

Every Second Counts: Quantifying the Negative Externalities of Cybercrime via Typosquatting

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Goal of This Work

- Understand the harm caused by cybercrime
- Prior studies have focused on monetary losses and data breaches
- An additional dimension is the “loss of user time”

What is Typosquatting?

- Identification and registration of well-known typos for established websites
- Populate typo domains with:
 - i. Competing content
 - ii. Malware
 - iii. Advertisements

Our Contributions

- Develop an intent based method to detect passive typosquatting instances
- Present a harm metric based on user time lost as a result of typosquatting
- Quantify the harm caused by different characterizations of typosquatting


The Datasets

- University HTTP and DNS packet captures
- Enterprise HTTP proxy logs
- Active crawls of typosquatting domain names


Detection of Typosquatting Instances

- To Identify a typo domain we evaluate the conditional probability of a typo website being followed by a request to a similar legitimate website


User Behavior on Encountering a Typo Domain



Accuracy of The Probability Model




Typo Characterization




- 1. Adversarial**
 - Malicious domains
 - Parked with ads
 - Other
- 2. Cooperative**
 - Redirections
- 3. Unregistered**
 - NXDomains

Typosquatting Domain Popularity




Quantifying Harm

Cumulative delays of each typo category



- Adversarial domains have a higher user loss rate, but approximately the same average delays

Delay clustering of adversarial domains by DNS provider



- Significant number of adversarial clusters have lower delays than unregistered domains

Conclusive Findings

- As a result of typosquatting, an individual loses on average, 64 seconds and \$0.29 per capita income per year
- The harm is not worth investing into defensive registrations