Kubernetes Security and stuff

LINUS ÖSTBERG linus@scilifelab.uu.se

SciLifeLab Data Centre



WHO AM I?



Linus Östberg

SciLifeLab Data Centre



talavis



linus@oestberg.dev



WHERE TO START?

- Risk assessment
- Threat modelling
- Laws
- Requirements from organisations

CIA

- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability

FUNDAMENTALS

- Defence in depth
- Least privilege
- Zero trust
- Separation of duties

CLOUD-NATIVE SECURITY

- Code
- Containers
- Clusters
- Cloud (on-premise)

CODE

- Security starts in the application
- Secure software development

SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY

- Trusting third-party libraries
 - Have you analysed the code of all third-party libraries before use?
 - Did you verify their integrity?
- Do you keep all libraries up-to-date?

THIRD-PARTY SECURITY VULNERABILITIES

- Automated warnings about security vulnerabilities
- Snyk
- Trivy
- Dependabot

TASK: Scanning with Trivy

- https://github.com/ScilifelabDataCentre/ lunch-menu
- Are there any known vulnerabilities?
- Use trivy, snyk, or any other scanner
- Hints:
 - requirements.txt
 - yarn.lock
 - trivy fs

What is a container?

What are the differences between a container and a virtual machine?

CONTAINERS

- Namespaced processes
- ▶ OCI
 - Image
 - Runtime
 - Distribution

CONTAINER RUNTIMES

- Docker
- Containerd
- ► CRI-O
- Gvisor
- Kata
- Firecracker

- Containers share the kernel
- Very sensitive data should be in different vms/clusters

- Containers share the kernel
- ► Very sensitive data should be in different vms/clusters

ROOT == ROOT != ROOT

- Container user == host user
 - User namespaces exist, but have limited support
- Capabilities
- hostUsers
- Privileged container == danger

- ► Run containers using hardened runtimes
- Kata containers (virtualisation)
- gVisor (sandbox)

TASK: USE GVISOR

https://killercoda.com/killer-shell-cks/ scenario/sandbox-gvisor

CONTAINER DRIFT

Preventing containers from doing unintended actions

SECCOMP, APPARMOR, SELINUX

- Security frameworks to add extra security
- Ubuntu: seccomp, apparmor
- Red Hat: seccomp, selinux
- Define a security profile to be used with a container
- Optimal security: define a specialised profile for each container
- Using the "runtime default" is better than nothing

TASK: USING APPARMOR

https://killercoda.com/killer-shell-cks/ scenario/apparmor

SECURITY VULNERABILITIES

- Scan the packaged software in container images
- E.g. Trivy

TASK: IMAGE AND CODE SCANNING

- https://github.com/ScilifelabDataCentre/ lunch-menu
- Do the latest container images contain any known vulnerabilities?
- Use Trivy or any other scanner
- trivy image container:label

MALICIOUS COMPLIANCE

- ▶ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9weGi0csBZM
- Possible to trick the vulnerability scanners
 - Remove package management files
 - Symlinks
 - Multi-stage builds

BUILDING CONTAINERS

- Minimise
 - Minimal base
 - Remove unused binaries
 - Squash layers
- Never include secrets during the build steps
- Automate
- Do not run as root
- Immutable

KUBERNETES

- Container orchestration
- Designed to be flexible
- Declare wanted state
 - Reconciliation loop

RUNNING WITH SCISSORS

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ltrV-Qmh3oY

OWASP KUBERNETES TOP TEN

HTTPS://OWASP.ORG/WWW-PROJECT-KUBERNETES-TOP-TEN/

K01 Insecure Workload Configurations K02 Supply Chain Vulnerabilities K03 Overly Permissive RBAC Configurations K04 Lack of Centralized Policy Enforcement K05 Inadequate Logging and Monitoring K06 Broken Authentication Mechanisms K07 Missing Network Segmentation Controls K08 Secrets Management Failures K09 Misconfigured Cluster Components K10 Outdated and Vulnerable Kubernetes Components

K10: OUTDATED AND VULNERABLE KUBERNETES COMPONENTS

- Keep Kubernetes updated
- Three most recent minor releases:
 - 1.28
 - 1.27
 - 1.26
- ► ~1 year support
- Distributions may be supported longer

K09: MISCONFIGURED CLUSTER COMPONENTS

CIS Benchmarks (kube-bench)

K08: Secrets Management Failures

- Encrypt secrets
- Vault
- Sealed secrets etc

K07: MISSING NETWORK SEGMENTATION CONTROLS

- Zero trust
- Network policies

NETWORK POLICIES

- https://editor.networkpolicy.io/
- Default: deny-all for namespace
- Minimise access

K06: Broken Authentication Mechanisms

- certificate = forever
- Service account tokens
- use MFA if possible

K05: INADEQUATE LOGGING AND MONITORING

- Audit logs, logs in external system
- Falco etc for monitoring
- Fluentbit etc
- Loki

K04: Lack of Centralized Policy Enforcement

- ▶ OPA Gatekeeper, Kyverno
- "Policies in git"

TASK: Using Kyverno

https://killercoda.com/kyverno/scenario/intro

- ► GitOps Argo
- ► Infrastructure as code
- Ansible
- "Replace one node every month"

K03: Overly Permissive RBAC Configurations

- Least Privilege
- Service account and user RBAC permissions
- Limit use of ClusterRoleBinding
- Not everyone needs admin permissions

K02: SUPPLY CHAIN VULNERABILITIES

- Security vulnerabilities in third-party libraries
- Insecure/malicious images
- Container signing
- Image minimisation

SUPPLY CHAIN VULNERABILITIES

- Signing
- Do not use untrusted images

Signing

K01: Insecure Workload Configurations

- Scanners: kube-score, kubesec, kubeaudit, snyk ...
- Pod Security Standards
- Pod admission: kyverno, Open Policy Agent Gatekeeper

POD SECURITY STANDARDS

- https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/ security/pod-security-standards/
- Apply to a namespace
- pod-security.kubernetes.io/<MODE>: <LEVEL>
- ► Enforce, audit, warn

TASK: CREATE A HARDENED DEPLOYMENT

- Make a deployment of ghcr.io/scilifelabdatacentre/menu-backend:latest
- Create a new namespace and apply the pod security standard restricted to it
- Update your deployment to allow deployment in the created namespace

HOST SECURITY

- Hardening
- ► CIS Benchmark
- Minimisation
- Firewalls

COMPLIANCE

- Not just a checklist
- Aid to make your systems more secure

- ► Least Privilege
- Defence in depth (layered security)
- Zero Trust