

Legitimacy and Legitimation Practices: An Analysis of TSMO Networks

Abstract

Private transnational organizations have grown in number and in influence. However, sociologists and political scientists often study them separately, either as transnational social movement organizations (TSMOs) or the larger category of international non-governmental organizations (INGOs). In this paper, I examine the determinants of TSMO legitimacy by drawing on the literature on INGOs. In so doing, I call for bridging the disciplinary gap between sociology and political science. Empirically, I find that legitimation benefits already prominent organizations than those that are not. Networking thus helps reproduce the hierarchy among the TSMOs, challenging the earlier notion that TSMOs are horizontally networked. However, I also find that Southern TSMOs are more likely to gain legitimacy than Northern TSMOs once they are visible to their peers. The analysis of TSMOs thus cautions our bias to study Northern INGOs and generalize the findings to INGO population. Overall, my findings reveal that the incentives and strategies that INGO research has documented exist among TSMOs despite their counter-hegemonic ambitions.

1 Private, non-profit transnational organizations are regularly engaged in the pursuit of
2 social change, working on human rights, eco-systems, gender equity, and more. The work of
3 such transnational organizations has been noted in seminal studies of transnational social
4 movements (Boli & Thomas, 1999; Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Tarrow, 2005). The typical picture of
5 these groups is of principled actors seeking to hold the powerful to account (Smith & Wiest,
6 2012). Existing research documents that some private organizations consistently wield vast
7 authority, commanding the attention of global media outlets, policymakers, corporations, and
8 their peers (Bob, 2005; Carpenter, 2014; Dauvergne & LeBaron, 2014; Stroup & Wong, 2017).

9 Both sociologists and political scientists have extensively analyzed these organizations
10 but used different terms to describe them, with the former preferring the term “transnational
11 social movement organization” (TSMO) and the latter employing “international non-
12 governmental organization” (INGO). Conceptually speaking, TSMOs are a special subset of
13 INGOs, defined as INGOs “explicitly involved in work to change the dominant political and
14 social order” (Smith & Wiest, 2012: 46). As INGOs include pro-system organizations, TSMOs
15 and INGOs may seem to fall into different conceptual categories. However, little empirical
16 investigation has been done to demonstrate the differences.

17 The question is not just about the terminology of transnational private organizations. The
18 difference in the terminology also signifies different ways in which research is conducted among
19 sociologists and political scientists. While sociologists have studied the processes in which
20 TSMOs organize progressive movements (Caniglia, 2001; Smith, 2001, 2002; Smith, Chatfield,
21 & Pagnucco, 1997; Smith, Gemici, Plummer, & Hughes, 2018; Smith, Plummer, & Hughes,
22 2017), research on the differences in organizational legitimacy has been relatively scarce. By
23 contrast, political scientists have focused on the differences in organizational legitimacy,
24 demonstrating the effects of INGO legitimacy on international norms and regulations (Bob,
25 2005; Carpenter, 2014; Stroup & Wong, 2017).

26 The analysis of organizational legitimacy is important because neither TSMOs nor
27 INGOs have coercive power to singlehandedly affect social changes. Instead, they must rely on
28 legitimacy—a *right* to act—acknowledged by their audiences. Although the analysis of social
29 movement processes offers a useful insight into TSMO behaviors, the analysis of organizational
30 legitimacy helps us understand the effect of TSMOs on the broader political and social
31 phenomena.

1 Taken together, I ask *why some TSMOs gain legitimacy while others do not*. In so doing,
2 I draw on the literature on INGO research. This paper has two main contributions. First, it
3 reveals the extent to which the choices of TSMOs influence their own legitimacy. In recent
4 years, the legitimacy of civil society as a whole has been challenged (Deloffre & Schmitz, 2019),
5 but we know little about how individual organizations build or defend their legitimacy. This
6 paper evaluates whether TSMOs are capable of shaping their own legitimacy through strategic
7 choices, or their legitimacy is shaped by structural pressure exerted by shared expectations about
8 organizations (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Second, this paper emphasizes the need to bring the
9 literatures on INGOs and TSMOs closer together. To do this, I leverage a newly updated TSMO
10 dataset¹ and evaluate whether explanations for INGO legitimacy are able to account for the
11 variation in TSMO legitimacy. In particular, I examine whether the anti-systemic goals of
12 TSMOs challenge the current understandings of INGOs.

13 The results of my analysis below show that legitimation through networking (*i.e.*
14 claiming a connection to another organization) is relatively rare but effective among TSMOs. My
15 empirical evidence suggests that networking is a deliberate attempt to leverage connectivity for
16 organizational legitimacy rather than driven by functional needs. However, I also find that the
17 effect of networking on organizational legitimacy is larger for prominent TSMOs than low-
18 profile ones, suggesting that the existing hierarchy among TSMOs is persistent. While some
19 scholars characterize TSMO networks as horizontal (Smith, 2002; Smith et al., 2018), my
20 findings support the view that the division and inequality are salient characteristics of TSMO
21 networks (Hughes, Paxton, Quinsaat, & Reith, 2018). These findings are consistent with the
22 established canon explaining INGO behaviors (Lake & Wong, 2009; Murdie, 2013),
23 underscoring the benefit of studying INGOs and TSMOs together.

24 The following sections are organized as follows. First, I define TSMOs and discuss how I
25 conceptualize and measure TSMO legitimacy. Second, I briefly review the network-based
26 studies of INGOs and TSMOs to motivate my analysis. I then empirically evaluate arguments
27 about organizational legitimacy through quantitative analysis. I demonstrate that legitimacy is
28 primarily associated with legitimation attempts. However, legitimation advantages already
29 prominent TSMOs rather than those that are not, helping the reproduction of hierarchy among
30 the TSMO community. The final section discusses the implications of my findings.

1 *Understanding the Legitimacy of Transnational Social Movement Organizations*

2 The concept of TSMOs was introduced more than two decades ago by Jackie Smith and
3 her colleagues (Smith et al., 1997). Smith and Wiest (2012: 46) define TSMOs in terms of their
4 goals and objectives. A transnational private group is a TSMO if it is “explicitly involved in
5 work to change the dominant political and social order.” The definition of TSMOs by itself does
6 not imply ideological orientations, but Smith and Wiest (2012) recognize that they are mostly
7 progressive and even anti-systemic, since right-wing, nationalist groups tend to avoid publicizing
8 their work (exceptionally, see Bob (2012) for global right-wing mobilizations). Organizations
9 whose primary focus is research, religion, service provision, or education are also excluded
10 (Smith & Wiest, 2012: 70). TSMOs are thus a subset of the national and INGO population with
11 an anti-systemic focus.

12 Currently, there is no database that catalogs the entire population of INGOs. Scholars
13 often use the *Yearbook of International Organizations* as a relatively comprehensive dataset on
14 INGOs (for its sampling bias, see Bush and Hadden (2019)’s comparison with US charity
15 database). The *Yearbook* updates every year and covers both intergovernmental organizations
16 (IGOs) and private organizations. For private organizations to be included, they must hold three
17 or more offices internationally or conduct internationally-oriented activities. However, the
18 *Yearbook* does not publish its data longitudinally or in a manner that is amenable to cross-
19 sectional studies. In building the initial TSMO dataset, Smith and her colleagues reviewed the
20 historical records of the *Yearbook* and sampled the organizations that fit the above definition.

21 In the context of transnational organizations, legitimacy is defined as the belief that an
22 actor is *right* to act in the eyes of audiences. It does not mean that legitimate actors *always*
23 induce behavioral compliance by their audiences (Lake, 2009), but their claims will be heard and
24 taken seriously. If the Brookings Institution offers a view on American politics, for example,
25 other think tanks may contrast their positions with Brookings’ to legitimate them as challengers.
26 As Hudson (2001: 348) points out, legitimacy is “a socially-constructed quality that can be
27 ascribed to an NGO by stakeholders coming from different perspectives.” As such, legitimacy is
28 inherently relational, must be conferred by others, and cannot be claimed singlehandedly.

29 Although the study of TSMOs tends to assume that any TSMO is legitimate, substantial
30 differences exist between individual TSMOs. To measure the legitimacy of TSMOs, I use a
31 dataset on networks of TSMOs (Smith et al., 2018). This network data also comes from the

1 *Yearbook*, but importantly, network ties are *self-reported collaboration* between TSMOs. The
2 nature of self-reporting could harm measurement validity if we analyze actual cooperation and
3 collaboration among TSMOs. However, self-reporting works well for the purpose of measuring
4 organizational legitimacy. For example, if A reports a tie to B, B should also have collaboration
5 with A, but this does not necessarily mean that B *reports* a tie with A. TSMOs do not have to
6 validate their ties when reporting to the *Yearbook*, so they may aspirationally name other
7 organizations as a way to legitimate themselves before their peers. Conversely, even if a TSMO
8 works with other organizations, it may not mention some unimportant ones.

9 From this vantage point, the number of *incoming* ties can be interpreted as an indicator of
10 organizational legitimacy. The more legitimate a TSMO, the more likely it is to have incoming
11 ties from other organizations seeking to benefit from association with a legitimate actor. This
12 legitimization practice is widely adopted by private organizations, including for-profit firms,
13 which often use association with high-status firms as a quality signaling in market settings
14 (Kilduff & Krackhardt, 1994; Podolny, 1993). To use a more concrete example of Amnesty
15 International, TSMOs may be interested in Amnesty International's global reach and stated
16 commitment to representation of diverse views on human rights. Other might appreciate
17 Amnesty's effectiveness in securing attention from global media outlets (Powers, 2018).
18 Whatever the reason may be, TSMOs like Amnesty International are likely to end up with having
19 more incoming ties than outgoing ties because peers want to leverage connections with
20 legitimate organizations. Conversely, I use *outgoing* ties to approximate the intensity of
21 legitimization efforts.

22 My use of peer networks builds upon existing efforts to use incoming ties as an indicator
23 of organizational legitimacy. Mitchell and Stroup (2017) measure organizational reputation
24 based on the self-reporting of INGOs during interviews with INGO staff. Similarly, Murdie and
25 Davis (2012) create a matrix of INGO network ties based on the *Yearbook* data, and Stroup and
26 Wong (2017) provide a ranking of INGOs in terms of authority based on the number of incoming
27 ties.

28 To be sure, legitimacy may be observable in other places. For example, differences in
29 INGO legitimacy can be observed from the frequency by which media outlets quote INGOs:
30 legitimate INGOs are more often cited to boost the credibility of news stories (Thrall, Stecula, &
31 Sweet, 2014). However, a focus on peer networks has two major advantages. First, data on non-

1 peer organizations would introduce selection bias. We cannot observe TSMOs if they do not
2 receive any attention, *even if* they are engaged in legitimation practices. The TSMO dataset
3 allows us to observe negative cases since all TSMOs are observable regardless of the attention
4 they receive. Second, because of counter-hegemonic ambitions, TSMOs may be less interested in
5 the response of pro-system actors. Pro-system actors, such as states, corporations, and INGOs
6 that frequently partner with states and corporations, typically undermine rather than help
7 transnational social movements (Smith et al., 2017). This context in effect creates a hard test for
8 my hypotheses based on INGO research. Because INGOs include pro-system actors, if the
9 insights of INGO research are able to account for TSMO legitimacy among peers, they should
10 also work when we analyze TSMO legitimacy among other groups.

11 12 *Understanding Legitimacy in Transnational Private Organizations*

13 Existing research has adopted network perspectives to understand the legitimacy of
14 INGOs. I highlight four findings from network theories to motivate my analysis of TSMO
15 networks. First, the choice of strategies within networks can shape structural properties, such as
16 international norms, which in turn affect the legitimacy of agents. For example, Goddard (2006)
17 argues that entrepreneurial agents in international networks are able to effect changes in
18 normative structures. Others have explored how organizational strategies, in the context of
19 networks, affect advocacy output (Luxon & Wong, 2017) or their ability to affect international
20 norms (Wong, 2012). Although INGOs and TSMOs are constrained by international structures,
21 network theory allows us to examine if and how organizations can effect changes in broader
22 social structures.

23 Second, networks between INGOs and other types of actors can be seen as co-
24 constitutive of legitimacy. For instance, given substantial attention to the “democratic deficit” in
25 global governance, IGOs are increasingly “opening up” to INGO participation (Bernauer,
26 Böhmelt, & Koubi, 2013; Tallberg, Sommerer, & Squatrito, 2013). INGOs generate
27 accountability for IGOs, and in turn, participating INGOs increase their voice in global
28 governance. Research has documented that some TSMOs also leverage their networks to
29 increase their legitimacy. Smith (2001) argues that appeals to international law provided
30 legitimacy to the TSMOs protesting the WTO in Seattle. Similarly, the work of environmental

1 TSMOs was legitimated by national elites and marginalized states (Caniglia, 2001; Smith,
2 2014).

3 Third, networks among INGOs are frequently analyzed as attempts to build legitimacy. In
4 the analysis of what she terms free-riding behavior, Murdie (2014b) argues that outgoing ties by
5 human rights INGOs to other INGOs are attempts to increase their legitimacy. Carpenter (2011)
6 also argues that agenda setting by INGOs at the center of advocacy networks create
7 “bandwagoning effect” where smaller INGOs join the coalition and bolster their legitimacy by
8 joining the advocacy winners.


9 Finally, the effect of networks on legitimacy is well-established in sociology, although
10 the focus tended to be domestic organizations. Kamens (1977) shows how universities and
11 colleges create certain discourse about education that legitimates particular organizational
12 structures. Organizations also leverage their connections to influential companies and local
13 communities (Galaskiewicz, 1979). Similar to IGO-INGO relations, corporations and charitable
14 organizations have mutually co-constitutive legitimacy (Galaskiewicz, Wasserman,
15 Rauschenbach, Bielefeld, & Mullaney, 1985; Miles & Cameron, 1982). Others show how the
16 structure of networks affected the legitimacy of small- to medium-sized corporations in the
17 United States (Human & Provan, 2000). In short, the existing network literature on INGOs and
18 organizational sociology has demonstrated how ties among actors, while also useful for other
19 purposes, are mechanisms for building and defending legitimacy.

21 *Who Is Legitimate?*

22 In this section, I describe different levels of legitimacy among TSMOs, using the latest
23 TSMO dataset.² The dataset by Smith et al. (2018) has two files. One file reports a variety of
24 organizational attributes, including the location of headquarters, the issue areas of operation, and
25 the years of founding, every odd number year from 1981 to 2013. The other file reports TSMO
26 networks in 1993, 2003, and 2013.³ These networks capture all sorts of “horizontal,”
27 collaborative self-reported connections between TSMOs. In other words, they do not indicate
28 formal hierarchies, such as founder-founded relationship or official membership to an umbrella
29 organization.⁴ As I discussed above, however, the nature of self-reported ties creates a *de facto*
30 hierarchy among TSMOs in terms of organizational legitimacy. Both files are based on the
31 entries of the *Yearbook*.

I merged these two data files as cross-sectional data to overcome observation bias. Because data on TSMO networks only include organizations that have ties, they miss a large number of organizations that are not involved in any networking efforts. To avoid the selection bias of observing only positive cases (Geddes, 1990), I need to compare TSMOs that engaged in networking *and* ones that did not. Thus, my analysis treats incoming and outgoing ties as organizational attributes. Since network data are available only in 1993, 2003, and 2013, I also took the subset of organizational data in these years. The number of organizations in my dataset is 4,946 (1,045, 1,879, and 2,022 in 1993, 2003, and 2013, respectively).


Figure 1: Histogram for legitimacy of TSMOs



Descriptively, the TSMOs that are legitimate or involved in legitimation are relatively uncommon. We can see this from both incoming ties and outgoing ties (see Table A1 for summary statistics). As Figure 1 shows, the majority of the TSMOs receive no tie (73.1%). This pattern by itself challenges the widespread portrayal of TSMOs as a highly networked community (Carroll, 2007; Juris, 2008; Wolfson & Funke, 2017). More importantly, it suggests that organizational legitimacy is rare, or very few TSMOs are legitimate enough to induce others to claiming association. Yet, the finding is consistent with existing INGO research. For example, Stroup and Wong (2017) find that only a handful of INGOs have authority before multiple audiences and the vast majority of them have none.

In terms of legitimation, the majority of the TSMOs also do not send ties (67.1%), as shown in Figure 2. Some TSMOs have extreme values due to the self-reporting nature of the *Yearbook*,⁵ suggesting that the strategy of networking is not uniformly distributed among TSMOs. The low number of outgoing ties suggests that TSMOs do not just “name drop.” It represents costly networking, in which TSMOs strategically send ties to other INGOs rather than sending them automatically by working in the same issue area.

Figure 2: Histogram for networking effort of TSMOs



The scarcity of observed networking behavior among TSMOs does not necessarily mean that they lack an interest in developing and defending their legitimacy. As a point of comparison to INGOs, I use Stroup and Wong (2017)’s list of top fourteen INGOs in terms of the amount of attention paid by a variety of audiences, such as states, corporations, and peer INGOs. Among the fourteen INGOs, eleven are identified as TSMOs.⁶ As Table 1 reports, not all leading INGOs are highly legitimate in the TSMO community, which suggests that TSMOs might be unique in terms of their ideas about what a legitimate organization should look like (See also Table A2 for 1993 and 2003 data and Figure A1 for network diagram). As discussed above, Smith and Wiest (2012) define TSMOs in terms of their counter-hegemonic goals and objectives, a position that is not always welcomed by other actors, especially states and corporations. Below, I take a closer look to investigate which factors explain the legitimacy of TSMOs.

Table 1: Legitimacy ranking of TSMOs from 2013 data

Rank	TSMO	# of Outgoing Ties	# of Incoming Ties
1	GLOBAL CALL FOR ACTION AGAINST POVERTY	85	27
2	AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL	1	25
3	INTERNATIONAL UNION FOR CONSERVATION OF NATURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES	6	21
4	INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT MOVEMENT	4	18
5	OXFAM	10	16
6	WORLDWIDE FUND FOR NATURE (WWF)	0	15
7	UNIVERSAL ESPERANTO ASSOCIATION	31	14
8	FRIENDS OF THE EARTH INTERNATIONAL	5	11
9	ALLIANCE FOR LOBBYING TRANSPARENCY AND ETHICS REGULATION (ALTER-EU)	23	10
10	CARE INTERNATIONAL	0	10
11	ACTIONAID	18	9
12	GREENPEACE INTERNATIONAL	4	9
13	INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS	0	9
14	UNREPRESENTED NATIONS AND PEOPLES' ORGANIZATION	36	8
15	HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH	13	8
16	ENVIRONMENTAL DEVELOPMENT ACTION IN THE THIRD WORLD	3	8
17	WORLD SOCIAL FORUM	0	7
18	HAGUE APPEAL FOR PEACE	59	6
19	INTERNATIONAL ALERT	22	6
20	INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE AGAINST HUNGER (IAAH)	12	6
	Mean	1.33	0.55
	Sum	2,684	1,118
	SD	5.36	1.59
	N = 2,022		

What Explains Legitimacy?

If some TSMOs stake their legitimacy on being counter-hegemonic actors, what are the organizational attributes that satisfy such expectations? Here, I derive several hypotheses from the literature on INGOs. First, networking behavior, such as making a claim to work with other INGOs, can be used as an attempt to increase legitimacy. For example, Bob (2005) argues that insurgent groups seek to obtain the endorsement of highly legitimate INGOs. I expect that the more they send ties, the more others will respond in kind, thereby creating legitimacy (through incoming ties) for themselves.

H1: The more ties a TSMO will send, the more legitimacy it will gain among its peers.

Another plausible explanation is that affiliation with IGOs increases TSMO legitimacy by sending credible signals. Murdie (2014a) finds that INGOs with IGO consultative status are more likely to be effective in international development, as consultative status works as a costly

1 signal to local and international donors. It is costly because the requirements for such
2 consultative status are heavy, and an INGO must have the capacity to go through the long
3 process of obtaining consultative status. Moreover, consultative status gives INGOs standing
4 before states in IGOs and helps them link to other INGOs. Murdie (2013) finds that human rights
5 NGOs with IGO consultative status are more likely to be connected with one another. However,
6 as social movements frequently target IGOs as neoliberal institutions (Ayres, 2004), consultative
7 status may tarnish TSMO legitimacy by signaling pro-system positions. INGO signaling
8 behavior is measured by the number of IGO affiliations.

9
10 *H2: A TSMO will gain more legitimacy as the number of IGO affiliations increase.*
11

12 The divide between the global North and South is a critical element that counter-
13 hegemonic movements seek to address (Evans, 2012; Smith et al., 2018; Smith & Wiest, 2012).
14 And yet, the existing literature suggests that the connection with Northern INGOs is essential for
15 Southern INGOs to achieve their goals, mainly because Northern INGOs enjoy larger social and
16 economic resources necessary to influence states and IGOs (Bob, 2005; Carpenter, 2007; Keck
17 & Sikkink, 1998). Northern TSMOs may therefore induce networking behavior of others. Here,
18 TSMOs are treated as Northern INGOs if they have primary or secondary headquarters in the
19 global North.

20
21 *H3: TSMOs located in the global North are more legitimate than those located in the global*
22 *South.*
23

24 Finally, organizational age may be associated with TSMO legitimacy, as TSMOs may be
25 able to establish their brand associated with their issue areas of operation over time. Household
26 names, such as Amnesty International and Oxfam, were indeed established more than half a
27 century ago. Operating for a long time also signals an ability to survive in a changing
28 environment. Organizational age is computed as the data year (1993, 2003, or 2013) minus the
29 year of TSMO founding.⁷
30

31 *H4: On average, older TSMOs are more legitimate than younger TSMOs.*

Estimation methods

To test the hypothesized relationships, I control for other factors that might confound TSMO legitimacy. First, the size of a TSMO can shape prominence and thus organizational legitimacy. Typically, size is seen as budget, but the dataset does not report the budget of TSMOs. Instead, I use the number of countries where a TSMO operates as the measure for organizational scale, with the assumption that operating in more countries indicates a greater fiscal capacity. Second, TSMOs working in multiple issue areas may have greater legitimacy because they can bridge different clusters of organizations (Granovetter, 1977; Murdie & Davis, 2012). I therefore control for whether or not a TSMO operates in multiple issue areas.

Even though the dataset is panel-structured, the variation among the indicators within each TSMO is over time quite low. For example, once a TSMO is established in the global South, it is uncommon to move its headquarters to the global North. Therefore, rather than including time fixed effects or a lagged dependent variables, I resorted to a pooled regression with organizational fixed effects. Organizational fixed effects account for the unobservable, idiosyncratic effects on organizational legitimacy that are specific to each TSMO (Vaisey & Miles, 2017).

It is important to note that the dependent variable is not tie activation itself, but the number of incoming ties. In network terms, it is called indegree centrality. While tie activation is estimated with exponential random graph models (ERGMs) (Cranmer & Desmarais, 2011), indegree centrality is often estimated by regression analysis (Faris & Felmlee, 2011; Lyle & Smith, 2014). In my case, the dependent variable is a count variable with many zero observations (73.1%). To account for overdispersion and zero-inflation, I adopted a zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) model. ZINB regression assumes that observed zeros are generated by two different, unobservable processes: the zero-inflation stage estimates the latent group membership of the sample that could have *never* received a tie (*structural zeros*), while the conditional stage estimates the number of ties for the rest of the sample, some of which happened to receive no tie (*incidental zeros*) (Hendrix & Wong, 2013; Long, 1997). In my interpretation, structural zeros may be generated by *visibility*. In other words, if a TSMO is not visible to its peers, it could never be mentioned. By contrast, incidental zeros may result from the lack of organizational attributes necessary to TSMO legitimacy, even if the organization is known by others. As a

1 robustness check, I also conducted ERGMs to explicit account for network dependency (see
2 Tables A3 and A4), but the results are consistent with my findings below.

3
4 *Determinants of legitimacy*

5 Table 2 reports the results of regression analysis. Observations with missing data were
6 removed, which gives us a total of 3,447 observations. For robustness checks, Model 2 (ZINB
7 without random intercepts), Model 3 (negative binomial model: NB), and Model 4 (zero-inflated
8 Poisson model: ZI Poisson) are also reported. Note that the zero-inflation stage estimates the
9 membership for the *structural-zero* group, so negative coefficients mean that such variables are,
10 in short, positively associated with visibility of a TSMO among peers.

1 Table 2: Results of regression analyses on the legitimacy of TSMO


Models:	ZINB	ZINB	NB	ZI Poisson
<i>Conditional stage (Estimating # of incoming ties)</i>				
Random Intercepts	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Networking	0.033*** (0.003)	0.060*** (0.006)	0.052*** (0.004)	0.022*** (0.002)
IGO Membership	0.073*** (0.010)	0.090*** (0.009)	0.078*** (0.011)	0.048*** (0.008)
HQ North	−0.251** (0.090)	−0.237** (0.079)	−0.219* (0.086)	−0.262** (0.087)
Age	−0.004* (0.002)	−0.002 (0.001)	0.005** (0.002)	−0.003 (0.002)
Country Count	0.006*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.007*** (0.001)	0.007*** (0.001)
Multiple Issue Areas	0.125 (0.087)	0.203 (0.074)	0.125* (0.087)	0.134 (0.085)
(Intercept)	−0.582*** (0.108)	−0.344*** (0.093)	−1.531*** (0.093)	−0.499*** (0.104)
<i>Zero-inflation stage (estimating structural-zero membership)</i>				
Networking	−2.794*** (0.331)	−2.410*** (0.430)		−2.351*** (0.373)
IGO Membership	−0.023 (0.048)	−0.024 (0.043)		−0.061 (0.039)
HQ North	−0.184 (0.242)	−0.155 (0.226)		−0.178 (0.212)
Age	−0.075*** (0.018)	−0.060*** (0.017)		−0.048*** (0.011)
Country Count	−0.010* (0.004)	−0.010* (0.004)		−0.006 (0.003)
Multiple Issue Areas	−0.012 (0.264)	−0.145 (0.248)		−0.042 (0.226)
(Intercept)	2.221*** (0.331)	1.990*** (0.317)		1.931*** (0.252)
N	3,447	3,447	3,447	3,447
Akaike Inf. Crit.	6,902.6	7,036.6	7,162.5	6,969.6
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	7,000.9	7,128.8	7,217.8	7,061.8

2

Across all models, I find robust support for H1 that networking behavior is positively associated with TSMO legitimacy. In the zero-inflation stage, outgoing ties are negatively associated with the structural-zero membership. This means that sending a tie to other TSMOs can increase organizational legitimacy among peers and it also increases their visibility among the broader TSMO community. In short, networking as a legitimation practice works to gain both visibility and legitimacy.

However, the marginal effect of networking might be extremely limited for smaller TSMOs. Figure 3 illustrates the marginal effect of networking behavior for two TSMOs—Amnesty International and International Union of Catholic Esperantists (IUCE)—while everything else is held at the mean for each TSMO. The marginal effects differ between these organizations because they are dependent on the values of other independent variables, but they are illustrative of the fact that already legitimate TSMOs can easily legitimate themselves with networking, while low-profile ones like IUCE have a much more difficult time.

Figure 3: Predicted legitimacy of Amnesty International and Catholic Esperantists



Collectively, this effect would help reproduce the hierarchy of legitimacy among TSMOs despite the repeated claims that TSMOs are often horizontally organized (Smith, 2002; Smith et al., 2018). Given this finding, it also makes sense that many TSMOs do not engage with networking (see Figure 2) because low-profile TSMOs, which are the vast majority of TSMOs in the dataset, do not gain much legitimacy from it. Low-profile TSMOs may be better off focusing

1 on local constituencies rather than seeking collaboration with other TSMOs, which incurs
2 transaction and administrative costs.

3 I also find support for H2 that IGO consultative status increases TSMO legitimacy. The
4 effect of each additional affiliation with an IGO is substantially larger than that of networking in
5 the conditional stage. In the zero-inflation stage, the effect is much smaller than networking and
6 not statistically significant. That is, no evidence supports that affiliation with IGOs by itself can
7 increase the visibility of a TSMO. It is only when the TSMO is known among other TSMOs that
8 IGO affiliation can increase organizational legitimacy. This may be because, while IGOs serve
9 as a venue in which TSMOs can claim credit over outcome (Betsill & Corell, 2008), civil society
10 participation in IGO meetings may not be accessible to outsider TSMOs and thus does not
11 increase organizational visibility. The results also suggest that, despite the critiques that IGOs are
12 coopted by neoliberalism (Bond, 2012; Charnovitz, 1996; Mooney, 2012; Willetts, 2006),
13 affiliation with IGOs does not damage TSMO legitimacy. Perhaps, pragmatism is important for
14 the legitimacy of counter-hegemonic movements, and anti-systemic positions can be more about
15 market positioning. For example, Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, which rejects pro-system
16 advocacy methods (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni & Bondaroff, 2014) accepted funds from the Dutch
17 National Postcode Lottery, which is run by a marketing agency.⁸

18 Contrary to my expectation in H3, having headquarters in the global North is negatively
19 associated with TSMO legitimacy. In the zero-inflation stage, the substantive effect is positive
20 but statistically insignificant. That is, I do not find that Northern TSMOs are more visible in the
21 TSMO community, perhaps because the majority of TSMOs are headquartered in the global
22 North anyway (74.8%). It is still puzzling, however, that they receive fewer ties than Southern
23 TSMOs once they are known. One could argue, given that the current structure of global
24 governance favors Northern INGOs (Barnett & Walker, 2015), Southern TSMOs that brought
25 themselves to visibility might exhibit exceptional qualities. Alternatively, organizations with
26 counter-hegemonic ambitions, such as TSMOs, might favor actors from the global South. The
27 result also points out the problem of observation bias. We know that the density of ties among
28 TSMOs is higher among Northern countries (Hughes, Peterson, Harrison, & Paxton, 2009), but it
29 does not follow that Northern TSMOs are on average more legitimate than Southern TSMOs.

30 I find limited support for H4, and organizational age has two different effects in the zero-
31 inflation and conditional stages. In the zero-inflation stage, organizational age is negatively

1 associated with the structural zero group, meaning that TSMOs are more likely to gain visibility
2 as long as they stay active. Surprisingly, however, in the conditional stage, organizational age is
3 negatively associated with legitimacy. There are two possible reasons for this. First, older
4 TSMOs have likely amassed long track records that other TSMOs can exploit to challenge their
5 legitimacy. Second, organizations that have survived for a long time may have developed a
6 narrow, path-dependent vision. If TSMOs have been successful in effecting change in the past,
7 they could be trapped in the past success model (Yanacopulos, 2015). More broadly, this finding
8 cautions us against extrapolating our knowledge from leading INGOs. For example, Amnesty
9 International and the Friends of the Earth were established more than 50 years ago, but these
10 TSMOs with high levels of legitimacy should be seen as anomalies rather than typical long-
11 standing organizations.

12 Organizational size, measured by the number of countries in which TSMOs operate, had
13 a statistically significant effect on organizational legitimacy. This is unsurprising in the sense
14 that large organizations should have relatively large operational budgets that allows them to
15 collaborate with many other TSMOs. However, the effect of organizational size on visibility was
16 statistically inconsistent. Overall, the marginal effect of organizational size was smaller than
17 networking or IGO affiliation. The result thus strongly suggests that being a large organization is
18 not the only determinant of organizational legitimacy. It does seem to help, but strategic actions,
19 such as networking and IGO affiliation, have greater impacts on the legitimacy of TSMOs.

20 Finally, I did not find the evidence of brokerage by TSMOs working in multiple issue
21 areas, such as human rights and development. While Murdie and Davis (2012) find that such
22 "hybrid" organizations play an important role in bridging different network clusters, multi-issue
23 TSMOs are not necessarily more legitimate than the rest of TSMOs. Perhaps, brokerage is not a
24 widely adopted tactic among TSMOs, as Hadden (2015) finds in the networks of climate change
25 organizations. In Appendix 3, I conducted an analysis based on ERGMs to estimate the chance
26 of legitimization between two TSMOs, which generally supports the findings presented here.

28 *Conclusion*

29 In this paper, I evaluated self-reported networks as proxies for the legitimacy of TSMOs.
30 The self-reported nature of TSMO data allowed me to exploit the incentives and disincentives of
31 associating with other organizations in a publicly accessible forum. A TSMO that reports a

1 network tie is, whether genuine or not, engaging in a strategy of legitimation. I demonstrated the
2 insights of INGO research can also explain how different strategies and organizational attributes
3 affect TSMO legitimacy. The main empirical finding is that, while TSMOs can improve their
4 legitimacy by leveraging connectivity to other TSMOs, such networking helps those that are
5 already prominent rather than lesser known TSMOs. There are also a few counter-intuitive
6 findings. Among TSMOs, Southern organizations are more likely to gain legitimacy than
7 Northern TSMOs and organizational age is negatively associated with legitimacy (although it
8 does help organizational visibility).

9 The analysis begs further research as to why the hierarchy of TSMOs is so persistent
10 despite their counter-hegemonic ambitions. I suspect it has to do with the credibility of the
11 claims (Gourevitch, Lake, & Stein, 2012). Perhaps, there is a bias in how TSMOs interpret
12 claims to have network ties. A legitimate TSMO's claims to work with other organizations
13 should be true, 1) as their reputations negate their need to make spurious claims about partners;
14 and 2) their prominence makes it more likely that misrepresentations will be reported. Such a
15 display of collaborative behavior might further increase the legitimacy of the TSMO, potentially
16 creating "free-riders" (Murdie, 2014b). Other TSMOs, on the other hand, may aspire towards
17 having connections with better-known peers, but paradoxically, the lack of erstwhile
18 interpretation makes it hard for others to interpret whether a reported tie is genuine or not.
19 Moreover, even if such TSMOs genuinely reported ties, the networked TSMO may not see them
20 as important and legitimate enough to report on a public forum. In short, peer organizations may
21 not want to react to some TSMOs based on their claims, but they trust other TSMOs because of
22 different levels of legitimacy. This insight of the winners keep on winning seems to be a logic
23 that is true in other social relations, such as corporations and individuals (Sauder, Lynn, &
24 Podolny, 2012). More broadly, structural pressure to maintain the hierarchy among TSMOs is
25 persistent, and strategic choices have positive but limited effects on most TSMOs.

26 The results also suggest that explanations for INGO behaviors generally work for TSMOs
27 despite the latter's inclination against the status quo, with the possible exception that Northern
28 TSMOs are less likely to be legitimated than Southern TSMOs. This finding illuminates the
29 challenges of being an anti-hegemonic organization. In other words, it is no surprise that TSMOs
30 prefer to work with Southern organizations in rejection of the current world order. It is more
31 surprising that other determinants of INGO legitimacy, such as IGO affiliations, translate to

1 positive effects on TSMO legitimacy. Perhaps, TSMOs are strategic about how they can achieve
2 counter-hegemonic goals, even if doing so requires some collaboration with pro-system actors.

3 My analysis also contributes to efforts to understand the networking behavior of
4 transnational private organizations. I have shown that sending an outgoing tie is an attempt at
5 legitimation *that actually works* despite its limited effect. This is a different conclusion from a
6 prominent interpretation in the INGO literature. Murdie (2014b) argues that INGOs with more
7 outgoing ties than incoming ties are “free-riders.” She finds that INGOs that have been less
8 active in advocacy events in the past are more likely to report outgoing ties, which she argues as
9 evidence of these INGOs not actively contributing to the network. While Murdie may be
10 partially correct that free-riding could happen around extremely prominent TSMOs, my finding
11 that outgoing ties increase the expected number of incoming ties offers a different insight.

12 Thus, this paper contributes to the call for more research on the strategic concerns of
13 TSMOs and INGOs. While the structural pressure exerted by shared expectations about TSMOs
14 is strong, it does not mean that TSMOs are impossible to construct their own legitimacy. Recent
15 research on INGOs has emphasized the structural properties of issue areas, such as the density of
16 organizational populations, in legitimating certain forms of organizations (Abbott, Green, &
17 Keohane, 2016; Bush & Hadden, 2019), but the agency of INGOs should not be left aside. Most
18 importantly, if TSMOs collectively act, as often stated in their goals and objectives, their
19 definition of legitimacy may shift in the way that would be more conducive to the emergence of
20 entrepreneurial transnational private organizations.

21 22 **Notes**

¹ Smith, Jackie, Dawn Wiest, Melanie M. Hughes, Samantha Plummer, Brittany Duncan. 2017. Transnational Social Movement Organizations Dataset (TSMOD), 1953-2013. [Computer file]. Pittsburgh, PA: World Historical Dataverse [distributor]. And, Hughes, Melanie M., Samantha Plummer, and Jackie Smith. 2017. Transnational Social Movement Organization Networks (TSMOnet), Version I, 1993, 2003, & 2013. [Computer File]. Pittsburgh, PA: World Historical Dataverse [distributor]

² The same as above.

³ These years were chosen by the coders, Smith et al. (2018). I focus on the ties that are described as any collaborative relationships, coded as “1” in the TSMOnet dataset.

⁴ For more, see the codebook of the TSMOnet. Hughes, Melanie M., Samantha Plummer, and Jackie Smith. 2017. Transnational Social Movement Organization Networks (TSMOnet),

Version I, 1993, 2003, & 2013. [Computer File]. Pittsburgh, PA: World-Historical Dataverse [distributor]

⁵ For example, International Campaign to Ban Land Mines has 181 and 161 outgoing ties in 2003 and 2013, when the mean of TSMOs in those years are 0.96 and 1.33, respectively.

⁶ Ten TSMOs were leading INGOs in 1993, and they were 11 in 2003 and 2013. International Campaign to Ban Land Mines were not included in 1993, presumably because it was too young (established in 1992).

⁷ A few TSMOs indicated negative ages, which were dropped from the analysis.

⁸ <http://www.theideatree.ca/sea-shepherds-8-3-million-euro-award-and-the-idea-tree/> (Accessed June 11, 2019)

Acknowledgement

I thank Jackie Smith, Samantha Plummer, and Melanie Hughes for making the TSMO dataset available. I also thank the participants of conferences at the University of Pittsburgh, ISA, and ARNOVA for constructive comments.

References

- Abbott, Kenneth W., Green, Jessica F., & Keohane, Robert O. (2016). Organizational ecology and institutional change in global governance. *International Organization*, 70(2), 247-277.
- Ayres, Jeffrey M. (2004). Framing collective action against neoliberalism: The case of the anti-globalization movement. *Journal of World-Systems Research*, 10(1), 11-34.
- Barnett, Michael, & Walker, Peter. (2015). Regime change for humanitarian aid. *Foreign Affairs*, 94, 130-141.
- Bernauer, Thomas, Böhmelt, Tobias, & Koubi, Vally. (2013). Is there a democracy–civil society paradox in global environmental governance? *Global Environmental Politics*, 13(1), 88-107.
- Betsill, Michele Merrill, & Corell, Elisabeth. (2008). *NGO diplomacy: The influence of nongovernmental organizations in international environmental negotiations*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Bob, Clifford. (2005). *The marketing of rebellion: Insurgents, media, and international activism*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- . (2012). *The global right wing and the clash of world politics*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Boli, John, & Thomas, George M. (1999). *Constructing world culture: International nongovernmental organizations since 1875*. Stanford University Press.
- Bond, Patrick. (2012). *Politics of climate justice: Paralysis above, movement below*. Scottsville, South Africa: University of Kwazulu-Natal Press.
- Bush, Sarah Sunn, & Hadden, Jennifer. (2019). Density and decline in the founding of international NGOs in the united states. *International Studies Quarterly*, 63(4), 1133-1146.
- Caniglia, Beth. (2001). Informal alliances vs. Institutional ties: The effects of elite alliances on environmental tsmo networks. *Mobilization: An International Quarterly*, 6(1), 37-54.
- Carpenter, R. Charli. (2007). Setting the advocacy agenda: Theorizing issue emergence and nonemergence in transnational advocacy networks. *International Studies Quarterly*, 51(1), 99-120.
- . (2011). Vetting the advocacy agenda: Network centrality and the paradox of weapons norms. *International Organization*, 65(1), 69-102.
- . (2014). *"Lost" causes: Agenda setting and agenda-vetting in the global issues networks*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Carroll, William. (2007). Hegemony and counter-hegemony in a global field. *Studies in Social Justice*, 1(1), 36.
- Charnovitz, Steve. (1996). Two centuries of participation: NGOs and international governance. *Michigan Journal of International Law*, 18, 183-286.

- Cranmer, Skyler J., & Desmarais, Bruce A. (2011). Inferential network analysis with exponential random graph models. *Political Analysis*, 19(1), 66-86.
- Dauvergne, Peter, & LeBaron, Genevieve. (2014). *Protest inc.: The corporatization of activism*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
- Deloffre, Maryam Zarnegar, & Schmitz, Hans Peter. (2019). INGO legitimacy: Challenges and responses. In T. Davies (Ed.), *Routledge handbook of NGOs and international relations*: Routledge.
- DiMaggio, Paul J., & Powell, Walter W. (1983). The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organization fields. *American Sociological Review*, 48(2), 147-160.
- Evans, Peter. (2012). Counter-hegemonic globalization. In G. Ritzer (Ed.), *The wiley-blackwell encyclopedia of globalization*. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Faris, Robert, & Felmlee, Diane. (2011). Status struggles: Network centrality and gender segregation in same-and cross-gender aggression. *American Sociological Review*, 76(1), 48-73.
- Galaskiewicz, Joseph. (1979). The structure of community organizational networks. *Social Forces*, 57(4), 1346-1364.
- Galaskiewicz, Joseph, Wasserman, Stanley, Rauschenbach, Barbara, Bielefeld, Wolfgang, & Mullaney, Patti. (1985). The influence of corporate power, social status, and market position on corporate interlocks in a regional network. *Social Forces*, 64(2), 403-431.
- Geddes, Barbara. (1990). How the cases you choose affect the answers you get: Selection bias in comparative politics. *Political Analysis*, 2(1), 131-150.
- Goddard, Stacie E. (2006). Uncommon ground: Indivisible territory and the politics of legitimacy. *International Organization*, 60(1), 35-68.
- Gourevitch, Peter A., Lake, David A., & Stein, Janice Gross (Eds.). (2012). *The credibility of transnational NGOs: When virtue is not enough*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Granovetter, Mark S. (1977). The strength of weak ties *American journal of sociology* (Vol. 78, pp. 1360-1380): Elsevier.
- Hadden, Jennifer. (2015). *Networks in contention: The divisive politics of global climate change*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Hendrix, Cullen S., & Wong, Wendy H. (2013). When is the pen truly mighty? Regime type and the efficacy of naming and shaming in curbing human rights abuses. *British Journal of Political Science*, 43(3), 651-672.
- Hudson, Alan. (2001). NGOs' transnational advocacy networks: From 'legitimacy' to 'political responsibility'? *Global Networks*, 1(4), 331-352.
- Hughes, Melanie M., Paxton, Pamela, Quinsaat, Sharon, & Reith, Nicholas. (2018). Does the global north still dominate the international women's movement? A network analysis of women's international nongovernmental organizations, 1978-2008. *Mobilization: An International Quarterly*, 23(1), 1-21.
- Hughes, Melanie M., Peterson, Lindsey, Harrison, Jill Ann, & Paxton, Pamela. (2009). Power and relation in the world polity: The INGO network country score, 1978-1998. *Social Forces*, 87(4), 1711-1742.
- Human, Sherrie E., & Provan, Keith G. (2000). Legitimacy building in the evolution of small-firm multilateral networks: A comparative study of success and demise. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 45(2), 327-365.

- Juris, Jeffrey S. (2008). *Networking futures: The movements against corporate globalization*: Duke University Press.
- Kamens, David H. (1977). Legitimizing myths and educational organization: The relationship between organizational ideology and formal structure. *American Sociological Review*, 208-219.
- Keck, Margaret, & Sikkink, Kathryn. (1998). *Activists beyond borders: Advocacy networks in international politics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Kilduff, Martin, & Krackhardt, David. (1994). Bringing the individual back in: A structural analysis of the internal market for reputation in organizations. *Academy of management journal*, 37(1), 87-108.
- Lake, David A. (2009). *Hierarchy in international relations*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Lake, David A., & Wong, Wendy H. (2009). The politics of networks: Interests, power, and human rights norms. In M. Kahler (Ed.), *Networked politics: Agency, power, and governance*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Long, J. Scott. (1997). *Regression models for categorical and limited dependent variables*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Luxon, Emily M., & Wong, Wendy H. (2017). Agenda-setting in greenpeace and amnesty: The limits of centralisation in international NGOs. *Global Society*, 1-31.
- Lyle, Henry F., & Smith, Eric A. (2014). The reputational and social network benefits of prosociality in an andean community. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 111(13), 4820-4825.
- Miles, Robert H, & Cameron, Kim S. (1982). *Coffin nails and corporate strategies*: Prentice Hall.
- Mitchell, George E., & Stroup, Sarah S. (2017). The reputations of NGOs: Peer evaluations of effectiveness. *The Review of International Organizations*, 12(3), 397-419.
- Mooney, Pat. (2012). Civil society strategies and the stockholm syndrome. *Development Dialogue*, 61(September), 327-331.
- Murdie, Amanda. (2013). The ties that bind: A network analysis of human rights international nongovernmental organizations. *British Journal of Political Science*, 44(1), 1-27.
- . (2014a). *Help or harm: The human security effects of international NGOs*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- . (2014b). The ties that bind: A network analysis of human rights international nongovernmental organizations. *British Journal of Political Science*, 44(01), 1-27.
- Murdie, Amanda, & Davis, David. (2012). Shaming and blaming: Using events data to assess the impact of human rights INGOs. *International Studies Quarterly*, 56(1), 1-16.
- Podolny, Joel M. (1993). A status-based model of market competition. *American Journal of Sociology*, 98(4), 829-872.
- Powers, Matthew. (2018). *NGOs as newsmakers: The changing landscape of international news*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
- Sauder, Michael, Lynn, Freda, & Podolny, Joel M. (2012). Status: Insights from organizational sociology. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 38, 267-283.
- Smith, Jackie. (2001). Globalizing resistance: The battle of seattle and the future of social movements. *Mobilization: An International Quarterly*, 6(1), 1-19.
- . (2002). Bridging global divides? Strategic framing and solidarity in transnational social movement organizations. *International Sociology*, 17(4), 505-528.

- . (2014). Counter-hegemonic networks and the transformation of global climate politics: Rethinking movement-state relations. *Global Discourse*, 4(2-3), 120-138.
- Smith, Jackie, Chatfield, Charles, & Pagnucco, Ron. (1997). *Transnational social movements and global politics: Solidarity beyond the state*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
- Smith, Jackie, Gemici, Basak, Plummer, Samantha, & Hughes, Melanie M. (2018). Transnational social movement organizations and counter-hegemonic struggles today. *Journal of World-Systems Research*, 24(2), 372-403.
- Smith, Jackie, Plummer, Samantha, & Hughes, Melanie M. (2017). Transnational social movements and changing organizational fields in the late twentieth and early twenty - first centuries. *Global Networks*, 17(1), 3-22.
- Smith, Jackie, & Wiest, Dawn. (2012). *Social movements in the world-system: The politics of crisis and transformation*. New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Stroup, Sarah S., & Wong, Wendy H. (2017). *The authority trap: Strategic choices of international NGOs*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Tallberg, Jonas, Sommerer, Thomas, & Squatrito, Theresa. (2013). *The opening up of international organizations*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Tarrow, Sidney. (2005). *The new transnational activism*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Thrall, A. Trevor, Stecula, Dominik, & Sweet, Diana. (2014). May we have your attention please? Human-rights NGOs and the problem of global communication. *The International Journal of Press/Politics*, 19(2), 135-159.
- Willets, Peter. (2006). The cardoso report on the un and civil society: Functionalism, global corporatism, or global democracy? *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations*, 12(3), 305-324.
- Wolfson, Todd, & Funke, Peter N. (2017). Contemporary social movements and media: The emergent nomadic political logic and its nervous system.
- Wong, Wendy H. (2012). *Internal affairs: How the structure of NGOs transforms human rights*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Yanacopulos, Helen. (2015). *International NGO engagement, advocacy, activism: The faces and spaces of change*. Springer.

Appendix

Table A1: Summary statistics

Statistic	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
# of Incoming Ties	4,938	0.607	1.711	0	30
# of Outgoing Ties	4,938	1.448	5.439	0	181
IGO Membership	3,651	2.053	3.159	0	44
HQ North	4,756	0.744	0.436	0	1
Organizational Age	4,756	24.672	21.687	0	174
Multiple Issue Areas	4,938	0.212	0.409	0	1
Country Count	4,919	21.837	28.605	0	188

Table A2: Legitimacy ranking of TSMOs

1993

Rank	TSMO	# of Outgoing Ties	# of Incoming Ties
1	CENTRE FOR OUR COMMON FUTURE	96	30
2	INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT MOVEMENT	46	24
3	WORLD ORGANIZATION AGAINST TORTURE	30	20
4	INTERNATIONAL UNION FOR CONSERVATION OF NATURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES	41	17
5	WORLDWIDE FUND FOR NATURE (WWF)	47	16
6	ELC INTERNATIONAL / ENVIRONMENTAL LIAISON CENTRE	14	16
7	UNIVERSAL ESPERANTO ASSOCIATION	71	15
8	EUROPEAN YOUTH FOR ACTION	23	15
9	INTER-AFRICAN COMMITTEE ON TRADITIONAL PRACTICES AFFECTING THE HEALTH OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AFRICA	28	14
10	AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL	21	13
11	FRIENDS OF THE EARTH INTERNATIONAL	21	12
12	INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS	23	11
13	WOMEN'S GLOBAL NETWORK ON REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS	18	11
14	WOMEN'S EXCHANGE PROGRAMME INTERNATIONAL	16	11
15	WORLD FEDERATION OF DEMOCRATIC YOUTH	18	10
16	DEVELOPMENT INNOVATIONS AND NETWORKS / ASSOCIATION OF DEVELOPMENT INNOVATIONS AND NETWORKS	6	10
17	WORLD JEWISH CONGRESS	6	10
18	NGO COMMITTEE ON THE FAMILY	3	10
19	INTERNATIONAL UNION OF STUDENTS	27	9
20	INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL OF WOMEN	17	9
	Mean	2.56	0.10
	Sum	2,663	1,142
	SD	6.00	2.47
	N = 1,042		

2003

Rank	TSMO	# of Outgoing Ties	# of Incoming Ties
1	THE HAGUE APPEAL FOR PEACE CAMPAIGN	24	19
2	AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL	5	18
3	UNIVERSAL ESPERANTO ASSOCIATION	17	14
4	INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS	1	13
5	HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH	2	8
6	INTERNATIONAL UNION FOR CONSERVATION OF NATURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES	0	8
7	OXFAM	0	8
8	WORLD ORGANIZATION AGAINST TORTURE	36	7
9	WORLDWIDE FUND FOR NATURE (WWF)	6	7
10	INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS LEAGUES	5	7
11	WORLD JEWISH CONGRESS	1	7
12	INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO BAN LAND MINES	181	6
13	DEVELOPMENT INNOVATIONS AND NETWORKS / ASSOCIATION OF DEVELOPMENT INNOVATIONS AND NETWORKS	51	6
14	INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT MOVEMENT	5	6
15	ENVIRONMENTAL DEVELOPMENT ACTION IN THE THIRD WORLD	3	6
16	ABOLITION 2000-GLOBAL NETWORK TO ELIMINATE NUCLEAR WEAPONS	0	6
17	INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE OF WOMEN	0	6
18	WORLD CONFERENCE ON RELIGION AND PEACE	28	5
19	ARAB LAWYERS' UNION	9	5
20	PAX CHRISTI INTERNATIONAL CATHOLIC PEACE MOVEMENT	4	5
	Mean	0.96	0.39
	Sum	1,804	737
	SD	5.10	1.19
	N = 1,874		


Figure A1: Network diagrams

Green nodes are leading INGOs identified by Stroup and Wong (2017). Node size is proportionate to legitimacy (# of incoming ties). Isolates are removed. Graphs were generated by the Force Atlas algorithm in Gephi.


1993



2003



2013



Appendix 3: Exponential Random Graph Models

I conduct the analysis of exponential random graph models (ERGMs) to estimate the chance of having a tie between two TSMOs. Although the dependent variable is different from the ZINB model discussed in the main text, it measures a similar outcome: what drives TSMOs to confer legitimacy on another organization. The advantage of ERGMs is that they can estimate the effects of different logics of tie activation, while explicitly taking account for network structures through Markov chain Monte Carlo simulations (Cranmer & Desmarais, 2011). ERGMs assume that the observed network is just one realization of many possible networks and simulate a network many times to evaluate if a tie between two nodes occurs randomly or systematically.

First of all, I consider *reciprocity*. This network statistic estimates the likelihood of receiving a tie back when a TSMO sends a tie to another TSMO: when j sends a tie to i , what is the chance of i sending a tie back to j ? In my interpretation, this represents the mechanism of direct legitimation.

I also consider three types of network clustering. The first clustering is a mechanism by which TSMOs send a tie because the tie recipients successfully signal its legitimacy through its association with a legitimate TSMO. In network terms, this relationship is called *transitive*: i sends a tie to j when both i and j send a tie to k . In my interpretation, this represents the case where k is locally seen as a legitimate TSMO, and thus being associated with k increases the chance of legitimation by peers. The second clustering is called *cyclical*: i sends a tie to j when j sends a tie to k and k sends a tie to i . I doubt this is a common phenomenon because deferential relationship should not be circular. I included this network statistic to evaluate how much more likely transitive relations are to occur relative to other kinds of triadic relations. Finally, I also consider network centralization because the network data, as suggested in Figures 1 and 2, have highly uneven distribution of ties among TSMOs.^{ix} The primary purpose of this network statistic to help Markov chain Monte Carlo estimation converge by constraining the degree distribution of a network.

To explore homophily effects, I included headquarter locations (global North) and United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) affiliation, given that these are salient explanations in the regression analysis above. I chose ECOSOC since it is an IGO that is well-

known and used widely in the study of INGOs (Murdie, 2014a). I also account for organizational age, which estimates the chance of a tie when age difference between TSMOs increase by one year.^x

Finally, I consider the issue areas of operation to evaluate functionalism. This is statistically equivalent to the inclusion of other organizational attributes, just like the case of homophily. I separate this mechanism from others because in real-world practices the functional logic that motivates a tie among TSMOs should not be organizational similarities *per se*, but the functional needs to achieve something in the issue area in question.

Table A3 reports the results of estimations. Because the size of a network varies by year, the results are also reported by year. Coefficients are changes in the log-odds of a tie, so they can be interpreted in the same way logistic regression coefficients are interpreted. The number of edges serve as a *baseline* likelihood; when simulation includes this network statistic alone, the likelihood of a tie equals the density of a network, which can be understood as a random assignment of realized ties in the network.^{xi}

Table A3: Results of ERGM for 1993, 2003, and 2013

	1993	2003	2013
Edges	−6.887*** (0.082)	−6.640*** (0.092)	−6.957*** (0.072)
Mutual	7.612*** (0.134)	3.780*** (0.167)	5.232*** (0.118)
HQ North	0.288*** (0.054)	0.499*** (0.083)	0.361*** (0.062)
Issue Area	1.201*** (0.058)	1.801*** (0.075)	1.518*** (0.058)
ECOSOC	−0.164** (0.051)	−0.140* (0.070)	−0.081 (0.057)
Age	−0.0003 (0.001)	−0.002 (0.001)	−0.0004 (0.001)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	9,112	8,962	13,650
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	9,173	9,024	13,717
<i>Note:</i> *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 Standard errors are in parentheses.			

Across all years, I find that a tie is much more likely to occur as a result of *reciprocity* than the other mechanisms I examined. Cyclical relations are statistically significant, but the coefficient is negative. This means that a tie is unlikely in a cyclical relationship, which is in line with my argument about how legitimation works. In fact, transitive relations have the second largest effect among independent variables. That is, association with a legitimate organization does help increase peer legitimacy.

To look at the effects more carefully, I derive the chance of tie activation from the cumulative probability distribution of the latent variables of interest. In 2013, the chance of a tie in any given dyad (*i.e.* baseline likelihood) is 0.1%. The very low baseline is expected given that the network is both large *and* directed. The chance of a tie, however, increases to 16.7% when I consider reciprocity. That is, when A sends a tie to B, B sends a tie back to A with a 16.7%

chance.^{xii} This is significantly higher than that of transitivity (0.7%), in which association with a legitimate TSMO increases the chance of tie activation. Thus, networking increases the legitimacy of a TSMO *directly* rather than indirectly. Signaling through a third party seems a reasonable strategy at first glance, but perhaps because peers are more knowledgeable about other organizations around them, it does not have a substantively important effect.

The chance of a tie via *homophily* is also quite low. The ECOSOC affiliation is negatively associated with tie activation, and the statistical significance is inconsistent (not significant in 2013). A tie is negligibly more likely among Northern TSMOs, and so is the effect of organizational age. However, the chance of a tie via *functionalism* is slightly higher, 0.4%. Overall, while I confirm that different mechanisms are at work in tie activation, direct networking is by far the most effect way of increasing legitimacy. Table A3 summarizes the estimated chance of tie activation.

Table A4: Probability of a tie based on reciprocity and shared attributes

Year	Baseline	Reciprocity	Northern TSMO	Issue area
1993	0.1%	67.4%	0.1%	0.3%
2003	0.1%	54.2%	0.2%	0.7%
2013	0.1%	15.1%	0.1%	0.4%

^{ix} I use indegree distribution since the network is a directed network.

^x More accurately, it estimates a change in log-odds of a tie.

^{xi} Network density = # of the observed ties / # of all possible ties. In a way, this is like the “intercept” of regression analysis.

^{xii} The chance of reciprocity is very high in 1993. I suspect this is due to a smaller size of the network (441 vs. 509, 727). Note that network matrices expand quickly with an additional node.