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Jane Hathaway

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Rewriting Eighteenth-Century Ottoman History

JANE HATHAWAY

This essay surveys twentieth-century historical writing on the Middle East and more particularly on the Ottoman Empire in the eighteenth century. It explores the pioneering works of the post-World War II era and then points to the shift from exclusively political to social and economic history beginning in the 1960s and 1970s, the increasing use of archival documents, and the inclusion in the historical narrative of women and minority populations, as well as the still-looming gaps in intellectual history. The essay's aim is to assess the century's key historiographical accomplishments while suggesting directions for the future.

The eighteenth century is a particularly problematic one in Ottoman historiography. It lies between two periods canonically defined as pre-modern and modern. Before it comes what has conventionally been regarded as the Ottoman 'Golden Age' in the sixteenth century and the corruption of the Sultanate of Women in the seventeenth. After it come the nineteenth century's social and political transformations. This, in fact, is the dominant conceptualization of the eighteenth century in a number of Mediterranean civilizations, notably France, Spain, Venice, and Morocco: it follows a time of political upheaval (often ending in renewed attempts at centralization) which itself succeeds a golden age and precedes a profound transformation featuring either the rise of the nation-state or a fundamental reconfiguration of the existing state.[1] Thus, the eighteenth century, in the Ottoman Empire as elsewhere in the Mediterranean world, is frequently characterized in terms of what went before and what came after. For much of the twentieth century, the two dominant views of the Ottoman eighteenth century were as the culmination of the Ottoman version of the *ancien régime*, on the one hand, and as the prelude to modernization-cum-Westernization, on the other. Only in the later decades of the twentieth century did the eighteenth century emerge as an era worthy of study in its own right.

This essay attempts to characterize the study of the eighteenth-century Ottoman Empire during the twentieth century. It is at once a historiographical and bibliographical survey and a rumination on accomplishments and desiderata. Although it cannot hope to be all-encompassing, it does try to be

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comprehensive. To make the exercise manageable, I have divided the discussion into five major categories: state institutions, provincial studies, intellectual and religious history, regional contextualization, and primary sources. Since I am a specialist in the Ottoman Arab provinces and Egypt in particular, literature concerning these regions will inevitably be somewhat overrepresented as compared with literature on Anatolia and the Balkans. This imbalance in itself reflects a persistent, perhaps inevitable, feature of the Ottoman field that has affected the study of the eighteenth century no less than any other subdivision of Ottoman history.

THE BIG PICTURE: THE OTTOMAN STATE IN THE ERA OF 'DECLINE'

When historians of the first half of the twentieth century attempted to reconstruct 'traditional society' in the Ottoman Empire, they often deployed the eighteenth century as a sort of snapshot of that society just before the metamorphoses wrought by Westernization. For example, a disproportionately influential work on that society, Gibb and Bowen's *Islamic Society and the West*, offers in the guise of traditional Islamic society what is in effect a portrait of the Ottoman Empire ca. 1750.[2] Although the first volume of their never completed work bore the title *Islamic Society in the Eighteenth Century*, it depicted the institutions that existed at that time as paradigmatic for the entire era stretching from the Golden Age of Süleyman I ('the Magnificent', r. 1520–66) through the beginnings of defensive Westernization under Selim III (r. 1789–1807) – the period which, not coincidentally, was typically regarded throughout much of the twentieth century as that of the empire's decline. The institutional structure that Gibb and Bowen presented was, in turn, based on a less publicized analysis of the Ottoman state during Süleyman's reign by Albert Lybyer.[3] It was Lybyer who introduced the rigidly bipartite schema of the 'ruling institution' and the 'religious institution'. The first was made up of the ministers or viziers, headed by the grand vizier, who determined military and fiscal policy, along with the palace pages and the empire's military forces. At the helm of the second was the *şeyhülislam*, or chief jurisconsult, who headed the hierarchy of ulema, the Islamic scholars who controlled religious education and the interpretation and execution of Islamic law. These two institutions, Lybyer held, were not only functionally but epistemologically separate – staffed by functionaries of fundamentally different backgrounds and training. The ruling institution was, at least until the late seventeenth century, the preserve of *devşirme* recruits, Christian boys from western Anatolia and the Balkans taken from their families, converted to Islam, and trained as either soldiers or palace pages, who, though they received an Islamic education, were first and foremost the sultan's servants. The religious institution, on the other hand, consisted of free-born Muslims of

largely Turkish origin (at least in the Balkans and Anatolia) whose principal loyalty was to the dictates of the *sharī*ᶜ*a*, or Islamic canon law. Once these institutions had fully formed, in the sixteenth century, they vied for influence in what Lybyer clearly regarded as an unfair struggle. The religious institution exploited the ruling institution as a source of institutional structure, all the while 'insinuat[ing its] appalling conservatism' into that assimilative institution, which it thereby ruined. Thus Lybyer describes the absorption of free-born Muslims into the ranks of the Ottoman armies and the palace pages. The notion that Ottoman institutions steadily and rationally adapted to changing geopolitical and military priorities, economic circumstances, demographic shifts, and religious trends was somehow alien to this scheme of a dynamic Christian institution versus a decadent and parasitic Muslim one.

Only in 1962, when Norman Itzkowitz published 'Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Realities',[4] was this portrait of the empire's institutions called into question. Itzkowitz introduced the novel idea that Lybyer's ruling and religious institutions were accompanied by a third, which he called the 'palace institution' and considered a mediator between the other two. Here he positioned the employees of the grand vizier's chancery and the financial ministry, headed by the chief financial administrator or *defterdar*. By the eighteenth century, he argued, employees of the palace institution were increasingly entering the ruling institution by being appointed grand viziers and *defterdars* in a phenomenon that Itzkowitz, referring to the titles that accompanied these institutional affiliations, dubbed 'efendi-turned-pasha'. His prime example of this phenomenon was the career path of Koca Ragib Mehmed Pasha, a religiously trained ethnic Turk who became *reisülkuttâb*, or head of diplomatic correspondence, in the 1740s and then rose to the grand vizierate in the late 1750s, meanwhile having served as governor of Egypt and *muhassıl*, or tax administrator, of the western Anatolian district of Aydın.[5]

Itzkowitz's innovation indirectly pointed the way towards the dismantling of the venerable paradigm of decline by suggesting that, far from stagnating during the 250 years between Süleyman I and Selim III, the empire's institutional structure adapted to changing circumstances. Decline itself, nonetheless, was still very much entrenched in the historiography of the eighteenth century. Even by the end of the twentieth century, when pioneering revisionists such as Linda Darling and Suraiya Faroqhi had reconstructed the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as an era of crisis and adaptation,[6] the eighteenth century was still regarded as the period when decline finally caught up with the Ottoman Empire as European imperial powers took advantage of long-standing capitulations to incorporate the empire into the emerging European-dominated world economy in a process that facilitated the rise of quasi-autonomous provincial overlords (*a*ᶜ*yān*). This, indeed, is the picture presented by Bruce McGowan in his 'The Age of the *A*ᶜ*yān*s', the third

section, following immediately on Faroqhi's, of *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire*, one of the most comprehensive works on the Ottoman Empire to be published since *Islamic Society and the West*.[7]

For analysts of the politics of the imperial capital, the eighteenth century arrives at the end of the infamous Sultanate of Women, when a series of weak and immature sultans enabled imperial wives and mothers, along with their cronies among the palace functionaries and the ulema, to exercise an inordinate degree of political influence.[8] Although the widespread soldiery revolts known as the Celâlî rebellions at the end of the sixteenth century were distant memories, as was the assassination by palace soldiers of Sultan Osman II in 1622, the potential for upheaval among the empire's soldiers, both in the capital and in the provinces, remained. In this context, the Edirne incident of 1703 and the cataclysmic Patrona Halil rebellion of 1730, which began and ended the reign of Ahmed III, seem to have been almost inevitable. The Edirne incident, a revolt of soldiery in the Ottomans' virtual second capital, the Balkan city of Edirne (Adrianople), against the inordinately powerful chief jurisconsult Feyzullah Efendi, can easily be seen as the inevitable result of the weak sultanic leadership that had allowed Feyzullah and his family to acquire so much authority. The Edirne incident has remained oddly undertreated in secondary scholarship. To Rifa'at A. Abou-El-Haj's seminal monograph we can add an unpublished doctoral thesis by Sabra Maservey.[9] Some attempt has been made by scholars of the Ottoman Arab provinces to contextualize this event by linking it to incidents in the provinces, notably a rebellion against the Ottoman governor of Jerusalem led by the local head of the descendants of the Prophet the same year.[10] Meanwhile, Madeline Zilfi has pointed out that after suffering violent internal dissension in the course of the seventeenth century, the Ottoman ulema regularized and settled into a more or less stable hierarchy in the eighteenth.[11] Against this backdrop, we can arguably reread the Edirne incident and concurrent provincial revolts involving ulema as part of this not always painless process of regularization.

Just as the Edirne incident can be seen as the culmination of the inordinate influence and political enmeshment of the ulema, so the Patrona Halil rebellion, in which military irregulars deposed Ahmed III and executed his grand vizier, can be regarded as the culmination of the penetration of mercenaries into the ranks of the Ottoman military. This process dated to the Long Wars against the Hapsburg Empire from 1595 to 1605, when the sultan was obliged to raise a peasant infantry to counter the Hapsburgs' pike formations – the same series of events that laid the ground for the Celâlî rebellions.[12] In succeeding years, mercenaries were a regular feature of both the army and the navy, and the structure of mercenary formations took on its own distinctive character. The emergence of the powerful janissary bosses so

visible in Egypt during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries[13] may perhaps reflect the influence of mercenaries. The Patrona Halil rebellion resulted from the efforts of military irregulars led by a naval boss with the mercenary title *patrona* (from the Italian *patron*, 'leader') to counter the Europeanizing tendencies of the grand vizier Nevşehirli Ibrahim Pasha. The rebellion ended with Nevşehirli Ibrahim's execution and Ahmed III's abdication. The classic treatment of this rebellion is M. Münir Aktepe's *Patrona İsyanı*,[14] which has the disadvantage of focusing entirely on the imperial centre. As in the case of the Edirne incident, we can probably assume that the rebellion had repercussions in the provinces. In Egypt, for example, 1730 marked the final triumph of the Faqārī political-military faction over the rival Qāsimī faction and inaugurated a period of some 25 years when the janissary regiment would dominate the province's political economy. This outcome reflected in part the growing prominence of Patrona Halil-like irregular forces attached to the janissary corps, which took a leading role in Egypt's political culture in the middle decades of the eighteenth century.[15]

MANY LITTLE PICTURES: PROVINCIAL STUDIES IN THE ERA OF DECENTRALIZATION

In the historiography of the Ottoman provinces, the eighteenth century has been regarded as the era during which decentralization triumphed and local notables, or *aʿyān*, came to dominate provincial administration and provincial economies. Their efflorescence resulted in no small part from the spread of the life-tenure tax farm (*iltizām*) known, at least in Anatolia and the Balkans, as *mālikāne*. The *mālikāne* made possible a landowning élite in all but name. The economic underpinnings of this pivotal development have been most cogently analyzed in the 1980s and 1990s by Mehmet Genç and Ariel Salzmann.[16] However, the study of the provincial political cultures that emerged in the wake of this development was already well developed decades before such research into political economy was attempted. Perhaps as a consequence, the two realms of inquiry – provincial political culture and provincial political economy – remained oddly separate until the very end of the twentieth century. Part of the difficulty lay in the fact that the approach to land tenure was typically statist and centrist, engaging a discourse and relying on sources that were, literally or figuratively, foreign to provincial historiography.[17] In general terms as well, the twentieth-century historiography of the Ottoman provinces developed separately from that of the central lands, largely because of the hegemony of the nation-state in the historiography of both the Arab and the Balkan provinces and, in the case of the Balkans, the pervasiveness of Soviet-style Marxist-Leninist interpretations of the Ottoman legacy.

The historiography of the Ottoman Arab provinces in the eighteenth century arguably began with reports and surveys turned out by servants of the British Empire, notably Stephen Longrigg's multiple volumes on Iraq and St. John Philby's account of nascent Saudi Arabia.[18] In the post-World War II era, a tremendous debt accrues to Peter M. Holt, who began as a British bureaucrat in the Sudan in the wake of the war but shifted during the 1950s to the study of Egypt before the nineteenth century. Holt, to a large extent, invented the scholarly study of eighteenth-century Egypt. He based his studies entirely on Arabic narrative chronicles, starting with the already well-known chronicle of ʿAbd al-Rahmān al-Jabartī (1754–1825) and then extending his range to chronicles composed earlier in the eighteenth century and in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as well.[19] From his pioneering work came the basic narrative of Ottoman Egyptian political history before the 1798 French invasion. His 1966 classic *Egypt and the Fertile Crescent*, furthermore, included in its purview greater Syria, Iraq, and the Arabian peninsula, exploiting what Arabic narrative sources were available for those provinces as well as the still severely limited secondary literature.[20] During these same years, Stanford Shaw was applying the resources of the recently opened Prime Ministry Archives in Istanbul to the study of Ottoman Egypt; his results appeared in 1962 in the ponderous *The Financial and Administrative Organization and Development of Ottoman Egypt, 1517–1798*, itself based on his 1959 doctoral dissertation.[21] Here, Shaw laid out in detail Egypt's administrative and military hierarchy and sources of revenue, both urban and rural. To a large extent, his findings corroborated those extracted by Holt from the Arabic narrative sources. It was to take several decades, however, for a second generation of scholars of Ottoman Egypt to carry forward this cross-fertilization of narrative and archival sources. I shall return to this point presently.

The historiography of eighteenth-century Syria had a more mixed record in the mid- to late twentieth century. Holt's student Abdul Karim Rafeq set out during the 1960s to produce the same sort of political-administrative narrative history that his mentor had achieved for Egypt; the result was *The Province of Damascus, 1723–1783*.[22] This study, like Holt's, was based primarily on Arabic narrative sources, notably the chronicles of ʿAbd al-Ghanī al-Nābulsī (1641–1731) and Haydar Ahmad al-Shihābī (1761?–1835?), and the biographical dictionary of Khalīl al-Murādī (1749–91), whose family monopolized the post of chief jurisconsult of Damascus during the mid- to late eighteenth century.

At just this time, the dominant interpretive paradigm for the political culture of the Arab provinces was propounded by the late Albert Hourani. I refer here to the 'politics of local notables', first put forth in a 1966 conference at the University of Chicago.[23] For better or for worse, this paper established

the paradigm of an indigenous Arab élite, known as *a ʿyān*, of tribal shaykhs, ulema, merchants, and other townsmen who served as intermediaries between the masses and the Ottoman administration. Although this paradigm pertained specifically to greater Syria (and even more specifically to Lebanon) and although Ehud Toledano has recently demonstrated that Hourani meant it as a complement to 'The Ottoman Background of the Modern Middle East',[24] it came to be applied to the Ottoman Arab provinces in general. It meshed particularly well with the nationalist assumption of a native Arab élite in at least implicit confrontation with an imposed Turkish élite and with the more recent commitment to the representation of 'authentic' Arab provincial sources and voices. Explicitly or implicitly, the local-notables paradigm has undergirded much secondary scholarship on the Arab provinces up to the present, although this scholarship has been far from uniform in approach and emphasis. The chronicle-based work of Daniel Crecelius and John Livingston on the rebellious late eighteenth-century grandee ʿAlī Bey al-Kabīr and his successors in Egypt, as well as the studies of Rafeq and Margaret Meriwether on the political and economic élites of Damascus and Aleppo, can probably be seen in this light.[25]

The relative paucity of monographic studies on the Anatolian provinces in the eighteenth century may point to the state-centred historiographical tradition dominant in modern republican Turkey. Generally, we find that while twentieth-century historians of these provinces also focused on local notables, their approach tended to be far more centrist, not unlike their approach to the related question of land tenure.[26] Nonetheless, and not coincidentally, historians from this tradition have been among the few to attempt broad, synthetic characterizations of Ottoman provincial rule such as those of Salzmann (cited above) and Engin Akarlı.[27]

Meanwhile, the Balkan and eastern European provinces enjoyed their own distinctive historiographical tradition in the twentieth century, heavily influenced by the Marxist principles of the former Warsaw Pact states and by the heavily anti-Ottoman cast of their national histories. Before the fall of the Iron Curtain, the chief work on the eighteenth-century Balkans was produced by scholars such as Bulgaria's Vera Mutafchieva, who managed to combine orthodox Marxist analysis with Bulgarian nationalism in studies that characterized the Ottoman land-tenure system as feudal, featuring a foreign class of Ottoman prebends exploiting an indigenous peasantry.[28] Meanwhile, publications resembling the administrative studies of Holt and Shaw were produced for the provinces in the region of the former Yugoslavia by Charles and Barbara Jelavich and for the European provinces of the Ottoman Empire generally by Peter Sugar.[29] Greece and particularly the northeastern city of Salonika under Ottoman rule were represented by the works of Nikos Svoronos and M. Lascaris.[30]

None of these works made extensive use of the rich trove of documentation available in the Muslim court archives of the various provinces. Beginning in the 1970s, however, in conjunction with the new emphasis on social history within the historical discipline as a whole, a veritable revolution occurred in provincial historiography as a result of the exploitation of Muslim court registers (s. *sijill*) as a source for local microhistories. The ground-breaking work in this genre was undoubtedly André Raymond's monumental *Artisans et commerçants au Caire au XVIIIe siècle*, which used records of court cases and probate inventories in Cairo's *sharī*ᶜ*a* court archives to reconstruct the urban reality of eighteenth-century Cairo.[31] Raymond's scope extended far beyond ruling or religious élites to encompass artisans, merchants in staple and luxury goods, low-ranking military cadres, weights and measures, money, urban topography, and material culture in general. In this respect, he followed the method of the then pervasive *Annaliste* school, although he maintains that the work's social-history emphasis resulted from the nature of the sources.[32] In depth and breadth, this work has really never been equalled among studies of the Arab provinces or, arguably, of the Ottoman Empire in general.[33] Nonetheless, it directly or indirectly inspired a host of other *sijill*-based microstudies of Ottoman Arab cities, including Cairo itself. We might divide these into *Annaliste*-style histories of material culture and *mentalité*, such as Amnon Cohen's study of Jerusalem and Abraham Marcus' study of Aleppo,[34] and studies stressing material culture in the context of urban topography, such as Nelly Hanna's and Doris Behrens-Abouseif's work on Cairo and Jean-Paul Pascual's and Colette Establet's work on Damascus (here, the role of the French archaeological institutes in the two cities concerned in publishing these studies is noteworthy).[35] Related provincial archival documents, such as collections of Muslim legal opinions (s. *fatwa*, Turkish *fetva*) and registers of tax farms, proved instrumental in ᶜAbd al-Rahīm ᶜAbd al-Rahmān ᶜAbd al-Rahīm's and Kenneth Cuno's studies of land tenure.[36] Moreover, the social-history concerns epitomized by Raymond's work, as well as the exploitation of Muslim court records, also characterize more recent studies of political economy in the Arab provinces, such as Bruce Masters' study of Aleppo, Beshara Doumani's study of Palestine, Hala Fattah's and Thabit Abdullah's work on southern Iraq and the Persian Gulf, and Dina Rizk Khoury's work on Mosul.[37] These studies represent, at the same time, an effort to reconcile the study of provincial political culture with the more centrist matters of political economy addressed by Genç and Salzmann. Among specialists on the Balkans and Anatolia, the Japanese historian Yuzo Nagata's work on Bosnian and western Anatolian *a*ᶜ*yān* stands out for integrating an empirical social-history approach with a recognition of more general, cross-provincial patterns.[38] Meanwhile, a surge of new research on Greek cities under Ottoman rule is

represented for the eighteenth century by Elena Frangakis-Syrett's economic history of Izmir, combining close reading of *sijill*s with insights drawn from European commercial archives and travellers' accounts.[39]

Yet these same decades have also witnessed a somewhat more modest production of revisionist studies of military-administrative élites in various provinces that have drawn on the precedents set by both Hourani and Raymond while, in some cases, incorporating Ottoman archival resources along with provincial chronicles. Among these may be counted Karl K. Barbir's *Ottoman Rule in Damascus*, which, in contrast to Rafeq's study, showed the interpenetration of local élites with the Ottoman centre; my own *Politics of Households in Ottoman Egypt*, which attempted more or less the same for eighteenth-century Egypt; and Tal Shuval's study of eighteenth-century Algiers, which extended the Ottoman-household paradigm to a frontier province long considered exceptional.[40] On the Balkan front, Michael R. Hickok has attempted to apply to eighteenth-century Ottoman Bosnia much the same logic, showing that there was no rigid dichotomy between administrative cadres from Istanbul and local notables, but that the administrators' relative localization allowed for cross-fertilization between the two groups.[41] Most of these studies make the point that the category of local notables was fluid and could include localized administrators from the Ottoman centre or from other provinces.

A further, highly visible effect of the social-history revolution is the continuing effort to include underrepresented groups, notably women and non-Muslims, in Ottoman scholarship – a trend that continues into the twenty-first century. Lois Beck and Nikki R. Keddie's well-known *Women in the Muslim World*, published in 1978, included a single chapter on women in the Ottoman Empire.[42] Since then, entire books, both monographs and edited volumes, have been devoted to this topic, and, although very few books have concentrated exclusively on the eighteenth century, it has benefited from the general attention.[43] Although the pervasive divide between the central lands and the Arab provinces has persisted in this literature,[44] with the result that we still await a truly synthetic treatment of women in Ottoman society, it at least does not extend to edited collections. The 14 essays in Madeline Zilfi's *Women in the Ottoman Empire*, eight of which concern the eighteenth century, treat both the imperial centre and the Arab provinces, while Amira al-Azhary Sonbol's *Women, the Family, and Divorce Laws in Islamic History*, though somewhat weighted towards the Arab lands, includes several papers focusing on Istanbul and on the Balkans.[45] Moreover, these collections of studies based on intensive primary research are far preferable to the timeless descriptions of earlier decades embodied in Fanny Davis' *The Ottoman Lady* or Raphaela Lewis' *Everyday Life in Ottoman Turkey*.[46] At the same time, we can justifiably ask why no counterpart to Leslie Peirce's *The Imperial Harem* has

been written for the eighteenth century, which boasted equally influential and fascinating imperial women, notably Rabia Gülnuş Emetullah, widow of Mehmed IV (r. 1648–87) and mother of Ahmed III (r. 1703–30).

A tradition of writing on the status of non-Muslims under Islamic rule dates at least to the early decades of the twentieth century. Where Ottoman rule is concerned, scholars of this subject have been slow to abandon the decline paradigm.[47] Nonetheless, the eighteenth century stands apart as the period during which Jewish and Christian merchants received legal protection, often including honorary citizenship, from the European maritime powers. France, in particular, exploited this practice to encourage the conversion of Syrian Orthodox Christians to Roman Catholicism; the resulting population of Syrian Catholic merchants became an influential presence throughout the eastern Mediterranean, as noted in Robert Haddad's brief study.[48] Meanwhile, the virtually neglected subject of Shi^{c}ite Muslims under Sunni Ottoman rule has been broached in Marco Salati's research on Aleppo and Yitzhak Nakash's research on Iraq.[49] As in the case of studies of women, a salutary yet still somewhat elusive trend in publications on non-Sunnis is the interpretation of their experience within a broadly Ottoman context.[50]

THE BIG LACUNA: RELIGIOUS AND INTELLECTUAL HISTORY

Intellectual history is arguably the great lacuna in Ottoman history. Leslie Peirce, in her contribution to this collection, stresses this shortcoming in the historiography of the fourteenth through the seventeenth centuries; it is just as glaring in that of the eighteenth century. The one feature of intellectual life that did attract considerable attention in the middle decades of the twentieth century was the career patterns of the ulema, particularly in the imperial capital and in the Arab provinces. In connection with this trend, orthodox, mainstream sufism of the type in which Ottoman ulema participated received due attention as well.

To some extent, interest in the ulema grew naturally out of an interest in Ottoman central and provincial institutions. In addition, the millennial anniversary in 1969 of the founding of Cairo and, concurrently, of the great mosque of al-Azhar generated heightened interest in the histories of Cairo's ulema in particular and their interaction with the great university. In the late 1960s and early 1970s a spate of articles by Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot and Daniel Crecelius examined the faculty of al-Azhar in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and in particular the *shaykh al-Azhar*, or rector of the university, an office that emerged only in the late seventeenth century but by the end of the following century had become the most influential religious office in Egypt.[51] Three features of these studies should be underlined, for they were typical of studies of ulema at this time: (1) they were based entirely on narrative

sources and overwhelmingly on the chronicle of ᶜAbd al-Rahmān al-Jabartī; (2) they were largely prosopographical, tracing the career patterns of various key ulema without examining their intellectual output; and (3) they treated Egypt's ulema as completely separate from the 'Ottoman' ulema, that is, the ulema of the imperial capital and the central lands. Yet, had these scholars attempted a comparison, they would have found that the Azharīs' counterparts in Istanbul and Edirne were subject to the same patterns of demographic flux in the seventeenth century, as ulema migrated from provincial towns to the large cities, followed by stabilization and institutional regularization in the eighteenth century. And although these scholars duly noted that a number of prominent Cairene ulema enjoyed ties to officials in Istanbul, they do not seem to have explored the implications of these connections for central-provincial integration.

Apart from career patterns, the social role of Egypt's ulema received most attention from these scholars. As is evident from a reading of al-Jabartī, the leading ulema of al-Azhar played a key role in social protest during the eighteenth century, and expositions of that role in social protest emerged during these same years from the pens of Raymond, Gabriel Baer, and Marsot.[52] These studies buttressed the paradigm of the ulema – who were invariably native Arabophone Egyptians – as mediators between the masses and the 'foreign' ruling élite, a paradigm introduced most forcefully by Gibb and Bowen.[53]

A somewhat more nuanced view of the ulema's place in Ottoman society was achieved by Madeline Zilfi in *The Politics of Piety: The Ottoman Ulema in the Post-Classical Age (1600–1800)*, which demonstrates the stabilization of the ulema hierarchy in the Ottoman central lands after the tumult of the seventeenth century.[54] This analysis was tied to central institutional history. Few efforts have as yet been made to connect the experience of the central ulema – those who participated in the hierarchy of imperial *madrasa*s, or theological academies, and mosques – with that of the provincial ulema, whether Arab or otherwise. The overriding reason for this negligence is institutional: since the ulema of the Arab (and Balkan) provinces did not participate in the *madrasa* hierarchy and were not typically candidates for tutor to the crown prince or spiritual adviser to the grand vizier, it is widely accepted that they were not, properly speaking, part of the Ottoman ulema. Yet the evidence of intellectual and occupational exchange among the central and provincial ulema suggests that the picture was considerably more complex than the central-provincial dichotomy would lead us to expect. As in the case of the military-administrative élite, the key to these interchanges was the ulema, both Turcophone and Arabophone, who moved physically and intellectually between centre and province as well as between or among various provinces.

Egypt exemplifies this sort of cross-fertilization. By the eighteenth century, it is true, Egypt's *naqīb al-ashrāf*, or head of the descendants of the Prophet, was no longer a Turcophone efendi appointed from Istanbul but typically a member of one of two influential Cairene sufi families, the Bakrīs and the Sādāts.[55] Nonetheless, the chief judge (*qādī*) was still dispatched from Istanbul every year or so; various judges forged intellectual ties with Egypt's ulema, notably Shaykh Hasan al-Jabartī, father of the chronicler. The senior Jabartī was evidently well-read in Ottoman Turkish and Persian, as well as Arabic, and provided legal opinions for the chief judge and other *qādī*s.[56] Intellectually predisposed governors such as the future grand vizier Koca Ragib Mehmed Pasha, and no doubt other appointees from the capital, engaged in intellectual exchange with Egypt's ulema. Ragib Pasha evidently took an active role in propagating the Halveti/Khalwatī sufi order in eighteenth-century Cairo. He is supposed to have accompanied the Damascene sufi shaykh Mustafā al-Bakrī on his journeys to Palestine, Egypt, and the Hijaz; moreover, he deeply revered the Azharī shaykh al-Hifnī, to whom he famously referred as 'Egypt's roof against disaster'.[57]

Furthermore, the libraries maintained by a number of these officials, as well as the pious foundations (s. *waqf*, Turkish *vakıf*) they endowed, must have influenced the intellectual milieu in the provincial capitals. In this case, Egypt is perhaps unusually rich in examples. Daniel Crecelius and Hamza ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Badr have contributed three valuable studies of the libraries endowed by Cairene grandees, including two exiled eunuchs of the imperial harem.[58] In general, however, the libraries of appointees and exiles from Istanbul remain largely unexplored.[59] The imperial harem eunuchs loom particularly large in this regard because at the close of their careers they were routinely exiled to Egypt, where they typically established well-equipped and well-staffed residences and commercial enterprises and well-stocked libraries. Several chief eunuchs of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, including the long-lived el-Hājj Beshīr Āghā (in office 1717–46), were famous bibliophiles.[60] Their role in transmitting influential works, to say nothing of religious tendencies, to Egypt and other provinces is not yet fully appreciated.

Of all the religious and intellectual trends in the eighteenth century, sufism was arguably the most thoroughly examined in the twentieth, in no small part because of the phenomenon that Fazlur Rahman labelled neo-sufism: the emergence within certain mystical orders of practices supposedly newly compatible with Sunni orthodoxy, particularly a new stress on veneration of the Prophet Muhammad over sufi 'saints' and a corresponding stress on the study of sayings ascribed to the Prophet (*hadīth*).[61] In the early 1990s R.S. O'Fahey and Bernd Radtke challenged the neo-sufism paradigm, proposing that it amounted to little more than a colonialist construct.[62] Nonetheless, an invigorated exchange among certain mainstream sufi orders is noticeable in

the eastern Mediterranean and the Red Sea region in the latter half of the eighteenth century. The reformed variant of the Naqshbandī mystical brotherhood propagated by the Indian scholar Ahmad Sirhindī in reaction to the syncretistic personal religion (Dīn-i Allāhī) of the Mughal emperor Akbar (r. 1556–1605) had by the eighteenth century spread north to Central Asia and along the pilgrimage route to the Red Sea and the eastern Mediterranean. In the latter region it not only coexisted with but interacted with a newly invigorated Khalwatī (Halveti) order. Indeed, most of the Azharī ulema who led merchant protests were Khalwatīs, in many cases quite influential members of the order. Even al-Jabartī, the conservative chronicler, belonged to the order.

Still, a rather vexing feature of scholarship on the place of sufis and sufi brotherhoods in eighteenth-century Ottoman society, whether central or provincial, is that we know far more about the career lines and patterns of social activity of the sufis in question than we do about their doctrines or self-perception. As O'Fahey and Radtke rightly pointed out, many of the very scholars who proclaimed neo-sufism seemed distressingly unfamiliar with the writings of their sufi subjects. Indeed, their refutation of the neo-sufi paradigm rested largely on a close reading of the written *oeuvre* of the West African sufi shaykh Ahmad ibn Idrīs in particular. In contrast, earlier writers on provincial ulema, including not only Marsot and Crecelius but also prominent neo-sufi exponents such as John O. Voll, Nehemia Levtzion, and even Fazlur Rahman himself, seem to have focused on the career paths, social connections, and social activism of these ulema,[63] occasionally to the exclusion of their religious writings. At the close of the twentieth century, however, a new generation of scholars had begun to peruse the writings of these ulema in an effort to ascertain their contribution to and place in broader intellectual currents.[64] Part of the impetus for this trend undoubtedly came from the undeniable tension between this orthodox, institutionalized sufism and the growing popularity of Wahhabism, the puritanical, virulently anti-sufi credo that emerged in the interior of the Arabian peninsula towards the middle of the eighteenth century and spread along some of the same trade and pilgrimage routes as so-called neo-sufism. Indeed, some exponents of orthodox sufism, such as al-Jabartī, seem also to have been attracted by the pietistic rigour of Wahhabism or at least by a more generic pietism that appears to have been at large in the region late in the eighteenth century.[65]

Nonetheless, tension between pietism and the mainstream sufism of the religious establishment was noticeable, never more so than in the notorious incident at the city gate known as Bāb Zuwayla in Cairo in 1711, when a band of Turkish soldiers, inspired by a 'Rūmī' (Balkan or western Anatolian) preacher, attacked a group of sufis near the gate and then denounced the Cairene *qādī* and other ulema who tried to intervene. This incident was analyzed in the mid-1970s by Barbara Flemming and a dozen years later by

Rudolph Peters.[66] Both historians termed the soldiers' ideology 'proto-Wahhābī' inasmuch as it was anti-innovationist and anti-sufi. A more fitting label might be 'neo-Kadızadeli', since the soldiers' actions, sentiments, and provincial Anatolian provenance were similar to those of the seventeenth-century puritanical movement whose followers are known to historians as Kadızadelis.[67]

CONTEXTUALIZATION: THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE WORLD

This observation raises the broader issue of the contextualization of provincial intellectual and spiritual trends and the even broader issue of routes and modes of cultural exchange. In the latter half of the eighteenth century, a vigorous intellectual, spiritual, and cultural traffic flourished along the Red Sea and Indian Ocean trade and pilgrimage routes. The economic underpinnings of this exchange began to come to light only in the last years of the twentieth century. Raymond pointed out in *Artisans et commerçants* the far-reaching effects of the coffee trade through the Red Sea.[68] Coffee, indeed, was the source of the great household fortunes of eighteenth-century Egypt, as well as the mansions and charitable works funded by these fortunes.[69] Only quite recently, however, have the full ramifications of this trade, including the influence exercised by and upon non-Ottoman participants, particularly along the shores of the Indian Ocean, begun to be explored.[70]

Typically, twentieth-century historians stressed the Ottoman Empire's relations with Europe during the eighteenth century, to the exclusion of relations with non-European territories. The first half of the eighteenth century marked an exceptional lull in the empire's European military engagements, apart from the retaking of the Morea from the Venetians. Revisionist historians of the later twentieth century realized that this was in no small part due to the Ottomans' habitually underestimated skill in diplomacy. Rifa'at Abou-El-Haj, in 'Ottoman Diplomacy at Karlowitz', showed how the Ottoman delegates to the truce negotiations, despite representing the losing side, managed to retain provinces in which they had holdings while forcing Hapsburg, Russian, Polish, and Venetian evacuation of these territories.[71] Adept negotiation at Belgrade in 1739, as Salzmann points out, won the Ottomans three decades of quiet on their western front.[72] Meanwhile, the Ottoman court was steadily increasing its contacts with France in particular. More than one observer has noted the pervasive influence of the Louis XV style in the furnishings of Topkapı Palace during the eighteenth century.[73] As has been pointed out most recently by Fatma Müge Göçek, this commercial contact was doubtless a factor in the rise of a mercantile élite of Christians and Jews who were honorary citizens of France and other European commercial powers.[74] Edhem Eldem, in fact, used French commercial records and Ottoman bank archives to plumb the depths of

Franco-Ottoman fiscal enmeshment in the eighteenth century in an effort that was complemented in Arab provincial historiography by the work of Michel Tuchscherer.[75]

The next logical step in this exercise in contextualization was to place eighteenth-century Ottoman military conflicts in the same context as the empire's unexpectedly canny diplomacy. In this light, Ottoman engagements with Russia in particular became part of the long-term trajectory of crisis and adaptation rather than an unbroken chain of battlefield defeats. The promise of Abou-El-Haj's 'Diplomacy at Karlowitz' was, arguably, realized in Virginia H. Aksan's study of statesman Ahmed Resmî Efendi (1700–83),[76] in which the title character is portrayed as part of a long-standing (and far from monolithic or static) peace party favouring the sort of far-sighted statecraft that had benefited the Ottomans at Karlowitz and Belgrade. This party faced a daunting struggle with an opposing current of opinion that in the 1760s favoured renewed holy war (*jihād*) against Russia,[77] which earlier in the century had taken the lead in depicting the struggle against the Turk as a holy war. The link between these mid-century pacifists and the reformers of Selim III's administration decades later becomes clearer as a result of this more broadly contextualized approach; indeed, the peace party ties into a more general tradition of internal reform, stressing meritocracy and pruning of bloated payrolls, that can be traced back at least as far as Ahmed III.[78] Provincial repercussions of the growing confrontation with the Russians – notably the revolts of ʿAlī Bey in Egypt and Zāhir al-ʿUmar in Palestine, encouraged by the presence of Count Orlov and the Russian navy in the eastern Mediterranean[79] – received surprisingly little attention within this context. The dominant treatments retained a narrowly provincial focus in which, moreover, ʿAlī Bey's revolt in particular was framed as a proto-nationalist foretaste of the autonomy of the nineteenth-century autonomous governor Mehmed ʿAlī Pasha, whose dynasty would control Egypt from 1805 to 1952.[80]

We may perhaps avoid the nationalist-versus-imperialist conundrum by treating the European impact as one factor among many affecting Ottoman society and economy during the eighteenth century. In this regard, Ottoman relations with other regions of the world – above all Iran, India, and China – deserve more attention in order to take the inordinate teleological stress off the impact of Europe on the Ottoman Empire. So far as Iran is concerned, by far the most momentous turn of events in the eighteenth century was the collapse of the Safavid empire in 1722 and the chaos that ensued until the consolidation of the Qajar dynasty late in the century. As cataclysmic as this event was, it, too, received little scholarly attention from twentieth-century Ottomanists apart from Itzkowitz's explanation of Ottoman peace overtures to the resurrected Safavid Nādir Shāh (r. 1736–47).[81] One much underrecognized

consequence of the Safavid rout by Afghan forces in 1722 was a flood of Georgians into the Ottoman provinces, for eastern Georgia had been a Safavid protectorate and the source of the élite slaves (*ghulām*s in Safavid parlance, *mamlūk*s in Ottoman usage) who manned the Safavid armies. The Ottomans took advantage of the Safavid defeat to declare this part of Georgia an Ottoman protectorate, from which large numbers of élite slaves would subsequently enter Ottoman territory. By 1770 the administrative élites of the provinces of Damascus, Baghdad, and Cairo were dominated by Georgian *mamlūks*, in the last two cases to the virtual exclusion of other ethnic groups.[82] This contextualization of what can justifiably be termed a Georgian hegemony in the Ottoman Arab provinces adds a new dimension even to ᶜAlī Bey's much-remarked rebellion and, in particular, to the part played in it by the bey's antagonism to the governor of Damascus, Osman Pasha, a Georgian *mamlūk* of the ᶜAzm family of Syrian notables.[83] In Damascus and Baghdad, a locally trained Georgian *mamlūk* could become governor of the province; in Egypt, the governor (Georgian or otherwise) still had to be dispatched from Istanbul. In other words, ᶜAlī Bey had no hope of becoming governor of Egypt through recognized practices; this career frustration may well have figured in his rebellion, a hallmark of which was the virtual house arrest of governors sent to Cairo from Istanbul.

PRIMARY SOURCES

Ultimately, the twentieth century's single most important contribution to the study of eighteenth-century Ottoman history may be uncovering primary sources and making them accessible. Already in 1930, Jean Deny's *Sommaire des archives turques du Caire*[84] raised the possibility of applying Ottoman archival sources to the history of Ottoman Egypt – a possibility realized for the first time with Shaw's 1962 administrative survey and only sporadically thereafter. The opening of the Turkish Prime Ministry Archives to scholars in the 1950s revolutionized Ottoman scholarship, particularly for the imperial capital. In the 1990s the archive began to publish the earliest volumes (primarily sixteenth-century) of imperial orders transcribed in the *mühimme* registers.[85] It will, obviously, be well into the twenty-first century before a substantial corpus of eighteenth-century materials is published. Meanwhile, such vital sources for social history as Muslim court registers and jurisconsults' legal opinions (s. *fatwa*) remain virtually unpublished for the eighteenth century, although an assortment of valuable *waqf* documents has been published.[86]

Published narrative sources for the eighteenth century have, however, long been available. The venerable editions of al-Jabartī's *ᶜAjā'ib al-athār* and Khalīl al-Murādī's *Silk al-durar* published by the Egyptian government

printing press at the Nile port of Bulaq (now a suburb of Cairo) date to the late nineteenth century.[87] The 1950s and 1960s saw new Arabic editions of al-Jabartī and of a portion of the annals of the Shihāb emirs of Lebanon, composed by Haydar Ahmad al-Shihābī.[88] Two more editions of al-Jabartī (one unindexed) appeared in Beirut in the 1970s.[89] In the same decade, Moshe Perlmann and Thomas Philipp launched their marathon project of translating *ʿAjā'ib al-athār*, a project that has only recently been completed, while Joseph Cuoq and Shmuel Moreh produced, respectively, French and English translations of the historian's account of the French occupation of Egypt.[90] Yet another Arabic edition of *ʿAjā'ib al-athār* appeared in the late 1990s.[91] A complete edition of Haydar Ahmad al-Shihābī's annals appeared in 1980 to join the partial edition of 1969.[92] As for Murādī's *Silk al-durar*, new Arabic editions were published in Beirut in the 1980s and 1990s.[93]

Given the sustained interest in al-Jabartī, it is all the more remarkable that the closing decades of the twentieth century saw the discrediting of *ʿAjā'ib al-athār* as a primary source for eighteenth-century Egypt,[94] coupled with the uncovering and publication of earlier sources to which al-Jabartī himself is indebted. Among the latter are Ahmed Çelebi b. ʿAbd al-Ghani's *Awdah al-ishārāt fī man tawallah Misr al-Qāhira min al-wuzarā' wa'l-bāshāt*, published in two editions in 1977 and 1978, and the largest and latest of the four so-called Damūrdāshī chronicles, Ahmed Kâhya ʿAzebān al-Damūrdāshī's (Demirdaşî) *Al-Durra al-musāna fī akhbār al-Kināna*, edited and published by A.A. ʿAbd al-Rahīm in 1989 and published two years later in an occasionally problematic English translation by Daniel Crecelius and ʿAbd al-Wahhāb Bakr.[95] As for Turkish sources, the Turkish History Foundation (Türk Tarih Kurumu) has taken the lead in publishing critical editions of chronicles, among which M. Münir Aktepe's three-volume edition of Şemdanizade Fındıklılı Süleyman Efendi's *Tārīh* deserves special mention.[96] As aide to the governor Rakım Pasha, Şemdanizade accompanied his patron to Egypt, where he observed ʿAlī Bey's rebellion. His take on that rebellion, which paints ʿAlī Bey as an Abkhazian supremacist,[97] offers a novel supplement to the standard Arabic accounts. It is therefore the more regrettable that this published source is almost never exploited by specialists on eighteenth-century Egypt.

EPILOGUE: TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY DESIDERATA

My own hope is that in the new century historians of the Ottoman Empire will continue the progress made in the latter half of the preceding century and as a result will stress continuity while weaning themselves from a number of misleading yet tenacious binary oppositions. One such opposition whose time I sense is limited is that between centralization and decentralization. If historians of the Ottoman Empire have accepted the revisionist notion that

the empire did not enter an irreversible decline towards the end of the sixteenth century and we are therefore willing to regard the seventeenth century as a period of adaptation to new imperial priorities, we still tend to regard the eighteenth century as the period when decline finally caught up with the empire or at least when decentralization finally won out over sporadic attempts at recentralization. In this context, decentralization becomes shorthand for decline, not least because we habitually assume that decentralization is inherently bad while centralization is inherently good. Instead of thinking in such polarized terms, we might reframe the Ottoman Empire as a polity whose administration went through cycles of greater and lesser centralization as a result of rational strategic and economic choices on the part of various segments of Ottoman society. Such a rethinking seems imminent; indeed, it is foreshadowed in Salzmann's 'Ancien Régime' article.[98]

Such a reframing accords with the reconceptualization that is already going on at the provincial level. In recent monographs on individual Ottoman provinces, the conventional wisdom of the emergence of autonomous provincial regimes spearheaded by local notables – ʿAlī Bey in Egypt, the *mamlūk* governors in Iraq, Ahmed Pasha al-Jazzār in Syria, the various governors of Bosnia – has begun to give way to a scheme of synthesized Ottoman provincial political cultures. Further work along these lines may point to a new conceptualization of eighteenth-century provincial political culture as the logical outcome of the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century vizier and pasha households: in later generations, these households acquired deep provincial roots and recruited clients independently of the imperial centre but retained symbiotic links to Istanbul and even exerted reciprocal influence on that centre's political culture.[99] By the same token, the role of the life-tenure tax farm, or *mālikāne*, in providing the economic foundation for these self-sustaining provincial households can be viewed as a logical progression from the amalgamation of the *tīmār*s and *iltizām* (both rural and urban) on which earlier households had based their wealth.

In this sphere, too, a conceptual synthesis between central and provincial would surely deepen our appreciation of eighteenth-century Ottoman religious trends. The spread of the Khalwatī and Mujaddidī Naqshbandī sufi orders through the Arab provinces in the eighteenth century has been remarked, but any connection to the earlier efflorescence of these orders at the centre has been overlooked. Likewise, the influence of local notables' patronage on these orders, as well as on other religious institutions, has been examined only in isolation but never synthesized across provincial lines. Local notables also patronized secular high culture, notably by means of literary salons, yet no link has been suggested to cultural production at the centre: for example, to the cultural efflorescence of the Tulip Era (1718–30) or to the culture-bearing activities of exiled eunuchs of the imperial palace.

Indeed, the heavy emphasis on centralization and decentralization tends to foster a historiography of the Ottoman provinces in which each province interacts exclusively with the Ottoman centre. Comparisons between and among Ottoman provinces and, in particular, comparison of Anatolian, Balkan, and Arab provinces during the eighteenth century – as well as economic interactions among these provinces and the movement of administrators among them – could shed much light on how a decentralized empire functioned. A historiography that takes trans-provincial developments into account will have the added benefit of giving appropriate emphasis to the increasing role of Bedouin and Turcoman tribes in Ottoman provincial life during the eighteenth century. Although recent studies of individual Arab provinces have included tribal populations, many of these tribes operated in more than one province.[100]

Just as inhibiting as the centralization/decentralization dichotomy is the equally artificial dichotomy between élite and 'low' culture. In the same way that central and provincial or centralized and decentralized can be recast as part of the same continuum, so élites and non-élites can be seen to participate in a cultural continuum. Thus, for example, household culture, of which we are becoming steadily more knowledgeable, constituted a bridge between the ruling élite and members of the lower social orders, who might receive patronage from élite households or might form their own households on smaller scales. By the same token, urban and rural commoners participated in some of the same sufi orders and religious rites as the religious and administrative leadership, albeit often in humbler settings. As Suraiya Faroqhi has pointed out, festivals and popular lore are cultural productions in which both élites and commoners participated and to which they contributed.[101]

A worrisome obstacle confronting this highly desirable synthesis is the persistent Arab–Turkish divide, which, far from being resolved, seems in danger of intensifying as a result of a misguided backlash against attempts to place Arab provincial history in its proper Ottoman context. Reifying and, in the process, distorting the approaches of Peter Holt and Albert Hourani to the Ottoman Arab provinces, a handful of scholars of the succeeding generation claim, at least implicitly, that Arabic sources are sufficient for the historiography of the Ottoman Arab lands and that scholarship drawn from such sources is somehow more authentic and faithful to the so-called indigenous Arab population of these lands than history drawn from Ottoman sources.[102] It would be ironic indeed if this artificial dichotomy, the product of early twentieth-century European imperialism, were to overshadow the salutary trends surveyed above as the twentieth century's most tenacious legacy to the historiography of the eighteenth century.

NOTES

1. See, for example, E. LeRoy Ladurie, *The Ancien Régime: A History of France, 1610–1774*, trans. M. Greengrass (Oxford and Cambridge, MA, 1996), esp. pp.304–17; J. Lynch, *Bourbon Spain, 1700–1808* (Oxford and Cambridge, MA, 1989), esp. Ch.1 and 10; J.J. Norwich, *Venice: The Greatness and the Fall* (London, 1981), Ch.26; G. Parker and L.M. Smith (eds.), *The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century* (London and New York, 1997), esp. Introduction and Chs.2, 5, and 8; J.M. Abun-Nasr, *A History of the Maghrib in the Islamic Period* (Cambridge, 1987), pp.158–60, 170–73, 191–3, 219–27.
2. H.A.R. Gibb and H. Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West: A Study of the Impact of Western Civilization on Moslem Culture in the Near East*, Vol.1, *Islamic Society in the Eighteenth Century*, 2 parts (London and New York, 1950–57).
3. A.H. Lybyer (1876–1949), *The Government of the Ottoman Empire in the Time of Suleiman the Magnificent*, Harvard Historical Studies, Vol.18 (New York, 1913).
4. N. Itzkowitz, 'Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Realities', *Studia Islamica*, 16 (1962), pp.73–94.
5. Ibid., pp.86–90; idem, 'Mehmed Raghib Pasha: The Making of an Ottoman Grand Vezir', Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1959; J. Hathaway, *The Politics of Households in Ottoman Egypt: The Rise of the Qazdağlıs* (Cambridge, 1997), p.94.
6. L.T. Darling, *Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy: The Ottoman Financial Administration, 1560–1660* (Leiden, 1994); S. Faroqhi, 'Crisis and Change, 1590–1699', Pt. 2 of H. Inalcik with D. Quataert (eds.), *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge, 1994).
7. B. McGowan, 'The Age of the *Aʿyān*s, 1699–1812', Pt. 3 of Inalcik with Quataert, *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire*.
8. L.P. Peirce, *The Imperial Harem: Women and Sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire* (New York and Oxford, 1993), pp.24–7, 91–149.
9. S. Meservey, 'Feyzullah Efendi: An Ottoman Şeyhülislam', Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1966; R.A. Abou-El-Haj, *The 1703 Rebellion and the Structure of Ottoman Politics* (Leiden, 1984).
10. A. Mannaʿ, 'Mered Naqīb al-Ashrāf bi-Yerushalayim, 1703–1705', *Cathedra*, 53 (1989), pp.49–74; D. Zeʾevi, *An Ottoman Century: The District of Jerusalem in the 1600s* (Albany, NY, 1996), pp.62–4.
11. M.C. Zilfi, *The Politics of Piety: The Ottoman Ulema in the Post-Classical Age (1600–1800)* (Minneapolis and Chicago, 1988), Ch.5.
12. H. Inalcik, 'The Socio-Political Effects of the Diffusion of Fire-Arms in the Middle East', in V.J. Parry and M. Yapp (eds.), *War, Technology, and Society in the Middle East* (London, 1975); G. Parker, *The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500–1800*, 2nd edn (Cambridge, 1996 [1988]).
13. P.M. Holt, 'The Career of Kūchūk Muhammad (1676–94)', *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, 26 (1963), pp.269–87; A. Raymond, 'Une "révolution" au Caire sous les Mamelouks: La crise de 1123/1711', *Annales Islamologiques*, 1 (1966), pp.95–120; Hathaway, *Politics of Households*, pp.20, 42, 66–70.
14. M.M. Aktepe, *Patrona İsyanı (1730)* (Istanbul, 1958).
15. Hathaway, *Politics of Households*, pp.55, 57–8, 62–5; Ahmed Kâhya ʿAzebān al-Damūrdāshī (fl. c. 1750), *Al-durra al-musāna fī akhbār al-Kināna*, British Museum, MS Or. 1073–4, pp.471–2.
16. M. Genç, 'Osmanlı Maliyesinde Mālikāne Sistemi', in O. Okyar and Ü. Nalbantoğlu (eds.), *İktisat Tarihi Semineri* (Ankara, 1975); idem, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Devlet ve Ekonomi* (Istanbul, 2000); A. Salzmann, 'An Ancien Régime Revisited: "Privatization" and Political Economy in the Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Empire', *Politics and Society*, 21 (1993), pp.393–423.
17. This is despite Salzmann's rather ambiguous references to 'the Middle East', which seems for the most part to mean Syria and, in that case, typically Aleppo.

18. S.H. Longrigg, *Four Centuries of Modern Iraq* (Oxford, 1925; reprinted in Beirut, 1968); H. St. J.B. Philby, *Arabia of the Wahhābīs* (London, 1928).
19. P.M. Holt, 'Ottoman Egypt (1517–1798): An Account of Arabic Historical Sources', in P.M. Holt (ed.), *Political and Social Change in Modern Egypt* (London, 1968); idem, 'Al-Jabartī's Introduction to the History of Ottoman Egypt', *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, 25 (1962), pp.38–51; idem, 'The Pattern of Egyptian Political History from 1517 to 1798', in Holt, *Political and Social Change in Modern Egypt*.
20. P.M. Holt, *Egypt and the Fertile Crescent, 1516–1922: A Political History* (Ithaca, NY, and London, 1966).
21. S.J. Shaw, *The Financial and Administrative Organization and Development of Ottoman Egypt, 1517–1798* (Princeton, 1962); idem, 'The Financial and Administrative Organization and Development of Ottoman Egypt (1517–1798)', Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1959.
22. A.K. Rafeq, *The Province of Damascus, 1723–1783* (Beirut, 1966).
23. A. Hourani, 'Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables', in W.R. Polk and R.L. Chambers (eds.), *The Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East: The Nineteenth Century* (Chicago, 1968); reprinted in A. Hourani, *The Emergence of the Modern Middle East* (Berkeley, 1981), and A. Hourani, P.S. Khoury, and M.C. Wilson (eds.), *The Modern Middle East: A Reader* (London, 1993).
24. E.R. Toledano, 'The Emergence of Ottoman-Local Elites in the Middle East and North Africa (1700–1900)', in I. Pappé and M. Ma'oz (eds.), *Middle Eastern Politics and Ideas: A History from Within* (London and New York, 1997); A. Hourani, 'The Ottoman Background of the Modern Middle East', in Hourani, *The Emergence of the Modern Middle East*.
25. D. Crecelius, *The Roots of Modern Egypt: A Study of the Regimes of ᶜAlī Bey al-Kabīr and Muhammad Bey Abū al-Dhahab, 1760–1775* (Minneapolis and Chicago, 1981); J.W. Livingston, 'ᶜAlī Bey al-Kabīr and the Mamlūk Resurgence in Ottoman Egypt, 1760–72', Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1968; idem, 'The Rise of Shaykh al-Balad ᶜAlī Bey al-Kabīr: A Study in the Accuracy of the Chronicle of al-Jabartī', *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, 32 (1970), pp.283–94; idem, 'ᶜAlī Bey al-Kabīr and the Jews', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 7 (1971), pp.221–8; Rafeq, *The Province of Damascus*; M.L. Meriwether, 'Urban Notables and Rural Resources in Aleppo, 1770–1830', *International Journal of Turkish Studies*, 4 (1987), pp.55–73.
26. See, for example, Necdet Sakaoğlu, *Anadolu Derebeyi Ocaklarından Köse Paşa Hanedanı* (Ankara, 1984).
27. Saltmann, 'An Ancient Régime Revisited'; E.D. Akarlı, 'Provincial Power Magnates in Ottoman Bilād al-Shām and Egypt, 1740–1840', in A. Temimi (ed.), *La vie sociale dans les provinces arabes à l'époque ottomane* (Zaghouan, Tunisia, 1988).
28. For example, V.P. Mutafchieva and S.A. Dimitrov, *Sur l'état du système des tīmārs des XVIIe–XVIIIe ss.* (Sofia, 1968); V.P. Mutafchieva, 'L'institution de l'*âyânlık* pendant les dernières décennies du XVIIIe siècle', *Études Balkaniques*, 2–3 (1965), pp.233–47; B. Cvetkova, 'Recherches sur le système d'affermage (*iltizām*) dans l'empire ottoman au cours du XVIe–XVIIIe s. par rapport aux contrées bulgares', *Rocznik Orientalistyczny*, 27/2 (1964), pp.111–32.
29. C. and B. Jelavich (eds.), *The Balkans in Transition: Essays on the Development of Balkan Life and Politics since the Eighteenth Century* (Berkeley, 1963; reprinted in Hamden, CT, 1974); P.F. Sugar, *Southeastern Europe under Ottoman Rule, 1354–1804*, A History of East Central Europe, Vol.5 (Seattle, 1977, reprinted 1996).
30. N.G. Svoronos, *Le commerce de Salonique au XVIIIe siècle* (Paris, 1956); M. Lascaris, *Salonique à la fin du XVIIIe siècle d'après les rapports consulaires français* (Athens, 1939).
31. A. Raymond, *Artisans et commerçants au Caire au XVIIIe siècle*, 2 vols. (Damascus, 1973–74).
32. N.E. Gallagher, *Approaches to the History of the Middle East: Interviews with Leading Middle East Historians* (Reading, 1999), p.79; see also Raymond's contribution to the present collection.

33. The only just comparison is probably to the late Robert Mantran's work on seventeenth-century Istanbul: *Istanbul dans la seconde moitié du XVIIe siècle: Essai d'histoire institutionelle, économique, et sociale* (Paris, 1962).
34. A. Cohen, *Palestine in the Eighteenth Century: Patterns of Government and Administration* (Jerusalem, 1973); A. Marcus, *The Middle East on the Eve of Modernity: Aleppo in the Eighteenth Century* (New York, 1989).
35. N. Hanna, *Habiter au Caire: La maison moyenne et ses habitants aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles* (Cairo, 1991); idem, *An Urban History of Bulāq in the Mamlūk and Ottoman Periods* (Cairo, 1983); D. Behrens-Abouseif, *Azbakiyya and Its Environs: From Azbak to Ismail* (Cairo, 1985); C. Establet and J.-P. Pascual, *Familles et fortunes à Damas: 450 foyers damascains en 1700* (Damascus, 1994). See also A. Raymond, *Le Caire des janissaires: L'apogée de la ville ottomane sous ᶜAbd al-Rahmān Katkhudā* (Paris, 1995).
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38. Y. Nagata, *Materials on the Bosnian Notables* (Tokyo, 1979); idem, *Some Documents on the Big Farms (Çiftliks) of the Notables in Western Anatolia* (Tokyo, 1976); idem, *Muhsinzade Mehmet Paşa ve Âyânlık Müessesesi* (Izmir, 1999); idem, *Tarihte Âyânlar: Karaosmanoğulları Üzerinde bir İnceleme* (Ankara, 1997).
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41. M.R. Hickok, *Ottoman Military Administration in Eighteenth-Century Bosnia* (Leiden, 1997); see also M. Todorova, 'The Ottoman Legacy in the Balkans', in L.C. Brown (ed.), *Imperial Legacy: The Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East* (New York, 1996).
42. I.C. Dengler, 'Turkish Women in the Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age', in L. Beck and N. Keddie (eds.), *Women in the Muslim World* (Cambridge, MA, 1978).
43. An exception in this regard is A. Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot, *Women and Men in Late Eighteenth-Century Egypt* (Austin, TX, 1995).
44. Thus, Judith Tucker's work, though quite important for the field as a whole, focuses on Ottoman Syria and Palestine: J.E. Tucker, *In the House of the Law: Gender and Islamic Law in Ottoman Syria and Palestine* (Berkeley, 1998); idem, 'Ties that Bound: Women and Family in Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century Nablus', in N.R. Keddie and B. Baron (eds.), *Women in Middle Eastern History: Shifting Boundaries in Sex and Gender* (New Haven, CT, 1992).
45. M.C. Zilfi (ed.), *Women in the Ottoman Empire: Middle Eastern Women in the Early Modern Era* (Leiden, 1997); A. al-Azhary Sonbol (ed.), *Women, the Family, and Divorce Laws in Islamic History* (Syracuse, NY, 1996).
46. F. Davis, *The Ottoman Lady: A Social History from 1718 to 1918* (New York, 1986); R. Lewis, *Everyday Life in Ottoman Turkey* (London, Batsford, and New York, 1971).
47. Thus, Avigdor Levy labels the period between roughly 1566 and 1839 'the era of standstill and decline' while Norman Stillman includes this period under the rubric 'the long twilight'; see A. Levy, 'Introduction', in A. Levy (ed.), *The Jews of the Ottoman Empire*

(Princeton, 1994); N.A. Stillman, *The Jews of Arab Lands: A History and Source Book* (Philadelphia, 1979).

48. R.M. Haddad, *Syrian Christians in Muslim Society: An Interpretation* (Princeton, 1970), pp.10–68.
49. M. Salati, *Ascesa e caduta di una famiglia di Ašrāf Sciiti di Aleppo: I Zuhrāwī o Zuhrī-zāda* (Rome, 1992); Y. Nakash, *The Shīᶜīs of Iraq* (Princeton, 1994), pp.13–25.
50. A good example is Cohen, *Palestine in the Eighteenth Century*, in which the status of non-Muslims forms part of a much larger survey of provincial administration.
51. D. Crecelius, 'The Emergence of the Shaykh al-Azhar as the Pre-Eminent Religious Leader in Egypt', in *Colloque international sur l'histoire du Caire*, assembled under the auspices of the Ministry of Culture of the Arab Republic of Egypt (Cairo, 1969); idem, 'Nonideological Responses of the Egyptian ᶜUlamā' to Modernization', in N.R. Keddie (ed.), *Scholars, Saints, and Sufis: Muslim Religious Institutions since 1500* (Berkeley, 1972); A. Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot, 'A Socio-Economic Sketch of the ᶜUlamā' in the Eighteenth Century', in *Colloque international sur l'histoire du Caire*; idem, 'The ᶜUlamā' of Cairo in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries', in Keddie, *Scholars, Saints, and Sufis*; idem, 'The Wealth of the ᶜUlamā' in Late Eighteenth-Century Cairo', in T. Naff and R. Owen (eds.), *Studies in Eighteenth-Century Islamic History* (Carbondale and Edwardsville, IL, 1977).
52. Raymond, *Artisans et commerçants*, Vol.2, pp.432–3; G. Baer, 'Popular Revolt in Ottoman Cairo', *Der Islam* 54/2 (1977), pp.213–42; Marsot, 'The ᶜUlamā' of Cairo in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries'.
53. Gibb and Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West*, Vol.1, Pt.2, pp.110–13.
54. M.C. Zilfi, *The Politics of Piety: The Ottoman Ulema in the Post-Classical Age (1600–1800)* (Minneapolis and Chicago, 1988); see also R. Repp, 'The Altered Nature and Role of the Ulema', in Naff and Owen, *Studies in Eighteenth-Century Islamic History*.
55. M. Winter, 'The *Ashrāf* and *Niqābat al-Ashrāf* in Egypt in Ottoman and Modern Times', *Asian and African Studies* (Haifa), 19/1 (1985), pp.17–41; Marsot, 'The ᶜUlamā' of Cairo in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries', pp.151–2.
56. ᶜAbd al-Rahmān al-Jabartī (1754–1825), *ᶜAjā'ib al-athār fi'l-tarājim wa'l-akhbār*, ed. H.M. Jawhar *et al.*, 7 vols. (Cairo, 1958–67), Vol.3, pp.83, 87.
57. B.G. Martin, 'A Short History of the Khalwatī Order of Dervishes', in Keddie, *Scholars, Saints, and Sufis*, pp.297–8, 301; E. Bannerth, 'La Khalwatiyya en Égypte: Quelques aspects de la vie d'un confrérie', *Mélange de l'Institut Dominicain d'Études Orientales*, 8 (1964–66), pp.1–74.
58. D. Crecelius, 'The *Waqf* of Muhammad Bey Abū al-Dhahab in Historical Perspective', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 23 (1991), pp.57–81; H. ᶜAbd al-ᶜAzīz Badr and D. Crecelius, 'The *Awqāf* of al-Hājj Bashīr Āghā in Cairo', *Annales Islamologiques*, 27 (1993), pp.291–311; idem, 'The *Waqf*s of Shāhīn Ahmad Āghā', *Annales Islamologiques*, 26 (1992), pp.79–114.
59. On this subject, see J. Hathaway, 'The Wealth and Influence of an Exiled Ottoman Eunuch in Egypt: The *Waqf* Inventory of ᶜAbbās Āghā', *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, 37 (1994), pp.293–317.
60. Hathaway, 'Wealth and Influence'; idem, 'Jean-Claude Flachat and the Chief Black Eunuch: Observations of a French Merchant at the Sultan's Court', in S.J. Webber and M.R. Lynd (eds.), with K. Peterson, *Fantasy or Ethnography? Irony and Collusion in Subaltern Representation* (Columbus, OH, 1996).
61. F. Rahman, *Islam*, 2nd edn (Chicago, 1979 [1966]), pp.205–6.
62. R.S. O'Fahey and B. Radtke, 'Neo-Sufism Reconsidered', *Der Islam*, 7 (1993), pp.52–87.
63. J.O. Voll, 'Linking Groups in Networks of Eighteenth-Century Revivalist Scholars: The Mizjājī Family in Yemen', in N. Levtzion and J.O. Voll (eds.), *Eighteenth-Century Renewal and Reform in Islam* (Syracuse, NY, 1987); N. Levtzion, 'The Eighteenth Century: Background to the Islamic Revolutions in West Africa', in Levtzion and Voll, *Eighteenth-Century Renewal and Reform.*

64. For example, Knut Vikør, *Sufi and Scholar on the Desert Edge: Muhammad b. ᶜAlī al-Sanūsī and His Brotherhood* (Evanston, IL, 1999).
65. Suggestive in this regard is L. Bjørneboe, 'In Search of the True Political Position of the ᶜUlamā': An Analysis of the Chronicles of ᶜAbd al-Rahmān al-Jabartī (1753–1826) [*sic*]', Ph.D. diss., University of Southern Denmark, 2002.
66. B. Flemming, 'Die Vorwahhabitsche *Fitna* im osmanischen Kairo 1711', in *İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı'ya Armağan* (Ankara, 1975); R. Peters, 'The Battered Dervishes of Bāb Zuwayla: A Religious Riot in Eighteenth-Century Cairo', in Levtzion and Voll, *Eighteenth-Century Renewal and Reform*.
67. J. Hathaway, 'Egypt in the Seventeenth Century', in M.W. Daly (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Egypt*, Vol.2, *The Modern Period: From the Ottoman Conquest to the End of the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge, 1998), p.57. Flemming has recently revisited this incident in a paper entitled 'The Story of the Cairene "*Fitna*" of 1711', presented at the conference 'Chronicler's Text, Rebel's Voice', University of Leiden, January 2002; she points out that the participants' ideology, like that of the Kadızadelis, fits squarely within Hanafī orthodoxy.
68. Raymond, *Artisans et commerçants*, Vol.1, pp.156 ff., 177.
69. D. Behrens-Abouseif, *Azbakiyya and Its Environs*; Hathaway, *Politics of Households*, Ch.6; M. Tuchscherer, 'Le pèlerinage de l'émir Sulaymân Gâwîš al-Qazduġlî, sirdâr de la caravane de la Mekke en 1739', *Annales Islamologiques*, 24 (1988), pp.155–206.
70. M. Tuchscherer (ed.), *Le commerce du café avant l'ère des plantations colonials: Espaces, réseaux, sociétés (XV–XIX siècle)* (Cairo, 2001); U. Freitag and W.G. Clarence-Smith (eds.), *Hadhramī Traders, Scholars, and Statesmen in the Indian Ocean, 1750s–1960s* (Leiden, 1997).
71. R.A. Abou-El-Haj, 'Ottoman Diplomacy at Karlowitz', *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 87 (1967), pp.148–52.
72. Salzmann, 'Ancien Régime', p.405.
73. Notably N.M. Penzer, *The Harem: An Account of the Institution as It Existed in the Palace of the Turkish Sultans, with a History of the Grand Seraglio from Its Foundation to Modern Times*, 2nd edn (New York, 1993 [1965]), pp.102, 194–5, 257; see also Pl. XX.
74. F.M. Göçek, *Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire: Ottoman Westernization and Social Change* (New York, 1996); idem, *East Encounters West: France and the Ottoman Empire in the Eighteenth Century* (New York, 1987). See also n.48 above.
75. E. Eldem, *French Trade in Istanbul in the Eighteenth Century* (Leiden, 1999); Tuchscherer, *Le commerce du café*.
76. V.H. Aksan, *An Ottoman Statesman in War and Peace: Ahmed Resmî Efendi (1700–1783)* (Leiden, 1995). See also N. Itzkowitz and M. Mote (eds. and trans.), *Mubadele: An Ottoman–Russian Exchange of Ambassadors* (Chicago, 1970).
77. Aksan, *Ahmed Resmî Efendi,* pp.xi, 161–3, 167–9, 185–200.
78. *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd edn, s.v. 'Ahmad III', by H. Bowen; Aksan, *Ahmed Resmî Efendi*, pp.201–5.
79. See W.F. Reddaway (ed.), *Documents of Catherine the Great: The Correspondence with Voltaire and the Instruction of 1767 in the English Text of 1768* (Cambridge, 1931; reissued 1971); J.P. LeDonne, *The Russian Empire and the World, 1700–1917: The Geopolitics of Expansion and Containment* (New York, 1997); Aksan, *Ahmed Resmî Efendi*, pp.125, 143.
80. Crecelius, *Roots of Modern Egypt*, pp.172–6; Livingston, 'The Revolt of ᶜAlī Bey'; Rafeq, *Province of Damascus*. See, in contrast, Crecelius, 'Russia's Relations with the Mamlūk Beys of Egypt in the Eighteenth Century', in F. Kazemi and R.D. McChesney (eds.), *A Way Prepared: Essays on Islamic Culture in Honor of Richard Bayly Winder* (New York, 1988).
81. Itzkowitz, 'Mehmed Raghib Pasha', pp.76–9, 117–19.
82. Hathaway, *Politics of Households*, pp.44–6, 101–6; Ahmed Pasha (Cezzâr), *Ottoman Egypt in the Eighteenth Century: The Nizâmnâme-i Mısır of Cezzâr Ahmed Pasha*, ed. and trans. S.J. Shaw (Cambridge, MA, 1962); Rafeq, *Province of Damascus*, Ch.6.
83. Rafeq, *Province of Damascus*, pp.234, 253–68; Crecelius, *Roots of Modern Egypt*, pp.80–91.

84. J. Deny, *Sommaire des archives turques du Caire* (Cairo, 1930).
85. *3 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri (966–968/1558–1560); 5 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri (973/1565–1566); 6 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri (972/1564–1565); 12 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri (978–979/1570–1572)* (Istanbul, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996). See also M.A. Ünal (ed.), *Mühimme Defteri 44* (Izmir, 1995); N. Aykut *et al.* (eds.), *Mühimme Defteri 90* (Istanbul, 1993).
86. See nn.58–9, above. Documents for earlier and later centuries have been published, among them U. Heyd (trans.), *Ottoman Documents on Palestine, 1552–1615* (Oxford, 1960); D. Ihchiev (comp.), *Turski D'rzhavni Dokumenti za Osman Pazvanoğlu Vidinski* (*Turkish Documents on Osman Pazvanoğlu from Vidin*) (Sofia, 1909).
87. ᶜAbd al-Rahmān al-Jabartī, *Al-Ta'rīkh al-musamma ᶜAjā'ib al-athār fī'l-tarājim wa'l-akhbār*, ed. M.A. Qāsim, 4 vols. in 2 (Bulaq, 1880); Muhammad Khalīl al-Murādī (1759–91), *Kitāb silk al-durar fī aᶜyān al-qarn al-thāni ᶜashar*, 4 vols. in 1 (Bulaq, 1874–83).
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99. On this point see, for example, Khoury, *State and Provincial Society*, Ch.5.
100. See, for example, Fattah, *Politics of Regional Trade*, pp.23–41.
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102. See, for example, M.A. Fay, review of Hathaway, *Politics of Households, Middle East Journal*, 52 (1998), pp.282–4, and the pointed use of the adjective 'indigenous' in N. Hanna, *Making Big Money in 1600: The Life and Times of Ismail Abu Taqiyya, Egyptian Merchant* (Syracuse, NY, 1998), pp.xxii, 19, 44, 95, 136, 167.