



CloudNativeCon

Europe 2022

WELCOME TO VALENCIA





CRI-O: Secure, Performant, and Boring as Ever!

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What is CRI-0?





- OCI based Kubernetes runtime
- Supports all OCI based container images, runtimes, and registries
- Balance stability and features
- Focus on Kubernetes
- Focus on security

A Few Updates



- CRI v1alpha2 to v1
 - Support for both implementations
- Reduce CPU overhead of golang GC
- Sysctl CVE
 - https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2022-0811



For many releases, conmon was the desired OCI runtime (runc, crun) monitor:

https://github.com/containers/conmon

- Little helper tool to ensure communication between CRI-O and OCI runtime
- Takes care of container creation and process cleanup upon termination
- Provides endpoints for executing processes and attaching to containers
- Writes container log files for Kubernetes
- Fulfills use cases for Podman



conmon is designed to have the lowest possible memory footprint

Some drawbacks of conmon:

- It's written in C and therefore finding maintainers is hard
- The main interface to interact with conmon is the command line (CLI)
- Adding new features increases technical debt
- It still has runtime dependencies like glib, which makes static linking hard




We're happy to announce the successor of conmon, conmon-rs!

- Completely new software architecture
- Utilizing Rust and the asynchronous tokio runtime: https://tokio.rs
- Targeting to keep the memory usage (vmrss) as low as possible
- Supporting multiple containers (Pods) in one instance
- Re-engineering in-container process execution (exec)
- Providing an extensible API and golang client



An API between Rust and golang?





Cap'n Proto is faster than protobuf and smaller than a gRPC runtime (https://grpc.io)

```
struct CreateContainerRequest {
19
            id @0 :Text;
20
            bundlePath @1 :Text;
21
            terminal @2 :Bool;
22
            exitPaths @3 :List(Text);
23
             logDrivers @4 :List(LogDriver);
24
25
26
        struct LogDriver {
27
             type @0 :Type;
28
            path @1 :Text;
29
30
            enum Type {
31
                 # The CRI logger, requires `path` to be set.
32
                 containerRuntimeInterface @0;
33
34
35
36
        struct CreateContainerResponse {
37
             containerPid @0 :UInt32;
38
39
40
        createContainer @1 (request: CreateContainerRequest) -> (response: CreateContainerResponse);
41
```



- Cap'n Proto allows us to provide clients for multiple languages
- It trims the CLI to only require a runtime (like runc) and directory for the state handling
- Allows us to use its streaming capabilities rather than using sockets for attach

conmon-rs is not ready for production usage yet


- Working on the integration into CRI-O, because for that it's already feature-complete
- Following up to make it ready for Podman (https://podman.io)

https://github.com/containers/conmon-rs

SELinux and Kubernetes: A Primer



seLinuxOptions have the following sub fields:



SELinux and Kubernetes: A Primer



- The provided SELinux label will be passed 1:1 from the kubelet to the container runtime (CRI-O)
- CRI-O will use the data on sandbox and container creation to pass it down to the underlying storage library: (https://github.com/containers/storage or c/storage)
 - o c/storage will generate a new process and file (mount) label used within that sandbox
 - The process label will be used for the container process
 - The mount label will be used for the rootfs and volume mounts (if supported)
 - Note: the mount label will only be added to a volume in the volume plugin requests it.
 hostPath volumes do not request the path be relabeled.

```
securityContext:
    seLinuxOptions: > k exec -it test-pod -- ls -Z /etc/os-release
    level: s0:c3
```

SELinux and Kubernetes: A Primer



- There is a special type available for Super Privileged Containers called spc_t
 - Basically disables SELinux for the container or pod
- spc_t is almost similar to unconfined_t, except:
 - container runtimes are allowed to transition to spc_t
 - confined processes can communicate with sockets using spc_t
- Please don't run unconfined containers if not absolutely necessary.
- Distributing SELinux policies / profiles can be done using the security-profiles-operator:
 - https://sigs.k8s.io/security-profiles-operator


The Problem: Volume Relabeling

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 CRI-O sometimes can't relabel volume in time.

 Kubelet must cap request with a time limit.

 Kubelet and CRI-O bicker trying to create the specified container.



(No daemons were hurt in the making of this presentation)







- Container must have a process label that can access the volume.
- Volume must be labeled to prevent other containers from accessing.
- Relabel as few times as can be trusted
 - Allow timely starts/restarts of containers.



"The Sleeper - Edgar Allan Poe" by jumpinjimmyjava is licensed under CC BY 2.0

Solution #1: Conditionally Skip if Correct



If the label is already correct, and the container is explicitly allowed, skip the relabel

• Pros:

- Secure: Container is still confined.
- Workload-defined: Can be enabled for specific containers that need it.
- Restart-friendly: If the container is restarted, the label doesn't need to be reapplied.
- Pod-friendly: If multiple containers in a pod try to access the volume, the relabel only needs to happen once.
- Optimizable: Volume can be labeled ahead of time

Cons:

- Label has to happen once. If done by CRI-O, timeouts can be incurred.
- If a file in the volume, but not the top level, is relabeled, the container won't have access.

Solution #2: Always Skip if 'spc_t'



Never attempt the relabel if the container's label is 'spc_t'

- Pros:
 - Fastest: never label, never timeout!
 - Easy: No configuration required.
 - Portable: Add any volume with no overhead.

Cons:

 Not secure: the container is privileged in the eyes of SELinux



Efficiency vs Security







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Imagine a world in which...

There is no relabel, only an initial label on mount, that the kubelet does itself.

(see github.com/kubernetes/enhancements/issues/1710 for more information)



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Enabling Seccomp by Default



- Container security is multi-layered
 - The more layers in the onion, the more secure you are
 - Seccomp restricts the syscalls that a container can make



- State of seccomp in k8s
 - Default is Unconfined (no seccomp!!!)
 - SeccompDefault Feature gate is alpha
 - Blog https://kubernetes.io/blog/2021/08/25/seccomp-default/

Enabling Seccomp by Default



- CRI-O defaulting to seccomp in 1.24
 - seccomp_use_default_when_empty = true
 - Working with upstream k8s to graduate SeccompDefault to beta and GA

Looking Forward



- Multi storage support
 - Selection based on runtime classes
- Cosign verification
- Checkpoint & Restore
 - https://github.com/kubernetes/enhancements/pull/1990
- OpenTelemetry traces





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Thank you for listening to our talk!

