Security Event Analysis

Introduction

This analysis investigates security events derived from authentication logs collected across a hybrid Windows/Linux environment. The logs were analyzed for suspicious behavior such as brute-force attacks, logins from high-risk geolocations, and credential anomalies. Cross-correlation of logs enabled detection of sophisticated multi-step intrusion scenarios.

Implementation Steps

1. Log Sources Analyzed

- Windows Event Logs (Winlogbeat ingestion)
- Linux Syslog Authentication Logs (Filebeat ingestion)
- Web Access Logs (mock data for web login simulation)

2. Interpretation Methodology

- Events were parsed into fields: timestamp, event type, username, source IP, geo-location, user-agent, and message.
- Used Kibana and Elasticsearch queries to:
 - O Group events by username and source IP.
 - Identify failed and successful authentication patterns.
 - Detect logins from suspicious countries.
 - Analyze anomalies like login attempts with expired credentials or unusual user agents.

Analysis and Findings

Example 1: Authentication Failures (Windows Event Log Analysis)

• Events Identified:

 authentication_failure for user it_support from North Korea and Iran.

• Annotated Log Excerpt:

```
json
CopyEdit

{
    "timestamp": "2025-04-28T11:51:28.408895Z",
    "event": "authentication_failure",
    "username": "it_support",
    "source_ip": "198.51.100.24",
    "geo_location": "North Korea",
    "message": "Brute-force attack detected"
    }
}
```

• Interpretation:

- Login attempts from sanctioned countries.
- O Pattern indicates brute-force attack attempts, based on rapid and repeated failures.

Example 2: Successful Login from High-Risk Geo (Linux Syslog Analysis)

- Events Identified:
 - authentication_success for root from Iran and guest123 from China.
- Annotated Log Excerpt:

```
json
CopyEdit

{
    "timestamp": "2025-04-24T10:04:28.408895Z",
    "event": "authentication_success",
```

```
"username": "guest123",
"source_ip": "45.67.23.89",
"geo_location": "China",
"message": "Failed login attempt with suspicious user
agent"
}
```

• Interpretation:

- O Success after a failed attempt hints at a password guess or credential stuffing.
- Suspicious user-agent (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) used during access.

Example 3: Suspicious Web Access (Web Access Logs - Mock Data)

• Mock Event: json

```
CopyEdit

{
    "timestamp": "2025-04-28T12:20:00Z",
    "event": "web_login_attempt",
    "username": "ceo_login",
    "source_ip": "8.8.8.8",
    "geo_location": "Private IP",
    "user_agent": "Python-requests/2.25",
    "message": "Suspicious automated login detected"
}
```

• Interpretation:

- O Automated login attempt simulating API exploitation.
- o Originates outside regular VPN/protected infrastructure.

Correlation Between Log Sources

Scenario: Credential Theft Leading to Privileged Access

Timeline	Event
2025-04-22T05:48 :28Z	Multiple authentication failures for it_support from China (Windows logs).
2025-04-26T13:02 :28Z	Successful login for it_support from a different suspicious IP (Linux syslog).
2025-04-28T01:17 :28Z	Unauthorized privileged access by root from North Korea (web access mock).

Conclusion from Correlation:

- Attacker brute-forced user credentials across platforms.
- Later leveraged valid credentials to access root systems across OS types.
- Attack path shows lateral movement from initial phishing/brute-force to root escalation.

Incident Detection Scenario: Full Event Timeline

Attack Chain Reconstruction:

1. Initial Breach:

• Authentication failures targeting it support account from foreign IPs.

2. Credential Theft:

O Successful it support login from untrusted region (Vietnam/China).

3. Privilege Escalation:

• root successful login from same IP block used previously for failed attempts.

4. Command-and-Control Setup (Mock):

O Unusual outbound traffic detected to external IP (noted in separate mock network logs).

Timeline Chart:

```
sql  
CopyEdit  
Day 1 \rightarrow Failed logins \rightarrow Day 2 \rightarrow Successful suspicious login \rightarrow Day 3 \rightarrow Root escalation
```

Alert Triage Process

Step	Action
Initial Detection	Detection rule triggered for multiple authentication failures (>5 failures
Severity	HIGH — privileged accounts targeted, logins from blacklisted countries.
False Positive Identification	Cross-checked user location history (user normally operates from US); foreign logins were highly anomalous.
Escalation	Immediate escalation to Tier-2 SOC analysts due to privilege level
Containment	Account lockout initiated, VPN credentials rotated, IP address blacklisting

Conclusion

This investigation utilized multi-source log analysis to detect, correlate, and respond to sophisticated unauthorized access attempts. Proper log correlation between Windows, Linux, and web access environments revealed a coordinated attack chain from brute-force attempts to privilege escalation.

Triage and severity scoring prioritized alerts for swift escalation, minimizing potential impact.