

# Metamorph: Injecting Inaudible Commands into Over-the-air Voice Controlled Systems


Tao Chen<sup>1</sup> Longfei Shangguan<sup>2</sup> Zhenjiang Li<sup>1</sup> Kyle Jamieson<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup>*City University of Hong Kong*, <sup>2</sup>*Microsoft*, <sup>3</sup>*Princeton University*



# Voice Assistants in Smart Home

2




# Voice Assistants in Smart Home

2




# Voice Assistants in Smart Home

2



**111.8 million people in U.S. use voice assistants and related services!**




**Are they safe enough?**

# How to attack the voice assistant?

4

**Neural networks**




**Speech Recognition Models (SR)**

# How to attack the voice assistant?

5


Audio Clip:  $I$



# How to attack the voice assistant?

5

Audio Clip:  $I$




Perturbation:  $\delta$

# How to attack the voice assistant?

5

Audio Clip:  $I$




Perturbation:  $\delta$

*minimize*  $dB_I(\delta),$   
*such that*  $SR(I) = T,$   
 $SR(I + \delta) = T'$

# How to attack the voice assistant?

5

Audio Clip:  $I$



## Audio Adversarial Attack

$x 0.01$


Perturbation:  $\delta$

*minimize*  $dB_I(\delta),$

*such that*  $SR(I) = T,$

$SR(I + \delta) = T'$









Is it a real threat? Yes!






Adversarial Example

But, failed Over-the-air!

# Challenge


## Channel Effect



# Challenge

## Channel Effect

*Multi-path*




Hardware Heterogeneity

$SR(I + \delta)$  **vs**  $SR(H(I + \delta))$

H is unknown in advance!


# Understand Over-the-air Attack

## Channel Effect




Hardware Heterogeneity


# Attenuation




# Attenuation



# Attenuation




# Attenuation




# Understand Over-the-air Attack

10





# Hardware Heterogeneity





Anechoic Chamber Testing

# Hardware Heterogeneity




Anechoic Chamber Testing

# Hardware Heterogeneity




Anechoic Chamber Testing

# Hardware Heterogeneity




Anechoic Chamber Testing




Not strong, device's inherent feature, compensable!

# Hardware Heterogeneity



**Character Successful Rate (CSR):**




Anechoic Chamber Testing

Static, predictable  
and compensable!

# Understand Over-the-air Attack


## Channel Effect

*Multi-path*



**Hardware Heterogeneity**



# Multi-path






# Multi-path: Near range






# Multi-path: Near range



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# Multi-path: Near range





Also not strong and similar!




# Multi-path: Long range






# Multi-path: Long range



# Multi-path: Long range



# Multi-path: Long range




**Stronger and unpredictable!**


# Multi-path: Long range



## Character Successful Rate (CSR):




# Design Inspiration





# Design Inspiration



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



$$\arg \min_{\delta} \alpha \cdot dB_I(\delta) + \frac{1}{M} \sum_i Loss(SR(H_i(I + \delta)), T')$$

# Design Inspiration




## Transcript and Character Successful Rate:




$$\arg \min_{\delta} \alpha \cdot dB_I(\delta) + \frac{1}{M} \sum_i Loss(SR(H_i(I + \delta)), T')$$

# Design Inspiration



# Metamorph: Meta-Enhancement


## Adversarial Example Generator



$$\arg \min_{\delta} \alpha \cdot dB_I(\delta) + \frac{1}{M} \sum_i Loss(SR(H_i(I + \delta)), T') - \beta \cdot L_d$$


# Metamorph: Meta-Qual

- Acoustic Graffiti:



- Reducing Perturbation's Coverage:

*L1/L2 regularization*



# Evaluation: Audio Quality

- Examples

## Classical music

**Original:**  
[no transcription]

**Meta-Enha:**  
**“hello world”**

**Meta-Qual:**  
**“hello world”**

## Human speech


**Original:**  
“your son went to  
serve at a distant  
place and became  
a centurion”

**Meta-Enha:**  
**“open the door”**

**Meta-Qual:**  
**“open the door”**

# Evaluation: Attack Successful Rate


- Attack Target: “DeepSpeech” (White-Box)



A multi-path prevalent office

# Evaluation: Attack Successful Rate


- Line-of-Sight (LOS) Attack



**Meta-Enha: > 90% attack successful rate**

# Evaluation: Attack Successful Rate

- No-Line-of-Sight (NLOS) Attack



Character Successful Rate

Transcript Successful Rate

**Meta-Enha: over 85% attack successful rate across 11/20 NLOS location!**

# Conclusion

1. Investigate over-the-air audio adversarial attacks systematically.
2. Propose a “generate-and-clean” two-phase design and improve the audio quality.
3. Develop a prototype and conduct extensive evaluations.

Visit [acoustic-metamorph-system.github.io](https://acoustic-metamorph-system.github.io)  
for more information!