

# When Machines Pass the Test: Professional Certification Signaling Erosion Under AI Disruption

Wei-Lun Cheng<sup>a</sup>, Daniel Wei-Chung Miao<sup>a,\*</sup>, Guang-Di Chang<sup>a</sup>

<sup>a</sup>*Graduate Institute of Finance, National Taiwan University of Science and Technology, Taipei, 10607, Taiwan*

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## Abstract

Professional certifications such as the Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA) designation have long served as credible signals in financial labor markets, enabling employers to screen for scarce cognitive abilities. We develop a Modified Spence Signaling Model that incorporates an AI replication cost parameter to analyze how large language models (LLMs) erode certification signaling value. Our central theoretical result—the Partial Signaling Collapse Theorem—demonstrates that signaling erosion is *selective*, not total: certification loses its screening power over formalizable abilities (formula recall, rule application, algorithmic computation) where AI replication costs approach zero, but retains signaling value for tacit abilities (ethical judgment, stakeholder reasoning, fiduciary decision-making) that resist low-cost AI replication. Integrating the Autor et al. [3] task-based framework with Becker [4] human capital theory, we map the CFA curriculum onto a six-dimensional ability taxonomy and derive a tipping-point condition: when the fraction of AI-replicable abilities exceeds a critical threshold  $\alpha^*$ , the separating equilibrium collapses into pooling. We provide empirical support through a controlled option bias experiment ( $N = 1,032$  CFA-style questions): a frontier LLM achieves 82.6% accuracy with multiple-choice options versus 80.6% without, a difference of +1.9 percentage points that is not statistically significant (McNemar’s test with Yates’ correction,  $p = 0.251$ ). This result demonstrates that AI performance on formalizable financial tasks

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\*Corresponding author

*Email addresses:* d11018003@mail.ntust.edu.tw (Wei-Lun Cheng),  
miao@mail.ntust.edu.tw (Daniel Wei-Chung Miao), gchang@mail.ntust.edu.tw  
(Guang-Di Chang)

is largely independent of the option signal structure—implying that the multiple-choice format, which dominates certification assessment, provides negligible screening value against AI replication. Our analysis yields concrete policy implications: certification bodies must rebalance assessment toward AI-resistant competencies—context-dependent judgment, interpersonal reasoning, and responsibility-bearing decision-making—to preserve institutional credibility in the age of artificial intelligence.

*Keywords:* signaling theory, professional certification, artificial intelligence, human capital, CFA, labor market screening, large language models

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## 1. Introduction

The Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA) designation has served as one of the most widely recognized professional certifications in global finance for over six decades. With a historically low pass rate—averaging approximately 43% for Level I and declining to roughly 50% for Level III—the certification imposes substantial costs on candidates in terms of time, effort, and foregone earnings [7]. In the classical labor economics framework of Spence [11], these costs are precisely what make the CFA credential a credible signal: because high-ability workers find it less costly to obtain the certification, the CFA charter sustains a separating equilibrium in which employers can distinguish between ability types.

The rapid advancement of large language models (LLMs) poses a fundamental challenge to this signaling mechanism. Recent studies demonstrate that frontier AI systems achieve performance levels on standardized financial examinations that rival or exceed median human candidates. Callanan et al. [6] show that GPT-4 passes the CFA Level I and Level II examinations, while domain-adapted models such as BloombergGPT [13] and FinDAP’s LlamaFin [9] demonstrate strong performance on financial knowledge benchmarks. When an AI system can replicate the cognitive skills that a certification is designed to measure—at near-zero marginal cost—the fundamental economic logic of signaling is disrupted.

This paper asks a precise question: *Does AI replication of certified cognitive abilities destroy the signaling value of professional certification, and if so, how?* We argue that the answer is neither a simple yes nor a simple no. Instead, we develop a theoretical framework demonstrating that signaling

erosion is *partial and selective*—concentrated on formalizable abilities while sparing tacit competencies that resist cheap AI replication.

Our contribution is threefold. First, we extend the Spence [11] signaling model by introducing a multi-dimensional ability space and an AI replication cost function, deriving a Partial Signaling Collapse Theorem. Second, integrating the Autor et al. [3] task-based framework with Becker [4] human capital theory, we map the CFA curriculum onto a six-dimensional ability taxonomy and derive a tipping-point condition for equilibrium collapse. Third, we provide empirical evidence through a controlled option bias experiment ( $N = 1,032$  CFA-style questions), demonstrating that AI performance on formalizable tasks is format-invariant—supporting our prediction that signaling erosion reflects genuine knowledge replication, not assessment format exploitation.

## 2. Theoretical Foundations

Our framework integrates three theoretical streams. First, the canonical signaling model of Spence [11] establishes that professional credentials sustain separating equilibria only when the cost of acquiring the signal is negatively correlated with ability. A consistent finding across the signaling literature [10, 12, 5] is that signals lose value when the cost differential between types shrinks—precisely the dynamic that AI replication introduces.

Second, Becker [4] distinguishes general from specific human capital. Professional certifications primarily certify general human capital—codifiable knowledge portable across employers—making them inherently vulnerable to AI replication. The human capital framework predicts a compositional shift: general cognitive skills depreciate as AI provides them cheaply, while tacit skills appreciate in relative terms [8].

Third, the task-based framework of Autor et al. [3] classifies workplace activities into routine cognitive, routine manual, non-routine analytical, and non-routine interactive tasks, showing that computerization substitutes for routine tasks while complementing non-routine ones. Acemoglu and Restrepo [1] extend this to general equilibrium. Critically, LLMs represent a qualitative shift: unlike earlier automation, they can perform certain *non-routine analytical tasks* previously considered resistant to computerization, expanding the automatable frontier with novel implications for certification signaling.

Empirically, Callanan et al. [6] show that GPT-4 achieves pass-level performance on CFA Levels I and II, while domain-adapted models such as BloombergGPT [13] and FinDAP’s Llama-Fin [9] further close the gap through targeted post-training. These results motivate our central question: when AI replicates certified cognitive abilities at low cost, what are the equilibrium implications for certification’s labor market role?

### 3. A Modified Spence Signaling Model with AI Replication

#### 3.1. Setup

Consider a labor market with asymmetric information. There is a continuum of workers, each characterized by an unobservable ability type  $\theta \in \{\theta_L, \theta_H\}$ , where  $\theta_H > \theta_L > 0$ . The prior probability that a worker is high-ability is  $\lambda \in (0, 1)$ . Workers can invest in a professional certification  $e \in \{0, 1\}$  (e.g., the CFA charter) at cost  $c(\theta)$ , where the single-crossing property holds:  $c(\theta_H) < c(\theta_L)$ .

We depart from the standard model by introducing a *multi-dimensional ability space*. Let certification  $e$  attest to a vector of  $K$  distinct skill dimensions:

$$\mathbf{s} = (s_1, s_2, \dots, s_K) \in \mathbb{R}_+^K \quad (1)$$

where each  $s_k$  represents a specific cognitive ability that the certification is designed to measure and signal. In the context of the CFA, these dimensions include declarative knowledge ( $s_1$ ), algorithmic computation ( $s_2$ ), analytical decomposition ( $s_3$ ), integrative judgment ( $s_4$ ), normative/ethical reasoning ( $s_5$ ), and stakeholder reasoning ( $s_6$ ).

**Assumption 1** (Employer Valuation). *The employer’s valuation of a certified worker is a weighted sum over skill dimensions:*

$$V(\mathbf{s}) = \sum_{k=1}^K w_k \cdot s_k, \quad \text{where } \sum_{k=1}^K w_k = 1, \quad w_k > 0 \quad \forall k. \quad (2)$$

The weights  $w_k$  reflect the market’s assessment of each skill’s contribution to worker productivity. In the pre-AI equilibrium, these weights are relatively stable and determined by the technology of production.

### 3.2. The AI Replication Cost Function

The key innovation of our model is the introduction of an *AI replication cost function* that captures the cost at which an artificial intelligence system can replicate each skill dimension.

**Definition 1** (AI Replication Cost). *For each skill dimension  $s_k$ , define the AI replication cost  $c_{AI}(s_k) \geq 0$  as the marginal cost at which an AI system can produce output of equivalent quality to a human worker possessing ability  $s_k$ . The vector of AI replication costs is:*

$$\mathbf{c}_{AI} = (c_{AI}(s_1), c_{AI}(s_2), \dots, c_{AI}(s_K)). \quad (3)$$

**Assumption 2** (Heterogeneous Replicability). *AI replication costs are heterogeneous across skill dimensions. Specifically, for the CFA ability space, there exists a partition  $\{1, \dots, K\} = \mathcal{F} \cup \mathcal{T}$  into formalizable abilities ( $\mathcal{F}$ ) and tacit abilities ( $\mathcal{T}$ ) such that:*

$$c_{AI}(s_k) \rightarrow 0 \quad \forall k \in \mathcal{F}, \quad c_{AI}(s_k) \gg 0 \quad \forall k \in \mathcal{T}. \quad (4)$$

This partition follows directly from the Autor et al. [3] task-based framework. Formalizable abilities ( $\mathcal{F}$ ) correspond to routine cognitive tasks and the subset of non-routine analytical tasks that are amenable to pattern-based replication by LLMs. Tacit abilities ( $\mathcal{T}$ ) correspond to non-routine interactive tasks that require embodied judgment, ethical deliberation, and contextual reasoning that resists low-cost AI replication.

### 3.3. AI Replicability Index

To formalize the degree of AI vulnerability for each skill dimension, we define:

**Definition 2** (AI Replicability). *The AI replicability of skill dimension  $s_k$  is:*

$$\rho_k = 1 - \frac{c_{AI}(s_k)}{\bar{c}_k} \quad (5)$$

where  $\bar{c}_k$  is the human acquisition cost of skill  $s_k$  (i.e., the investment required for a human to develop this ability through training and education). When  $\rho_k \rightarrow 1$ , the skill is fully replicable by AI; when  $\rho_k \rightarrow 0$ , the skill remains a human comparative advantage.

### 3.4. Signaling Value Under AI Replication

In the classical Spence model, certification generates signaling value because it credibly communicates unobservable ability. AI replication disrupts this mechanism by providing an alternative, low-cost source of certified-equivalent output. We formalize this as follows.

**Definition 3** (Effective Signaling Value). *The effective signaling value of certification  $e$  under AI replication is:*

$$\Sigma(\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{c}_{AI}) = \sum_{k=1}^K w_k \cdot s_k \cdot (1 - \rho_k) = \sum_{k=1}^K w_k \cdot s_k \cdot \frac{c_{AI}(s_k)}{\bar{c}_k} \quad (6)$$

The intuition is direct: the signaling contribution of skill  $s_k$  is discounted by the factor  $(1 - \rho_k)$ , which captures the residual scarcity of that skill after accounting for AI replication. When  $\rho_k = 1$ , the skill contributes zero signaling value because AI provides it at negligible cost; when  $\rho_k = 0$ , the full signaling value is preserved.

### 3.5. Modified Employer Beliefs

Under AI disruption, the employer must consider whether certified skills *continue to differentiate* the worker from an AI-augmented uncertified worker. The employer's *residual information gain* from observing  $e = 1$  is:

$$\Delta I(e) = \sum_{k=1}^K w_k \cdot [\mathbb{E}[s_k \mid e = 1, \theta_H] - \mathbb{E}[s_k \mid \text{AI}]] \cdot (1 - \rho_k) \quad (7)$$

When  $\rho_k \rightarrow 1$  for skill  $k$ , the term  $(1 - \rho_k) \rightarrow 0$ , and that skill dimension no longer contributes to the employer's information gain. The certification becomes informationally *equivalent to noise* along that dimension.

## 4. Equilibrium Analysis: Partial Signaling Collapse

### 4.1. Pre-AI Separating Equilibrium

In the standard Spence [11] framework, a separating equilibrium exists when the following incentive compatibility constraints are satisfied:

$$\text{High type: } V(\mathbf{s}) - c(\theta_H) \geq V_0 \quad (8)$$

$$\text{Low type: } V_0 \geq V(\mathbf{s}) - c(\theta_L) \quad (9)$$

where  $V_0$  is the market wage for uncertified workers. The separating equilibrium requires  $c(\theta_H) < V(\mathbf{s}) - V_0 < c(\theta_L)$ : the wage premium from certification exceeds the cost for high types but not for low types.

#### 4.2. AI-Modified Equilibrium Conditions

Under AI replication, the employer's willingness to pay for certified skills changes. The effective wage premium from certification becomes:

$$\Pi_{AI} = \Sigma(\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{c}_{AI}) - V_0 = \sum_{k=1}^K w_k \cdot s_k \cdot (1 - \rho_k) - V_0 \quad (10)$$

The modified incentive compatibility constraints are:

$$\text{High type: } \Pi_{AI} \geq c(\theta_H) \quad (11)$$

$$\text{Low type: } c(\theta_L) \geq \Pi_{AI} \quad (12)$$

**Remark 1.** As  $\rho_k \rightarrow 1$  for an increasing number of skill dimensions,  $\Pi_{AI}$  declines monotonically. The separating equilibrium is sustained only as long as  $\Pi_{AI} > c(\theta_H)$ . When AI replication costs fall sufficiently across enough dimensions, the wage premium drops below the cost of certification even for high types, and the separating equilibrium collapses.

#### 4.3. The Partial Signaling Collapse Theorem

We now state the central theoretical result of this paper.

**Proposition 1** (Partial Signaling Collapse). *Let  $\mathcal{F}$  and  $\mathcal{T}$  denote the sets of formalizable and tacit skill dimensions, respectively, with  $|\mathcal{F}| + |\mathcal{T}| = K$ . Suppose AI replication costs satisfy Assumption 2:  $\rho_k \rightarrow 1$  for all  $k \in \mathcal{F}$  and  $\rho_k \approx 0$  for all  $k \in \mathcal{T}$ . Then the effective signaling value converges to:*

$$\Sigma(\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{c}_{AI}) \rightarrow \Sigma_{\mathcal{T}} \equiv \sum_{k \in \mathcal{T}} w_k \cdot s_k \quad (13)$$

*That is, the signaling value of certification collapses to the weighted sum of tacit abilities only. Signaling erosion is partial: it eliminates the informational content of formalizable skills while preserving the signaling value of tacit skills.*

*Proof.* By Definition 3, the effective signaling value is:

$$\Sigma(\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{c}_{\text{AI}}) = \sum_{k \in \mathcal{F}} w_k s_k (1 - \rho_k) + \sum_{k \in \mathcal{T}} w_k s_k (1 - \rho_k).$$

Under Assumption 2,  $\rho_k \rightarrow 1$  for  $k \in \mathcal{F}$ , so  $(1 - \rho_k) \rightarrow 0$  for these dimensions. Simultaneously,  $\rho_k \approx 0$  for  $k \in \mathcal{T}$ , so  $(1 - \rho_k) \approx 1$ . Taking the limit:

$$\lim_{\rho_k \rightarrow 1, k \in \mathcal{F}} \Sigma(\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{c}_{\text{AI}}) = 0 + \sum_{k \in \mathcal{T}} w_k s_k = \Sigma_{\mathcal{T}}.$$

The signaling value is reduced from  $\sum_{k=1}^K w_k s_k$  to  $\Sigma_{\mathcal{T}} = \sum_{k \in \mathcal{T}} w_k s_k$ , representing a partial (not total) collapse proportional to the weight of formalizable skills in the employer's valuation.  $\square$

**Corollary 1** (Signaling Retention Ratio). *The fraction of pre-AI signaling value that survives AI disruption is:*

$$R = \frac{\Sigma_{\mathcal{T}}}{\Sigma_0} = \frac{\sum_{k \in \mathcal{T}} w_k s_k}{\sum_{k=1}^K w_k s_k} \quad (14)$$

*If the certification curriculum is heavily weighted toward formalizable skills (i.e.,  $\sum_{k \in \mathcal{F}} w_k \gg \sum_{k \in \mathcal{T}} w_k$ ), then  $R \rightarrow 0$  and the certification approaches complete signaling failure.*

#### 4.4. Tipping Point Analysis

We now characterize the conditions under which the separating equilibrium collapses entirely.

**Definition 4** (AI-Replicable Fraction). *Let  $\alpha$  denote the weighted fraction of certification abilities with AI replicability exceeding a threshold  $\bar{\rho}$  (set at 0.9 for near-complete replication):*

$$\alpha = \frac{\sum_{k: \rho_k > \bar{\rho}} w_k}{\sum_{k=1}^K w_k} = \sum_{k: \rho_k > \bar{\rho}} w_k \quad (15)$$

**Proposition 2** (Tipping Point). *There exists a critical threshold  $\alpha^* \in (0, 1)$  such that:*

1. *If  $\alpha < \alpha^*$ , the separating equilibrium is sustained: certification remains a credible signal, though with diminished informational content.*



2. If  $\alpha \geq \alpha^*$ , the separating equilibrium collapses into a pooling equilibrium: certification no longer credibly separates ability types.

The critical threshold is determined by:

$$\alpha^* = 1 - \frac{c(\theta_H) + V_0}{\sum_{k=1}^K w_k s_k} \quad (16)$$

*Proof.* The separating equilibrium requires  $\Pi_{AI} \geq c(\theta_H)$ . Write  $\Pi_{AI}$  as:

$$\Pi_{AI} = \sum_{k=1}^K w_k s_k (1 - \rho_k) - V_0.$$

In the worst case for signaling, all dimensions with  $\rho_k > \bar{\rho}$  contribute  $(1 - \rho_k) \approx 0$  to the sum, while dimensions with  $\rho_k \leq \bar{\rho}$  contribute their full value. Thus:

$$\Pi_{AI} \approx (1 - \alpha) \sum_{k=1}^K w_k s_k - V_0$$

where we use the approximation that highly replicable dimensions contribute negligibly and non-replicable dimensions contribute proportionally to  $(1 - \alpha)$ . The separating equilibrium holds iff:

$$(1 - \alpha) \sum_{k=1}^K w_k s_k - V_0 \geq c(\theta_H)$$

Solving for the critical  $\alpha$ :

$$\alpha \leq 1 - \frac{c(\theta_H) + V_0}{\sum_{k=1}^K w_k s_k} \equiv \alpha^*.$$

When  $\alpha > \alpha^*$ , the incentive compatibility constraint for high types is violated, and no separating equilibrium exists.  $\square$

**Corollary 2** (Equilibrium Dynamics). *As AI capabilities improve over time,  $\alpha$  is weakly increasing (new skill dimensions cross the  $\bar{\rho}$  threshold). If the certification body does not adjust the curriculum,  $\alpha$  eventually exceeds  $\alpha^*$ , resulting in equilibrium collapse. The speed of collapse depends on the rate of AI capability improvement and the proportion of the curriculum devoted to formalizable skills.*

## 5. Application to the CFA Certification

### 5.1. Mapping CFA Abilities to the Theoretical Framework

We now apply the theoretical framework to the CFA Program, mapping its three-level curriculum onto our six-dimensional ability taxonomy. Table 1 presents this mapping, drawing on the CFA Institute’s published competency framework and the task-based classification of Autor et al. [3].

Table 1: CFA Ability Taxonomy: Mapping to Task Framework and AI Replicability

Skill Code	Ability Type	CFA Level	Autor (2003) Task Class	AI $\rho_k$	Signal Retention
$s_1$	Declarative Knowledge	I	Routine Cognitive	$\sim 0.95$	Low
$s_2$	Algorithmic Computation	I–II	Routine Cognitive	$\sim 0.92$	Low
$s_3$	Analytical Decomposition	II	Non-routine Analytic	$\sim 0.70$	Medium
$s_4$	Integrative Judgment	III	Non-routine Analytic	$\sim 0.45$	Med–High
$s_5$	Ethical Reasoning	II–III	Non-routine Interactive	$\sim 0.30$	High
$s_6$	Stakeholder Reasoning	III	Non-routine Interactive	$\sim 0.15$	High

Figure 1 provides a visual comparison of the six ability dimensions, contrasting the profile of a CFA-certified professional with that of a frontier AI system. The radar chart makes the asymmetry vivid: AI closely matches or exceeds human performance on declarative knowledge ( $s_1$ ) and algorithmic computation ( $s_2$ ), but falls sharply behind on ethical reasoning ( $s_5$ ) and stakeholder reasoning ( $s_6$ ).

The AI replicability values reflect the emerging empirical literature: Callanan et al. [6] document GPT-4 achieving approximately 70% on CFA Level I (predominantly  $s_1/s_2$  items), while domain-adapted models further close this gap [9]. The sharp decline from  $s_1$ – $s_2$  to  $s_5$ – $s_6$  mirrors the routine/non-routine boundary of Autor et al. [3]. Critically, the CFA program’s curriculum weighting creates a structural vulnerability. Table 2 presents the estimated curriculum weight distribution.

### 5.2. Computing the Signaling Retention Ratio

Using the values in Table 2, we compute the signaling retention ratio (Corollary 1):




Figure 1: Radar chart comparing CFA Professional and AI ability profiles across the six-dimensional taxonomy. Each axis represents one ability dimension ( $s_1$ – $s_6$ ). AI replicability is near-complete for declarative knowledge and algorithmic computation but drops sharply for ethical and stakeholder reasoning, reflecting the formalizable–tacit partition central to the Partial Signaling Collapse Theorem.

Table 2: Estimated CFA Curriculum Weight Distribution Across Ability Dimensions

Ability Dimension	Weight $w_k$	Category	$\rho_k$	$w_k(1 - \rho_k)$
$s_1$ : Declarative Knowledge	0.25	$\mathcal{F}$	0.95	0.013
$s_2$ : Algorithmic Computation	0.25	$\mathcal{F}$	0.92	0.020
$s_3$ : Analytical Decomposition	0.20	$\mathcal{F}/\mathcal{T}$	0.70	0.060
$s_4$ : Integrative Judgment	0.15	$\mathcal{T}$	0.45	0.083
$s_5$ : Ethical Reasoning	0.10	$\mathcal{T}$	0.30	0.070
$s_6$ : Stakeholder Reasoning	0.05	$\mathcal{T}$	0.15	0.043
<b>Total</b>	<b>1.00</b>			<b>0.288</b>

$$R = \frac{\sum_{k=1}^K w_k s_k (1 - \rho_k)}{\sum_{k=1}^K w_k s_k} = \frac{0.288}{1.000} = 0.288 \quad (17)$$

assuming  $s_k = 1$  for all  $k$  (i.e., normalized ability levels). This implies that **the CFA certification retains approximately 28.8% of its pre-AI signaling value** under current AI capability levels. More than 70% of the informational content that the certification historically conveyed to employers is now replicable by AI systems at low cost.

Figure 2 illustrates the signal erosion curve—plotting the signaling retention ratio  $R$  as a function of the weighted AI replicability across all dimensions. The current CFA position ( $R = 0.288$ ) is marked, showing the certification deep within the erosion zone. The curve highlights the nonlinear nature of erosion: once formalizable dimensions (which carry the largest curriculum weights) become AI-replicable, signaling value drops precipitously before flattening as only tacit abilities remain.

### 5.3. Tipping Point Assessment

Using a threshold of  $\bar{\rho} = 0.9$ , only  $s_1$  and  $s_2$  currently qualify, giving  $\alpha = 0.50$ . If  $s_3$  crosses  $\bar{\rho} = 0.9$  as LLMs continue to improve,  $\alpha$  rises to 0.70. Table 3 characterizes the resulting scenarios.

Table 3: Tipping Point Scenarios for CFA Signaling Equilibrium

Scenario	$\alpha$	Relative to $\alpha^*$	Equilibrium Status
Current state	0.50	Depends on $\alpha^*$	Separating (weakened)
$s_3$ crosses $\bar{\rho}$	0.70	Likely $> \alpha^*$	Collapse risk
$s_3 + s_4$ cross $\bar{\rho}$	0.85	Almost certainly $> \alpha^*$	Pooling equilibrium

The CFA’s current curriculum allocates roughly 50% of its weight to already highly AI-replicable abilities, placing it in a *vulnerable zone* approaching equilibrium collapse absent intervention.

## 6. Empirical Evidence: Multiple-Choice Options as Informational Signals

We provide direct empirical support through a controlled experiment testing whether the multiple-choice option structure functions as an informational signal that differentially aids AI performance.




Figure 2: Signal erosion curve showing the signaling retention ratio  $R$  as a function of increasing AI replicability. The current CFA position is marked at  $R = 28.8\%$ , indicating that more than 70% of the certification's pre-AI signaling value has already eroded. The tipping point  $\alpha^*$ , beyond which the separating equilibrium collapses into pooling, is shown as a vertical threshold.

### 6.1. Experimental Design

The identification strategy is straightforward: if options serve as informational signals aiding AI (e.g., through process-of-elimination), removing them should degrade performance; if AI performance reflects genuine knowledge replication, option presence should be immaterial. We administer  $N = 1,032$  CFA-style questions from the CFA-Easy benchmark [9] to GPT-4o-mini under two conditions:

- **With options:** The standard multiple-choice format, with all answer options presented.
- **Without options:** The same question stem, but with all answer options removed. The model must generate a free-form response, which is then evaluated by an LLM judge for semantic correctness against the ground-truth answer.

This paired design enables within-question comparison, eliminating confounds from question difficulty variation. The key test statistic is McNemar’s test with Yates’ continuity correction for paired nominal data, which evaluates whether the marginal distribution of correct/incorrect responses differs between the two conditions.

### 6.2. Results

Table 4 presents the aggregate results from the option bias experiment.

Table 4: Option Bias Experiment Results ( $N = 1,032$ , GPT-4o-mini)

Metric	Value
Accuracy with options	82.6% (852/1,032)
Accuracy without options	80.6% (832/1,032)
Option bias ( $\Delta$ )	+1.9 pp
Questions with option-dependent correctness	147/1,032 (14.2%)
<i>McNemar’s Test with Yates’ Correction (paired comparison)</i>	
Discordant pair $b$ (correct $\rightarrow$ incorrect)	147
Discordant pair $c$ (incorrect $\rightarrow$ correct)	127
$\chi^2$ statistic (Yates corrected)	1.318
$p$ -value	0.251
Significant at $\alpha = 0.05$ ?	No

The LLM achieves high accuracy regardless of option presence (82.6% vs. 80.6%), and the +1.9 pp difference is not statistically significant (McNemar’s

test with Yates’ correction,  $\chi^2 = 1.318$ ,  $p = 0.251$ ). While 14.2% of questions show option-dependent correctness, the balanced discordant pairs ( $b = 147$  vs.  $c = 127$ ) indicate symmetric, noise-like variation rather than a systematic option-signal advantage.

### 6.3. Implications for Signaling Theory

Within our model, the multiple-choice option set can be interpreted as a *secondary signal* that reduces task difficulty by constraining the response space. If AI exploits this signal, then the MCQ format inflates measured replicability  $\rho_k$ , and switching to free-response could restore signaling value. Our result refutes this optimistic scenario:

$$\rho_k^{\text{MC}} \approx \rho_k^{\text{free-response}} \quad \text{for } k \in \mathcal{F} \quad (18)$$

AI replicability of formalizable skills is approximately *format-invariant*, strengthening Proposition 1: signaling erosion reflects genuine knowledge replication, not format exploitation. The policy corollary is that assessment format reform alone is insufficient; meaningful signaling restoration requires *content* reform—reweighting toward tacit abilities ( $s_5$ ,  $s_6$ ) where AI replicability remains low regardless of format.

### 6.4. Robustness and Scope Conditions

The experiment uses a single frontier model (GPT-4o-mini) on a question pool dominated by formalizable abilities ( $s_1$ ,  $s_2$ ). The format-invariance result may not hold for  $s_4$ – $s_6$ , where options could provide more substantive scaffolding. Future work should extend to CFA Level III essay items targeting integrative judgment and ethical reasoning.

## 7. Implications and Policy Recommendations

### 7.1. Testable Predictions

The model generates three key testable predictions:

- P1. Differential wage premium erosion.** The CFA wage premium should erode faster in job functions dominated by formalizable skills (e.g., quantitative analysis) than in functions requiring tacit skills (e.g., client advisory). The premium change  $|\Delta w_j|$  should correlate positively with the average AI replicability  $\bar{\rho}_j$  of the required skills.

- P2. Employer behavioral shifts.** Rational employers should supplement certification screening with methods targeting tacit abilities (behavioral interviews, case simulations), with adoption rates increasing with AI replicability of the certification’s core content.
- P3. Format invariance (supported).** AI replicability of formalizable skills should be approximately format-invariant. Our option bias experiment supports this: the +1.9 pp difference is not significant ( $p = 0.251$ ,  $N = 1,032$ ).

### 7.2. Policy Implications for Certification Design

Propositions 1 and 2 yield three prescriptions for certification bodies.

**Curriculum rebalancing.** Reduce weight on  $s_1$  (declarative knowledge) and  $s_2$  (algorithmic computation), which are highly AI-replicable ( $\rho > 0.9$ ) and contribute minimally to residual signaling value. Increase weight on  $s_5$  (ethical reasoning) and  $s_6$  (stakeholder reasoning), which have low AI replicability ( $\rho < 0.3$ ) and represent the primary source of retained signaling value. CFA Level III’s essay-format IPS questions are directionally correct but insufficient while the overall curriculum remains skewed toward formalizable skills.

**Format innovation paired with content reform.** Our empirical evidence demonstrates that format changes alone are insufficient: removing MCQ options does not reduce AI performance ( $p = 0.251$ ). Format reform must target tacit skill dimensions ( $s_4$ – $s_6$ ) through interactive case simulations, ethical dilemma deliberation without uniquely correct answers, and AI-augmented assessment where candidates must critically evaluate and override AI recommendations.

**Dynamic recalibration.** As AI capabilities expand the replicable frontier (Corollary 2), certification bodies should institute periodic review mechanisms explicitly linked to AI capability benchmarks [6, 9].

## 8. Discussion

### 8.1. Extensions and Generalizability

Our model complements the general equilibrium approach of Acemoglu and Restrepo [1] by focusing on the *informational* consequences of AI for a specific market institution. The key insight is that even when AI does not eliminate jobs, it can undermine the screening institutions that organize labor markets—the social cost is misallocation rather than displacement.



Our formalizable–tacit distinction connects to “Polanyi’s Paradox” [2]: LLMs replicate the *surface structure* of tacit reasoning without the *deep structure* (normative commitment, legal liability, reputational skin-in-the-game). The framework generalizes beyond CFA to any certification operating as a labor market signal: certifications weighting formalizable content (FRM, basic actuarial exams) should experience faster erosion than those emphasizing tacit abilities (medical board clinical components, oral bar examinations).

### 8.2. Limitations

Our model treats AI replicability as exogenous and monotonically increasing; in practice, capabilities develop unevenly. The two-type model is stylized; a continuous-type extension would yield richer dynamics. The  $\rho_k$  values are calibrated assumptions—perturbing all by  $\pm 0.10$  shifts  $R$  to approximately  $[0.19, 0.39]$ , indicating moderate sensitivity that does not alter the qualitative conclusion. We abstract from reputational and network effects of CFA membership, and our empirical evidence is limited to a single model and formalizable question pool. Despite these limitations, the core result—partial, selective signaling erosion concentrated on formalizable abilities—is robust and provides a clear qualitative prediction distinguishing our framework from polar positions in the current discourse.

## 9. Conclusion

We develop a Modified Spence Signaling Model showing that AI-driven signaling erosion is *partial and selective*: certification loses informational content on formalizable abilities while preserving signaling value for tacit competencies. A controlled option bias experiment ( $N = 1,032$ , McNemar’s test with Yates’ correction,  $p = 0.251$ ) confirms that AI performance on formalizable tasks is format-invariant, ruling out the possibility that assessment format reform alone can restore signaling value.

Applied to the CFA, approximately 50% of curriculum weight is already highly AI-replicable, and the certification retains only about 29% of its pre-AI signaling value. The policy prescription is clear: certification bodies must rebalance assessment *content*—not merely format—toward ethical reasoning, integrative judgment, and stakeholder deliberation, where human professionals retain comparative advantage. A certification that primarily tests abilities

available from AI at negligible cost cannot sustain the signaling equilibrium on which its economic value depends.

More broadly, our framework demonstrates that AI reshapes not just production but the *institutions* that organize economic activity. Professional certification, educational degrees, and occupational licensing all face analogous pressures; understanding the selective nature of AI-driven institutional erosion is essential for designing adaptive responses.

### Data Availability

The CFA-Easy benchmark ( $N = 1,032$ ) used in the option bias experiment is available through the FinDAP framework [9]. Experiment code and full results (JSON) are available from the corresponding author upon request.

### Declaration of Competing Interest

The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.

### CRedit Author Contributions

**Wei-Lun Cheng:** Conceptualization, Methodology, Formal Analysis, Software, Investigation, Writing – Original Draft. **Daniel Wei-Chung Miao:** Supervision, Writing – Review & Editing. **Guang-Di Chang:** Supervision, Writing – Review & Editing.

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