



ÇAPAMUN'23



NATO **Study Guide**

1. Letter from the Secretary General

On behalf of our organization team, it is my utmost pleasure and honor to invite you to our inaugural Model United Nations conference. We have worked tirelessly to put together an entertaining and instructive program, and we are delighted to have you join us as we explore some of the most pressing issues confronting the globe.

Our Academic Team has chosen committee topics that piqued their interest and curiosity, resulting in a wide range of diverse committees. Delegates will undoubtedly find a committee that matches their interests and skills, ranging from thought-provoking General Assembly committees to dynamic crisis committees. We are excited to give a remarkable experience for the delegates in attendance, with committees targeted to provide you the opportunity to gain a greater understanding of many issues ranging from sovereignty disputes to the protection of migrant workers' rights.

We seek to establish a welcoming and educationally inclusive environment for participants of all levels of experience, as we value the insights and perspectives that each delegate will bring to the conference. Meanwhile, we also strive to give you unforgettable memories apart from the committees. All of our participants will be provided with an environment in which they can connect, participate in activities, and build social skills as well as friendships.

Our secretariat has been and will continue to work relentlessly to provide you with the finest experience possible this year, and I hope to see you all in March. We hope that our conference will ignite your interest in international issues and provide you with the necessary skills to take home with you and use confidently for years to come. Thank you for your participation once more. I am looking forward to meeting you at Çapa Model United Nations Conference 2023.

Sincerely

Ayşe Şule Ercantürk
Secretary General

2. Letter of the USG and Academic Assistant

Most esteemed delegates,

It would be my pleasure to welcome all of you to the Çapa MUN Conference. I am Vedat Yıldız, an eleventh grader at Kadıköy Anadolu Lisesi and I am Sibel Yıldırım tenth grade at Çapa Fen Lisesi In this most prestigious conference We will be serving as the Under Secretary General of the United Nations Office on NATO Committee. It is for the best interests of the committee and to ensure mutual understanding of the agenda item at hand I have prepared this study guide for you.

Within just four days; we will discuss, debate and come up with creative solutions with the use of Harvard MUN procedure. With our debates we will come to understand what steps should be taken and what lies ahead of us. I have faith in the committee that we will achieve most amazing solutions and create a resolution effective at handling our agenda item. In order to achieve such feats, we expect the hard work and creativity of all delegates and for them to cooperate and be constructive.

I have prepared this study guide with reliable sources and with facts only. With uttermost care I have compiled and included the most important details regarding the agenda item and have included multiple different perspectives on the issue in order to achieve neutrality and to make the agenda item more comprehensible. The topic of “The natural gas reserve dispute in the Mediterranean Sea and the Imia Crisis” handles an ongoing crisis. We urge all delegates to not only read our study guide on the matter, but also to do their own research on the topic. If you have any questions regarding the study guide or the agenda item, feel free to contact us via our email addresses:

vdtyld05@gmail.com
sibelhaski26@gmail.com

We are far too excited to meet all of you and pleased to be able to have you experience the enticement of an MUN conference and to give you a chance at learning from each other as well as making new friends. We hope to meet with you and to have an excellent committee. Wish you all the best of luck!

Best regards,

Vedat Yıldız
Sibel Yıldırım

3. Introduction

The Imia Crisis and the natural gas reserves in the Mediterranean are complex topics with many interrelated factors and historical contexts. The Imia Crisis, which occurred in January 1996, was the result of a territorial dispute between Greece and Turkey over two small uninhabited islets in the Aegean Sea. The islets, known as “Imia” in Greek and “Imia” in Turkish, had been the subject of a long-standing dispute between the two countries, with both sides claiming sovereignty over the territory. The crisis began when a Turkish survey ship entered the waters around the islets, prompting a response from the Greek Navy. The situation quickly escalated, with both sides sending military vessels and aircraft to the area which resulted in several incidents of gunfire and close encounters between ships, and at one point a Turkish helicopter crashed, killing three crew members.

Turkey and Greece have long been in hardships and rivalry, within close history there have been many instances –diplomatic and military- where we can see these two nations claim the islands in the Aegean Sea. Which makes it unsurprising that the crisis escalated to a serious degree and lasted for several weeks. Mirroring their history, both sides refused to back down and engaged in aggressive behavior. However, the situation was eventually resolved with assistance from international community through diplomatic negotiations and both sides withdrew their forces from the area. The crisis had significant implications for the relationship between Greece and Turkey, which had long been marked by tension and conflict. The crisis further strained relations between the two countries, and it highlighted the potential for conflicts over territorial disputes in the Aegean Sea and reminded the tension between both nations.

The crisis also had implications for regional dynamics in the Mediterranean, particularly in the context of the region's natural gas reserves. The Eastern Mediterranean has become a significant source of natural gas in recent years, with significant reserves located off the coasts of Israel, Cyprus, and Egypt. These reserves have the potential to transform the region's energy landscape, as well as to have broader geopolitical implications. The natural gas discoveries have sparked discussions about the potential for new energy partnerships and cooperation between countries in the region, as well as with European countries. However, the natural gas discoveries have also led to increased tensions between countries in the region, particularly over issues of maritime boundaries and territorial disputes. The Imia Crisis highlighted the potential for conflicts over territorial disputes to impede energy cooperation and development in the region.

In addition to Greece and Turkey, other countries in the region have been involved in the natural gas industry and have been affected by the Imia Crisis. Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Israel, and Egypt have all made claims to portions of the Mediterranean Sea, and there have been ongoing disputes over maritime boundaries and territorial

sovereignty. Furthermore economic interests of the EU in the region have further complicated the geopolitics and relations of the situation. European countries such as France and Italy have been involved in energy exploration and production in the region, notably in Cyprus and Israel. The EU has responded to the tension by establishing organizations such as the Union for the Mediterranean.

However, Turkey has their own interests in the region. One reason for such tensions is that Turkey does not recognize UNCLOS agreement –signed in 1996 by several countries including Greece, an agreement which declares bodies of water within 12 nautical miles of a nation's terrestrial borders their own territory- and instead uses a different method to determine borders. Turkey has been mostly left alone in diplomacy when it comes to the Mediterranean.

Overall, the Imia Crisis and the natural gas reserves in the Mediterranean are topics of ongoing significance and complexity. They involve a wide range of historical, political, economic, and social factors, and they have the potential to shape regional dynamics for years to come.

4. Countries' Policies

Over the past decade substantial natural gas reserves have been discovered in the eastern Mediterranean. In theory, this gas could benefit the countries in the region by satisfying their energy needs and generating export revenues, and help the EU to diversify its energy supplies. It is no surprise then that Egypt, Cyprus, Greece, Turkey, Israel, Lebanon, and the EU authorities all want as large a piece of the pie that they can secure for themselves.

Turkey

Turkey is facing various challenges, with the most significant one being the Cyprus problem that has existed for decades. In 1996, Turkey asserted that it would only abide by international agreements that it considers valid and those that both Turkey and Greece have signed. As a result, Turkey has implemented an assertive policy in the eastern Mediterranean, using military capabilities to enforce its maritime jurisdiction claims against regional states like Greece, Southern Cyprus, and Egypt.

Recently, Turkey has been advancing its naval technology and building a strong navy, including a large shipbuilding program, advanced corvettes, frigates, an amphibious assault ship, combat drones, missiles, and attack helicopters. Turkey has also deployed armed drones in Northern Cyprus to protect its survey ship. This assertive naval policy is similar to the neo-Ottomanism policies, where Turkey is building a road to itself through a leading role and non-involvement.

Some Turkish analysts view the eastern Mediterranean as the geopolitical issue of the 21st century, a chance to challenge treaty settlements made a century ago amid the collapse of the Ottoman empire. Turkey is threatening to send ships to explore for hydrocarbon reserves, but it has not declared war because it would be fighting against the UN if it aligned itself. However, President Erdoğan's actions and rhetoric have provoked an immense backlash from countries such as Egypt, Israel, and Greece.

Turkey mostly relies on imported gas from Iran, Azerbaijan, and Russia to meet its domestic natural gas needs. However, recent offshore discoveries in the Black Sea region will enable Turkey to alleviate some of its natural gas import needs through domestic natural gas once the fields are brought online. Eastern Mediterranean gas could supply Europe via Turkey through the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP), enhancing Turkey's role as a transit country for European gas supplies and helping the EU reduce its dependence on Russian gas.

Turkey's inadequate revision of the treaty of Sèvres in 1923 left it trapped as a landlocked power, despite having 5,000 miles of coastline. Although Turkey imports three-quarters of its energy and relies on Russia for around half of its gas imports, it could still play a role in exploiting eastern Mediterranean gas by offering up its pipeline infrastructure as a route to market.

Turkey's growing naval power and assertive policies in the eastern Mediterranean have been causing tensions with neighboring countries, including Greece, Southern Cyprus, and Egypt. One of the main issues is the decades-old Cyprus problem, which has yet to be resolved.

Turkey has been implementing an assertive policy in the region, relying on military capabilities to enforce its maritime jurisdiction claims, rather than diplomatic talks. In recent years, Turkey has been investing heavily in its navy, with a large shipbuilding program that includes new air defense destroyers, advanced corvettes, frigates, a large mini-aircraft carrier, the amphibious assault ship Anadolu, combat drones, missiles, and attack helicopters. The country has also deployed armed drones to Northern Cyprus to protect its survey ship.

The Blue Homeland doctrine of 2013 encapsulates Turkey's current assertive naval policies in the eastern Mediterranean, which some Turkish analysts see as a chance to challenge treaty settlements made a century ago amid the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. However, these policies have provoked an immense backlash from other actors in the region, such as Egypt, Israel, and Greece.

Turkey's growing naval power and potential as a transit country for natural gas has also led to suggestions that the country could play a significant role in the Southern

Gas Corridor, which would bring Eastern Mediterranean gas to Europe via Turkey. However, this proposal faces various challenges that need to be overcome. If successful, it could enhance Turkey's role as a transit country for European gas supplies and help the EU reduce its dependence on Russian gas.

Despite its significant potential in the natural gas sector, Turkey currently imports three-quarters of its energy and relies on Russia for around half of its gas imports. Recent offshore natural gas discoveries in the Black Sea region provide significant potential for the country's future production, but Turkey will need to overcome various challenges to fully exploit these resources.

Overall, Turkey's growing naval power and potential in the natural gas sector have significant geopolitical implications for the region and beyond. Its assertive policies in the eastern Mediterranean are causing tensions with neighboring countries, and its role as a transit country for natural gas could impact Europe's energy security and its relationship with Russia.

Israel

In recent years, Israel has made significant strides in the development of its own natural gas resources, which has enabled the country to use more natural gas for power generation and industrial production. In fact, Israel was able to meet 60-65 percent of its energy needs through natural gas, and this figure is expected to increase to 70 percent by 2030. However, despite the progress made in the development of natural gas resources, there have been numerous political and regulatory obstacles that have jeopardized or hindered progress in some projects. These obstacles include issues such as the allocation of discovered resources into exports and domestic markets, taxation and administrative uncertainties, and antitrust concerns regarding the monopoly of the two leading companies active in the Israeli upstream sector. Despite these challenges, progress has been made in recent years, and with the approval of the Supreme Court in May 2016, the so-called Natural Gas Framework has been established. This framework is designed to bring gas from deposits in Israel and Cyprus to Greece and Italy via the 'East Med pipeline', which is expected to cost around \$7 billion and could bring 10 billion cubic meters of gas per year to the EU, accounting for around 4 percent of its annual gas consumption.

Israel has also been actively participating in the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, which includes countries such as Egypt, Greece, and Cyprus, among others. This forum aims to create a regional gas market that will promote cooperation and stability in the region, as well as the development of energy resources. With plans to launch a fourth offshore bidding round for natural gas exploration, Israel is also


looking to provide Europe with an alternative source of natural gas other than Russia. This move could further strengthen Israel's position as a key player in the global energy market and promote regional stability and cooperation.

Egypt

Egypt has a more optimistic perspective than other countries in the region . Egypt is the largest liquid fuels producer in the Eastern Mediterranean, producing an average of about 702,000 barrels per day . As production began to decline by 2019 Egypt became in search of maturing fields and new significance . Greece Declining production and booming domestic demand have made the country recently a net gas importer.* Recent discoveries, particularly the Zohr field in 2015 -with 845 bcm of gas in place it is considered as the largest ever gas discovery in the Mediterranean Sea- has radically changed the picture. Ongoing fast-track development program foresees first gas deliveries at the end of 2017, and an estimated peak production of 27 bcm/y by 2019-20.This success, which is regarded as a geological game changer, is stimulating new exploration activity from various major international companies in the country. Despite its support towards Türkiye in the area of economic strategy. Türkiye's behavior provoked Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi and the relationship now has been harmed.

As we see Turkey and Egypt are, respectively, the largest and second-largest liquid fuel consumers in the Eastern Mediterranean Greece, Israel, Jordan, and Lebanon are smaller countries in terms of population and consume relatively less liquid fuels compared with others.

Figure 2. Annual liquid fuels consumption, selected countries in the Eastern Mediterranean, 2012–2021
thousand barrels per day



Saudi Arabia

Türkiye and Saudi Arabia are also assisting each other, which will bring peace to the region. That peace will bring more affordable gas price and the energy prices with

operative pipelines. Saudi Arabia is the world's largest exporter of oil while it does not export gas even though its natural gas reserves amount to nearly 300 trillion cubic feet, making it the largest fifth gas reserve in the world. Saudi government has been exploring ways to start exporting its gas globally,

Cyprus

Cyprus represents the greatest geostrategic challenge of history which makes it an important conflict between Greece and Turkey. Negotiations with the selected bidders for the offshore hydrocarbon exploration licenses for three blocks offered in the last bidding round in 2016 were completed in early March 2017. Approval by the government is expected soon. Despite successful bidding rounds, exploration activities so far have been rather disappointing. To date only one discovery (Aphrodite field, estimated to hold 128 bcm of gas, in December 2011) was made. The final investment decision is hoped to be taken soon. If everything goes well, the start of commercial flows from the fields to domestic and foreign markets are expected in 2020. The discovery of new fields would be a game changer for Cyprus, since the Aphrodite field alone does not meet intentions to be involved in the world market. Which Cyprus now tries to achieve by implementing relationships with the EU and building paths in favor for both as Cyprus has with Lebanon and Israel.

Greece

stronger deterrence means for the Greek side is not only some-thing to be acquired by the maintenance of strong armed forces but also by the empowerment of Greece through new allies. Greece claims that the Turkish allegation that the procedures of the agreement of December 1932 were not completed and that it was not registered with the Secretariat of the League of Nations is invalid. In addition, there are also official maps of other countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, and Italy that include the Imia/Imia islets within Greek territory. Moreover, ownership of Imia/Imia and its ties to the continental shelf and territorial waters could have a great impact on each country's sense of national prestige, honor, and inherent mistrust of the other side. Greece contended that Turkey has no legal standing to contest the demilitarized obligation with regard to the islands that are controlled by the 1974 Paris Peace Treaty, which Turkey is not part of this treaty but Italy. However, the most significant benefit of a Greek-based NATO headquarters is

psychological. The U.S. and NATO are interested in expanding confidence-building measures between Greece and Turkey. represents the most significant confidence-building measure that NATO could have put in place to reinforce its confidence in Greece and, in turn, Greece's continuing commitment to the alliance. An effort by Nato to start technical naval deconfliction talks was delayed after Greece objected to Nato's involvement. The Greek foreign minister, Nikos Dendias, insisted that the talks would start only when the threats stopped. Greece's strategy is to enclose Turkey's coastline in favor of enosis and did not wish to give up, therefore it would be more difficult for Turkey to economically exploit the Mediterranean. The Eastern Mediterranean Natural Gas Pipeline project (Israel-Cyprus-Greece-Italy), could also link Israel and Cyprus to European gas markets. This project has been approved by the EC as a project of common interest, making it eligible for EU funding. Republic of Turkey is a candidate for EU membership and is linked to the EU by an association agreement and customs union. We talk about a country that has Turkish fury, who even used a veto of Turkey's membership.

United States of America

US has a controversial strategy on the Cyprus crisis. While resolving the crisis without using force to be an regulatory of international agreements. US political and regional interest in the region The United States to a certain extent unwillingly became the "mediator" between the two states, peaceful settlement that would not rupture the cohesiveness of the strategic southern flank of NATO. President Lyndon Johnson, in order to avoid a Turkish land-ing in Cyprus, which would have resulted in a Greek-Turkish war, The efforts of preventing the war reached the conclusion that union with Greece would have been the best outcome. However, this was only to be achieved in return for Greece's territorial concessions to Turkey, which the United States was determined not to humiliate. The island would have been retrieved from the status of a nonaligned state and placed within the NATO orbit. The United States fought the symptoms rather than the roots of the problem. Its aim was to keep Greece and Turkey from clashing over Cyprus and harming the NATO flank. The US ally was motivated by its strategic considerations without taking into account the vital interests of each country. Both strove to decrease their dependency on the United States. Greece shifted its foreign policy to Western Europe, and Turkey improved its relations with the Soviet Union and other regional states. The relative ineffectiveness of the world's only superpower in this specific peacekeeping enterprise stems to a large extent from US political considerations.

The Greeks ask from the Americans for support and understanding for their problems; the Turks, on the other hand, think that they can deal with the Greeks by themselves. Ned Price said that "Greece's sovereignty over these (Aegean) islands is not in question" after saying that "we would refer you to specific governments

regarding any deployment of their own defense equipment. then-US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo confirmed US support for Greece

That is not something for us Greece, Israel and Cyprus — the regional entities in the U.S.-sponsored “3+1” cooperation framework — by withdrawing support for the EastMed Pipeline, U.S. investments to integrate eastern Mediterranean and European economies through the sale of natural gas would strengthen Western relations with the littoral states of the eastern Mediterranean and reduce Russia’s ability, of which US has 40 percent dependence. US Ambassador to Greece, Geoffrey Pyatt, support the notion that Greek islands have rights to an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and continental shelf.

European Union

Europe has long been wanting to cut its reliance on Russian gas, and the energy-hungry trading bloc would be an ideal market for eastern Mediterranean natural gas. because of the larger size of their economies and populations, according to World as much as 65 percent of Europe’s imports of oil and natural gas passes through the Mediterranean Like Germany, Italy* is seeking alternative sources. As the war in Ukraine rages on, natural gas prices in Europe have reached record highs. Natural gas developments in the Eastern Mediterranean have the potential to provide economic gains and contribute to energy security in the region and Europe, as well as support European efforts to diversify away from natural gas supplied by the Russian Federation. EU consider bilateral deals with Turkey as Turkey’s role as a transit country for European gas supplies and thereby helping the EU reduce in part,

The following month, The EU threatened to impose sanctions on Turkey over its continued gas exploration in the Eastern Mediterranean.

After the crisis, the “European Commission expressed deep concern over recent developments on Imia. The Commission expressed its full solidarity with Greece, a Member State of the European Union The Commission reminds that the decisions taken by the Council of Ministers on March 6, 1995, which concern customs union with Turkey and which were ratified by the European, were aimed at creating conditions for an upgraded level of relations based on respect for democratic principles, international law, and excluding resorting to force.”⁵ Furthermore the European Parliament, on 15 February 1996, adopted a resolution entitled “On the Provocative Actions and Contestation of Sovereignty Rights by Turkey

China

As an expanding economy and foreign dependent country, getting a cut from mediterranean wealth is among China's intentions. Therefore China has invested heavily in the ports in the Mediterranean that incorporate Israel, Egypt, Turkey, Lebanon and other regional states. Although China is a latecomer to the eastern Mediterranean development but has used its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as a gateway to enter the area. *.China has also distanced itself from Turkey's standoff with some Mediterranean countries over the use of natural resources in the waters surrounding the island of Cyprus. Turkey's policies in the eastern Mediterranean are causing instability. If continued, Turkey's role in the BRI might become suspicious. Currently, China seems to favor Greece for its trade relations with Europe although China and Turkey expected to work together. It is an indisputable fact that having the longest coastline in the Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey stands as a regional power in the Mediterranean whose influence cannot be denied by China. China increase its influence in the region and achieves its economic ambitions while avoiding military conflicts*. Consequently, China's ultimate stance towards Turkey in the region will have significant geopolitical implications. avoiding antagonizing any of the regional actors.

Conclusion

- Disputes in Validity of agreements
- Turkey and Greece psychological dynamics-examples of behavior
- The idea of war
- Development of military technology
- Greece's try to taking advantage Of international power-extension of Turkey in regional cooperation.
- US Mediator-Nato Reputation
- EU strategy to control Turkey and way of impact of occurred crisis.
- International interest in exploiting this resource has waxed and waned along with regional political difficulties.
- For exportation and exploiting Gas Political issues should be solved
- Mediterranean Gas threatens Turkey and Greece to go into a war.

- Europe energy crisis and increment of mediterranean projects
- Multi pipe policy and + increment in investments among mediterranean region.
- Awareness of economic power mediterranean countries have.

Large discoveries since January 2009 and the prospect of substantial hydrocarbons resources waiting to be tapped beneath the eastern Mediterranean waters have opened up a new deep-water province and sparked major international interest. The discovery of hydrocarbon resources presents a rare window of opportunity for regional cooperation, long term energy security and prosperity, it shows a path towards economic development as each regional country wishes. Despite that security challenges come along with ambition to explore reserves as well as perturbed political relations between the countries in the region. These include the persistent conflicts between Turkey and Greece. Disputes have been going on controversial issues in the history of the law of maritime boundary definition. As agreements have been interpreted differently by Greece and Turkey, each country takes a stand along its own confidence and strategy. We see that the history of countries and international empowerment plays a huge role in taken actions. As tension on Imia islands does not increase in one day. Nowadays Turkey-Greece relations are arguably at their worst since 1974. Greece since tries to complete its enosis miss which provokes Türkiye's aggressive strategy in expanding into the Mediterranean sea. With the idea of war that comes up several times, especially Türkiye developed its military competence while Greece improve its international relations. Membership in the EU clear the way for Greece, by offering agreement in countenance of its own member. Considering the energy crisis the EU have been facing, the Mediterranean weld is a rescue and a way of decreasing dependence on Russia. Raising investments 'making on the Mediterranean increases the potential for regional countries as well. Turkey is the main transit corridor along with Israel, Egypt and other low capacity states like Greece and Cyprus. Discoveries make sense if reserves are converted into production capacity. Companies will carry on costly exploration and field development endeavors if they see the ability to commercialize their discoveries with a favorable rate of return consequential because they directly affect an EU member-state. Turkey's military presence will deter foreign companies from carrying out further exploration, and from constructing the East Med pipeline. The other important mediator is US, who de-escalate the tension several times by following impartial policy. The aim was to establish peace between NATO allies to regulate the threat against Soviet Union.

SOLUTIONS:

years have gone by since the Imia crisis, yet it is an incident that remains deeply etched on the collective conscience. The resolution process can certainly be helped by Turkey's current bid to join the EU. membership would not only benefit Turkey but would also benefit Greece politically and economically.

- The more that Greece and Turkey attempt to solve their dispute, the better Turkey's chances are of completely complying with membership conditions and therefore being accepted as a member of the EU. With supporting Turkey's full integration into European institutions there would be a possibility to stabilize the region by reducing long-standing Greek-Turkish tensions,
- American warnings and diplomatic efforts have a critical role in de-escalating the crisis. Looking at examples from historical archives, the United States has the potential, as seen during the Imia/Imia incident, to help achieve a solution that the two countries could not reach by themselves.
- Crisis is an event that influences the dynamics of conflict between parties and therefore needs to be also evaluated by its own. Expected end to this controversy can be achieved by spilling out strategy. By leaving each country a margin to temper its Aggression.
- Turkey and Greece and also underscores that prevention of sudden spillover of crisis depends heavily on the behavior of the political leaders considering the latest situation, entering into negotiations with a view to arrive to an agreement become way more important as well as conclusive.
- Greece claims that the problems with Turkey could be resolved by the deterrence of a strong army. For this reason Greece's agreement on defense cooperation with Russia, Iran, Iraq, Syria and Armenia would be the right decision, considering Greece is way behind compared to Turkey in its military capabilities.
- Another claim that a legal settlement, such as a ruling of the International Court of Justice, is the proper way to come to a solution. Turkey prefers a negotiated settlement achieved out of dialogue between the two countries because she is afraid that a decision by an outside legal party (such as the ICJ) would not fully appreciate Turkish interests.

- Among the other options is to bring Greece's arming of the islands to the UN Security Council as a violation of international agreements. Considering the veto rights of France and the USA, it seems almost impossible for the Security Council to take a decision in favor of Turkey.
- The United States and EU, together with the UN, should continue to work toward resolving disputed EEZs in the region. Avoiding a hot maritime incident is of paramount importance, and the EU, United States, and UN should work together to dissuade* belligerent actions and create platforms conducive to solving problems through negotiation. The EU and the United States should dedicate themselves to a more concerted approach, combining energy and political diplomacy.
- The role Energy security takes in cooperation when the political foundation, or space for cooperation, is already in place; can help clear the doubts in territory and trade security.
- The general principles of international law concerning the exploration and exploitation of gas as well as delimitation of maritime zones are set out in the relevant provisions of the 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS) although Turkey rejects involving by accepting the law, Arrange a multilateral forum between all countries in the region could be a good start to establish a balanced and pragmatic approach.
- Establishing geopolitical frameworks make energy cooperation possible, rather than the other way around which causes fierce competition in gaining economical power that makes neither country profit.
- The action of the private companies involved in the different projects could also push for the sector. Energy companies need a clear economic, legal and administrative framework in order to formalize their investment decisions, attract financing for their projects and start the implementation of their projects.
- The existence of reservoirs overlapping the EEZs could imply a joint exploitation of the field which would require a kind of unitization agreement, but could also generate tensions between the involved countries.

- JDA could implement the crisis: A JDA is an agreement pursuant to which, usually, two states agree to develop and share jointly in agreed proportions the gas found within the overlapping zone. The key to the success of a JDA is for the terms concerning the sharing of resources to be considered equitable by both states.

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