

Replication Project for Development Economics: Wealth Heterogeneity and the Income Elasticity of Migration

By Samuel Bazzi (2017)

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Introduction

This replication study examines *Wealth Heterogeneity and the Income Elasticity of Migration* by Samuel Bazzi (2017), which analyzes how income shocks affect international migration from Indonesia. The paper addresses the opposing effects of income growth — reducing liquidity constraints while increasing opportunity costs — using a two-step estimation framework, which reveals how wealth heterogeneity shapes the migration response to income shocks. This replication seeks to unpack the methodological choices by transcribing the author’s code from Stata to R and reassess the original findings.

Table 1

Table 1 presents the summary statistics for the Indonesian villages, including Village Population (total population), Number of Emigrants (total emigrants), Emigrants/Population (proportion of population that migrated), 1 (Any Emigrants Abroad) (proportion of villages with at least one emigrant), Number of Emigrants — Emigrants > 0 (average number of emigrants in villages with migration), and Emigrants/Population — Emigrants > 0 (average migration proportion in villages with emigrants).

We observe the following from the results:

- They find that, similar to developing country trends in both the years the number of emigrants in comparison to the village population is very small. This can be seen by the following statistics: village population, number of emigrants and even the proportion of emigrants in the population which is very low. They also observe that emigration rates vary across villages as observed the respective standard deviation measures.
- From the last table on the national summary, they observe that international migration is more common in rural areas - 60 percent reside in rural areas and 82 percent of migrants come from rural areas
- In 2005, 45% (0.54 - 1) of villages had no residents working abroad. However, 40% (0.586 - 1) of the national increase in migrant outflows from 2005 to 2008 came from these villages. This means that

although only 54% of villages had emigrants in 2005 (as indicated by the 1 (Any Emigrants Abroad) statistic), a significant portion of the increase in migration over the next few years originated from villages that previously had no migration. This is indicative of the extensive margin.

Table 1: Summary Statistics: International Labor Migration from Indonesian Villages (Reproduced)

| Stocks, 2005 | | | | |
|---|-------|--------|----------|--------|
| Variable | Mean | Median | SD | Max |
| Village population | 3,216 | 2,095 | 4,123.07 | 78,986 |
| Number of emigrants | 17 | 1 | 60.98 | 1,996 |
| Emigrants/population | 0.006 | 0.000 | 0.019 | 0.832 |
| 1 (any emigrants abroad) | 0.542 | — | — | — |
| Number of emigrants emigrants > 0 | 31 | 8 | 80.12 | 1,996 |
| Emigrants/population emigrants > 0 | 0.010 | 0.003 | 0.025 | 0.832 |
| Stocks, 2008 | | | | |
| Variable | Mean | Median | SD | Max |
| Village population | 3,377 | 2,187 | 4,330.15 | 82,215 |
| Number of emigrants | 20 | 2 | 64.22 | 998 |
| Emigrants/population | 0.007 | 0.001 | 0.020 | 0.759 |
| 1 (any emigrants abroad) | 0.586 | — | — | — |
| Number of emigrants emigrants > 0 | 35 | 9 | 80.82 | 998 |
| Emigrants/population emigrants > 0 | 0.012 | 0.004 | 0.026 | 0.759 |
| Changes (Δ), 2005-2008 | | | | |
| Variable | Mean | Median | SD | Max |
| Difference in number of emigrants | 3.582 | 0.000 | 52.52 | 998 |
| Difference in emigrants/population | 0.110 | 0.000 | 1.918 | 59.20 |
| Difference in emigrants (only for emigrants > 0) | 6.262 | 1.000 | 73.09 | 995 |
| Difference in emigrants/population (only for emigrants > 0) | 0.143 | 0.016 | 2.551 | 59.20 |
| Difference in ln(emigrants/population) | 0.106 | 0.062 | 1.012 | 5.669 |

| 2005 vs 2008 National Summary | | |
|---|-----------|-----------|
| Variable | 2005 | 2008 |
| Share of Indonesian population from rural areas | 0.59 | 0.59 |
| Share of Indonesian emigrants from rural areas | 0.82 | 0.83 |
| Total emigrants, all villages | 1,113,244 | 1,349,540 |

Table 2

Table 2: Agricultural Income Shocks and Migration Choice in Micro Data (Reproduced)

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|--|------------------|------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| rainfall shock, t | 0.200 (0.104) | 0.214 (0.107) | 1.109 (0.586) | 1.712 (0.653) |
| rainfall shock, t \times landholdings (ha) | | | -0.267 (0.680) | -3.844 (1.799) |
| rainfall shock, t \times landholdings (ha) squared | | | | 1.583 (0.802) |
| price shock, t | | 0.769 (0.293) | 3.752 (1.384) | 3.892 (1.417) |
| price shock, t \times landholdings (ha) | | | -0.581 (0.934) | -3.128 (1.970) |
| price shock, t \times landholdings (ha) squared | | | | 0.802 (0.654) |
| Observations | 1,902 | 1,380 | 1,380 | 1,380 |

The estimating equation for table 2 is

$$\Pr(\text{migrate}_{iv,t+1} = 1) = \text{shock}'_{vt}\alpha + (\text{shock}_{vt} \times f(\text{land}_i))'\beta + \psi_i + \psi_t + e_{iv,t+1} \quad (1)$$

In this conditional fixed effects logit model, the migration decision of household i in village v in year $t + 1$ will be modeled such that $\text{migrate}_{iv,t+1} = 1$ if that year, the household had any migrant leave. The shock term consists of the rainfall shock) and the change in the log price index. $f(\text{land}_i)$ refers to a linear or quadratic function corresponding to the size of the household landholdings. ψ_i and ψ_t denote the household and yearly fixed effects, respectively, while $e_{iv,t+1}$ is the idiosyncratic error term. The paper uses price shocks (changes in rice prices) and rainfall shocks (deviations from normal rainfall) as exogenous variables that influence migration decisions.

The columns represent the different specifications in terms of the shocks and interaction terms Both column 1 and column 2 are the average marginal effect. Column 3 and 4 use point estimates and hence represent implied average marginal effects.

First 2 columns indicate that both the chocks increase the probability that a household will send one of its members to work abroad. Income elasticities (the responsiveness of migration to variations in income-coefficients with the shocks) are larger in column 3 and 4 for small landowners. Small landowners appear to react more sensitively to income changes and are therefore more probable to migrate following income shocks. It fits the assumption that small landowners are faced with a higher likelihood of encountering liquidity constraints that could push them to emigrate as a means of getting out of their financial troubles. The other quadratic specifications (Column 4) reveal that while the average marginal effects (AMEs) of shocks are positive and significant for households that cultivate fewer than 0.6 ha of land, they are negative or nonsignificant for larger landholders. In other words, these small-scale farmers (with less than 0.6 hectares) have a greater chance of migrating in the case of shocks, while large landowners become less responsive.

Note: The standard errors in our table differs from the one they report in the paper mainly because we use the clogit command in R with the method = "exact" which doesn't allow us to cluster standard errors. Other methods with the clogit command allow for clustering but they use different point estimation techniques hence leading in widely different coefficients. Therefore, to ensure consistency with the coefficients reported in the paper, clustering of standard errors in this table is not possible due to limitations within the R language when using the clogit command with the 'exact' method.

Table 4 and 5 : Breakdown of Extensive and Intensive Responses to Agricultural Shocks

The findings from Tables 2 (and 3) provide preliminary evidence of heterogeneous migration responses to income shocks, highlighting the potential role of liquidity constraints and wealth heterogeneity. However, at the macro village level, the analysis could not disentangle whether observed changes in migration were driven by new migration flows (extensive margin) or increases in migration among existing migrant-sending villages (intensive margin).

$$E\left(\frac{M_{vs}}{N_{vs}}\right) = E\left(\underbrace{\mathbb{1}\{R_{L_s} \leq R_{iv} \leq R_{U_s}\}}_{\text{intensive margin}} \mid \underbrace{\tilde{R}_v \geq R_{L_s}, R_v \leq R_{U_s}}_{\text{extensive margin}}\right) \times \Pr\left(\tilde{R}_v \geq R_{L_s}, R_v \leq R_{U_s}\right) \quad (2)$$

The extensive margin of migration refers to whether a village has any international migrants at all, capturing the decision to transition from zero to positive emigration. This depends on two conditions: at least one individual must be able to afford migration—determined by wealth exceeding a threshold in the presence of cash-in-advance (CIA) constraints—and at least one individual must find migration profitable, with expected net returns exceeding home income. Traditional random utility models struggle to explain the prevalence of zero migration, as they assume continuous migration flows. In contrast, the intensive margin describes the scale of migration within villages already participating in migration, influenced by expected income gains relative to staying home. Income shocks, such as rainfall deviations and rice price changes, interact with individual wealth heterogeneity to determine the rate of migration, with liquidity constraints shaping the responsiveness of migration flows.

In the following section, the author employs a two-step Heckman-style selection framework to disentangle these two margins to provide a more accurate estimation of the income elasticity of migration. Notably, this approach manages to: (1) explicitly model the *extensive margin* by addressing the prevalence of zero migration flows, an issue ignored in previous reduced-form estimates which can lead to underestimation of income elasticity of migration; (2) correct for *selection bias* by accounting for the fact that migration flows are only observed in villages with existing migration, leading to more accurate estimates of income elasticity; and (3) provide a clearer understanding of how *wealth heterogeneity interacts with income shocks*, influencing both the decision to initiate migration and the scale of ongoing migration.

Table 4

Table 4: Extensive Margin First-Stage Estimates (Reproduced)

| Variable | SU-LPM | | | | Bivariate probit | | | |
|---|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | (1) | | (2) | | (3) | | (4) | |
| | 2008 | 2005 | 2008 | 2005 | 2008 | 2005 | 2008 | 2005 |
| log maximum landholdings | 0.032 (0.002) | 0.035 (0.002) | | | 0.123 (0.008) | 0.126 (0.008) | | |
| log minimum landholdings | -0.045 (0.005) | -0.035 (0.005) | | | -0.180 (0.019) | -0.140 (0.019) | | |
| Pareto exponent $\hat{\lambda}$ | | | -0.006 (0.002) | -0.010 (0.003) | | | -0.037 (0.012) | -0.054 (0.012) |
| log village population | | | 0.076 (0.003) | 0.071 (0.003) | | | 0.279 (0.013) | 0.253 (0.012) |
| log district population less v | 0.154 (0.005) | 0.141 (0.005) | 0.108 (0.005) | 0.101 (0.005) | 0.541 (0.022) | 0.496 (0.021) | 0.373 (0.024) | 0.344 (0.023) |
| log district area less v | -0.059 (0.003) | -0.062 (0.003) | -0.058 (0.004) | -0.060 (0.003) | -0.182 (0.013) | -0.193 (0.012) | -0.185 (0.013) | -0.195 (0.012) |
| log distance to subdistrict capital | -0.021 (0.003) | -0.023 (0.003) | -0.019 (0.003) | -0.021 (0.003) | -0.083 (0.010) | -0.084 (0.010) | -0.076 (0.010) | -0.077 (0.010) |
| log distance to nearest emigration center | -0.019 (0.005) | -0.012 (0.005) | -0.019 (0.004) | -0.013 (0.005) | 0.003 (0.019) | 0.009 (0.018) | 0.003 (0.019) | 0.011 (0.018) |
| rice price shock | 0.091 (0.082) | 0.237 (0.102) | 0.082 (0.076) | 0.209 (0.089) | 0.145 (0.391) | 0.954 (0.373) | 0.151 (0.393) | 0.875 (0.374) |
| rainfall shock | 0.034 (0.004) | 0.034 (0.004) | 0.034 (0.004) | 0.034 (0.004) | 0.094 (0.019) | 0.093 (0.017) | 0.101 (0.019) | 0.100 (0.017) |
| Number of Villages | 44665 | | 44665 | | 44665 | | 44665 | |

Notes: All replicated coefficients are close to the author's results. The standard errors in our replication procedure are **not** clustered at the district level because we could not find a clustering procedure that is compatible with the the system function for SU-REG and the biprobit function in R, whereas clustering SE is built-in in Stata.

Table 4 of the paper focuses on the **extensive margin of migration**. The author estimates the probability of observing any migrants from a village in 2005 and 2008 using two main estimation techniques:

Column 1 & 2: Seemingly Unrelated Linear Probability Model (SU-LPM)

This method jointly estimates linear probability models for the presence of migrants in 2005 and 2008, accounting for potential correlations in the error terms across the two periods. The coefficients in a linear probability model are interpreted as the change in the probability of the outcome (having any migrants) for a one-unit change in the independent variable. The standard errors for the SU-LPM estimates are obtained using a block bootstrap procedure clustered at the district level.

Column 3 & 4: Bivariate Probit Estimator

This method models the binary outcome of having any migrants in 2005 and 2008 using a bivariate probit model, assuming that the unobserved factors influencing migration in the two periods follow a bivariate normal distribution. The table reports the coefficients from these probit regressions. In probit models, the coefficients represent the change in the z-score of the probability of the outcome, while the actual change in probability (marginal effects) is typically derived from these coefficients.

Estimation Equation

The general form of the first-stage equation estimated is:

$$\Pr(M_{vs} > 0) = \mathbf{shock}'_{vs}\eta_s + \mathbf{f}(\tilde{\mathbf{R}}_v, \mathbf{R}_v)'\rho_s + \mathbf{Z}'_{vs}\gamma_s + \mathbf{u}_{vs}, \quad (3)$$

where $\Pr(M_{vs} > 0)$ is the probability that village v has international migrants at time s (2005 or 2008). \mathbf{shock}_{vs} represents rainfall and price shocks for year s . $f(\tilde{R}_v, \bar{R}_v)$ is a function of the maximum (\tilde{R}_v) and minimum (\bar{R}_v) landholdings; in column 2, it is replaced by the Pareto exponent ($\hat{\lambda}_v$) and log village population. \mathbf{Z}_{vs} is a vector of control variables and excluded instruments, including log distance to the subdistrict capital and nearest emigration center, share of households with landholdings above 0.1 hectares, share of wetland in total agricultural land, urban classification indicator, Muslim, ethnic Chinese, and ethnic Arab population shares, and accessibility by motorized land transport. η_s, ρ_s, γ_s are coefficient vectors to be estimated, and u_{vs} is the error term.

Comments on key results

Column 1 & 2

landholdings

The positive coefficient on log maximum landholdings suggests that villages with wealthier households are more likely to have migrants. This supports the idea that some level of wealth is necessary to overcome migration costs. The negative coefficient on log minimum landholdings suggests that villages where even the poorest have relatively large landholdings are less likely to have migrants, likely due to lower migration incentives.

Pareto exponent $\hat{\lambda}_v$

The negative coefficient on the Pareto exponent ($\hat{\lambda}_v$) suggests that villages with a higher upper tail of the landholding distribution are more likely to have migrants, since the exponent is inversely proportional to the share of land-rich residents in a village. The positive coefficient on log of village population indicates that larger villages are more likely to have international migrants due to a higher likelihood of having individuals with financial means to migrate, as implied by the Pareto distribution of wealth.

Columns 2 & 4

District-Level Variables

The positive coefficient on log district population and the negative coefficient on log district area suggest that migration recruiters are more likely to be active in densely populated districts, lowering migration costs. The negative coefficients on distance to subdistrict capital and emigration center suggest that proximity to administrative and migration hubs increases the likelihood of migration.

Rainfall and Rice Price Shocks

The coefficients on rainfall and rice price shocks are generally positive but statistically insignificant, indicating that these shocks impact income but may not be sufficient to push villages over the migration threshold. Notably, both rainfall and rice price shocks are included as they represent distinct types of income fluctuations – the former temporary and the later more persistent – allowing the author to rigorously test the theoretical predictions of the model regarding the roles of liquidity constraints and opportunity costs in shaping the income elasticity of migration

Comments on underlying assumptions

Critically, the assumption of exogeneity for variables like landholdings and population might be challenged as migration itself could influence local economies and potentially long-term land distribution or population dynamics. The bivariate normality assumption in the probit model regarding unobserved factors is a strong assumption that may not accurately reflect the underlying complexities. Furthermore, relying solely on a log-linear functional form for the relationship between landholdings and migration probability might oversimplify potentially non-linear effects. Finally, while landholdings are likely a key wealth indicator in rural Indonesia, they may not fully capture the nuances of household wealth, potentially overlooking other relevant assets or access to credit that could also influence the affordability of migration.

Table 5

Two-Step Estimation Framework

The methodology for Table 5 employs a two-step estimation framework to account for villages with zero international migration in the observed periods. This approach separates the decision of whether a village has any migrants (the extensive margin) from the effect of income shocks on the scale of migration in villages already sending migrants (the intensive margin).

Step 1: Estimating the Extensive Margin (First Stage)

The first step, as presented in Table 4, estimates the probability that a village has any international migrants in 2005 and 2008 using the following specification:

This first-stage estimation is conducted using a Seemingly Unrelated Linear Probability Model (SULPM) and a bivariate probit estimator to account for the binary nature of the dependent variable and

panel structure of the data.

Step 2: Estimating the Intensive Margin (Second Stage)

The second step, presented in Table 5, examines the change in the log migration rate between 2005 (t) and 2008 ($t + 1$) for villages with migrants in both periods. The estimating equation is:

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta \ln \left(\frac{M_{v,t+1}}{N_{v,t+1}} \right) = & \theta_a \Delta \text{rainfall shock}_{vt} + \theta_{a\lambda} \left(\Delta \text{rainfall shock}_{vt} \times \hat{\lambda}_v \right) \\ & + \theta_p \Delta \text{price shock}_{vt} + \theta_{p\lambda} \left(\Delta \text{price shock}_{vt} \times \hat{\lambda}_v \right) \\ & + \mathbf{X}'_v \boldsymbol{\theta} + \mathcal{D}_{j(v)} + f \left(\hat{P}_{v,t+1}, \hat{P}_{vt} \right) + \Delta \varepsilon_{v,t+1} \end{aligned} \quad (4)$$

where $\Delta \ln \left(\frac{M_{v,t+1}}{N_{v,t+1}} \right)$ represents the change in the log migration rate (number of emigrants divided by village population) from 2005 to 2008. $\Delta \text{rainfall shock}_{vt}$ and $\Delta \text{price shock}_{vt}$ measure the changes in cumulative rainfall and annualized rice price shocks between the two periods. $\hat{\lambda}_v$ is the estimated Pareto dispersion parameter for paddy landholdings, capturing wealth heterogeneity. The interaction terms allow income shock effects to vary with village wealth distribution. Higher $\hat{\lambda}_v$ signifies less dispersion and a higher concentration of small landholders. \mathbf{X}_v includes time-invariant controls such as $\hat{\lambda}_v$ and migration cost proxies (e.g., distance to emigration points, ethnic group composition, plurality destination in 2005). $\mathcal{D}_{j(v)}$ represents fixed effects for the plurality migration destination of village v in 2005, controlling for destination-specific factors. $f(\hat{P}_{v,t+1}, \hat{P}_{vt})$ are selection correction terms from the first-stage estimation, which address potential bias from observing migration changes only in villages with migrants in both periods. These can take the form of bivariate Mills ratios (in the parametric Poirier method) or polynomials in propensity scores (in the semi-parametric Das, Newey, and Vella (DNV) method). The joint significance of these terms, reported in Table 5, indicates the importance of selection correction. $\Delta \varepsilon_{v,t+1}$ is the error term.

The second-stage estimation is performed using OLS (without selection correction in column 1), and with both semi-parametric (DNV) and parametric (Poirier) methods to correct for selection bias. Standard errors in Table 5 are clustered at the district level, with significance levels for the selection-corrected estimates obtained via block bootstrap-t procedures to account for potential heteroskedasticity and intra-district correlation.

This methodology applies a two-step approach: the first stage determines whether a village participates in international migration, while the second examines how income shocks influence migration scale in villages already engaged in migration. Selection correction terms from the first-stage estimation address potential biases. The inclusion of interaction terms with the Pareto dispersion parameter allows for estimating heterogeneous income elasticities of migration based on wealth distribution. A key assumption underlying this methodology is the validity of exclusion restrictions in the first stage, ensuring that selection correction terms properly account for bias in the second-stage estimates.

Table 5: Two-Step Estimates of the Income Elasticity of Migration (Reproduced)

| Panel A. Semiparametric correction procedure | OLS | | | | |
|--|-------------------|------------------|------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| Δ rainfall shock | 0.077 (0.133) | 0.293 (0.177) | 0.143 (0.076) | 0.118 (0.081) | -0.029 (0.187) |
| Δ price shock | -0.078 (0.443) | 0.337 (0.584) | 0.341 (0.635) | 0.886 (0.492) | -2.225 (0.836) |
| Δ rainfall shock $\times \hat{\lambda}$ | | | 0.053 (0.227) | 0.097 (0.231) | 0.085 (0.058) |
| Δ price shock $\times \hat{\lambda}$ | | | | -1.214 (1.007) | 0.823 (0.390) |
| Δ rainfall shock \times share households > 0.1 Ha | | | | | 0.617 (0.148) |
| Δ price shock \times share households > 0.1 Ha | | | | | 4.069 (0.907) |
| Joint significance of selection correction terms | | *** | *** | *** | *** |
| Panel B. Parametric correction procedure | - | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
| Δ rainfall shock | | 0.244 (0.137) | 0.034 (0.174) | 0.099 (0.178) | 0.028 (0.190) |
| Δ price shock | | 0.518 (0.457) | 0.525 (0.457) | -1.610 (0.783) | -1.907 (0.839) |
| Δ rainfall shock $\times \hat{\lambda}$ | | | 0.128 (0.057) | 0.088 (0.061) | 0.037 (0.062) |
| Δ price shock $\times \hat{\lambda}$ | | | | 1.265 (0.404) | 0.917 (0.378) |
| Δ rainfall shock \times share households > 0.1 Ha | | | | | 0.399 (0.142) |
| Δ price shock \times share households > 0.1 Ha | | | | | 2.091 (0.793) |
| Joint significance of selection correction terms | | *** | *** | *** | *** |
| Number of villages | 24855 | 24855 | 24855 | 24855 | 24855 |

Note: Column 1 shows estimates that deviate slightly from the author's results, while all other columns present close replicates for both the estimated coefficients and the standard error clustered at the district level (compatible solution found for the `felm` function in R, which is used for the second-stage regression). The second-stage linear programme is run on villages with positive (ie. non-zero) migration, thus dropping the number of valid observations to 24855. The bootstrap was run at district level with 1000 replications for Panel A but 500 for Panel B as Panel B is computationally heavy. The selection correction terms are calculated from the fitted values in the first-stage regression in each bootstrap iteration: in Panel A, they are calculated as fitted values and their interactions up to the 3rd polynomial term in each iteration, while Panel B constructs them with formulae of Inverse Mill Ratio proposed by Poirier(1980). The joint significance test *** denotes P-values < 0.001 , which again matches the author's results.

Comments on key results

The results from Table 5 indicate that, after accounting for selection into migration, agricultural income shocks—both rainfall and rice price shocks—positively influence the change in village-level migration rates. This suggests that for villages already engaged in migration, liquidity constraints play a crucial role in shaping responses to income fluctuations. Additionally, the effect of income shocks on migration is not uniform across villages; those with a higher concentration of small landholders (higher $\hat{\lambda}_v$, indicating less dispersion) experience larger increases in migration rates following both types of income shocks. This supports the hypothesis that liquidity constraints are more binding for poorer households, making their migration decisions more sensitive to economic shocks.

Moreover, failing to account for the extensive margin of migration, as seen in the OLS estimates in column 1, leads to an underestimation of financial constraints' significance in migration decisions. The selection correction terms are jointly significant, demonstrating that the same factors determining whether a village participates in migration also influence the scale of migration. These findings underscore the importance of using selection-corrected models to accurately capture the relationship between income fluctuations and migration responses.

Although we managed to closely reproduce the author's results, we notice that it was difficult for the model to converge when running on the parametric model. The statistic exhibits sensitivity to variations in the sample, leading to inconsistencies in the bootstrap estimates. This may indicate the high precision and sensitivity of the parametric model as a good check for the semi-parametric results. However, it might also be evidence that there might be clustering effects or district-level heterogeneity that violates the parametric assumptions.

Table 6

Table 6 extends the two-step estimation framework used in Table 5 to further explore the mechanisms underlying the income elasticity of migration, particularly the role of opportunity costs. The dependent variable remains the change in the log migration rate between 2005 and 2008, consistent with the second stage of the previous model. The semi-parametric (DNV) selection correction procedures employed in Table 5 is applied here to account for the extensive margin of migration.

Table 6 introduces interaction terms to examine heterogeneous wealth effects. Column 1 introduces interaction terms between both rainfall and price shocks and an indicator for the presence of recruitment agencies. This accounts for the role of migration intermediaries in shaping the effects of income shocks. Column 2 introduces interactions between income shocks and the quartile of the district's agricultural GDP in 2002, allowing for variation in income shock effects based on regional agricultural development. The regressions also include the same vector of time-invariant control variables as in Table 5, such as the Pareto exponent $\hat{\lambda}_v$ and proxies for migration costs, along with fixed effects for the plurality migration destination in 2005. Standard errors are clustered at the district level, and significance levels are determined using a block bootstrap-t procedure.

Comments on key results

Recruitment Agencies and Opportunity Costs: Price shocks have a strong positive effect on migration in villages without recruitment agencies, indicating that liquidity constraints limit migration in these areas, and increased income from price shocks facilitates migration. In contrast, price shocks have no significant effect on migration in villages with recruitment agencies, suggesting that migration is more accessible in these areas due to interlinked contracts or lower upfront costs. If liquidity constraints were the only factor, price shocks should have a similar effect to rainfall shocks. Rainfall shocks positively affect migration in both types of villages, but the effect is significantly larger in villages without recruitment agencies, reinforcing the argument that cash-in-advance constraints are more binding where recruiters are absent. The asymmetric response to transitory (rainfall) and persistent (price) shocks in villages with recruiters highlights the role of opportunity costs.

Agricultural Development and Opportunity Costs: In the lowest quartile of agricultural GDP, both rainfall and price shocks significantly increase migration, demonstrating that liquidity constraints are the dominant factor in the poorest agricultural areas. However, in the highest quartile of agricultural GDP, rainfall shocks have no effect, while price shocks negatively affect migration at the 5 percent significance level. This suggests that in more developed agricultural regions, the opportunity costs of migration outweigh liquidity constraints, as rising rice prices incentivize staying and expanding farm production. The second and third quartiles display a transition, where the positive effect of income shocks on migration diminishes as agricultural GDP increases, reflecting a shift from liquidity-constrained to opportunity-cost-driven migration decisions.

Table 6 provides compelling evidence that the relationship between income shocks and migration is not uniform. Liquidity constraints are a dominant factor in poorer areas and those without established migration networks, where increased income facilitates migration. However, in more developed agricultural regions with potentially lower migration barriers, the opportunity cost of leaving becomes increasingly important, leading to a reduction in migration in response to persistent positive income shocks like sustained rice price increases.

Table 6: Evidence on the Opportunity Cost Mechanism (Reproduced)

| | (1) | (2) |
|---|------------------|-------------------|
| Δ rainfall shock \times recruiter presence | 0.245 (0.156) | |
| Δ rainfall shock \times no recruiter presence | 0.442 (0.135) | |
| Δ price shock \times recruiter presence | 0.138 (0.628) | |
| Δ price shock \times no recruiter presence | 1.780 (0.473) | |
| Δ rainfall shock \times agricultural GDP, quartile = 1 | | 0.570 (0.304) |
| Δ rainfall shock \times agricultural GDP, quartile = 2 | | 0.183 (0.202) |
| Δ rainfall shock \times agricultural GDP, quartile = 3 | | 0.217 (0.188) |
| Δ rainfall shock \times agricultural GDP, quartile = 4 | | -0.055 (0.164) |
| Δ price shock \times agricultural GDP, quartile = 1 | | 3.352 (1.075) |
| Δ price shock \times agricultural GDP, quartile = 2 | | 0.680 (0.552) |
| Δ price shock \times agricultural GDP, quartile = 3 | | -0.995 (0.764) |
| Δ price shock \times agricultural GDP, quartile = 4 | | -1.970 (0.691) |
| Number of villages | 24855 | 24493 |

Notes: All replicated coefficients and standard errors are close to the author's results. The standard errors are properly clustered at the district level. The observation counts also follow the original results.

Conclusion

This replication study reinforces the key insights of the original paper, confirming the importance of both liquidity constraints and opportunity costs in shaping international migration flows. By replicating the two-step econometric framework in R, this analysis validates the findings that positive income shocks increase migration in liquidity-constrained villages, particularly those with a greater proportion of small landholders. Additionally, the results support the notion that in more developed agricultural regions and areas with established migration networks, opportunity costs become more significant, potentially dampening migration responses to persistent income growth. This replication further highlights the structural role of migration costs and the prevalence of liquidity constraints, emphasizing the potential for policy interventions to facilitate mobility. It was a challenging yet rewarding exercise for our course on development economics.