# **Introduction to Quantum Computing**

Week 6: Quantum Encryption in Action


# Bernardo Villalba Frías, PhD

b.r.villalba.frias@hva.nl

**Quantum Talent and Learning Center** Amsterdam University of Applied Sciences

> Week 6 13<sup>th</sup> June 2025

## Cryptography



- "Secure communication and data in the presence of third parties"
- Symmetric-key encryption
- Asymmetric-key encryption


## **Quantum Key Distribution**

- Key exchange protocol between two remote users via:
  - An *insecure* quantum channel:
    - An adversary can perform arbitrary quantum operations on transmitted quantum systems
  - An authenticated classical channel:
    - Messages can be read by the adversary but not modified
- Proven to be information-theoretically secure (under certain assumptions)
- The exchanged keys can be used to implement a classical private–key cryptosystem
- Security of key is based on principles of quantum information
  - No-cloning theorem
  - Information gain implies disturbance

# The BB84 Protocol

### Requirements

- Assuming that the quantum theory is correct...
- Eight step protocol which requires Alice and Bob to:



 Operate within secured locations using only trusted devices and adhering strictly to the protocol

- Have true random number generators
- Share a classical authenticated channel
- Share a quantum channel
- Prepare and measure in the computational (Z) and X basis



Bob

- Alice randomly chooses a basis  $B_i \in \{X, Z\}$  and, randomly and privately, picks a bit  $b_i \in \{0, 1\}$
- Alice prepares qubit  $|q_i\rangle$  according to:

$$egin{array}{c|c|c|c} B_i & b_i & | & |\psi_i
angle \ \hline Z & 0 & | & |0
angle \ Z & 1 & |1
angle \ X & 0 & |+
angle \ X & 1 & |-
angle \end{array}$$

• Alice sends the resulting qubit  $|q_i\rangle$  to Bob

- Bob measures qubit  $|q_i\rangle$  in a basis  $\widetilde{B}_i \in \{X, Z\}$  that he picks randomly. He privately records the measurement outcome  $m_i$
- Alice and Bob repeat the previous steps a large number of times (N)

- Alice and Bob publicly announce the N bases they have each used. Importantly, Alice does not reveal her  $b_i$  nor does Bob reveal his  $m_i$
- Alice and Bob sift out the  $M \leq N$  runs in which they used the same basis  $(B_i = \widetilde{B}_i)$  and throw away the rest.

• Alice and Bob randomly pick a subset of the sifted pairs  $(b_i, m_i)$  and compare them using a classical communication channel. If the outcomes correlate perfectly, they can confidently use the remaining ones as a sifted key!

Alice:	$B_i$ $b_i$ $q_i$	Z X (1) (1)  1)  -)	Z X (0) (0)  0)  +)	X (0)  + )	X (0)  +
Bob:	$B_i$ $m_i$ $q_i$	Z X (1) (1)  1)  ->	Z X 0 0 10  +>	X (0)  + )	X (0)  +

Sifted key:

#### **Performance**

• Randomness in selecting the basis  $B_i$  and  $\widetilde{B}_i$  would ensure a 75% of correctness in the message

$$\{B_i, b_i\} \rightarrow \begin{cases} B_i = \widetilde{B}_i & 50\% \\ B_i \neq \widetilde{B}_i & \begin{cases} b_i = m_i & 25\% \Rightarrow 75\% \\ b_i \neq m_i & 0\% \end{cases}$$

- However, when  $B_i \neq \widetilde{B}_i$ , it is just "chance"
- ⇒ better be safe
- Eavesdroppers have to randomly pick a basis  $\overline{B_i}$ , hence disturbance is introduced

### Post-processing

- ullet To detect an eavesdropper with probability 99.9999% ightarrow need to compare 72 bits
- As a post-processing step, Alice and Bob apply additional operations on the remaining bits to obtain a shared private key:
  - Information reconciliation (e.g. cascade protocol)
  - Privacy amplification (e.g. hash function)

#### **Characteristics**

- Limited quantum complexity
  - Preparation to zero state, Pauli X gate, Hadamard gate, and measurement in the computational basis.
- Secure
  - Key is truly random (generated by Alice)
  - Eavesdroppers can be detected

# Thank you

Thank you!