Beneath the Surface: Measuring Hidden Indifference in Japanese Territorial Attitudes

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Draft: December 8, 2025

Abstract

Japan is currently engaged in three major territorial disputes: the Northern Territories (known as the Kuril Islands to Russia), Takeshima (Liancourt Rocks, or Dokdo to South Korea), and the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu to China and Tiaoyutai to Taiwan). Official government surveys consistently report high levels of public concern regarding these territories. However, public opinion on matters of national identity and territory is not always straightforward, and respondents may overstate their concern due to social desirability bias. Expressing indifference on a matter of national sovereignty could be perceived as unpatriotic, leading respondents to conceal their genuine lack of a strong opinion.

To address this issue, this paper employs a list experiment embedded in a large-scale online survey of 4,500 Japanese citizens. The design estimates the proportion of the population that is privately indifferent to each territorial dispute. The results reveal substantial levels of hidden indifference: approximately 19% of respondents do not have a strong opinion on the sovereignty of Takeshima, around 11% are indifferent to the Senkaku Islands dispute, and around 5% do not have strong opinion on the Northern Territories. These findings challenge the conventional view of a uniformly concerned public and suggest that the domestic political constraints facing Japanese leaders may be more flexible than commonly assumed.

Keywords: territorial disputes; public opinion; social desirability bias; list experiment; Japan

1 Introduction

Japan is currently engaged in three major territorial disputes: the Northern Territories (known as the Kuril Islands to Russia), Takeshima (Liancourt Rocks, or Dokdo to South

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Korea), and the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu to China and Tiaoyutai to Taiwan) (Bukh, 2018). Official government surveys consistently report high levels of public concern regarding these territories. For instance, a 2023 survey by the Cabinet Office found that 63.6% of respondents were "concerned" about the Takeshima issue (Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, 2023), while a 2024 survey reported that 78.4% were concerned about the Senkaku Islands (Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, 2024). These figures are often cited as evidence of a strong, unified national consensus demanding a firm governmental stance.

However, public opinion on matters of national identity and territory is not always straightforward. Governments may leverage territorial issues to stoke nationalist sentiment for domestic political gain (Fang et al., 2022), as has been argued in the case of Japan's policy on the Northern Territories (Bukh, 2018). Conversely, strong public sentiment can constrain a government's diplomatic flexibility, narrowing the "zone of possible agreement" by making any perceived concession politically costly (Loizides, Ireton and LaGro, 2022). Given these dynamics, a critical question arises: Are the Japanese people truly as concerned with these territorial disputes as direct surveys suggest?

This paper posits that conventional surveys may overestimate public engagement due to social desirability bias (SDB), the tendency of respondents to give answers they believe are socially acceptable rather than expressing their true beliefs. Expressing indifference on a matter of national sovereignty could be perceived as unpatriotic, leading respondents to conceal their genuine lack of a strong opinion. Moreover, as these surveys are conducted by the Japanese government, they inquire whether respondents are concerned about each issue and what actions they believe the Japanese government should undertake, without eliciting respondents' claims or opinions regarding each disputed territory.

To overcome this methodological challenge, this study employs a list experiment, an indirect questioning technique designed to elicit more truthful answers on sensitive topics (Blair and Imai, 2012). By embedding this experiment within a large-scale online survey, this research provides a quantitative estimate of the proportion of the Japanese public that is privately indifferent to these territorial disputes. The findings suggest that a considerable portion of the population does not hold a strong opinion, revealing a more nuanced and complex reality of public attitudes than is commonly assumed.

2 Literature Review: Nationalism, Public Opinion, and Sensitive Attitudes

2.1 Public Opinion and Foreign Policy in Territorial Disputes

The link between public opinion and foreign policy is a central theme in international relations. Putnam (1988) argues that diplomatic negotiations should be understood as

"two-level games," which involve interactions between domestic and international factors. In democratic states, leaders must remain attentive to public sentiment, as it can impose significant political costs on those who are seen as compromising on core national interests. Territorial disputes are particularly potent in this regard, as land is often framed as an "indivisible" part of the national identity. Research shows that public opinion can drive governments toward harder stances and limit their ability to negotiate peaceful resolutions (Fang et al., 2022; Loizides, Ireton and LaGro, 2022).

However, the causal relationship is not always unidirectional. Governments also actively shape public opinion. Bukh (2018) argues that the Japanese government historically leveraged the Northern Territories issue as a tool to foster anti-Soviet sentiment, a strategy that proved successful in domestic politics but ultimately hindered diplomatic progress. This highlights the complex interplay between elite-led narratives and grassroots public sentiment. While official discourse in Japan portrays a nation united in its concern for its territories, no academic research has systematically investigated the "true" underlying attitudes of the public, free from the pressures of social desirability.

Prior research has shown that public attitudes toward territorial disputes are far from uniform. In particular, Tanaka (2015) demonstrates that proximity to disputed areas and economic considerations systematically shape citizens' degree of hawkishness. His findings highlight that even in highly salient territorial conflicts, sub-national heterogeneity exists, challenging the assumption of a monolithic nationalist public. These insights imply that variation may exist not only in how strongly people feel about a dispute but also in whether they hold a strong opinion at all—an issue that direct surveys are ill-equipped to detect.

Existing work also highlights the emotional mechanisms through which territorial threats shape political attitudes (Kobayashi and Katagiri, 2018). Threats from rival states can evoke anger and heighten nationalist pressure, thereby making expressions of indifference socially costly. The current findings therefore suggest a parallel mechanism: external threats may not only mobilize anger but also create social pressure to express concern, prompting indifferent citizens to conceal their true attitudes.

2.2 Measuring Sensitive Attitudes: The List Experiment

Directly asking about sensitive topics—such as racial prejudice, corruption, or support for extremist ideologies—is notoriously difficult due to social desirability bias (Blair and Imai, 2012). Respondents may mask their true views to avoid social sanction. This phenomenon has been observed in various political contexts, from citizens concealing dissent against the war in Ukraine to Taiwanese citizens hiding pro-unification attitudes (Kramon and Weghorst, 2019; Chapkovski and Schaub, 2022; Wu and Lin, 2024).

The list experiment, also known as the Item Count Technique (ICT), offers a solution.

This indirect questioning method presents two randomly assigned groups with a list of items. The control group receives non-sensitive "control" items, while the treatment group receives the same list plus one sensitive item. Respondents report only the total number of applicable items, not which ones. By providing this veil of privacy, the technique encourages more honest responses and enables researchers to detect attitudes that remain hidden in direct surveys (Blair and Imai, 2012; Glynn, 2013; Kramon and Weghorst, 2019).

Consistent with this, Kim (2015) finds weak demographic predictors of territorial attitudes using direct surveys. The present study suggests one reason for such weak associations: a large portion of respondents may be giving socially desirable answers, masking true variation in latent attitudes. Indirect methods thus uncover structure that direct questioning fails to detect, providing a more accurate picture of the distribution of public opinion on territorial issues.

While recent work has begun to employ list experiments to study attitudes toward territorial concessions in Ukraine, no study to date has systematically examined hidden indifference toward multiple territorial disputes in a non-war setting such as contemporary Japan. In the context of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Daniels and Polegkyi (2025) uses a list experiment to assess Ukrainians' willingness to concede territory—specifically, Crimea. The study finds that the estimated share supporting concessions is very small (around 5–6 percent) and closely matches direct-question estimates, suggesting limited social desirability bias in that particular wartime context. Pop-Eleches and Robertson (2025) also employs list experiments to gauge support for territorial concessions during wartime, finding that only a small minority of citizens are willing to "trade land for peace" and that opposition to concessions is largely genuine rather than a product of social desirability bias.

3 Research Design and Methodology

This study addresses the research question: "How many Japanese citizens are genuinely indifferent to the country's territorial disputes?" An online, opt-in panel survey was conducted on June 28–29, 2025, with a sample of 4,500 Japanese citizens aged 18 to 99. Quotas were set for gender and region (47 prefectures) to enhance the representativeness of the sample.

Respondents were randomly assigned to either a control group or one of three treatment groups, each focused on a different territory (Takeshima, the Senkaku Islands, or the Northern Territories).

Control Group. Respondents were shown a list of four non-sensitive items and asked how many applied to them. The items were designed to be politically neutral and varied in their likely applicability to the general population:

1. I would rather watch movies in a theater than at home.
2. I tend to plan my trips in detail beforehand.
3. I have made a donation(s) through the Furusato Nozei (Hometown Tax Donation) system before.
4. I have purchased a physical book or magazine from a bookstore within the last month.

Treatment Groups. Respondents received the same four non-sensitive items plus one sensitive item. The sensitive item was phrased to capture indifference:

> I am not concerned about which country has sovereignty over [Takeshima / the Senkaku Islands / the Northern Territories]. [1]

The difference in the mean count of items between a treatment group and the control group provides the estimated proportion of respondents who agree with the sensitive item—that is, the proportion who are indifferent to that specific territorial dispute.

4 Results

4.1 Mean-in-differences

4.2 Baseline estimates of latent indifference

Figure 2 reports the average marginal effects (AMEs) of the treatment indicator for each territorial dispute, based on the fully interacted ICT regression model in Table A1. Substantively, these AMEs can be interpreted as the estimated share of respondents who would agree with the indirect statement that they are "not concerned about which country has sovereignty" over the respective territory, holding the observed covariate distribution constant.

In addition to demographic characteristics (gender, age, and employment status), the survey records respondents' prefecture of residence. For the analysis, I group prefectures into eleven proportional representation (PR) electoral districts used in elections to the House of Representatives: Hokkaido, Tohoku, Kita-Kanto, Minami-Kanto, Tokyo, Hokuriku-Shinetsu, Tokai, Kinki, Chugoku, Shikoku, and Kyushu[2].

The estimates show that hidden indifference is far from negligible. For Takeshima, the AME is about 0.19, implying that roughly 19% of Japanese citizens are indifferent

[1] *Original:* [竹島 / 尖閣諸島 / 北方領土]が日本のものか[韓国 / 中国 / ロシア]のものか、個人的にはこだわらない

[2] Table A3 provides the mapping of prefectures to PR blocks.



Figure 1: Mean-in-differences estimates of latent indifference by territorial dispute

to the sovereignty of the Liancourt Rocks. For the Senkaku Islands, the estimated share of indifferent citizens is around 11%, while for the Northern Territories the estimate is approximately 5%. Although the latter is smaller in magnitude, it is still statistically distinguishable from zero at conventional levels, indicating the presence of a non-trivial group that does not hold strong views even on this highly salient dispute.

These figures contrast sharply with government opinion polls, in which large majorities report concern about the disputes when asked directly. The list experiment therefore reveals considerable latent heterogeneity in territorial attitudes that is masked by social desirability in conventional surveys.

4.3 Heterogeneity by age

Figure 3 plots the marginal effect of the treatment indicator by age group for each territory. For Takeshima, indifference is relatively concentrated among middle-aged respondents: those in their 40s display the highest estimated latent indifference, with the 95% confidence interval clearly above zero. Indifference is also non-trivial among respondents in their 30s and 50s, but the estimates for the youngest and oldest cohorts are more modest and often statistically indistinguishable from zero.

For the Senkaku Islands, the age pattern is flatter, but again respondents in their 40s and 60s show somewhat higher latent indifference than other groups. In contrast, for the Northern Territories the pattern is more polarized: younger respondents in their 20s exhibit relatively high indifference, whereas older cohorts are either less indifferent



Figure 2: Estimated share indifferent by territorial dispute

or display wide intervals that include zero. This combination suggests that the Northern Territories have become more salient for older citizens—likely in the context of Russia's invasion of Ukraine—while younger citizens are comparatively less engaged with the issue.

Overall, the age profiles indicate that hidden indifference is not simply a "youth apathy" story. Rather, indifference peaks at different points in the life cycle across disputes, reflecting the interaction between generational experience and issue salience.

4.4 Heterogeneity by region and employment

Figure 4 examines how latent indifference varies across proportional representation (PR) blocks. For Takeshima and the Senkaku Islands, indifference is particularly high in metropolitan and urbanized regions such as Tokyo, Kinki, and Kyushu. At the same time, residents in geographically proximate areas (e.g. Tohoku for the Senkaku Islands; Hokkaido and Tohoku for the Northern Territories) tend to be less indifferent, and in several cases the estimated marginal effects are small and statistically indistinguishable from zero. This pattern is consistent with the idea that physical proximity to the disputed areas increases the perceived relevance of territorial issues, thereby lowering indifference.

The Northern Territories provide a more nuanced picture. While the national average indifference is relatively low, Hokkaido—the region geographically closest to the disputed islands—shows substantially higher indifference than most other blocks. One plausible interpretation is that residents in Hokkaido may place more weight on pragmatic concerns in their everyday lives, such as local economic conditions, than on symbolic sovereignty



Figure 3: Estimated share indifferent by territorial dispute



Figure 4: Estimated share indifferent by territorial dispute

claims, even under heightened tensions with Russia.

Figure 5 further disaggregates the AMEs by employment status. For Takeshima and the Senkaku Islands, non-regular workers exhibit the highest levels of latent indifference, followed by those who are not currently working (students, homemakers, or the unemployed). Among the self-employed, indifference is particularly pronounced for the Northern Territories. In contrast, regular employees display lower and often statistically insignificant levels of indifference across all three disputes.

These patterns suggest that precarious or non-standard labor market positions are associated with weaker attachment to territorial claims. One interpretation is that material insecurity and everyday economic concerns crowd out attention to foreign policy issues, including disputes that are highly salient in elite political discourse.

4.5 Robustness and diagnostic checks

Because list experiments are sensitive to design failures, I conduct several standard diagnostic checks recommended in the literature.

First, I examine potential floor and ceiling effects. For each dispute and experimental



Figure 5: Estimated share indifferent by territorial dispute

group, I compute the share of respondents who select zero items and the share who select the maximum possible number of items on the list. Appendix Figure A1 visualizes the distribution of item counts by territory and experimental group. Across all three disputes, between 29–34% of respondents in the control and treatment groups report zero items, while less than 4% choose the maximum number of items. The absence of substantial mass at the extremes suggests that neither floor nor ceiling effects are severe enough to threaten the validity of the ICT estimates.

Second, I check whether the non-sensitive control items behave similarly across experimental conditions. Focusing on respondents in the control condition, the mean number of agreed non-sensitive items is highly similar across the Takeshima, Senkaku, and Northern Territories samples, and their confidence intervals overlap substantially. Appendix Figure A2 summarizes the mean number of control items by territory. This indicates that the lists share a comparable baseline level of sensitivity and that differences across disputes are not driven by idiosyncrasies in the control items.

Third, I implement a placebo test. I construct a dataset that combines the control group with each treatment group and regress the count of non-sensitive items on a pseudo-treatment indicator and the full set of covariates. Because the sensitive item is not included in these counts, the treatment indicator should have no effect if the randomization and the design are valid. Consistent with this expectation, the treatment coefficient is effectively unidentified (and statistically null) once the model drops the collinear indicator, and the covariate patterns are stable across placebo specifications. The specification and placeholder results are reported in Appendix Table A2. This strengthens confidence that the positive AMEs reported above are capturing genuine responses to the sensitive item, rather than artefacts of the survey design.

Taken together, these diagnostic checks suggest that the list experiment performs as intended: extreme response behaviour is limited, the control items are well behaved, and the treatment assignment does not spuriously shift responses to the non-sensitive items.

5 Discussion

The list experiment reveals a sizable, and previously hidden, reservoir of indifference toward Japan's territorial disputes. Roughly one in five citizens are estimated to be indifferent to the sovereignty of Takeshima, about one in nine to the Senkaku Islands, and one in twenty to the Northern Territories. These estimates are substantially lower than the levels of "concern" reported in conventional Cabinet Office surveys, in which strong majorities claim to care about each dispute when asked directly. The gap between direct and indirect measures is consistent with the presence of social desirability bias: citizens feel pressure to express patriotic concern even when they lack strong personal views.

At the same time, indifference is systematically structured. It is not simply random noise or a residual category of "don't know" responses. The ICT regression and marginal effect analyses show that indifference varies by territory, region, age, and employment status in ways that are broadly consistent with existing theories of territorial politics and public opinion.

For Takeshima, hidden indifference is most pronounced. This is striking given the high symbolic salience of the Liancourt Rocks in Japan–Korea relations and the prominent role of the dispute in nationalist rhetoric. One plausible interpretation is that the intensity of public concern has been overstated by direct surveys that are highly susceptible to social desirability bias. Although elites in both countries have invested heavily in nationalist framing, a considerable share of citizens appear willing—at least privately—to live with ambiguity over sovereignty.

The Senkaku Islands occupy an intermediate position. Indifference is lower than for Takeshima but still far from negligible. The dispute is embedded in a broader geopolitical rivalry with China and is frequently framed in security terms, which may make it harder for citizens to admit indifference even under the protection of an indirect question. Yet the presence of a non-trivial indifferent group suggests that domestic constraints on compromise may be less rigid than aggregate survey responses imply.

The Northern Territories present a different pattern. Nationally, the estimated share of indifferent citizens is relatively small, which is consistent with the heightened salience of Russia as an adversary since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. However, residents of Hokkaido, geographically closest to the islands and most directly affected by cross-border interactions, display substantially higher latent indifference. This divergence between national and local attitudes challenges the assumption that proximity to disputed territories always produces hardline views. In the Northern Territories case, everyday concerns and pragmatic local interests may temper symbolic attachment to sovereignty.

Employment status further conditions territorial attitudes. Non-regular workers and those outside the labour force are more likely to be indifferent to Takeshima and the

Senkaku Islands, while self-employed respondents are relatively indifferent to the Northern Territories. These patterns resonate with research showing that economic insecurity and precarious work can depress political engagement and shift attention away from foreign policy and nationalist issues. In other words, indifference is socio-economically stratified: citizens facing unstable livelihoods are less invested in symbolic disputes over distant islands.

These findings have implications for debates on the domestic politics of foreign policy. First, they nuance the standard picture in which territorial disputes are treated as indivisible issues backed by uniformly hawkish publics. Even on highly salient disputes, a sizeable minority of citizens are quietly indifferent. Second, they add a micro-level perspective to the literature on how elites strategically construct territorial issues. While past work has shown that governments can mobilize public opinion around territorial symbols, the present results suggest that such efforts may coexist with a reservoir of latent indifference that is invisible in direct surveys.

Finally, the results speak to the potential for diplomatic flexibility. If policymakers recognize that public opinion is more nuanced than headline survey figures suggest, there may be more room to explore creative arrangements that de-emphasize formal sovereignty while addressing local economic and security concerns. At the same time, the concentration of indifference among precarious groups raises normative questions about whose preferences are most likely to be heard in the foreign policy process. Future research should investigate the stability of these indifferent attitudes over time and their responsiveness to elite framing, as well as triangulate list experiments with other methods such as qualitative interviews and panel surveys.

6 Conclusion

Conclusion goes here.

Acknowledgments

I thank JX Press Corporation for providing access to the survey data used in this study. The views expressed here are my own and do not represent those of the company.

Data Availability

The survey data used in this paper were provided by JX Press Corporation and cannot be publicly shared due to contractual and confidentiality restrictions. Replication code using simulated example data is available upon request.

Conflict of Interest

The author has an outsourcing contract with JX Press Corporation, which provided access to the data used in this study. The company had no role in the design, analysis, or conclusions of this research.

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Appendix

A Full ICT Regression Results

Table A1: ICT Regression Results for Three Territorial Disputes (Key Coefficients)

	Takeshima	Senkaku	Northern Territories
Treatment (List)	−0.120	0.235	0.348
	(0.296)	(0.316)	(0.305)
Treatment × Male	−0.157	−0.175+	−0.152
	(0.096)	(0.093)	(0.093)
Treatment × Other gender	−0.565	−0.309	0.005
	(0.387)	(0.397)	(0.396)
Treatment × Age: 30s	−0.010	0.057	−0.634*
	(0.263)	(0.261)	(0.265)
Treatment × Age: 40s	0.165	0.092	−0.528*
	(0.252)	(0.254)	(0.257)
Treatment × Age: 50s	−0.152	−0.205	−0.656*
	(0.251)	(0.249)	(0.256)
Treatment × Age: 60s	−0.075	0.097	−0.323
	(0.256)	(0.254)	(0.260)
Treatment × Age: 70+	−0.074	−0.124	−0.408
	(0.249)	(0.248)	(0.255)
Treatment × Hokkaido	0.498+	0.146	0.545+
	(0.286)	(0.292)	(0.285)
Treatment × Tohoku	0.435	0.011	0.159
	(0.278)	(0.299)	(0.280)
Treatment × Kita-Kanto	0.339	−0.073	0.202
	(0.244)	(0.260)	(0.239)
Treatment × Minami-Kanto	0.292	−0.018	0.251
	(0.232)	(0.250)	(0.227)
Treatment × Tokyo	0.710**	0.133	0.356
	(0.238)	(0.258)	(0.234)
Treatment × Hokuriku-Shinetsu	0.558*	0.263	0.449
	(0.279)	(0.299)	(0.275)
Treatment × Tokai	0.263	−0.049	0.101
	(0.241)	(0.258)	(0.235)
Treatment × Kinki	0.579*	−0.044	0.383+
	(0.227)	(0.245)	(0.219)
Treatment × Shikoku	0.139	−0.339	−0.055
	(0.356)	(0.383)	(0.339)
Treatment × Kyushu	0.556*	−0.054	0.285
	(0.255)	(0.275)	(0.253)
Num.Obs.	2253	2275	2266
R2	0.038	0.026	0.033
F	2.469	1.690	2.154
RMSE	1.10	1.09	1.08

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

OLS models of list experiment item counts. Coefficients on Treatment and its interactions capture latent indifference; coefficients without Treatment are omitted for brevity.

B Robustness Checks

B.1 Floor and Ceiling Effects



Figure A1: Distribution of item counts by territory and experimental group

B.2 Baseline Comparability of Control Items Across Territories



Figure A2: Mean number of control items by territory

B.3 Placebo Regression (pseudo-treatment)

As a placebo test, I regress the number of non-sensitive control items on the pseudo-treatment indicator and covariates using the control list only.

C Regional Coding: Prefectures and PR Blocks

Table A3 shows how Japan's 47 prefectures are grouped into the eleven proportional representation (PR) electoral districts used in the analysis.

Table A2: Placebo Regression Using Control-Item Counts

	Placebo
Intercept	1.224***
	(0.205)
Male	0.082
	(0.072)
Other gender	−0.075
	(0.267)
Age: 30s	0.201
	(0.176)
Age: 40s	0.075
	(0.170)
Age: 50s	0.190
	(0.168)
Age: 60s	0.249
	(0.173)
Age: 70+	0.373*
	(0.174)
Hokkaido	−0.080
	(0.185)
Tohoku	−0.185
	(0.182)
Kita-Kanto	0.058
	(0.154)
Minami-Kanto	0.136
	(0.147)
Tokyo	−0.045
	(0.153)
Hokuriku-Shinetsu	−0.200
	(0.179)
Tokai	0.055
	(0.155)
Kinki	−0.014
	(0.142)
Shikoku	0.272
	(0.246)
Kyushu	−0.080
	(0.162)
Non-regular	−0.515***
	(0.103)
Self-employed	−0.244+
	(0.133)
Not working	−0.509***
	(0.091)
Other employment	−0.327**
	(0.117)
Num.Obs.	1147
R2	0.060

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.
Dependent variable: number of non-sensitive control items (0–4).
The pseudo-treatment indicator is perfectly collinear with the intercept and therefore omitted.
The same control group is used for all disputes; hence a single-column placebo test is sufficient.

Table A3: Mapping of prefectures to PR electoral districts

PR block	Prefectures
Hokkaido	Hokkaido
Tohoku	Aomori, Iwate, Miyagi, Akita, Yamagata, Fukushima
Kita-Kanto	Ibaraki, Tochigi, Gunma, Saitama
Minami-Kanto	Chiba, Kanagawa, Yamanashi
Tokyo	Tokyo
Hokuriku-Shinetsu	Niigata, Toyama, Ishikawa, Fukui, Nagano
Tokai	Gifu, Shizuoka, Aichi, Mie
Kinki	Shiga, Kyoto, Osaka, Hyogo, Nara, Wakayama
Chugoku	Tottori, Shimane, Okayama, Hiroshima, Yamaguchi
Shikoku	Tokushima, Kagawa, Ehime, Kochi
Kyushu	Fukuoka, Saga, Nagasaki, Kumamoto, Oita, Miyazaki, Kagoshima, Okinawa