

Distributed System: Project 2 Report

1 Part1: Implementation Details

1.1 Client

The code for **Client** is mainly in *client.go*, which is acting like an test file. In that file, you will create some **wallet** and define their actions like “A transfer AMOUNT to B”. Since our implementation is based on **UTXOSet**, the transaction should includes multiple **TxIn** and multiple **TxOut** (explained later). In our implementation, a wallet will not maintain a **UTXOSet** it self, he needs to get one from one **Miner** and then create corresponding **Transactions** (find enough his spendable **TxOut** in the **UTXOSet** for the AMOUNT it needs). Also, he need to sign the inputs of the transaction. After that, he needs to broadcast all the transactions to all the miners.

1.2 Wallet

The code for **Wallet** is mainly in *wallet.go*. A wallet consists of a pair of (PublicKey, PrivateKey). And we identify each wallet by the hash of its PublicKey.

1.3 TxIn

The code for **TxIn** is mainly in *TxIn.go*. It is just a struct containing the signature and PublicKey (used to verify the legal wallet), the **TxOut** it is using.

1.4 TxOut

The code for **TxOut** is mainly in *TxOut.go*. It contains the value of this output and the target wallet's PublicKeyHash (used to specify to whom).

1.5 Transaction

The code for **Transaction** is mainly in *Transaction.go*. There are basicly two types of transactions. One is called “CoinBaseTransaction”, which has no input and is used to generate some initial **TxOut**. Another is the normal transactions that are raised by wallets to spend their spendable outputs. When creating a normal transaction, a wallet need to sign on every input of the transaction using its PublicKey and specify the receiver by putting the receiver's PublicKeyHash in the output.

1.6 Block

The code for **Block** is mainly in *block.go*. For each block, it contains “Header”: the hash value of the transactions, “PrevHash”: the hash value of the previous block, “ID”: the height of this block, “TimeStamp”: the time when this block is created, “Nonce”: the result of ProofOfWork, “Transactions”: the list of all the transactions kept in this block. The block need to make sure that the hash of the contatenate of the hash of this block (all the stuff, including the nounce) and the nounce should have enough number of leading zeros.

1.7 BlockChain

The code for `BlockChain` is mainly in *blockchain.go*. It contains an array of blocks, making sure that they are linked by `PrevHash`.

1.8 UTXOSet

The code for `UTXOSet` is mainly in *UTXOset.go*. It contains a map with key being the `PublicKeyHash`, representing each wallet and value being a list of his spendable `TxOut`.

1.9 Miner

The code for `Miner` is mainly in *miner.go*. It contains one `UTXOSet`, one `BlockChain` and several channels used to transmit information. We are making sure that the `BlockChain` and the `UTXOSet` it contains are consistent, i.e. all the spendable `TxOut` in the `UTXOSet` have not been used in the `BlockChain` or the set of transactions it is working on, and you can find those `TxOut` in the `BlockChain` or the set of transactions it is working on. Below shows our method.

1.9.1 Receive a transaction from the client:

When receiving a transaction from the client, the miner first check that the validation of the transaction (signature, amount ...) and all the inputs are in `UTXOSet`. Then he interrupt the mining process, update the `UTXOSet` by the content of this transaction, put this transaction into the block he's mining and restart the mining process. After mined out one block, it will broadcast the block to all miners.

1.9.2 Receive a block from another miner:

When a miner gets a new block and send it to me, I will first check the validation of this block (if invalid, just ignore it) and then check whether the `PrevHash` of the block is the hash of the tailblock of my `blockchain`.

If yes, it means that our `blockchains` are the same (except for the sent block), hence this block is also legal in my `blockchain`. Then I will undo the update of `UTXOSet` of the current transactions I am working on, update all the transactions in this block and then reverify the transactions I was working on and update the `UTXOSet` by the content of those legal transactions (ignore the illegal transactions).

If not, it means that our `blockchains` differ. We should adopt "Longest Chain Rule". If your block's ID is smaller than or equal to mine, I will just ignore this block. If your ID is greater (your chain is longer), I will send a request for your whole chain. By scanning over the `PrevHash` in chain, we can find the first different block and then check whether your blocks are valid (`PrevHash` correct, PoW correct). If your chain is indeed valid, I will undo the update of `UTXOSet` of my blocks and the transactions I am current working on. Append your blocks to my chain and update the `UTXOSet` by the contents. Then we will redo all the transactions undone just now (verify whether they are legal according to current `UTXOSet` and decide whether to work on it) and further keep on mining.

2 Part1: Attack and Defense

There are several kinds of attack we can defend:

- Wallet fake on the amount of Transactions. We will verify the amount of the transaction when the miner get the transaction from the client. If $\text{sum}(\text{input}) < \text{sum}(\text{output})$, it will output "Not Enough Inputs! Fake Client !!!" and ignore the transaction.
- Wallet fake on the signature. Verified when the miner get the transaction from the client, output "Wrong Signature! Fake Client !!!" and ignore the transaction
- Miner fake on ProofOfWork. When a miner get a block from another miner, it will verify its PoW, if fake, raise "Invalid Block" and ignore this block.

- Miner fake on PrevHash. When a miner get the blockchain from another miner (want to adopt “longest chain rule”), it needs to verify that the chain is valid on the PrevHash pointers. If we find that the blockchain is invalid, we will just take the miner as a lyer and ignore his blockchain and keep working on our own work.

Notice that there is another kind of attack: a miner fake on transactions it have mined out (only change the content of the transaction but the PrevHash, PoW are correct). Up to now, we assume that our miner will only put the transactions permitted by his own UTXOSet onto his blockchain. In this setting, this attack will not be raised so we cannot handle this so far. We may fix this problem in Part2.

3 Part2: Improvements

3.1 Merkle Tree

We change the structure of a block, and set the header of block to be the root of merkle tree built from transactions in it. When the block is printed out in terminal, the tree will also be printed out like below:

```
===== Block: 1 =====
Timestamp:2024-01-18 13:05:22
Header: 4e54ee337249aa8237f75524e44c52a9d52bbd68d5c7ccbcc610893b3a6f9e91
PrevBlockHash: 015a55f9dc0a748ae29b303d3d8b4425121c6b103d3b1bb95fbd6d287590c4b6
Nounce: 97097d
--- begin tree: 4e54
4e54
c418 8eee
34ac 7349 87de
f07a 23e2 6cd3 bd5f 502f
e4c1 7c3a 4f99 21d5 0ee6 7fd5 13bc e99c 8c3d 7021
de7f 9b80 945e bd6e 8f74 1341 a638 ca9b 5ffc 6c4b d8e2 4f15 9005 048e
c217 17c9 3721 85b2 434e
792a 4a0f 90c4 0ea2 58f0 c859 ec84 384c 40c5 cb7c d8a2 2a77 83b2 d106
3a53 8eb0 486a 5e42 dee0 a08b 0fc6 df2e 5a1e d8be 5a2f cd1f 0ab4 c85a
acae 1d09 fc63 4a50 861a 6d9f 26a0 fb8a 7840 dc7a
---Transaction 792a90f1510fca5c8192e633f565eef2f8f1e62d990ab047947be78e3a4e0b9d:
  INPUT 0:
    TxId:
```

Figure 1: figure for section 2

3.2 Dynamic List of Miner

We add two grpc protocols to achieve this. First each miner maintains a list of address which it can communicate with. When a miner is added, it needs to know the address of at least one miner. This is achieved in function ‘GetAddrList’. Then it will call these existing miners to get their address list and set its own list to be the union of these lists. After this, it will send its own address to the address in its own list to let these miners add its address to their list. This is achieved in function ‘UpdateAddrList’.

3.3 Disable the attack of fake transactions

In the Attack and Defense part we mentioned that we assume the miner will not include transactions that can not be done in its own UTXO set.

Now we remove the assumption.

When a miner receives a block, we need to simulate the transactions of incoming block in its own UTXO set. If one of the transaction cannot be done, then we will undo the previous simulated transactions and reject the block. So is for the case when miner gets a chain from other miners, but in this case we will first undo the blocks different from the incoming blockchain, then simulate the different part of incoming chain,

if simulation fails (one transaction cannot be done), then we need to undo the simulated blocks and redo the different blocks of my own chain.

3.4 Exponential search for faster blockchain merge

In part1, when there is conflict of blockchain, the miner with shorter chain will fetch the whole longer chain from other miner. This can be very inefficient when the blockchain is very long and two chains differ by a small fraction (say one is of length 10000002 and the other is 10000000). A natural idea is to search for the first different position of two chains and only transfer the different part. Using exponential search in class, this can be done efficiently.

Suppose I am the miner with shorter blockchain and I received a block with ID larger than my length, then I will send a request to the owner of received block to fetch `block[my_length - 1]`, then compare it with my `block[my_length - 1]`. If they don't match, I will call the owner again and fetch `block[my_length - 3]`, then compare it with my `block[my_length - 3]` and so on until they match. In the i -th time we fetch `block[my_length - 2^{i-1}]`.

One example:

```
Got block:24 from 10.1.0.96:18056
probe_block_id:22
probe_id:22, probe_length:2
Got blockchain[22:] from 10.1.0.96:18056
first_diff_id:23
add chain
===== Block: 23 =====
=====
Timestamp:2024-01-18 13:46:45
Header: e3b0c44298fc1c149afb4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b9
34ca495991b7852b855
PrevBlockHash: 900406245eb10bda576f012d74d0fdc31486e7
0554f3bbf3f26c64c6f979c5e2
Nounce: 640b02
<nil>
ThisBlockHash: 5b4f5a00b572800764f554257f104849f37d14
6eb36058175996560948d1b2bc
***** Block: 23 *****
*****
```

Figure 2: figure for section 2