Andrew A. Tai

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Education

Ph.D. Economics, UC Berkeley, 2018-present
(expected graduation 05/2024)

B.A. Economics & Applied Mathematics, UC Berkeley, 2015
with Highest Honors, Phi Beta Kappa

Research Interests

Primary: Matching, market design
Secondary: Networks, game theory

Working Papers

"Revealed Preferences of One-Sided Matching." [pdf]

Abstract: Consider the object allocation (one-sided matching) model of Shapley and Scarf (1974). When final allocations are observed but agents' preferences are unknown, when might the allocation be in the core? This is a one-sided analogue of the model in Echenique, Lee, Shum, and Yenmez (2013). I build a model in which the strict core is testable – an allocation is "rationalizable" if there is a preference profile putting it in the core. In this manner, I develop a theory of the revealed preferences of one-sided matching. I study rationalizability in both non-transferrable and transferrable utility settings. In the non-transferrable utility setting, an allocation is rationalizable if and only if: whenever agents with the same preferences are in the same potential trading cycle, they receive the same allocation. In the transferrable utility setting, an allocation is rationalizable if and only if: there exists a price vector supporting the allocation as a competitive equilibrium; or equivalently, it satisfies a cyclic monotonicity condition. The proofs leverage simple graph theory and combinatorial optimization and tie together classic theories of consumer demand revealed preferences and competitive equilibrium.

"House-Swapping with Objective Indifferences." [pdf]

Work in Progress

Why Do Legislators Form Links? Network Analysis on the House (with Kevin Dano and Will Sandholtz)

Pre-PhD Publications

"Measuring the Effects of Dollar Appreciation on Asia: A FAVAR Approach" (with Zheng Liu and Mark Spiegel). 2017. *Journal of International Money and Finance.*

"International Transmission of Japanese Monetary Shocks under Low and Negative Interest Rates: A Global FAVAR Approach" (with Mark Spiegel). 2019. *Pacific Economic Review.*

References

Haluk Ergin
Economics, UC Berkeley
hie@berkeley.edu

Chris Shannon
Economics, UC Berkeley
cshannon@berkeley.edu

Federico Echenique
Economics, UC Berkeley
fede@econ.berkeley.edu

Shachar Kariv
Economics, UC Berkeley
kariv@berkeley.edu

Teaching
As Teaching Assistant (GSI) at UC Berkeley:
- Game Theory in the Social Sciences, ECON C110
  - Fall '19, Fall '20
- Labor Economics, ECON 152
  - Spring '20
- Advanced Economic Theory, ECON 104
  - Spring '21
- Microeconomic Theory (PhD first year sequence), ECON 201A/B
  - Fall '21, Spring '22, Fall '22

Outstanding GSI Award recipient (2022-2023 AY)

Conferences & Presentations

2022 – CLIMB Retreat, UC Berkeley

Research Experience

Research Assistant, for David Card, Summer 2019

Research Assistant, for Stefano DellaVigna, 2017-2018

Research Associate, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 2015-2017
    (for Mark Spiegel, Zheng Liu, and Fernanda Nechio)