

CSCI-351

Data communication and

Networks


Lecture 17: HTTPS

Warning: This may be hard to understand. Do not lose yourself during the class and keep asking questions




Closed-book Quizzes

Quiz 5 (Closebook)




Quiz 6 (Closebook)




Open-book Quizzes

Quiz 7 (Open-book)




Quiz 8 (Open-book)




Final announcement

- I will put some problems with 30% extra credits (**HUGE**)
- The level of difficulty will be **similar** to that of the midterm



100% at Project 4
80% at Final



100% at Project 4
100% at Final



115% at Project 4
130% at Final
(Hope this happens, seriously)



DNSSEC again...
for your project4

SSL/TLS

- Application-layer protocol for confidentiality, integrity, and authentication between clients and servers
 - Introduced by Netscape in 1995 as the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL)
 - Designed to encapsulate HTTP, hence HTTPS
- Transport Layer Security
 - Defined in an RFC in 1999
 - Supersedes SSL: SSL is known to be insecure and should not be used
- Sits between transport and application layers
 - Thus, applications must be TLS-aware

Goals of TLS

- Confidentiality and integrity: use BofA's public key to negotiate a session key; encrypt all traffic
- Authentication: BofA's cert can be validating by checking Verisign's signature



Let's Talk about Certificates




- Suppose you start a new website and you want TLS encryption
 - You need a certificate. How do you get one?
- Option 1: generate a certificate yourself
 - Use *openssl* to generate a new asymmetric keypair
 - Use *openssl* to generate a certificate that includes your new public key
- Problem?
 - Your new cert is *self-signed*, i.e. not signed by a trusted CA
 - Browsers cannot authenticate your cert to a trusted root CA
 - Users will be shown a scary security warning when they visit your site

Certificate Authorities

- Certificate Authorities (CAs) are the roots of trust in the TLS PKI
 - Symantec, Verisign, Thawte, Geotrust, Comodo, GlobalSign, Go Daddy, DigiCert, Entrust, and hundreds of others
 - Issue signed certs on behalf of third parties
- How do you become a CA?
 1. Create a self-signed root certificate
 2. Get all the major browser vendors to include your cert with their software
 3. Keep your private key secret at all costs
- What is the key responsibility of being a CA?

• Any CA can issue a cert for any domain!
• The only thing that stops me from buying a cert for *google.com* is a manual verification process

Acquiring a Certificate



X.509 Certificate (Part I)

Certificate:

Data:

Version: 3 (0x2)

Serial Number:

0c:00:93:10:d2:06:db:e3:37:55:35:80:11:8d:dc:87

Issuer: who generated this cert? (usually a CA)

Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption

Issuer: C=US, O=DigiCert Inc, OU=www.digicert.com, CN=DigiCert SHA2 Extended Validation Server CA

Validity

Not Before: Apr 8 00:00:00 2014 GMT

Not After : Apr 12 12:00:00 2016 GMT

Certificates expire

Used for revocation

Subject: businessCategory=Private Organization/I.3.6.1.4.1.3II.60.2.1.3=US/I.3.6.1.4.1.3II.60.2.1.2=Delaware/serialNumber=5157550/street=548 4th Street/postalCode=94107, C=US, ST=California, L=San Francisco, O=GitHub, Inc., CN=github.com

Subject Public Key Info:

Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption

Public-Key: (2048 bit)

Modulus:

00:b1:d4:dc:3c:af:fd:f3:4e:ed:c1:67:ad:e6:cb:

GitHub's public key

- Subject: who owns this cert?
- This is GitHub's certificate
- Must be served from github.com

X.509 Certificate (Part 2)

X509v3 extensions:

X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:

DNS:github.com, DNS:www.github.com

Additional DNS names that
may serve this cert

X509v3 CRL Distribution Points:

Full Name:

URL:<http://crl3.digicert.com/sha2-ev-server-g1.crl>

If this cert is revoked, its serial will be in the lists at
these URLs

Full Name:

URL:<http://crl4.digicert.com/sha2-ev-server-g1.crl>

X509v3 Certificate Policies:

Policy: 2.16.840.1.114412.2.1

CPS: <https://www.digicert.com/CPS>

Authority Information Access:

OCSP - URL:<http://ocsp.digicert.com>

This cert's revocation status
may also be checked via OCSP

TLS Connection Establishment



Quick question


- TLS is based on the Transport Layer
 - The layer below domain name service (DNS)
- All message after TLS handshake encrypted
- If one server (with IP address) serves one domain name, it will be trivial
 - What about the server serving multiple domains (virtual hosting?)
- SNI, DNS, ESNI, DNS-over-TLS, and so on.

TLS Authentication


- During the TLS handshake, the client receives a **certificate chain**
 - Chain contains the server's cert, as well as the certs of the signing CA(s)
- The client must **validate** the certificate chain to establish trust
 - i.e. is this chain authentic, correct, cryptographically sound, etc.
- Client-side validation checks
 - Does the server's DNS name match the common name in the cert?
 - E.g. *example.com* cannot serve a cert with common name *google.com*
 - Are any certs in the chain expired?
 - Is the CA's signature cryptographically valid?

How HTTPS Works

How can users truly know with whom they are communicating?



HTTPS: Hierarchical PKI



X.509 Format

Version: 3 (0x2)

Serial Number:

0e:77:76:8a:5d:07:f0:e5:79:59:ca:2a:9d:50:82:b5

Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption

Issuer: C=US, O=DigiCert Inc, OU=www.digicert.com,
CN=DigiCert High Assurance EV CA-1

Validity

Not Before: May 27 00:00:00 2011 GMT

Not After : Jul 29 12:00:00 2013 GMT

Subject: C=US, ST=California, L=San Francisco,
O=GitHub, Inc., CN=github.com

Subject Public Key Info:

Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption

Public-Key: (2048 bit)

Modulus:

00:ed:d3:89:c3:5d:70:72:09:f3:33:4f:1a:72:74:
d9:b6:5a:95:50:bb:68:61:9f:f7:fb:1f:19:e1:da:

X.509 Format

- Real world examples

CA Trustworthiness (I)

- A CA is essentially a trusted third party
 - Certificate signatures are attestations of authenticity for the server and (optionally) the client
 - Remember: trust is bad and should be minimized!
- If a CA mistakenly (or purposefully) signs a certificate for a domain and provides it to a malicious principal, TLS can be subverted
- Not only must we trust root CAs, but also intermediate CAs that have been delegated signing authority

CA Trustworthiness (2)

- Clearly, the CA secret key must be protected at all costs
 - Possession of the CA secret key grants adversaries the ability to sign any domain
 - **Attractive target for adversaries**
- Signatures should only be issued after verifying the identity of the requester
 - Also known as domain validation
 - Should be easy, right?

CA Failures

Issued to: Microsoft Corporation

Issued by: VeriSign Commercial Software Publishers CA

Valid from 1/29/2001 to 1/30/2002

Serial number is 1B51 90F7 3724 399C 9254 CD42 4637 996A

Issued to: Microsoft Corporation

Issued by: VeriSign Commercial Software Publishers CA

Valid from 1/30/2001 to 1/31/2002

Serial number is 750E 40FF 97F0 47ED F556 C708 4EB1 ABFD

- In 2001, VeriSign issued two executable signing certificates to someone claiming to be from Microsoft
 - Could be used to issue untrusted software updates

Comodo

Independent Iranian hacker claims responsibility for Comodo hack

Posts claiming to be from an Iranian hacker responsible for the Comodo hack ...

by Peter Bright - Mar 28 2011, 11:15am EDT

65

1. Hello
- 2.
3. I'm writing this to the world, so you'll know more about me..
- 4.
5. At first I want to give some points, so you'll be sure I'm the hacker:
- 6.
7. I hacked Comodo from InstantSSL.it, their CEO's e-mail address mfpenco@mfpenco.com
8. Their Comodo username/password was: user: gtadmin password: [trimmed]
9. Their DB name was: globaltrust and instantsslcms

The alleged hacker's claim of responsibility on pastebin.com

The hack that resulted in [Comodo creating certificates](#) for popular e-mail providers including Google Gmail, Yahoo Mail, and Microsoft Hotmail has been claimed as the work of an independent Iranian patriot. A [post](#) made to data sharing site pastebin.com by a person going by the handle "comodohacker" claimed responsibility for the hack and described details of the attack. A second [post](#) provided source code apparently reverse-engineered as one of the parts of the attack.

Diginotar

Another fraudulent certificate raises the same old questions about certificate authorities

For the second time this year, Iranian hackers have created a fraudulent ...

by Peter Bright - Aug 29 2011, 11:12pm EDT

42

Earlier this year, an [Iranian hacker](#) broke into servers belonging to a reseller for certificate authority Comodo and issued himself a range of certificates for sites including Gmail, Hotmail, and Yahoo! Mail. With these certificates, he could eavesdrop on users of those mail providers, even if they use SSL to protect their mail sessions.

It's happened again. This time, Dutch certificate authority DigiNotar has issued a fraudulent certificate for google.com and all subdomains. As before, Gmail appears to be the target. The perpetrator also appears to be Iranian, with [reports](#) that the certificate has been used in the wild for man-in-the-middle attacks in that country. The certificate was issued on July 10th, and so could have been in use for several weeks prior to its discovery.


DigiNotar has revoked the certificate, which provides some protection to users (though many applications do not bother checking for revocations). However, the company has so far not disclosed how the certificate was issued in the first place, making it unclear that its integrity has been restored. As a result, Google and Mozilla have both made patches to [Chrome](#) and [Firefox](#) respectively that blacklist the entire certificate authority.

How to handle those situations?

- A certificate has been mis-issued.
 - In the perspective of clients, the certificate seems legit
 - Still valid (not expired)
- Question:
 - How can we protect clients from accepting mis-issued certificates?
 - Revocation


Certificate revocation

What happens when a certificate is no longer valid?



Revocation Check (I)

Certificate Revocation List



Revocation Check (I)

Certificate Revocation List

https://www.rit.edu

USERTrust RSA Certification Authority

InCommon RSA Server CA

www.rit.edu

Extension Subject Alternative Name (2.5.29.17)

Critical NO

DNS Name www.rit.edu

DNS Name rit.edu

Extension Certificate Policies (2.5.29.32)

Critical NO

Policy ID #1 (1.3.6.1.4.1.5923.1.4.3.1.1)

Qualifier ID #1 Certification Practice Statement (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.2.1)

CPS URI https://www.incommon.org/cert/repository/cps_ssl.pdf

Policy ID #2 (2.23.140.1.2.2)

Extension CRL Distribution Points (2.5.29.31)

Critical NO

URI <http://crl.incommon-rsa.org/InCommonRSAServerCA.crl>

Extension Embedded Signed Certificate Timestamp List (1.3.6.1.4.1.11129.2.4.2)

Critical NO

SCT Version 1

Log Key ID EE 4B BD B7 75 CE 60 BA E1 42 69 1F AB E1 9E 66 A3 0F 7E 5F B0 72 D8

Timestamp Monday, August 20, 2018 at 4:35:53 PM Eastern Daylight Time


Signature Algorithm SHA-256 ECDSA

Signature 71 bytes : 30 45 02 21 00 F3 D6 BD ...

```
$ openssl crl -inform DER -text -noout -in InCommonRSAServerCA.crl
```

Revocation Check (2)

Online Certificate Status Protocol



Revocation Check (2)

Online Certificate Status Protocol

https://www.rit.edu

CPS URI https://www.incommon.org/cert/repository/cps_ssl.pur

Policy ID #2 (2.23.140.1.2.2)

Extension CRL Distribution Points (2.5.29.31)
Critical NO
URI <http://crl.incommon-rsa.org/InCommonRSAServerCA.crl>

Extension Embedded Signed Certificate Timestamp List (1.3.6.1.4.1.11129.2.4.2)
Critical NO

SCT Version 1

Log Key ID EE 4B BD B7 75 CE 60 BA E1 42 69 1F AB E1 9E 66 A3 0F 7E 5F B0 72 D8 83 00 C4 7B 89 7A A8 FD CB

Timestamp Monday, August 20, 2018 at 4:35:53 PM Eastern Daylight Time

Signature Algorithm SHA-256 ECDSA

Signature 71 bytes : 30 45 02 21 00 F3 D6 BD ...


Extension Certificate Authority Information Access (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.1)
Critical NO

Method #1 CA Issuers (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.2)
URI http://crt.usertrust.com/InCommonRSAServerCA_2.crt


Method #2 Online Certificate Status Protocol (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1)
URI <http://ocsp.usertrust.com>

```
$ openssl ocsp -issuer cert.pem -serial  
5226810331521645508876562747113126991 -url http://ocsp.usertrust.com  
-header host ocsp.usertrust.com
```

Challenges of Online Certificate Status Protocol




OCSP Stapling




Challenges still remain: Soft failure

Most clients will accept a certificate
even if they are **unable** to obtain revocation information




OCSP Must-Staple

- ✓ No additional latency
- ✓ No privacy issues
- ✓ No soft failure




To support OCSP Must Staple

(I) CA




To support OCSP Must Staple (2) Clients




- ✓ Understand the OCSP Must-Staple extension in the certificate
 - ✓ Present the Certificate Status Request (CSR) to the web servers
Certificate Authority
 - ✓ Reject the certificate if they do not receive OCSP responses
- OCSP Responders

To support OCSP Must Staple



(3) Web servers



- ✓ **(Web server software) must fetch/cache OCSP responses**
- ✓ **(Web server administrators) must configure to use OCSP stapling**



To support OCSP Must Staple




Is the Web Ready for OCSP Must-Staple?




- ✓ Availability
- ✓ Validity
- ✓ Consistency with CRL


Measuring OCSP Responders



Measuring OCSP Responders



Measurement



Oregon (US West)



Virginia (US East)



São Paulo (Brazil)



Paris (France)



Sydney (Australia)




Seoul (Korea)


Scan them every hour
April 25, 2018 ~ September 4, 2018

~ 46 M OCSP requests & responses

(I) Availability




(I) Availability Overview



For 29 OCSP responders, there was at least one measurement client that was never able to make a successful request.

(16: DNS problem, 4: TCP connection errors, 8: HTTP problems, 1: HTTPS Error)


(I) Availability: Geographical Differences



*After we contacted them on August 29th, the issue was fixed at 11pm August 31st.

(I) Availability: Transient Failure


Seoul, Sydney, and Oregon (Asia Pacific)



(I) Availability: Transient Failure (Case-Study)

Seoul, Sydney, and Oregon (Asia Pacific)

Percentage of
successful requests




OCSP Server Name	DNS Records
ocsp.comodoca.com	
ocsp.comodoca4.com	
ocsp.gandi.net	CNAME: ocsp.comodoca.com
ocsp.globessl.com	CNAME: ocsp.comodoca.com
ocsp.incommon-ecc.org	CNAME: ocsp.comodoca.com
ocsp.incommon-igtf.org	NS: ns0.comododns.com.
ocsp.incommon-rsa.org	NS: ns0.comododns.com.
OCSP.intel.com	CNAME: ocsp.comodoca.com
ocsp.marketware.eu	CNAME: ocsp.comodoca.com
ocsp.netsolssl.com	CNAME: ocsp.comodoca.com
ocsp.register.com	CNAME: ocsp.comodoca.com
ocsp.securecore-ca.com	NS: ns0.comododns.com.
ocsp.sgssl.net.	NS: ns0.comododns.com.
ocsp.trustasiassl.com.	NS: ns0.comododns.com.
ocsp.trust-provider.com	CNAME: ocsp.comodoca.com
ocsp.usertrust.com	NS: ns0.comododns.com.

(I) Availability: Impact on the Web

Comodo
down for 2 hours

43 servers from wosign
5 servers from startssl

9 servers
from digicert
16 servers
from ocsp-certum




Availability

OCSP responders are not fully reliable

(2) Validity of the Response


3 servers from postsigum.cz
returning “0” response




Validity

OCSP responses are (mostly) valid

(3) Consistency OCSP vs. CRL



(3) Consistency OCSP vs. CRL



(3) Consistency OCSP vs. CRL

OCSP URL	CRL	# of certificates where the OCSP response is		
		Unknown	Good	Revoked
ocsp.camerfirma.com	crl1.camerfirma.com/ camerfirma_cserverii-2015.crl			
ocsp.quovadisglobal.com	crl.quovadisglobal.com/qvssl3.crl			
ocsp.startssl.com	crl.startssl.com/sca-server1.crl			
ss.symcd.com	ss.symcb.com/ss.crl			
twcasslocsp.twca.com.tw/	sslserver.twca.com.tw/sslserver/ securessl			
ocsp2.globalsign.com/gsalphasha2g2	crl2.alphassl.com/gs/gsalphasha2g2.crl			
ocsp.firmaprofesional.com	crl.firmaprofesional.com/ infraestructura.crl			
...	...			

(3) Consistency

OCSP vs. CRL

OCSP URL	CRL	# of certificates where the OCSP response is		
		Unknown	Good	Revoked
ocsp.camerfirma.com	crl1.camerfirma.com/ camerfirma_cserverii-2015.crl	0	7	369
ocsp.quovadisglobal.com	crl.quovadisglobal.com/qvssl3.crl	0	1	514
"OCSP and PKI Management are <i>two different platforms and are synchronized by means of some DDBB triggers that are failing in some circumstances. Meanwhile CRL management is easier and simple, OCSP should give information about any certificate serial number issued by *** and the amount of information transmitted between them. That's the source of this problem.</i> "	ss.symcb.com/ss.crl sslserver.twca.com.tw/sslserver/ SecureSSL	0	1	28,032
ocsp2.globalsign.com/ gsalphasha2g2	crl2.alphassl.com/gs/ gsalphasha2g2.crl	5,375	0	0
ocsp.firmaprofesional.com	crl.firmaprofesional.com/ infraestructura.crl	11	0	0
...	...	0	0	...

Is the Web Ready for OCSP Must-Staple?



Web server



Browser

- ✓ Fetch and cache OCSP responses
- ✓ Handling errors

Web Server Methodology



(1) Performance

- Prefetch OCSP response

(2) Caching

- Cache OCSP response
- Respect nextUpdate* in cache

(3) Availability

- Retain OCSP response on error

Web Server Administrator Result

	 THE APACHE™ SOFTWARE FOUNDATION	NGINX
Prefetch OCSP response	X	X
Cache OCSP response	✓	✓
Respect nextUpdate in cache	X	✓
Retain OCSP response on error	X	✓

Is the Web Ready for OCSP Must-Staple?




Certificate Authority



Browser

- ✓ Understand the extension
- ✓ Present Certificate Status Request extension
- ✓ Reject the certificate if the response is not provided

Methodology



Methodology and Result

	Desktop Browsers (OS X, Linux, Windows)						Mobile Browsers			
	Chrome 66	Firefox 60	Opera	Safari	IE	Edge	Safari	Chrome	Firefox/ iOS	Firefox/ Android
Request OCSP Response	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Respect OCSP Must-Staple	✗	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Send own OCSP Request	✗	-	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	-

Clients

Clients are largely not yet ready for OCSP Must-Staple

(the additional coding work necessary to support OCSP Must-Staple is likely not too significant)

Conclusion

- Considering OCSP Must-Staple can operate only if each of the principals in the PKI performs correctly.
 - OCSP servers: **not fully reliable**
 - Web server softwares: **not fully support**
 - Browsers: **not fully support**
- But the bright side is
 - **Only a few players** need to take action to make it possible for web server administrators to begin enabling OCSP Must-staple
 - Much wider deployment of OCSP Must-Staple is an **realistic** and **achievable** goal


Some protocols

- HSTS (HTTP-STRICT-TRANSPORT-SECURITY)
 - “Strict-Transport-Security” Header
- HSTS-preloaded list
- HPKP (HTTP Public Key Pinning)
- SNI (Server Name Indication)
- Certificate Transparency
-


Today's another problem of HTTPS

How HTTPS Works

How can users truly know with whom they are communicating?



Fundamental Assumption in HTTPS



Authentication **fundamentally** assumes:


Only  knows 

The PKI in Today's Web

Rare!



The PKI in Today's Web




The PKI in Today's Web

Third-party Hosting Providers


- Content delivery networks
- Web hosting services
- Cloud providers

Varying levels of involvement




But all trusted to deliver content

The PKI in Today's Web



Third-party hosting providers
know their customers' private keys


Example of Key Sharing




Large Saudi Arabian ISP
Secretary of State
of Vermont
Israeli bank

Problems of Key Sharing

1. Complicates the trust model, users don't know who they're really trusting
2. Potential to create centralization of trust
3. Potential to create single point of failure (in terms of management)



Research Questions



How prevalent is the **key sharing**?



What's the **potential vulnerabilities**?



How can we **improve** it?


Scanning All IPv4 Certificates

Dataset	
Period	2013/10/30 ~ 2016/04/30
# of IPs	101,306,358 (Full IPv4 scan)
Certificates	38,514,130
# of Domains	2,552,936

How Prevalent of Key Sharing?




Who Shares the Keys?



**Key sharing is common across the Internet
Economic incentives drives key sharing**


New Attack Targets



Popular hosting services are prime targets for attack

Summary

Whom am I talking with?



- Due to economic incentives, **key sharing** is prevalent in today's web
 - **76.5%** of keys are shared
 - **43.2%** (of top 10K webpages) share the private keys
 - Compromising a single hosting provider could put **60%** of top 1K webpages in danger