



# **WHITE SUPREMACY EXTREMISM:**

*The Transnational Rise of the Violent  
White Supremacist Movement*

THE SOUFAN CENTER  
SEPTEMBER 2019



# **WHITE SUPREMACY EXTREMISM:**

*The Transnational Rise of the Violent White Supremacist Movement*

THE SOUFAN CENTER  
SEPTEMBER 2019



Cover photo: *Fighters from the Azov volunteer battalion ignite flares during the march marking the 72nd anniversary of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in Kiev, Ukraine* (AP Photo/Sergei Chuzavkov)

# CONTENTS

<b>List of Abbreviations</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>List of Figures</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>Key Findings</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>Introduction</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>Trends &amp; Organizing Principles of Global White Supremacy Extremism</b>	<b>14</b>
<b>Financing</b>	<b>20</b>
<b>High-Profile Attack Case Studies</b>	<b>26</b>
<b>Comparing Salafi-Jihadists and White Supremacy Extremists</b>	<b>28</b>
<b>Policy Recommendations</b>	<b>43</b>
<b>Conclusion</b>	<b>54</b>
<b>Contributors</b>	<b>56</b>
<b>About The Soufan Center</b>	<b>59</b>
<b>Endnotes</b>	<b>60</b>

## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<b>ADL</b>	Anti-Defamation League
<b>AWD</b>	Atomwaffen Division
<b>B&amp;H</b>	Blood and Honor
<b>BNP</b>	British National Party
<b>BPS</b>	Black Pigeon Speaks
<b>BTC</b>	Bitcoin
<b>COPS</b>	Community-Oriented Policing Services
<b>DHS -</b>	Department of Homeland Security
<b>DOJ</b>	Department of Justice
<b>FATE</b>	Families Against Terrorism and Extremism
<b>FBI</b>	Federal Bureau of Investigation
<b>FTO</b>	Foreign Terrorist Organization
<b>GAO</b>	(U.S.) Government Accountability Office
<b>GIFCT</b>	Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism
<b>GTD</b>	(University of Maryland's) Global Terrorism Database
<b>HCR</b>	Hate Crimes Report
<b>HCSA</b>	Hate Crime Statistics Act
<b>IS</b>	Islamic State
<b>KKK</b>	Ku Klux Klan
<b>MAK</b>	Maktab al-Khidamat
<b>NSU</b>	National Socialist Underground
<b>P2P</b>	Peer-to-peer
<b>PEGIDA</b>	Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the West
<b>R.A.M</b>	Rise Above Movement
<b>Rahowa</b>	Racial holy war
<b>RIM</b>	Russian Imperial Movement
<b>RUSI</b>	Royal United Services Institute
<b>SPLC</b>	Southern Poverty Law Center
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNSCR 1373</b>	United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373
<b>USG</b>	United States Government
<b>WSEs</b>	White Supremacist Extremists
<b>ZOG</b>	Zionist Occupied Government

## LIST OF FIGURES

**Figure 1: Violent extremist incidents in the United States that resulted in death:**

September 12, 2001 through December 31, 2016 10

**Figure 2: White Supremacy Extremism and Online Radicalization** 16

**Figure 3: Estimated Foreign Fighters in Ukraine: 2014-2019 (\* as of 1 June 2019)** 29

**Figure 4: Map of Foreign Fighters in Ukraine: 2014-2019 (\* as of 1 June 2019)** 30

## KEY FINDINGS

- White supremacy extremism (WSE) is a transnational challenge—its tentacles reach from Canada to Australia, and the United States to Ukraine—but it has evolved at a different pace in different parts of the world.
- To make serious progress, the United States should consider building upon Canada and the United Kingdom’s leadership by sanctioning transnational WSE groups as foreign terrorist organizations. U.S. Departments of State and Treasury terrorist designations could hinder the travel of terrorists into the United States; criminalize support to designated individuals and groups; block the movement of assets to those designated; and allow for the Department of Justice (DOJ) to prosecute individuals for providing material support to designated groups.
- While there are crucial differences between jihadis and white supremacy extremists, there are also important similarities and particular ways these groups feed off of each other, including: the utility and cycle of violence; use of the internet; propaganda; recruitment; financing; and the transnational nature of the networks.
- White supremacy extremist groups and individuals accrue wealth through both licit and illicit sources of finance. WSEs also accrue, move, and store their wealth through various means but as payment processors curb access to their platforms, these groups have relied on cryptocurrency or other alternatives to fiat currency.
- WSE operational tradecraft has not significantly evolved over time and remains rooted in the use of conventional weapons, especially light arms. What has changed is the speed in which social media allows for the amplification and glorification of attacks.
- The rapid expanse of social media facilitates radicalization and recruitment within the white supremacy extremist domain. Spaces in which radicalized individuals can communicate and share content enable the development of a worldwide, rapidly expanding network of white supremacy extremists.
- Recruitment and radicalization goals within white supremacy extremism remain consistent over time, despite traditional methods of spreading propaganda diverging from more modern ones. Extremists intend to expand their influence and power through a variety of recruitment tactics, new and old.

- U.S. government efforts to combat the WSE threat remain lacking. The international community has also lagged in developing policies to counter white supremacy extremism. More resources, both financial and human, need to be directed at white supremacy extremism to curb its rise. Governments should review their terrorism laws to ensure that they are sufficiently updated to prosecute individuals who carry out acts of domestic terror.

---

## INTRODUCTION

From Pittsburgh to Poway and Charleston to El Paso, white supremacist extremists (WSEs) pose a clear terrorist threat to the United States. And while extremist groups operating on American soil are often labeled or categorized as domestic terrorist organizations, this report will demonstrate that they maintain links to transnational networks of like-minded organizations and individuals, from Australia, Canada, Russia, South Africa, and elsewhere.<sup>1</sup> The danger of terrorism is growing in the United States, just as it is elsewhere in the world, with white supremacist extremists strengthening transnational networks and even imitating the tactics, techniques, and procedures of groups like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS). These networks share approaches to recruitment, financing, and propaganda, with Ukraine emerging as a hub in the broader network of transnational white supremacy extremism, attracting foreign recruits from all over the world. Where jihadis travel to fight in places like Syria, white supremacists now have their own theater in which to learn combat—Ukraine, where the conflict between pro-Russian separatists and Ukrainian government forces has been raging since 2014, attracting fighters from around the globe who are fighting on both sides. Recent research shows that around 17,000 foreigners from 50 countries, including the United States, have gone to fight in that conflict.<sup>2</sup> Muslim foreign fighters flocked to Afghanistan in the 1980s, the Balkans in the 1990s, Iraq after the 2003 U.S. invasion, and Syria following the start of the civil war in 2011.

While fighters espousing white supremacist beliefs have traveled to Ukraine, others have joined for a variety of reasons, much like their jihadi counterparts. Nonetheless, many fighters, particularly from Western countries, have taken advantage of the conflict in Ukraine to expand the global white supremacy extremist movement. Moreover, those that traveled to Ukraine for

adventure, nationalism, or sheer boredom, may eventually become radicalized and grow more interested in white supremacist ideology over time. This demonstrates that the WSE movement has transnational roots and global connections, and is growing in both frequency and strength.


Today, white supremacist terrorism is responsible for more deaths on U.S. soil than jihadist terrorism since 9/11.<sup>3</sup> The Anti-Defamation League reports that over the past decade, white supremacy extremists were responsible for three times as many deaths in the United States as were Islamists. In 2018, white supremacy extremists were connected to 50 murders, including 11 individuals killed at the Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh, and were responsible for more killings last year than at any point since 1995, the year Timothy McVeigh bombed the Alfred P. Murrah Federal building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.<sup>4</sup>

In May 2019, a senior FBI official testified to Congress that the bureau is pursuing about 850 domestic terrorism investigations, a “significant majority” of which are related to white supremacist extremists.<sup>5</sup> By nearly every metric, white supremacy extremism has become one of the single most dangerous terrorist threats facing the United States, if not the single most dangerous.<sup>6</sup> Yet despite this, and despite numerous public overtures by intelligence and law enforcement officials pleading for more help in countering this threat, “there is a significant disparity in the amount of funds, personnel, and law-enforcement tools that America devotes to combating Islamist versus white nationalist terrorism.”<sup>7</sup>

The 2018 attack by Robert Bowers at the Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh resulted in more scrutiny of the violent threat posed by U.S. white supremacy extremism.<sup>8</sup> There are a bevy of organizations that collect data on incidents of violence in the United States and their numbers often diverge. Despite that divergence, organizations including the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) depict an increasing threat posed by white supremacy extremists, especially when compared to Islamist-motivated violence. The GAO study, using the U.S. Extremist Crime Database that covered a time period of September 12, 2001, through December 31, 2016, concluded that white supremacy extremists were responsible for more incidents (62) of violence than radical Islamist extremists (23).<sup>9</sup> Soufan Center analysis of the University of Maryland’s Global Terrorism Database (GTD) between September 12, 2001, and December 31, 2017, also demonstrates that attacks perpetrated by white supremacy extremists in the United States far outpace violent incidents associated with Islamist extremists.<sup>10</sup> During this time period, white supremacy extremism groups carried out 123 attacks, compared to 46 Islamist-motivated extremists and 83 by left-wing radicals. Neither the GAO study nor the publicly available GTD data covers 2018, but both datasets demonstrate that the lethality rate of Islamist-linked extremists was higher than that of white supremacy extremists, despite the higher rate of incidence of the latter. However, according to 2018 statistics compiled by the Anti-

Defamation League, white supremacy extremists in the United States were responsible for nearly all extremist-related murders, while domestic Islamist extremists were responsible for only 2 percent.<sup>11</sup>

**Figure 1: Violent extremist incidents in the United States that resulted in death: September 12, 2001 through December 31, 2016**



The U.S. military has also struggled to root out violent racists and the broader white supremacy extremist movement from its ranks, which claims many veterans of the armed forces and typically sees a surge in membership following the end of major wars.<sup>12</sup> Two of the United States' most prominent white supremacy extremist groups, the Atomwaffen Division (AWD) and the Rise Above Movement (R.A.M.), count veterans of the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts among their members.<sup>13</sup> R.A.M. members have traveled overseas to Germany, Ukraine, and Italy to celebrate Adolf Hitler's birthday and forge stronger organizational links with white supremacy extremists based in Europe.<sup>14</sup> Brandon Clint Russell, a member of the Florida National Guard and a founding member of Atomwaffen, was found in possession of a cooler in his garage containing the explosive HMTD (hexamethylene triperoxide diamine), along with other explosive precursors, multiple pounds of ammonium nitrate, nitromethane, empty shell casings, fuses, and electric matches.<sup>15</sup> Christopher Hasson, a self-described white nationalist and member of the U.S. Coast Guard who also spent five years in the Marine Corps and two more in the Army National Guard, was arrested with an arsenal of weapons, including 15 firearms and more than 1,000 rounds of ammunition.<sup>16</sup>

One of the challenges in combating this movement is that white supremacy extremism is far from monolithic and is especially diverse in Europe, where the movement is characterized by a range of entities and often seeks shelter in a broad tent of fringe politics and underground movements. And while European nationalist movements have largely been analyzed through the frame of national or domestic contexts, “many of these nationalist movements have distinctly and strikingly global aspects.”<sup>17</sup> The British government is acutely aware of the threat posed by white supremacist extremists, which authorities have labeled the “fastest growing threat” of terrorist violence in that country since 2017.<sup>18</sup> Germany has struggled to root out neo-Nazi sympathizers in its security forces and government agencies.<sup>19</sup> An increase in Muslim migrants has also fueled violence in Germany, with attacks by white supremacy extremists and associated groups using explosives tripling in Germany between 2015 and 2016.<sup>20</sup> In Canada, which is also experiencing a drastic uptick in racially motivated violence, 53 members of the armed forces have been connected to hate groups, including white supremacy extremist organizations, since 2013.<sup>21</sup>

The globalization of white supremacy extremism is evident when closely analyzing several of the high-profile attacks conducted by WSEs over the past few years, including by white supremacists in Norway and New Zealand, with each major incident serving to galvanize future attacks. The attackers themselves have been lionized as heroes, martyrs, “saints,” “commanders,” and other honorifics. White supremacy extremists rely on a diverse set of techniques to radicalize potential recruits, from the worldwide music scene to fringe websites like Gab and 8chan, popular among white supremacists and neo-Nazis. Many adherents to transnational white supremacy extremism hold millenarian and apocalyptic beliefs about an imminent race war, with some ardent believers in the end of time and influenced by elements of Christian identity. Among other core beliefs is virulent anti-Semitism, which pervades a broad range of groups espousing anti-tax and anti-government sentiments, whose members often refer to the U.S. government as the Zionist Occupied Government (ZOG).<sup>22</sup>

As this report highlights, there are important similarities between white supremacy extremists and jihadists, including in the utility and cycle of violence; use of the internet; employment of propaganda; recruitment and financing; and the transnational nature of the networks. The comparison even extends to the naming of groups within these movements: neo-Nazis have adopted the name “The Base”—a translation from the Arabic of “al-Qaeda,” used, obviously by bin Laden—as a new social networking platform connecting various elements of white supremacy extremism.<sup>23</sup> Neo-Nazis seek tactical expertise by scouring jihadist magazines and web forums for tips on how to build bombs and select targets.<sup>24</sup>

White supremacy extremists engage in a wide variety of activities to obtain money and matériel to support their operations and have demonstrated skill operating online, using virtual currencies and crowdfunding mechanisms to sustain their organizations. But the international community is

far from helpless and countries, including the United States, should be doing more. There are a number of practical actions the United States and the international community can take to counter the spread of white supremacist extremism, including, but not limited to: updating U.S. legal statutes, ensuring better data collection on domestic terrorism and hate crimes, utilizing sanctions more proactively, and continuing to pressure the technology sector to implement its community use guidelines and develop innovative solutions that hamper the spread of speech encouraging violence.

Above all else, the United States should consider building upon Canada and the United Kingdom's leadership by sanctioning transnational WSE groups as foreign terrorist organizations. Canada recently sanctioned Blood & Honour and Combat 18. Departments of State and Treasury terrorist designations could hinder the entry of terrorists into the United States; criminalize support to designated individuals/groups; block the movement of assets to those designated; and allow for the Department of Justice (DOJ) to prosecute individuals for providing material support. This is a measure that might very well receive bipartisan support in Congress; at a House Homeland Security Committee hearing in early September 2019 that focused on global terrorism and the threat posed to the U.S. homeland, both Republicans and Democrats expressed a strong desire to combat the threat posed by transnational white supremacist extremism.<sup>25</sup>

“  
The United States should consider sanctioning transnational white supremacy extremist groups as foreign terrorist organizations. ”

Since 2001, numerous individuals have been indicted in the United States for providing material support to designated foreign terrorist entities. But it is impossible to bring material support charges against individuals who aid domestic terrorist organizations, because there is no mechanism for designating domestic groups as terrorists. Additionally, domestic terrorism charges in the United States are hard to prove and carry penalties inadequate to the gravity of the offense.

To make progress in combating white supremacist extremists, Congress should move immediately to update post-9/11 legislation to allow domestic terror groups to be designated in the same way as foreign ones. This will afford law-enforcement agencies access to the full suite of monitoring tools and provide prosecutors with the authority needed to bring meaningful charges for aiding domestic terrorism. Continued inaction in the face of a rising threat from white supremacist

extremists risks the lives of American citizens and makes the U.S. homeland vulnerable to attack much in the same way it was in the years leading up to September 11, 2001.

The first section of this report analyzes the trends, organizing principles, and ideological underpinnings of a range of white supremacy extremism movements outside of the United States, assessing both commonalities and differences among groups in the United States while also highlighting their growing connections in a broader transnational network. The next section features an in-depth comparative analysis of WSE groups and Salafi-jihadist organizations (such as ISIS and al-Qaeda), evaluating the growing corpus of lessons learned and best practices for attempting to combat these groups. The conclusion focuses on policy recommendations, including sanctioning WSE groups in the United States and abroad, updating U.S. laws, applying civil society solutions, and encouraging multilateral efforts. As part of the final chapter, the authors discuss data collection efforts and resource challenges while also providing targeted financial guidance and an assessment of the role of the technology sector in combating white supremacy extremism.

---

## TRENDS & ORGANIZING PRINCIPLES OF GLOBAL WHITE SUPREMACY EXTREMISM

### *Traditional Radicalization*

When discussing white supremacy extremism, traditional methods of growing membership are still relevant. Multiple recruitment methods have withstood the test of time, as long-established radicalization tactics intertwine with modern communication methods. Early efforts included the dissemination of so-called white supremacist guidebooks, such as the anti-Semitic fabrication *Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion* or William Luther Pierce's *Turner Diaries*.<sup>26</sup> Both works, and others like them, are foundational to the belief systems from which contemporary white supremacy extremism evolved.<sup>27</sup> Although hailing from different eras of extremist activity, these pieces of propaganda often comprise the groundwork for radicalization efforts today, and are far easier to distribute than ever before. Whereas McVeigh spent considerable time peddling *The Turner Diaries* at gun shows and militia gatherings, today the work can be sent instantaneously through an extremist's online medium of choice.

Past white supremacy extremists utilized other measures beyond print media to circulate their ideologies and cultivate support. Radio, especially shortwave, where the technological barriers to entry were far lower and less regulated, was used to publicly broadcast ultraconservative, xenophobic programming.<sup>28</sup> Tom Metzger, founder of the Indiana-based neo-Nazi organization White Aryan Resistance, developed a public access television program on which he interviewed radical white supremacy extremists.<sup>29</sup> Others propagated their ideologies and conspiracies on a more localized level though in-person gatherings, a practice that remains popular today. Ku Klux

Klan leaders and members of various Christian survivalist groups would—and at times still do—conduct seminars to recruit new members and reinforce collective identity among supporters.<sup>30</sup> The notorious Christian Identitarian extremist Louis Beam attracted followers through heated sermons as he toured white supremacist compounds and meeting halls.<sup>31</sup> Similarly, Wesley Swift, a Christian Identitarian minister, delivered impassioned speeches saturated with racist, survivalist-aligned arguments to numerous sympathetic congregations.<sup>32</sup> On-the-ground radicalization and recruitment efforts remain commonplace today, specifically in institutes of higher education. White supremacy extremist groups have surreptitiously left flyers and other propaganda promoting white supremacy on college campuses, hoping to attract a younger generation of extremists to attend clandestine meetings;<sup>33</sup> for example, flyers promoting the avowed white nationalist organization Identity Evropa were discovered at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst in 2017.<sup>34</sup>

An additional objective of white supremacy extremists has been to establish organizational ties with other sympathetic activists. Even in the earliest days of the internet, extremists took to computer messaging platforms to spread propaganda. Liberty Net, a network of message boards created in 1983, was used to exchange information and doctrine, and to connect extremists with one another.<sup>35</sup> Similarly, Louis Beam established a computer system financed by The Order, through which members exchanged locations, operations, and propaganda.<sup>36</sup> These early networks were critical for cross-organizational communication and propagandizing, presaging modern online activities.

Networking tactics, however, were not limited solely to electronic messaging systems. Music was, and continues to be, an essential mode of recruitment among white supremacy extremists. The neo-Nazi music scene can be traced to the 1970s, specifically to Ian Stuart Donaldson and Skrewdriver, a British neo-Nazi hardcore punk band.<sup>37</sup> In the 1990s, the white supremacy extremism music genre expanded significantly in the United States, as white power rock bands associated with the Hammerskin Nation, among others, trumpeted their racist, neo-Nazi, and white supremacist beliefs through song lyrics.<sup>38</sup> Moreover, the internet has allowed white supremacist and neo-Nazi music groups to gain further traction both domestically and internationally, as the music has become accessible worldwide—including to individuals in countries where it might otherwise be banned.<sup>39</sup> Neo-Nazis, skinheads, and their associated social scenes represent one of the most widespread expressions of white supremacy extremism propaganda and radicalization currently active.

**Figure 2: White Supremacy Extremism and Online Radicalization**

			
<b>YOUTUBE</b>	<b>ENCRYPTED CHAT APPS</b>	<b>GAMING CULTURE</b>	<b>INTERNET BOARDS</b>
<b>Radicalization Spiral</b>	<b>Privacy and absolute free speech</b>	<b>Misogyny and reactionism</b>	<b>Unregulated platforms</b>
Multiple extremist YouTube channels produce radicalizing content to recruit individuals into the white supremacy extremist milieu.	Encrypted apps, such as Discord and Telegram, offer privacy for keeping users anonymous, while apps like Gab oppose censorship and offer absolute free speech.	Initially centered on gaming culture, "Gamergate" has grown into a reactionary misogynistic movement that propagates violent misogyny and virtual harassment methods.	Modern white supremacy extremists often communicate on forums such as Reddit or so-called freedom boards like 4chan and 8chan with little to no inspection by website administrators.

### *Online Radicalization*

#### **YouTube as a Radicalization Tool**

White supremacy extremism ideologies now transcend national borders at a far faster pace and greater scale than ever before. Modern media sources like YouTube have been heavily utilized by extremists to produce ideological content, often consisting of racist and misogynist messaging, among other ideological positions.<sup>40</sup> The Atomwaffen Division, a neo-Nazi group notorious for white supremacist beliefs and an obsession with violence described in more detail below, has previously published videos featuring members training with firearms and spreading white supremacist propaganda, among other activities.<sup>41</sup> Multiple extremist YouTube channels produce radicalizing content to recruit individuals into the white supremacy extremist milieu.<sup>42</sup> More specifically, researchers have discovered unintended quirks in the YouTube algorithm that have, in the past, served to promote radical white supremacy extremism ideology automatically, enabling a radicalization “spiral” as individuals are prompted to view progressively more extreme content.<sup>43</sup> This propaganda disseminated on YouTube serves to establish a community of individuals with shared interests, thus reinforcing the beliefs perpetuated by white supremacy extremists and influencing vulnerable individuals.<sup>44</sup>

### **Covert Communications and Messaging: Encrypted Chat Apps**

Extremists use social media platforms both for the promulgation of white supremacy extremism conspiracies and beliefs and in an attempt to radicalize and recruit new adherents. Communication today among white supremacy extremists often occurs within online chat applications such as Discord or Telegram, both of which ensure privacy for groups seeking to remain anonymous and keep their operations surreptitious.<sup>45</sup> Organizers of the Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, where Heather Heyer was murdered and several others injured, took to Discord for planning, designating specific accommodations, and sending messages of support both prior to and following the event.<sup>46</sup> Discord has also been used by more explicitly militant groups, such as the Atomwaffen Division; in 2018, ProPublica obtained the group's chat logs, which allowed authorities to uncover information regarding its operations, including discussions of potential murders and cell locations.<sup>47</sup> Additionally, Gab, a Twitter-like social networking site, has been manipulated in a similar fashion; users banned from Facebook or other sites have sought refuge on the network.<sup>48</sup> Gab purports to oppose censorship and emphasizes absolute free speech—in practice, creating an environment where white supremacy extremists can freely communicate with one another and comfortably spread propaganda.<sup>49</sup> For example, Robert Bowers was a longtime user of Gab, even going so far as to post a brief foreboding message prior to his attack on Pittsburgh's Tree of Life synagogue.<sup>50</sup>

### **Gaming Culture**

Video game-related culture has been central to the rapid growth of white supremacy extremism online. “Gamergate,” a decentralized movement, was framed initially as a reaction to the rise of perceived social liberalism “infringing” on the video game space, before devolving into a full-blown reactionary political project. The movement, and the grievances associated with it, led male gamers to “troll,” or deliberately undermine and harass any individuals (especially women) deemed targets. Some, primarily male gamers, feared a loss of power and control in wider society and saw video games as a refuge for their misogynistic, reactionary ideals. Although initially concerned solely with gaming culture, Gamergate became the basis for a far wider online cultural reactionary movement among primarily white and male internet users.<sup>51</sup> The networks, tactics, and ideologies popularized around Gamergate today undergird much of what takes place in white supremacy extremism circles online; video game-adjacent chat apps are a preferred medium, violent misogyny is a current theme that cuts across most online extremist movements, and the virulent harassment methods pioneered within the movement have become commonplace.

### **Internet Boards**

Modern white supremacy extremists initially communicated via larger social media websites such as Facebook.<sup>52</sup> These social networking companies, however, have begun to take notice of the racist, sexist, and violent content on their platforms, becoming more proactive in banning some

of the more overtly extremist users. Memes, neo-Nazi symbols, and other threads in support of the Unite the Right rally were banned from sites such as Facebook and Twitter, among other media outlets, unintentionally paving the way for a new, radical, alt-right internet as these users migrated to less regulated sites.<sup>53</sup> Some explicitly white supremacist or fascist forums, including both Stormfront and Iron March—both of which have been tied to violence and subsequently shuttered—were inspired by former computer message boards such as Liberty Net.<sup>54</sup> Additionally, members of the Atomwaffen Division were frequent users of Iron March, attaining relevance within the white supremacy extremist domain through their active presence on the site.<sup>55</sup> Stormfront was likewise popular among white supremacists, militia movement members, and neo-Confederates. Established by KKK member Don Black and inspired by Liberty Net, the site circulated white supremacy extremism content and was linked, directly or indirectly, to numerous murders committed on the basis of hate.<sup>56</sup>

Modern online white supremacy extremists are typically young, technologically savvy white men, and often communicate via memes and on forums such as Reddit or so-called freedom boards like 4chan and 8chan, where users can post with little to no inspection by website administrators and few, if any repercussions.<sup>57</sup> Furthermore, the 8chan imageboard has frequently been associated with white supremacy extremism due to the website's high concentration of anti-Semitic and racist content as well as users' tendency to celebrate mass killers. Brenton Tarrant, perpetrator of the Christchurch shootings, first published his neo-fascist manifesto and a link to the live-streamed massacre on 8chan.<sup>58</sup> Tarrant's attack has developed into an internet meme of its own; it was shared widely (and continuously referenced) by 8chan users, and cited approvingly by both users and later mass killers.<sup>59</sup> Both alleged Poway synagogue shooter John T. Earnest and purported El Paso shooter Patrick Crusius posted manifestos in the style of Tarrant's "The Great Replacement" to 8chan shortly before committing their respective attacks.<sup>60</sup> As of August 4, 2019, 8chan has been shut down after a San Francisco company ceased providing network services to the site.<sup>61</sup> On September 5, 2019, Jim Watkins, 8chan's owner, stated during a meeting on Capitol Hill that the site will remain offline willingly until it develops the capacity to counteract illegal material published on it.<sup>62</sup>

The sheer ideological concentration of white supremacy extremists on anarchic image boards is difficult to overstate; the language of Tarrant, Ernest and Crusius—all of whom are approvingly referred to as "saints" on the board—is in no way extreme or out of place among the site's users.<sup>63</sup> It will remain to be seen where, should 8chan and other similar forums truly be shut down, these users concentrate again.

### **Red-Pilled Reactionaries**

Many of these radicalization tactics are referred to by online extremists as red-pilling (a term inspired by the 1999 film *The Matrix*), wherein individuals occupying liberal or apolitical views

figuratively ingest a “red pill” intended to awaken them to the world as it truly is, leading them toward more reactionary, then ultimately extreme, politics, such as white supremacy, hypermasculinity, and anti-Semitism.<sup>64</sup> Red-pilling has become a widely acknowledged expression often associated with white supremacy extremist groups, ideologies, and movements, including Gamergate.<sup>65</sup> These red-pilled extremists seek to counteract feminism, social liberalism, and general progressivism in an often rhetorically violent and threatening manner through online forums, imageboards, and other social networking outlets.<sup>66</sup> Individuals radicalized through red-pilling are often conscious of their own radicalization, boasting about it on forums such as 8chan.<sup>67</sup> In other cases, disenfranchised or extremely isolated individuals are often unconsciously radicalized as they consume readily accessible white supremacy extremism content online.

Recruitment strategies have changed over the years, and there remains no sole radicalization method attributed to white supremacy extremism. Efforts among white supremacy extremists to indoctrinate new adherents are buoyed by the staggering communication potential of online networks. There is an evident resilience of white supremacy extremism ideology as new radicalization technologies develop and as individuals continue to engage in violent acts. The increasingly pervasive ways in which extremists propagandize, radicalize, and recruit individuals represent perhaps the greatest challenge to policymakers and law enforcement today.

---

## FINANCING

White supremacist extremists use a variety of methods to accrue financing. In the United States, the KKK, which has been in existence in various forms since 1865, has used myriad methods to fund its activities, many of which have evolved considerably. Today, for example, the Knights Party of the KKK, with a website hosted by an entity based in Belize, continues the tradition of requiring membership fees for prospective applicants and has monetized an eclectic mix of paraphernalia ranging from books, leaflets, flags, and clothing to jewelry and belt buckles.<sup>68</sup> What started as rudimentary print media efforts to manipulate vulnerable populations to acquire new members and receive financial support for white supremacy extremism causes has grown more professional and sophisticated with the development of the internet and social media. With this evolution has come a tighter intersection of white supremacy extremism finance and propaganda.

Financing typologies have advanced significantly since the rise of the KKK now more than 150 years ago. As demonstrated below, white supremacy extremism groups today engage in a wide variety of legitimate and illegitimate activities to obtain money and matériel to support their operations. White supremacy extremism groups and personalities use both traditional means, such as reliance on donations, and more contemporary methods, such as cyber-enabled activities, to finance their actions. The white supremacy extremism movement needs money to recruit and train members, create slick videos to propagate messages, acquire supplies, weapons, and explosives, establish bases and safe houses, and pay for transportation. While there is little information on the finances of more recent groups like Atomwaffen, it is most likely that its members self-finance their activities. This tracks with a ProPublica report in which John

Cameron Denton, a leader within Atomwaffen, said that members should pool money and purchase land in rural areas so they can “get the f\*\*\* off of the grid.”<sup>69</sup> According to another ProPublica report, Atomwaffen profited briefly from the sale of t-shirts via Inktale, an online retailer.<sup>70</sup> However, given recent developments in crowdfunding, cryptocurrencies, and other forms of both licit and illicit financing, we should expect white supremacy extremists to gravitate toward new and innovative methods of funding, as outlined below, to fund their organizations and operations.

### *Crowdfunding*

Crowdfunding, the process of funding projects by using a multitude of people who contribute small amounts of money, has become a standard method of financing by all stripes of extremist actors, including WSEs, who have also leveraged content-creation social media platforms such as Twitter, YouTube, and Facebook to seek funding. Once a donor clicks on a link to donate, they may be taken to another site, like the group’s own website or a specialized crowdfunding site like Patreon, GoFundMe, or Kickstarter. Alternatively, the group-run social media page could point directly to a payment processor, such as PayPal, to provide funds to the recipient organization. The intersection and overlap between social media, crowdfunding websites, and payment systems facilitate peer-to-peer (P2P) financial transactions in a manner that has served as an accelerant for white supremacy extremism fund-raising. Unlike the KKK’s reliance on checks or money orders and newspaper or leaflet subscription sales, today’s extremists can secure finance beyond the limitations of the United States Postal Service or local newspaper delivery truck.

In the United States, there are many examples of white supremacy extremists using crowdfunding as a mechanism to secure funding. Kyle Chapman is someone best known for having been banned from participating in rallies due to his engagement in violence.<sup>71</sup> Another prominent international figure, a Canadian citizen and activist with the Identitarian movement named Lauren Southern, made more than \$5,000 per month by using the Patreon crowdfunding site, which made up a large share of her income.<sup>72</sup> Tommy Robinson utilized the services of the U.S.-based crowdfunding platform Donorbox to raise funds for his legal defense.<sup>73</sup> Robinson



*Screen grab from Atomwaffen's Twitter account. (Source: Atomwaffen Division Twitter)*

demonstrated the interconnected process that allows for those with sympathetic views to provide support. He used his camera phone to record a livestream video encouraging people to visit a website that outlined his cause in greater detail. From there, the website quickly redirects to Robinson's personal website, TR News, where supporters can provide funds to him via Donorbox.<sup>74</sup>

Mainstream social media content, payment processors, and crowdfunding platforms have taken significant steps to curtail abuse of their services by white supremacy extremism figures. For example, in 2014, PayPal removed Daily Stormer publisher Andrew Anglin, an American neo-Nazi propagandist, from its service.<sup>75</sup> Three years later, in 2017, white supremacy extremists lost access to a number of crowdfunding platforms such as GoFundMe, Patreon, and YouCaring.<sup>76</sup> Payment processors like PayPal continued to act as well, limiting the account of Generation Identity, a French-based anti-immigration group. PayPal's decision had practical impact on Generation Identity in that it had to refund €30,000 to donors.<sup>77</sup> In early June 2019, YouTube took enforcement action by taking down thousands of inflammatory supremacist content-laden videos associated with white supremacy extremism in an effort to reduce its spread across the platform.<sup>78</sup> Black Pigeon Speaks<sup>79</sup> (BPS) was one channel caught in YouTube's enforcement action. BPS produces videos that contain themes and imagery often associated with white nationalism and anti-feminism, and its comment boards are saturated with anti-Semitic overtones. BPS was briefly deleted and demonetized by YouTube, according to BPS, which took to Twitter to bemoan the enforcement action.<sup>80</sup>

As mainstream payment processors, crowdfunding websites, and social media companies take efforts to curb the financing of white supremacy extremism online, white supremacists extremists have turned to creating a number of smaller, less regulated platforms for financing as an alternative. Explicitly racist white supremacy extremism crowdfunding platforms, such as GoyFundMe and Hatreon, have provided services that allow for the continued flow of funds that mimick the functions of larger mainstream sites, creating parallel white supremacy extremism worlds online. A 2019 Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) report documented that Hatreon was collecting upward of \$25,000 per month for white supremacy extremism initiatives.<sup>81</sup> The phenomenon of parallel white supremacy extremism worlds created in the online space also extends to social media content providers. As groups lose their platforms or become demonetized, acolytes have transitioned to less restrictive content-moderated portals, such as BitChute or DTube, where they can send P2P payments to support their favorite white supremacy extremism messenger.<sup>82</sup> BPS's BitChute, for example, can still receive P2P payments via both mainstream crowdfunding websites (Patreon) and payment processors (PayPal). Still, the parallel white supremacy extremism universe of BitChute is significantly smaller than that of its mainstream competitor, YouTube. BPS, for instance, has more than 500,000 thousand

subscribers at YouTube, but only 55,000 thousand subscribers at BitChute as of July 2019. As such, mainstream entity de-platforming and demonetization efforts have an important impact: limiting the size of the audience that can provide direct financial support to extremists.

### *Cryptocurrency*

In 2017, white supremacy extremism pivoted to cryptocurrency following its loss of access to PayPal and credit card companies.<sup>83</sup> Andrew Anglin has received significant funding via Bitcoin donations. According to recent reports, he may personally maintain access to \$25 million in Bitcoin.<sup>84</sup> The Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) tracks the Bitcoin transactions of a number of white supremacy extremism figures and organizations, such as the Atomwaffen Division, the Daily Stormer, and Defend Evropa.<sup>85</sup> As of July 2019, the SPLC was tracking thirteen Daily Stormer Bitcoin wallets. One Daily Stormer Bitcoin wallet had received over 106 bitcoins and was involved in more than 1,255 total transactions.<sup>86</sup> Cryptocurrency's provision of pseudo-anonymity and freedom from government oversight is attractive to white supremacy extremism, and this partly explains why major figures like American white supremacist Richard Spencer have called Bitcoin the "currency of the far-right."<sup>87</sup> Heeding Spencer's call, the Daily Stormer website touts the fact that "Bitcoin is the only way to donate" and further explains how prospective donors can find a Bitcoin exchange that will convert fiat currency to Bitcoin so it can be directed to Daily Stormer's virtual wallet.<sup>88</sup> Today, Tommy Robinson's crowdfunding efforts via the TR News webpage directs potential P2P donors to cryptocurrencies Bitcoin, Ethereum, and Stellar. The neo-Nazi BTC Tracker on Twitter, organized by John Bambenek, tracks in near-real time white supremacy extremism Bitcoin transactions like those executed by Robinson, who on July 6 alone withdrew 1.8 BTC, or \$20,968.66 USD.<sup>89</sup>

Major white supremacy extremism YouTube influencers like Stefan Molyneux, among others, transact<sup>90</sup> heavily in Bitcoin. While no major white supremacy extremism attack has yet been primarily funded via cryptocurrency, radicalizing propaganda outlets receive significant cryptocurrency support from donors. Given relatively lax cryptocurrency regulation compared to that of the formal financial sector, the continued financing of white supremacy extremism via cryptocurrency presents a significant challenge. Cryptocurrency crowdfunding efforts will remain the primary way that white supremacy extremism will fund activities in the future as mainstream social media content providers, payment processors, and formal financial entities continue to disassociate themselves from white supremacy extremism figures who threaten their reputations by using their platforms and institutions to fund and foment hate and terrorism.

### *Other Licit Forms of Financing*

It is legal to seek donations by crowdfunding online and to receive cryptocurrency from entities like the Daily Stormer or individuals like YouTube personality Stefan Molyneux. U.S. laws are not violated in such transactions. Until recently, two neo-Nazi organizations based in Canada, Blood & Honour and Combat 18, financed themselves by legally soliciting donations, including via a shared website. These two groups sought funding from new members in the form of dues.<sup>91</sup> Shortly after the Canadian government designated them terrorist entities,<sup>92</sup> their ability to raise funds became illegal, and any support was considered prosecutable. What was once a licit form of funding—appeals for online donations—became illegal. Shortly after, Blood & Honour’s website was shut down, and the group also lost its ability to recruit and fund itself via Facebook and Instagram after the two social media platforms removed the groups’ pages from their platforms for violating community standards.<sup>93</sup> In contrast, the United Kingdom’s Blood & Honour network continues to fund itself legally in a number of ways, including via magazine subscriptions<sup>94</sup> and event fees stemming from heavy metal concerts.<sup>95</sup>

White supremacy extremism groups also avail themselves of more traditional businesses to fund their activities. In Italy, two current radical-right groups, CasaPound and Forza Nuova, can trace their lineage to Terza Posizione,<sup>96</sup> a neo-fascist terrorist group formed in 1978 that may have served as a front for the Nuclei Armati Rivoluzionari, a group best known for the 1980 Bologna Centrale train station attack that killed more than 80 people.<sup>97</sup> Roberto Fiore, a co-founder of Terza Posizione and now Forza Nuova’s national secretary, has secured funding from an array of student travel companies and three trusts based in the United Kingdom.<sup>98</sup> CasaPound, which counts former Terza Posizione co-founder Gabrielle Adinolfi as one of its preeminent thinkers, has benefited from deep-pocketed donor support and a dense network of commercial operations.<sup>99</sup>

Whether by securing finance through legitimate donors or legal businesses, or through profits derived by white power music sales, white supremacy extremism derives significant funding from legitimate means. However, especially among those who have carried out direct forms of violence, white supremacy extremism also benefits significantly from illegal forms of finance.

### *Criminal Financing and White Supremacy Extremism*

Violent white supremacy extremism groups continue to raise funds through illicit means. The Aryan Brotherhood, an explicitly white supremacist violent organization that formed in the 1960s, has carried out numerous illegal activities via its prison and non-prison networks.<sup>100</sup> On June 6, 2019, the U.S. Attorney’s office for the Eastern District of California announced racketeering and murder charges against sixteen Aryan Brotherhood members.<sup>101</sup> The U.S.

government's 2011–2016 investigation into an Aryan Brotherhood Folsom Prison-based network revealed that the organization was engaged in a significant heroin and methamphetamine drug trafficking operation to fund the group's activities.<sup>102</sup> The aforementioned R.A.M. has engaged in robberies to finance its activities.<sup>103</sup> The leader of R.A.M, Robert Rundo, also cultivated overseas connections, according to ProPublica investigative reporting, which details his relationship-building in Kiev with neo-Nazi Denis Nikitin and highlights the business relationship between R.A.M and Nikitin's clothing line.<sup>104</sup> Just a few months after Rundo's Ukrainian venture, Rundo and three other members of R.A.M were charged for a series of violent attacks they carried out in 2017.<sup>105</sup> Other white supremacists have tried to promote their own clothing lines, too; Thor Steinar is the favorite brand of German neo-Nazis. In 2008, the company was sold to International Brands General Trading, a Dubai-based conglomerate, and Mohammed M. Aweidah was appointed CEO.<sup>106</sup>

U.S. and overseas white supremacy extremism organizations and individuals have leveraged both licit and illicit forms of finance to sustain operations. While it is impossible to precisely quantify the scope of white supremacy extremists' financial power, it is, without question, substantial. Advances in technology and the power of social media and crowdfunding have allowed for both violent and non-violent white supremacy extremism actors to avail themselves of a large number of like-minded donors who share similar fears. Playing on these fears to monetize hatred and discord is big business. Unlike those that came before them, today's white supremacy extremists need not take as much direct risk by robbing banks. Until civil society, laws, government resources, technology companies, financial institutions, and multilateral institutions are better harmonized, white supremacy extremists' financial power will only continue to grow in the years ahead.

---

## HIGH-PROFILE ATTACK CASE STUDIES

While statistics provide useful insights into possible developing trends, analyzing the operational details, motivations, justifications, and financing of white supremacy extremist attacks provides important perspective. The brief analysis of the Christchurch (2019) and Norway (2011) attacks and activities associated with neo-Nazi groups are illustrative of the capabilities of white terrorists.

### *Christchurch, New Zealand (2019)*

On March 15, 2019, Brenton Tarrant, a 28-year-old Australian, killed 51<sup>107</sup> people in an attack carried out at two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand, during Friday prayers.<sup>108</sup> In an effort to maximize press attention, Tarrant documented 17 minutes of his attack on Facebook Live.<sup>109</sup> Having resolved to kill Muslims two years prior<sup>110</sup> to the attack, Tarrant legally acquired five guns, including two semiautomatic weapons.<sup>111</sup> On those very guns were inscribed the names of, among others, David the Builder and David Soslan, two historical figures who fought against Islamic forces.<sup>112</sup> Tarrant further outlined his motivations in the aptly named “The Great Replacement” manifesto. Tarrant’s manifesto expresses profound concern about a world where ethnic replacement in the form of white genocide is sanctified by mass immigration.<sup>113</sup> Throughout the manifesto, Tarrant emphasizes the importance of taking revenge against the forces of Islam, attempting to justify his targets. He also explains that he was influenced by the writings of Anders Breivik (discussed below) and Dylann Roof,<sup>114</sup> the American white supremacist who killed 9 African Americans at a church in Charleston, South Carolina. Operationally, the Tarrant attack was simple and likely required few resources. At the time of the

attack, Tarrant was unemployed.<sup>115</sup> There are scattered reports, however, that he inherited money when his father died, with those funds likely allowing for overseas travel long prior to the Christchurch shooting.<sup>116</sup> Tarrant also claimed to have earned money through investments in cryptocurrency,<sup>117</sup> but there is a great degree of skepticism regarding this point.<sup>118</sup> Perhaps more interesting than the costs associated with the Christchurch attack is the fact that Tarrant donated €2,200 to Generation Identity in France in 2017, and another €1,500 to the Identitarian Movement of Austria, led by Martin Sellner.<sup>119</sup> The donation of funds from a violent white supremacy extremist like Tarrant to a non-violent white supremacist personality like Sellner, a propagator of ‘great replacement’ theory, suggests that ideology serves as the sinew between theory and violence, with money serving as the unifying connection.

### *Oslo and Utoya, Norway (2011)*

The July 22, 2011, attack by Anders Breivik in Norway was lone-actor terrorism. Operating alone, Breivik funded and acquired all of the necessary components for the dual-sequenced attacks in Oslo and Utoya Island that took the lives of 77 people.<sup>120</sup> Breivik’s attack began when he set off a car bomb (killing 8) outside a government office building in Oslo.<sup>121</sup> Dressed as a police officer, he then took a public ferry to Utoya equipped with an automatic rifle and a handgun<sup>122</sup> and murdered 69 young people,<sup>123</sup> many of whom were associated with the governing Labor political party.<sup>124</sup> Breivik documented his motivations for the attack in a 1,500-page manifesto, 2018—A European Declaration of Independence.<sup>125</sup> His creed excruciatingly details his infatuation with the Middle Ages and his overall distaste for Islam.<sup>126</sup> These sentiments motivated Breivik to stage his attack; he justified his target selection based upon the Norwegian government’s embrace of multiculturalism. Breivik’s manifesto provides guidance to would-be terrorists on operational tradecraft, financing, and the planning of attacks. Unlike McVeigh, Breivik largely used legal means to fund his attack. As detailed by terrorism expert Magnus Ranstorp, Breivik began purchasing the police uniform, medals, weapons, and ammunition used for the attack nearly two years prior to its commission. To avoid scrutiny, he also legally established a company called Geofarm in 2009 which allowed him to buy large quantities of the fertilizers used for the bomb. He rented a farmhouse outside Oslo to make the bomb. Breivik exhausted ten credit cards so he could pay himself a monthly salary while planning the final stages of his attack.<sup>127</sup> The total estimated cost of the attack was 389,000 Norwegian kroner, or the equivalent of slightly more than \$71,000, in July 2011.<sup>128</sup>

---

## **COMPARING SALAFI-JIHADISTS AND WHITE SUPREMACY EXTREMISTS**


Although the threat of WSE violence has been omnipresent, most studies and analysis have focused on jihadi violence. The impact of the al-Qaeda attacks of September 11, 2001, was so significant that for the past two decades, al-Qaeda and now the Islamic State garner far more media attention than terrorist groups not motivated by Salafi-jihadism.<sup>129</sup> And while there are obviously important differences between jihadis and white supremacy extremists, there are also important similarities that can help inform best practices and lessons learned in how these organizations can be successfully countered. Writing in the *New York Times* in August of this year, Max Fisher observed, “The ideological tracts, recruiting pitches and radicalization tales of the Islamic State during its rise echo, almost word-for-word, those of the white nationalist terrorists of today.”<sup>130</sup> While WSE attacks “may differ from Islamic State attacks in degree,” they are also “similar in kind: driven by hateful narratives, dehumanization, the rationalization of violence and the glorification of murder, combined with ready access to recruits and weapons of war.”<sup>131</sup>

As noted above, a new neo-Nazi social networking platform has been named “The Base.” Neo-Nazis have even taken to glorifying bin Laden as a symbol.<sup>132</sup> In terms of organizational structure, white supremacists adopted the leaderless resistance model of terrorism before jihadists ever did, relying on attacks by lone actors as a means of minimizing infiltration of the movement by federal law enforcement agents in the 1980s.<sup>133</sup>

**Figure 3: Estimated Foreign Fighters in Ukraine: 2014-2019 (\* as of 1 June 2019)**

Country	On the side of Ukraine	On the side of Separatists / Russia	Total
1. Afghanistan	0	2	2
2. Albania	15<	0	15<
3. Armenia	0	25<	25<
4. Australia	5<	4<	9<
5. Austria	35<	15<	50<
6. Azerbaijan	20<	0	20<
7. Belarus	300<	500<	800<
8. Belgium	1	1	2
9. Bosnia & Herzegovina	5	3	8
10. Brazil	0	4<	4<
11. Bulgaria	6	25<	31<
12. Canada	10<	4	14<
13. Chile	0	3	3
14. Colombia	0	4	4
15. Croatia	60<	5<	65<
16. Czech Republic	5<	30<	35<
17. Denmark	15<	0	15<
18. Estonia	10<	15<	25<
19. Finland	15<	20<	35<
20. France	15<	50<	65<
21. Georgia	120<	30<	150<
22. Germany	15<	150<	165<
23. Greece	2	5	7
24. Hungary	0	2	2
25. India	0	2	2
26. Ireland	7	0	7
27. Israel	15<	20<	35<
28. Italy	35<	20<	55<
29. Kazakhstan	0	40<	40<
30. Kyrgyzstan	0	40<	40<
31. Latvia	8	15<	23<
32. Lithuania	15<	10<	25<
33. Moldova	15<	70<	85<
34. Montenegro	0	1	1
35. Kosovo	4	0	4
36. Netherlands	3<	5	8<
37. New Zealand	0	1	1
38. North Macedonia	4	10<	14<
39. Norway	10<	2	12<
40. Poland	10<	15<	25<
41. Portugal	1	0	1
42. Romania	4<	1	5<
43. Serbia	6	100<	106<
44. Slovakia	8	30<	38<
45. Slovenia	0	5	5
46. Spain	0	20<	20<
47. Sweden	25<	0	25<
48. Switzerland	0	2	2
49. Tajikistan	0	20<	20<
50. Turkey	30<	0	30<
51. Turkmenistan	0	6<	6<
52. United Kingdom	10<	5<	15<
53. United States	15<	20<	35<
54. Uzbekistan	0	15<	15<
55. Russia (FFs; non-army members)	3,000<	12,000<	15,000<
<b>Total</b>	<b>3,879&lt;</b>	<b>13,372&lt;</b>	<b>17,241&lt;</b>
<b>Excluding Russians:</b>	<b>879&lt;</b>	<b>1,372&lt;</b>	<b>2,241&lt;</b>

Source: Independent research by Arkadiusz Legieć, Senior Analyst at the Polish Institute of International Affairs, 2014-2019

**Figure 4: Map of Foreign Fighters in Ukraine: 2014-2019 (\* as of 1 June 2019)**

**Methodology:** Researchers employed a multi-method approach, to include qualitative analysis. The initial data was collected through open-source research of propaganda sites that identified and named foreign fighters engaged on both sides of the conflict. Researchers conducted interviews with humanitarian aid workers and journalists who met with the foreign fighters. Researchers also interviewed a number of foreign nationals and checked the veracity of their stories against a variety of open sources.

## *Transnational Networks*

For too long, conventional wisdom largely held that jihadi terrorism was a global phenomenon while white supremacy extremism was almost entirely a parochial issue, a by-product of domestic political systems and local in reach. This misperception persisted even though there was ample evidence that over a fifteen-year period between 1965 and 1980, as many as 2,300 Americans, including members of the John Birch Society and neo-Nazis, traveled to Rhodesia (modern-day Zimbabwe) to fight on behalf of white minority rule.<sup>134</sup> Indeed, romanticizing the conflict in Rhodesia has become trendy for today's radical white supremacy extremists.<sup>135</sup>

The attacks in Norway and New Zealand invited closer scrutiny of WSE, which revealed that, similar to the global jihadist movement, violent white supremacists and other elements of white supremacy extremism maintain international linkages and continue to forge transnational networks with ideologues radicalizing individuals across the globe.<sup>136</sup> Both Breivik and Tarrant drew inspiration from grievances from other countries and causes, while each presented himself as a defender of global European white civilization.<sup>137</sup> And while the attacks at Utoya and Christchurch are among the most prominent of those perpetrated by WSEs, there have also been linkages between white supremacy extremism ideologies and attacks in the United States (California, Florida, Kansas, New Mexico, Oregon, South Carolina, Wisconsin), Canada, Germany, the UK, and Sweden.<sup>138</sup>

Yet the emerging epicenter of WSE seems to be in Ukraine and Russia. Just as jihadists have used conflicts in Afghanistan, Chechnya, the Balkans, Iraq, and Syria to swap tactics, techniques, and procedures and to solidify transnational networks, so too are WSEs using Ukraine as a battlefield laboratory. As noted above, an estimated 17,000 people from over 50 countries have traveled to participate in the ongoing conflict.<sup>139</sup> In Ukraine, the Azov Battalion has recruited foreign fighters motivated by white supremacy and neo-Nazi beliefs, including many from the West, to join its ranks and receive training, indoctrination, and instruction in irregular warfare.<sup>140</sup>



*Poster promoting the "Awakening II" conference, the second reiteration of an international gathering of White Supremacy Extremists that took place on April 6, 2019 in Turku, Finland. Prominent U.S. ideologues were scheduled to speak and the spokeswoman for the Azov Battalion's Western Outreach Office, Olena Semenyaka, also attended and spoke. (Source: SARASTUS)*

In late September, a U.S. Army soldier stationed at Fort Riley in Kansas was arrested after distributing information online about how to build a bomb and planning to travel to Ukraine to fight with the Azov Battalion. Members of the “western outreach office” travel around Europe to promote the organization and meet with like-minded individuals and groups. In addition, the group invited prominent white supremacy extremist ideologues to visit Ukraine.<sup>141</sup> In October 2018 American Greg Johnson, a leading ideologist for the white nationalist movement, visited Ukraine and attended a series of events hosted by the National Corps. In the summer of 2018, German-language flyers were distributed among audience members at a rock concert in Thuringia, inviting them to be part of the Azov Battalion: “join the ranks of the best” in order to “save Europe from extinction.”<sup>142</sup> Similar efforts to infiltrate mainstream German society by soft-pedaling messages of racism and hatred are staged frequently.<sup>143</sup>

There are striking resemblances between the Azov Battalion’s Western Outreach Office and al-Qaeda’s Maktab al-Khidamat (MAK), which was responsible for promoting the cause and helping recruits reach the battlefield. Just as Afghanistan served as a sanctuary for jihadist organizations like Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group in the 1980s, so too are parts of Ukraine becoming a safe haven for an array of white supremacy extremist groups to congregate, train, and radicalize. And just like the path of jihadist groups, the goal of many of these members is to return to their countries of origin (or third-party countries) to wreak havoc and use acts of violence as a means of recruiting new members to their cause. Unlike jihadis who are attempting to strike Western targets, though, radicalized white supremacists have the added advantage of being able to blend in seamlessly in the West, just as Brenton Tarrant was able to do. For Russian neo-Nazis, the International Russian Conservative Forum serves as the rallying point for white supremacy extremists from all over the globe to congregate and network.<sup>144</sup>



*U.S. citizens Robert Rundo (C), leader of RAM, with Ukrainian Azov Battalion members at Reconquista Club in Kyiv, Ukraine, on April 27, 2018.*  
(Source: Reconquista Club Facebook Page/RFERL)

Street-level white supremacy extremist groups have proliferated following the Euromaidan protests of 2014 and subsequent armed conflicts in Crimea and the Donbass, in eastern Ukraine.<sup>145</sup> The most well-publicized of these groups are associated with the Azov Battalion.<sup>146</sup> While the international white supremacy extremism sympathies of the paramilitary arm have been well documented, veterans of the movement have formed several more informal street

organizations.<sup>147</sup> (The paramilitary has now formally been incorporated into the Ukrainian military, at least in theory.) These street-level organizations, such as the National Corps (or National Militia), have been implicated in brutal attacks on ethnic Roma encampments—pogroms justified by their ultranationalist, exclusionary rhetoric and stated goal of “cleaning the streets.”<sup>148</sup> Other movements unaffiliated with Azov, such as the neo-Nazi group Combat 18, have received the official imprimatur of government officials for their “street patrols.”<sup>149</sup> The proliferation of paramilitary groups in Ukraine has likely been exacerbated by the ongoing conflict, which has both drawn foreign fighters and undergirded the rise of exclusionary ultranationalism.<sup>150</sup>

The Azov Battalion has cultivated a relationship with members of the Atomwaffen Division<sup>151</sup> as well as with U.S.-based militants from R.A.M., the Southern California-based organization that the FBI has labeled a “white supremacy extremist group.”<sup>152</sup> The relationships between U.S.-based WSEs and the Azov Battalion go beyond mere networking and include training and radicalization of American extremists.<sup>153</sup> The Azov Battalion also maintains a political wing and has ties to a growing vigilante street movement that can be counted on for violence, intimidation, and coercion.<sup>154</sup> So far, nationals from Germany, the UK, Brazil, Sweden, the United States, and Australia have reportedly traveled to join the Azov Battalion in Ukraine. The group has also allegedly established youth camps, recreation centers, lecture halls, and indoctrination programs, including some that teach children as young as 9 years old military tactics and white supremacist ideology.

On the other side of the conflict in Ukraine, Russian groups like the Russian Imperial Movement (RIM) and its paramilitary unit, the Imperial Legion volunteer unit, attract and train foreign fighters motivated by white supremacy and neo-Nazi beliefs.<sup>155</sup> Interestingly, there has been a decline in the public presence of white supremacy extremist street movements within the Russian Federation.<sup>156</sup> Despite having a significant neo-Nazi skinhead subculture to draw on, many WSE ultranationalist groups have either been co-opted or suppressed (or, as often is the case, both) by the government.<sup>157</sup> Those WSE organizations that remain have been either



*Anton Thulin and Viktor Melin (SWE) during the “Partisan” paramilitary course set up by the Russian Imperial Movement (RIM). (Source: The Swedish Security Police)*

directed inward, turning their ire toward the internal political enemies of the state itself, or focused outward, seeking to support Russian revanchism through externalizing this increasingly global current through RIM.

The RIM is an ultranationalist, quasi-paramilitary organization that describes itself as monarchist and stridently Orthodox.<sup>158</sup> Concerned with fighting against globalization, multiculturalism, and liberalism, the RIM is part and parcel of the broader international WSE project.<sup>159</sup> To this end, the group has hosted paramilitary training camps and cultivated contacts with other WSE movements and individuals, such as convicted Swedish neo-Nazi bombers Viktor Melin and Anton Thulin, who attended a RIM-affiliated training camp.<sup>160</sup> There are also indications of RIM involvement in the Donbass war, as well as potential linkages with American WSE groups.<sup>161</sup> Notorious American white supremacist Matthew Heimbach, who has demonstrated an affinity for terrorist groups like Lebanese Hezbollah and the Provisional Irish Republican Army, maintains links to RIM and has served as a crucial interlocutor between white supremacists in the United States and Russia.<sup>162</sup> Heimbach, who founded the neo-Nazi Traditionalist Worker Party and was a key organizer of the Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, has gone on record to state that Russia is the “biggest inspiration” for white supremacy extremists and that he and many of his colleagues view Russian president Vladimir Putin as “the leader of the free world.”<sup>163</sup>

This international network is fueled by two forces: first, Russian state tolerance for paramilitary groups like RIM, provided they remain concerned with vague notions of societal collapse, fighting “multiculturalism,” and reinforcing perceived traditional values; and, second, the interest and enthusiasm for these same ideas proliferating in the United States, Europe, and elsewhere.<sup>164</sup> For U.S.-based WSE groups, Russian organizations like RIM—regardless of more esoteric political goals, such as a Romanov restoration—represent a counterweight to Western



*Matthew Heimbach stands next to a flag used to represent the president of Russia, wearing a Hezbollah shirt, in a photo he published to his personal page on the Russian social media web*



*Matthew Heimbach at the Unite the Right Rally in Charlottesville, Virginia in 2017. (Source: IndyStar Twitter)*

governments, which in their minds represent an inherently corrupt cesspool of liberal, global, and multicultural decline. While RIM itself is a modest organization, with a less than impressive web presence, it has become one piece of a much broader, and more dangerous, ecosystem of international WSE movements with connections to Russia.<sup>165</sup> Links between American white supremacy extremist ideologues and Russian nationalists are not new and in fact date back years—in 2015, several well-known American white supremacists spoke at the International Russian Conservative Forum in St. Petersburg, Russia, and mingled with members of Golden Dawn (Greece), the National Democratic Party (Germany), and Forza Nuova (Italy).<sup>166</sup> These connections are evidence of growing links between American white supremacy extremists and their counterparts throughout the world, which are especially strong in the UK, Germany, Sweden, France, and Poland and, increasingly, throughout large swaths of Central Eastern Europe.<sup>167</sup>

There are extensive ties between the Russian government and far-right groups in Europe.<sup>168</sup> Russian disinformation efforts online have fueled anti-immigrant sentiment in countries like Sweden, fueling resentment among native-born Swedes and newly arrived immigrants from the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia. In 2015, Sweden accepted 163,000 asylum seekers, primarily from Afghanistan, Somalia, and Syria.<sup>169</sup> The Nordic countries have had a long and complicated relationship with white supremacy extremism. Given the cult hero status that Breivik enjoys in certain circles, coupled with the influence of Odinism and other religious and ideological belief systems throughout Scandinavia and northern Europe, this threat will persist in that part of the world. Odinism is also growing in popularity among violent white supremacists and other adherents of white supremacy extremism.<sup>170</sup> Several high-profile American white supremacists found guilty of committing murder have been linked to Odinism, including Frazier Glenn Cross Jr., who killed three people in attacks on Jewish institutions in Kansas City, Missouri, in 2014, and Ryan Giroux, a white supremacist who gunned down one and injured five more during a shooting in Arizona in March 2015.

A white supremacist extremist group called Soldiers of Odin has emerged over the past several years and is forging a transnational network that includes a significant presence in North America, Europe, and Australia. The network used the internet to organize, connect, and spread propaganda, especially in Finland, Sweden, and Canada.<sup>171</sup> A major part of the group's platform is an anti-immigration stance, especially among its chapters in Canada, where its members have patrolled the streets and attempted to act as a vigilante force under the guise of ensuring public safety.<sup>172</sup> There is also a history of political parties associated with the “radical right” in countries including Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden.<sup>173</sup> In August of this year, Philip Manshaus attacked the Al Noor Islamic Centre near Oslo, Norway, firing several shots before being subdued by worshippers. The next month, Manshaus, held on charges of suspicion of murder and

breaching anti-terror laws, made a Nazi salute at a court hearing.<sup>174</sup> A growing movement focused on anti-immigration in Nordic countries will likely feed white supremacy extremist movements and will remain a major challenge for law enforcement and intelligence agencies in Europe, especially as neo-Nazi and other groups increasingly cooperate across borders. Violent groups are increasing and diversifying their membership. “For example, in Scandinavia the main neo-Nazi organization, the Nordic Resistance Movement, has some 30–40 activists in Norway, maybe 400–500 in Sweden, and around 100 in Finland and Denmark. Previously these groups were primarily made up of youths; today, members are adults, typically between the age of 20 and 50.”<sup>175</sup>

Yet for all of the similarities between jihadis and white supremacy extremists, there are important differences, too. While Ukraine has served as a growing hub for white supremacy extremism, there have been far fewer conflicts that have served as sanctuaries or safe havens for its members. This has proven a challenge for law enforcement, since white supremacy extremists and associated groups lack a defined territory or headquarters to discover and target.<sup>176</sup> Al-Qaeda and IS have been standard-bearers for the global jihadist movement, but to date, WSE has had no true equivalent. In turn, the movement is far more decentralized than that of its jihadist counterparts. This has long been evident in the online space as well, where white nationalist activity on Twitter demonstrated a far more factionalized movement, which included numerous competing movements within it, especially when compared with jihadist activity online.<sup>177</sup> The other glaring disparity between the two movements is the double standard between how each is perceived as a threat, and thus what laws and policies exist to aggressively combat each. This double standard exists both in the sense of urgency that politicians have expressed in countering these threats and in the resources allocated to authorities to deal with the terrorism challenge.

Traditional street movements include neo-Nazi skinheads, various groups of whom exist across the globe.<sup>178</sup> Usually organized around hardcore music scenes, some promotional networks and labels have proliferated internationally, spreading messages of racial hatred and violence through the medium of hardcore punk and an aggressive countercultural posture. Most notorious among these networks is Blood & Honor, discussed above, an international promotional group, music label, and zine publisher.<sup>179</sup> Blood & Honor maintains a network of affiliates across Europe, the Americas, and Australia, although the movement is explicitly banned in Germany,<sup>180</sup> Spain<sup>181</sup>, and, recently, Canada.<sup>182</sup> Although Blood & Honor itself produces violent and at times illegal (especially in some European states) content, the neo-Nazi organization’s banning is likely due in part to its affiliation with the nebulous Combat 18 group.<sup>183</sup>

Combat 18 emerged from the toxic combination of neo-Nazi skinhead culture and British football hooliganism as early as 1995, when it was involved in riots alongside radical Unionists

following football matches in Northern Ireland.<sup>184</sup> The ‘18’ represents, in classic neo-Nazi form, the first and eighth letters of the English alphabet, A and H, for Adolf Hitler. Rhetorically committed to the principals of “leaderless resistance” as promulgated by the American neo-Nazi Louis Beam, Combat 18 was, for much of the late 1990s and early 2000s, the highest-profile white supremacy extremist terror organization in the British Isles.<sup>185</sup> As with many other racist skinhead groups, the white power music scene played a major role in allowing the group to further its messages of a declining working class fueled by third-world immigrants.<sup>186</sup> After the death of its founder Ian Stuart Donaldson in 1993, a power struggle ensued between Blood & Honour members and individuals from Combat 18, a split that originated in England but soon spread to North America, where two distinct variations formed in the United States: Blood & Honour America Division and Blood & Honour USA. Several subsequent splits throughout the 2000s occurred, and the organization is thought to maintain a global presence, although linkages to Combat 18 vary and depend on the specific faction. For its part, Combat 18 considers itself a global organization, with the group’s propaganda noting, “Our National Socialist family now transcends national borders, we do not owe our allegiance to any nation, our only allegiance is to our race—The White Race. Our countries are just geographical areas in which we just happen to live, but our race knows no national boundaries in this eternal struggle.”<sup>187</sup>

The organization was tied to a string of attacks (including the London nail bombings and a spate of killings in Germany) and formed alliances with both the B&H global network and the neo-fascist British National Party (BNP), as well as establishing cells in numerous other European states, most notably Germany.<sup>188</sup> Although Combat 18 is held by many observers to be largely attenuated as a movement—not least because of their apparent infiltration by law enforcement—the group was significant enough to make widespread transnational connections through underground channels.<sup>189</sup> Reports of its activity still surface in conjunction with white supremacy extremism attacks, such as the assassination in June 2019 of German politician Walter Lübcke by an individual closely tied to a Combat 18 cell.<sup>190</sup>

German Combat 18 leadership likewise maintained links to the National Socialist Underground (NSU), a similar neo-Nazi terrorist organization that committed a brutal series of murders targeting migrants through the 2000s.<sup>191</sup> The group, led by Beate Zschäpe, Uwe Böhnhardt, and Uwe Mundlos, was dedicated to fostering the demise of a German government that welcomed

“  
Our National Socialist family now  
transcends national borders, we do  
not owe our allegiance to any  
nation, our only allegiance is to  
our race—The White Race. Our  
countries are just geographical  
areas in which we just happen to  
live, but our race knows no  
national boundaries in this eternal  
struggle”

immigrants and shunned white supremacy.<sup>192</sup> During its existence, the NSU carried out multiple bombings in a Turkish neighborhood in Cologne and murdered nine immigrants.<sup>193</sup> The group primarily funded its activities through armed robbery, which led to the eventual apprehension of Böhnhardt and Mundlos.<sup>194</sup> Shortly after their arrests, the NSU collapsed due to successful, albeit long overdue, German law enforcement and intelligence operations. Neo-Nazi groups continue to persist despite the fall of the NSU.

Notwithstanding its overall decline, Combat 18—in its cell-like structure, sporadic yet brutal violence, overlap with other subcultural movements, and widespread global network—presaged later groups like the Atomwaffen Division. Formed on the neo-Nazi Iron March forums, Atomwaffen is an ephemeral and idiosyncratic neo-Nazi movement organized almost wholly online, largely through the video game-oriented Discord chat app.<sup>195</sup> The Atomwaffen Division announced its founding (2013) on the now defunct fascist ironmarch.org website.<sup>196</sup> In its announcement, the group claimed to have more than 40 members, with a heavy concentration in Florida, where its co-founder, Brandon Russell, was a member of the Florida National Guard.<sup>197</sup> Since the group's inception, it has been responsible for a number of attacks and plots. Between 2017 and early 2018, the Atomwaffen Division was linked to five deaths in three separate attacks.<sup>198</sup> The most well-known alleged attack was staged by Samuel Woodward, the suspected murderer of 19-year old Blaze Bernstein.<sup>199</sup>

In the group's secret online chats, group members both celebrated Woodward's act and lamented leaks that indicated he had trained with the Atomwaffen Division.<sup>200</sup> Also in those secret chats, according to ProPublica reporting, it is clear that the group is motivated by a hatred of minorities, gays, and Jews (Blaze Bernstein was both Jewish and gay) and were inspired by the likes of McVeigh, Breivik, and Roof.<sup>201</sup> Atomwaffen's message has resonated with former and active-duty military members. One such individual was Vasiliios Pistolis, an active member of the U.S. Marines when he (in his own words) "cracked three skulls open" at the now infamous August 12, 2017, white supremacist rally in Charlottesville, Virginia.<sup>202</sup> The group boasts transnational linkages as well, including with Sonnenkrieg Division, a white supremacist group based in Europe, with strong membership in the United Kingdom and Eastern Europe.<sup>203</sup> Its members also have linkages in Canada, Germany, and Ukraine.<sup>204</sup> In German, Atomwaffen means



*Rise Above Movement members at the Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, Virginia, on August 12, 2017. (Source: FBI)*

“atomic weapons,” another nod to the organization’s desire to connect with others who view Adolf Hitler with admiration.

Atomwaffen represents the apotheosis of white supremacy extremism in the digital age. It is steeped in the sort of syncretic radicalism found perhaps only on the fringes of the internet, where admiration for Islamic State executioners exists comfortably alongside references to Charles Manson and the neo-Nazi tract *Siege* by James Mason.<sup>205</sup> Globally, there are a number of affiliated groups that have organized in similar fashion, either on the Iron March forums or as established offshoots of Atomwaffen.<sup>206</sup> Most notable among these is National Action, a UK-based neo-Nazi organization whose founding, likewise on the Iron March forums, predates that of Atomwaffen.<sup>207</sup> Banned in the wake of British MP Jo Cox’s assassination by a National Action sympathizer named Thomas Mair, the group continues to operate in secret.<sup>208</sup> Mair also had links to the National Alliance, based in West Virginia.<sup>209</sup> Atomwaffen offshoots with a significant presence—at least online—include the Sonnenkrieg Division in England and Antipodean Resistance in Australia.<sup>210</sup> Although members of the U.S.-based Atomwaffen have been involved in several murders, neither that organization nor any of its international affiliates has as of yet been implicated in systemic violence on par with that of the NSU. Should the online network revolving around Atomwaffen ever metastasize into a full-scale underground terror movement, it could draw upon an anonymous globalized network with an indeterminate number of supporters.

### *Utility of Violence*

Like jihadis, white supremacy extremists justify the use of extreme violence by citing self-defense, inherently necessary because of the violence used by their adversaries. Both groups often deploy metaphors in their writings and propaganda that reflect a firm belief that their societies are under siege and that only violence can halt the “invaders.”<sup>211</sup> For jihadis, this means an assault on Muslims by the West, which seeks to destroy Islam and humiliate the *ummah*. Conversely, white supremacy extremists fear encroachment from multiculturalism, immigration, and the so-called ‘Islamization of society.’ White supremacist extremism propaganda relies on themes related to so-called replacement theory, or the ‘great replacement’, which is the idea that Western culture is under assault from demographic shifts favoring non-white immigrants, something WSEs believe is the deliberate strategy of a shadowy cabal of (mostly) Jewish elites.<sup>212</sup> The conspiracy theory claims an “intellectual” basis in the work of French philosopher Renaud Camus and American eugenicist Madison Grant.<sup>213</sup> The exemplification of this violent ideology was captured in the motivation of Robert Bowers, the terrorist who attacked the Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh, PA, in October 2018.<sup>214</sup> Bowers appeared to target the Tree of Life because of what he perceived as the synagogue’s assistance for immigrants from Muslim-majority countries.<sup>215</sup> Violence is viewed by both groups as something that is both utilitarian and at times theatrical,

intended to inspire followers while terrorizing others. Only through extreme violence can these groups achieve their goals, which requires inducing a climate of fear that can in turn be used to reshape society in the image they seek to create.<sup>216</sup>

### *Cycle of Violence*

In addition to serving as both the means and the end for both jihadists and WSEs, violence is also intended to beget further violence, contributing to a tit-for-tat cycle that inspires followers and provokes a reaction from those not considered to be within the terrorists' in-group. Extreme violence serves as a complement to identity politics, and the two are inextricably linked in ways that do not always appear obvious. The perceived threat to the identity of these groups is their "exact mirror image."<sup>217</sup> Jihadi violence in the Middle East and North Africa has contributed to civil war and state failure, which in turn have driven migration of predominantly Muslim societies to Europe. As European countries receive ever-increasing applications for asylum—in 2015, the European Union received more than 1.3 million applications—segments of domestic populations in countries like Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and elsewhere throughout the continent have perceived the demographic shift as a threat to their traditional values.<sup>218</sup> In some cases, this has led to the growth of movements like PEGIDA, or Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the West.<sup>219</sup>

To extremists on both sides, the current state of world affairs is presented as an existential threat to their way of life, and exclusionist ideologies fuel a pushback against societal change.<sup>220</sup> Extremists also feel emboldened, convinced that violence will lead to revolutionary change. "Murderous Muslim militants, like America's most dangerous young men, feel destiny if not righteous wrath behind them."<sup>221</sup> Both movements also see attacks contributing to an "inspirational contagion," which will strengthen their respective organizations while encouraging further plots.<sup>222</sup> Each attack builds on the last and can have a cumulative effect, reinforcing the validity of propaganda that both jihadists and white supremacy extremists promote.<sup>223</sup> As Simon Cottee has observed, jihadists and white supremacist extremists "feed off each other, cynically exploiting the outrages of their enemies as a spur and justification for further retaliatory bloodshed."<sup>224</sup>

### *Virtual Laboratories/Use of Internet*

WSE groups have long been adept at operating in the online space.<sup>225</sup> The internet helps perpetuate a "feedback loop of radicalization and violence" that is intended to accelerate the timetable toward an apocalyptic end of times.<sup>226</sup> There are legitimate concerns that the internet has "accelerated the radicalization process," although research demonstrates that there also remains a significant offline, or in-person, component to how individuals radicalize.<sup>227</sup>

In many ways, social media has exacerbated the issue by helping connect transnational nodes of like-minded individuals and groups. In the current environment, jihadis have flocked to sites like Telegram, while WSEs and their supporters operate on Gab and 8chan. The internet serves as a medium for both radicalization and recruitment, as well as terrorist learning. WSEs have curated an online library of terrorist manuals and manifestos, while jihadists have created magazines like *Inspire* and *Dabiq* that have taught others how to conduct attacks.<sup>228</sup> It is also now well-documented that WSEs have used the internet to study terrorist tactics used by jihadists to improve their own capabilities.<sup>229</sup>

### *Propaganda*

Propaganda, media and public relations, and information operations of both jihadis and WSEs describe an existential battle between good and evil that forms the cornerstone of these movements' ideological beliefs. For jihadis, this eternal struggle is often framed in terms of the battle against the Zionist-Crusader alliance, while for white supremacy extremists, it is the call of a racial holy war, or Rahowa, that most resonates with its adherents. Both movements are also dualistic in nature, offering binary choices to potential followers to become part of the ideological in-group or risk being labeled as an enemy, apostate, or outsider.<sup>230</sup> The propaganda of jihadis and that of white supremacy extremists each portrays members as defenders of a unique culture and bulwarks against cultural elites deemed unworthy of legitimacy.<sup>231</sup> And both jihadis and white supremacy extremists promote anti-Semitism, aspects of austere social conservatism, and variations on obscure and antiquated eschatology.<sup>232</sup>

Each group also seeks to actively undermine the foundations of liberal democratic societies, which, it is believed, should be destroyed through violence and remade by a small vanguard of true believers.<sup>233</sup> Both movements have also recognized the importance of key figures who have become an inspiration for the fringes of their respective movements. Jihadists worshipped the sermons of the American-born preacher and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula figurehead Anwar al-Awlaki, whose radical views inspired numerous terrorists to launch attacks.<sup>234</sup> White supremacy extremists also have their own martyrdom figures, notably Anders Breivik.<sup>235</sup> Breivik has been lauded as a “Saint” and “Commander,” his beliefs cited as inspiration by Christchurch attacker Brenton Tarrant.<sup>236</sup>

### *Recruitment*

Terrorist propaganda serves as a key avenue for exposing potential supporters to radical ideologies and helping to recruit new members into extremist movements. While jihadis have long circulated martyrdom tapes and beheading videos, WSEs have live-streamed their attacks, as occurred in Christchurch, and published long manifestos that often reference previous high-

profile attacks.<sup>237</sup> By spreading these types of videos, extremists on both sides are attempting to reach individuals, primarily young men (though not exclusively) who may be alienated from broader society or feel marginalized or discriminated against, and who are disconnected from their communities.<sup>238</sup> Both elements recruit from the wellspring of “the anger of alienated young men, vulnerable to moral suasion and often lacking strong community or social bonds as moderating influences in their lives.”<sup>239</sup>

Victimization forms a commonality across both movements, as does a distrust of political leaders and public institutions and a feeling of helplessness or ineptitude about how to find success and fulfillment in modern society.<sup>240</sup> Self-empowerment is a key element of the recruiting pitch, while both jihadis and WSEs focus on themes of “purity,” militancy, and physical fitness.<sup>241</sup> The martial aspects of recruitment appealed to generations of al-Qaeda militants who answered the call of holy war, traveling to training camps to learn guerrilla warfare tactics and bombmaking techniques. In Ukraine, white supremacy extremism groups have bonded over shared interest in mixed martial arts and so-called ultimate fighting competitions. The Azov Battalion has used this venue as a method for growing its network, including with neo-Nazis from the United States and the West who have traveled to Ukraine to forge bonds with white supremacy extremists from Europe and elsewhere.<sup>242</sup>

There are similarities, too, between how the West has handled the rise of white supremacists and how governments in the Middle East dealt with jihadis in the 1990s. Rather than accurately assess the threat of domestic terrorist groups that have transnational links, Western governments and their security services often deem terror suspects mentally ill and relegate them to the status of so-called lone wolves, even when it seems increasingly clear that they were operating as part of a broader global terrorist network.<sup>243</sup>

---

## POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

At first a low boil, the threat posed by the contemporary white supremacy extremism movement in the United States began to bubble in 1979 when five protesters were killed at a rally in Greensboro, North Carolina, by KKK members and neo-Nazis. Four years later, well-known KKK leader Louis Beam's call for leaderless resistance against the federal government represented another inflection point. The boil continued with U.S. government miscalculations in Ruby Ridge, Idaho, and Waco, Texas. More than 20 years after Waco, the United States has reached a tipping point. The white supremacy extremism threat posed to Americans at home may have surpassed that of Islamist terrorism. In Europe, the threat appears to be statistically less pronounced, but social and political divisions are deepening. Europe may now have reached the point the United States reached 40 years ago. The situation, while dire, is not without solution. There are a number of practical actions the United States and the international community can take to counter the spread of white supremacy extremism. The bulk of the eight categories of recommendations are focused on the United States, where the threat is most persistent. These categories include:

- Utilizing sanctions more proactively in the United States and more broadly in Europe and other countries where WSEs and associated movements and groups are present;
- Updating U.S. legal statutes that would result in the development of a robust domestic terrorism statute;
- Ensuring better data collection on domestic terrorism and hate crimes;

- Providing more resources (human and programmatic) to federal agencies responsible for countering domestic terrorism actors;
- Developing targeted guidance for financial and nonbank financial institutions to better identify white supremacy extremism suspicious financial activity;
- Encouraging more civil society solutions;
- Continuing to pressure the technology sector to implement its community use guidelines and develop innovative solutions to curbing the spread of speech that encourages imminent and targeted violence;
- Multi-lateralizing the discussion at key forums, including at the United Nations.

### *Sanctions*

Currently, there are two sanction-specific legal authorities the United States government can deploy against white supremacy extremism organizations or individuals. The first, the designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO), is levied by the United States Department of State. The second, designations of individuals and organizations pursuant to Executive Order 13224, is an authority jointly shared by the Departments of State and Treasury.<sup>244</sup> In examining these lists, we find that there are no extant white supremacy extremism groups sanctioned by either department.<sup>245</sup>

“ The U.S. State and Treasury Departments should consider building upon Canada and the United Kingdom’s leadership by sanctioning transnational WSE groups as foreign terrorist organizations. ”

With few exceptions, international counterparts have also been slow to designate white supremacy extremism organizations and individuals as terrorists. One early adopter, the United Kingdom, has sanctioned a domestic-based white supremacy extremism organization. In 2016, the UK designated National Action a white supremacy extremism terrorist organization.<sup>246</sup> The consequences<sup>247</sup> include criminalization of the following: membership in the group; provision of financial or other forms of support; expressing an opinion in support of the group; wearing clothes that express overt support for the group or publishing images that do so. National Action’s assets are also subject to freezing. More recently, as we have seen, the government of Canada designated as terrorist groups the neo-Nazi Blood & Honour and Combat 18.<sup>248</sup> The Canadian government’s designations freeze the groups’ assets and criminalize assistance to them.<sup>249</sup> Also as we have seen, shortly after the Canadian decision, Facebook took down pages administered by the group, demonstrating the power of the terrorist designation.

The U.S. State and Treasury Departments should consider building upon Canada and the United Kingdom's leadership by sanctioning transnational WSE groups as foreign terrorist organizations. Broadly speaking, State and Treasury terrorist designations hinder the travel of terrorists into the United States; criminalize support to designated individuals/groups; and block the movement of assets to those so designated.

Perhaps most importantly, the State Department's FTO designation allows for the Department of Justice (DOJ) to prosecute individuals for providing material support to designated groups. Since the beginning of the Syrian civil war, the DOJ has successfully meted out justice to a number of would-be foreign terrorist fighters who tried to join groups like the Islamic State or Jabhat al-Nusra.<sup>250</sup> Similarly, the FTO designations provide the FBI with wider powers to investigate and surveil terrorist threats. And, finally, the designations have provided Silicon Valley with the legal coverage necessary to remove terrorist propaganda, most notably that associated with the Islamic State.

If the U.S. State Department designates as terrorist foreign-based white supremacy extremism groups like National Action or Blood & Honour, the FBI could leverage those actions to infiltrate U.S.-based white supremacy extremism groups.<sup>251</sup> For example, undercover special agents or informants could pose as members of overseas-based chapters of Blood & Honour and infiltrate U.S.-based white supremacy extremism groups. In time, if the agent's ledger is accepted and the infiltration allows for the provision of material support to the U.S.-based group, those actions could serve as a foundation for material support arrests. Without the FTO designation of white supremacy extremism groups, this tactic, which has been used against ISIS, is untenable.

The State Department should also designate as terrorist organizations foreign-based white supremacy extremism groups like National Action pursuant to Executive Order 13224. This would serve two vitally important purposes. First, it would allow the Treasury Department to thus designate individuals implicated by the State Department's group proscription. For instance, Treasury could designate as terrorist financiers and facilitators individuals who are part of groups like National Action. Second, Treasury could use its derivative authority<sup>252</sup> to designate as terrorist U.S.-based groups such as the Holy Land Foundation,<sup>253</sup> that have links to foreign-based groups.

If the State Department designated, say, the foreign-based wings of Blood & Honour or the Atomwaffen Division, Treasury might be able to use its derivative E.O. 13224 authority to designate U.S.-based chapters associated with these foreign-based entities. Doing this could obviate the need for establishing a separate domestic designations regime, as some have advocated.<sup>254</sup> However, if the domestic terrorism threat continues to expand and the designations

of foreign-based actors do not allow for a sufficient law enforcement response, serious consideration should be given to the establishment of a domestic designations regime. Any such domestic regime must be carefully calibrated to ensure it does not violate First Amendment rights or the Fifth Amendment's due process clause. At this time, the development of a domestic terrorist sanctioning regime is unrealistic, given the lack of bipartisanship on Capitol Hill. As such, using current terrorist designation tools in a more creative manner is the most straightforward path to enhancing U.S. law enforcement efforts in countering white supremacy extremism, even though this is not an effective long-term solution.

### *Legislation*

On February 27, 2019, Christopher Hasson, a member of the United States Coast Guard, was indicted on federal charges for illegal possession of firearms and a silencer.<sup>255</sup> In addition to stockpiling weapons, Hasson allegedly developed a "hit list" that included media personalities, senior-level House and Senate Democrats,<sup>256</sup> and U.S. Supreme Court justices.<sup>257</sup> Additionally, in government filings seeking Hasson's detention, Robert Hur, the U.S. Attorney for the District of Maryland, explains that Hasson described himself as a white supremacist<sup>258</sup> who admired ideologues like Anders Breivik.<sup>259</sup> The U.S. government went even further in describing Hasson as a "domestic terrorist bent on committing acts dangerous to human life that are intended to affect governmental conduct."<sup>260</sup> The United States' characterization of Hasson as a domestic terrorist, while seemingly an accurate description, is of note given that the United States has no law that criminalizes acts of domestic terrorism. This weakness in U.S. law became even more acute when Hasson was nearly released from prison on bail.<sup>261</sup> In late September, a federal judge in Maryland refused to dismiss firearms charges against Hasson.

As Mary McCord and Jason Blazakis, a co-author of this report, wrote this year in Lawfare, Congress could enact a domestic terrorism statute modeled on 18 U.S.C. § 2332b and 18 U.S.C. § 2331.<sup>262</sup> A new law would close the gap that exists which currently makes it impossible to levy domestic terrorism charges on individuals who try to kill and maim in the name of white supremacy. While enacting a domestic terrorism statute would provide federal prosecutors and law enforcement investigators additional leverage, the law would also remove the double standard that seemingly exists.<sup>263</sup> The USG's long-standing inability to legally label the Hassons of the world as terrorists, at the same time that it retains a myopic and targeted focus on countering the "Islamist threat" through a mix of technological, policy, legal, and kinetic means, creates an in-group/out-group dynamic that may unintentionally accelerate and enable white supremacy.

### *Data Collection*

Collection of data on domestic acts of hate, much less terrorism, is inconsistent. Data collectors rely on a range of different methodologies and definitions; and in some cases, no data at all is collected from potentially key sources. While terrorism attack data like that compiled by the University of Maryland's GTD provides useful insight into the threat landscape, the U.S. government's own reporting is cumbersome and piecemeal in comparison. In 1990, Congress passed the Hate Crime Statistics Act (HCSA), under which the FBI is responsible for collecting and reporting on data submitted by local and state law enforcement agencies. Due in part to the lack of a corresponding domestic terrorism statute, a number of the attacks referenced in the Hate Crimes Report (HCR) have been characterized as hate crimes instead of being catalogued as terrorist acts. Especially because there is no domestic terrorism statute, it is vitally important that the FBI's HCR be accurate and complete. Unfortunately, by the FBI's own admission, this is not the case, because the FBI is entirely dependent upon the goodwill and voluntary contributions of local and state law enforcement.<sup>264</sup> This limits the HCR's value, and while trends like an increase of 17 percent<sup>265</sup> in reported hate crimes from 2016 to 2017 are worrisome, it still is not reflective of a more comprehensive picture.

During a May 15, 2019, House Committee on Oversight and Reform hearing on white supremacy, all of the witnesses agreed about the need for improved data collection and reporting on hate crimes and/or domestic terrorism.<sup>266</sup> Because of the voluntary nature of local and state law enforcement reporting, this will prove unattainable, unless the HCSA is amended. For instance, lawmakers could require that state, local, tribal, or territorial law enforcement agencies provide detailed hate crime statistics to the FBI prior to receiving any future federally appropriated community-oriented policing services (COPS) funds. Under such an amended law, if law enforcement agencies fail to provide HCR statistics, their jurisdiction would be ineligible for future COPS grants. Additionally, as Jason Blazakis and Mary McCord previously wrote, Congress should consider passing legislation that would create a domestic equivalent to the State Department's annually produced Country Reports on Terrorism.<sup>267</sup> If the United States government can comprehensively collect, identify, assess, and report on hate crimes and domestic terrorism events, it will better orient how law enforcement, intelligence, and policy tools are directed against the terrorism threat.

### *Human and Financial Resources*

In his May 2019 testimony to the House Committee on Oversight and Reform, George Selim, vice president at the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) and former Department of Homeland Security (DHS) official, detailed the shrinking programmatic and human resources devoted to preventing domestic extremism at DHS. During the Obama administration, the office for

countering extremism had 16 full-time employees, 25 contractors, and a total budget of \$21 million. As of May 2019, that office had 8 staff members and a budget of \$2.6 million.<sup>268</sup> Coupled with the fact that the intelligence unit responsible for handling domestic terrorism issues had been disbanded, it had become acutely clear that DHS was ill-equipped to handle the growing threat posed by white supremacy extremism.<sup>269</sup>

Since 9/11, federal law enforcement, including the FBI, has focused primarily on the threat posed to the homeland by Salafi jihadists. The FBI has not provided precise data regarding the number of agents devoted to tackling domestic terror. However, in 2017, Christopher Wray, the FBI director at the time, said that there were 1,000 domestic terrorism cases open. In 2009, the FBI documented that there were 335 special agents dedicated to domestic terror, while thousands of agents were responsible for investigating international terrorism. In 2019 congressional testimony, Michael McGarrity, head of the FBI's counterterrorism division, explained that the FBI devotes 20 percent of its resources to the domestic terrorism threat, and that it had 850 open domestic terrorism cases. In that same testimony on white supremacy, McGarrity acknowledged that domestic terrorists carried out more attacks and killed more people than Islamist terrorists. Given this, the FBI's allocation of human resources to domestic terrorism is not commensurate with the current threat landscape.<sup>270</sup>

In October 2018, the Trump administration published its “National Strategy for Counterterrorism,” highlighting the need to prioritize domestic terrorism investigations.<sup>271</sup> Despite this prioritization, the federal government does not seemingly have the necessary resources to credibly counter, in the words of the “National Strategy,” “the increasing number of fatalities and violent nonlethal acts committed by domestic terrorists.”<sup>272</sup> Nor does the FBI or DHS, based on testimony before the House Committee on Oversight and Reform, have sufficiently dedicated resources or strategies in place to counter the threat posed by white supremacy extremism.<sup>273</sup> Today, just as prior to 9/11, the U.S. government lacks the appropriate level of resources allocated to the most dangerous threats.

### *Targeted Financial Guidance*

As detailed in the finance portion of this report, cryptocurrencies have become increasingly important to white supremacy extremism due to lost access to online payment processors. Therefore, it remains imperative that financial and non-bank financial institutions remain cognizant of trends related to white supremacy extremism activity.

Along with pictographic symbols, numerals are used symbolically among white supremacy extremist milieus. These numerals often reference key dates or correspond to letters by their

position in the alphabet.<sup>274</sup> Symbolic numbers are difficult to identify, as they are not highly conspicuous to those who are not intimately involved in white supremacy extremism philosophies. Moreover, many of these numbers used as symbolic white supremacy extremism references share benign meanings in mainstream culture. For example, 311 is used to reference the Ku Klux Klan. However, it is more widely known to be the name of an internationally touring rock band. The number 420 is used by extremists to represent April 20, Adolf Hitler's birthday.<sup>275</sup> It is also a well-known symbol for marijuana within pop culture. These numbers can be combined or obfuscated, almost without limit, to alter their meaning or hide their message in plain sight. Such characteristics and simplicity in using numeric symbols make them difficult to identify outside of a white supremacy extremism context.

Further, as noted earlier in the paper, a general conspiratorial distrust of formal banking pushes many white supremacy extremism sympathizers into transactions involving cryptocurrency. In analysis of blockchain and P2P networks, knowledge and familiarity with the symbolic numbers of white supremacy extremism may serve as a tool in analyzing networks and tracing suspicious actors back to known nodes. Financial regulators should also closely examine organizations advertising fees, subscriptions, or admission prices containing symbolic numbers. These numbers are often broken into fractions or multiples. For example, a year's membership for an organization may be paid in bimonthly installments of fourteen dollars and change (fourteen being symbolic of David Lane's infamous fourteen words).<sup>276</sup> A year's bimonthly installments equals six (a symbolic number) payments of \$14.67, which totals \$88; eighty-eight is a reference to "Heil Hitler."

Use of these symbolic numbers by white supremacy extremists has recently been documented by expert researchers in the United States and Europe. However, Soufan Center analysis suggests that U.S.-based and multilateral financial crime and counterterrorism financing bodies<sup>277</sup> have not issued any guidance or recommendations to financial institutions regarding the relevance of these numbers to white supremacy extremism. U.S. and multilateral institutions charged with battling financial crime and the financing of terrorism should issue advisories and recommendations detailing white supremacy extremism-related financial transaction trends to banking and non-banking financial industries. Until that happens, it may be incumbent on the banking and non-banking financial sectors to develop transaction monitoring protocols that pick up on symbolic numerical transactional activity that could be associated with white supremacy extremism. Adopting and implementing such transaction monitoring may increase the cost of doing business but will enhance the reputations of entities that demonstrate a willingness to decline transactions associated with white supremacy extremism.

## *Civil Society Engagement*

Countering domestic terrorism, hate, and extremism more generally requires civil society contributions. Governments should continue to encourage civil society engagement in this sphere because these organizations can often operate without the perceived taint of government-run initiatives. Civil society groups countering hate and extremism are critical in that they can raise awareness of a problem; organize communities; press governments to act; raise funds for the victims of hate and terror; educate the public about pressing challenges; and publish research findings that can contribute to the dialogue. Civil society initiatives like Families Against Terrorism and Extremism (FATE)<sup>278</sup> and Extremely Together<sup>279</sup> provide avenues for moderate voices and mobilize people through the implementation of projects. FATE, a consortium of more than 85 networks<sup>280</sup>, has brought together families of terrorists and families of terrorism victims, as well as former white supremacy extremists.<sup>281</sup> Shortly after the Christchurch shooting, Extremely Together, as did other civil society organizations, called for heads of state to stand up to transnational white supremacist terrorism.

Enabling dialogue between people impacted by terror and hate can blunt the effects of rage and fear that can fuel extremism. This applies to both victims and repentant perpetrators. Person-to-person exchanges are of paramount importance, but the battle against hate and terror in the online space is also critically important. While social media platforms can provide a forum for hate-mongering, they can also be used to develop networks of online volunteers to combat hate. The #IAmHere movement, founded in Sweden, allows volunteers to organize via Facebook in an effort to scan that platform for comments considered racist, misogynistic, or homophobic. Once problematic comments are identified, the #IAmHere volunteers inject facts and data into the conversation in an effort to offer alternative perspectives.<sup>282</sup> Ensuring that white supremacy extremism's rhetoric and inaccurate historical dogma is not allowed to go unchecked in the online space is of paramount importance.

In Poland, the Never Again Association, an antiracist organization that promotes multicultural understanding, uses a national network of voluntary correspondents and grassroots contacts to monitor discrimination. The group also publishes the “Brown Book,” an extensive register of racist incidents and other xenophobic crimes committed in Poland.<sup>283</sup> While groups like Never Again are significantly smaller than the ADL or SPLC, their published research is critical to understanding the international scope of the white supremacy extremism threat.

Worldwide there are many civil society organizations that have, as part of their mission, a focus on countering white supremacy extremism. Where appropriate, these groups should receive government funding, and at a minimum receive rhetorical support. The diverse array of civil

society groups can both illuminate the threat and provide a safe place for reconciliation and understanding between former foes. Creating these safe places, especially in the online social media space, will be instrumental in impeding white supremacy extremism's momentum.

### *Technology Sector*

More than their predecessors, white supremacy extremism terrorists use social media to spread virulent ideology, raise money, radicalize and red-pill potential sympathizers, recruit, and share operational tradecraft. Because the online space provides the sinew for uniting previously disparate white supremacy extremism groups, technology companies have an important role to play in countering individuals and groups that propagate hate and foment violence. As we have seen, the Christchurch shooter used Facebook Live to document his attack on worshippers at two mosques. Before Facebook recognized this and took the video down, it had spread to forums such as 8chan. Robert Bowers, the Pittsburgh synagogue shooter, used Gab to propagate his hatred of Jews.

Silicon Valley has made incremental strides in removing violent and hate-laden content following public and congressional pressure. Since 2016, Twitter, for example, has documented enforcement actions taken against users who violate its rules. In its last published report, covering July–December 2018, Twitter took action on over 250,000 accounts over hateful conduct violations and more than 50,000 because of violent threats.<sup>284</sup> During the first quarter of 2019, Facebook took enforcement action against 4 million pieces of content that violated its hate speech content, 6.4 million pieces associated with terrorist propaganda, and 33.6 million that contained violence and graphic content. Facebook enforcement actions have significantly increased since 2017.<sup>285</sup> YouTube started documenting its community guidelines enforcement actions in 2018, and during the first quarter of 2019, nearly 3 million channels were removed—of which 24,661 were related to the promotion of violent extremism or terrorism.<sup>286</sup> While Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube's reporting on enforcement actions in violation of their hate speech and violent content standards are notable, it remains clear from this report's overall analysis that white supremacy extremism utilizes mainstream social media platforms at a pace that machine learning tools and human content moderators simply cannot maintain. This, coupled with the proliferation of radicalizing platforms like 4chan, 8chan, BitChute, and Gab (among many others), will require creative technological and policy solutions.

In June 2019 testimony to the House Subcommittee on Intelligence and Counterterrorism, Alexander Stamos, director of Stanford University's Internet Observatory, explained that major tech companies can limit the transition between their platforms and radicalizing sites by not allowing links to these sites.<sup>287</sup> For example, individuals who comment on YouTube videos will

often attempt to red-pill other commenters by encouraging them (through embedding links in comments) to visit more radical websites. Curbing this practice via more aggressive content moderation efforts may limit white supremacy extremism red-pilling tactics. Technology companies must quickly adapt their community guidelines to conform with trends and should take every step possible to apply them evenly against individuals or organizations advocating for hate and calling for imminent and targeted violence. YouTube's recent updating of its hate speech policies to ban white supremacist and neo-Nazi content is an example of an important policy change in response to an increase in violent actions and rhetoric perpetrated by white supremacy extremism.<sup>288</sup>

Technology sector companies need to continue to invest in human experts who understand the terminology, history, tomes, figures, and cultural nuances that dominate white supremacy extremism. When the Islamic State took center stage, companies like Google and Facebook made important hires, adding Islamic State experts like William McCants and Brian Fishman, respectively, to help navigate the complexities of the Islamic State as the group used social media to propagate its ideology and nihilistic videos to lure fighters to Syria and Iraq. In addition to increasing direct hires with substantive experience studying white supremacy extremism, companies should partner closely with universities. Facebook's academic research program provides funding to scholars working on a broad array of issues, such as content policy, where there is a natural nexus to white supremacy extremism.<sup>289</sup> Outsourcing cutting-edge academic research will augment the technology sector's understanding of how extremist actors, not just within the white supremacy movement, use their platforms to spread hate and foment violence.

Smaller technology companies do not, however, have the resources to hire specialized experts or contract out research needs to external vendors. Smaller companies should avail themselves of the expertise of the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT), where members share knowledge and best practices and conduct and fund research. For example, members who are part of GIFCT have access to a shared industry hash (or digital fingerprint) database that contains more than 200,000 hashes.<sup>290</sup> Access to these terrorism content-related digital fingerprints can assist smaller companies with their own content moderation efforts as they struggle to remove violent extremist or hate speech material.

As social media users increasingly utilize handheld devices with powerful encryption tools to access and communicate over content provider platforms, technology companies should, as Alexander Stamos suggested in his testimony, develop and deploy machine learning techniques that detect nefarious content and require the user to decrypt the connection.<sup>291</sup> While using machine learning to decrypt and exploit user data could have profound privacy implications, these must be weighed against the imperative of creating safe online environments that adhere to

company community guidelines. The delta between the two may seem negligible, but the stakes are high for companies as they face great reputational and financial risk should their platforms become the waypoint for the next Oklahoma City attack.

### *Multilateral Efforts*

The United Nations (UN) provides an important platform to discuss the rising tide of white supremacy extremism. The UN should use its convening authority to discuss at high levels the recent surge of high-profile white supremacy extremism attacks, such as the Christchurch tragedy. In March 2019, at the UN’s 71st and 72nd General Assembly plenary meetings, officials expressed profound concern regarding the proliferation of hate speech and racism, the Christchurch massacre, and the rise of white supremacist ideology.<sup>292</sup> Condemning white supremacy extremism attacks at UN meetings while important, is not enough. UN counterterrorism bodies such as the Office of Counter-Terrorism and the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate should make a robust assessment of the threat posed by white supremacy extremism organizations and, as appropriate, determine whether UN member states are sufficiently carrying out their obligations pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (UNSCR 1373). Among other things, UNSCR 1373 requires countries to curb the financing of terrorist groups.

As analysis heretofore has demonstrated, it is highly likely that a number of countries, including the United States, have significant deficiencies in fulfilling this UN obligation, given the paucity of terrorist designations targeting active white supremacy extremism groups. The United Kingdom—one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council—has designated a domestic-based white supremacy extremism group and therefore may be best positioned to lead future discussions about the threat of WSEs within the UN Security Council’s counterterrorism bodies. If the UN can develop a program of work to identify gaps in fulfilling relevant UN Security Council resolutions and provide objective technical support and training to interested member states, it might help diminish the threat posed by white supremacy extremism. Such discussions could also take place in the UN General Assembly and at the next UN General Assembly session in September 2020.

## CONCLUSION

Federal law enforcement agencies have much less freedom to monitor or prosecute white supremacists and members of WSE groups.<sup>293</sup> This is true even as WSE groups provide an easier target for law enforcement to infiltrate, especially in the United States and Europe, where there are fewer ethnic, cultural, and language barriers than among jihadist groups elsewhere. Still, “using informants and stings to aggressively investigate people who appear to harbor sympathy for white supremacist ideology would likely elicit a broader uproar over free speech,”<sup>294</sup> as civil rights activists have repeatedly denounced this tactic. Cases such as those against Dakota Reed<sup>295</sup>, who threatened a mass murder of Jewish people, and Christopher Hasson,<sup>296</sup> accused of plotting a white supremacist-inspired terrorist attack “on a scale rarely seen in this country,” demonstrate the challenges faced by U.S. law enforcement agencies struggling to effectively deal with the threat posed. Domestic laws and protections also limit what tech companies can do in this space, further exacerbating the already complex challenge of constructing and implementing a comprehensive approach to countering WSEs.<sup>297</sup>

“Cuts to funding for programs to counter violent extremism have further hobbled the fight against WSE, as has a reorganization in the Justice Department’s categorization of domestic terrorism.”

To most people paying even cursory attention to the growing threat of white supremacy extremism, it has become evident that combating terrorism perpetrated by jihadis is far

prioritized over countering political violence engineered by violent white supremacists and groups of their ilk.<sup>298</sup> Cuts to funding for programs to counter violent extremism have further hobbled the fight against WSE, as has a reorganization in the Justice Department's categorization of domestic terrorism.<sup>299</sup> White supremacists are “too often left unchecked,” consistently able to hide behind images of their countries’ flags and pseudo-patriotic slogans, while “we still do not call out white nationalism and white supremacism commensurate to the threats they pose,” which may be more of a problem proportionally than the lure of Islamic State-style ideology in Muslim majority societies.<sup>300</sup> A new counterterrorism strategy document released by the Department of Homeland Security in late September places a much greater emphasis on the threat posed by violent white supremacists, although more still needs to be done.

Terrorism scholar John Horgan has concluded that because “white supremacy is a far more dispersed and deeply ingrained ideology in Western society,” over the long-term “it will be far harder to defeat than jihadism,” a sobering assessment given the two-decade-long fight against al-Qaeda and its progeny, which seems open-ended and at times futile and counterproductive.<sup>301</sup>

---

## CONTRIBUTORS

### **Jason Blazakis**

*Professor of Practice at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies (MIIS)*

Jason Blazakis is a Professor of Practice at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies (MIIS) at Monterey. He is also the Director of the Center on Terrorism, Extremism, and Counterterrorism (CTEC) at MIIS. He is also a professor at Johns Hopkins University and the University of Maryland. He worked for nearly 20 years in the federal government on national security issues.

### **Janet Byrne**

*Editor*

Janet Byrne is a freelance editor, copyeditor, researcher, and writer specializing in material that concerns social justice and the politics of inequality.

### **Colin P. Clarke**

*Senior Research Fellow*

Colin P. Clarke is a Senior Research Fellow at The Soufan Center. Clarke has briefed his research at a range of national and international security forums, including the U.S. Army War College, US Air Force Special Operations School, Society for Terrorism Research International Conference, the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) and the Counter ISIS Financing Group (CIFG), which is part of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS.

## **Mohamed H. El Shawesh**

*Multimedia Coordinator*

Mohamed H. El Shawesh assists The Soufan Center with multimedia editing. El Shawesh has an MBA in Media Management from the Metropolitan College of New York through a Fulbright scholarship granted to him by the US State Department.

## **Stephanie Foggett**

*Strategic Partnerships and Engagement*

Stephanie Foggett focuses on international security, terrorism, and strategic communications at The Soufan Center.

## **Arkadiusz Legieć**

*Senior Analyst, Polish Institute of International Affairs*

Arkadiusz Legieć is a Senior Analyst, focusing on the Caucasus and Central Asia, at the Polish Institute of International Affairs. His research areas include terrorism studies, foreign fighters and mercenaries in armed conflicts. He is a graduate of the University of Warsaw and a PhD candidate at the Faculty of International and Political Studies at the University of Łódź. He is a member of the European Expert Network on Terrorism Issues (EENet).

## **Christopher Maldonado**

*Research Intern*

Christopher Maldonado is a Research Intern at The Soufan Center. He is a graduate of the International Crime & Justice M.A. program at John Jay College of Criminal Justice. His research experience includes areas of terrorism, transnational organized crime, and radicalization.

## **Aileen Leela McClintock**

*Intern, Center on Terrorism, Extremism, and Counterterrorism (CTEC), Middlebury Institute of International Studies*

Aileen Leela McClintock is an intern at CTEC, majoring in Italian Studies and International Relations at Smith College. She speaks Italian and Arabic, and is interested in national security, counterterrorism, and in understanding extremism.

## **William Morrison**

*Researcher, Center on Terrorism, Extremism, and Counterterrorism (CTEC), Middlebury Institute of International Studies*

William Morrison is a CTEC researcher focusing on extremist ideologies, domestic security policy, and insurgencies. He received an M.A. from the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey in 2019 in Nonproliferation and Terrorism Studies and a B.S. from the University of Oregon in 2013 in Political Science. His previous work includes research on radical right-wing and conspiratorial language and rhetoric online, the impacts of privatization on the U.S. military, and the Islamic State's use of social control mechanisms.

## **Mollie Saltskog**

*Intelligence Analyst*

Mollie Saltskog is an Intelligence Analyst at The Soufan Group. She has global experience in international security, specifically on issues related to terrorism, geopolitics, and foreign policy.

## **Meredith Stricker**

*Executive Director*

Meredith Stricker is Executive Director of The Soufan Center. She has extensive experience in the human rights, peace and security, and development sectors.

## **Emerita Torres**

*Director of Policy Research and Programs*

Emerita Torres is the Director of Policy Research and Programs at The Soufan Center. She has over a decade of experience in the federal government as a national security expert, where she has developed and coordinated U.S. policy on human rights, counterterrorism and conflict prevention.

---

## **ABOUT THE SOUFAN CENTER**

The Soufan Center (TSC) is a nonprofit organization dedicated to serving as a resource and forum for research, analysis, and strategic dialogue related to global security issues and emergent threats. TSC fills a niche-role by producing independent, quality research and hosting proactive events in order to effectively equip thought leaders, policy makers, governments, bi- and multilateral institutions, the media, funders, and those in the non-profit and academic communities to engage in strategic security-related practices. Our work focuses on a broad range of complex security issues—from international and domestic terrorism, to humanitarian crisis analysis, to refugee and immigrant issues, and more.

TSC's dynamic team of research and policy analysts, with diverse professional, educational and cultural backgrounds—including experience in human rights; international development; federal, state and local government; law enforcement; and military—leverage subject matter expertise against real-world experience to offer world-class investigative methodologies, innovative analytical tools, and contextualized, actionable solutions.

---

## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> After much deliberation, the authors decided on the term White Supremacy Extremism (WSE) to describe the movement analyzed throughout this paper. It is important to note that our analysis covers white supremacy extremists and associated movements, which demonstrate a degree of both ideological overlap and ambiguity and consist of like-minded networks that mutually reinforce certain aspects of each other's core beliefs. That said, and while the ideology is important, our term is primarily focused on white supremacy extremism that directly relates to violence, the promotion of violence, or the threat of violence. There are obvious political sensitivities at play as well, one of the reasons the authors decided against using the term "radical right-wing extremism." "Right-wing," has too often been maligned or misconstrued to connote connections to the American or European conservative mainstream, whereas in reality, the movement described and analyzed in this paper exists on the "extreme" pole of an ideological spectrum, consisting primarily of individuals or groups that advocate widespread changes to existing views, habits, conditions, or institutions, often through the use of (though not exclusively) political or ideologically motivated violence and societal upheaval. We also eschewed the use of racially motivated violent groups because we felt the category was too broad, and the data suggest that Black Identity Extremists pose a much less significant threat than white supremacist extremists, the primary focus of this report.

<sup>2</sup> Rękawek, Kacper. "Not Only Syria? The Phenomenon of Foreign Fighter in Comparative Perspective". Vol. 134. Nato Science for Peace and Security Series, 2017. <https://www.iospress.nl/book/44928/>.

<sup>3</sup> Bergen, Peter, Albert Ford, Alyssa Sims, David Sterman, "Part IV. What Is the Threat to the United States Today?" New America. <https://www.newamerica.org/in-depth/terrorism-in-america/what-threat-united-states-today/>

<sup>4</sup> "Murder and Extremism in the United States in 2018." Anti-Defamation League. Accessed September 24, 2019. <https://www.adl.org/murder-and-extremism-2018>.

<sup>5</sup> Shortell, David. "FBI is Investigating More than 850 Domestic Terrorism Cases," CNN.com, May 8, 2019, <https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/08/politics/fbi-domestic-terrorism-cases/index.html>

<sup>6</sup> The Soufan Center. "Right Wing Terrorism and The Enemy Within," IntelBrief, February 26, 2019 <https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-right-wing-terrorism-and-the-enemy-within/>

<sup>7</sup> Giglio, Mike. "The Fight Against White Nationalism Is Different," The Atlantic, August 7, 2019, <https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/08/the-difficulties-of-fighting-white-nationalism/595609/>

<sup>8</sup> Gessen, Masha. “Why The Tree of Life Shooter Was Fixated on the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society,” New Yorker, October 27, 2018, <https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/why-the-tree-of-life-shooter-was-fixated-on-the-hebrew-immigrant-aid-society>

<sup>9</sup> United States Government Accountability Office, “Countering Violent Extremism,” GAO-17-300, April 2017. <https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/683984.pdf>

<sup>10</sup> Global Terrorism Database. “Number of Attacks Perpetrated by White Supremacy Extremists in the United States September 12, 2001 through December 31, 2017.” University of Maryland. <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/>

<sup>11</sup> Anti-Defamation League. “Murder and Extremism in the United States in 2018.” Education, 2018. <https://www.adl.org/murder-and-extremism-2018>

<sup>12</sup> Phillips, Dave. “White Supremacism in the U.S. Military, Explained,” New York Times, February 27, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/27/us/military-white-nationalists-extremists.html>; see also Belew, Kathleen. “Veterans and White Supremacy,” New York Times, April 15, 2014, <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/16/opinion/veterans-and-white-supremacy.html> and The Soufan Center. “Order of the Day: Tolerance,” IntelBrief, October 26, 2017, <https://thesoufancenter.org/order-of-the-day-tolerance/>

<sup>13</sup> McCausland, Jeff. “Inside the U.S. Military’s Battle With White Supremacy and Far-Right Extremism,” NBC News, May 25, 2019, <https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/inside-u-s-military-s-battle-white-supremacy-far-right-ncna1010221>

<sup>14</sup> Jones, Seth G. “The Rise of Far-Right Extremism in the United States,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), November 7, 2018, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/rise-far-right-extremism-united-states>

<sup>15</sup> US Department of Justice. “Neo-Nazi Leader Sentenced to Five Years in Federal Prison for Explosives Charges,” January 9, 2018. <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/neo-nazi-leader-sentenced-five-years-federal-prison-explosives-charges>

<sup>16</sup> Bui, Lynh “Coast Guard Officer Accused of Plotting Terrorist Attack to Remain Jailed, Judge Says,” Washington Post, May 13, 2019, [https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/coast-guard-officer-accused-of-plotting-terror-attack-to-remain-jailed-judge-says/2019/05/13/d1b48430-741f-11e9-9f06-5fc2ee80027a\\_story.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/coast-guard-officer-accused-of-plotting-terror-attack-to-remain-jailed-judge-says/2019/05/13/d1b48430-741f-11e9-9f06-5fc2ee80027a_story.html)

<sup>17</sup> Miller-Idriss, Cynthia. The Extreme Gone Mainstream: Commercialization and Far Right Youth Culture in Germany, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017, p.133.

<sup>18</sup> Dodd, Vikram and Jamie Grierson, “Fastest-Growing UK Terrorist Threat is from Far-Right, Say Police,” The Guardian, September 19, 2019, <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/sep/19/fastest-growing-uk-terrorist-threat-is-from-far-right-say-police>

<sup>19</sup> Kuras, Peter. “Germany Has a Neo-Nazi Epidemic,” Foreign Policy, July 2, 2019, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/07/02/germany-has-a-neo-nazi-terror-epidemic/>

<sup>20</sup> Koehler, Daniel. “Violence and Terrorism from the Far-Right: Policy Options to Counter an Elusive Threat,” International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT)- The Hague, ICCT Policy Brief, February 2019, p.4, <https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Koehler-Violence-and-Terrorism-from-the-Far-Right-February-2019.pdf>

<sup>21</sup> Lamoureux, Mack and Ben Makuch, “Canadian Military Confirms Neo-Nazi Group Atomwaffen Was Within Its Ranks,” Vice News, May 28, 2019, [https://www.vice.com/en\\_ca/article/a3xndb/canadian-military-confirms-neo-nazi-group-atomwaffen-was-within-its-ranks](https://www.vice.com/en_ca/article/a3xndb/canadian-military-confirms-neo-nazi-group-atomwaffen-was-within-its-ranks)

<sup>22</sup>In much of the white supremacy extremist propaganda, the Zionist Occupational Government (ZOG) is often described as part of “the New World Order” where power is closely held by the Jewish-controlled media, banking and entertainment sectors, with willing connivance of Blacks, Communists, and liberals. Those who rail against the ZOG are also against perceived globalism of the United Nations. See Durham, Martin. “The American Far Right and 9/11,” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 15:2, 2003, p.97.

<sup>23</sup>Makuch, Ben, and Mack Lamoureux. "Neo-Nazis Are Organizing Secretive Paramilitary Training Across America" Vice News, November 20, 2018. [https://www.vice.com/en\\_us/article/a3mexp/neo-nazis-are-organizing-secretive-paramilitary-training-across-america](https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/a3mexp/neo-nazis-are-organizing-secretive-paramilitary-training-across-america)

<sup>24</sup>Thompson, A.C. and Ali Winston, "White Supremacists Share Bomb-Making Materials in Online Chats," ProPublica, November 2, 2017, <https://www.propublica.org/article/white-supremacists-share-bomb-making-materials-in-online-chats>

<sup>25</sup>Johnson, Bridget. "White Supremacist Threat Has 'Striking Resemblance' to Jihadism, Experts Tell Congress," Homeland Security Today, September 17, 2019, <https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/terrorism-study/white-supremacist-threat-has-striking-resemblance-to-jihadism-experts-tell-congress/>

<sup>26</sup>Belew, Kathleen. Bring the War Home: The White Power Movement and Paramilitary America, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2018, p. 111

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., p.148

<sup>28</sup>Herrman, John. "For the New Far Right, YouTube has Become the New Talk Radio," The New York Times. August 3, 2017. <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/03/magazine/for-the-new-far-right-youtube-has-become-the-new-talk-radio.html>

<sup>29</sup>Turner, Wallace. "Extremist finds Cable TV is Forum for Right-Wing Views." The New York Times. October 7, 1986. <https://www.nytimes.com/1986/10/07/us/extremist-finds-cable-tv-is-forum-for-right-wing-views.html>

<sup>30</sup>Coates, James. "Armed and Dangerous: The Rise of the Survivalist Right". Noonday Press. September 1, 1988. pp. 116

<sup>31</sup>Belew, Kathleen. Bring the War Home: The White Power Movement and Paramilitary America, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2018, p.26.

<sup>32</sup>Coates, James. "Armed and Dangerous: The Rise of the Survivalist Right". Noonday Press. September 1, 1988. pp. 116

<sup>33</sup>Calfas, Jennifer. "White Supremacist Propaganda Swells to Record Levels on Campuses." Wall Street Journal, June 27, 2019, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/white-supremacist-propaganda-swells-to-record-levels-on-campuses-11561654393>

<sup>34</sup>Coates, James. "Armed and Dangerous: The Rise of the Survivalist Right". Noonday Press. September 1, 1988. pp. 137

<sup>35</sup>Gross, Terry. "How America's White Power Movement Coalesced after the Vietnam War." npr. April 25, 2019. <https://www.npr.org/2018/04/25/605661710/how-americas-white-power-movement-coalesced-after-the-vietnam-war>

<sup>36</sup>Belew, Kathleen. "Bring the War Home: The White Power Movement and Paramilitary America", Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2018, p.144.

<sup>37</sup>Furtell, Robert, Simi, Pete and Gottschalk, Simon. "Understanding Music in Movements: The White Power Music Scene," The Sociological Quarterly: Official Journal of the Midwest Sociological Society. March 31, 2006.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid.

<sup>40</sup>Roose, Kevin. "The Making of a Youtube Radical," The New York Times. June 8, 2019. <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/06/08/technology/youtube-radical.html>

<sup>41</sup>Thompson, A.C. "Inside Atomwaffen as it Celebrates a Member for Allegedly Killing a Gay Jewish College Student," ProPublica. August 3, 2018. <https://www.propublica.org/article/atomwaffen-division-inside-white-hate-group>

<sup>42</sup> Beggin, Riley. "How YouTube Sent One Man Down an Alt-Right Rabbit Hole," Vox. June 8, 2019. <https://www.vox.com/2019/6/8/18657925/youtube-new-york-times-caleb-cain-alt-right-rabbit-hole>

<sup>43</sup> Lewis, Rebecca. "Alternative Influence: Broadcasting the Reactionary Right on Youtube. Data & Society.

<sup>44</sup> Southern Poverty Law Center, "About Steven Molyneux." 2017. <https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/individual/stefan-molyneux>

<sup>45</sup> Roose, Kevin. "This Was the Alt-Right's Favorite Chat App. Then Came Charlottesville.; The Shift." The New York Times. August 15, 2017. <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/15/technology/discord-chat-app-alt-right.html>

<sup>46</sup> Ibid.

<sup>47</sup> Thompson, A.C. "Inside Atomwaffen as it Celebrates a Member for Allegedly Killing a Gay Jewish College Student," ProPublica. August 3, 2018. <https://www.propublica.org/article/atomwaffen-division-inside-white-hate-group>

<sup>48</sup> Roose, Kevin. "On Gab, an Extremist Friendly Site, Pittsburgh Shooting Suspect Aired his Hatred in Full." The New York Times. October 28, 2018. <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/28/us/gab-robert-bowers-pittsburgh-synagogue-shootings.html>

<sup>49</sup> Coaston, Jane. "Gab, the Social Media Platform Favored by the Alleged Pittsburgh Shooter, Explained." Vox. October 29, 2018. <https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/10/29/18033006/gab-social-media-anti-semitism-neo-nazis-twitter-facebook>

<sup>50</sup> Roose, Kevin. "On Gab, an Extremist Friendly Site, Pittsburgh Shooting Suspect Aired his Hatred in Full." The New York Times. October 28, 2018. <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/28/us/gab-robert-bowers-pittsburgh-synagogue-shootings.html>

<sup>51</sup> Lees, Matt. "What Gamergate Should have Taught us About the Alt-Right," The Guardian. December 1, 2016. <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/dec/01/gamergate-alt-right-hate-trump>

<sup>52</sup> Roose, Kevin. "On Gab, an Extremist Friendly Site, Pittsburgh Shooting Suspect Aired his Hatred in Full." The New York Times. October 28, 2018. <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/28/us/gab-robert-bowers-pittsburgh-synagogue-shootings.html>

<sup>53</sup> Johnson, Jessica. "The Self-Radicalization of White Men: "Fake News" and the Affective Networking of Paranoia," Communication, Culture and Critique. Oxford University Press, 2018. pp. 110-115. pp. 106

<sup>54</sup> Southern Poverty Law Center, "Visions of Chaos: Weighing the Violent Legacy of Iron March." February 15, 2019. <https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2019/02/15/visions-chaos-weighing-violent-legacy-iron-march>

<sup>55</sup> Ibid.

<sup>56</sup> Poulter, James. "The Obscure Neo-Nazi Forum Linked to a Wave of Terror," Vice News. March 12, 2018. [https://www.vice.com/en\\_uk/article/437pkd/the-obscure-neo-nazi-forum-linked-to-a-wave-of-terror](https://www.vice.com/en_uk/article/437pkd/the-obscure-neo-nazi-forum-linked-to-a-wave-of-terror)

<sup>57</sup> Greene, Viveca S. "'Deplorable' Satire: Alt-Right Memes, White Genocide Tweets, and Redpilling Normies," Studies in American Humor. Vol. 5, No. 1. 2019, pp. 58. [www.jstor.org/stable/10.5325/studamerhumor.5.1.0031](http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5325/studamerhumor.5.1.0031); see also, Bromwich, Jonah. "Explaining 4chan," The New York Times. October 1, 2015. <https://www.nytimes.com/live/shooting-at-umpqua-community-college/explaining-4chan/>

<sup>58</sup> Bogost, Ian. "Meme Terrorists," *The Atlantic*. April 30, 2019. <https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2019/04/california-synagogue-shooting-worse-you-thought/588352/>

<sup>59</sup> Ibid.

<sup>60</sup> Gutierrez, Rudy. “Investigators ‘reasonably confident’ Texas Suspect left Anti-Immigrant Screed, Tipped off Before Attack.” NBC News. August 3, 2019. <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/investigators-reasonably-confident-texas-suspect-left-anti-immigrant-screed-tipped-n1039031>; see also, The Soufan Center. “El Paso, Texas and the Scourge of Radical Right-Wing Extremism.” IntelBrief (blog), August 5, 2019. <https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-el-paso-texas-and-the-scourge-of-radical-right-wing-extremism/>

<sup>61</sup> Robertson, Campbell, Smith, Rich, and Rick Rojas. “Mass Shootings in Dayton and El Paso: Live Updates.” The New York Times. August 5, 2019. <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/05/us/mass-shootings.html>

<sup>62</sup> Farivar, Cyrus and Ben Collins, “8chan Owner Vows to Put Website Back Online in Congressional Testimony,” NBC News, September 5, 2019, <https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/8chan-owner-vows-put-website-back-online-congressional-testimony-n1050406>

<sup>63</sup> Bogost, Ian. “Meme Terrorists,” The Atlantic. April 30, 2019. <https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2019/04/california-synagogue-shooting-worse-you-thought/588352/>

<sup>64</sup> Greene, Viveca S. “‘Deplorable’ Satire: Alt-Right Memes, White Genocide Tweets, and Redpilling Normies,” Studies in American Humor. Vol. 5, No. 1. 2019, pp. 58.

<sup>65</sup> Ellis, Emma Grey, “How Red Pill Culture Jumped the Fence and Got to Kanye West.” Wired. April 27, 2018. <https://www.wired.com/story/kanye-west-red-pill/>

<sup>66</sup> Ibid.

<sup>67</sup> Bogost, Ian. “Meme Terrorists,” The Atlantic. April 30, 2019. <https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2019/04/california-synagogue-shooting-worse-you-thought/588352/>

<sup>68</sup> “The Knights Party – American Heritage Store.” <http://americanheritagecommittee.com/main/product-category/the-knights-party/>

<sup>69</sup> Thompson, A.C., Ali Winston, and Jack Hanrahan, “Inside Atomwaffen As It Celebrates a Member for Allegedly Killing a Gay Jewish College Student,” ProPublica, February 23, 2018. <https://www.propublica.org/article/atomwaffen-division-inside-white-hate-group>

<sup>70</sup> Thompson, A.C. and Ali Winston, “Atomwaffen Extremist Group Whose Members have been charged in five murders, Loses some of its Platforms,” ProPublica, March 6, 2018. <https://www.propublica.org/article/atomwaffen-extremist-group-whose-members-have-been-charged-in-five-murders-loses-some-of-its-platforms>

<sup>71</sup> Lewis, Sukey. “Far-Right Figure Kyle ‘Based Stickman’ Chapman Banned From Berkeley Rally.” KQED, August 25, 2017. <https://www.kqed.org/news/11613889/far-right-figure-kyle-based-stickman-chapman-charged-with-felony-possession-of-billy-club>

<sup>72</sup> Newhouse, Alex. “From Classifieds to Crypto: How White Supremacist Groups Have Embraced Crowdfunding,” Center on Terrorism, Extremism, and Counterterrorism Publications at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies, June 2019, p. 9, [https://www.middlebury.edu/institute/sites/www.middlebury.edu.institute/files/2019-06/Alex%20Newhouse%20CTEC%20Paper.pdf?fv=9T\\_mzirH](https://www.middlebury.edu/institute/sites/www.middlebury.edu.institute/files/2019-06/Alex%20Newhouse%20CTEC%20Paper.pdf?fv=9T_mzirH)

<sup>73</sup> Taylor, Matthew and Martin Wainwright, “English Defence League Supporters Attack Police at Bradford Rally,” The Guardian, August 28, 2010, <https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/aug/28/english-defence-league-bradford-demonstrations>

<sup>74</sup> Di Stefano, Mark. “Tommy Robinson is Now Reliant on This US Crowdfunding Platform,” BuzzFeed, April 6, 2019, <https://www.buzzfeed.com/markdistefano/heres-how-the-british-far-right-is-relying-on-a-us>

<sup>75</sup> Conway, Maura and Michael Courtney, “Violent Extremism and Terrorism Online in 2017: The Year in Review” December 8, 2017, p. 10, [https://www.voxpol.eu/download/vox-pol\\_publication/YiR-2017\\_Web-Version.pdf](https://www.voxpol.eu/download/vox-pol_publication/YiR-2017_Web-Version.pdf); see also O’Brien, Luke. “Andrew Anglin: The Making of an American Nazi - The Atlantic.” The Atlantic, December 2017. <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/12/the-making-of-an-american-nazi/544119/>

<sup>76</sup> Blake Montgomery, Blake. “PayPal, GoFundMe, and Patreon Banned a Bunch of People Associated with the Alt-Right. Here’s Why,” BuzzFeed, August 2, 2017, <https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/blakemontgomery/the-alt-right-has-a-payment-processor-problem>

<sup>77</sup> Ibid.

<sup>78</sup> Casey Newton, “YouTube Just Banned Supremacist Content, and Thousands of Channels Are About to Be Removed,” The Verge, June 5, 2019, <https://www.theverge.com/2019/6/5/18652576/youtube-supremacist-content-ban-borderline-extremist-terms-of-service>

<sup>79</sup> Black Pigeon Speaks. “Black Pigeon Speaks.” YouTube. September 25, 2019. <https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCmrLCXSDScliR7q8AxxjvXg>

<sup>80</sup> Black Pigeon Speaks. “@TeamYouTube My Channel Gets Deleted / Then Comes Back with No Explanation. Now the Channel Gets Totally Demonetized & When Asking YT Help, I’m Told They Can’t Give Any Specifics or Details- This Isn’t a Good Look for You-Given What Has Come out Recently-Help Would Be Appreciatedpic.Twitter.Com/H5bjaf6TCm.” Tweet. @navyhato (blog), June 27, 2019. <https://twitter.com/navyhato/status/1144254233589555201>

<sup>81</sup> Keatinge, Tom, Florence Keen, and Kayla Izenman. “Fundraising for Right-Wing Extremist Movements: How They Raise Funds and How to Counter It.” RUSI, May 31, 2019. <https://rusi.org/publication/rusi-journal/fundraising-right-wing-extremist-movements-how-they-raise-funds-and-how>

<sup>82</sup> Alexander, Julia. “Controversial YouTubers Head to Alternative Platforms in Wake of ‘Purge,’” Polygon, March 7, 2018 <https://wwwpolygon.com/2018/3/7/17087668/steemit-dtube-bitchute-youtube-purge>

<sup>83</sup> Gerard, David. “Neo-Nazis Bet Big on Bitcoin (And Lost).” Foreign Policy (blog), March 19, 2019. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/19/neo-nazis-banked-on-bitcoin-cryptocurrency-farright-christchurch/>

<sup>84</sup> O’Brien, Luke. “Who Gave Neo-Nazi Publisher Andrew Anglin A Large Bitcoin Donation After Charlottesville? | HuffPost.” Huffington Post, May 12, 2019. [https://www.huffpost.com/entry/andrew-anglin-bitcoin-mysterious-donor\\_n\\_5d011cc6e4b0304a12087e0c?guccounter=1&guce\\_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xLmNvbS8&guce\\_referrer\\_sig=AQAAADYykv3lSKjGw7gcAXr1GmiGMKrh7nZxGTeXwyoHf4-SW7\\_xDZmLDDQBE57g-s8m5TxAJ9iWdP9lQtAFoHam9l9WDZGY67vRQrfQQcp-vHZdNkyEEX7ucMa-1KzStb5s\\_8wPXtqqbKbfB\\_krAyMjwl\\_VwoktnCe8cUFGgCDWu](https://www.huffpost.com/entry/andrew-anglin-bitcoin-mysterious-donor_n_5d011cc6e4b0304a12087e0c?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xLmNvbS8&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAADYykv3lSKjGw7gcAXr1GmiGMKrh7nZxGTeXwyoHf4-SW7_xDZmLDDQBE57g-s8m5TxAJ9iWdP9lQtAFoHam9l9WDZGY67vRQrfQQcp-vHZdNkyEEX7ucMa-1KzStb5s_8wPXtqqbKbfB_krAyMjwl_VwoktnCe8cUFGgCDWu)

<sup>85</sup> Southern Poverty Law Center. “Bitcoin and the Alt-Right.” 2019 <https://www.splcenter.org/bitcoin-and-alt-right>

<sup>86</sup> BLOCKCHAIN. “Bitcoin Address 1A1ryxZtz4LX7o1GEne9Qz49w3DFgfJaB.” 2019. <https://www.blockchain.com/btc/address/1A1ryxZtz4LX7o1GEne9Qz49w3DFgfJaB>

<sup>87</sup> Ebner, Julia. “The Currency of the Far-Right: Why Neo-Nazis Love Bitcoin,” *The Guardian*, January 24, 2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/jan/24/bitcoin-currency-far-right-neo-nazis-cryptocurrencies>

<sup>88</sup> Anglin, Andrew. “Contributions – Daily Stormer,” 2019. <https://dailystormer.name/contributions/>

<sup>89</sup> Tracker, Neonazi BTC. “Little Tommy Robinson Daily Wallet Summary Report (Lifetime Numbers): Rec: 1.8034662 BTC ~\$20,968.66 USD Spent: 1.8034662 BTC ~\$20,968.66 USD Bal: 0 BTC ~\$0 USD.” Tweet. @NeonaziWallets (blog), July 6, 2019. <https://twitter.com/NeonaziWallets/status/1147562864582057985>

<sup>90</sup> Tracker, Neonazi BTC. “Stefan Molyneux Daily Wallet Summary Report (Lifetime Numbers): Rec: 689.85030029 BTC ~\$7,848,841.95 USD Spent: 688.41279619 BTC ~\$7,832,486.6 USD Bal: 1.4375041 BTC ~\$16,355.35 USD.” Tweet. @NeonaziWallets (blog), July 7, 2019. <https://twitter.com/NeonaziWallets/status/1147924980912594944>

<sup>91</sup> <https://28brotherhood.com/combat18> accessed on June 26, 2019. No longer accessible since it has been shutdown

<sup>92</sup> Bell, Stewart. “Canada Adds Neo-Nazi Groups Blood & Honour, Combat 18 to List of Terror Organizations - National | Globalnews.Ca,” June 26, 2019. <https://globalnews.ca/news/5432851/canada-adds-neo-nazi-groups-blood-honour-and-combat-18-to-list-of-terror-organizations/>

<sup>93</sup> Bell, Stewart. “Neo-Nazi group Blood & Honor Removed from Facebook after Terrorist Designation,” Global News, June 27, 2019. <https://globalnews.ca/news/5439431/blood-honour-banned-from-facebook/>

<sup>94</sup> Blood and Honour. “Subscribe – B & H Worldwide,” 2019. <https://www.bloodandhonourworldwide.co.uk/bhww/28-2/>

<sup>95</sup> Blood and Honour. “B & H Calendar – B & H Worldwide,” 2019. <https://www.bloodandhonourworldwide.co.uk/bhww/b-h-calendar/>

<sup>96</sup> Palladino, Andrea, Giovanni Tizian, and Stefano Vergine. “The Italian Far-Right Money.” L’Espresso, November 8, 2017. <http://espresso.repubblica.it/inchieste/2017/11/06/news/the-italian-far-right-money-1.313568>

<sup>97</sup> Hoffman, Bruce. “Right-Wing Terrorism in Europe,” RAND, March 1982, pp. 4–5, <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a114129.pdf>

<sup>98</sup> Palladino, Andrea, Giovanni Tizian, and Stefano Vergine. “The Italian Far-Right Money.” L’Espresso, November 8, 2017. <http://espresso.repubblica.it/inchieste/2017/11/06/news/the-italian-far-right-money-1.313568>

<sup>99</sup> Ibid., p. 4.

<sup>100</sup> Stockton, Richard. “Inside the Aryan Brotherhood, One of the World’s Most Dangerous Prison Gangs,” December 13, 2018, <https://allthatsinteresting.com/arian-brotherhood-gang>

<sup>101</sup> US Department of Justice. “Aryan Brotherhood Members and Associates Charged with Racketeering for Directing Murders and Other Violent Crimes from Inside California Prisons,” June 6, 2019. <https://www.justice.gov/usao-edca/pr/arian-brotherhood-members-and-associates-charged-racketeering-directing-murders-and>

<sup>102</sup> US Eastern District of California. “US v. Ronald Yandell, Daniel Troxell, William Sylvester, Travis Burhop, Brant Daniel, Donald Mazza, Pat Brady, Jason Corbett, Mathew Hall, Samuel Keeton, Michael Torres, Jeanna Quesenberry, Kevin MacNamara, Kristen Demar, Justin Petty, Kathleen Nolan”. US Department of Justice. May 21, 2019. <https://www.justice.gov/usao-edca/press-release/file/1170501/download>

<sup>103</sup> Thompson, A.C., Ali Winston, and Darwin BondGraham, “Racist, Violent, Unpunished: A White Hate Group’s Campaign of Menace,” ProPublica, October 19, 2017, <https://www.propublica.org/article/white-hate-group-campaign-of-menace-rise-above-movement#>

<sup>104</sup> Winston, Ali and A. C. Thompson, “American Hate Group Looks to Make Allies in Europe,” ProPublica, July 5, 2018, <https://www.propublica.org/article/robert-rundo-denis-nikitin-hooligans-europe-hate-group>

<sup>105</sup> US Department of Justice. “Four Local Members of White Supremacy Group Face Federal Charges in Attacks at Political Rallies across California,” October 24, 2018. <https://www.justice.gov/usao-cdca/pr/four-local-members-white-supremacy-group-face-federal-charges-attacks-political-rallies>

<sup>106</sup> Rogers, Thomas “Authoritarian Outfitters,” New Republic, March 4, 2015, <https://newrepublic.com/article/121199/germanys-thor-steinar-neo-nazis-favorite-clothing-brand>; see also: Bryant, Chris. “Fashion Blow for Neo-Nazis,” Financial Times, March 24, 2009, <https://www.ft.com/content/b2a9593e-17d8-11de-8c9d-0000779fd2ac>

<sup>107</sup> Hollingsworth, Julia. “Christchurch Terror Attack Death Toll Increases to 51” CNN, May 2, 2019. <https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/02/asia/nz-christchurch-attack-death-toll-intl/index.html>

<sup>108</sup> Mahtani, Shibani, McKay, Wilma and Shuttleworth, Kate. “Hiding in Plain Sight: In Quiet New Zealand City, Alleged Gunman Plotted Carnage,” Washington Post, March 21, 2019, [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia\\_pacific/hiding-in-plain-sight-in-quiet-new-zealand-city-alleged-gunman-plotted-carnage/2019/03/21/1846de9e-4a7b-11e9-8cf8-2c5d0999c21e\\_story.html?utm\\_term=.db8f33aabfea](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/hiding-in-plain-sight-in-quiet-new-zealand-city-alleged-gunman-plotted-carnage/2019/03/21/1846de9e-4a7b-11e9-8cf8-2c5d0999c21e_story.html?utm_term=.db8f33aabfea)

<sup>109</sup> Gunia, Amy. "Facebook Tightens Live-Stream Rules in Response to the Christchurch Massacre," Time, May 15, 2019, <https://time.com/5589478/facebook-livestream-rules-new-zealand-christchurch-attack/>

<sup>110</sup> Stephen Wright, "Christchurch Harbored White Supremacists before Massacre," Associated Press, March 19, 2019, <https://www.sunburynews.com/news/27029/stories-on-the-mosque-shootings>

<sup>111</sup> Regan, Helen and Sidhu, Sandi. "Brent Tarrant: From Gym Trainer to Murder Suspect," CNN.com, March 17, 2019, <https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/16/asia/new-zealand-suspect-brenton-tarrant-about-intl/index.html>

<sup>112</sup> Eckel, Mike. "Christchurch Attacks: Why Are the Names of a Georgian King and a Ukrainian Extremist Written on the Guns?" Radio Free Europe, March 15, 2019. <https://www.rferl.org/a/christchurch-attacks-why-are-the-names-of-a-georgian-king-and-a-ukrainian-extremist-written-on-the-guns-/29824018.html>

<sup>113</sup> Tarrant, Brenton. "The Great Replacement," pp. 4–6. [https://www.ilfoglio.it/userUpload/The\\_Great\\_Replacementconvertito.pdf](https://www.ilfoglio.it/userUpload/The_Great_Replacementconvertito.pdf)

<sup>114</sup> Ibid., p. 18.

<sup>115</sup> Mahtani, Shibani, McKay, Wilma and Shuttleworth, Kate. "'Hiding in Plain Sight': In Quiet New Zealand City, Alleged Gunman Plotted Carnage." Washington Post, March 21, 2019, sec. Asia & Pacific. [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia\\_pacific/hiding-in-plain-sight-in-quiet-new-zealand-city-alleged-gunner-plotted-carnage/2019/03/21/1846de9e-4a7b-11e9-8cfc-2c5d0999c21e\\_story.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/hiding-in-plain-sight-in-quiet-new-zealand-city-alleged-gunner-plotted-carnage/2019/03/21/1846de9e-4a7b-11e9-8cfc-2c5d0999c21e_story.html)

<sup>116</sup> McBride, Jessica. "Brenton Tarrant: 5 Fast Facts You Need to Know." Heavy.Com (blog), March 15, 2019. <https://heavy.com/news/2019/03/brenton-tarrant/>

<sup>117</sup> Tarrant, Brenton. "The Great Replacement," p. 5. [https://www.ilfoglio.it/userUpload/The\\_Great\\_Replacementconvertito.pdf](https://www.ilfoglio.it/userUpload/The_Great_Replacementconvertito.pdf)

<sup>118</sup> Gerrard, David. "Neo-Nazis Bet Big on Bitcoin (And Lost)." Foreign Policy, March 19, 2019. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/19/neo-nazis-banked-on-bitcoin-cryptocurrency-farright-christchurch/>

<sup>119</sup> Associated Press. "Germany: Mosque Attack Suspect Sent Money to French Group." AP NEWS, April 4, 2019. <https://apnews.com/1c725b3c3a894e278893a346f96ff5f1>

<sup>120</sup> Lewis, Mark and Cowell, Alan. "Norwegian Man Claims Self-Defense in Killings," New York Times, April 16, 2012, <https://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/17/world/europe/trial-of-anders-behring-breivik-opens-in-norway.html?searchResultPosition=20>

<sup>121</sup> Erlanger, Steven and Shane, Scott "Oslo Suspect Wrote of Fear of Islam and Plan for War," New York Times, July 23, 2011, <https://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/24/world/europe/24oslo.html?searchResultPosition=14>

<sup>122</sup> Ibid.

<sup>123</sup> Library, C. N. N. "Norway Terror Attacks Fast Facts." CNN, July 3, 2019. <https://www.cnn.com/2013/09/26/world/europe/norway-terror-attacks/index.html>

<sup>124</sup> Erlanger, Steven and Scott Shane, "Oslo Suspect Wrote of Fear of Islam and Plan for War" *New York Times*, July 23, 2011. <https://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/24/world/europe/24oslo.html?searchResultPosition=14>

<sup>125</sup> Public Intelligence. "Anders Behring Breivik's Complete Manifesto 2083 – A European Declaration of Independence" July 28, 2011. <https://publicintelligence.net/anders-behring-breiviks-complete-manifesto-2083-a-european-declaration-of-independence/>

<sup>126</sup> Ibid.

<sup>127</sup> Ranstorp, Magnus. "'Lone Wolf Terrorism': The Case of Anders Breivik," Security and Peace 31:2 (2013): 90

<sup>128</sup> X-Rates. "NOK Historical Exchange Rates (Norwegian Krone)" July 22, 2011. <https://www.x-rates.com/historical/?from=NOK&amount=389000&date=2011-07-22>

<sup>129</sup> Controlling for target type, fatalities, and being arrested, attacks by Muslim perpetrators received, on average, 357 percent more coverage than other attacks. See Kearns, Erin M. et al., “Why Do Some Terrorist Attacks Receive More Media Attention Than Others?” *Justice Quarterly* 36:6 (2019): 985–1022

<sup>130</sup> Fisher, Max. “White Terrorism Shows ‘Stunning’ Parallels to Islamic State’s Rise,” *New York Times*, August 5, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/05/world/americas/terrorism-white-nationalist-supremacy-isis.html>

<sup>131</sup> Allen, John R. and McGurk, Brett. “We Worked to Defeat the Islamic State. White Nationalist Terrorism Is an Equal Threat,” *Washington Post*, August 6, 2019, [https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/we-worked-to-defeat-the-islamic-state-white-nationalist-terrorism-is-an-equal-threat/2019/08/06/e50c90e8-b87d-11e9-bad6-609f75bfd97f\\_story.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/we-worked-to-defeat-the-islamic-state-white-nationalist-terrorism-is-an-equal-threat/2019/08/06/e50c90e8-b87d-11e9-bad6-609f75bfd97f_story.html)

<sup>132</sup> Makuch, Ben and Lamoureux, Mack. “Neo-Nazis are Glorifying Osama bin Laden,” *Vice News*, September 17, 2019, [https://www.vice.com/en\\_us/article/bjwv4a/neo-nazis-are-glorifying-osama-bin-laden](https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/bjwv4a/neo-nazis-are-glorifying-osama-bin-laden)

<sup>133</sup> Hoffman, Bruce. “Back to the Future: The Return of Violent Far-Right Terrorism in the Age of Lone Wolves,” *War on the Rocks*, April 2, 2019, <https://warontherocks.com/2019/04/back-to-the-future-the-return-of-violent-far-right-terrorism-in-the-age-of-lone-wolves/>

<sup>134</sup> Belew, Kathleen. *Bring the War Home: The White Power Movement and Paramilitary America*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2018,, p. 78.

<sup>135</sup> Ismay, John. “Rhodesia’s Dead—But White Supremacists Have Given It New Life Online,” *New York Times*, April 10, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/10/magazine/rhodesia-zimbabwe-white-supremacists.html>

<sup>136</sup> Some prominent ideologues in the WSE movement include James Mason, Greg Johnson, Martin Lichtmesz, Frodi Midjord, and Kevin MacDonald, among others.

<sup>137</sup> Byman, Daniel. “Right-Wingers Are America’s Deadliest Terrorists,” *Slate*, August 5, 2019, <https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/08/right-wing-terrorist-killings-government-focus-jihadis-islamic-radicalism.html>; see also: Byman, Daniel. “Right-Wing Terrorism Has Gone Global,” *Slate*, March 15, 2019, <https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/03/new-zealand-mosque-attacks-global-right-wing-terrorism.html>

<sup>138</sup> Cai, Weiyi and Landon, Simone. “Attacks by White Extremists are Growing. So Are Their Connections,” *New York Times*, April 3, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/04/03/world/white-extremist-terrorism-christchurch.html>

<sup>139</sup> Rękawek, Kacper. *Not Only Syria? The Phenomenon of Foreign Fighter in Comparative Perspective*. Vol. 134. Nato Science for Peace and Security Series, 2017. <https://www.iospress.nl/book/44928/>

<sup>140</sup> The Soufan Center. “The Transnational Network That Nobody Is Talking About,” *IntelBrief*, March 22, 2019, <https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-the-transnational-network-that-nobody-is-talking-about/>; Dorell, Oren. “Volunteer Ukrainian Unit Includes Nazis,” *USA Today*, March 10, 2015, <https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2015/03/10/ukraine-azov-brigade-nazis-abuses-separatists/24664937/>

<sup>141</sup> Colborne, Michael “There’s One Far-Right Movement That Hates the Kremlin,” *Foreign Policy*, April 17, 2019, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/17/theres-one-far-right-movement-that-hates-the-kremlin-azov-ukraine-biletsky-nouvelle-droite-venner/>

<sup>142</sup> Spiegel Online. “Ukraine: Deutsche Söldner Heuern Bei Rechtsextremem Freiwilligenbataillon an.” November 11, 2017. <https://www.spiegel.de/panorama/justiz/ukraine-deutsche-soeldner-heuern-bei-rechtsextremem-freiwilligenbataillon-an-a-1177400-amp.html>

<sup>143</sup> Eligon, John. “Face Paint, Balloons, and ‘White Power’: German Neo-Nazis Put on a Pretty Face,” *New York Times*, September 26, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/26/world/europe/germany-far-right-neo-nazi.html>

<sup>144</sup> Seddon, Max. “Racists, Neo-Nazis, Far Right Flock to Russia for Joint Conference,” *Buzzfeed*, March 22, 2015, <https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/maxseddon/europes-far-right-comes-to-russia-in-search-of-shared-values>

<sup>145</sup> Golinkin, Lev. “Neo-Nazis and the Far Right Are on the March in Ukraine,” The Atlantic, February 22, 2019, <https://www.thenation.com/article/neo-nazis-far-right-ukraine/>

<sup>146</sup> Ibid.

<sup>147</sup> Cohen, Josh. “Commentary: Ukraine’s Neo-Nazi Problem,” Reuters, March 29, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cohen-ukraine-commentary/commentary-ukraines-neo-nazi-problem-idUSKBN1GV2TY>

<sup>148</sup>“Ukraine: Fatal Attack on Roma Settlement.” Human Right Watch, June 26, 2018, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/06/26/ukraine-fatal-attack-roma-settlement>

<sup>149</sup> Mendel, Iuliia. “Attacks on Roma Force Ukraine to Confront an Old Ethnic Enmity,” New York Times, July 21, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/21/world/europe/ukraine-roma-attacks.html>

<sup>150</sup> The Soufan Center. “The Transnational Network That Nobody Is Talking About.” IntelBrief (blog), March 22, 2019. <https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-the-transnational-network-that-nobody-is-talking-about/>

<sup>151</sup> Kuzmenko, Oleksiy “‘Defend the White Race:’ American Extremists Being Co-opted by Ukraine’s Far-Right,” Bellingcat, February 15, 2019, <https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2019/02/15/defend-the-white-race-american-extremists-being-co-opted-by-ukraines-far-right/>

<sup>152</sup> Criminal Complaint, United States of America v. Robert Paul Rundo, Robert Boman, Tyler Laube, and Aaron Eason, United States District Court, Central District of California, <https://int.nyt.com/data/documenthelper/421-robert-rundo-complaint/0f1e76cdee814133f24/optimized/full.pdf>

<sup>153</sup> Miller, Christopher. “Azov, Ukraine’s Most Prominent Ultranationalist Group, Sets Its Sights on U.S., Europe,” Radio Free Europe/Freedom Liberty, November 14, 2018, <https://www.rferl.org/a/azov-ukraine-s-most-prominent-ultranationalist-group-sets-its-sights-on-u-s-europe/29600564.html>

<sup>154</sup> Hume, Tim. “Far-Right Extremists Have Been Using Ukraine’s War as a Training Ground. They’re Returning Home,” Vice News, July 31, 2019, [https://www.vice.com/en\\_us/article/vb95ma/far-right-extremists-have-been-using-ukraines-civil-war-as-a-training-ground-theyre-returning-home](https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/vb95ma/far-right-extremists-have-been-using-ukraines-civil-war-as-a-training-ground-theyre-returning-home)

<sup>155</sup> Carpenter, Michael. “Russia Is Co-Opting Angry Young Men.” The Atlantic, August 29, 2018, <https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/08/russia-is-co-opting-angry-men/568741/>; Huetlin, Josephine. “Russian Extremists Are Training Right-Wing Terrorists From Western Europe.” The Daily Beast, August 2, 2017, <https://www.thedailybeast.com/russian-extremists-are-training-right-wing-terrorists-from-western-europe>

<sup>156</sup> Petkova, Mariya. “The Death of the Russian Far Right,” Al Jazeera, December 26, 2017, <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/11/death-russian-171123102640298.html>

<sup>157</sup> Ibid.

<sup>158</sup> Russian Imperial Movement, “Программа РИД” RIM Program—Russian Imperial Movement, <http://rusimperialinfo.com/p/rid-program.html>. [Russian]; see also: Parton, Heather Digby. “Trump, the Alt-Right, and the Kremlin: White Supremacists’ Russia Links Are No Secret,” Salon, August 17, 2017, <https://www.salon.com/2017/08/17/trump-the-alt-right-and-the-kremlin-white-supremacists-russia-links-are-no-secret/>

<sup>159</sup> Parton, Heather Digby. “Trump, the Alt-Right, and the Kremlin: White Supremacists’ Russia Links Are No Secret,” Salon, August 17, 2017, <https://www.salon.com/2017/08/17/trump-the-alt-right-and-the-kremlin-white-supremacists-russia-links-are-no-secret/>

<sup>160</sup> Huetlin, Josephine. “Russian Extremists Are Training Right-Wing Terrorists from Western Europe,” Daily Beast, August 2, 2017, <https://www.thedailybeast.com/russian-extremists-are-training-right-wing-terrorists-from-western-europe>

<sup>161</sup> Ibid.

<sup>162</sup> Dickson, Caitlin. “The Neo-Nazi Has No Clothes: In Search of Matt Heimbach’s Bogus ‘White Ethnostate,’” Huffington Post, February 2, 2018, [https://www.huffpost.com/entry/neo-nazi-mattew-heimbach-bogus-white-ethnostate\\_n\\_5a745c5fe4b01ce33eb1d720](https://www.huffpost.com/entry/neo-nazi-mattew-heimbach-bogus-white-ethnostate_n_5a745c5fe4b01ce33eb1d720)

<sup>163</sup> Feuer, Alan and Andrew Higgins. “Extremists Turn to a Leader to Protect Western Values: Vladimir Putin” New York Times, December 3, 2016, <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/03/world/americas/alt-right-vladimir-putin.html>

<sup>164</sup> Carpenter, Michael. “Russia is Co-Opting Angry Young Men,” The Atlantic, August 29, 2018, <https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/08/russia-is-co-opting-angry-men/568741/>

<sup>165</sup> Weill, Kelly. “American Racists Look for Allies in Russia,” Daily Beast, July 26, 2018, <https://www.thedailybeast.com/american-racists-look-for-allies-in-russia>

<sup>166</sup> Anti-Defamation League (ADL). “American White Supremacists Attend Russian Nationalist Conference,” March 26, 2015, <https://www.adl.org/blog/american-white-supremacists-attend-russian-nationalist-conference>

<sup>167</sup> Anti-Defamation League (ADL). “Hate Beyond Borders: The Internationalization of White Supremacy,” September 2019, <https://www.adl.org/resources/reports/hate-beyond-borders-the-internationalization-of-white-supremacy#summary-of-country-specific-ties-between-european-and-american-white-supremacists>

<sup>168</sup> Levinson, Robert. “The Fight in the Right: It is Time to Tackle White Supremacist Terrorism Globally,” War on the Rocks, August 22, 2019, <https://warontherocks.com/2019/08/the-fight-in-the-right-it-is-time-to-tackle-white-supremacist-terrorism-globally/>

<sup>169</sup> Becker, Jo. “The Global Machine Behind the Rise of Far-Right Nationalism,” New York Times, August 10, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/10/world/europe/sweden-immigration-nationalism.html>

<sup>170</sup> Jenkins, Jack. “The New Religion of Choice for White Supremacists,” Think Progress, November 13, 2015, <https://thinkprogress.org/the-new-religion-of-choice-for-white-supremacists-8af2a69a3440/>

<sup>171</sup> Veilleux-Lepage, Yannick and Archambault, Emil. “Mapping Transnational Extremist Networks An Exploratory Study of the Soldiers of Odin’s Facebook Network, Using Integrated Social Network Analysis,” Perspectives on Terrorism 13:2 (April 2019): 21–38, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/26626863.pdf>

<sup>172</sup> Lamoureux, Mack. “Soldiers of Odin Escalate from Street Patrols to Vigilante Escalations,” Vice News, September 18, 2017, [https://www.vice.com/en\\_ca/article/8x8gna/soldiers-of-odin-escalate-from-street-patrols-to-vigilante-investigations](https://www.vice.com/en_ca/article/8x8gna/soldiers-of-odin-escalate-from-street-patrols-to-vigilante-investigations)

<sup>173</sup> Widfeldt, Anders. “The Radical Right in the Nordic Countries,” in Jens Rydgren, ed., *The Oxford Handbook of The Radical Right*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, pp. 545–564.

<sup>174</sup> Harley, Nicky. “Norway Mosque Attack Suspect Does Nazi Salute in Court,” The National, September 10, 2019, <https://www.thenational.ae/world/norway-mosque-attack-suspect-does-nazi-salute-in-court-1.908687>

<sup>175</sup> Bjørgo, Tore. “Right-Wing Extremism in Norway: Changes and Challenges.” C-Rex Center for Research on Extremism, February 25, 2019. <https://www.sv.uio.no/c-rex/english/news-and-events/right-now/right-wing-extremism-in-norway.html>

<sup>176</sup> Watts, Clint. “How to Fight the New Domestic Terrorism,” Wall Street Journal, August 9, 2019, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-to-fight-the-new-domestic-terrorism-11565363219>

<sup>177</sup> Berger, J. M. “Nazis vs. ISIS on Twitter: A Comparative Study of White Nationalist and ISIS Online Social Media Networks,” George Washington University Program on Extremism, September 2016, <https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2191/f/downloads/Nazis%20v.%20ISIS.pdf>

<sup>178</sup> Beirich, Heidi. “Hate Across Waters: The Role of American Extremists in Fostering an International White Consciousness” in Right Wing Populism in Europe, Ruth Wodak, Majid KhosraviNik, and Brigitte Marl, eds., New York: Bloomsbury, 2013, pp. 89–102, p. 94.

<sup>179</sup> Worley, Matthew and Nigel Copsey, “White Youth” in ‘Tomorrow Belongs to Us:’ The British Far Right Since 1967, Nigel Copsey and Matthew Worley, eds., New York: Routledge, pp. 112–131, p. 114.

<sup>180</sup> Janjevic, Darko. “Reports: Banned neo-Nazi group ‘Combat 18’ active in Germany again.” DW27 January 2017. <https://www.dw.com/en/reports-banned-neo-nazi-group-combat-18-active-in-germany-again/a-37297774>

<sup>181</sup> “El Supremo ordena a la organización neonazi ‘Blood and Honour’ que se disuelva.” Público 06 August 2011. (Spanish). <https://www.publico.es/actualidad/supremo-ordena-organizacion-neonazi-blood.html>

<sup>182</sup> Bell, Stewart. “Canada Adds Neo-Nazi Groups Blood & Honor, Combat 18 to List of Terror Organizations,” Global News, June 26, 2019, <https://globalnews.ca/news/5432851/canada-adds-neo-nazi-groups-blood-honor-and-combat-18-to-list-of-terror-organizations/>

<sup>183</sup> Keatinge, Tom, Florence Keen, and Kayla Izenman. “Fundraising for Right-Wing Extremist Movements: How They Raise Funds and How to Counter It.” RUSI, May 31, 2019. 10–23, p. 18. <https://rusi.org/publication/rusi-journal/fundraising-right-wing-extremist-movements-how-they-raise-funds-and-how>

<sup>184</sup> O’Sullivan, Lorraine. “What Happened to Combat 18 after the ’95 Landsdowne Road Riot?” Newstalk, May 27, 2013, <https://www.newstalk.com/news/what-happened-to-combat-18-after-the-95-landsdowne-road-riot-728506>

<sup>185</sup> The Guardian. “We’re at War and If That Means More Bombs, so Be It...” April 27, 1999, <https://www.theguardian.com/uk/1999/apr/27/uksecurity>

<sup>186</sup> Cotter, John M. “Sounds of Hate: White Power Rock and Roll and the Neo-Nazi Skinhead Subculture,” Terrorism and Political Violence 11:2 (1999): 117–118.

<sup>187</sup> Perry, Barbara and Ryan Scrivens, “White Pride Worldwide: Constructing Global Identities Online,” in Jennifer Schweppe and Mark Austin Walters, The Globalization of Hate: Internationalizing Hate Crime?, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, pp. 73–74.

<sup>188</sup> Knight, Ben. “Combat 18: The Neo-Nazi Network Facing a Ban in Germany.” DW, July 5, 2019. <https://www.dw.com/en/combat-18-the-neo-nazi-network-facing-a-ban-in-germany/a-49493000>

<sup>189</sup> Ibid.

<sup>190</sup> Amos, Deborah. “A German Politician’s Assassination Prompts New Fears About far-Right Violence,” NPR, July 1, 2019. <https://www.npr.org/2019/07/01/737561640/a-german-politicians-assassination-prompts-new-fears-about-far-right-violence>

<sup>191</sup> Knight, Ben. “Combat 18: The neo-Nazi network facing a ban in Germany.” DW 5 July 2019. <https://www.dw.com/en/combat-18-the-neo-nazi-network-facing-a-ban-in-germany/a-49493000>

<sup>192</sup> McGowan, Lee. “Right-Wing Violence in Germany: Assessing the objectives, personalities, and terror trail of the national socialist underground and the state’s response to it,” German Politics, 23:3 pgs 196–203

<sup>193</sup> Ibid.

<sup>194</sup> Melzer, Ralf and Serafin, Sebastian (eds.), “Right-Wing Extremism in Europe,” Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Project, 2013. <https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/dialog/10031.pdf>

<sup>195</sup> Thompson, A.C. “An Atomwaffen Member Sketched a Map to Take the Neo-Nazis Down. What Path Officials Took Is a Mystery.” Pro Publica, 20 November 2018. <https://www.propublica.org/article/an-atomwaffen-member-sketched-a-map-to-take-the-neo-nazis-down-what-path-officials-took-is-a-mystery>

<sup>196</sup> Iron March Forums. “ATOMWAFFEN DIVISION - CENTRAL TOPIC - Atomwaffen Division” October 12, 2015. <https://web.archive.org/web/20170615224829/http://ironmarch.org/index.php?topic/5647-atomwaffen-division-central-topic/>

<sup>197</sup> Associated Press. "Florida Neo-Nazi Leader Gets 5 Years for Having Explosive Material." NBC News, January 9, 2018. <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/florida-neo-nazi-leader-gets-5-years-having-explosive-material-n836246>

<sup>198</sup> Boghani, Priyanka, Robiou, Marcia and Trauitwein, Catherine. "Three Murder Suspects Linked To Atomwaffen: Where Their Cases Stand," PBS Frontline. June 18, 2019. <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/three-murder-suspects-linked-to-atomwaffen-where-their-cases-stand/>

<sup>199</sup> Thompson, A.C., Winston, Ali and Hanrahan, Jack. "California Murder Suspect Said to Have Trained With Extremist Hate Group," ProPublica, January 26, 2018. <https://www.propublica.org/article/california-murder-suspect-atomwaffen-division-extremist-hate-group>

<sup>200</sup> Thompson, A.C., Winston, Ali and Hanrahan, Jack. "Inside Atomwaffen As It Celebrates a Member for Allegedly Killing a Gay Jewish College Student," ProPublica, February 23, 2018, <https://www.propublica.org/article/atomwaffen-division-inside-white-hate-group>

<sup>201</sup> Ibid.

<sup>202</sup> Thompson, A.C., Winston, Ali, and Hanrahan, Jack. "Ranks of Notorious Hate Group Include Active-Duty Military," ProPublica, May 3, 2018, <https://www.propublica.org/article/atomwaffen-division-hate-group-active-duty-military>

<sup>203</sup> The Soufan Center. "The Atomwaffen Division (AWD): A Brief Profile," IntelBrief, April 4, 2019, <https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-the-atomwaffen-division-awd-a-brief-profile/>

<sup>204</sup> Ware, Jacob. "Siege: The Atomwaffen Division and Rising Far-Right Terrorism in the United States," International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT)- The Hague, ICCT Policy Brief, July 2019, <https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/ICCT-Ware-Siege-July2019.pdf>

<sup>205</sup> Epp, Alexander and Höfner, Roman. "The Hate Network." Der Spiegel 35 (2018). <https://www.spiegel.de/international/the-hate-network-an-inside-look-at-a-global-extremist-group-a-1226861.html>

<sup>206</sup> Ibid.

<sup>207</sup> Macklin, Graham. "Only Bullets will Stop Us!" – The Banning of National Action in Britain." Perspectives on Terrorism 12:6 (2018). 104-122. Pp. 105.

<sup>208</sup> Kelly, Becky. "Exclusive: Former Members of Banned Terror Group Meet at Far-Right Training Camp." ITV News, March 20, 2017. <https://www.itv.com/news/2017-03-20/exclusive-former-members-of-banned-terror-group-meet-at-far-right-training-camp/>

<sup>209</sup> Cobain, Ian. et al., "The Slow Burning Hatred That Led Thomas Mair to Murder Jo Cox," The Guardian, November 23, 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/nov/23/thomas-mair-slow-burning-hatred-led-to-jo-cox-murder>

<sup>210</sup> Epp, Alexander and Höfner, Roman. "The Hate Network." Der Spiegel 35 (2018). <https://www.spiegel.de/international/the-hate-network-an-inside-look-at-a-global-extremist-group-a-1226861.html>

<sup>211</sup> Anderson, Sulome. "The Twin Hatreds," Washington Post, March 22, 2019, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2019/03/22/feature/how-white-supremacy-and-islamist-terrorism-strengthen-each-other-online/>

<sup>212</sup> Schwartsburg, Rosa. "The 'White Replacement Theory' Motivates Alt-Right Killers The World Over," The Guardian, August 5, 2019, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/aug/05/great-replacement-theory-alt-right-killers-el-paso>; see also, Davey, Jacob and Ebner, Julia. "'The Great Replacement: The Violent Consequences of Mainstreamed Extremism,'" Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD), 2019, <https://www.isdglobal.org/isd-publications/the-great-replacement-the-violent-consequences-of-mainstreamed-extremism/>

<sup>213</sup> Eligon, John. "The El Paso Screech, and the Racist Doctrine Behind It," New York Times, August 7, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/07/us/el-paso-shooting-racism.html>

<sup>214</sup> The Soufan Center. “The Anti-Semitic Murders in Pittsburgh,” IntelBrief, October 29, 2018, <https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-the-anti-semitic-murders-in-pittsburgh/>

<sup>215</sup> Gessen, Masha. “Why The Tree of Life Shooter Was Fixated on the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society,” New Yorker, October 27, 2018, <https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/why-the-tree-of-life-shooter-was-fixated-on-the-hebrew-immigrant-aid-society>

<sup>216</sup> Soufan, Ali. “I Spent 25 Years Fighting Jihadis. White Supremacists Aren’t So Different,” New York Times, August 5, 2019 , <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/05/opinion/white-supremacy-terrorism.html>

<sup>217</sup> Gilsinan, Kathy. “How White-Supremacist Violence Echoes Other Forms of Terrorism,” The Atlantic, March 15, 2019, <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/03/violence-new-zealand-echoes-past-terrorist-patterns/585043/>

<sup>218</sup> Ebner, Julia. “The Rage: The Vicious Circle of Islamist and Far-Right Extremism”, London: I.B Tauris & Co. Ltd, London, 2017, p.79.

<sup>219</sup> Bennhold, Katrin. “One Legacy of Merkel? Angry East German Men Fueling the Far Right,” New York Times, November 5, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/05/world/europe/merkel-east-germany-nationalists-populism.html>

<sup>220</sup> Etehad, Melissa. “White Supremacists and Islamic State Recruits Have More in Common Than You Might Think,” Los Angeles Times, August 7, 2019, <https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2019-08-07/domestic-terrorism-white-supremacists-islamic-state-recruits>

<sup>221</sup> Gerecht, Ruel Gerecht. “Violent Young Men, Here and Abroad,” The Wall Street Journal, August 13, 2019, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/violent-young-men-here-and-abroad-11565737090>

<sup>222</sup> Watts, Clint. “America Has a White Nationalist Terrorism Problem. What Should We Do?” Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI), May 1, 2019, <https://www.fpri.org/article/2019/05/america-has-a-white-nationalist-terrorism-problem-what-should-we-do/>

<sup>223</sup> Katz, Rita. “New Zealand Shooting: White Supremacists and Jihadists Feed Off Each Other,” Daily Beast, March 20, 2019, <https://www.thedailybeast.com/new-zealand-shooting-white-supremacists-and-jihadists-feed-off-each-other?ref=author>

<sup>224</sup> Simon Cottee, “What Right-Wing Violent Extremists and Jihadists Have in Common,” National Post, April 5, 2019, <https://nationalpost.com/opinion/what-right-wing-violent-extremists-and-jihadists-have-in-common>

<sup>225</sup> Belew, Kathleen. “The Right Way To Understand White Nationalist Terrorism,” New York Times, August 4, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/04/opinion/el-paso-terrorism.html>

<sup>226</sup> Fisher, Max. “White Terrorism Shows ‘Stunning’ Parallels to Islamic State’s Rise,” New York Times, August 5, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/05/world/americas/terrorism-white-nationalist-supremacy-isis.html>

<sup>227</sup> Etehad, Meslissa. “White Supremacists and Islamic State Recruits Have More in Common Than You Might Think,” Los Angeles Times, August 7, 2019, <https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2019-08-07/domestic-terrorism-white-supremacists-islamic-state-recruits> see also, Hughes, Seamus. “To Stop ISIS Recruitment, Focus Offline.” Lawfare, August 7, 2016. <https://www.lawfareblog.com/stop-isis-recruitment-focus-offline>

<sup>228</sup> Soufan, Ali. “I Spent 25 Years Fighting Jihadis. White Supremacists Aren’t So Different,” New York Times, August 5, 2019 , <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/05/opinion/white-supremacy-terrorism.html>

<sup>229</sup> Gardner, Frank. “The Unlikely Similarities Between the Far Right and IS,” BBC, March 30, 2019, <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-47746271>

<sup>230</sup> Stewart, Stewart. “What White Supremacism and Jihadism Have in Common,” Stratfor, March 26, 2019, <https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/what-white-supremacism-and-jihadism-have-common>

<sup>231</sup> Sciuotto, Jim. “The Striking Similarities Between the KKK and Islamist Jihadis,” CNN.com, August 17, 2017, <https://www.cnn.com/2017/08/17/opinions/striking-similarities-between-jihadis-and-kkk-sciutto/index.html>

<sup>232</sup> Richards, Imogen. “Right-Wing Extremism, Salafi Jihadism, and The War on Terror,” ADI, April 2019, <https://adi.deakin.edu.au/news/right-wing-extremism-salafi-jihadism-and-the-war-on-terror>

<sup>233</sup> Byman, Daniel. “Terrorism and the Threat to Democracy,” Brookings Policy Brief, February 2019, <https://www.brookings.edu/research/terrorism-and-the-threat-to-democracy/>

<sup>234</sup> Melagrou-Hitchens, Alexander. “Why Awlaki Mattered,” Wall Street Journal, October 3, 2011, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204612504576606522230694328>

<sup>235</sup> Clarke, Colin, P. “The Cult of Breivik,” Slate, March 18, 2019, <https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/03/anders-breivik-new-zealand-right-wing-terrorism-inspiration.html>

<sup>236</sup> Dearden, Lizzie. “Revered as a Saint by Online Extremists, How Christchurch Shooter Inspired Copycat Terrorists Around the World,” Independent, August 25, 2019, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/australasia/brenton-tarrant-christchurch-shooter-attack-el-paso-norway-poway-a9076926.html>

<sup>237</sup> The Soufan Center. “Christchurch and the Globalization of Right-Wing Terrorism,” IntelBrief. March 18, 2019, <https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-christchurch-and-the-globalization-of-right-wing-terrorism/>

<sup>238</sup> Etehad, Melissa. “White Supremacists and Islamic State Recruits Have More in Common Than You Might Think,” Los Angeles Times, August 7, 2019, <https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2019-08-07/domestic-terrorism-white-supremacists-islamic-state-recruits>

<sup>239</sup> Clint Watts, “How to Fight the New Domestic Terrorism,” The Wall Street Journal, August 9, 2019, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-to-fight-the-new-domestic-terrorism-11565363219>; see also, The Soufan Center. “The Transnational Network That Nobody is Talking About.” IntelBrief, 22 March 2019, <https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-the-transnational-network-that-nobody-is-talking-about/>

<sup>240</sup> Sciuotto, Jim. “The Striking Similarities Between the KKK and Islamist Jihadis,” CNN.com, August 17, 2017, <https://www.cnn.com/2017/08/17/opinions/striking-similarities-between-jihadis-and-kkk-sciutto/index.html>

<sup>241</sup> Soufan, Ali. “I Spent 25 Years Fighting Jihadis. White Supremacists Aren’t So Different,” New York Times, August 5, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/05/opinion/white-supremacy-terrorism.html>

<sup>242</sup> Colborne, Michael. “Friday Night Fights With Ukraine’s Far Right,” New Republic, July 9, 2019, <https://newrepublic.com/article/154434/friday-night-fights-ukraines-far-right>

<sup>243</sup> The Soufan Center. “Allowing the Threat of Violent White Supremacy to Remain Unchecked,” IntelBrief, April 29, 2019, <https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-allowing-the-threat-of-violent-white-supremacy-to-remain-unchecked/>

<sup>244</sup> Blazakis, Jason. “What’s the New Terror Financing Executive Order All About?” Just Security, September 17, 2019. <https://www.justsecurity.org/66206/whats-the-new-terror-financing-executive-order-all-about/>

<sup>245</sup> While Kahane Chai, a radical-right wing group, is on the State Department’s FTO list the group, is for all intents and purposes defunct. The last periodic review of that group occurred in 2010. FTOs are reviewed every five years and Kahane Chai’s review is long overdue. There are other radical right groups, such as Lehava and the Revolt, in Israel that could also be sanctioned pursuant to the Department of State’s legal authorities.

<sup>246</sup> Home Office. “Proscribed Terrorist Organizations. Government of the United Kingdom, 2019. [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/795457/Proscription\\_website.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/795457/Proscription_website.pdf)

<sup>247</sup> Ibid.

<sup>248</sup> Public Works and Government Services Canada. “Canada Gazette, Part 2, Volume 153, Number 13: Regulations Amending the Regulations Establishing a List of Entities.” . Government of Canada. June 26, 2019. <http://gazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p2/2019/2019-06-26/html/sor-dors231-eng.html>

<sup>249</sup> The Soufan Center. “Canada Lists Radical Far-Right Wing Groups as Terrorist Organizations.” IntelBrief. July 2, 2019. <https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-canada-lists-radical-far-right-wing-groups-as-terrorist-organizations/>

<sup>250</sup> Center on National Security. “Terrorism Database and Publications.” August 31, 2019. <https://www.centeronnationalsecurity.org/research>

<sup>251</sup> Owen, Tess. “The U.S. Doesn’t Prosecute Far-Right Extremists As Terrorists. Here’s How it Could,” Vice News, June 20, 2019 [https://news.vice.com/en\\_us/article/3k3y43/the-us-doesnt-prosecute-far-right-extremists-as-terrorists-heres-how-it-could](https://news.vice.com/en_us/article/3k3y43/the-us-doesnt-prosecute-far-right-extremists-as-terrorists-heres-how-it-could)

<sup>252</sup> Executive Order 13224 provides the State Department the primary authority to designate terrorist entities. The Treasury Department has derivative authorities meaning that it essentially has to build a designation case linked to already existing group’s (or individual’s) designation.

<sup>253</sup> US Department of Treasury. “Protecting Charitable Organizations - E.” [https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/terrorist-illicit-finance/Pages/protecting-charities\\_execorder\\_13224-e.aspx](https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/terrorist-illicit-finance/Pages/protecting-charities_execorder_13224-e.aspx)

<sup>254</sup> Blazakis, Jason. “American Terrorists: Why Current Laws Are Inadequate for Violent Extremists at Home,” Lawfare, December 2, 2018 <https://www.lawfareblog.com/american-terrorists-why-current-laws-are-inadequate-violent-extremists-home>

<sup>255</sup> US Department of Justice. “Christopher Hasson Facing Federal Indictment for Illegal Possession of Silencers, Possession of Firearms by a Drug Addict and Unlawful User, and Possession of a Controlled Substance,” February 27, 2019. <https://www.justice.gov/usao-md/pr/christopher-hasson-facing-federal-indictment-illegal-possession-silencers-possession>

<sup>256</sup> Reilly, Ryan. “Hasson.”, HuffingtonPost, February, 19, 2019 <https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/5745079-Hasson.html>

<sup>257</sup> Kunzelman, Michael. “Coast Guard Officer Accused of Making Hit List Targeted Supreme Court Justices, Feds Say.” Navy Times, April 24, 2019. <https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2019/04/24/coast-guard-officer-accused-of-making-hit-list-targeted-supreme-court-justices-feds-say/>

<sup>258</sup> Reilly, Ryan. “Hasson.”, HuffingtonPost, February, 19, 2019 <https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/5745079-Hasson.html>

<sup>259</sup> Berger, J.M. “The Dangerous Spread of Extremist Manifestos,” February 26, 2019, The Atlantic <https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/02/christopher-hasson-was-inspired-breivik-manifesto/583567/>

<sup>260</sup> US Department of Justice. “United States of America v. Christopher Paul Hasson”. United States District Court for the District of Maryland, February 19, 2019. <https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/5745079-Hasson.html>

<sup>261</sup> Urias, Daniel. “Judge: USCG Officer to Remain in Jail on Weapons Charges.” UPI, May 13, 2019. [https://www.upi.com/Top\\_News/US/2019/05/13/Judge-USCG-officer-to-remain-in-jail-on-weapons-charges/4361557790194/](https://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2019/05/13/Judge-USCG-officer-to-remain-in-jail-on-weapons-charges/4361557790194/)

<sup>262</sup> McCord, Mary, and Blazakis, Jason. “A Road Map for Congress to Address Domestic Terrorism.” Lawfare, February 27, 2019. <https://www.lawfareblog.com/road-map-congress-address-domestic-terrorism>

<sup>263</sup> Michaels, Samantha. “Why so Many Violent White Supremacists Aren’t Charged with Domestic Terrorism.” Mother Jones. April, 2019. <https://www.motherjones.com/crime-justice/2019/04/why-so-many-violent-white-supremacists-arent-charged-with-domestic-terrorism/>

<sup>264</sup> “Uniform Crime Reporting Statistics: Their Proper Use.” FBI, May 2017. <https://ucr.fbi.gov/ucr-statistics-their-proper-use>

<sup>265</sup> “New FBI Statistics Show Increase in Reported Hate Crimes.” Human Rights Campaign, November 13, 2018. <https://www.hrc.org/blog/new-fbi-statistics-show-alarming-increase-in-number-of-reported-hate-crimes/>

<sup>266</sup> “Confronting White Supremacy (Part I): The Consequences of Inaction.” House Committee on Oversight and Reform, May 15, 2019. <https://oversight.house.gov/legislation/hearings/confronting-white-supremacy-part-i-the-consequences-of-inaction>

<sup>267</sup> McCord, Mary, and Jason Blazakiz. “A Road Map for Congress to Address Domestic Terrorism.” Lawfare, February 27, 2019. <https://www.lawfareblog.com/road-map-congress-address-domestic-terrorism>

<sup>268</sup> Selim, George. Congressional Testimony, § Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Subcommittee of the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee (2019). <https://docs.house.gov/meetings/GO/GO02/20190515/109478/HHRG-116-GO02-Wstate-SeliumG-20190515.pdf>

<sup>269</sup> Aaronson, Trevor. “Terrorism’s Double Standard : Violent Far-Right Extremists Are Rarely Prosecuted as Terrorists.” The Intercept, March 23, 2019. <https://theintercept.com/2019/03/23/domestic-terrorism-fbi-prosecutions/>

<sup>270</sup> Goldman, Adam. “F.B.I., Pushing to Stop Domestic Terrorists, Grapples With Limits on Its Power.” The New York Times, June 4, 2019. <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/04/us/politics/fbi-domestic-terrorism.html>

<sup>271</sup> “National Strategy for Counterterrorism of The United States of America.” National Counterterrorism Center, October 2018. [https://www.dni.gov/files/NCTC/documents/news\\_documents/NSCT.pdf](https://www.dni.gov/files/NCTC/documents/news_documents/NSCT.pdf)

<sup>272</sup> Ibid.

<sup>273</sup> “Confronting White Supremacy (Part II): Adequacy of the Federal Response.” House Committee on Oversight and Reform, June 4, 2019. <https://oversight.house.gov/legislation/hearings/confronting-white-supremacy-part-ii-adequacy-of-the-federal-response>

<sup>274</sup> Keatinge, Tom, Florence Keen, and Kayla Izenman. “Fundraising for Right-Wing Extremist Movements.” The RUSI Journal 164, no. 2 (February 23, 2019): 10–23. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2019.1621479>

<sup>275</sup> “Hate on Display™ Hate Symbols Database.” Anti-Defamation League. <https://www.adl.org/hatesymbolsdatabase>

<sup>276</sup> David Lane was a high-ranking member and ideologue within the white-supremacist group known as the Order (mentioned previously in the financing section of this report). The fourteen-word slogan is commonly used by an eclectic mix of white supremacists and white power groups.

<sup>277</sup> Neither the U.S. government’s financial intelligence unit known as the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FINCEN), nor the Canada-based Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units (comprised of more than 150 FIUs worldwide) have issued advisories regarding radical right financing trends. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the intergovernmental body responsible for issuing terrorism finance and anti-money laundering recommendations is also silent on the financial activities of the radical right.

<sup>278</sup> “The Forgiveness Project - Posts.” Facebook, August 17, 2019. <https://www.facebook.com/ForgivenessProj/posts/families-against-terrorism-and-extremism-fate-is-an-organic-network-of-organisat/854416321361391/>

<sup>279</sup> “About Extremely Together.” Kofi Annan Foundation. <https://www.kofiannanfoundation.org/extremely-together/>

<sup>280</sup> “FATE.” Quilliam International. <https://www.quilliaminternational.com/divisions/quilliam-global/programmes/fate/>

<sup>281</sup> Ebner, Julia. “The Rage: The Vicious Circle of Islaist and Far-Right Extremism”, I.B Tauris & Co. Ltd, London, 2017. Pages 205-206.

<sup>282</sup> Batemen, Jessica. “#IAmHere: The people trying to make Facebook a nicer place,” BBC, June 10, 2019. <https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-48462190>

<sup>283</sup> “Who Are We?” NEVER AGAIN ASSOCIATION. 2019. <http://www.nigdywieczej.org/en/>

<sup>284</sup> “Twitter Rules Enforcement - July to December 2018.” Twitter Transparency Report. <https://transparency.twitter.com/en/twitter-rules-enforcement.html>

<sup>285</sup> “Data Snapshot: Facebook’s Community Standards Enforcement Report October 2017-March 2019.” FB NewsRoom US, May 2019. <https://fbnewsroomus.files.wordpress.com/2019/05/cser-data-snapshot-052219-final-hires.png>

<sup>286</sup> “YouTube Community Guidelines Enforcement.” Google Transparency Report. Google. [https://transparencyreport.google.com/youtube-policy/removals?channels\\_by\\_reason=period:Y2019Q1&lu=total\\_channels\\_removed&total\\_channels\\_removed=period:Y2019Q1](https://transparencyreport.google.com/youtube-policy/removals?channels_by_reason=period:Y2019Q1&lu=total_channels_removed&total_channels_removed=period:Y2019Q1)

<sup>287</sup> Stamos, Alexander. Written Testimony and Statement for the Record, “Artificial Intelligence and Counterterrorism: Possibilities and Limitations,” U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Intelligence and Counterterrorism, June 25, 2019. <https://docs.house.gov/Committee/Calendar/ByEvent.aspx?EventID=109697>

<sup>288</sup> “YouTube Updates Hate Speech Guidelines to Prohibit Videos.” Business Insider, June 5, 2019. <https://www.businessinsider.com/youtube-updates-hate-speech-guidelines-to-prohibit-videos-2019-6>

<sup>289</sup> Facebook Hosts Fellowship Summit.” Facebook Research. <https://research.fb.com/>

<sup>290</sup> “Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism.” About. <http://www.gifct.org>

<sup>291</sup> Stamos, Alexander. Written Testimony and Statement for the Record, “Artificial Intelligence and Counterterrorism: Possibilities and Limitations,” U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Intelligence and Counterterrorism. June 25, 2019, <https://docs.house.gov/Committee/Calendar/ByEvent.aspx?EventID=109697>

<sup>292</sup> “Rise of Supremacist Ideologies Sparks Alarm as General Assembly Marks Day for Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Remembers Slavery’s Victims” United Nations Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, March 25, 2019. <https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/ga12128.doc.htm>

<sup>293</sup> Owen, Tess. “The U.S. Doesn’t Prosecute Far-Right Extremists As Terrorists. Here’s How it Could,” Vice News, June 20, 2019. [https://www.vice.com/en\\_us/article/3k3y43/the-us-doesnt-prosecute-far-right-extremists-as-terrorists-heres-how-it-could](https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/3k3y43/the-us-doesnt-prosecute-far-right-extremists-as-terrorists-heres-how-it-could)

<sup>294</sup> Savage, Charlie. “What Could a Domestic Terrorism Law Do?” New York Times, August 7, 2019. <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/07/us/domestic-terror-law.html>

<sup>295</sup> Goldman, Adam. “F.B.I., Pushing to Stop Domestic Terrorists, Grapples With Limits on Its Power,” New York Times, June 4, 2019. <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/04/us/politics/fbi-domestic-terrorism.html?module=inline>

<sup>296</sup> Koerner, Claudia. “A Coast Guard Lieutenant Accused of Planning a Terrorist Attack Won’t Be Charged With Terrorism,” Buzzfeed, April 25, 2019. <https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/claudiakoerner/coast-guard-lieutenant-hasson-release-terrorism>

<sup>297</sup> Byman, Daniel. “Should We Treat Domestic Terrorists The Way We Treat ISIS?” Foreign Affairs, October 3, 2017. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2017-10-03/should-we-treat-domestic-terrorists-way-we-treatisis>

<sup>298</sup> Ganesh, Bharath. “Jihadis Go to Jail, White Supremacists Go Free,” Foreign Policy, May 15, 2019. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/05/15/jihadis-go-to-jail-neo-nazis-walk-free-christchurch-call-social-media-dignity-digital-hate-culture-tarrant-breivik-bowers-white-supremacists-ardern-macron/>

<sup>299</sup> Beinart, Peter. "Trump Shut Programs to Counter Violent Extremism." The Atlantic, October 29, 2018. <https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/10/trump-shut-countering-violent-extremism-program/574237/>; Bergengruen, Vera, and W.J. Hennigan. "'We Are Being Eaten From Within.' Why America Is Losing the Battle Against White Nationalist Terrorism." Time, August 8, 2019. <https://time.com/5647304/white-nationalist-terrorism-united-states/>; "Trump's Homeland Security Department Gives Right-Wing Extremists a Pass." Washington Post, August 31, 2017. [https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/trumps-homeland-security-department-gives-right-wing-extremists-a-pass/2017/08/31/a0164ab4-8455-11e7-ab27-1a21a8e006ab\\_story.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/trumps-homeland-security-department-gives-right-wing-extremists-a-pass/2017/08/31/a0164ab4-8455-11e7-ab27-1a21a8e006ab_story.html)

<sup>300</sup> Katz, Rita. "New Zealand Shooting: White Supremacists and Jihadists Feed Off Each Other." The Daily Beast, March 20, 2019. <https://www.thedailybeast.com/new-zealand-shooting-white-supremacists-and-jihadists-feed-off-each-other>; Hellyer, H.A. "Where We Go Wrong in Comparing White Supremacy With ISIS." Time, March 21, 2019. <https://time.com/5555845/white-supremacy-isis-threat-west/>

<sup>301</sup> Anderson, Sulome. "How White Supremacy and Islamist Terrorism Strengthen Each Other Online." Washington Post, March 22, 2019. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2019/03/22/feature/how-white-supremacy-and-islamist-terrorism-strengthen-each-other-online/>

TS