# Cursor Navigation Types

- □ Statement stC = dbcon.createStatement ([{ResultSet.NAV\_TYPE}], [ResultSet.CONCUR\_TYPE]);
- NAV TYPE
  - TYPE\_FORWARD\_ONLY: ResultSet can only be navigated forward.
  - SCROLL\_INSENSITIVE: ResultSet can be navigated forward, backwards and jump. Concurrent db changes are not visible.
  - SCROLL\_SENSITIVE: ResultSet can be navigated forward, backwards and jump. Concurrent db changes are visible.

CS1555/2055, Panos K. Chrysanthis & Constantinos Costa - University of Pittsburgh

61

# Cursor Concurrency Types

- Statement stC = dbcon.createStatement
  ( [{ResultSet.NAV\_TYPE}], [ResultSet.CONCUR\_TYPE] );
- □ CONC TYPE
  - CONCUR\_READ\_ONLY: ResultSet can only be read
  - CONCUR\_UPDATABLE: ResultSet can be updated

CS1555/2055, Panos K. Chrysanthis & Constantinos Costa - University of Pittsburgh

62

# Moving Cursors

Statement stC = dbcon.createStatemen

(ResultSet.TYPE\_SCROLL\_INSENSITIVE, ResultSet.CONCUR\_READ\_ONLY);

ResultSet resultSet = stC.executeQuery("SELECT \* FROM STUDENT");

int pos = resultSet.getRow(); // Get cursor position, pos = 0

boolean b = resultSet.isBeforeFirst(); // true

resultSet.next(); // Move cursor to the first row pos = resultSet.getRow(); // Get cursor position, pos = 1

b = resultSet.isFirst(); // true

resultSet.last(); // Move cursor to the last row pos = resultSet.getRow(); // If table has 10 rows, pos = 10

b = resultSet.isLast(); // true

resultSet.afterLast(); // Move cursor past last row

pos = resultSet.getRow(); // If table has 10 rows, value would be 11

b = resultSet.isAfterLast(); // true

CS1555/2055, Panos K. Chrysanthis & Constantinos Costa – University of Pittsburgh

# The PreparedStatement Class

- Create and pre-compile parameterized queries using parameters markers, indicated by question marks (?)
   PreparedStatement st2 = dbcon.prepareStatement
   ( "SELECT \* FROM STUDENT WHERE Name LIKE ?"):
- Specify the values of parameters using setXXX(i,v) where XXX: SQL type in including NULL,

i: argument-index,

v: value

String fname = readString("Enter First Name: "); st2.setString(1, fname);

stz.setotinig(1, mame),

ResultSet res2 = st2.executeQuery();

CS1555/2055, Panos K. Chrysanthis & Constantinos Costa - University of Pittsburgh

64

# Error Handling

Ty { ResultSet res3 =
 st.executeQuery("SELECT \* FROM STUDENT"); }
catch (SQLException e1) {
 System.out.println("SQL Error");
 while (e1 != null) {
 System.out.println("Message = "+ e1.getMessage());
 System.out.println("SQLState = "+ e1.getSQLstate());
}

System.out.println("SQLState = "+ e1.getErrorCode());

CS1555/2055, Panos K. Chrysanthis & Constantinos Costa – University of Pittsburgh

65

# **Executing Transactions**

- Each JDBC statement is treated as a separate transaction that is autocommitted by default
  - dbcon.setAutoCommit(false);

e1 = e1.getNextException();

- A new transaction automatically is set after either dbcon.commit(); or dbcon.rollback();
- □ Set Constraint Mode ResultSet res1 = st.executeQuery("SET CONSTRAINTS ALL DEFERRED");
- $\hfill \Box$  Five transaction isolation levels (to be discussed later)
  - setTransactionIsolation(int level);
- No global transactions, transactions across many db
  - No atomicity or "all or nothing property"

CS1555/2055, Panos K. Chrysanthis & Constantinos Costa - University of Pittsburgh

# Error Handling

JDBC provides the SQLException class to deal with errors

```
try { ResultSet res3 =
    st.executeQuery("SELECT * FROM STUDENT"); }
catch (SQLException e1) {
    System.out.println("SQL Error");
    while (e1 != null) {
        System.out.println("Message = "+ e1.toString());
        System.out.println("SQLState = "+ e1.getSQLstate());
        System.out.println("SQLState = "+ e1.getErrorCode());
        e1 = e1.getNextException();
    }; }:
```

CS1555/2055, Panos K. Chrysanthis & Constantinos Costa - University of Pittsburgh

66

# Not Deferred Constraints

□ Transaction atomicity is enforced in a flexible way by the developer (with the support of the DBMS), e.g.:

## JDBC: Stored Functions □ SQL: SELECT upper('database'); -- Invocation in DataGrip "select" for functions only (default) "callIfNoReturn" for procedures and functions "call" for procedures only □ JAVA: props.setProperty("escapeSyntaxCallMode", "callIfNoReturn"); Connection conn = DriverManager.getConnection(url, props); CallableStatement upperFunc = conn.prepareCall("{? = call upper(?)}"); upperFunc.registerOutParameter(1, Types.VARCHAR); upperFunc.setString(2, "database"); upperFunc.execute(); String upperCased = upperFunc.getString(1); upperFunc.close(); System.out.println(upperCased); CS1555/2055, Panos K. Chrysanthis & Constantinos Costa - University of Pittsburgh

### JDBC: Stored Procedures □ SQL: CREATE OR REPLACE PROCEDURE change major proc(varchar(5), varchar(5)) LANGUAGE plpgsql AS \$\$ UPDATE STUDENT SET MAJOR=\$2 WHERE Major=\$1; ENDSS: begin; -- Invocation in DataGrip call change\_major\_proc('CS','CSD'); □ JAVA: // As of v11, procedures must be outside a transaction to work conn.setAutoCommit(true); CallableStatement proc = conn.prepareCall("{call change major proc(?,?)}"); proc.setObject(1, "CS"); proc.setObject(2, "CSD"); proc.execute(); proc.close(); CS1555/2055, Panos K. Chrysanthis & Constantinos Costa - University of Pittsburgh

## JDBC: Stored Functions □ SQL: CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION fx() RETURNS SETOF student AS \$\$ RETURN OUERY SELECT \* FROM student: \$\$ LANGUAGE plpgsql; SELECT \* FROM fx(); -- Invocation in DataGrip JAVA: ResultSet res1 = st.executeQuery("SELECT \* FROM fx()"); int rid; String rname, rmajor; while (resl.next()) { rid = res1.getInt("SID"); rname = res1.getString("QPA"); rmajor = res1.getString(3); System.out.println(rid + " " + rname + " " + rmajor); CS1555/2055, Panos K. Chrysanthis & Constantinos Costa - University of Pittsburgh

### JDBC: Execute/Create // Setup function to call. Statement stmt = conn createStatement(): stmt.execute("CREATE FUNCTION refcursorfunc() RETURNS refcursor AS '" + " DECLARE ' + " mycurs refcursor; " + " BEGIN " + " OPEN mycurs FOR SELECT \* FROM STUDENT;" + " RETURN mycurs; " + " END; ' language plpgsql"); stmt.close(); // We must be inside a transaction for cursors to work. conn.setAutoCommit(false); // Function call. CallableStatement func = conn.prepareCall("{? = call refcursorfunc() }"); func.registerOutParameter(1, Types.OTHER); func.execute(); ResultSet results = (ResultSet) func.getObject(1); while (results.next()) { // do something with the results.} results.close(); func.close(); 72

CS1555/2055, Panos K. Chrysanthis & Constantinos Costa - University of Pittsburgh

# Querying the Catalog & Native SQL

Metadata about results

```
ResultSet res3 = st.executeQuery("SELECT * FROM STUDENT");
ResultSetMetaData resmetadata = res3.getMetaData();
int num_columns = resmetadata.getColumnCount();
string column_name = resmetadata.getColumnName(3);
```

- Metadata about database
   DatabaseMetaData dbmd = dbcon.getMetaData();
- Native SQL

nativeSQL(String sql);

Converts SQL stmt into the system's native SQL grammar

CS1555/2055, Panos K. Chrysanthis & Constantinos Costa - University of Pittsburgh

SQLDAID
SQLDABC
SQLN
SQLD
SQLVARI

SQLTYPE
SQLLEN
SQLDATA
SQLIND
SQLNAME\_LEN
SQLNAME

SQLTYPE
SQLLEN
SQLDATA
SQLIND
SQLNAME\_LEN
SQLNAME

Ind

CS1555/2055, Panos K. Chrysanthis & Constantinos Costa – University of Pittsburgh

74

# SQL injection vulnerabilities

- Allow an attacker to inject (or execute) SQL commands within an application
- Typical example:

CS1555/2055, Panos K. Chrysanthis & Constantinos Costa - University of Pittsburgh

# What is the problem?

- Accepting user input without performing adequate input validation or escaping meta-characters
- □ String sql = "SELECT \* FROM user WHERE username = "" + username +"" and password="" + password + """;
- Example inputs:

admin (for username) 1' OR '1'='1. (for password)

Result:

SELECT \* FROM user


WHERE username='admin' and password='1' OR '1'='1';

Effect: ?

CS1555/2055, Panos K. Chrysanthis & Constantinos Costa - University of Pittsburgh

76

# What is the problem? String sql = "SELECT \* FROM user WHERE username = "" + username + " and password = "" + password + """; Example inputs: panos (for username) 3113'; DELETE FROM user WHERE '1 (for password) Result: SELECT \* FROM user WHERE username = 'panos' and password = '3113'; DELETE FROM user WHERE '1'; Effect: ? CS1555/2055, Panos K. Chrysanthis & Constantinos Costa - University of Pittsburgh 77



ResultSet rs = st.executeQuery();

System.out.println("Successfully logged in");

System.out.println("Username / password not recognized");

CS1555/2055, Panos K. Chrysanthis & Constantinos Costa - University of Pittsburgh

if (rs.next()) {

loggedIn = true;

OH, DEAR - DID HE

BREAK SOMETHING?

IN A WAY-

DID YOU REALLY

NAME YOUR SON

Robert'); DROP

TABLE Students: -- ?

WELL, WE'VE LOST THIS

I HOPE YOU'RE HAPPY.

YEAR'S STUDENT RECORDS.

HI, THIS IS

YOUR SON'S SCHOOL.

WE'RE HAVING SOME

COMPUTER TROUBLE.

```
Avoiding SQL Injection

In the same way attackers can inject other SQL commands

extract, update or delete data within the database

Solution: Good programming practice; use prepareStatement()

All queries should be parameterized

All dynamic data should be explicitly bound to parameterized queries

String concatenation should never be used to create dynamic SQL (in general)

Example:

PreparedStatement st3 = dbcon.prepareStatement
("SELECT * FROM user WHERE username= ? AND password = ?");
```