state and the payment to the *seller* via *bank2* is complete, then the termination stage dissolves the DGI and releases all collaborating parties.

We next give the relationships between detailed collaboration elements that the lifecycle management of Figure 8 coordinates.


## 4 Value-Transfer Protocol

An integral part of the Tachacoin-framework is the notion of a value-transfer protocol (VTP) that orchestrates cross-organizational information logistics and value

transfers, in line with the value proposition Figure 7 depicts. Consequently, Section 4.1 describes the relationship of process types that form a VTP. Section 4.2 discusses the need for a specific smart-contract language with the utility to specify VTPs. Finally, Section 4.3 discusses the features of a VTP-supporting language versus Solidity that Ethereum uses.


#### 4.1 Cross-Organizational Processes

The VTP comprises three different types of collaborating processes. Figure 9 shows a simplified BNM in BPMN notation for the seafood delivery that Section 3 introduces. The BNM assumes that a sequence of subprocesses are placeholders for service types [12, 13] with labels that indicate the roles of organizations.



**Fig. 9.** Tachacoin BNM.


We assume that the BNM also comprises tasks connecting service-type subprocesses for establishing choreography control flow. For simplicity, Figure 9 depicts unlabeled choreographing tasks together with an AND-split and -join. The BNM commences with the seafood seller informing the bank to prepare for an international currency transaction and next, the seafood is cooled before a carrier performs shipping to the destination. In the destination country, the seafood is cooled again while a local bank processes the currency transaction between both countries. Finally, the buyer receives the seafood for local sales.



**Fig. 10.** Externalized service-type process view.

For the carrier subprocess of the BNM, the assumption is that several candidate organizations exist for filling the role of seafood carrier. Figure 10 depicts a

simplified example for a lower-level refinement in the form of a service-type process view [12, 13]. The simplified process in Figure 10 assumes a carrier receives the seafood from the fridge in the source country and charges the bank of the seller. Next, three parallel branches require that temperature monitoring, preparing delivery papers and informing the cooling company in the target company take place simultaneously. Only a candidate organization can become a service-providing carrier that promises adhering to this simplified process. Note that a collaboration hub [30] can offer the service-type process views for matching the latter with corresponding service-offering organizations.



**Fig. 11.** Local carrier contract.

As a third VTP-element, Figure 11 shows the local contract the carrier uses internally. Note that differently to the service-type process view in Figure 10, the local contract comprises two additional tasks with the labels inform buyer and charge bank2. Thus, the local contract is a subclass of the service-type process view with respect to enactment behavior [12, 13], i.e., all tasks of the process view are experienced externally while the carrier has the option to insert hidden additional steps in a privacy-assuring way that constitute a competitive advantage, or are not of interest for external display, and so on.

## 4.2 Tachacoin Smart-Contract Language

To support the VTP scenario of Section 4.1, the current smart-contract lingua franca Solidity does not have the required utility level with respect to contained concepts and properties. Instead, it is the objective to develop a Tachacoin smart contract language (QSCl) and compiler that has comparatively better utility for VTP management.

High-level QSCl concepts and properties, Figure 12 depicts. The VTP scenario of Section 4.1 resembles the eSourcing framework for which a dedicated language exists, the eSourcing Markup Language (eSML) [31] that is currently specified for the semantic-web domain. We intend to map the concepts and properties of eSML into the blockchain domain for creating QSCl together with a language compiler for a novel Tachacoin virtual machine.

Briefly, while we refer the reader to [31] for further details, the properties in Figure 12 we organize along conceptual interrogatives. One QSCl-instance

QSCL			
Tachacoin Smart-Contract Language	Who	party	company_data
			company_contact_data
			resource_section
			data_definition_section
	Where		business_context_provisions
			legal_context_provisions
	What	Mapping	exchanged_value
			process (conjoinment)
			lifecycle_definition
			lifecycle_mapping
			active_node_label_mapping
			monitorability
			exchanged_value

**Fig. 12.** Properties and concepts of the future Tachacoin smart contract language [31].

resembles a BNM definition (Figure 9). The Who concept of QSCL comprises constructs for defining the contracting parties uniquely together with involved resources and data definitions. The Where concept specifies business-context- and also legal-context provisions in which a specific smart contract holds. The What concept allows for defining exchanged values and the service-type process views (Figure 10) together with lifecycle definitions for such process views and also for elementary tasks respectively. Thus, in the What part of a QSCL instance, several service-type process views can be defined comparable to Figure 9. Finally, conjoinment constructs are specifically defined exchange channels for cross-organizational data flow. Monitorability constructs allow for a flexible definition of dedicated task-monitoring that either uses a polling-, or a messaging principle.

### 4.3 Comparative Discussion

Using the smart-contract ontology [31], we examine informally the suitability of existing Solidity versus QSCL that we construct for the Tachacoin-framework. As a general observation, Solidity is a language with a focus on mostly low-level blockchain-manipulation commands with JavaScript-resembling syntax. Still, it is possible to import third-party APIs and perform external function calls. So-called external functions in Solidity are part of a smart-contract interface that can be called from other contracts and via transactions.

Because of the Turing-completeness of Solidity, it is in principle possible to define cumbersome supports for all concepts and properties of the smart-

contract ontology that QSCl embodies. However, concepts such as pattern-based design, process awareness, matching of processes etc., are not adopted in any way in Solidity. With respect to inventing cumbersome workarounds, a recent conference-paper publication [43] uses Solidity to demonstrate the feasibility of untrusted business-process monitoring and execution in smart contracts.

One must stress that Solidity has historically not been backed by formal verification means, differently to the design inception of QSCl [31]. Without such formally verifiable expressiveness, it is not possible to know ahead of enactment if a contract is correct and free of security issues. A Solidity-related security incident<sup>16</sup> has triggered only very recently the development and application of verification tools such as Why<sup>17</sup>, Solidifier<sup>18</sup>, or Casper<sup>19</sup> that likely leads to a shift from proof-of-work towards proof-of-stake for Ethereum all together.

## 5 Conclusions

This whitepaper presents the Tachacoin-framework for a novel smart-contract blockchain-technology solution. We show the specific Tachacoin transaction-processing implementation that uses proof-of-stake validation. Furthermore, Tachacoin integrates the Ethereum virtual machine (EVM) together with the Bitcoin unspent transaction output protocol. Note that the Tachacoin EVM constantly remains backwards compatible. Additionally, the Tachacoin-framework recognizes that smart-contract lifecycle management is important for supporting proper security vetting of collaborating parties. To support Tachacoin lifecycle management, the current lingua franca Solidity lacks suitability. Consequently, the emerging Tachacoin-framework requires a novel smart-contract language with enhanced utility.

The adoption of proof-of-stake into Tachacoin constitutes a considerable saving of computational effort over the not scaling Ethereum alternative that still uses proof-of-work. While Ethereum plans to also adopt proof-of-stake, it is unclear when such a new version will be released. Also the use of unspent transaction outputs is more scalable in comparison to the account management of Ethereum. In combination with simple payment verification, Tachacoin already develops a smart-contract mobile-device solution. While the not scaling Ethereum solution does not allow for mobile solutions, Tachacoin aims to achieve a democratized and highly distributed proof-of-stake transaction validation with its mobile strategy.

The Tachacoin-framework has a clear understanding of quality criteria that future developments must satisfy. With respect to functional requirements, Tachacoin plans to develop an application layer for smart-contract lifecycle management. Most importantly, such lifecycle management is important for vetting collaborating parties to reduce security breaches such as those Ethereum recently experienced, resulting in multiple hardforks of the latter.

<sup>16</sup> <https://www.wired.com/2016/06/50-million-hack-just-showed-dao-human/>

<sup>17</sup> <http://why3.lri.fr/>

<sup>18</sup> <https://hack.ethereum.camp/idea/solidifier—formal-verification-of-solidity-programs>

<sup>19</sup> <http://www.coindesk.com/ethereum-casper-proof-stake-rewrite-rules-blockchain/>



The value-transfer protocol for information logistics in Tachacoin comprises a business-network model for choreographing several collaborating organizations. The latter can provide services with local contracts that must match with the specified runtime behavior of service-type process views in the business-network model. With a multi-layered smart-contract management layer, collaborating parties protect the privacy of their business secrets that pose a competitive advantage by hiding extension steps in local contracts.

In summary, the Tachacoin-framework recognizes that smart contracts are sociotechnical artifacts that must also take into account essential quality requirements for achieving widespread user adoption. Ongoing real-life industry projects with Tachacoin applications result in continuous empirical requirements harvesting. The mobile strategy in support of highly distributed proof-of-stake transaction processing aims at a significant advancement in the state of the art. Still, Tachacoin also recognizes that smart-contract lifecycle management requires application-layer development with sophisticated front-end user experience that current solutions do not pay attention to sufficiently.

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